COMMENT
- students (especially graduate, post-graduate level working in "dual-use" high tech areas)
- academics, scientists (PhD on up) especially on high tech.
- engineers, business people (targets as above)
- journalists (usually official news agencies) also useful for influence spreading
- pro-China Australian citizens (including some politicians)
- "diplomats" and defence attaches (may be involved in directing and debriefing those categories
above), See article below.
- Chinese, China based government officials of all types active in directing and/or debriefing
Chinese (or non-Chinese Aussies?) travellers/residents, who were/are/will be, in Australia.
Intelligence gathering is a standard assumption. Intelligence might more often be collected in fragments (ie. bit by bit collection from all sources and methods). This is in contrast to the popular assumption of fully paid-up, dedicated human agents/moles (often with false identities) in the John le Carré "Soviet bloc tradition".
Other Chinese activities-objectives may include:
- spreading pro-Beijing political influence through "Agents of Influence". More specifically China
may influence Australian politics and perhaps compromise Australian politicians (recent
concern?), and
- security monitoring by Chinese diplomats (helped by informants) of any/all of the Chinese groups
while in Australia. This is monitoring particulary of Chinese deemed to be involved in:
: overseas Uyghur or Uighur ("East Turkestan) Xinjiang Independence Groups (some
in China are involved in Islamic terrorism). See February 2017 report of Uighur militant
jihadists from China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region fighting for various causes in Syria
= The Diplomat's“How Serious Is the Islamic State Threat to China?” of March 14, 2017
: anti-Communist
; pro-democracy
: pro-Tibet
: Falun Gong or
: some Christian influences).
China is not the only security/influence/intelligence threat to Australia, of course.
BACKGROUND AND ARTICLE
Regarding Chinese Government special political and intelligence activity in Australia, 2008 to the present. In 2008 Chinese diplomats organised and payed costs of at least 10,000 pro-Beijing supporters (Chinese students) (see photo above). The students travelled 100's of kms, from Sydney and Melbourne to Canberra (Australia's capital). This was for a 2 hour "spontaneous" loyalty demonstration. Pro-Tibet democracy protesters were crowded out and intimidated as were Australian police. The occasion was the pro-Beijing Olympics (2008) Torch Relay. Location was the usually Australian Federal Government controlled Federal Triangle, Canberra, 24 April 2008.
Just imagine if the Australian Embassy tried to do the same "support" protest organising in Beijing? Tiananmen Square II? (Photo courtesy Getty images).
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Andrew Greene, for Australia’s government financed news agency ABC Online, reported on 20 November 2016. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-11-20/how-many-spies-does-china-have-in-australia/8041004:
“Chinese spies in Australia on the rise, former diplomat Chen Yonglin says”
“Chen Yonglin, the Chinese diplomat who sensationally quit his job [at the Chinese consulate in Sydney Australia, in 2005] more than a decade ago, has broken a lengthy silence to warn of a growing number of spies and agents working for Beijing in Australia.
Key points:
- Chen Yonglin successfully sought political asylum in Australia after resigning his diplomat role
- Warned more that 1,000 Chinese spies in Australia
- Says "majority of Chinese community representatives" work for [Chinese] Government
- In 2005, Mr Chen caused global headlines when he claimed China was operating a network of
"over 1,000 Chinese secret agents and informants in Australia".
The former diplomat, who now works as a businessman, [Chen] has warned the number of secretive Chinese operatives has steadily grown since he stopped working for China's foreign service.
"There should be some increase after over 10 years because China is now the wealthiest government in the world, they should have money, they should be [able] to afford raise a huge number of spies here," he told ABC News.
He stressed the increase was mainly in casual informants who provided crucial pieces of intelligence to Beijing.
Since successfully seeking political asylum in Australia, Mr Chen said he had become growingly concerned about Beijing's influence in his new home.
He believes that of particular concern is last year's decision to approve a 99-year lease of the Port of Darwin to Chinese-owned company Landbridge [presumably this will be a great job opening for Chinese Military Intelligence, performing under cover in Darwin. Great job :]
"I think it's very stupid. It's common sense that Darwin Port is strategically important and against the northern invasion," he said.
Mr Chen has also hit out at activists who have recently taken to the streets to show support for China's military expansion in the South China Sea.
"A majority of Chinese community representatives work for the Chinese Government," he said. ENDS
TWO REFERENCES:
- My On Line Opinionarticle of 5 May 2008 Embracing China involves risks for Australia about
possible Chinese intelligence involvement in Chinese student mobilisation in Australia. In it I give
some emphasis to Chen Yonglin's revelations about Chinese intelligence activities.
and
some emphasis to Chen Yonglin's revelations about Chinese intelligence activities.
and
- A major Sydney Morning Herald article of 7 May 2009, Defence 'rejected' minister spy link
concerns.
concerns.
Pete