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http://csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/CSBA6117-New-Era-Undersea-Warfare-Reportweb.pdf
leadin http://csbaonline.org/publications/2015/01/undersea-warfare/
http://csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/CSBA6117-New-Era-Undersea-Warfare-Reportweb.pdf
leadin http://csbaonline.org/publications/2015/01/undersea-warfare/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-submarine_indicator_loop
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/04/10/five-charts-that-show-the-rapid-expansion-of-chinas-navy/
Note that even as early as 1997 there were increasing reports indicating for China "Passive bottom arrays protect harbor entrances, extending out to sea about 20-30 nm."
Western submarines can no longer move near the Chinese and Russia Pacific coast with any confidence that submarines won't be detected by undersea sensor arrays, Such enemy arrays are increasing common in
- across the mouths and approaches of Chinese naval bases, for example Yulin Naval Base, Hainan Island, China and Ngong Shuen Chau Naval Base, Hong Kong
- harbours of important cities such as Hong Kong and Shanghai
- arrays in narrows or other strategic waters such as the Taiwan Strait, Yellow Sea, Diaoyu Islands (East China Sea) and near newly enlarged islands-rocks of the South China Sea
Once a Western (including Japanese) submarine is detected China has an increasing capability to positively identify the nattionality of a submarine or even its individual sonar signature.
China has been steadily developing anti-submarine anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) weapons. The quickest reacting , hence most dangerous weapons being land launched or sea launched missiles. During low to medium level conflict such missiles might deploy light submarine killing torpedos. During high intensity war nuclear warheads on light torpedos or powerful nuclear warheads on the missiles themselves are powerful enough to ensure a kill. Carrier killer missiles. At the upper end of the spectrum China's DF-21D "carrier killer" ballistic missiles could be used a high value submarine target. China has increasing numbers of subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles that can deploy warheads against submarines.
New long-range sensors, such as LF active sonar or wake detection, and emerging undersea communication capabilities will enable the development of new undersea fire control networks analogous to those using radio signals in above-the-surface warfare. For example, long-range ASW weapons such as a missile with a CVLWT warhead could be networked with long-range sensors to create an effective standoff ASW capability that delays or drives off submarines by exploiting their inherent limitations in speed, situational awareness, and self-defense.
- across the mouths and approaches of Chinese naval bases, for example Yulin Naval Base, Hainan Island, China and Ngong Shuen Chau Naval Base, Hong Kong
- harbours of important cities such as Hong Kong and Shanghai
- arrays in narrows or other strategic waters such as the Taiwan Strait, Yellow Sea, Diaoyu Islands (East China Sea) and near newly enlarged islands-rocks of the South China Sea
Once a Western (including Japanese) submarine is detected China has an increasing capability to positively identify the nattionality of a submarine or even its individual sonar signature.
China has been steadily developing anti-submarine anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) weapons. The quickest reacting , hence most dangerous weapons being land launched or sea launched missiles. During low to medium level conflict such missiles might deploy light submarine killing torpedos. During high intensity war nuclear warheads on light torpedos or powerful nuclear warheads on the missiles themselves are powerful enough to ensure a kill. Carrier killer missiles. At the upper end of the spectrum China's DF-21D "carrier killer" ballistic missiles could be used a high value submarine target. China has increasing numbers of subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles that can deploy warheads against submarines.
New long-range sensors, such as LF active sonar or wake detection, and emerging undersea communication capabilities will enable the development of new undersea fire control networks analogous to those using radio signals in above-the-surface warfare. For example, long-range ASW weapons such as a missile with a CVLWT warhead could be networked with long-range sensors to create an effective standoff ASW capability that delays or drives off submarines by exploiting their inherent limitations in speed, situational awareness, and self-defense.
* Disruptive technological shifts. With computer processing power continuing to rapidly increase and become more portable, dramatic breakthroughs are imminent in undersea sensing, communications, and networking. Advancements are also underway in power generation and storage that could yield significant increases in the endurance, speed, and capability of unmanned vehicles and systems. These improvements would compel a comprehensive reevaluation of long-held assumptions about the operational and tactical employment of undersea capabilities, as well as the future design of undersea systems.