Following Canada's purchase of 3 Oberon SSKs in the 1960s in the 1980s Canada explored the purchase of 10 nuclear propelled attack submarines (SSNs). Many issues surrounding the "Canada-class" SSN rejection are covered here so I won't restate these issues. Instead I'll discuss other issues, such as:
- increasing the Canadian submarine force from 3 inexpensive Oberon SSKs to be replaced by 10
very expensive SSNs always looked like an extravagant submarine service ask.
- why more than triple the submarine force? Was the naval budget going to triple or would major
surface ship and some army and airforce items by halved? Submarines need to operate in secret and
cannot provide the overt show of force provided by surface ships.
- the US would have been aware that the Canadian Navy was vastly underestimating the costs of
purchasing, operating and facility-supporting an SSN force. Canadian politicians and the public
would only learn the full costs when it was too late.
- Canadian SSKs were more useful strategically and tactically in complimenting USN specialties
than a Canadian SSN navy impoverished by nuclear submarine ownership.
- Facilities? Basing SSNs with their reactors and perhaps other radioactive support facilities in the
harbour of Halifax (a growing city of now 400,000) would prove unviable in the public-opposition
long term. Halifax had suffered a massive (ammunition ship) explosion in 1917 - so its citizens
wouldn't take kindly to a newer vessel hazard. Reactors have been known to leak and even threaten
to meltdown. Canada would need to build a new, very expensive, east coast naval base to take
SSNs.
- Why would Canada want an all nuclear, SSN, force - to match the all nuclear direction the UK, US
and French Navy were going in? Why were Canadian SSKs (say, for southerly missions) in a
mixed force, unsuitable.
- Was Canada aware that US, UK and French SSNs justified much of their high cost by protecting
those countries' SSBNs (eg. conducting sweeps of the approaches to SSBN bases)? Perhaps the US
suspected Canadian SSNs would be the thin end of the wedge to Canada building an SSBN force.
- When Canada entertained the idea of building all or some SSNs in Canada was Canada aware that
no nuclear country had tranferred a whole how-to-build an SSN package to a non-nuclear country.
The UK's Trafalgar-class SSN used a US reactor design which was non-transferable to third
countries. While the French Rubis-class SSN was all French technology it was too loud, slow,
small, crowded and only carried 14 heavyweight shots (eg. torpedoes) compared to Canada's
Oberons which carried 20 torpedoes.
- If the US (on national security grounds) was not going to supply SSNs to Canada was Canada
aware that the Monroe Doctrine still existed/exists? The US would want to prevent the UK or
France providing nuclear (reactor) military equipment to Canada which after all was a "Western
Hemisphere country" in US eyes. Most people are accustomed to consider the US the self-
appointed protector against leftwing or greater European influences in Latin America (eg. in
Panama and Venezuela, Brazil etc) and the Caribbean (Cuba always, and Grenada in the 1980s).
But people forget that the US sees itself as defender of Canada as well, via NATO, NORAD and
more unilateral US policies.
Many of the above issues also apply to Australia in a recurring and often poorly informed debate that Australia should have SSNs.
Pete
- increasing the Canadian submarine force from 3 inexpensive Oberon SSKs to be replaced by 10
very expensive SSNs always looked like an extravagant submarine service ask.
- why more than triple the submarine force? Was the naval budget going to triple or would major
surface ship and some army and airforce items by halved? Submarines need to operate in secret and
cannot provide the overt show of force provided by surface ships.
- the US would have been aware that the Canadian Navy was vastly underestimating the costs of
purchasing, operating and facility-supporting an SSN force. Canadian politicians and the public
would only learn the full costs when it was too late.
- Canadian SSKs were more useful strategically and tactically in complimenting USN specialties
than a Canadian SSN navy impoverished by nuclear submarine ownership.
- Facilities? Basing SSNs with their reactors and perhaps other radioactive support facilities in the
harbour of Halifax (a growing city of now 400,000) would prove unviable in the public-opposition
long term. Halifax had suffered a massive (ammunition ship) explosion in 1917 - so its citizens
wouldn't take kindly to a newer vessel hazard. Reactors have been known to leak and even threaten
to meltdown. Canada would need to build a new, very expensive, east coast naval base to take
SSNs.
- Why would Canada want an all nuclear, SSN, force - to match the all nuclear direction the UK, US
and French Navy were going in? Why were Canadian SSKs (say, for southerly missions) in a
mixed force, unsuitable.
- Was Canada aware that US, UK and French SSNs justified much of their high cost by protecting
those countries' SSBNs (eg. conducting sweeps of the approaches to SSBN bases)? Perhaps the US
suspected Canadian SSNs would be the thin end of the wedge to Canada building an SSBN force.
- When Canada entertained the idea of building all or some SSNs in Canada was Canada aware that
no nuclear country had tranferred a whole how-to-build an SSN package to a non-nuclear country.
The UK's Trafalgar-class SSN used a US reactor design which was non-transferable to third
countries. While the French Rubis-class SSN was all French technology it was too loud, slow,
small, crowded and only carried 14 heavyweight shots (eg. torpedoes) compared to Canada's
Oberons which carried 20 torpedoes.
- If the US (on national security grounds) was not going to supply SSNs to Canada was Canada
aware that the Monroe Doctrine still existed/exists? The US would want to prevent the UK or
France providing nuclear (reactor) military equipment to Canada which after all was a "Western
Hemisphere country" in US eyes. Most people are accustomed to consider the US the self-
appointed protector against leftwing or greater European influences in Latin America (eg. in
Panama and Venezuela, Brazil etc) and the Caribbean (Cuba always, and Grenada in the 1980s).
But people forget that the US sees itself as defender of Canada as well, via NATO, NORAD and
more unilateral US policies.
Many of the above issues also apply to Australia in a recurring and often poorly informed debate that Australia should have SSNs.
Pete