Drawing from the South China Morning Post’s, January 24, 2021 article also from Wikipedia and the US DoD's China Military Power Report 2020: 

The JL-3, China’s latest submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM), is designed for use in China’s future Type 096 SSBN .

TYPE 096 SSBN

The Type 096 is likely to be a larger derivative of China’s existing Type 094 SSBN. Larger in part to accommodate 12-16 longer and/or larger diameter JL-3s. The 096 will also be larger as it will likely have a larger, quieter, longer fuel life nuclear reactor all pointing to a  longer, heavier, reactor space. The 096 may be launched and commissioned in the mid 2020s with integration of JL-3’s taking an extra 2-3 years. Hence China may have a mature 096 - JL-3 weapon system by 2028 (or later).

THE JL-3 SLBM

Unlike the preceding JL-2 SLBM each JL-3 is expected to have multiple MIRVed warheads. The number of warheads per missile often begins with 3. The first JL-3 test launch was in 2018.

In contrast to the JL-2’s range of around 7,200 km the JL-3 may have a range more than 10,000 km.  One US source estimates a longer JL-3 range of 12,100 km - although that figure may be an effort to claim that the JL-3 (with presumably reduced load - maybe one warhead) has a longer range that the US Trident D5’s 12,000+ km range (with reduced load - maybe one warhead). 

It is expected the JL-3’s range will be insufficient to hit the US mainland (contiguous 48 states) from a South China Sea launch point. However, from 096s operating out of China's Southern Theater naval bases (see map below) in the South China Sea JL-3s could hit 3 of China's potential enemies. That is provide a secure second strike capability against India and Russia and also psychologically threaten Australia. 

STRATEGY

094s already operate from Yulin, Hainan SSBN base, Southern Theater Navy, providing access to the South China Sea. In a “bastion” naval strategy these 094s are protected by Chinese air and surface ship bases, SSNs and SSKs in Southern bases. These defenses are augmented by sensors sited on and between China's newly built islands. Future 096s operating in the South China Sea will continue to get this protection, particularly if they are noisy, like the 094s. 

China also recognises its current submarine bases continue to be hemmed in by the First Island Chain sensors and forces, including Western fixed sensors (SOSUS open sea and smaller chokepoint nodal sensors) and mobile sensors (aircraft, ships, subs and satellites which still patrol and dominate). 

To permanently break through the First Island Chain China would need a "forward operating base" for some of its SSBNs or a neutralised ex-Western alliance archipelago. A base in the eastern Philippines or a neutralised Philippines archipelago might be ideal. Only after breaking through to the Pacific east of the Third Island Chain will a 096 - JL-3 combination be able to hit all 50 of the United States.

In part assisted by a quicker COVID recovery, by 2028, as China's nominal GDP begins to surpass the USA's, China will be able to afford the 096, JL-3 and new bases. China then will approach dominance regionally in the Western Pacific, while US naval power is diluted by US global responsibilities.

Pete

Following the article “Netherlands New Sub...” of January 19, 2021, Anonymous kindly commented on the estimation of cost of fuel cell AIP for submarine.

Assumed cost of fuel cell system is consisted of (i) cost of fuel cell, (ii) distribution cost of fuel cell including anti-shock and safety system such as hydrogen leakage, (iii) price of metal hydride, and (iv) distribution cost of metal hydride cylinder (cylinder structure, gas/medium distribution, flow meter, heat sensor, heating system, anti-shock, non-magnetism, corrosion resistance, adiabatic, thermal insulation etc.)

As there are no data on (ii) and (iv) which are not so serious in Stirling generator, (i) and (iii) are estimated on other information. 

(i) unit price per power of fuel cell is nearly same as that of Stirling generator. As price of Stirling generator (240kW) is 2 billion price of fuel cell (480kW) is 4 billion yen. 

(iii) Price of commercial metal hydrogen cylinder [size 81mm(diameter) x 270mm (length)] is 200,000 yen.

Estimated metal hydride cylinder for Type 212A: size 60cm (diameter) x 350 cm (length) and 32 sets?.

Then estimated price of metal hydride for Type 212A is 4.5billion yen [=(60/8.1)^2 x 350/27 x 200,000 x 32]

Cost of fuel cell system = (i) + (ii) + (iii) + (iv) = (ii) + (iv) + 8.5billion yen (US$8 million). Judging from technology level used and severe requirements, (ii) and (iv) are considerably expensive.

Shawn C, offine, has kindly drawn my attention to Singapore Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) News Release:

Singapore Navy Inaugurates Maritime Security and Response Flotilla to Strengthen Maritime Security Capabilities of January 26, 2021, which advises:

"The new flotilla will add capacity and build capabilities to protect Singapore's territorial waters and respond to expanded maritime security threats. The MSRF will be equipped with new purpose-built ships. As a start, the flotilla will operate four Sentinel-class Maritime Security and Response Vessels (MSRVs) and two Maritime Security and Response Tugboats (MSRTs) to enable more calibrated responses."

It carries Fact Sheet Response Flotilla to Enhance Maritime Security. of January 26, 2021.

Shawn C commented offline:

“My thoughts:

The Singapore Maritime Security and Response Flotilla (MSRF) begins with four ex-Fearless classpatrol vessels(PVs), which have been renamed Sentinal-class [Sentinel-class table below from the Fact Sheet]

Some of their original names have been 'recycled' with the Independence-classLittoral Mission Vessels (LMVs). See the included infographics.

Infographic: Maritime Security and Response Flotilla courtesy MINDEF January 26, 2021.
---

Shawn actually wondered why, when the LMVs were announced, they had new build 76mm Oto Melera guns, instead of refurbishing and refitting the ones from the PVs, and though it was so that the retired PVs could be sold on. The new 'Sentinal-class' look like they have a new 25mm RWS [like this?], LRAD?? plus additional armour, but no longer carry anti-ship missiles (ASMs). 

It was previously announced that 'purpose-built security vessels' would operate from 2026, which may indicate that the planned (and mysterious) multi-role combat vessel (MRCV) build has been pushed back. In 2019 it was reported that they would enter service from 2027, while in June 2020 a MINDEF fact stated 'six MRCVs expected to be delivered by 2030.'see https://www.mindef.gov.sg/web/portal/mindef/news-and-events/latest-releases/article-detail/2020/June/29jun20_fs5 "

Pete Comment

Will the mysterious MRCVs (a ship size larger than the MSRVs and two ship sizes larger than the Tugboats) rise again in MINDEF-Singapore Navy plans!?

Following this article, Pete has changed a few bits of the indomitable Shawn C's comment
 of January 31, 2021: 

Due in part to increased local piracy the Singapore Navy's Maritime Security Command has undergone some strengthening and reorganisation.

Looking at the Singapore Navy's Updated Organisational Structure by scrolling down to the Chart here Maritime Security Command (MSR) is increased in strength with:

-  the 8 x Independence-class Littoral Mission Vessels (LMVs) of 1,200 tonnes are in the
   "Second Flotilla" under MSR. These vessels are new build (4 years old or less) and
    represent an increase in displacement and, with it, capability.

-  MSR's other main change is the inauguration of Maritime Security & Response Flotilla
   consisting of:
   =  2 tugboats, and 
   =  4 most serviceable around 22 y/o Fearless-class Patrol Vessels (PVs) 500 tonnes
       redesignated Sentinel-class Maritime Security Response Vessels (MSRVs) 
       with the names/numbers: MSRV Sentinel 55, MSRV Guardian 56, MSRV Protector 57,
       and MSRV Bastion 58

[Pete comment: These Singaporean Sentinels should not be confused with the similar size (353 tons), similar function, US Coast Guard Sentinel class (aka "Fast Response") cutters, some operating out of Guam. Might cause a bit of confusion if some of these US cutters operate out of Singapore!]

See the stirring "Maritime Security and Response Flotilla Inauguration" video below of the 4 Singaporean Sentinel-class with the 2 Tugboats here and below, uploaded by MINDEF on January 26, 2021:
 

Shawn comments:

With the return of the retired Fearless-class PVs as Sentinel-class  'MSRVs' (Maritime Security Response Vessels, and yes, someone in Singapore's Defense Ministry has a love of creating new acronyms: MSRV, MRCV, JMMS) the near-shore security role has re-assumed priority.

This is primarily due to the rise in sea robberies in local waters, with 34 attempts in 2020 in the Singapore Straits - see the Straits Timesarticle 

There were three attempted robberies last week in the Singapore Straits - see Maritime Executive article. 

The majority of these cases are robberies, but there has been hijackings in the Malacca Straits and off the East coast of Peninsula Malaysia.

The introduction of the Singaporean Sentinel class would indicate an increased naval presence around the waters off Singapore, with naval units backing up coast guard vessels with greater 'in-the-area' firepower and sensing. Meanwhile the LMVs could be re-tasked with Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) patrol duties, specifically the Malacca Straits, but probably to patrol the shipping routes that lead from Singapore to Indonesia's Natuna Islands. See NavyRecognition . Comarticle.

Pete Comment

Of course SLOC work, out to Natuna may involve bigger fish than pirates - even wandering Chinese naval/militia/coordinated "fishing boat" activity.

Watch this space.

Following (but not totally due to :) my article "Hunting Australia's Elusive but Failed... Tiger Helicopter" of August 16, 2018, Australia's weapons buyers have at last seen the light. 

Australia is buying a mature Attack Helicopter produced and used by Australia's main ally, the US. Australia's current Tiger helicopter, which Australia never used in Middle East or Afghanistan operations, is therefore on its way out.

Australia's illustrious Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, January 15, 2021 reports :

“The Australian Army’s armed reconnaissance capability will be strengthened following the selection of Boeing Apache Guardian to replace Army’s [Tiger] Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) from 2025. Minister for Defence Linda Reynolds said the AH-64E Apache Guardianis equipped with improved sensors, communications suites, attack capabilities and improved survivability.

“This new ARH capability will strengthen Australia’s armed reconnaissance force to better shape our strategic environment and deter actions against our national interest,” Reynolds said. “Defence considered a number of helicopters against key criteria of proven ability, maturity and an off-the-shelf operating system. The Apache Guardian is the most lethal, most survivable and lowest risk option, meeting all of Defence’s capability, through-life support, security, and certification requirements. By pursuing a proven and low-risk system offered by the Apache, Defence will avoid the ongoing cost and schedule risk typically associated with developmental platforms.”

Lessons learned from issues with the ARH Tiger and other rotary wing projects had informed the strategy to seek a proven, mature ARH replacement capability.“The project will deliver on the Government’s vision to maximise Australian industry involvement in defence capability,” Reynolds said. “There are potential opportunities for Australian industry in logistic support, warehousing services, training development, engineering services, and maintenance, repair and overhaul. Maximising these opportunities for Australian businesses will enable the future growth of our local rotary wing industry and will present opportunities for Australian industry involvement in the aircraft’s global supply chain.”

Detailed transition planning will be conducted to ensure effective management of the skilled workforce, across Defence and industry, as Defence transitions the Tiger to the Apache.”

The following is new to me:

"SOSUS has also been used by law enforcementpersonnel, most notably in drug interdiction efforts for over-water supply routes from Central and South America."

wrote:

LT John Howard, United States Navy Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California Undersea Warfare Department in his paper 

"FIXED SONAR SYSTEMS THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF THE UNDEWATER SILENT SENTINEL" page 12

at https://nps.edu/documents/103449515/0/HOWARDAPR2011.pdf/1219db41-a727-4940-ab0b-b953c54f6e01

in [presumably the US] THE SUBMARINE REVIEW,  April 2011.
______________________________

Part Confirmed by:

1.  The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 95, 2852 (1994); doi: 10.1121/1.409559

at https://asa.scitation.org/doi/pdf/10.1121/1.409559 

“Using modern computers and networking technology, such an observatory could provide data from SOSUS arrays for research, law enforcement...” 

and

2.  https://fas.org/irp/program/collect/surtass.htm  Ocean Surveillance Ships conduct submarine hunting patrols and counter drugmissions. Ships on Submarine hunting duty employ a towed sonar array. Data is transmitted from the ship to an acoustic processing site ashore via satellite. Stalwart class ships were designed to search for foreign submarines. Several have since been assigned as drug interdiction forces. Victorious class ships are built on a Small Waterplane Twin Hull (SWATH) design for stability at low speeds and in rough waters.

In the correctly gradual process, since 2014, to select Netherlands' 4 Walrus replacement subs the shortlist (3 contenders: Sweden, France and Germany) are fighting it out on many levels. One level is the relatively arcane choice of less magnetic pressure hull steel.

By contrast Australia only gave itself less than 18 months (for political vote reasons) from shortlist stage to picking the winner.

Below the article  of January 19, 2021 two particular comments were: 

A.  Anonymous's (for the French or Swedish contender?) comment of January 29, 2021 at 6:01 PM:

[Germany’s? ] Regarding "Non-magnetic stainless [steel] Nitronic 50, well for it to be truly ‘non-magnetic’ it needs to be annealed which means no strength, which means...nope, not useful for the application at hand. Incredible hard to weld, solidification cracks. And there are other ways to manage magnetism too; degaussing.

Wonder why Nitronic, which I think is inherently an American steel is offered by the Germans?"
__________________________

Against which Anonymous B. countered:
__________________________
 

B. Another Anonymous (for Germany?) at January 31, 2021 at 12:17 PM:

(1) 1.3964 is material number and Nitronic 50 is bland name [that hyperlink explaining]:

“1.3964 is the Werkstoff number for a more highly alloyed austenitic stainless steel most commonly known as Nitronic 50. The Werstoff designation was developed by the German standards body DIN, with the term Werkstoff translating approximately to ‘material’. It is also known as XM19, as used in ASTM A182, ASTM A276 and ASTM A479, alongside the unified numbering system caption of UNS S20910. Nitronic 50 is a trademark of AK Steel Corporation.”

(2) Magnetism of 1.3964 is extremely small and annealing is not needed.

[See this link] page 2/2, figure of “Magnetic permeability”

(Relative) magnetic permeability (ur) is 1.0033, while ur for iron is 200000 as shown in wikipedia.

(3) Effect of annealing on magnetism of Nitronic 50 is neglectable.

[See this link] , page2/2, table of “PHYSICAL PROPERTIES”, Magnetic Permeability: (@ RT, 200 oersted):

(Relative) Magnetic Permeability of Annealed or “Super” High Strength (of Nitronic 50) is ca.1.004”

ibid MAGNETIC PERMEABILITY: Nitronic® 50 does not become magnetic when cold worked. The magnetic permeability of the alloy remains low even at cryogenic temperatures to below -400˚F.

Pete Comment

So there you have it. After 6 years the Dutch future submarine selectors thoroughly continue the mage task deciding the $Multi-Billion merits of the 3 contenders – maybe by 2022.

If only Australia's future submarine selectors had also been allowed 8 years (instead of less than 18 months) by their political masters to coolly select the winner of 3 contenders.

Note what I wrote on April 25, 2016. But the selection milestone in Australia was the 2016 Federal Election. Racing towards selection of France was essential for the ruling Coalition to win votes in South Australia. So Australia's Prime Minister cut the selection from a shortlist of 3 to just one winner, on April 26, 2016.

Pete

The following very brief article is about German diesels for submarine [MTU being the one and only German maker?] which might not be supplied for Pakistan's future submarines. 

 https://www.timesnownews.com/india/article/germanys-reluctance-to-supply-engines-casts-shadow-on-chinas-desire-to-make-submarines-for-pakistan/716412

 Australian Government owned ABC News, January 6, 2021 reports : 

The US Marine Rotational Force - Darwin (MRF-D) unit has rented a secure facility outside the Darwin, Northern Territory, Australia for most of the US arrivals to quarantine in before June 2021.

"The ability for 2021’s MRF-D to go ahead under challenging global circumstances, is a testament to the endurance and adaptability of the Australia-US Alliance,"Australian Defence Minister Ms Linda Reynolds. who is a former Brigadier General, said.

"COVID-19 permitting, the ADF and MRF-D will also train with partner countries throughout the year, including exercise Talisman Sabre," Ms Reynolds said

Exercise Talisman Saber is the largest bilateral combined training activity between the US and Australian militaries and is planned to run from June to August this year along the Queensland coast.

About 2,200 US marines will arrive in Darwin by June.(Supplied: Australian Department Of Defence)
---

MRF-D Commanding Officer US Marine Colonel David Banning described the alliance between the US and Australia as "outstanding".

"We are excited to commemorate the 10th anniversary with two highly capable and interoperable forces that advance our shared goals, demonstrate the strength and endurance of our alliance, and contribute to regional security," he said.”

My friend from Texas has drawn my attention to the NATO name Alfa aka Alpha class "interceptor" SSN. It had the Russian, aka Soviet, name Project 705 "Lira". 

Russia's Alfa concept badly mixed up submarines with jetfighters. In 1957 the Russians begun planning this very small, small crew, highly automated, very fast, but very noisy submarine with either a highly innovative (but troublesome) OK-550 or BM-40A LCFR reactor. 

It was noise and the unconventional lead-bismuth cooled fast reactor  (LCFR) reactor that prematurely closed down the project after only 7 Alfas. They were only commissioned from 1971 to 1981.

LCFR technology greatly reduced the size of the Alfa's reactor compared to conventional pressurised water reactor (PWR) (water as coolant) dimensions. The Alfa's reactor permitted very high acceleration and overall speed (around 41 knots). This permitted Alfas to travel  from the Russian Northern Fleet Base, up into the Arctic Ocean, then down into the North Atlantic to attack NATO subs or ships. 

However, the LCFR reactor had a short lifetime and had to be kept warm (at Russia's very cold bases) when it was not being used.  

The LCFR was much more maintenance intensive than older, mature technology PWRs. The issue was that the lead/bismuth eutectic solution solidifies at 125 °C. If it ever hardened, it would be impossible to restart the reactor, since the fuel assemblies would be frozen in the solidified coolant. Thus, whenever the reactor is shut down, the liquid coolant must be heated externally from a pier-side source producing super-heated steam.

While the LCFR reactor worked for many years without stopping, they were not specifically designed for such treatment and any serious reactor maintenance became impossible. This led to a number of failures, including coolant leaks and one reactor broken down and frozen while at sea.
___________________________________

A US LMFR FOR SUBMARINE?

In contrast the US Navy tried but quickly discarded a similar liquid metal "fast" LMFR plant. Part of the reason was Admiral Rickover'spreference for standardized, mature, PWR technology. The first US SSN named USS Seawolf (SSN-575)is the only US submarine to have a sodium-cooled nuclear power plant. The reactor was known as S2G.  Seawolf-575 was commissioned in 1957, but it had leaks in its superheaters, which were bypassed. In order to standardize the reactors in the USN submarine fleet the submarine's sodium-cooled reactor was removed starting in 1958 and replaced with a PWR.
____________________________________

Jive Turkey aka Sub Brief has produced a long Youtube description here and above of the Alfa Project.

POST ALFA SUBMARINE TRAITS THE RUSSIANS PRIORITIZED

41 minutes, 13 seconds into the Youtube Jive describes the reasons why the Russians  stopped making the Alfas. I summarise those reasons as:

- Russians realised stealthy-quieter subs preferable to noisy ones. Hence the follow-on
  Akula SSNs were/are stealthier than Alfas.
- Keeping LCFR plants critical-warm too expensive manpower, cost and time.
- Refueling LCFR dangerous, difficult and expensive.
- Liquid metal coolant Oxidized requiring replacement.
- Labour saving automated systems unreliable, failed at sea, couldn't be fixed there, and
- Automatic sonar less effective than a dedicated sonar team.

So large nuclear submarines powered by PWRs, with large crews (for at sea maintenance, safety and damage control) have become standard in All nuclear submarine navies.  

On February 5, 2021 /Kjell provided an interesting comment on steel in upper structures of A26 submarines leading to a high center of gravity, with consequent stability problems. 

The implication being Saab-Kockums is aiming to extensively use composites (for fins and elsewhere) in Sweden's Blekinge-class A26s and hopefully (for Sweden) in export A26s for the Netherlands.

/Kjell commented:

“It may happen that the Blekinge class (A26) will get rid of some steel and replace it with composite structure instead." [See Swedish language thesis (below) which has an abstract in English]:

“ABSTRACT

This report [of June 14, 2013] is a master thesis performed at The Royal [Swedish] Institute of Technology divisions of Lightweight Structures and Naval Architecture in collaboration with the Swedish defence material administration, FMV. There are several naval submarines used by the Swedish navy and more to be built.

The existing submarines have stability problems due to a high centre of gravity. Most parts on the existing vessels are made of steel, despite a position far above the vertical centre of gravity. By replacing the current steel casing covering the top part of the submarines pressure hull and the rudders placed on the tower, to a lighter composite structure it is possible to lower the centre of gravity.

In this report the composite structure of the rudder and the casing has been weight optimized to achieve a structure as light as possible, but still able to withstand the forces applied to the structure. An analysis of the applied loads shows that the dimensioning loads vary between 50 and 90 kPa depending on the specified part.

The results show that it is possible to decrease the weight of the rudder and casing [by] over 80 %. This would also give the submarine an increase in initial stability [by] over 40 % compared to the existing steel construction." 
_______________________________________

This use of composites was earlier supported by this Swedish article of 2012:

"parts of the [A26] tower [aka fin or sail] and the molded [ie. outer] hull will be built with the same unique material that makes up the hull of the Visby corvettes, ie composite of carbon fiber and vinyl ester (thermosetting plastic). The purpose is to give the submarine better stealth properties."

---

Pete Comment

As can be seen above the 3 versions of Saab Kockums A26s ("Oceanic "extended range" intended for the Netherlands?) have extensive fins/sails. Therefore the use of composites, rather than heavy steel, would be even more appropriate. 

The sails have that unusual large, but blended, shape perhaps for hydrodynamic efficiency, acoustic stealthiness (reducing cavitation and other water flow noise), low magnetic signature and perhaps to house/mount a towed array sonar. (Artwork previously in this 2017 article).

Probably, internationally, most of the latest submarines designs would use composites, where possible, in those parts of submarines that are non-high load bearing. It is likely that steel (or part use of Titanium in some Russian and Chinese subs?) would particularly remain for pressure hulls.

The debate between advocates for Germany or Sweden, in the Netherlands future submarine competition, continues. The French contender has been strangely quiet...wonder why? Do the French know France has won, or what?

In the German corner Anonymous on February 5, 2021 commented:

"Dear Pete,

Magnetic signature is an interesting topic. Germans always put a focus here because of the mine threat in the Baltic Sea and the shallowness of it [see map below].

Lots of places and opportunities there to hide from active sonar. Not so many to hide from magnetometers . And magnetometers are likely to get more powerful and so small that they even can be used from fairly small unmanned aerial vehicles. (see this link eg:  about “SQUID” sensors).

Smart design of the submarine's degaussing system mitigates the problem to a certain extent. However, this system continuously nibbles on your (limited) amount of energy. Not so cool for the captain when his sub is in a high threat environment. Best way to avoid a high magnetic signature is to dramatically reduce the magnetic field of the steel structure. The rest can be reduced with a much smaller degaussing system.

As always... it's some kind of philosophical question and guessing what your future opponents capabilities might be during the life cycle of your submarine."
_______________________________

The UK Daily Mail's entertaining articleof February 8, 2021 is a must-read for serious Submarine Matter-ers. The article appears to vindicate concerns of some in the UK RN's submarine service (not to mention their worried shore-based wives and girlfriends) that women on subs can be a risky (or risqué?) proposition. Also sexual fraternisation  between officers and seamans' semen (all genders and hermaphrodites) is somewhat  frowned on in all navies. 

Article begins:

“Royal Navy lieutenant 'is caught shooting X-rated videos with her leading seaman boyfriend at top secret nuclear submarine base'”

...Claire Jenkins, 29, who uses the name Cally Taylor, makes several movies inside the Faslane nuclear submarine HQ, HMNB Clyde, near Glasgow. 

Furious bosses have launched an investigation over the 'porn to order' videos which Lt Jenkins sells on Only Fans.

She regularly posts explicit footage with her lover, Leading Seaman Liam Doddington, also based at HMNB Clyde.  

There are even fears that the couple could be blackmailed by foreign agents.

Warfare officer Lt Jenkins has commanded a team of sailors on the [the nuclear submarine] HMS Artfuland was responsible for the £1billion vessel's hi-tech outer casing of sound-damping tiles. 

Those tiles allow the vessel to glide through the ocean stalking Russian subs.

She was also responsible for Tomahawk cruise missiles, embarking special forces at sea and covert insertions 

A Navy source told The Sun: 'The commanders can't believe it. There could be all kinds of security risks involved.'
 

Lt Jenkins is thought to have cleared a rigorous vetting process to get her role, including a grilling on her sex life.   

However, she secretly as kinky Cally Taylor, inviting people to pay her to act out their sexual fantasies. 

In her profile on Only Fans, she writes: 'I'm 29 and working that 9 to 5 life, I love to be naughty and stay colourful.

'My naughty side can sometimes get me into trouble, but that feeling of excitement we can get from doing this just makes me so hot and bothered.'

She is thought to have confessed her discretions to the top brass when challenged last week. 

However, she continued to post more content over the weekend.

A Navy source said: 'This individual has been open...""

See whole DAILY MAIL article for more text and photos.

_______________________

 THE SUN is also interesting.

 The debate on pressure hull steel with some relevance to the future Netherlands submarine (Walrus Replacement) issue continues. Below this article on February 5, 2021 an Anonymous commented:

“Concerning the use of austenitic stainless steel (non magnetic) versus the use of dedicated low carbon steel (extra high yield stress) in submarine construction - I did understand that the choice had to do more with the compromise selection relevant to the expected missions; I might be wrong however [Pete comment: Expected missions of the specific submarine class and consumer navy nationality sounds right.]

For a coastal sub (operating in the Baltic [an essential Swedish, German or Polish  characteristic is minimal] magnetic signature. This is very relevant (magnetic anomaly signature decreases at the cube with depth and the sensor has to be very close, may be a fraction of a mile) while the need to operate at great depth (250 /400 meters) and endure the associated cycling fatigue /cracks is not the prerequisite [for Baltic subs].

AIP for short distance , low speed makes also sense . (Israeli Dolphins are really in the "parking lot" off Haifa or the Syrian coast for a second Nuclear strike [especially at Tehran]..)

For an oceanic sub which needs to hide below the accoustic diopter at 150m+ typically, magnetism becomes secondary versus the need to have a lighter structure allowing more batteries for a conventional sub, for instance (we are talking a hundred tons probably for equivalent depth).

Magnetic anomaly detection is probably not really pertinent for a nuclear attack sub à la US Seawolf/UK Astute/French Barracuda.

Within a few min of a datum [a SSN] can cruise at 30 knots at 350 m ..How long does it take for a helicopter or plane to be on the spot and launch an attack in the real tactical world ?

The US, UK or French subs use HY100 or equivalent [pressure hull] steel. I do not know about the Japanese choice.”
___________________________________

On the same thread a different Anonymous responded (at February 6, 2021 at 12:32 AM) about the Japanese choice of pressure hull steel [for Japan's varying oceanic travel and deep seafloor sitting missions]:

“Pressure hull for Japanese submarine is made of [Japanese naval standard] NS80 (proof strength 784MPa [around HY120 see Table 2 below. ]) and NS110 (1078MPa)[around HY156 also see Table 2 below.]. Welding strength of NS80-NS110 and NS110-NS110 were experimentally proven.”
___________________________________

The following was originally from the article Submarine Pressure Hull Steel (Tables) Especially Swedish of March 7, 2019:

Pete Comment

TABLE 2.

YS = Yield Strength or proof stress. HY = High Yield

YS	US	UK	France	Germany	China	Russia and India	Japan	Australia	Sweden
550MPa	HY80	Q1N		1.3964		India DMR- 292 #	* 1) NS56
590MPa			60HLES		921A TA5-A	AK-25 48-OT3
630MPa				1.3974
690MPa	HY100	Q2N				AB-2	* 2) NS70
700MPa			80HLES					BIS812 EMA	Weldox 700
785MPa					980	AK-29	NS80
890MPa	HY130		100HLES		*4) Ti80	AB-3?	NS90		Weldox 900
980MPa						AK-33
1075MPa						AK- ??
1178MPa	HY156						* 3) NS110

COMMENTS FOR TABLE 2.

The higher the yield (stronger) the steel alloy or Titanium alloy in a submarines pressure hull the deeper it can dive in operations. As well as alloy strength other factors also influence diving depth including:

- supports for the the pressure hull
- compartments or multiple pressure hulls, and
- strength of the welds used to join sections of the pressure hull.

It is not possible to verify the accuracy of most of the figures. Commenters who know more are invited to supply corrections.

FURTHER READING
 Soryu Submarine Steel Details - Japan Offer to Australia, January 20, 2015

Anonymous and Pete

In the tradition of Australia buying US weapon systems as an "insurance premium" on the US alliance "insurance policy".

Australia is paying France $Billions to buy the Attack-class conventional subs AND as an insurance premium on a partial strategic insurance policy. 

France is demonstrating that insurance policy via France's response-to-China FONOP using the French SSN Emeraude (See article). Such FONOPs favour French Pacific regional (and SLOC) interests and also Australian interests.

Note also - Australia hosted the same French SSN (Emeraude) in early-mid November 2020 (at Australia's Fleet Base West) at an earlier stage in Emeraude's Pacific mission. 

Visible accidents are very rare in the Japanese Submarine Service. There has been a veritable avalanche of information and comments about the February 8/9, 2021 collision between:

-  the 3,000 ton Japanese Soryu submarine, specifically first-of-class "Soryu" (SS-501)

-  with the 51,000 ton bulk carrier ship Ocean Artemis. 

1.  Perhaps the most useful written report, so far, is The Drive's“Veteran Submariners Explain What Might Have Caused Japanese Submarine Collision” of February 9, 2021. The report poses various combinations of:

- submarine hit from behind by the ship or hit side-on by the ship [Pete comment: either way a very slow to change course ship generally has the right of way. This is because the sub ascends into danger - like a pedestrian stepping into traffic.]
- the sub being below periscope depth, at periscope depth or surfaced
- in a position of poor coverage by the sub's sonars or inadequately monitored/interpreted sonars and/or the periscope
- the sub was in relatively shallow/continental shelf waters which can confuse sonar returns.

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2.  Anonymous has identified sankei.com's article "Mistake in manoeuvring due to lack of crew training in inspection or accident of JMSDF submarine "Soryu"" of February 10, 2021. In that article an anonymous Japanese government official (once translated) suggests:

- the sub may have made a mistake in manoeuvring due to insufficient training of the crew 
- the sub was involved in working-up training after a prolonged period of "inspections" [and Pete would guess maintenance/overhaul] prior to returning to full operations
- the Japanese Navy will be confirming this training status and "whether the prescribed ship manoeuvring methods were thoroughly implemented".
- the sub is in the port of Kochi [which seems to be first available port for safety rather than a regular Japanese Naval Base?] 
- a ship accident investigator of the Japan Transport Safety Board began an official investigation, at Kobi, on January 10.

[Pete's further translation of the translation] "According to the Ministry of Defense, the sub seems to have hit Ocean Artemis when the sub ascended towards the surface. The sub's sonar team and/or equipment could not recognize Ocean Artemis. As the sub ascended it raised its periscope to look around. Inadequate training of crew members prior to returning to duty may have led to sonar's lack of surveillance of surrounding vessels and incorrect ascent procedures, government officials said."
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JIVE'S VIDEO

3. Jive Turkey's Sub Brief video, uploaded Feb 10, 2021, here and below is very informative:

The Japan Times reported, February 7, 2021:

"WASHINGTON – The United States, Japan, Australia and India are working to arrange the first meeting of their leaders under the so-called Quad framework amid China’s growing clout in the region, a source from one of the countries involved said.

The move comes as the new administration of U.S. President Joe Biden appears eager to build on renewed attention to the grouping of the four major Indo-Pacific democracies, with National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan calling it “a foundation upon which to build substantial American policy in the Indo-Pacific.”

[Could the Quad evolveinto a security alliance like NATO?]

According to the source, the United States has already proposed to other countries the idea of holding an online meeting of the Quad leaders.

Whether the talks will materialize soon is up to India, which is known for its relatively cautious stance on the framework. It is the only Quad member that shares a land border with China and operates outside of U.S.-led security alliances..."

SEE MORE OF THE JAPAN TIMESARTICLE 
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Also this article India should prioritise a denial strategy in the Indian Ocean,
of February 9, 2021, is very interesting.

Anonymous advises the Soryu-class submarine involved in the collision with Ocean Artemis is the first of class Soryu. Its name is, of course, Soryu (SS-501) (see SORYU TABLE below).

The collision occured on February 8 or 9 - depending on which side of the Internationa Date Line you're reading.
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SORYU TABLE
(with old Oyashio and new Taigei classes) as at February 11, 2021. 

Anonymous and Pete

With direct relevance to the Netherland's Walrus Replacement issue, many other submarine  and battery issues, Locum has provided this very interesting, lengthy comment (set out in Parts 1. and 2.):

Locum commented (with addition of hyperlinks by Pete) on February 7, 2021 7:04am:

Part 1:

Our planet is now in the conversion phase from a geo-political uni-polar [one Superpower, the US] situation towards a multi-polar world. Currently and in the future, we will face more threats, which can be technically equal or superior. The threats will also be more diverse, more complex and unpredictable.

In order to cope with this rapidly changing world, Darwin's Law becomes more important. The species that adapts the best, will have the most chance at survival.

Submarines are changing considerably to, because of technological developments like: AIP, drones, new types of batteries, and increasing automation. 

To give a submarine more potential of adaptation, or flexibility, the new generation subs need more multi-role capabilities. The new gen. sub must be able to operate in 'brown water' and 'blue water'. Considerably more max. diving depth, range, endurance and speed. All to cope better with nuclear propelled subs and operations further away.

Surface ship design is ruled by the "iron triangle" of: speed - range - payload.

Submarine design has to do with the "iron diamond": speed - range - payload - diving depth. 

-  An AIP will give much more endurance, but will also add roughly 5 meters to submarine length. During transit, the AIP is not working and thus will eat into your payload and range.

-  The payload will consist of bigger and better sensors, more drones and Special Operation Forces (SOF, commandos). Because they will play structurally a bigger role in the new boats.

Anti Surface Warfare (ASuW) and Land Attack capabilities are becoming more important too, so add more cruise missiles in your torpedo room or ... add a VLS. Not only for cruise missiles, but also (quasi) ballistic weapons.

If you want to operate your submarine not only in the cold North-European waters, but also in the (sub)-Tropics (with saltier water) your boat needs bigger trimming tanks.

Yes, further automation results in smaller crews, but significantly longer range and endurance asks for relatively bigger crews to prevent exhaustion.

In January 2015, the Netherland’s Damen Schelde Naval Shipyard CEO Heijn van Ameijde, announced the submarine cooperation with Saab-Kockums. During that announcement he noted the structural shift in the submarine market, especially in Asia, towards more 3.000 - 3.000+ tonnes submarine types.

If we want to believe the Saab-Kockums marketing. Than just stretching the A26 till a maximum of over 80 meters will serve that growing market segment.

The standard A26 has already an unfavourable Length/ Diameter (L/D) ratio of 10.3. The Kilo, TR-1700, Walrus, Type 212 and Dolphin's have a very good L/D ratio of approx 8. That's close to the optimal submarine L/D ratio of 7.0.

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The above drawing of a Soryu class sub illustrates the diameter difference and shape of:
-  a pressure hull (pink and of smaller diameter) and the
-  outer hull (lighter steel and larger diamenter - built for easier movement through water). 
The diagram is by "wispywood2344" and was in this article of September 6, 2016. A larger version is at wispywood2344's bloghere .

Locum continueswith Part 2. posted February 7, 2021 7:48am.

Originally, at the end of the 1990s, the Spanish Navy wanted to buy the Scorpene.

A relatively cheap export boat, with moderate performance and capabilities and optimised for littoral / 'brown water'. In 2002 - '03 the Spanish DoD ran an assessment of the future geo-political reality and threats. It concluded “we” [Spain and/or the Netherlands?] do not need a defensive coastal water boat, but an ocean-going defensive and offensive capable (power projection) sub.

It would have, significantly higher range of 10,000 – 12,500nm, deeper max. diving depth, cruise missile capability. This all means a much higher price.

Spain’s Navantia came up with a quite compact solution. A sub 2,200 tonnes (surfaced), 2,426 tonnes (submerged), total length of 71.05m, diameter of pressure-hull is just 7.30m.

The Netherlands’ Walrus class is already a cramped design. It is by comparison: (submerged) 2,800 tonnes, 67.7m length and a max. diameter of 8.40m. Both are propelled by 3 side-by-side diesel generator sets and built in Marel? steel, equivalent to HY-100.

The 2,400 tonnes (submerged) and 68.6 meter long Israeli Dolphin 2s, which are designed to the same doctrine as the S-80, have 3 x MTU 16V 396 SE84s as well. This is because of the higher safety margin, needed in a long range sub.

Try to squeeze 3 x MTU 396's or 3 x MTU 16V 4000's, depending on version: 1.69 – 1.80 m. wide, in an officially 6.80 meter wide pressure-hull [of an A26?]. Hhmm, mission impossible.

The Argentinian TR-1700 surfaced 2,140 tonnes and submerged 2,336 tonnes. Has a length of 65.93m; a diameter of 8.36m. Max. range is 12,500nm, with a max. speed of 25 knots. The TR-1700 was the fastest operational diesel-electric sub, propelled by 4 MTU 16V diesels. The TR-1700 had a crew of 37, while the Dolphin's have 35 crew + 10 extra crew or SOFs.

The Walrus has a crew of 50, while the (original) S-80 has a very compact crew of just 32. The S-80's Combat Information Center (CIC, command center) is cramped. In this CIC there is certainly no room for extra (drone) consoles. In this tight boat concept, there is also no spare space for extra crew, Special Operations Forces members, or drones. Yes, the S-80 Plus submarine got stretched from 71.05m to 80.81m, but that's to restore the buoyancy of the too heavy boat. The L/D ratio went from 9.73 to a very high 11.07. Originally, the S-80 should had a theoretical max. speed of 22 knots, but for the S-80 Plus it is calculated at 19 knots. 

So technically and commercially it's better for a submarine manufacturer to set up a 3,000 tonnes sub product line, which is not a stretched version of a littoral submarine, but a shortened variant of a bigger boat. A shorter version of the Type 216 was the favoured choice of the Singaporean Navy. Unfortunately, because of the quickly growing Chinese threat, they wanted their new submarines ASAP. Singapore also didn't want to bear the risks of being a the first customer of an entirely new Type 216 sub.

Lithium-Ion batteries

Scientific research concluded that statistically seen, sooner or later a Lithium-ion Battery (LIB) equipped submarine will catch fire. LIBs have been used safely underwater already for 25 years [Pete comment: maybe or maybe not]. However, it's the application of much larger numbers of LIBs cells in submarines and over a long timespan (25-30 years) that makes the statistical chance at a Li-Ion battery fire realistic.

Lithium Iron Phosphate (LiFePO) batteries are significantly more stable than other LIBs, in other words: as safe as Lead-acid Batteries (LABs). Compared to LABs, LiFePO batteries have also a 9 % lower specific weight.

The lifespan of LiFePO batteries is longer (more discharge cycles) and their re-charge time is shorter. 

The LiFePO manufacturer for TKMS is SAFT [Pete comment: see many mentions of SAFT and some of TKMS in this article]. First LiFePO batteries for rigorous defense applications, were introduced by SAFT in 2009.

LiFePO batteries will not only find application in Type 212CDs, but also 212CD Es, Type 214s, etc. 

Locum 

An excellent essay, dated February 11, 2021, by Arnaud Sobrero, is at The Diplomat paysite at: 

https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/russian-submarines-still-a-relevant-threat/

Based in Asia for more than 10 years, Arnaud Sobrero is an independent writer focused on defense technology and East Asian affairs.