Asia Pacific Defence Reporter (APDR) continues to be a unique source (or I haven't seen details elsewhere) on problems with the Australia's Attack-class Future Submarine Program.
For APDR's open website see https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/.
See very useful commentary at https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/apdr-february-2020-australian-national-audit-office-identifies-problems-with-the-future-submarine-project/ and scrolling down that link see
"Read more in the [February 2020] issue of APDR (Free to read with registration or via Facebook/Linkedin): https://venturaapdr.partica.online/apdr/apdr-feb-2020/features/australian-national-audit-office-identifies-problems-with-the-future-submarine-project ":
![]()
For APDR's open website see https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/.
See very useful commentary at https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/apdr-february-2020-australian-national-audit-office-identifies-problems-with-the-future-submarine-project/ and scrolling down that link see
"Read more in the [February 2020] issue of APDR (Free to read with registration or via Facebook/Linkedin): https://venturaapdr.partica.online/apdr/apdr-feb-2020/features/australian-national-audit-office-identifies-problems-with-the-future-submarine-project ":
"If [Australia's Defence Department] wanted to make the task for Naval Group far less costly and risky, they might want to change their approach to the layout of the torpedo tubes. The Barracuda has a 2 + 2 arrangement, but the RAN has a fixation on six torpedo tubes in a horizontal plane. Why this is the case, no one knows – even experienced ex submariners believe that four torpedo tubes are adequate. That is what the USN Virginia class attack submarines have. It would also be a considerable cost saving, with two less active discharge systems, two less handling systems – and a lot more room in what is a very crowded compartment.
The front of the submarine is already the most engineeringly complex and risky part of the build, and Defence is adding greatly to the difficulty of what is involved for reasons that are opaque and might never have been questioned, let alone analysed in detail..."
The front of the submarine is already the most engineeringly complex and risky part of the build, and Defence is adding greatly to the difficulty of what is involved for reasons that are opaque and might never have been questioned, let alone analysed in detail..."
The Collins submarine's 6 torpedo tube horizontal arrangement can be seen above. Above the torpedo tube room likely sits the large Thomson Sintra Scylla active/passive bow sonar (aka "Thales Underwater Systems TSM 2233 Scylla active/passive bow array" (see page 9)).
---
PETE COMMENT
It could be that if the RAN wants to carry over the Collins submarine's "Thomson Sintra Scylla active/passive bow sonar" to the Attack-class then a 2 + 2 torpedo tube arrangement may not be practical. Still, if the Attack class will involve such major differences of torpedo tube and bow sonar arrangements there will be a a major flow of other rearrangements required within the Attack class' interior.
This is on top of all the other Attack-class rearrangements required to fit the 4 to 6 diesel engines, diesel fuel tanks, and compensating seawater ballast tanks etc.
All these Attack-class interior changes mean this class has very little in common with the Barracuda SSN, the purported basis of the Attack-class. The marketing name "Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A" which helped sell the Naval Group concept submarine, is but a redundant memory.
Pete