As far as I can see - the US defense forces AirSea Battle doctrine began in 2009-10. The wiki entry explains:
"AirSea Battle officially became part of US grand strategy, when, in February 2010, the US Department of Defense's [long PDF! 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review] stated [on pages 32 and 33]:
"The Air Force and Navy together are developing a new joint air-sea battle concept for defeating adversaries across the range of military operations, including adversaries equipped with sophisticated anti-access and area denial capabilities. The concept will address how air and naval forces will integrate capabilities across all operational domains—air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace—to counter growing challenges to US freedom of action. As it matures, the concept will also help guide the development of future capabilities needed for effective power projection operations."
By 2012 increasing interest in China's DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile provided focus on an actual Chinese "wonder weapon" nicknamed "Carrier Killer".
In an AirSea battle, assuming it is US/Japan/maybe Australia versus China (hopefully not Russia as well) the red dotted line ........ represents the likely range of the DF-21D. See description and assumptions on the map of a battle. (Map courtesy WashPost, August 2012)
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Locating ships (eg. carriers) in favourable conditions then cueing the sensors, including Chinese subs, to accurately fir the missile. The wiki entry contains many good points.
As indicated in the Youtube (above of March 2012) the US or Japan could counter the DF-21D by:
- Frigates, destroyers or cruisers using SM-3 missiles to shoot DF-21Ds down
- Electronic warfare aircraft (eg. "Growlers"), ships and maybe LEO satellites to jam DF-21D guidance/sensors
- use of decoys or electronic lures (from the above platforms) to make the DF-21D "think" the target is where the target is not.
The bigger picture of Chinese ballistic missile ranges - from short range (SRBMs) to hit Taiwan to the longest range ICBM launched in central China to hit the US (US Government CSBA via China Mike)
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In the DF-21D China has an effective asymmetric weapon to face the superiority of combined US, Japanese and Taiwanese surface ships. China would probably justify its use against major warships in "defence" of China, including "defending China's province of Taiwan".
DF-26 "Guam Killer"
DF-26 "Guam Killer"
To solve the DF-21D’s inability, from the Chinese mainland, to hit the US air and naval base at Guam, China, in 2015, began to field the DF-26“Guam Killer”. The DF-26 with a 3,000 - 4,000 km range is reportedly capable of hitting land, large and medium sized ships. Like the DF-21D it is conventional or nuclear capable and it can be partly cued by Chinese remote sensing satellites like the Yaogan satellites.
DF-21D AND DF-26 SUFFER FROM NUCLEAR AMBIGUITY
As the DF-21D (equally relevant to the DF-26) is a ballistic missile (with some cruise missile maneuvre characteristics) the DF-21D suffers from nuclear ambiguity. While cruise missile, like the Tomahawk, are assumed to be conventional high explosive, deserving a conventional response, using a ballistic missile against a nuclear power might receive a mistaken nuclear response.
The risk that the DF-21D's use may be seen as a nuclear attack may be one reason why the US has not developed a similar weapon. Perhaps the US sees the Tomahawk anti-ship missiles (TASMs) and upgrades) or LRASMs as avoiding the nuclear ambiguity risk and being cheaper for lower, more common, conflict.
Also China's use of a DF-21D, merely costing several $million, may not be seen by the US as a legitimate weapon against a US aircraft carrier cost several $billion and potentially 1,000s of sailors lives.
Submarines
Against submarines, the DF-21D may also have a large depth-bomb (conventional or nuclear) or lightweight torpedo capability. The DF-21D could also hit submarines in their mooring at the joint US and Japanese naval base at Yokosuka Japan and Japanese submarines at Kure naval base, Japan.
The US Submarine Squadron 15 of SSNs at Guam naval base would also be high on the list of Chinese targets.
On left is a DF-21 (not necessarily a 21D) and on right a DF-31 ICBM (Courtesy Armscontrolwonk, Feb 5, 2016)
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Since 2012 China would have improved the accuracy, reliability and surprise-value of the DF-21D. China's smaller anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles have also become more effective. The cruise missiles also don't suffer from ambiguity.
Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC)
The US strategic concept "AirSea Battle" underwent a name change to "Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC)" in January 2015. See the National Interest's useful November 25, 2015 article on JAM-GC. JAM-GC seems to be an as yet not fully formulated attempt to avoid AirSea Battle's over specificity to the China-Western Pacific theatre - hence more global - including the recently rising Russian tensions.
However, lets hope China and the US (and allies) never come to blows.
However, lets hope China and the US (and allies) never come to blows.
Pete