Pete, being almost human, doesn't knock back plaudits. But Lex's comment below is much, much, more.
Below, a Jan 27 article, Lex, on Jan 28, 2022, commented:
"Hello Pete
I agree with 'anonymous' that Plan 'A' (the Astute [with Lockheed Martin Integrated Combat System] LMA with an S9G reactor [currently on the US Virginia-class SSN]) is the best option for Australia, if the RAN is to succeed in establishing a nuclear propelled submarine service in a reasonable period of time. [Pete comment: Will discuss "the reactor choice largely maketh the SSN" next week.]
I strongly support those who point out the serious environmental and security risks and the daunting construction and decommissioning costs of civil nuclear power stations; besides which, the federal ALP leadership’s support for the SSN program is conditional on there being no action taken to establish a civil nuclear power program in Australia.
It would be great if Submarine Matters was generally acknowledged as the one site where every morsel of public domain data on the acquisition of SSNs for the RAN was recorded and analyzed by people with diverse knowledge and viewpoints.
I think you are doing a fantastic job [Thanks Lex :) ] and that Submarine Matters is already the 'go to' site on this topic.
If deftly executed, Plan 'A' makes any fallback (or fall forward) Plans superfluous. However, as many observers are not yet optimistic that Australia's (as yet) unsettled pathway to provide the RAN with eight modern SSNs will lead to success, it is still worthwhile considering emergency alternative Plans.
Therefore, it is my hope is that in the coming months, informed observers will submit to you :
(1) their own technical, political, program mgt or other project failure scenarios;
(2) how policy makers could act to alleviate the project failures they cite; and
(3) alternate 'Plans' if the government of the day sees Plan 'A' as 'un-fixable'.
BUREAUCRATUS LEX JANUARY 28, 2022"
PETE COMMENT
Thanks Lex. Praise like yours keeps me writing.
Getting "all the ducks in a row" for Australia's future SSN Program "Plan A", is, as you indicate, an extremely complex problem, with many risks and unpredictables.
While discussions on Submarine Matters have been fairly UK Astute dominated, a surprise of Australia choosing the US rather than the UK for the hull and reactor is still possible. Chosing the US for the whole SSN (Combat System, Hull and Reactor) might prove highly risky for Australia due to the unpredictables of: build-in-US submarine industry pressures; US Congressional political hurdles, added to Pentagon and Presidential policy alterations. The last may really come to haunt if "lets make a new alliance deal" Trump 2.0 wins the 2024 Election.
But the likelihood of Australia choosing Astutes (or maybe similar outer appearance UK follow on SSN(Rs) seems supported by:
- the Astute (with no Virginia) photo on the official Australian Nuclear-Powered Submarine Taskforce website.
and
- Australia has a lengthy history of former UK RN SSN commanders serving as Australian RAN submarine Commanders (eg. already on the navy.gov.au overt website)
In terms of "getting Plan A. ducks in a row" training Australian nuclear submariners (in the 2020s-30s) will likely precede actual delivery of Australian SSNs (maybe late 2030s-early 2040s).
Extensive Australian-UK secondment-training (in the 1960s-70s) for the Oberon submarines may be repeated with training on Astutes in the 20s-30s. Noting:
"...the RAN began sending volunteers for [Oberon] submarine training with the Royal Navy. This flow of personnel was maintained as the building programme progressed, and so as each vessel was commissioned she was manned almost entirely by RAN officers and sailors."
Training might also include many of the Australian nuclear engineers and on shore maintainers at the UK's Devonport (part) SSN base.
While Australia actually leasing a whole Astute or two may expedite training of Australian crews and maintainers - this may well be precluded by the UK priority tasking Astutes to remain in Atlantic (or near) waters.