Due to popular demand here is the poor Norwegian frigate story. The situation is more complex than a kneejerk reaction "navies with frigates/destroyers based on the Navantia F100 design are hiding safety design flaws."
November 8, 2008 - Collision
"Latest update: 29.11.2018"
On November 8, 2018, Helge Ingstad collided with the 250m long tanker Sola TS (escorted by tug Tenax) in Norwegian waters. Helge Ingstad was severely damaged in the collision, began taking on water and intentionally beached itself to avoid total sinking and allow for the evacuation of the crew. Seven Helge Ingstad sailors were injured.
On November 13, Helge Ingstad sank where she had run aground, with only smaller sections of the superstructure remaining above water. Perhaps Helge Ingstad will not be operational again and might only be partly reconstructed to research why she sank so quickly. She was built by the Spanish shipbuilder Navantiain Ferrol, Spain, based on Navantia's Álvaro de Bazán (aka F100) class design.
Sola TS left Norway's Sture Oil Terminal (see blue dots). Helge Ingstad was moving southwest through the strait while Sola TS was moving north. Those on watch in Helge Ingstad may have not visually registered Sola TS as moving collision threat because Helge Ingstad did not notice Sola TS's navigation lights were moving (rather than being stationary at Sture Oil Terminal). Did Helge Ingstad fail to notice Vessel Tracking Service (VTS) instructions, Sola TS tracker satellite map beeping, or espcially Sola TS's large radar image? (Map courtesy MaritimeBulletin.net via FleetMon.com).
---
---
It is possible the Norwegian accident investigators are overstating any Helge Ingstad design errors instead of Norwegian Navy human errors. For example, did Helge Ingstad's crew follow the complete safety procedures of closing all water-tight hatches between compartments (to prevent flooding)?
---
Norwegian frigate Helge Ingstad (high tide beached November 8, 2018 before it sunk more completely on November 13, 2018)
---
November 29, 2018 - Preliminary Norwegian Accident Board Report
"...29 November 2018 the [Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN)] publish[ed] a preliminary report on the accident and two interim safety recommendations.
This preliminary report is published to communicate the information obtained during the initial phase of the ongoing investigation. The purpose is to provide a brief update on how the investigation is progressing as well as a preliminary description of the sequence of events and disseminate safety-critical issues identified at this stage of the investigation.
This preliminary report also identifies areas that need further investigation and describes lines of investigation that will be followed up."
"Latest update: 29.11.2018"
"... The accident was a complex one, involving several individuals, bridge crews, vessels, a VTS and the interaction between them. The investigation is therefore demanding in terms of time and resources. The AIBN stresses that this is a preliminary report and that it may consequently contain some errors and inaccuracies. Because of considerations relating to the duty of confidentiality, classified material and the investigation process, the AIBN does not publish all its information at the present time...."
Appendix: Interim safety recommendations 29.11.2018"
see the Comments for more on Human Error vs Design
see the Comments for more on Human Error vs Design