Below this article, on February 8, 2021 Anonymous has kindly commented:

Usually, the condition and performance of batteries are monitored. Batteries are exchanged on a regular basis and/or according to degree of deterioration [1] and never used over the service life of a submarine (20-30 years) [2]. One of reasons for adoption of Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) are LIBs’ safety [3, 4].

[1] The replacement period for Lead-acid Batteries (LABs) is decided based on operational experience (eg. once every three-years). LIBs might be exchanged once every six-years.

[2] Poorly managed or deteriorated LABs generate flammable hydrogen gas which might cause a hydrogen explosion as shown in the case of ARA San Juan which sank and imploded in 2017.

[3] TKMS might rely on Siemens' patent LIBs [or SAFT LIBs - see this article.]

[4] Possible serious accidents caused from LABs and LIBs are hydrogen explosion and fire, respectively. LIB cells on subs and surface ships/boats are increasingly shielded with inert gas in case of fire (in line with the Japanese standard for marine LIBs).
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Separately Japan's large GS Yuasa Lithium-ion battery making company: 

A. Makes Lithium batteries for Industrial and Military customers (called "LIMs") and

B.  Has made Lithium batteries for unmanned and manned undersea vessels "without incident to date".

Combining A + B = GS Yuasa makes Lithium batteries for military manned submarines.

This article says it more plainly: GS Yuasa is making LIBs for the latest Japanese submarines specifically the Soryu Mk 2s and new Taigei class - see SORYU TABLE.

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PETE COMMENT

It will take 10+ years of incident-free, safe LIB operation on Japanese submarines to fully assess whether LIBs are safe or safer than LABs.

Japan's submarine Soryu (SS-501) collision with bulk carrier ship Ocean Artemis may be more damaging politically than financially. Is is embarrassing for the Japanese Navy and Defense Ministry. Also Ocean Artemis is a Hong Kong (increasingly meaning China) flagged ship with around 20 Chinese crew. 

Maritime tensions have been raised because recently China's Navy and Coast Guard have increased pressure on Japan in the East China Sea over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute.

On November 9, 2020 I wrote about the coming Chinese Coast Guard "fire on law" in waters China claims sovereignty (mainly in the East China and South China seas).

The Chinese Government, in January 2021, passed that law. 

Coast Guard fire on activity is not restricted to China. In December 2001 a Japanese Coast Guard vessel fired on and sank a North Korean vessel in the so-called "Battle of Amami-Oshima". Fifteen North Koreans were killed for no loss of Japanese lives.

On February 8, 2021 the inexhaustible Locum commented:

"Many talk the Talk, but when start, do they walk the Walk?

The official Walrus replacement process started at the beginning of 2013. With the Netherlands signing a MoU about submarine cooperation with Norway and Germany. 

In this process there are two sides. One side wants to import a cheap MOTS submarine from abroad. The other side [the Navy and Ministry of Defense] wants a Walrus 2.0.  

The cheap MOTS side, consists of politicians and civil servants who differ greatly from the Defense Ministry’s Walrus 2.0 aspiration. The “cheap MOTS side” are afraid of a repeat of the Walrus troubles. [Pete comment see "The purchase of today's submarines, the Walrus class, was a headache."at marineschepenMarch 15, 2013 ] 

In the 1980s, politicians decided to save a large shipyard consortium (RSV) by speeding up the Walrus design phase. [RSV collapsed in 1983.] Then, the same happened during the "JSF" [F-35A?] System Development & Demonstration phase. The construction had already started, but many drawings were not ready or had not been made at all.

During the development, the specifications also changed because of the increasing Soviet submarine threat. Costs skyrocketed while time milestones were missed. The Navy’s leadership made the mistake of not reporting this to the politicians. The Walrus (troubling) affair was born. [Pete comment: see “Construction: complex, full of delays and problems” at this other marineschepen article].

There are not only 2 sides with totally different views about the Walrus replacement. Other Departments interfere in this project too. In this kind of large defense project there are financial, economical (trade & jobs), industrial and Foreign Affairs aspects too. Unfortunately, the Ministries of Finance, Foreign Affairs, Trade, Internal Affairs and the Prime Minister himself, all fit the expression “Too many cooks in the Kitchen”. [Also reported in this previous SubMatts article.] All those Ministries have opposing views about the Walrus successor. 

Our Netherlands economy depends a lot at international trade and has an open character.

So the foreign relations aspects are important for the Netherlands. Two contenders (Naval Group and TKMS) are from the most powerful EU members. This plays a significant role in the choice of the new sub.

All those factors have made the Walrus replacement a highly politically sensitive matter.

According to the current time schedule, in:

2021, the decision will be made for the Staff Requirements, design and shipyard.

2022 the contract will be signed in [Pete comment: Finally? :-]. 

2023 or 2024 the start of construction will begin. 

2027 the Walrus replacement must be delivered to the Dutch Navy, and 

2028 enter service. 

Well, that's a challenge !

Many experts, insiders and other interested people in The Netherlands are following the Naval Group designed for Australia Attack class project. [See here and here.]

Many Dutch do not like the French and do not favour the shortened Barracuda version.

Why? because the Dutch see the French as too dominant, too selfish and unreliable.

According to the Dutch General Accountability Office (Algemene Rekenkamer) one of the 3 contenders is too expensive for the Dutch budget. But this candidate is also the best performing one. Many Dutch suspect that this is the shortened Barracuda. 

[Pete comment. See the relevant Dutch General Accountability Office's "Report on the Replacement of the Submarines" here of 10 December 2020, which, once translated, states: “According to the [Minister of Defense], a better design that could handle all tasks with 3 pieces would be rejected due to excessive costs.”] 

Because political factors play the main role in this project. There is a realistic chance that the Walrus replacement ends up 'a train-wreck'. In other words: they get, what they don't need.

Locum
___________________________________

Artwork from Dutch General Accountability Office's "Report on the Replacement of the Submarines" 10 December 2020, here. Looking at the words and pictures translated by Pete, to the effect:
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Major Costs Investigated

4 Submarines

Including Anti-ship missiles

Land attack missiles

Torpedos

Submarine midlife update

Support ship

Additional Costs

Equipment and Fuel

Personnel Costs

Repairs and maintenance, need including in the Defense Budget

Transition costs, costs (unknown). [It may be significant that the accompanying artwork shows a new submarine with a Barracuda style pumpjet.] 

________________________________

PETE COMMENT

I suspect that TKMS which is offering the Type 212CD E can demonstrate its costs most precisely to the Dutch Government because 212s have been operating for many years. Germany like the Netherlands works loosely in the NATO command structure. However, the Germans, like the French, are also seen as a powerful, dominant, EU member.

Sweden, with Saab, offering the A26, is a similar small-medium European country as the Netherlands. The A26 is less costed as it has yet to be launched/operated and Sweden is not in NATO. But Saab may be offering the best industrial build-in-Netherlands agreement which would please many Dutch ministries, voters and trade unions. 

Composites are essential for submarines due to their non-magnetic nature, light weight, ease of shaping and many other benefits (below). Lightweight makes for a lower displacement, not top heavy with less contervailing need for ballast. Composites are easier than steel to shape. 

So a submarine making company skilled in composites has economic-sales advantages over  one that has a greater percentage of steel in its sub.

Following this composites article Anonymous's February 8, 2021 comments led to the following:

1.  TKMS uses SIEMENS composite materials technology:

Composite materials are seaworthy and offer many benefits. First, they stand up well to the harsh and salty marine environment, resisting any corrosion while possessing much better aging capabilities than metals. Composites also provide the ability to “design the material” by combining fibers and resins in different ways and by placing the fibers along preferred orientations following loading and stress paths, thus reducing the weight-tostrength and weight-to-stiffness ratios.

Further, composites facilitate the manufacture of seamless, complex shapes for better hydrodynamic performance and stealth characteristics. Composites can be more easily draped over round surfaces while sheet metals cannot. They also enable part consolidation and part count reduction using resin transfer molding or co-curing of large assemblies at once, without the need for riveting or joining small parts together, thus reducing manufacturing cycle times and costs.

Composites also offer some valuable mechanical properties, including better fatigue resistance and less sensitivity to crack propagation than aluminium and other metals;enhanced acoustic transparency for improved sonar transmission (for instance, in the bow dome); and reduced lifetime and maintenance costs compared to metallic structures.

HDW [part of TKMS] is using Fibersim to design and manufacture a variety of glass fiber and carbon fiber outfitting parts...TKMS is using Fibersim to design and manufacture the complete upper deck, keel covers, tower sail fairings, propeller blades and rudders. “Fibersim takes a lot of the worry out of the process by enabling us to capture many more details of the final composite layups...” complete upper deck, keel covers, tower sail fairings, propeller blades and rudders. In the near future, TKMS expects to extend the use of Fibersim to include the design of structural parts, starting with a new, lighter weight storage rack for torpedoes.

“Fibersim enables us to do a faster conversion from metal to composites, and minimizes the risk by verifying information before it ever gets to the manufacturing floor”.
________________________

2.  SAAB may have its own composite material section.

[Pete comment - although SAAB buying GKN Aerospace’s Applied Composites AB Business may be more SAAB-aircraft oriented than marine.

SAAB certainly has an extensive marine composites capability, as seen in the Visby corvettes. a capability which would extend to the A26 submarines.]

Maybe SAAB and Naval Group could send comments with some details of their submarine composites?
________________________

3.  ADifferent types of composites include:

-  Glass/carbon fiber reinforced plastic/polymer(GFRP/CFRP) and

-  Fiber reinforced metal (FRM) Metal matrix composite (MMC) for pressure hulls seems to be difficult.
______________________

PETE COMMENT

The percentage (by weight) of composites in submarines is likely to increase across submarine makers and their country customers. 

Composites in pressure hulls (hitherto Steel or Titanium monopolies) may be possible in the future.

Despite constant discipline problems on UK Royal Navy (RN) subs (not necessarally involving women) on: April 8, 2011,  October 3, 2017,  October 9, 2017,  November 2, 2020  and February 9, 2021.

The RN can look to the success of woman submariners in other navies. See some below:
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Norwegian Navy 

The Norwegian Navy was the world’s first Navy to allow women in submarines, in 1985. It was/is also the first (and only?) navy to have had a female Submarine Commander, Captain Solveig Krey (below) in 1995 in KNM Kobben. 

________________________

German Navy

Australian Navy

2019 marked the 20th year of women in Australian submarines. 

20 years ago, former Able Seaman Communication and Information Systems Submariner Rachel Irving became Australia's first female submariner when she was awarded her ‘Dolphins’ on 30 June 1999.

Most people serving in today's Submarine Force wouldn't remember submarines without female submariners. Over the past 20 years, women have served below the surface as officers and sailors across the spectrum of submarine employment categories. 

The Australian Navy in 1998 was the first non-Scandinavian country to allow women to serve aboard their submarines.   

The Australian Navy started off by focusing on gender diversity and doing things that now seem dated, but were actually quite challenging for the Navy of the day.

Former and current female submariners pose together in the junior sailor's cafe on board HMAS Sheean to celebrate the 20th anniversary of women in Australian submarines, at Fleet Base West, HMAS Stirling, Western Australia. Pete suspects the tall bald one at the back, with a beard, isn't a woman :)
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________________________

Lt. Krisandra Hardy, an Enlisted Women in Submarines (EWIS) and Lt. Marquette Leveque, an EWIS coordinator, speak to enlisted female sailors at Naval Station Mayport.
(Photo courtesy US Navy via Military.com).
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https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2021/02/17/us-navy-seeks-better-bulletproof-survival-suits/?sh=2ff332051ecf

Following this article Locum on February 9 has provided some excellent comments which Pete has rearranged a bit for clarity, given its a pretty complex subject.

Length of a submarine / Diameter of a sub = (L/D) ratio, a key measure. A L/D ratio of 7.0 is the ideal. A submarine with good hydrodynamic qualities needs to be short and 'fat' [like the current Walrus - see below]. That is good for an expeditionary submarine. 

[This is what the Netherlands Navy and Defense Ministry want, but its expensive. A short fat sub for the Netherlands is ideal as it would yield a long range of > 8,000nm miles and a high cruising speed for the shortest possible transit time. Good for missions from the Netherlands to the Dutch Caribbean or Netherlands through Mediterranean to the Middle East (for electronic monitoring, etc)].

A lot of people, even some Dutch politicians, think that a Saab-Kockums A26 Oceanic Extended Range concept is the contender for the Walrus replacement.

Incorrect, Saab-Kockums and Damen Schelde are offering a concept sub, that's 73m long and has a diameter of (approx) 8m.

But, Saab-Kockums marketing wants us to believe that a stretched A26 version will do. However if we simply stretch the A26 to from its Swedish Navy standard of 63m to eg. 70m [while retaining its Swedish Navy diameter of 6.4m] we will end up with an unfavourable L/D ratio of 10.94 .

A. Instead Saab-Kockums is really offering two designs. That is:

-  73m x 8m sub yielding a L/D ratio of 9.13. [An expensive choice, of the dimensions the Netherlands Navy wants] This is a new design, with some recycled and/or evolved elements of the Walrus, Collins class and A26. Displacement is approx 2,900 - 3,000 tonnes [submerged]. [This compares with the current Walrus’s 67.73 x 8.4 = L/D ratio of 8.06 at 2,650 tonnes (submerged)].

- and (probably) the standard A26 [Its standard dimensions make it cheaper and of the type most of the (non-Navy/non-Defense Ministry) economic Ministries want]. which is approx 63m x 6.4m yielding a L/D ratio of 9.84.

B. Naval Group is offering versions of the Barracuda and Scorpene [Dimensions, hence L/D unknown, being kept Secret.]

C. TKMS is offering the Type 212CD E. [Dimensions, hence L/D unknown, being kept Secret?]

------------------

Navantia was offering the S-80 Plus. [Though note “Navantia was not accepted as a bidder.” by the Netherlands’ future submarine selection panel.]

Drawing illustrates a submarine's L/D ratio, wherein Diameter (D) of Hull is a proportion of Length (L) of Hull. In this example L/D ratio is quite good 8.75 (where L = 8.75 D). See upper right corner of Drawing. (Drawing courtesy Google Images which Google located from this source).
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PETE COMMENT

An ideal L/D ratio not only has hydrodynamic efficiency (for low fuel use movement) through the water, but it also adds structural strength, eg: a perfect sphere L/D = 1, or even an egg, are strong shapes to crush with water pressure.

Low L/D also allows rapid turns (to clear the baffles) and rapid tactical changes in direction (good for dodging other subs, ship’s hulls and even torpedos). Low L/D also allows for easier steering around rocks and narrows and a more compact shape to fit in seafloor "holes" (eg. in the Singapore Strait or Baltic Sea).

The New Yort Times (NYT) reported February 11, 2021

"NEW DELHI — India, the unmatched vaccine manufacturing power, is giving away millions of doses to neighbors friendly and estranged. It is trying to counter China, which has made doling out shots a central plank of its foreign relations. And the United Arab Emirates, drawing on its oil riches, is buying jabs on behalf of its allies..."

yet

NYT earlier reportedDecember 15, 2020:

"The U.S., Britain, Canada and others are hedging their bets, reserving doses that far outnumber their populations, as many poorer nations struggle to secure enough.

As a growing number of coronavirus vaccines advance through clinical trials, wealthy countries are fueling an extraordinary gap in access around the world, laying claim to more than half the doses that could come on the market by the end of [2021]."
_________________________

A. What is to be done? 

B.  Is the World Health Organisation or some other entity, up to sorting things out?

Woman have been on some European submarines since the 1980s, on Australian from 1999 and the US subs since 2011 (see). It is the Japanese Navy that will be the first Asian navy to deploy women on an Operational submarine - probably in 2022.

Following the “Women Good on Subs” article Anonymous provided very interesting comments and links on February 17, 2021 (8:43AM and 12:40PM) on women soon to be on operational Japanese submarines.

(Group photo of 4 female Petty Officers. Photo courtesy Japanese Navy. See individual photos by scrolling down at STC48)

Then, on February 26, 2020, four female Petty Officers (above) and one female leading seaman joined STC for training. See Petty Officer rank insignia here.

ASAHI SHIMBUN reported that on October 29, 2020 training of the 4 female Petty Officers and one female leading seaman in training submarine JS Michishio (TSS-3609) finished, ie. they won their Dolphins (see photo) at Japanese Navy Base Kure. 

Their joining an operational submarine has been postponed because the current Oyashio and Soryu class submarines are too small “to maintain privacy, but the Ministry of Defense lifted gender restrictions in 2018.”

JS Taigei (29SS), of the new Taigei-class, will be the first Operational Japanese submarine with the necessary larger size and fitout facilities (sleeping room/shower section) for women (see Japanese Navy document).

PETE COMMENT

To meet Taigei’s commissioning objective “around March 2022” Taigei might be handed over to the Japanese Navy for working-up testing and training later this year (2021). So the first 5 female submariners may join Taigei later this year and may then be on Taigei when it becomes operational in 2022.

I’m guessing South Korea's or Singapore's Navy may be the next navy in Asia to deploy woman on subs.

Anonymous and Pete

Following this article Locum provided interesting comments on February 9, 2021, to which I respond:

On Spain's/Navantia’s S-80 Plus. (4 being built for the Spanish Navy)

Hi Locum

I assume you are saying the Dutch knocked back the S-80 Plus “in December 2019.” on cost grounds. Also the major displacement/buoyancy error of the original S-80 would have worried the Dutch.

"White Hat" Sitemeter Sigint Caution

As an aside my sitemeter provided very crude but effective “Sigint’ up to April 2011, when:

-  Google displayed actual keywords used by "Northern Hemisphere" countries, intelligence agencies and nuclear weapons establishments (eg. Iran nuclear) searching my blog, and

-  with these "Northern Hemisphere" entities not disguising their organizational IP addresses, which in turn revealed their organization's name up until April 2011, 2 weeks before this.

-  Meanwhile Southern Hemisphere entities where always more anonymous and careful.

-  Since 2011 all agencies everywhere (except some navies and defense departments) are much more careful not to too openly link IP addresses with actual organizational names, when they're searching. 

-  Also (for my sitemeter) since from around 2015 Google no longer displayed actual keywords users were searching for.

Back to Subs

Australia had/has good relations with Navantia during the Hobart-class and Canberra-class builds, but Navantia's grievous error in the original S-80 design was unacceptable for Australia. In that regard keyword “S-80” came up often in anonymous Australian searches - up to 2013. It seemed the usefully large S-80 design was a strong possibility to be shortlisted by Australia – but by then Spain’s dreaded buoyancy mistake was discovered . 

Root of the Buoyancy Problem

In addition to your “original S-80 there was no spare room for drones or extra SOF / commando's, over the standard 8 SOF operators.” There were other Combat System weights (eg. torpedos, tubes, missiles, servers and workstations). These essential weights were not factored in by Spain when Spain did its buoyancy calculations.

I’ve said somewhere that Spain had never fully developed and launched a sub in Modern times without major French help. Probably it was this Spanish inexperience that resulted in the failed S-80 design.

Now since 2019

The Dutch would have noticed that the S-80 Plus design for the Spanish Navy, "3,200 tonnes (surfaced) and 3,426 tonnes (submerged)" see right side bar, has little reserve buoyancy and is too heavy for the Dutch Navy overall.

As you point out, an additional problem is the S-80 Plus “engine room is too cramped for...3 MTU 396s” that the Dutch Navy probably wants. Although I'd say the Dutch economic ministries may be happy with only 2 diesels in much cheaper MOTS European designs.

Like the Australian Collins and now Attack classes, the Spanish have created an extremely expensive orphan submarine class in the S-80 Plus. 

Collins, Attack and S-80 Plus are only attractive to their builder shipyards-navies with no export prospects to amortize individual sub and project cost burdens. Any Australian hopes that the Dutch would look to Australian Attack class builders will pan out to be the Dutch going to Naval Group directly.

Naval Group is proving itself an industrial miracle in simultaneously running its new SSBN "SNLE 3G" Program alongside its (over-budget, missed deadlines) Australian Attack-class SSK Program. 

Naval Group can claim the Attack-class launch-of-sub timings place Attack SSK  before France's new SSBN. But each program lasts 15 years from initial contracts to commission of subs.

Attack-class's 15 years extend from 2016 to 2031. France's new SSBN's timings extend from 2021 to 2036. That means there is a 10 year overlap (of limited French management, designer and worker resources) between the years 2021 and 2031. 

The statement accompanying Naval Group's February 20, 2021 video, when translated into English: 

"The [French] Minister of the Armed Forces Florence Parly will officially launch the realization of the [France’s new SSBN Program]. A major program for Naval Group, a benchmark industrial partner in the service of French sovereignty.

This new generation of SSBN will meet the operational needs of the French deterrence posture from 2030 to 2090. The operational commissioning of the 1st submarine is scheduled for 2035, that of the other 3 at the rate of one every 5 years.

“Naval Group is very proud to put its skills, talents and industrial resources at the service of France's dissuasion mission. The whole company will mobilize with its partners to carry out this exceptional project.” [said Pierre Éric Pommellet Chairman and CEO of Naval Group]

[Pommellet continues France’s new SSBN Program] “remains one of the most complex industrial products ever made. Its design and construction require rare know-how, unique industrial resources and the ability to unite 200 partner companies. Our unique positioning as a systems integrator architect allows us to: commit to the overall performance of the vessels assume overall responsibility for their construction guarantee control of quality, deadlines and costs.”"

As Naval Group is French Government owned "62.25% by the French State” limited French management, designer and worker resources will prioritize the new French SSBN "dedicated to France's sovereignty" over Australia's Attack-class SSK.  

Readers should note SSBNs are always the highest priority weapon of the large nuclear weapon states that can afford SSBNs.

Counterintuitively Naval Group can continue to claim the Attack-class program is notsecond priority. Or not even third priority - when one considers no sub of France's new Barracuda Suffren-class SSN Program has achieved "Full Operating Capability".

Completion of France's new SSBN Program on time, on budget, is reportedly part of France's 2019-2025 Military Plan Law. Does such a law apply to completion of Australia's Attack-class SSK, on time, on budget?

Vive la France.

France has been sending navy ships to the contested South China Sea (SCS) and East China Seas as a pushback against China and also against North Korean smuggling. This comes amid France's moves to increase its presence in the Indo-Pacific to back US President  Biden's call for a multilateral response to China's assertiveness.

French missions in the Pacific, from November 2020 to February 2021, included the (NATO designation French Ship (FS)) Emeraude (a Rubis-class SSN) and its support ship FS Seine. 

Also Pacific based (homeport Tahiti) Floreal-class frigate FS Prairial will patrol the East China Sea from March 2021, against ship-to-ship smuggling involving North Korea. 

The amphibious warfare LHD Tonnerre is in the middle. Stealth frigate Surcouf (with its smooth  radar deflecting sides) is on Tonnerre's bow. It might be the, light frigate Prairial? in the foreground. (Photo courtesy French Navy via India's RepublicWorld.)
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From February 2021 to early July 2021 the French Mistral-class LHD FS Tonnerre and the stealthy La Fayette-class frigate FS Surcoufwill patrol the SCS. 

[As an aside, the frigate Surcouf has been a luckier ship than the doomed heavy artillery submarine Surcouf of WWII.] 

Along the way Tonnerre and Surcouf will exercise with the Indian, Australian, Japanese and US navies in support of the Quad security dialogue.

JS Tonnerre and Surcouf are now traveling from France, through the Suez Canal, Indian Ocean, to the Pacific. On the way they will visit Egypt, Djibouti, India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam and Japan, before returning to France in July 2021. 

Backing up Pete's Feb 22, 2019 article. On Feb 23 Australia’s Defence Minister, Linda Reynolds told Parliament she is annoyed with the slow progress of negotiations with the French.Linda is referring to the troubled Attack class program in which French government owned Naval Group is being paid many $Billions.

If the Dutch are contemplating choosing Naval Group for the Netherlands' future submarine, this may be risky. Naval Group may not be the money saver expected. Naval Group may be able to make a low contract winning bid, because this being is cross-subsidized by Australia's foolishly extravagant Attack class order. 

But the Dutch will also have to contend with Naval Group’s natural focus on its major French national priority - developing France’s future SSBN. Naval Group has also yet to complete “Full Operating Capability” of France’s new SSN. 

ARTICLE

Andrew Greene, Defence Correspondent, for Australia’s government owned ABC News, Feb 24, 2021, reports (Pete is just displaying part of the submarine content):

“Government frustrations and concerns grow over Australia's multi-billion-dollar submarine...”

Defence Minister Linda Reynolds has expressed "frustration" and "disappointment" with the French company building Australia's $90 billion future submarines as she prepares to confront its visiting global boss over crucial contract negotiations.

A year after Naval Group pledged to spend 60 per cent of the massive contract value on local suppliers, the company is yet to enshrine the figure in a formal deal with the Commonwealth...

Sources have said Prime Minister Scott Morrison has become increasingly worried in recent months about Defence's ability to deliver the massive projects and has relayed his concerns directly to the Department's National Naval Shipbuilding Enterprise team.

Ahead of her meeting with Naval Group, Senator Reynolds has told Parliament she is annoyed with the slow progress of the negotiations with the French.

On [Feb 24, 2021], Naval Group's global chief executive, Pierre Eric Pommellet, is expected to meet with Senator Reynolds in Canberra after flying into Adelaide where he completed a mandatory two-week quarantine stint.

"I am frustrated and I'm very disappointed that Naval Group have yet been able to finalise this contract with Defence, but it will not be done at the expense of Australian jobs, and Australian industry," Senator Reynolds said on Tuesday.

"This capability is far too important for our nation to do that."

The ABC understands the Commonwealth is insisting on annual audits of Australian Industry Content (AIC) in the project to construct 12 Attack Class submarines, but the French are so far resisting....”

Following this articleand in response to my friend GhalibKabir’s interesting commentI comment:

Over concerns about the level of Australian content in French Naval Group's Attack-class submarine project the Morrison Government's negotiations with Naval Group Chairman and CEO, Pierre Eric Pommellet, are largely window dressing. 

Back in 2016, and to win that year's Federal Election, the Turnbull Government prematurely chose a future submarine builder (Naval Group) as a sweetener to win one or two critical South Australia seats. Those seats actually won Turnbull the election and South Australians continue to rejoice in having the $10 Billions new submarine construction contract in their state. The higher the cost of a defence project the more political it is - vested interests and all.

But the Turnbull Government's choice happened so quickly that the contractual basis was largely open ended in Naval Group's favour. Now all Australian taxpayers are living with that reality today in terms of an open ended, rising, project price. 

In 2021 the Morrison Government can complain about open ended all it likes, but that doesn't alter Naval Group's stronger legal and political bargaining position.

In late February 2021 it is highly unlikely the Morrison Government would take the risky domestic political step of ending the Naval Group contract. South Australia remains hypersensitive to threats to its main manufacturing money earner, the submarine contract with Naval Group.

Morrison is now acutely vulnerable because yesterday Federal Member of Parliament Craig Kelly put serious pressure on the Coalition after leaving for the crossbench. This means Morrison’s Coalition government only needs to lose one seat in South Australia (in a possible October 2021 Election) for Federal Labor to win Government.

Also Defence Minister Linda Reynolds is already under major political pressure over the alleged rape of a female staff member.

Regarding my friend GhalibKabir floating Japan or Saab as possible submarine building alternatives to Naval Group. I comment:

Japan would probably offer the cheapest, fastest build in South Australia. But South Australians actually benefit from a slow, expensive build - more Federal money for their state. Japan also expects a much closer alliance in return for presiding over an efficient  build of submarines in Australia. That is Australia strategically supporting Japan in Japan’s more immediate confrontations with China, even in the East China Sea, many thousands of kms north of Australia. Australia did not/does not want to buy into Japan’s neighbourhood confrontations with China and North Korea.

Meanwhile Sweden's Saab-Kockums has yet to prove (after a 20 year hiatus) that it can turn out new subs efficiently. Saab's A26 Blekinge class has still not been launched even for Saab’s own Swedish Navy. The last new subs Kockums built were the unpopular Collins (HMAS Rankin launched 2001)

Also there is the RAN's, Australian politicians' and the publics’ bad memory of numerous Kockums technical, cost and attitudinal problems in the building of the Collins (eg. the defective diesels are still in the Collins and still limit its performance).

So Prime Minister Morrison would be a brave man indeed to even implicitly float an alternative to Naval Group. South Australians are counting on Mr Morrison to deliver an unthreatened, long and expensive submarine build for their underfunded state economy.

Naval Group knows all this. So Naval Group are arguing with the Morrison Government from a Naval Group position of strength.

Pete

On Jan 3, 2021 SubMatts'reported. Now in a very clear article Defense Brief, Feb 26, 2021, with an update, reports:

[Italian Type 212 NFS]

"Italian shipbuilder Fincantieri announced on February 26 [2021] the signing of a 1.35 billion euro deal for the delivery of the first two U212 NFS (Near Future Submarines) to the Italian Navy.

Type U212 NFS is an evolution of the first four Type 212A air-independent propulsion (AIP) submarines that were delivered in cooperation with Germany’s thyssenkrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) between 2006 and 2017.

Germany is also operating six units of the same class.

The contract for the first two [planned 212 NFS] was signed with OCCAR (Organisation Conjointe de Cooperation en matiere d’Armement, the international organization for joint armament cooperation).

While the [212 NFS] will be delivered by Fincantieri as prime contractor, TKMS will also be involved in the construction, delivering parts from its Kiel shipyard. More specifically, TKMS will build the bow sections of the boats, fuel cell systems, and other small components.

According to Fincantieri, the first two subs are scheduled for delivery in 2027 and 2029, in time to replace the four Sauro-class submarines whose operational operational lifetime is coming to a close after 40 years of operation.

According to unofficial reports, the new boats will be slightly longer than [Italy's] 55.9-meter-long Type 212A boats Todaro, Sciré, Romeo Romei and Pietro Venuti. The increased length will provide space for additional fuel cells for extra range and additional space for new electronic warfare systems.

The submarines are also set to incorporate more technology from the Italian defense industry [especially unique Italian Lithium-ion batteries]. Italian defense technology company has been awarded a 150 million euro contract to provide a new combat management system (CMS) for the two boats. In addition to the CMS, Leonardo will also provide a simulation and training laboratory at the Italian Navy’s Submarine Centre in Taranto and a package of logistic support including staff training and a set of spare parts.

[German/Norwegian 212 CDs]

It is worth noting that in addition to Italy, Norway and Germany are also jointly building additional Type 212 submarine, which are being referred to as Type 212 CD (Common Design). Germany is acquiring two, while Norway is buying four Type 212 CD units to replace its six Ula-class submarines.

[Back to Italian 212 NFS]

“We are going to take a real technological leap forward compared to the submarines of the previous class, starting with the design and the combat system developed along with Leonardo, which we are in charge of integrating on-board,” Fincantieri CEO, Giuseppe Bono, commented.

“This will allow Italy to continue being a main actor among the limited group of countries that can build such advanced units.”

/Kjell kindly provided comments on Feb 27, 2021 concerning the four TKMS Type 212CD submarines Norway MAY buy from TKMS.

/Kjell's comments are supported by this Norwegian link dated Sep 11, 2018, which is easily (right-click mouse) translated. 

Norway and TKMS signed an MoU for the Type 212CD subs in February 2017.  See mentions of Norway 212CD here .

But in this 212CD project Norway wants to avoid the low industrial content level it suffered in Norway's purchase of six TKMS Type 210 Ula submarines in the 1980s. Type 210s are a specialised design only ever exported to Norway.  

Within a more than US$5 Billion Norwegian Type 212CD purchase Norway wants a Norwegian industrial content (aka "cooperation") of around 75%. This is equivalent to more than US$3.5 Billion. 

Norway is waiting for TKMS to settle on the 75% content/cooperation. 75% likely includes  a Norwegian designed combat system [eg. weapons, sensors, computer terminals-data storage]. In April 2020 Norway rejected a third TKMS offer. 

As at February 2021 a formal Norway-TKMS contract (more binding than an MoU) had not been  signed. 

After the contract is signed it will still take 8 years to deliver the first 212CD to Norway. So Norway may need a life extension for its six Type 210s. [Pete suspects one of those 210s may need to be decommissioned and then cannibalized for spare parts].

There is much environmental/mission logic in Canada having a nuclear propelled attack submarine (SSN) capability. Canada has much experience with land based reactors having being involved in reactor design since 1942 and currently having 19 nuclear power/electricity reactors. Canada's 4 conventional subs can only slowly traverse Canada’s vast coastline and oceanic distances (eg. all the way in the North Atlantic to Canada’s UK/Euro NATO allies). Canada’s future subs would ideally need to operate under ice for weeks - something only nuclear subs can do and/or do safely. 

Russian SSN and SSBN’s traversing in/near Canadian waters are a potential threat that can most effectively be countered with SSNs. Also Canadian subs actually do missions far south to monitor Latin American drug smuggling – an operation coordinated by the US.

Against Canadian SSNs are cost, environmental concerns, US preferring to have the Western Hemisphere's SSN monopoly, US pressure that Canada’s naval mix compliments the USN, and that any confrontation with Russian or Chinese SSN/SSBNs may be high intensity warfare best left to nuclear weapons powers.

Also French, UK and US SSNs do temporarily dock at Dartmouth/Halifax Nova Scotia, Canada.

Canada has considered SSNs at least twice in the last 62 years. In March 1958 the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) began reviewing the possibility of acquiring SSNs with some in the RCN advocating five US built Skipjack class SSNs in June 1959. The US was not enthusiastic especially when the RCN and Cabinet began to think in unaffordable, grandiose terms, a purchase of 12 US SSNs. Sanity prevailed when the RCN settled in 1960 for just 3 conventional Oberon class subs from the UK commissioned in 1965-68 (although 6 or 8 may have formed a more viable force). Three Oberons probably cost about 1/36th the cost of 12 SSNs. Australia also chose the tried, tested and successful Oberon class (six of them).

In 1987 Canada revisited the SSN question. But Canada again was wildly ambitious in talking up to 12 SSNs when even France settled for just 6 Rubis class SSNs for the French Navy. After only 3 Oberons buying 12 Canadian "Canada-class" SSNs would huge jump for Canada's submarine service (where surface ships are also required). The US would have been concerned about a major shift in the North American balance of power, especially if Canada chose French SSNs.

Canada’s Oberons soldiered on until the end of the 1990s after extensive upgrades when they were replaced by the four British Upholder-class. The Upholders, renamed Victoria class in RCN service, were not the bargain the UK advertised and suffered much internal rust problems, electrical problems, fire  and other defects. Many of these problems stemmed from the UK RN "mothballing" the 4 subs for years in salt water.

Possibly the Upholders have been an even more off-putting public/political PR problem than Australia’s Collins. For many Canadians I suspect the Victoria experience has put them off the very idea of future submarines (replacements some time in the 2030, maybe).

Now in 2021 if Australian money becomes attractive enough (and US negative pressure on France not too great) then France might be persuaded to work with Australia first on six Barracuda class SSNs (entering service 2029-2035) replacing Australia’s Collins. If Australia’s take-up is satisfactory then Canada might conceivably buy six Barracuda’s (2036-2042). 

More detail:

The Barracudas are smaller hence cheaper, smaller crew, and use only low proliferation LEU in their K15 reactors. This is compared to the much larger, expensive large crew, US and UK SSNs that literally have weapons grade (around 95% U235) HEU in their reactors. UK/US reactors being a definite high proliferation legal/PR problem.

So for construction and language training Australian workers/technicians/engineers and managers would all need to be part of the first Australian Barracuda SSN built in Cherbourg, France. Then the final five built in Adelaide. The work cost would be the same as the 12 Attack class would have been. The difference is that one SSN has twice the capability at 5 times the fully submerged quiet speed as an SSK. An SSK needs to run its loud diesels about every 2 days (which the Chinese would love to hear).

and

If Canada were to buy 6 Barracudas the first built (and less language training, bilingual Canada...) of a Can-Barracuda would be in France. Then five or more built in Canada.

Refueling of Aus and Can Barracuda’s might be possible every 10 years in Canada given established Canada’s nuclear industrial base. This may well be easier than Aus SSNs going all the way to France. It would also help cross-subsidise "economies of scale" in  Canada's SSN costs. 

Australia would very likely stick with the US Combat System (weapons, sensors (eg. sonars), some workstations/databases) used on the Collins and being designed for the Attack class. The common US-Aus combat system is a major benefit of the US alliance. The US also being Canada's major strategic ally...

Along the lines I suspected when I wrote Unlikely Australia Wants to End French Submarine Deal  on January 21, 2021: 

A Brisbane Times article of March 2, 2021, written 4 hours ago is entitled :

"French submarines all but locked in after negotiation breakthrough"
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So Australia will always likely stick with Naval Group even though the Australian Governments puts on a hard bargaining act from time to time.

And a bitter casualty! Its way too early to be talking about Aussie SSNs.

An Australian-US alliance leads the world in a growing niche technology and doctrine. This is in Loyal Wingman stealthy jet powered UCAVs that work to manned aircraft or autonomously. 

This will, in future, provide a force multiplying air-to-air platform/network against China's more numerous manned jets. Loyal Wingman might also act as smart, one-way, "kamikaze" cruise missiles against high-value naval and ground targets (regime change "decapitation hits" anyone?).

See this most informative Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter article of March 2, 2021.
 

Woman on submarines reflect naval human resources recognition that its difficult to get enough people to crew a submarine, so either gender will do. Woman on subs also reflects wider societal moves toward affirmative action, orders on high and concern for naval public relations. 

Men are more used to women in previously male-only professions. More woman on subs might actually attract more men to the submarine service (?).

On subs the lack of Social Media connectivity/access (no social PC laptops, internet or mobile phones) is a recruitment turnoff. UK Royal Navy research has found this. Therefore I theorise this Social Media limitation can be partly offset by mixed-gender crews - not just blokes.

Further to the long running series on the advantages and disadvantages of woman part crewing submarines: 

Some articles are positive: Jul 27, 2015, Aug 11, 2015, Feb 16, 2021 and Feb 19, 2021

Some are scandalous: Oct 3, 2017,  Oct 9, 2017 and Feb 9, 2021.

With the help of readers I've located woman on submarines in additional navies - those of France, the UK, Spain and Argentina (a tragic episode). 

French Navy

There was a Defense Ministerial decision in 2014 that women were to be cleared to go on French SSBNs - perhaps from 2017. 

An official source is that there were four woman (with the roles “doctor”, engineering “head of the reactor service, assistant to the head of the diving safety service, assistant to the head of the underwater service”) on Triomphant-class French SSBN Le Terrible implicitly ending its patrol in July 2018.

UK Royal Navy

A 2014 French source advises: "The British  Royal Navy announced in 2011 it would allow females to work on its Vanguard class [SSBNs]. Like France, just three spots are currently available and non-commissioned officers will only be allowed starting" in 2015.

There were at least two female officers on HMS Vigilant (SSBN) in 2017 and one on HMS Artful (SSN). See the three "scandalous" articles above. It is more likely the majority of female deployments in the UK submarine service are successful - but only bad news hits the scandal sheets.

Spanish Navy

An Anonymous reader advised:

"In Spain, women have been serving in submarines since 1998-1999. But the first female officer just joined the fleet last summer, in June 2020." 

She is Submarine Officer Laura Vitalia González Martínez, See this long article from El Español "the Spanish" website here. With photo of Laura (below) courtesy the same website. 

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Argentine Navy (ARA San Juan)

The ARA San Juan tragically sank, with all 44 crew, in November 2017. In it was Submarine Officer Eliana Krawczyk. Eliana's home city of Oberá, Argentina, said it would name a street after her.