Anonymous has identified an excellent Dutch article that, to an extent, clarifies the issues of the Walrus Replacement Program (ie. Dutch future submarine competition). The article is centered on a Dutch Navy document.
The article is by Olof van Joolen and Niels Rigter in the Dutch language De Telegraaf,
October 2, 2019 titled “Angling fishing for submarines” at
October 2, 2019 titled “Angling fishing for submarines” at
(Pete has translated it into English, bolding some parts and adding the links)
"THE HAGUE - The four new submarines for the Navy must be of Dutch origin as much as possible. The large trade unions and the employers' organization VNO-NCW advocate this at the [Dutch] House of Representatives and the Cabinet.
They are doing this just before the matter is raised at the central political structures at The Hague [The Hague is the seat of the Dutch Cabinet, the States General, the Supreme Court, and the Council of State.]. From an internal comparison that De Telegraaf was given insight into, the Dutch / Swedish combination Damen / Saab seems to have the “best papers” for the multi-billion euro selection but the French Naval Group is chasing the consortium.
The unions, including FNV, CNV and De Unie, have already put agreements with Damen on paper that the shipbuilder use Dutch personnel, Dutch knowledge and development and production sites on Dutch soil as much as possible. The unions have also made agreements with the yard about internships, flexible staff and the remuneration of freelancers. “The parties will sign the agreements next week.”
This means that those involved anticipate things.With the Swedish Saab, Damen is only one of the four candidates to develop and build the replacement for the Walrus submarines now in use by the Navy.
Rough
However, the purchase of the four new submarines is not going smoothly. Ministries involved all want something different. Moreover, there are concerns about the risks of the multibillion euro project.
Pros and cons. An internal candidate comparison document written by the Dutch Navy shows which of four yards (in the race to build the future submarines) has the best characteristics. Saab / Damen scores best for Dutch industry and for maintaining strategic knowledge. The Swedish-Dutch consortium can also show sufficient projects (frigates and submarines) to inspire confidence in the piece that De Telegraaf was given access to. A 'risk management plan' is essential. Not unimportant for a project that costs at least 3.5 billion euros.
Injection
The [Dutch Navy's] candidate comparison shows that the role of the Spanish submarine builder Navantia “has been played out.” [eliminated?] The German TKMS is second to last in the ranking. The French Naval Group is chasing Saab / Damen. If the [Dutch] navy were in charge, the choice had already been made. The Netherlands would have Saab design the new submarines, have them built at Damen, with a pendulum of Dutch companies on board. After all, a good injection for Dutch industry and the Netherlands as a knowledge country. Moreover, Dutch defense would remain hooked on the very latest military technology and get exactly the boat it wants.
But the Navy is not in control. And the Ministry of Defense cannot decide independently. The Department of Economic Affairs and Climate is also on board and seems sensitive to the Dutch industrial map that Saab / Damen have drawn. But Finance, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs and General Affairs are also involved. They want something different. An "initiate" [insider] summarizes it as follows:
"Broadly speaking, the
Defense organization wants a state-of-the-art submarine quickly,
Defense organization wants a state-of-the-art submarine quickly,
Department of Economic Affairs and Climate wants a boost for the Dutch defense industry,
Finance wants as cheap as possible,
Home Affairs (with D66 minister Ollongren at the helm) wants TKMS, because it is European, and
Department of Foreign Affairs wants to maintain a good relationship with the French. ”
Prime Minister Rutte would also be sensitive to this.
The decision about which party or parties will continue to the next round therefore becomes more a political than a technical decision. It should have been decided last year. It is now expected in the coming weeks.
The postponement is due to a change in direction of this government, in which the importance of Dutch industry became more prominent, followed by a strongly intensified lobby by two participating parties.The German TKMS promising to place the construction of the Dutch submarines with the naval company in Den Helder and the French teaming up with the Dutch dredger IHC builder.
Risk
Since the 1990s, Damen has built all large ships for the Navy, but not yet a submarine. This is a risk. Moreover, making boats that are completely tailored to the wishes of the Navy is much more expensive. The fact that the defense budget is not rising as fast as expected means that a new submarine built on Dutch soil is far from certain.” ENDS
Pete Comment
So the competition continues to be undecided. The decision timeline is still vague. Being “more a political than a technical decision” (a reality suffered by submarine selectors in many countries) adds to uncertainty.
If risk is a worry then an enlarged version of a submarine that does not yet exist (eg. the A26, S-80 Plus and Type 212CD) is risky. The Dutch may see a large version of Naval Group's Scorpene as less risky than a small version of the not yet developed conventional Shortfin Barracuda.
Other major issues include do the Dutch require Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) and/or Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) or neither?
Next week Pete will describe Naval Group's progress in developing second generation AIP.
Anonymous and Pete