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Australia has a wide area of interest. Submarines are often about places where interests are concentrated... "In peacetime, tension and war they can collect intelligence and conduct surveillance and reconnaissance, clandestinely and a long way from home - knowledge is power". etc - see http://sea1000.gov.au/submarine-essentials/faqs/
This is an issue with some comments by readers already made, but the nuclear propulsion issue will always remain unfinished. The fact that the Shortfin concept is based on a soon to be launched nuclear Barracuda SSN (Suffren in 2017) continues to draw nuclear propulsion interest.
In Australia there will be a five year design phase (about 2017 to 2022) which, for the public will mainly be about discussion, inevitably much on nuclear propulsion. 2029 may see a renewal of discussion as suggested in paragraph 4.29 of the 2016 Defence White Paper (PDF of 10 MB):
4.29 "During the long life of the new submarines, the rapid rate of technological change and ongoing evolution of Australia’s strategic circumstances will continue. As part of the rolling acquisition program, a review based on strategic circumstances at the time, and developments in submarine technology, will be conducted in the late 2020s to consider whether the configuration of the submarines remains suitable or whether consideration of other specifications should commence."
SO MANY QUESTIONS ARE RELEVANT - INCLUDING:
4.29 "During the long life of the new submarines, the rapid rate of technological change and ongoing evolution of Australia’s strategic circumstances will continue. As part of the rolling acquisition program, a review based on strategic circumstances at the time, and developments in submarine technology, will be conducted in the late 2020s to consider whether the configuration of the submarines remains suitable or whether consideration of other specifications should commence."
SO MANY QUESTIONS ARE RELEVANT - INCLUDING:
1. What technical problems may occur with Australia and DCNS converting a nuclear submarine (Barracuda SSN) into a conventional diesel-electric submarine (Shortfin SSK)?
a. the unusually large scale diesel-electric propulsion for the Collins caused/cause major operational and availability problems. As some of the players may be the same, the unusually large scale diesel-electric propulsion for the Shortfin may again cause major problems.
b. Australia has chosen in such a way that it may be denied the advanced AIP of TKMS and probably mature, tested Lithium-ion Batteries of the Japanese option. Will the Shortfin be discrete/stealthy enough to face more thickly laid, more sensitive anti-submarine defences? This may not only include China and Russia but nations that recieve improved anti-submarine technology from those countries.
c. Submarine Matters is not alone on Question 1. Robert Gottliebsen in The Australian, May 13, 2016 states: “…there can be no nuclear option at the moment but if the [Shortfin design conversion goes badly over the 5 year design phase] clearly there could be a nuclear option. I accept that no one talked about the nuclear option in the [Australian] cabinet and during decision-making discussions but I am equally sure it was discussed among defence chiefs. Certainly it should have been.”
2. What changing strategic conditions (opponents and friends) might drive the Australian Government to consider an SSN?
a. Improved opposing sensor and weapons improvements are major strategic variables (like 1.b). China has only just begun its South China Sea island/shoal/reef military bastion building program.
b. the US has naval and air bases (Diego Garcia, Guam, Japan/Okinawa, Hawaii, US West Coast) which are unfortunately distant from Australia.
- But what if China continues to groom East Timor and builds an air and naval base much closer to Australia? A naval and air base at Baucau, East Timor could be built with South China Sea like rapidity and efficiency. Not only more aid in it for East Timor but China could add its political and oil/gas extraction assets to obtain the oil/gas revenues East Timor feels cheated of by Australia.
- An Independence Referendum in nickel rich New Caledonia (an island way outside of routine Australian discussion) expected in 2018 presents another strategic unknown which might be exploited by China.
- But what if China continues to groom East Timor and builds an air and naval base much closer to Australia? A naval and air base at Baucau, East Timor could be built with South China Sea like rapidity and efficiency. Not only more aid in it for East Timor but China could add its political and oil/gas extraction assets to obtain the oil/gas revenues East Timor feels cheated of by Australia.
- An Independence Referendum in nickel rich New Caledonia (an island way outside of routine Australian discussion) expected in 2018 presents another strategic unknown which might be exploited by China.
c. Srategic changes can exist in terms of changing threats but also in changing, or declining, alliances. Denial that Trump is really serious and his chance at the Presidency will wane just keeps on rolling as his chances improve. So there may be US alliance instability caused by a President Trump who may strip ANZUS down to "cutting the deal". China may be encouraged by what it perceives to be US isolationism.
d. Nuclear Tipping Points in Northeast Asia, caused by US isolationism, the China and North Korea threat, may trigger a proliferation trend (weapons first, propulsion later if relevant) that Australia might be forced to address. Ashleigh Sharp writing in ASPI Strategist, May 13, 2016 has succinctly written [Trump's] "suggestion that Tokyo and Seoul might need to start protecting themselves, via proliferation if necessary, contradict half a century of US foreign policy. Trump’s remarks saw some pundits justifying the value of those commitments and others considering the merits of his argument.
Further questions:
Further questions:
3. For the above strategic changes does submarine propulsion system matter that much?
4. Are surface ships adequate for strategic changes or do they need help from submarines?
5. In what scenarios might an SSN be advantageous for Australia?
4. Are surface ships adequate for strategic changes or do they need help from submarines?
5. In what scenarios might an SSN be advantageous for Australia?
6. How could Australia acquire 4 to 6 nuclear propelled submarines?
Pete