Reported by Agency France Press via France24 on March 26, 2021 

https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210326-russia-pushes-arctic-ambitions-after-suez-jam

Moscow (AFP) Russia has seized on the Suez Canal blockage to promote its northern shipping route as a reliable alternative, part of a broader push by Moscow to develop the Arctic and capitalise on climate change.

President Vladimir Putin has made Russia's Arctic region a strategic priority and ordered investment in military infrastructure and mineral extraction.

The development of the Northern Sea Route is closely linked to that push and Moscow has channelled large sums into a fleet of icebreakers and ice-class tankers.

Russia redoubled efforts to promote the Arctic route after a giant Japanese-owned tanker became wedged this week in the narrow Suez channel barring some 200 ships passage.

A senior Russian diplomat said Friday that the jam underscored the importance of developing the Arctic route.

...The Northern Sea Route is one of several Arctic shipping channels and lies within Russia's exclusive economic zone.

Russia has invested heavily to develop the route, which allows ships to cut the journey to Asian ports by 15 days compared with using the Suez Canal.

Transit of the eastern Arctic usually ends in November but Russia hopes climate change means the commercial benefit of the route will increase.

Moscow is planning to use the route to export oil and gas to overseas markets while companies including Russia's biggest LNG producer Novatek already navigate the northern route.

In August 2017, the first vessel travelled along the Northern Sea Route without the use of ice breakers.

...The Japanese-owned, Panama-flagged MV Ever Given became stuck in the Suez Canal during a sandstorm, blocking the waterway that connects the Mediterranean with the Red Sea and which handles more than 10 percent of global maritime trade.

Tugboats and dredgers scrambled [March 26, 2021] to free the giant container for a fourth day, forcing companies to re-route services from the vital shipping lane around Africa.

Russia's nuclear agency, which is the Arctic passage's official infrastructure operator, mockingly offered its northern route as an alternative Thursday, saying icebreakers would be sent to the rescue if vessels get stuck.

Nuclear agency Rosatom jokingly said the Arctic passage provides "more space to draw peculiar pictures using your giant ships," referring to shipping trackers which showed that the Ever Given traced the outline of a giant penis before getting stuck.

...Putin on Friday praised Russian navy’s Arctic exercises that launched last week, saying the troops had proven their ability to operate even "in harsh northern environments".

As part of the drill, three nuclear-powered submarines broke the ice and surfaced simultaneously while a nuclear submarine also fired a torpedo from beneath the ice.

SEE WHOLE AGENCY FRANCE PRESSARTICLE

Admiral Sean Paul"Jones" of the Royal Jamaican Submarine Service sings popular ditty
Got 2 Luv U ably assisted by Captain Alexis Jordan (dancing on the table).
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Buddies at the agency have asked me to write an op-ed on yesterday's (March 29, 2021) Ministerial reshuffle by Australian Prime Minister, Scott Morrison. 

Over the last month the Morrison Liberal-National Coalition government has declined from being mainly seen as an effective coordinator and financial responder to the Covid Crisis. Now it is seen as a symptom of alleged "rape" and sundry sexual deviancy by senior government males imposing themselves on junior females at Federal and State political levels.

Morrison was forced to act yesterday. His method is increasing the number of women in the Ministry. You will see many women in the official March 29, 2021 Ministry List.

Aside from humanitarianism Morrison cares because a Federal Election must be held any Saturday from "Saturday 7 August 2021" up until "Saturday 21 May 2022" inclusive. There being no fixed (eg. 4 year) Parliamentary terms in Australia's Federal level system. In Australia the optimal time for the Government to hold an election is seen as the Southern Hemisphere Spring (September - November) when people's happiness at  improvements in the weather is assumed to carry over to voting for the incumbent government. 

Significantly Morrison is clinging to Government by only a one-seat majority in the Federal House of Representatives. The next Federal Election will therefore be a close run, unpredictable, thing. The Labor Opposition (see red line on graph) is slightly ahead of the Morrison Coalition Government on a "two-party-preferred" basis.

So Morrison's reshuffle yesterday is aimed at resolving the "women problem" in likely preparation for an Australian Spring Election. Also by Spring enough Australians will have been Covid Vaccinated to make them feel better about their health, life and hence the incumbent Morrison Government.  

The main impact of this reshuffle on Australian defence matters can potentially come from the change in Defence Minister:

-  from Senator (for Western Australia) Linda Reynolds, suspected of effectively minimising an alleged rape of a staffer. Reynolds has spent 30 years, as part-time military, thus knowing military technology and policies well, though being a low profile Cabinet Minister.

-  to Peter Dutton MP as Defence Minister. His main defence related experience is Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. That portfolio involves much liaison with Defence, surveillance aircraft and patrol boats, with armed boarding parties, boarding refugee/people and drug smuggling boats. Dutton was not moved into a central direct interface with voters ministry because he has been and still is Morrison's main rival for Liberal Party Leader, hence the Prime Minister position. Dutton represents the Queensland seat/electorate of Dickson which may attract more defence business.

Dutton is unlikely to want to change the Government's ongoing policy of sticking with Naval Group (main contractor) and Lockheed Martin (combat system integrator) for Australia's Future Attack-class submarine program. As Dutton does not come from Reynolds' state of Western Australia Reynolds scheme to divert more current Collin's class submarine maintenance work to Western Australia may recede as a plan.

However, Melissa Price MP for Western Australia, remains the more junior Minister for Defence Industry.   

The highly ambitious, Andrew Hastie MP, remains Assistant Minister for Defence. He spent 14 years as a soldier and was Chair of the Parliamentary Committee on Intelligence and Security for just over 3 years, So Hastie has a good grounding to move into more senior defence ministerial grades. 

Whether the reshuffle has cured Morrison's "women problem" remains to be seen. It is unlikely that Morrison, or his rival, Dutton will significantly alter Australian defence/submarine projects and policies. Many workers/voters/businesses/politicians need to feel confident that federal money for defence funding in their area/electorates will be ongoing. There is especially with an Election approaching (September 2021 to May 2022).

Pete

A Hindustan Times report of March 24, 2021 indicated the Indian Navy had informed the Modi government that building six SSNs took priority over building a third aircraft carrier, (known as INS Vishal). 

My comment/question was the Indian Navy usually asks its political masters (especially Prime Minister Narendra Modi ) whether the Navy can radically alter its shipbuilding strategy/plan. I didn’t believe the Navy could get away with so boldly telling Parliament what the Navy was going to do. This is because Parliament supplies the ship/sub building money and politicians have a “pork barrel” tendency to build subs/ships in their own state/electorate for political gain.

On March 27, 2021 Gessler replied, with excellent detail and links, along the lines:

The Indian government created the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) on 24 December 2019. Since then the first (only) CDS, four star General Bipin Rawat (photo above - a former Chief of Army Staff) has been pushing the Navy to prioritize its purchases. Only a few months after taking office, CDS Rawat has pushed for submarines as opposed to aircraft carriers. As an illustration see this article of February 17, 2020Approval for third aircraft carrier may not comesoon, indicates CDS Rawat. 

The Arihant class and INS Chakra are current. Third one down is a possible shape and comparative size of a future Indian attack submarine (SSN) below that is the possible shape of a future, larger Indian SSBN class (known as S5). (Artwork and captions courtesy
H I Sutton's, Forbes article of Feb 23, 2020).
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The CDS has been supporting the build of 6 SSNs in particular. See this article, which says in summary: At CDS Rawat’s first media interaction, of Feb 2020, he asked the Navy to re-evaluate priorities and hinted that if it pushed for the third aircraft carrier it would have to forgo the 6 SSNs. 

CDS Rawat's call to prioritize 6 SSNs met resistance from the Chief of Naval Staff on down - see Feb 21, 2020’s Indian Navy will push ahead with plan for 3rd aircraft carrier despite CDS’ reservations. 

This internal defence force conversation went on for little over a year, from Feb 2020 to Mar 2021. In the civilian public domain, the discussion of SSNs vs 3rd Carrier continued. Several retired Admirals and other senior Navy officers published opinion pieces. Some even accusing CDS Rawat of “Land-Centrism”. Although in reality there's nothing land-centric about a fleet of SSNs. While some rejected the accusation, some even supported a Land-centrism case.

Meanwhile, the internal conversation finally culminated in the Combined Commanders Conference in early March 2021...where the Navy finally made the decision to abide by the CDS' call for SSN prioritization.

CDS Rawat has had solid political support. He served as Chief of Staff of the Indian Army from 2016-2019. He was then promoted to be India's first CDS, a position who's creation was recommended by several Defense Committees for almost two decades. CDS Rawat, though still of 4-star rank, became 'First Among Equals', over the three Service Chiefs (Army, Navy and Air Force). His promotion to CDS naturally occurred with the support of Modi and that of National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval. The NSA was reorganized into a very powerful Cabinet-level position in 2019.

All this means is that the Navy informing Parliament (in March 2021) that the Navy would be prioritizing the SSN program over the 3rd Carrier, was no surprise to Modi. The Navy was simply reminding the Indian government that this so-called “internal defence force decision” was what CDS Rawat had publically advocated in Feb 2020 and SSN prioritization already had the full support of the Modi government. 

In summary, the national security strategy/plan devised by the Modi government, NSA and CDS, that prioritizes SSNs over another carrier, has now overcome the Navy’s internal resistance to the strategy.

Following this article - on March 31 2021 Gessler provided highly insightful comments and links here and here. See them below (slightly edited by Pete): 

As well as for the first time appointing a Chief of Defence Staff the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi Government has carried out other defence reforms in its 2nd 5 year term (beginning 2019). Note the Constitution of India mandatesparliamentary elections once every five years. Modi was first voted into office in 2014 and his current term is from 2019 to 2024.

The most significant armed forces reform (of Modi’s second term) is easily the Theaterization of the Armed Forces in general, and in particular the creation of the proposed Maritime Theatre Command(MTC). The commander of the MTC will be an Indian Navy officer who will report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (see MAP  below) headed by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) (General Bipin Rawat) - his appointment reported here).

The Theaterization of the Air-Land tactical command-and-control chain on India's Western and Northern/North-Eastern Borders places all tactical assets in the theatre (infantry, tanks, missiles and  aircraft) under one Theatre Commander regardless of which Service recruited or trained that asset. This is very much in accord with the US’s Unified Combatant Command concept. As well as Indian Theatre Commanders the creation of a unified Air Defense Command (likely similar to North America’s NORAD) will likely  receive the most attention in the Indian Press. From an Indo-Pacific perspective Gessler estimates the MTC is the most significant in terms of capabilities represented.

A good read regarding this subject is at The Diplomat(paysite) and more accessibly at India's The Print (free site).  

(Graphic courtesy Tanmoy Chakraborty via Quora, December 17, 2020)

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The MTC would be unifying the Indian Navy's Western Naval Commend (HQ'd at Mumbai) and Eastern Naval Command (HQ'd at Vishakhapatnam)  as well as the already Tri-Service Andaman and Nicobar (A&N) Islands Command.  These three commands would be under one operational Theatre Commander (likely a Navy Officer) who would use all the assets as he sees fit and would treat the entire Indian Ocean Region as one combat theatre with the Peninsula portion of India at its center. The MTC will reportedly be HQ’d at Karwar Naval Base (INS Kadamba ?) at Karwar, Karnataka, about 600km south, on the coast, from Mumbai (see Map above).

To get a good look at what all the MTC would entail, a somewhat zoomed-out perspective is necessary. Basically you're looking at ALL the ships and submarines of the Indian Navy including:

 -  major surface combatants,
-  carrier task forces,
-  diesel and nuclear-powered attack subs,
-  all support, auxiliary and special vessels,
-  all tactical anti-ship missile forces based from out of both (Eastern and Western) Peninsular India as well as the A&N Islands,
- all Naval Aircraft (fighters, maritime patrols, drones)
-  all Air Force aircraft that till now were shore-based but poised for a maritime strike role with cruise missiles,
-  all Army amphibious infantry personnel which till now were controlled by Army but made to land on beaches in Navy ships,
-  all Naval Special Operations Forces (SOFs),
-  all ground-based VLF/ULF transmitters,
-  any future dedicated Marine Infantry force,
-  control of all Indian military-owned bases in Peninsular India and the Indian Ocean Region, and
-  all this and more, under one operational commander, who is Three-star Naval Officer.

Of course, although the SLBMs on India’s SSBNs would be operationally still under Strategic Forces Command the SSBNs will however be manned and maintained by Navy personnel. Therefore the responsibility to deliver the survivable nuclear deterrent, and to provide the means of protecting them from enemy action, will belong to MTC. 

This is more operational capability (and responsibility) than what any other Theatre Commander under the currently-planned setup would have. And even the Indian Coast Guard may have to report to the Maritime Theatre Commander. Therefore the Maritime Theatre Commander commander would be the most powerful person reporting to the CDS, who Chairs the Indian Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. This will inevitably have an impact on the way budgets and priorities are distributed in the future. Also when dealing with the needs of such a huge command, prioritization of purchases is likely to take on a whole new level of importance - no wonder CDS was pushing for it.

Furthermore it would cut the Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) office out of the loop of operational control of any assets whatsoever – with the CNS merely confined to an administrative role with the responsibility to recruit, train and base naval personnel, and fill out forms to buy equipment on MRT’s. 

With the open ocean in front of him with no immediate adversary (unlike the Air-Land Theatre Commanders who's job it will be to manage the Chinese and Pakistani borders), it will leave the MRT commander with a lot of room to manoeuvre and grow.

There are some other views from experts as well, namely that this is too much responsibility for one person and that India may need not one but two Maritime Theatre Commanders: 

MTC is the space to watch - how well the Indian Navy's programs evolve in the future (or don't) will be determined by how the MTC turns out.

SUMMARY

The following 8 articles refer to "Crypto" encoding-decoding machines made by Swiss company Crypto AG and distributed to 120 customers/countries. All the machines were allegedly compromised for the benefit of some large Western signals intelligence agencies. In 2018, Crypto AG was liquidated but much of its equipment, business associations and corporate culture appear to have been carried over in its descendent companies.

The current descendents of Crypto AG appear to be based in Switzerland and Sweden. If you are a foreign customer for their very expensive encoding-decoding machines you would expect assurance that your private, sensitive messages are not being read by other entities, ie. compromised. For example not being read by those entities who appear to have read the messages of 120 country/customers of Crypto AG since 1970. 

The descendent companies may have a credibilty problem owing to Crypto AG's 49-50 year tradition of compromised machines. To restore credibility simple consumer protection arrangements may be inadequate. Actual contracts between customers and the cybersecurity agencies of Switzerland and/or Sweden that are meant to protect the secure-ness of machines sold in Switzerland and Sweden might be more effective than shallow contracts that regular consumers accept when they are buying standard laptops. 

The home/parent signals/cybersecurity agencies of Switzerland and Sweden should protect the machines from having easily penetrated "backdoors or keys" such as hardware or software that expedites breaches by large third party foreign international agencies. Actual contracts between customers and the cybersecurity agencies of Switzerland and/or Sweden should best carry more legal, political and sueable clout than vague "laptop" contracts.

Given the many US$Billions involved in selling machines and the cost of sensitive data/conversations compromised, breaches of contract should be regulated by senior court decisions, eg: international criminal courts. Or in the spirit that American exceptionalism has permitted the US to try foreign leaders and large non-US corporations perhaps China should establish an international criminal court for compromised communications? This is on the basis the ITU has been unwilling or unable to fine members for long-term breaches of customer-consumer rights. Perhaps 1. below could be called Next of kin of Argentine soldiers and sailors killed who relied on "secure" Crypto AG Machines vs Crypto AG.

MAIN TEXT

1.  Latin America's El Snorkel submarine website reports March 27, 2021:

“The communications of the Argentine Navy were intercepted and decoded by the British during the [1982] Falklands/Malvinas War: The British managed to break Argentina's encryption keys with the help of the United States National Security Agency (NSA)”

During the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War, Argentine Navy communications were regularly intercepted and decoded by British intelligence at the GCHQ - Government Communications Headquarters, as the Crypto AG [see details below] machines used by the Argentine army were not secure.

The GCHQ learned of the movement of Argentine submarines in the theater of operations, including the names of the areas in which the ARA San Luis submarine operated.

A [UK] nuclear submarine and frigates were sent to intercept the Argentine submarine based on this information obtained by intelligence.

The British managed to break Argentina's encryption keys with the help of the United States National Security Agency (NSA).

The communications may have been picked up by listening stations on Ascension Island, New Zealand, Chile and, according to rumours, by the US Embassy in Buenos Aires.

A communications interception satellite called the Vortex, launched in 1981 by the United States, was also used to support the British during the conflict.

In the image below, is a British report indicating the status of all Argentine submarines on
April 16, 1982, during the Falklands/Malvinas War.  

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Compromised Crypto AG Machines

2.  Separately US website IntelNews March 3, 2020,reported : 

Switzerland’s Federal Department of Finance has filed a criminal complaint “against persons unknown” over media reports that a leading Swiss-based cryptological equipment manufacturer was secretly owned by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The complaint relates to Crypto AG, the world’s leading manufacturer of cryptologic equipment during the Cold War, whose clients included over 120 governments around the world. Last month, the Washington Post and the German public broadcaster ZDF appeared to confirm reports that had been circulating since the early 1980s, that Crypto AG was a front for American intelligence. According to the revelations, the CIA and West Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (BND) secretly purchased the Swiss company in the 1950s and paid off most of its senior executives in order to buy their silence.

The secret deal, dubbed Operation RUBICON, allegedly allowed the US and West Germany to spy on the classified government communications of several of their adversaries - and even allies, including Austria, Italy, Spain, Greece, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

The revelation about the secret deal has shocked Swiss public opinion and embarrassed the government of a nation that bases its national identity and international reputation on the concept of neutrality. For this reason, the Swiss Federal Department of Finance has filed a criminal complaint about the case. The complaint was announced by the Office of the Swiss Attorney General on Monday, following reports in the Swiss media. It said that it received a criminal complaint by the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), which is the part of the Finance Department that authorizes exports of sensitive software or hardware. SECO officials argue that they were deceived into authorizing the export of Crypto AG’s products without realizing they had been compromised by the company’s secret agreement with the CIA and the BND. Accordingly, the secret agreement violates Swiss federal law governing the regulation of exports, SECO officials claim. 

The Office of the Attorney General said it would review the criminal complaint and decide whether it warrants criminal proceedings. Meanwhile, a probe into the alleged Crypto AG-CIA-BND conspiracy, which was launched by the Swiss government last month, is already underway, and is expected to conclude in June. The Swiss Federal Assembly (the country’s parliament) is also expected to launch its own investigation into the alleged affair.”

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EXAMPLE OF LATE MODEL CRYPTO AQ MACHINE – SECURITY NOW IN DOUBT?

3.  A January 16, 2020 article reports :

“...Currently, Crypto AG offers the HC-9300 Crypto Desktop, which is a futuristic looking touchscreen device that performs the encryption of telephone, fax, VoIP and e-mail communications. This device is available at least since 2015 and is approved by the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW to be used for inspections for example. 

Maybe the Swiss diplomatic network already uses the HC-9300 to secure its fax messages, but in general, government agencies tend to be rather conservative and stick to older versions, also because new crypto equipment has to undergo rigorous testing before it may be used to protect classified information.” 
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4.  The following January 2020 advertisement for the HC-9300 (photo above), one of the Swiss Government's (others?) latest Crypto AG machines, includes such security assurances as: 

“The HC-9300 is based on a seamlessly integrated security architecture that has already proved its effectiveness in thousands of cases. Maximum security is therefore ensured for all its applications and security management procedures. The actual encryption is performed in a separate hardware module. The encryption process is based exclusively on symmetric and secret algorithms profiled by your security manager. Multiple keys can be defined in the system, allowing hierarchically arranged user groups to be set up. Access to the platform is protected with passwords and identity-based user accounts to deliver maximum security. All users are granted individual rights in keeping with their responsibilities and security clearance.”
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5.  Feeling of secure-ness may have been put into doubt by many February 2020 onwards media exposes including The Washington Post’s February 11, 2020’s article which, in part, states:

"Crypto’s products are still in use in more than a dozen countries around the world, and its orange-and-white sign still looms atop the company’s longtime headquarters building near Zug, Switzerland. But the company was dismembered in 2018, liquidated by shareholders whose identities have been permanently shielded by the byzantine laws of Liechtenstein, a tiny European nation with a Cayman Islands-like reputation for financial secrecy.

Two companies purchased most of Crypto’s assets. The first, CyOne Security, was created as part of a management buyout and now sells security systems exclusively to the Swiss government. The other, Crypto International, took over the former company’s brand and international business.

Each insisted that it has no ongoing connection to any intelligence service, but only one claimed to be unaware of CIA ownership. Their statements were in response to questions from The Post, ZDF and Swiss broadcaster SRF, which also had access to the documents.

"CyOne has more substantial links to the now-dissolved Crypto, including that the new company’s chief executive held the same position at Crypto for nearly two decades of CIA ownership.

A CyOne spokesman declined to address any aspect of Crypto AG’s history but said the new firm has “no ties to any foreign intelligence services.”

Andreas Linde, the chairman of the company that now holds the rights to Crypto’s international products and business, said he had no knowledge of the company’s relationship to the CIA and BND before being confronted with the facts in this article.

“We at Crypto International have never had any relationship with the CIA or BND — and please quote me,” he said in an interview."

[In a less than convincing tone of hurt honor, for a hard-nosed businessman, he continues.] 

“If what you are saying is true, then absolutely I feel betrayed, and my family feels betrayed, and I feel there will be a lot of employees who will feel betrayed as well as customers.”"

6.  Did a subsequent corporate rebirth, later in 2020, remove all personnel involved pre-2020 with intelligence agencies? That would be unreasonable in the security industry, no?!

Is there a continued relationship with Swiss or Swedish home/parent signals intelligence agencies or with pre-2020 identified foreign ones? Leopard changing more than spots?
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ACCOUNTABILITY OF PAST & CURRENT CRYPTO AG PROVIDERS

The current descendents of Crypto AG appear to be based in Switzerland and Sweden. If you are a foreign customer for their very expensive encoding-decoding machines you would expect assurance that your private, sensitive messages are not being read by other entities, ie. compromised. For example not being read by those entities who appear to have read the messages of 120 country/customers of Crypto AG for decades (see 2.).

Consumer level equipment assurance, box-ticking, disclaimer, by Crypto AG descendents that the equipment they are selling you is not compromised has been demonstrable inadequate since 1970. A contract between customers and the cybersecurity agencies of Switzerland and/or Sweden might be more to the point.

The accountability of home/parent signals/cybersecurity agencies of Switzerland and Sweden is because equipment sold in or from their borders should not have easy "backdoors". That is such hardware, software (or wetware employees "in-the-pay-of") that can be breached by large third party foreign international agencies.   

In contrast it is understandable that home/parent signals/cybersecurity agencies have rights to read messages from or to their borders on national security matters like counter-terrorism, counter-intelligence, money laundering (especially kept track of by Switzerland...)(for organised crime, etc) and many other law enforcement uses.

7. Contractural assurance from Switzerland's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) that encoder-decoder equipment sold by Swiss equipment makers is not compromised, may carry more legal, political and sueable clout. For example Switzerland could be sued by international criminal courts. Alternatively as US courts have a history of taking up international disputes could not China (a rapidly growing communications equipment provider) also build a legal structures to handle international equipment disputes? This is presuming the ITU is too toothless, slow and gentlemanly to sue members $USmillions to Billions for gross, long-term, breaches of customer-consumer rights.

8.  Equally contractural assurance from  Sweden's "NSA" the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA) that encoder-decoder equipment sold by Swedish equipment makers is not compromised may carry more legal, political and sueable clout. 

These are my comments following March 31, 2021's "India's future 6 SSNs over 3rd Carrier: Internal Leverage." 

India has been discussing the development of 6 x SSNs, now dubbed "Project 75 Alpha" since the 1990s. There has been endless talk and breathless Indian media reporting that these Indian SSNs (lets call them Alphas) will be built "very soon" for the last 15 years. 

India, like most nuclear submarine-nuclear weapon powers, has had to juggle needs to fill out all 3 "legs" of the nuclear triad. That means India has simultaneously developed  nuclear weapons dropped by aircraft and mounted on long range land based missiles. SSBNs with their SLBMs, are the last, hardest and longest to develop, leg of the Triad. Meanwhile India has been talking about developing Alpha concepts before it can get around to "cutting steel" - noting the highest priority of Alpha SSNs is to protect SSBNs.   

INS Chakra II and eventually III

India already has been transferring technology from its 30 year old design Russian built Akula SSN known as INS Chakra II (ex Nerpa) (see artwork below).  Chakra II has been under 10 year lease since 2012 from Russia - so lease expiration may be in 2022. The lease may be extended if Russia is unable to supply a later model Akula (unofficially named “Chakra III”) by about 2025.  Chakra II and then III hulls were designed in the early 1980s may not be carrying torpedoes or anti-ship missiles permitting them to be truly operational in defending Arihant-class SSBNs. I'm aware of no reports of  Chakra II regularly pulling out of its base at India's Eastern Naval Command HQ - Visakhapatnam or returning to "Visak". So Chakra II's main value may be limited Indian crew training and/or Russian  transfer of technology (ToT) to India. 

Training and ToT would include Chakra II's 190MW OK-650 reactor which may be running in place while not actually moving the sub. An Indian variant of the full 190MW power of the OK-650 reactor will be more than adequate to power India's future 13,500 tonne (surfaced) S5-class full size SSBNs (see artwork below). Significant updated variants of the OK-650 already power Russia's latest Borei/Borey class SSBNs (see right sidebar).

Meanwhile Indian nuclear crew training continues on INS Arihant and soon Arihant's sister-sub INS Arighat. 

French Barracuda SSN and K15 Reactor Value

India’s 6 x Alphas may have some features of India’s 8,140 tonne Chakra “II”. But India talks more of a 6,000 tonne Alpha that would, of course, have many design differences to a 8,140 tonne Chakra II. India understandably has an interest in French Naval Goup ToT from its 5,300 tonne (submerged) French Barracuda class very modern SSN which is likely to be much quieter than 38 year old hull technology Chakra-Akulas.  Naval Group may be enticed to release more Barracuda details if this is packaged with India purchasing 6 x Scorpene (AIP) SSKs under the endlessly discussed and delayed Project-75I. 

While a Russian OK-650 reactor would be too large for a 6,000 tonne Alpha Russia and India may want to investigate the Barracuda’s K15 reactor. Obtaining K15 details from France via India would constitute an intelligence coup for Russia. For India an enlarged, more powerful, variant of the K15 may be sought. The K15’s main limitation being its need to refuel every 7-10 years. India would value a fuel core more at 15 years or even better, 35 years (whole of submarine life).

Alternatively India may rely on a highly modified variant capable of 100MW derived from  the 83MW reactor used for INS Arihant (more see) .

Alpha SSN Protection of SSBNs

The Indian government support for building 6 Alphas in India is not only a navy matter. A (or the) major task of the Alphas will be to protect India’s growing force of SSBNs. See this generalised and very useful description of India's future nuclear subs.  These SSBNs (so far only the 2 small Arihant class) will form the most secure and potent second strike arm of India’s nuclear triad. Two more slightly larger Arihants are planned - making 4 Arihant small SSBNs (aka "Baby Boomers"). The Arihants however cannot accommodate SLBMs large enough to hit the capital, Beijing, of India’s (likely) enemy China. 

A more effective second strike SSBN arm will come with the full size “S5” SSBNs (see artwork below). These S5s, which may be launched from the late 2020s/early 2030s, will be able to accommodate 12 to 16 larger, longer range, desirably "K6" SLBMs capable of hitting Beijing.

The Arihant class and INS Chakra are current. Third one down is a possible shape and comparative size of a future Indian Alpha SSN below that is the possible shape of a future, larger Indian SSBN class (known as S5). (Artwork and captions courtesy

H I Sutton's, Forbes article of Feb 23, 2020).
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Bastion Protection of India's SSBNs 

India's Arihant SSBNs are believed to be noisier than Russian or Western ideal SSBN noise levels and there are no new Alphas to protect them. So India's Arihants may need to be Bastion Protected in the Bay of Bengal by India's P8 MPAs, other jet aircraft, helicopters,  surface naval ships, undersea sensors and many other sensor and weapons platforms. 

It remains unknown whether India's leased Chakra II is armed, and therefore able to provide credible protection to just one Arihant. Even if a "newer" Chakra III is leased these Akulas are early 1980s hull designs, so liable to be comparatively noisy. They would need to be able to detect far quieter Pakistani AIP-Agosta-90Bs and late model Pak-AIP-Yuan SSKs as well as Chinese AIP-Yuans and Chinese SSNs.

India's first Alpha may be delivered to the Navy in the late 2020s and will need around 3 years of testing/training/working up to be fully commissioned in the 2030s. India will then probably require 2 more Alphas to form a credible protection force of 3 Alphas (noting rule of thirds). This may need to coincide with full commissioning of the first S5 full size, and quiet, SSBN.

So India may only have a fully operational force of 3 Alphas and 3 S5s in the late 2030s.

Pete

Following their briefing of March 26, 2021, on Japanese submarine Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs), Derek Woolner and David Glynne Jones have kindly provided information  on LIBs for: 

-  South Korea's new conventionally (diesel-electric) propelled cruise and/or ballistic
    missile submarines (KSS-III SSBs), and 

-  Chinese Yuan-class conventionally propelled attack submarines (SSKs). 

SOUTH KOREA (SK)

SK is building its 9 x KSS-III SSBs in 3 “Blocks” of 3 each. The first 3 (KSS-III Block 1s)  will have current technology Lead-acid Batteries (LABs) and fuel cell Air Independent Propulsion (AIP).

For KSS-III Blocks 2 and 3 SK undertook a research process which determined LIBs were the best way to go. Blocks 2 and 3 will have reportedly use Samsung SDI LIBs. See further details here and here . [LIBs for subs development has been ongoing for 5+ years.]

SK’s 3 x KSS-III Block 2s will be [launched 2022-23 and 24 then steadily commissioned] in the mid-late 2020s. They will be equipped with LIB main batteries and fuel cell AIP. The Block 2 LIB main battery system will be approximately double the effective capacity of the Collins class submarine main battery but less than half the weight.

[Pete Comment: On the basis of JS Oryu's launch in October 2018 and the first KSS-III Block 2 perhaps being launched in late 2022, SK LIB development may be 4 years behind Japan’s. SK’s KSS-IIIs will not be typical SSKs (unlike Japan’s Soryus and Taigeis or SK's KSS-Is and KSS-IIs). SK’s KSS-IIIs are dedicated carriers of vertical launch systems for cruise or ballistic missiles - making these subs SSBs].

CHINA – A LIB MAYBE

Rounding out East Asian LIB developments. There have been unconfirmed reports, since 2015, that China has been planning to build a LIB-equipped evolution of the Yuan-class Type 039 SSK. 

There are strengthening indications that China will build a significant number (> 20) of Type 039C LIB-equipped submarines in the mid-late 2020s. See https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/yuan-units.htm [Limited free looks Paysite.] 

[

[Pete Comment: See this free Submarine Matters article, dated February 5, 2016, China's Yuan Subs May Adopt LIB Batteries. It is possible China's Winston Battery company (aka "Shenzhen Smart Lion Power Battery Limited" and/or "Thunder Sky") is developing a 335kg WB-LYP10000AHA LIB (photo/artwork above) for submarines. Sub LIBs may already be aboard one or two of Chinese Yuan class (039A) test submarines or on China’s dedicated large test sub (known as the Type 032 “Qing” class). Alternatively the Winston LIB concept might be a marketing idea to attract foreign finance. It is possible Russia may be interested in the Winston LIB concept.]

_________________

About Derek Woolner and David Glynne Jones 

Derek is co-author of the 2008 classic The Collins Class Submarine Story: Steel, Spies and Spin . He is a previous Director of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Group in the Parliamentary Research Service.

David is an independent advocate for the adoption of renewable energy technology across all sectors of the Australian economy. He is currently assessing the implications of emerging advanced battery technology for electrification of the Australian transport sector.

Their blog-website is Woolner and Jones.

Following India's 6 Future Alpha SSNs - SSBN Protectorsof April 7, 2021 came the blessing of a veritable avalanche of good comments from Anonymous, GhalibKabir, Gessler and Arpit Kanodia. Rather than attempt to summarise each comment (obscuring meaning and context). Or try to respond point by point (which would fill 10 pages/5 articles) I'll republish the comments. I'll also add some lengthened weapon designations,  comments in [...] brackets and extra links.

I'll start combining GhalibKabir’s comments of Apr 8, 2021:

“Pete, I think we discussed this way back in 2019, similar to the Chinese Type 091 (NATO (Chinese Dynasty) reporting name "Han" class) SSN. The future Indian Project 75 Alpha SSN will likely (initially) use a slightly uprated Arihant 40% HEU PWR (uprated from 83 MWt to 100 MWt) implying electrical power uprates to 16.7 MWe from a maximum of 13.8 MW presently) (the rule of 1/6 for naval reactors vs 1/3 for land based). 

Peter Lobner got it right with his 100 MWt prediction I think. [See Peter Lobner "Marine Nuclear Power 1939-2018: Part 5, China, India, Japan & other nations" (July, 2018) page 159 (Table) and page 163 at https://lynceans.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Marine-Nuclear-Power-1939-2018_Part-5_China-India-Japan-Others.pdf about 50 MB, 294 pages] 

The S-5 class future full size Indian SSBN could see a single Soviet/Russian OK-650 reactor [which India may have designated the CLWR-B2 Compact LWR - see right sidebar] derivative as the bigger SSBN will need 25 MWe or more capacity to be available implying a 160-170 MWt OK-650 [even 190 MW and see also ] class reactor.

However, SSN reactor dynamics are likely to be different as the rapid 'power up power down' variation demand on the SSN reactor for 'sprint chases' will be much higher than an SSBN. The Arihant class' or even the S-5's likely speed requirements could stay between 22-24 knots while the Alpha SSN will need burst speed capability of 35 knots and the ability to do 28-30 knots frequently and consistently... (like China's current Type 093 Shang class SSN for instance). 

Also I think INS Chakra IIelements with Arihant base is the most likely in SSN Alpha and not Barracuda or the Alvero Alberto [aka "SN-BR"] Brazilian Scorpene SSN (though some learnings will cross over in welding, silencing, reduction gear design etc.) [Also the future Chakra III might influence the Alpha SSN. "India and Russia, March 7, 2019, signed $3Billion deal to lease another Akula SSN, dubbed Chakra III, should be delivered to Indian Navy 2025].

I do hope India is able to leverage [France's] Thales and [Israel's] Rafael under water suites expertise to equip the SSN with good sonar suites and combat capabilities."

[The Russia-India lease deal means] INS Chakra II cannot be used in offensive war. It cannot be armed with any missile ranging > 290 km i.e. original MTCR restrictions apply (unless I am gravely mistaken)...it can help in case of open war, but will be limited to defending with torpedoes and such short range missiles as to be of very limited utility indeed....plus the sonars and combat suites are very old as well....

I think a vertical launch system (VLS) [on the Alpha SSN? Within a 6,000 tonne (submeged) displacement limit?] combo with Horizontal launch capability could be better... 24 Tri-packed Nirbhay sub-sonic SLCMs in 8 VLS with 20+ combination of Varunastra Torpedoes and BrahMos SLCMs are the most likely combos..

Also while a propulsor pumpjet is desirable and is being tried, I think a conventional 7 blade screw is likely for the first 2 Alpha SSNs at least. Like the Chinese Typo 091 SSN in 1975, the focus first should be to get a couple of Alphas out and test them. Then we can see and make real progress, instead of an unhealthy obsession with 'perfect profile' product launches.

The Type 091 used a 60 MWt inefficient PWR that delivered 8 MWe and was very radiation leak prone. The key difference being the PWR was a LEU (thanks to the Soviets screwing the Chinese over [Soviets were worried Mao was prepared to risk dragging the Soviets into nuclear war against US and Taiwan]. China was left with minimal uranium supplies and also a loss of nuclear and submarine expertise after China's Cultural Revolution). India has been a HEU navy.

Good that [India's Chief of Defence Staff, General] Bipin Rawat, Doval and co were able to prevail on the SSNs after 3 years of wrangle at North Block" [ie. wrangling at the Ministry of Finance, New Delhi].

Following Lithium-ion Batteries: South Korean & Chinese Subs of April 9, 2021, Anonymous on April 13, 2021 kindly provided thesecomments and calculations (with some editing by Pete) regarding battery propulsion for China’s Yuan-class submarine:

The advertisement for China's Winston Battery WB-LYP10000AHA Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) indicates the average on-board consumption of a Yuan-submarine, when not moving, is some “38kW/h” meaning that its hotel load is 38kW. 

The total energy of Lead-acid Batteries (LABs) (assuming they are 400 tonnes in weight) in the Yuan-class seems to be around 11 MWh or more. The Chinese make the incredible claim the Yuan-class using LABs can stay under water for 12 days! [1, 2] Such a LABs-based submarine does not exist. A capacity of 31 MWh, 3300 nm over 33 days for Yuan (LIBs) also looks like perfect nonsense. 580nm over 6 days looks more reasonable [3].

[1] A Japanese ton is the same as a metric tonne, ie. 1,000kg. This calculation example uses data of a Japanese GS-Yuasa LAB, type MSE-3000 (weight = 212kg, capacity = 3000 Ah, voltage = 2V). As the energy of a type MSE-3000 is 6 kWh ( = 3000 Ah x 2V) , then energy of 400 tonne of MSE-3000 is 11.3 MWh ( = 400 ton/212 kg x 6 kWh). Then total hotel load per day is 0.912 MWh/day (= 38 kW x 24h). Endurance is 11.3 (MWh)/0.912(MWh/day) = 12 days.

[2] Generally, the average hotel load of diesel submarine is around 150kW. Maximum (90% discharge depth) and repeatable (30% discharge depth) endurance of a Yuan-class using LABs might be 3 days or less.

[3] On LIBs, if the hotel load and propulsion output at 4 knots are 150kW and 50kW, respectively, total output per day (= (150kW + 50kW) x 24h) is 4.8MWh/day. Then endurance and distance, at 4 knots, is 6 days (90% of discharge depth) and 580nm ( = 4knots x 24h x 6 days). And endurance when not moving (= 0 knots) is 7.8 days (=31MWh / (150kW x 24h) x 0.9).

Following India's 6 Future Alpha SSNs - SSBN Protectors of April 7, 2021 Gessler made some learned and extensive comments on April 9, 2021. Pete has added some comments in [...] brackets. Here is the first of 3 Gessler instalments:

“@Pete. I'm sceptical about the figures of India’s future indigenous Project 75 Alpha SSN tonnage/displacement floating around in the media. I suspect those displacement figures (not only mentioned by Hindustan Times but many others as well) are from the same erroneous sources that also claimed that the S-3 boat (INS Arighat) the sister of S-2 (INS Arihant) would be considerably bigger and carry 8 missile silos. But satellite images (like this) of the Ship Building Centre (SBC) harbour at Visakhapatnam (Visak, most commonly pronounced & spelled Vizag) prove that both of the Arihant-class INS Arihant and INS Arighat are the same length [(116m) and size (Beam 11m, Draught 15m)], and carry the same number of missile tubes, ie. 4. [See "Future of Indian Navy - Nuclear Submarines"]

Now don't get me wrong - I still am inclined to believe the 4th nuclear boat to be built by SBC (known in the media as the S-4* or S-4 Star) [see "Ships in class"] would indeed be considerably bigger than the Arihant-class, satellite images of a new submarine dockyard shelter constructed at Vizag which is up to 40m longer than Arihant's shelter substantiate the theory that a new, bigger boat is around the corner - and it definitely can't be the S-5 yet. So it has to be the rumoured S-4* SSBN, with perhaps 8 silos.

Nuclear expert Hans M. Kristensen's observation of the same summarized in his tweet, though he speculates this to be intended for the S-4 itself (3rd nuclear boat), not the S-4*. Personally, I would think all three Arihant-class SSBNs will be of the same dimensions, it would not make any sense to have the last boat in class to be substantially different than the others.

The S-4* on the other hand might make sense as both a test platform for new, larger equipment that may eventually find use on the still larger S-5 class down the line, once the systems mature after at-sea testing on this boat. The Arihants would have to be at sea (or in refit), delivering on the deterrence role, you can't ask them to come off their vitally important duties to function as test platforms for new stuff - the S-4* might make a lot of sense in that respect. 

Another reason to be sceptical about the Alpha's displacement figures would be that pretty much all available sources (unless I'm misremembering) quote the Arihant-class boats' surfaced displacement as approx. 6,000 tonnes. [eg. see the right sidebar of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/INS_Arihantwhich states “Displacement: surface: 6,000 tonne (estimated)” based on this.]

So if the Alpha indeed turns out to 'Arihant without silos' then there's no way it'll also be 6,000 tonnes surfaced. The Alphas will have to be 5,000 tonnes [surfaced], but even that is speculation.

So personally I'll hold my horses for now regarding the displacement figures."

[Pete Comment: Interesting information by Joseph P Chacko at frontier India . com “Google Maps Show Indian [Arihant class] Submarines Berthed Alongside” February 5, 2021. “The [Arihants] are easily identifiable as the fins are located in the forward with the diving planes are fin mounted. Forward fin permits positioning of missile launchers aft. None of the the Indian conventional submarines have this feature...Initially [what became INS Arihant] was conceived as SSN based on the [Soviet] Charlie 1 class design ...However, after the first concept design was made the requirement to make an SSBN post Pokhran 2 in May 98, a decision was made to make Arihant as an SSBN. The objective was achieved with the design collaboration with Rubin design bureau in St Petersburg.” Much more.]

Tomorrow Gessler's 2nd informative Comment will appear. 

Interesting information by Joseph P Chacko at frontierIndia. com titled “Google Maps Show Indian [Arihant class] Submarines Berthed Alongside” of February 5, 2021:

...Initially [what became INS Arihant] was conceived as SSN based on the [Soviet] Charlie1 classdesign 

...However, after the first concept design was made the requirement to make an SSBN post Pokhran 2 (aka II) in May 98, a decision was made to make Arihant as an SSBN. 

The objective was achieved with the design collaboration with Rubin design bureau in St Petersburg.” Much more. 

Following India's 6 Future Alpha SSNs - SSBN Protectors of April 7, 2021 Gessler made some learned and extensive comments on April 9, 2021. Pete has added many links. Here is the second of 3 Gessler instalments:

Regarding the use of vertical launch systems (VLS) system to launch SLCMs from the Alphas - I don't think they will go down that way. Allow me to explain my point of view. 

In the 2030s, when the S-5 SSBNs start becoming available for carrying forward the role of what the Royal Navy calls Continuous At-Sea Deterrence or CASD... (I'm using that expression because the hydrodynamic testing model of S-5 has it's bow planes attached to the hull roughly at the same spot where the UK Vanguard-class SSBN has them, instead of on the conning tower like Arihant class...though the similarities are likely to end there).

As each new S-5 becomes available to take over the CASD role, a corresponding Arihant-class boat would in all likelihood be retired from performing any form of deterrence role, after which it would probably be subjected to a scheduled refit and  refueling of the reactor. So what will the Indian Navy do with these boats then? They would still have at least 10-15 more years of service life left. 

My guess: they will convert them into performing a role that is somewhat less demanding (on the part of keeping at least one boat operational at all times) - into an SSGN role. When the Arihants are subjected to refit and refueling, the nuclear armed K-4 IRBMs/SLBMs  ballistic missiles can be swapped out and replaced with up to 5 or 6 Nirbhay-type SLCMs per silo. The Arihant's silos were designed to accept either one K-4 or three smaller K-15s mini-SLBMs per tube so we know it is designed to support the multi-round ejection systems needed for such 'pack' VLS. 

The K-15 missile has a diameter of 0.74m compared to 0.52m for the Nirbhay, so it can potentially pack 5 or 6 (more?) Nirbhays in those tubes I'm guessing, for a total of 20-24 vertically-launched cruise missiles per boat (someone needs to do the math on that diameter, either way very similar to the 7-round Tomahawk [Virginia Payload Tubes (VPT)] on some Virginia-class boats). 

So, better to not encumber the Alphas with the additional weight and power requirements needed to fulfill an SSGN role - better to let them be as light and sleek as possible for reasons of speed, stealth as well as reactor efficiency, all critical for a hunter-killer SSN. 

Considering India does not have stockpiles of hundreds and hundreds of nuclear weapons, we might not even have the number it would be needed to simultaneously arm 3 or 4 S-5 class as well as 3 Arihant-class (discounting the S-4*). So it would have to be an inevitability to bring the Arihants off the line as deterrence platforms once the S-5s start coming in.

Following India's 6 Future Alpha SSNs - SSBN Protectors of April 7, 2021 Gessler made some learned and extensive comments on April 9, 2021. Pete has added many links. India's nuclear submarine Here is the third Gessler instalment:

Keeping in mind the fact that the S-5 class will probably have 12 missile tubes storing future K-5 or K-6 intercontinental SLBMs (which will most definitely have Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicles or MIRVs). Each S-5 boat, even if we assume a relatively modest MIRV capacity of 3 RVs per missile, would be carrying 36 nuclear warheads. Three such boats, if we assume each has it's own permanently assigned load of missiles, would require 108 warheads. If we're talking four boats (following the UK and France pattern of SSBN numbers) that goes to 144 warheads. That's close to the total stockpile that most experts assume India to have currently around 150 warheads. 

If we assume 4 MIRVs per SLBM (like the slide here) shown by DRDO's then-chairman Dr. VK Saraswat at IIT-Bombay university.) then it would be 48 warheads per sub, and 144 for Three boats and 192 for Four boats. With a quoted throwaway weight of 2 tons, likelihood is high for there to be indeed 4 x 500kg MIRVs per K-5/K-6.  

Personally I'd definitely assume India has more than 150 nukes even currently, the delays of Plutonium deliveries to the PFBR prototype also point at the possibility of the Pu going to fill other, more pressing & strategically important requirements, like perhaps building more bombs. By the time the S-5s come online, I'd certainly expect us to have more than 150. 

However - it must be remembered that India, with two hostile neighbours who share land borders, certainly has no plans of giving up it's land-based rail and road-mobile nuclear deterrent like UK & France have done. This portion of the triad will continue to be armed in the form of Agni-4, 5 and the in-development Agni-6 with MIRVs. The Agni-6 is reportedly designed to have a throw weight of 3 tons, so we're again looking at a significant MIRV payload (again, refer to the slide here from same source at IIT-Bombay presentation). 

And we won't be giving up the Air-launched deterrent either (like UK has done), the presence of nuclear gravity bombs as well as the ongoing development of a nuclear-capable Liquid-Fuel Ramjet controlled (LFRJ)  ALCM intended for the Indian Rafales (very similar to the French ASMP-A missile also see and here  ) indicate that this leg of the triad is here to stay as well. 

What all this means is that we'll be needing a significant number of warheads (at least 100) outside of CASD as well. And this just goes to show that there's no way we can continue operating Arihants as nuclear-armed SSBNs even after S-5s come in. We just won't have enough nukes for them, and that's just part of the reason compelling us to convert the Arihants into conventionally-armed SSGNs in the 2030s - poised to be the ideal platform for cruise missile strikes on likes of Karachi's naval facilities/airbases or any Chinese naval presence at Gwadar in the event of open hostilities."

Because that would be socially dangerous and unpatriotic to Chairman Putin, see:

https://www.rbth.com/arts/2013/11/29/ten_reasons_why_russians_dont_smile_much_31259

1:17 The proposal for a new type of submarine to replace the Oberon class submarines began in July 1978, when the RAN director of submarine policy prepared a paper detailing the need to start considering a replacement for the 6 ageing Oberons with a new class of subs, to be built in Australia (Aus), supported by Aus shipyards, equipped with advanced tech, long life-span of greater than 20 years service, must have peace time (intel gathering, covert insertion, periscope and electronic monitoring, etc) and hunter killer (mainly torpedo and anti-ship missile) capability.

2:41 May 1983, development begins. An initial list of 6 SSK/SSG builders considerd. Also Rockwell proposed a new Combat System (CS)(sensors, database, weapons amounting to about 30% of project).

3:12 May 1985 German vs Swedish main foreign contractor designs shortlisted. Rockwell vs Signaal (notional competitor (group of some US companies)) shortlisted for CS. Sweden’s Type 471 design and Rockwell’s (always the favoured company’s) CS selected. Budget was A$4 Billion in 1986.

4:34 June 1987, Osborne Ship and Submarine yard built for all Collins subs to built in Aus (instead of normal practice on winner (Sweden) building first hull in Sweden).

5:26 Aus’s future submarine class was named in honour of Vice Admiral Collins (1899-1989) with first of class. HMAS Collins, launched by his widow on August 28, 1993

6:14 Collins class Specs: built 1990-2003, 3,100 tonnes (surfaced), 77m long, 7m beam, 3 x Garden Island-Hedemora HV V18b/15Ub 18 cylinder diesel engines, 3 x Jeumont-Schneider Generators 1,400 KW each. the GIH diesel engines turn the JS Generators which in turn charge the batteries. which in spim the propeller

7:42 more specs – same as on right sidebar here 

9:11 Feb 1990 keel laid, and other milestones. Rockwell’s advanced CS with each crew station meant to see all was ahead of its computer power time and never completed to specs,

10:25 Construction problems continue including non release of software for the Rockwell CS

11:15 Computer Sciences Corporation takes over CS software development problem. Integrating 1990s software with 1980s hardware a major headache. Software not even matured when HMAS Collins goes on sea trials in 1994. See further detail as CS problems gradually resolved by CS companies (including Raytheon) used by USN nuclear subs. In fact the AN/BYG-1 Combat System used on Collins and US nuclear subs, will be carried over to the future Attack-class.

[Pete Comment: After CS problems were resolved the Collins Garden Island-Hedemora https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hedemora_Diesel  (a small Swedish company in the 1980s winding down) diesel engines limitations on use remains the Collins class major problems. This is a major reason the Attack class will adopt widely used in ships and subs MTU diesels. ]

12:36 Big Problems with Sea Trials:

- Jive says contract Aus expected was for a nuclear submarine silent at high speed, long range and endurance –[so Aus bound to be disappointed that a diesel electric sub couldn’t perform like that]

- the fuel tanksare backfilled with seawater (as intended) BUT some of that seawater leaks into diesel engine, stopping compressed diesel fuel from igniting, but cylinders and pistons would compress. The whole process stopping engine(s). (Problem never fully fixed. Major “sun-roof” cutout of top rear hull has weakened the pressure hulls of the whole Collins class thus reducing diving depth. Removal and overhaul of diesels (to remove rust-corrosion, salt, water ) from diesels each major overhaul.

“During trials of the first submarines, the propulsion system was found to be prone to failure for a variety of reasons.^[93] Most failures were attributed to the fifteen-tank diesel fuel system: the tanks were designed to fill with salt water as they were emptied to maintain neutral buoyancy, but water would regularly enter the engines due to a combination of poor design, gravity separation of the fuel and water being insufficient, and operator error resulting from poor training.^[93] Problems were also caused by bacterial contamination of the diesel fuel, which, along with the salt water, would cause the fuel pumps to rust and other components to seize.^[94] The fuel-related issues were solved by installing coalescers, improving training and operational procedures, and adding biocides to the fuel.^[94]”

- shaft sealsnot aligned properly during construction causing seawater leaks in of up to 984 liters per minute in a deep test dive, almost sinking Collins. Quick action permitted sub to rapidly move to surface. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collins-class_submarine#Propulsion_system
“Propeller shaft seals were a significant problem on Collins and Farncomb.^[95] Although designed to allow for a leak of 10 litres per hour, during trials it was found that the seals would regularly misalign and allow hundreds of litres per hour into the boat—during one deep diving test the flow rate was measured at approximately 1,000 litres a minute.^[95] ASCclaimed that solving these problems could be done by manually adjusting the seals as the submarine dived and rose, but this would have required a sailor dedicated solely to that task, affecting efforts to minimise the required number of personnel.^[95] It was found that the problem could be temporarily alleviated by running the propeller in reverse for 100 revolutions, pulling the seal back into alignment, although a permanent solution could initially not be found, as ASC refused to accept responsibility for the problem, and the original manufacturer of the seals had closed down.^[95] New suppliers were found, with modified seals fitted to the first two submarines in late 1996, before completely re-designed seals were fitted to the boats in late 1997, solving the problem.^[96] 

- Propeller problems: 

“The propellers themselves were also found to be poorly manufactured, having been shaped by hand, with at least one cast at the wrong pitch.^[97] This was rectified by using a five-axis milling machine for future shaping work and replacing the miscast propeller.^[98] The material used for the propellers was also found to be weaker than expected, developing fatigue cracks after only a few years of use.^[97] Instead of going to Kockums, which had started to go into decline after the end of the Cold War, the submarine project office sent the propeller to the United States Navy for redesigning.^[99] Despite the Americans fixing the problems with the propeller design, resulting in significant performance improvements, the Swedish company was dissatisfied with the Australian actions; the dispatch of the propellers was one of the points of contention in the company's legal action in the mid-2000s against the Australian government over ownership of the intellectual property rights to the submarine's design.^[100]“Bad cavitation problem causing lengthening of sail.

- Other propulsion problems: See:

“Other propulsion problems included excessive motor vibrations at certain speeds which damaged various components (which was attributed to the removal of a flywheel and to corrosion caused by the fuel problems), and excessive fuel consumption in Collins at high speed (found to be caused by manufacturing problems with the turbines and turbochargers).^[101] The propulsion system was also found to be a secondary source of noise: poor design of the exhaust mufflers, weight-saving measures in the generator mountings, and an incorrect voltage supply to the battery compartment exhaust fans were noise-creating factors found and eliminated during studies by the Defence Science and Technology Organisation.^[102]

In March 2010, the Department of Defence revealed that the generators in five of the submarines were flawed and had to be replaced.^[103] The three Australian-made generators aboard each of the five submarines (the generators aboard Collins were French-built, and exhibited no defects) are to be replaced in the submarines as they come in for their next maintenance docking.^[103]

- Periscopes and Masts
Periscopes had two problems, the first of which was shared with the other masts.^[104] They were not streamlined; raising a periscope while moving would create enough drag and turbulence to shake the entire submarine.^[105] As with many elements of the submarine, there were disagreements as to who was responsible for the problem.^[105] It was solved by modifying the masts to redirect the water flow around them (for example, a spiral wrap was fixed around the head of each periscope).^[106]

The periscopes also had problems with their optics: periscope users reported difficulty in refocusing after changing magnification, duplication of images, and bands across the field of vision.^[106] These problems were attributed to RAN demands that the optical view be the first exposed when a periscope was raised above the water, instead of placing the infrared sensor and single-pulse radar at the head as on other submarines, requiring the optical path to be routed around these components.^[106] The periscopes were gradually improved, and were no longer a problem by the time the fast track submarines entered service.^[56]

17:00 July 1996 HMAS Collins commissioned

17:35 - 6 x horizontal torpedo tubes capable of carrying 22 heavyweight shots, including best Mk.48 also Harpoon missiles and UK mines, no Tomahawk capability. SURTASS towed sonar array, LINK-11 datalink for big picture situational awareness.

19:22 History of Service. Great Record including October 21, 1999 HMAS Waller inserted Clearance Divers into Oecussi/Ambeno enclave, East Timor. Lots of exercise sinkings by Collins subs of “enemy” ships and subs (including Los Angeles class) ,

21:06 In mid 2000s begin some rather early 10 Year Mid-Life Upgrades (totalling 24 months per sub). The Collins class of today much better than Collins class of 2001.

Following Australia's Collins-class Submarine Program by Sub Brief of April 20, 2021, GhalibKabir commented/asked:

"To this day I cannot wrap my head around why Kockums and RAN went with Hedemora Diesel instead of a Pielstick or the go to workhorse good ol' MTU..."

A support group in Australia, without any real knowledge of Kockums' troubled Collins history, frequently ask why Australia doesn't cancel the Naval Group submarine contract and return to Swedish Kockums (now absorbed into Saab) instead. 

Sweden imposing the Hedemora diesel motor (on the Collins) is one of the primary reasons Australia did not/does not want to return to Saab-Kockums. Supporters regularly advocate building a "Collins 2" aka "Son of Collins". 

Some History - in the mid-2010s Kockums was a poor risk, in corporate turmoil, for Australia to buy its submarines. Kockums from 1999 was owned by the Germans and in no position to build submarines.

In 1999, following the acquisition of Celsius AB by Saab, Kockums was sold to the German shipbuilding company HDW. In 2005, HDW was bought by the German industrial conglomerate Thyssen Krupp.^[2] The time after 1999 was rife with conflicts between Kockums' only Swedish customer, the Defence Materiel Administration (FMV), and Kockums' German owners. ThyssenKrupp insisted that Kockums ought to discontinue large submarine construction and to focus on the development of small submarines. Meanwhile, anonymous sources from inside Kockums claimed that ThyssenKrupp's goal in acquiring Kockums was never to reach synergies with HDW, but only to eliminate its main competitor.^[2]

On 14 April 2014 about 200 employees had left Thyssen Krupp for Saab and it was reported that Saab and Thyssen Krupp had started to negotiate about selling Kockums.^[32] In June 2014 Thyssen Krupp agreed to sell Kockums to Saab.^{[33 ]}During a visit to Kockums facilities on 30 June 2015 the Swedish defence minister, Peter Hultqvist, announced that two submarines will be ordered for a cost of 8.2 billion SEK (US$ 867 million).^[36] The two submarines will be delivered to the Swedish Navy in 2024 and 2025 ^[37]

Technical experts have demonstrated Kockums' actions and corporate instability was far deeper and more significant than Swedish cop-outs that "Kockums didn't deserve the "dud sub" tag".

In the 1990s Kockum's mishandling of the then Swedish company Hedemora's diesel problems, perhaps the main continuing defect of the Collins, was reason enough to exclude Sweden from the mid 2010's SEA 1000 shortlist. Also in the mid-2010s when Australia was compiling its shortlist Saab had never managed an order for new submarines - not even from its own Swedish Navy.  

A submarine's diesel motors are a major propulsion component that can kill a submarine. Efficiency and reliability are key. Submarine motors are thus expected to be tried, tested and mature pieces of technology - built to handle a customer (like Australia's) mission conditions. Diesels need to be big business, for the builder to have the money and expertise to tailor the diesels to customer needs.  

Simply put - Hedemora, when under Swedish ownership, had built submarine diesels for the Swedish Navy's Baltic Sea conditions. This was more than unhelpful for the Australian Navy's warmer, saltier and rougher, Indian and Pacific oceanic conditions.

See https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt3fh0pr.12?seq=2#metadata_info_tab_contentshttps://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt3fh0pr.12?seq=2#metadata_info_tab_contents which explains:

"The Collins boats are the only diesel submarines [in the world with this particular 18 cylinder Hedemora] engine....In 1998 a liaison with ASC visited Hedemora [in Sweden] to try to resolve some of the problems with [these] engines and was shocked to see [Hedemora] only had 35 employees and was up for sale. Hedemora's ability to assist [the Australian Submarine Corporation] ASC was minimal, and Australia had to deal with the responsibilities of operating and supporting a unique engine that was a key to the submarines' success."  

Someone had to buy Sweden's Hedemora, the only builder of the Collins' diesels, before Hedemora went broke. 

Furthermore, Peter Yule's and Derek Woolner's 2008 book The Collins Class Submarine Story: Steel, Spies and Spin on page 225 explains, in part:

"The problems with the [Hedemora] diesels led many to question the choice of Hedemora engines...[As early as 2008 Hans Ohff] believes Hedemora should never have been involved in the project because it was a small and declining company that lacked the resources to develop and support submarine engines of the size required for the Collins, or to remedy any defects." 

UNDER AUSTRALIAN OWNERSHIP HEDEMORA HAS IMPROVED - BUT THE COLLINS' PROBLEMS ARE NOT OVER

Some history - Hedemora Diesel is a trademark to the Swedish company Hedemora Turbo & Diesel AB [which] used to produce diesel engines for ships, locomotives, and oil rigs along with backup generators to hospitals. The company later shifted its focus to supply existing engines with spare parts and service. In February 2006 Hedemora Diesel was bought by the Australian company Coote Industrial Ltd.^[1] The Collins' diesels are now called Garden Island-Hedemora HV V18b/15Ub (VB210) 18-cylinder diesel motors.

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SOME CONTEXT - SWEDISH KOCKUMS' PROPULSION PROBLEMS

Regarding the Collins submarines trials in the 1990s:

The fuel tanks were backfilled with seawater (as intended) BUT some of that seawater leaked into the Hedemora diesel engines, stopping compressed diesel fuel from igniting. But cylinders and pistons did compress, wrecking them. The whole process, of course, stopped the engine(s). This problem has never been completely fixed. Major “sun-roof” cutouts of top rear Collins hulls to remove the diesels for regular Total Overhauls (to remove rust-corrosion, salt, water) has weakened the pressure hulls of the whole Collins class thus reducing diving depth. This contributes to the total overall, overhaul, cost for the Collins submarines being about A$700 million per year.

“During trials of the first [Collins] submarines, the propulsion system was found to be prone to failure for a variety of reasons.^[93] Most failures were attributed to the fifteen-tank diesel fuel system: the tanks were designed to fill with salt water as they were emptied to maintain neutral buoyancy, but water would regularly enter the engines due to a combination of poor design, gravity separation of the fuel and water being insufficient, and operator error resulting from poor training.^[93] Problems were also caused by bacterial contamination of the diesel fuel, which, along with the salt water, would cause the fuel pumps to rust and other components to seize.^[94] The fuel-related issues were solved by installing coalescers, improving training and operational procedures, and adding biocides to the fuel.^[94]”

Shaft seals did not align properly during construction, causing seawater leaks in of up to 984 liters per minute in a deep test dive, almost sunk a Collins sub, perhaps  HMAS Dechaineux. Quick action by a crewman permitted this sub to rapidly move to surface to remove the pressure on onrushing water. 

“Propeller shaft seals were a significant problem on Collins and Farncomb.^[95] Although designed to allow for a leak of 10 litres per hour, during trials it was found that the seals would regularly misalign and allow hundreds of litres per hour into the boat—during one deep diving test the flow rate was measured at approximately 1,000 litres a minute.^[95] ASC claimed that solving these problems could be done by manually adjusting the seals as the submarine dived and rose, but this would have required a sailor dedicated solely to that task, affecting efforts to minimise the required number of personnel.^[95] It was found that the problem could be temporarily alleviated by running the propeller in reverse for 100 revolutions, pulling the seal back into alignment, although a permanent solution could initially not be found, as ASC refused to accept responsibility for the problem, and the original manufacturer of the seals had closed down.^[95] New suppliers were found, with modified seals fitted to the first two submarines in late 1996, before completely re-designed seals were fitted to the boats in late 1997, solving the problem.^[96] 

“The propellers themselves were also found to be poorly manufactured, having been shaped by hand, with at least one cast at the wrong pitch.^[97] This was rectified by using a five-axis milling machine for future shaping work and replacing the miscast propeller.^[98] The material used for the propellers was also found to be weaker than expected, developing fatigue cracks after only a few years of use.^[97] Instead of going to Kockums, which had started to go into decline after the end of the Cold War, the submarine project office sent the propeller to the United States Navy for redesigning.^[99] Despite the Americans fixing the problems with the propeller design, resulting in significant performance improvements, the Swedish company was dissatisfied with the Australian actions;the dispatch of the propellers was one of the points of contention in the [SWEDISH] company's legal action in the mid-2000s against the Australian government over ownership of the intellectual property rights to the submarine's design.^[100]

“Other propulsion problems included excessive motor vibrations at certain speeds which damaged various components (which was attributed to the removal of a flywheel and to corrosion caused by the fuel problems), and excessive fuel consumption in Collins at high speed (found to be caused by manufacturing problems with the turbines and turbochargers).^[101] The propulsion system was also found to be a secondary source of noise: poor design of the exhaust mufflers, weight-saving measures in the generator mountings, and an incorrect voltage supply to the battery compartment exhaust fans were noise-creating factors found and eliminated during studies by the Defence Science and Technology Organisation.^[102]

Kym Bergmann, editor of Australia's superb Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter (APDR) on
April 21, 2021 reports:

"UPDATED: First RAAF Triton to possibly be based outside Australia"

"At a media briefing in Canberra [Australia's capital] MQ-4C Triton Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) [photo below] prime contractor Northrop Grumman explained that despite the delay to the delivery of the first Triton to the RAAF there may still be opportunities for the first vehicle to demonstrate interoperability with the USN in the region without impacting the schedule. The initial RAAF Triton is expected to be completed in Palmdale, California, in 2023 – but since the infrastructure work at [RAAF Base] Edinburgh will not finish until 2024, the question arises: where to situate it in the meantime.  Northrop Grumman made it clear that they cannot comment on matters of location – those are decisions entirely for the RAAF and USN to make.

Leaving a massively capable surveillance platform sitting on the ground in the US would seem to be a huge waste – and while it can fly for a long time it cannot remain aloft for a full year until its Australian home is ready.  APDR observes that the USN currently has two Tritons operating from Guam out of a total of six that will eventually be deployed to constitute a complete a flight, or more correctly “Orbit” of the aircraft.  Currently, seven Tritons are awaiting transfer to the USN – and some might go to Guam or be deployed to other parts of the world, depending on operational priorities...." 

SEE REST OF GREAT APDRARTICLE

MQ-4C Triton RPVs (Photo coutesy USAF and Northrop Grumman in Australia)
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On April 21, 2021, the Indonesian Navy reported that its submarine KRI Nanggala (492)  disappeared in waters about 95km north of Bali.^[16] Nanggala had been conducting a torpedo drill, but failed to report its results as expected.^[17] The navy stated that Nanggala had requested permission to dive to perform firing of a SUT torpedo^[18] at 3am Indonesian time.  Around an hour after being given clearance, Nanggala  lost contact with surface personnel.^[20][21] The Indonesian Navy subsequently sent a distress call to the International Submarine Escape and Rescue Liaison Office to report Nanggala missing and presumably sunk.^[22] The Indonesian Navy stated it was possible that Nanggala experienced a power outage before falling to a depth of about 700m.^[20]

No usual radioing-in from Nanggala to Indonesian ships, naval bases or satellites or other distress signals (eg. flares) have been heard or seen. Based on a similar case, that of Argentine submarine ARA San Juan, in 2017, total loss of contact of a sub, usually indicates it has been lost with all hands (ie. no hope for Nanggala's approximately 50 officers and crew). 

KRI Nanggala's approximate last position. (Map courtesy Sydney Morning Herald)
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Around 7am Indonesian time, an aerial search revealed traces of oil spill on the surface of the water near the location where the submarine was believed to have dived.^[25][19] Oil slicks, if from Kri Nanggala, can indicate its diesel fuel tanks have ruptured under extreme crush depth water pressure - which may indicate KRI Nanggala was "lost with all hands" ie. sunk with the whole crew. The seabed is reported to be a submarine crushing 700m deep where Nanggala was lost.

Indonesia has requested assistance from the Singaporean and Australian Navy submarine rescue ships which can deploy deep diving rescue submersibles. Indonesia has an agreement with Singapore for submarine rescue. The Singaporean Navy's MV Swift Rescue has already departed Singapore's Changi naval base and can be seen on this marine satellite tracking site.

Significantly KRI Nanggala is a very old (40 year old) submarine -  a German built TKMS (was HDW) Type 209 conventional diesel-electic submarine. It was commissioned into the Indonesian Navy in 1981 and its last reported major maintenance/overhaul was in South Korea, in  2011. 

A 40 year old submarine, perhaps with decades old torpedoes, can suffer many technical defects.

5 POSSIBLE REASONS KRI NANGGALA MIGHT SINK:

1. seawater leaks through the snorkel when sucking in surface air at shallow depth. In a 2017 (Argentine submarine  ARA San Juan) lost submarine case seawater gushed through the snorkel down to the submarines 100s tonnes of lead-acid Batteries causing a release of poisonous, highly flammable and explosive hydrogen gas, which sank ARA San Juan in 2017. It is possible similar has happened to Indonesia's KRI Nanggala.

2.Human error and/or failure of torpedo tube equipment in a torpedo firing drill, can leave the tube outer or inner door(s) OPEN - thus allowing seawater to rush in. This quickly makes a sub "nose-heavy" with too much weight to be counteracted by Nanggala's usual air-tank buoyancy. This would cause Nanggala to sink to (around 400m deep, "crush depth") thus imploding, totally destroying,  Nanggala.

3.Deploying and/or dropping very old "live torpedoes" during test firing always carries risks that the torpedoes' highly flammable/explosive propellent manages to leak, and any sparks/electrical equipment sets it on fire - leading to smoke/poison gas and ultimately catastrophic explosion. This is what happened to the sunk Russian submarine Kursk in the year 2000.

4. Submarines are normally decommissioned after 30 years. One major reason is too many "cycles" of immersion/contraction of their Pressure Hulls causes Metal Fatigue. This makes a submarine unsafe to dive anywhere below about 100m deep. If Nanggala dived to (say) 250m its pressure hull may have "failed" ie. collapsed inward/imploded instantly destroying Nanggala.

5. The Indonesian Navy said an electrical failure may have occurred during the dive, causing the submarine to lose control and become unable to undertake emergency procedures that would have allowed it to resurface.

FINALLY DETERMINING WHAT HAPPENED

Sidescan sonar and deep sea manned or unmanned submersibles might locate Nanggala, or fragments of it, on the seafloor in the next 24 hours, or longer,

Failing that undersea sensors, belonging to the US Navy, that are nearby eg. 100s kms away  from where KRI Nanggala was lost, will be able to detect any loud sounds, like an imploding submarine hull. Due to secrecy the US will need to claim that it was the loud sound/nuclear test sensors of the international civilian "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)"  that picked up Nanggala's last sounds (especially any metal pressure hull cracking implosion). 

A big IF (but it is unlikely) Nanggala is intact and on a shallow seafloor, with most crew alive, Nanggala's use of its loud-booming active sonar could be heard by undersea sensors that are permanently fixed or on surface ships, aircraft or on other submarines. But unfortunately it is unlikely any crew are alive to trigger active sonar pulses from KRI Nanggala. This is because the seabed is reported to be a submarine crushing 700m deep where Nanggala was lost.

MANY MORE DETAILS TO COME

KRI Nanggala's oxygen runout time has passed (at 3am in Jakarta, Indonesia time (4am in Bali) Saturday 24 April 2021. The lack of oxygen on KRI Nanggala (402) (if it is intact on the seafloor) means survivors are highly unlikely.

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Submarine Matters'special Southeast Asia correspondent, "Shawn C" advised just over 5 hours ago: 

"No seismic activity [that could have been caused by KRI Nangalla imploding at extreme depth] was detected around the time of Nanggala’s disappearance.