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This diagram of the DF-21D Guidance System includes remote radar on land, aircraft, drones, sea and satellite and sensors on the warhead itself. I maintain that the same sensor platforms and undersea sensors placed by China would also provide nuclear and conventional warhead DF-21Ds with an anti-submarine capability.
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China's JL-2 (CSSNX-14) SLBM. Though it is China's main SLBM it was still under development in 2013.
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After terrorism and Iran and Pakistan's nuclear status US civilian and military intelligence are most interested in the growth in capabilities of China’s military forces. This is because China’s forces might pass US forces in size as China’s economy grows larger than the US economy. China’s transition to becoming No.1 in military and economic size may occur in the late 2020s or early 2030s. Whether China will be No.1 in military capability during that period is also dependent on the quality of China’s military personnel and technology. The degree of politically imposed limitations will also influence capability as the red bolded section of the report below reveals.
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Below are excerpts from Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, Chinese nuclear forces, 2013, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists2013, Vol. 69, No. 6, pp. 79-85, http://bos.sagepub.com/content/69/6/79.full.pdfThey include some interesting comments regarding Chinese SSBNs, SLBMs, Chinese area or sea denial DF-21D missiles that perform some of the anti-surface ship and ASW functions of submarines. The red bolded section provides comments on the high degree of Communist Party Central Military Commission caution and political control concerning China's nuclear forces. This degree of control may handicap the capability of these forces during threats and actual nuclear war.
SSBNs and SLBMs
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The authors report:
The authors report:
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[p. 82] China has two types of submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) developed for two types of nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines: the JL-1 and JL-2. Neither missile is operational.
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The 1,700-km-range, two-stage JL-1 (CSS-NX-3) SLBM developed for a single old Xia-class (Type 092) submarine first entered service in 1986 and is not considered operational. The Xia is based at the North Fleet Base near Qingdao in the Shandong province. The submarine underwent a lengthy shipyard overhaul in 2005-2006 but appears to have stayed in port since then. The Xia/JL-1 weapon system is expected to be retired soon.
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Development of the new JL-2 (CSSNX-14) SLBM for the second-generation Jin-class (Type 094) submarine is nearing completion. After several setbacks,China appears to have overcome
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[p. 83] technical difficulties and successfully test-launched the JL-2 in 2012-2013. The US intelligence community expects the JL-2 may reach initial operational capability in 2013 or 2014. [Endnote 5. The Pentagon predicts initial operational capability in 2013 (Defense Department, 2013), while the Defense Intelligence Agency (2013) predicts initial operational capability in 2014.]
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The JL-2 is a modified version of the DF-31. Equipped with a single warhead and, possibly, penetration aids, the JL-2 has never been flight-tested to its full range but is estimated to have a range of 7,000-plus km. Such a range is sufficient to target Alaska, Guam, Russia, and India from waters near China but unless the submarine sails significantly eastward, not the continental United States.
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Three Jin-class submarines are in service (without missiles), and the US intelligence community speculates that China may build a total of five before proceeding to develop a third-generation (Type 096) over the next decade.
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With 12 missile-launch tubes per submarine, three Jin-class boats could carry 36 missiles with an equal number of warheads - a significant increase from the 12 SLBMs that the sole Xia-class submarine carried.
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The Pentagon asserts that the Jin/JL-2 weapon system “will give the PLA Navy its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent” (Defense Department, 2013: 6). While that may be true in theory, a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine fleet faces several doctrinal, technical, and operational constraints in practice. Under current doctrine, China’s Central Military Commission does not allow the military services to have warheads deployed on missiles under normal circumstances. Handing over custody of nuclear warheads to deployed submarines in peacetime would constitute a significant change of Chinese doctrine.
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Moreover, no Chinese ballistic missile submarine has ever sailed on a deterrent patrol, so China’s navy and the Central Military Commission have essentially no experience in operating a submarine force during realistic military operations. Developing this capability will require development of new command-and control technologies and procedures.
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But even if China deployed warheads on submarines and sent them to sea in a crisis, where would they sail? For a JL-2 to reach the continental United States, a Jin-class submarine would have to sail through the East China Sea and well into the Pacific Ocean, through dangerous choke points where it would be vulnerable to hostile antisubmarine warfare. [Endnote 6: Chinese nuclear submarines are apparently very noisy (Kristensen, 2009b).]
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China’s main concern is the survivability of its minimum nuclear deterrent, and it spends considerable resources on dispersing and hiding its land-based missiles. This makes its submarine program puzzling, for it is much riskier to deploy nuclear weapons at sea, where submarines can be sunk by unfriendly forces, than to deploy them on land.”
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DF-21D Anti-ship (and anti-submarine?) Missile
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Pete’s Comment - Chinese area or sea denial MRBMs missiles perform some of the anti-surface ship and ASW functions usually performed by submarines.
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[p. 81] “China’s primary regional nuclear missile is the two-stage, solid-fuel, road-mobile DF-21 (CSS-5) medium range ballistic missile (MRBM). The DF-21 exists in two nuclear versions: the DF-21 (CSS-5 Mod 1) and the newer DF-21A (CSS-5 Mod2)… the new version probably has a longer range of about 2,150 km.
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China has also started deploying conventionally armed versions of the DF-21 (the DF-21C, and the DF-21D which is an anti-ship missile), a potentially dangerous mix of nuclear and conventional missiles that creates risks of misunderstanding, miscalculation, and mistaken nuclear escalation in a crisis. [Endnote 4: The Second Artillery's organization of DF-21s is unclear, but it is thought that nuclear and conventional units are kept separate. For insightful studies of China's missile force, see Stokes (2010) and Stokes (2012).]”
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Pete’s Comment
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The existence of the DF-21D MRBM may reduce the need for rapid development of China’s conventional and nuclear submarine forces (forces that are believed to be evolving slowly). The disparity of estimates of the DF-21D's range - from 1,450 km to 3,000 km may reflect Chinese political objectives or may be physical facts. 1,450 km may be the range with a heavy warhead (typically 1,500 kg) or for a "bus" of 3 MIRVed warheads. 3,000 km may the range for a light (typically 500 kg) warhead.
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Pete