Following Submarine Matters'US-North Korea Missile Issues Much Broader Than Korean Peninsula, March 12, 2019, Josh on March 12 2019 made interesting comments regarding the recent history of US nuclear weapons in and around South Korea. I have bolded, added, extra links and comments in square [...] brackets. Josh wrote:
Pete
“US nuclear weapons were previously based in South Korea for decades until their removal at the end of the cold war in 1991. Around the same time, USN vessels also offloaded all tactical nuclear weapons (this would have included the B61 [nuclear bombs on US aircraft carriers]. BGM-109 [cruise missiles with nuclear warheads on US] SSNs, and probably a collection of [nuclear] depth bombs, ASROC, and SUBROC warheads.
[See Document A“A history of US nuclear weapons in South Korea” (2017) at] https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2017.1388656
It's worth noting the weapons in Korea were probably directed at Russian Pacific Fleet bases more than North Korea; Japan would not allow warhead basing on their soil (though it didn't question whether docked ships had such weapons, unlike New Zealand).
In the current context, the only relevant US weapons that could reach North Korea are strategic weapons or tactical weapons that are based on US soil. So there is no reasonable posture for the US to adopt that would further denuclearize the Korean peninsula. There are of course tens of thousands of US troops in the ROK that could be traded as a bargaining chip, as well as the economic sanctions which are far more important to the [North Korea]. However the US position is that [North] Koreamust make the compromises first - which is understandable given how many previous agreements it has breached or worked around.
Realistically the only thing that will change the status quo is Kim dying of natural causes or some kind of conflict.”
[See Document A“A history of US nuclear weapons in South Korea” (2017) at] https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2017.1388656
It's worth noting the weapons in Korea were probably directed at Russian Pacific Fleet bases more than North Korea; Japan would not allow warhead basing on their soil (though it didn't question whether docked ships had such weapons, unlike New Zealand).
In the current context, the only relevant US weapons that could reach North Korea are strategic weapons or tactical weapons that are based on US soil. So there is no reasonable posture for the US to adopt that would further denuclearize the Korean peninsula. There are of course tens of thousands of US troops in the ROK that could be traded as a bargaining chip, as well as the economic sanctions which are far more important to the [North Korea]. However the US position is that [North] Koreamust make the compromises first - which is understandable given how many previous agreements it has breached or worked around.
Realistically the only thing that will change the status quo is Kim dying of natural causes or some kind of conflict.”
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Document Ais very interesting on US submarine issues as they relate to the Korea’s.
Document A is by Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris“A history of US nuclear weapons in South Korea” (2017) Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 73, 2017, Issue 6, Pages 349-357, Published online: 26 Oct 2017. The whole Document is published at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2017.1388656
Snippets on submarines in 18 pageDocument Ainclude:
“Since [1991] the United States has protected South Korea (and Japan) under a nuclear umbrella made up of several types of weapons: dual-capable fighter-bombers and strategic nuclear forces in the form of bombers and submarines.1
“...In addition to tactical nuclear forces, US strategic nuclear weapons also played (and continue to play) an important role in defending South Korea. This role has taken several forms over the years. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, for example, the US Navy suddenly began conducting port visits to South Korea with nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)...”
“...The reason for [US nuclear armed submarine] port visits is still unclear, but the timing coincided with the period when the United States significantly reduced deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Korea. This period overlapped with the years when the United States discovered and attempted to stop South Korea’s secret program to develop nuclear weapons.4...”
“...The SSBN visits ended when the remaining Polaris submarines were retired in 1981, and even though the US Navy gradually built up its fleet of new Ohio-class submarines in the Pacific, American SSBNs have not visited South Korea since January 1981.
Yet Ohio SSBNs continue to play an important role in targeting North Korea. With their much longer-range missiles, Ohio SSBNs can patrol much further from their targets than earlier submarines. A 1999 inspection of the Trident submarine command and control system identified the SSBNs as “mission critical systems” of “particular importance” to US forces in South Korea (Defense Department 1999, 1). Except for a lone SSBN visit to Guam in 1988, though, Ohio-class submarines did not conduct port visits to the Western Pacific for 35 years.”
That changed on October 31, 2016, when the USS Pennsylvania (SSBN-735) arrived in Guam for a highly publicized visit to promote US security commitments to South Korea and Japan.Military delegations from both countries were brought to Guam and given a tour and briefings onboard the submarine, which was carrying an estimated 90 nuclear warheads. “This specific visit to Guam reflects the United States’ commitment to its allies in the Indo-Asia-Pacific,” the US Strategic Command publicly announced, apparently a signal that the US nuclear umbrella also extends over the Indian Ocean (US Strategic Command 2016
).
).
----------------------------
See the whole interesting Document A by Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris“A history of US nuclear weapons in South Korea” (2017) Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 73, 2017, Issue 6, Pages 349-357, Published online: 26 Oct 2017 at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2017.1388656
Pete