Russia's very large BS-64 "Podmoskovye" special operations submarine was launched just a week ago, on August 11, 2015. BS-64's conversion began 16 years ago, in 1999, with intended launch in 2002, but lack of funds led to the 13 year delay. At 11,700 tons surfaced and 18,200 tons submerged BS-64 probably has more capabilities than USS Jimmy Carter (Seawolf SSN). (Photo courtesy Barents Observer).
BS-64 was a Delta SSBN but its 16 ballistic missiles were removed to accommodate a Multi-Mission Platform (MMP) which hosts a smaller submarine most probably a "Losharik" (60 to 80 meters long and successor to the"Paltus"). BS-64 can also host extra support crew (for example special forces, sigint specialists from Russia's NSA, scientists, technicians, divers and rescue crew).
Model of a Yankee or Delta class submarine acting as mothership to what may be a Losharik 60-80m long submarine attached to its belly. (Photo courtesy of a Russian website - right click mouse to translate into English).
So what, in more detail, does a special operations submarine do? USS Jimmy Carter would be the world's most famous example.
Russia's BS-64 "Podmoskovye", with its Loshariksubmarine (or LDUUV - see tomorrow's article) is capable of:
- splicing/placing taps on (Western country and Chinese) undersea cables
- placing sea-floor sensors in critical places like naval base approaches or removing Western sea-floor sensors
- hosting special forces, including divers or rubber boat marines, for Putin's new-style hybrid warfare campaigns
- oceanographic and undersea oil in the Arctic research
- hosting a smaller submarine (perhaps a 60-80 meter Losharik). Noting it may have been a (or the) Losharik that was detected in Swedish waters in late 2014. The Losharik's search and rescue function for sunken Russian submarines is critical - noting the damage that the Kursk's sinking did to Putin's reputation.
MORE LOSHARIK DETAILS
"Losharik" is a nickname for a toy horse connected by spheres. The Losharik submarine contains at least 2 layers of Titanium alloy pressure hulls - with the innermost hull (or hulls) being spheres around the crew of about 25. It is nuclear powered for scientific and strategic operational reasons. Losharik is variously called "Project 210", “AS-12”, “Project 10831” and the NATO reporting is NORSUB-5.
"BarentsObserverreported earlier, [BS-64] “Podmoskovye” will probably be used as carrier for the “Losharik” deep diving titanium submarine. “Losharik” was in 2012 used fordeep diving along the Mendeleyev ridgeat the seabed of the North Pole, as a part of Russia’s research before submitting its claims of the continental shelf in the Arctic for the United Nation."
"Due to the titanium hull and nuclear reactor, the submarine can stay much longer and much deeper than any other bathyscaphes. During the collecting of geologic material by the North Pole, the vessel dived to a depth of 2.5 to 3 kilometers and stayed submerged for 20 days."
"The “Losharik” is said to be able to dive to 6,000 meters, it has a crew of 25 and an estimated length of 79 meters. A photo of the top-secret submarine wasaccidentally publishedby the Russian edition of Top Gear in January 2015."
Note BS-64 "Podmoskovye" is the latest in a series of Russian special operations submarines which have included an earlier Delta, BS-136 "Orenburg", and a "Yankee Stretch" KS-411. There are various photos on the Internet of what may, or more likely, may not be the Losharik.
The Klavesin-1R or Harpsichord deepwater autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) (photos above and below) was developed by Russia's Institute of Marine Technology. This large AUV is sitting on the deck of the nuclear propelled icebreaker "Russia" (Rossiya) and being used to survey undersea oil rich Arctic waters that Russia claims. The AUV can dive to 6,000 meters.
Like most advanced countries Russia is developing unmanned underwater vehicle (UUVs) for commercial and military purposes. (Photos courtesy Naval Drones athttp://www.navaldrones.com/Klavesin-1R.html)
Note the four thruster propellers which improve manoeuvrability and station keeping in tides or currents.
For military uses AUVs are much less labour intensive and cheaper to operate than deep diving submarines like Russia's Losharik and the now decommissioned US submarine NR-1. However AUV/UUVs are too small to rescue people in sunken submarines (in a Kursk like emergency scenario).
For secret missions AUVs can be carried by smaller, less specialised, submarines than BS-64 Podmoskovye (in the previous article). A submarine can deploy a large diameter/displacement unmanned underwater vehicle (LDUUV) like the Klavesin, through a vertical or horizontal multi-purpose lock (tube) or using a detachable pod (dry deck shelter) usually on the back of a submarine behind the sail. Military uses for a LDUUV include intelligence gathering, using claw-arms for submarine cable tapping , "borrowing" sea-floor sensors or breaking sea-floor oil-gas pipelines (in wartime).
LDUUV or smaller UUV commercial applications include using side-scan radars for surveys - for underwater pre-construction of oil and gas drilling rigs, pipeline routes and submarine cable routes.
The Teledyne Gavia Defence AUV (see website) supplied to Russia.
Russia has not developed UUVs all by itself. The UUV market it highly internationalised. Many Western companies have supplied UUV technology to Russia. One is Teledyne Gavia Iceland - which has supplied the Gavia Defence AUV. The Gavia AUV is described as:
“a modular, man-portable autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) produced by Teledyne Gavia Iceland. The AUV's batteries and payloads are field swappable. Payloads include side scan sonar and digital cameras."
"Naval applications include mine counter measures (MCM), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), environmental assessment, surveillance, Search & recovery, and port security. In 2013-14, the RussianNavy acquired a total of eight Gavia AUVs for 744.244 million rubles ($13.2 M USD)”.
Comparison of the Collins with the three (Japan, Germany and France) Australian Future Submarine contenders - using open source information as at early May 2015. (Comparison Table courtesy of News Corp Australia article of May 16, 2015)
Note there are several mistakes or misleading figures in the Table above. This is partly owing to the Table's mix of current capabilities and estimated future capabilities which may be in 10 years time (2025). Clear current mistakes are:
- conventional Barracuda's surfaced Displacement is likely to be 4,765 tonnes. Submerged displacement would not be the 4,765 tonnes listed but more likely 5,300 tonnes if the Barracuda SSN's published figures are accurate.
- Conventional Barracuda's estimated range (18,000 nm) is not current - it is what this sub may have in 2025 if Australia chooses it.
- The Soryu's current Weapon Stowage is believed to be equivalent of 20 heavyweight torpedos/Harpoon missiles OR 10 torpedos/Harpoon missiles + 20 (smaller) mines = 30 weapons.
- The Soryu's current range is believed to be 6,100 nm but the "Super SoryuAU" (name first christened here) estimated range in 2025 may be more like 11,000 nm.
- If the Japanese option is selected Japan may well develop a fuel cell AIP (probably with German help).
Australian companies and business groups, the South Australian Government and to a lesser extent other State Governments continue to press for "Build future submarine in Australia".
While the Federal Labor Opposition (Bill Shorten) Party also advocates "Build in Australia" it has already said it will honour any contract made by the Abbott Coalition Government (which may be Build in Japan, Germany or France).
"There are a number of issues with plans to build Australia’s next fleet of submarines in Japan.
What are the risks? It is industry’s understanding that Japanese submarines are designed for short range, cold water operations. Australia’s submarines are required to travel long distances and operate primarily in warm tropical water. Industry is concerned that this and additional Australian system integration requirements will necessitate significant design changes that induces substantial additional risk if the submarines are redesigned and built in Japan.
Will Australia have to pay for the development of a new shipyard and workforce in Japan to build it submarines? Industry has been advised Japan produces one submarine each year as an industrial and employment policy. The submarines are built in two shipyards; and those two shipyards are programmed to build submarines for the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force for decades into the future. Industry is concerned that to build Australia’s submarines in Japan it will require the development of a new shipyard and workforce in Japan thereby compromising existing capabilities in Australia.
How long do Japanese submarines last? Because of Japan’s long-term shipbuilding strategy, industry has been advised the Japanese only build submarines to last approximately 15 years, as opposed to the traditional 25-30 year life of Australia Navy vessels. This means the Japanese do not factor major upgrades or overhauls into their design philosophy, which greatly limits the through life deeper level sustainment work available to be done by Australian industry.
What will be Australia’s capacity to sustain submarines built in Japan? The more Australian industry involvement there is in the design and build of the submarines the greater understanding it will have of the design philosophy and associated intellectual property. The greater understanding industry has of the design and build of the submarines the more capable it is to do the deeper level maintenance and repairs. If Japan designs and builds the submarines in Japan, there will be very limited capacity for Australian industry to perform any deeper level sustainment in Australia.
Can the hulls be built in Japan and fitted-out in Australia?
It has been suggested that an option might be to build the submarine hulls in Japan and transport them to Australia for final systems integration and fit-out. Industry’s advice is that this is particularly difficult with submarines as they will need to be constructed in fully integrated sections which are then sealed as a homogeneous pressure hull. There is very little capacity to fit-out a submarine once the hull is complete.
How do we go in times of trouble?
Industry is concerned that if it is not intimately involved in the design and build of submarines constructed in Japan, how dependent will Australia be on an extended supply chain back to Japan for support and supplies? These security concerns are heightened in times of trouble when those supply lines might be threatened.
Will we repeat the problems of the past?
The Japanese have not exported arms or been involved in collaborative defence procurements in decades. Industry is concerned that Australia doesn’t repeat the problems of the past in relation to securing access to intellectual property for technologies and dealing with countries that have not exported their designs."Unquote
* 1) steel of 550MPa and NS56 is equivalent to HY80 grade steel.
* 2) steel of 690MPa and NS70 is equivalent to HY100 grade steel.
* 3)steel 1078MPa and NS110 is equivalent to the HY156 grade steel.
* 4) Ti80 Titanium alloy under development 880MPa equivalent to NS90 or HY128 steel - source.
The Table is from towards the end of Japanese Document "High-tensile steel Summary of national submarine" or Summary of High Tensile Steel for Submarines by Country 2013http://seesaawiki.jp/w/doramarine/ .
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"S" has identified the document below which provides a comprehensive summary of some nuclear and conventional submarine pressure hull steel (and some Titanium) strengths. This is for at least 11 major submarine producing countries. The document is attributed to a vast number of open sources. The higher the yield (stronger) the steel alloy or Titanium alloy in a submarines pressure hull the deeper it can dive in operations. As well as alloy strength other factors also influence diving depth including: - supports for the the pressure hull - compartments or multiple pressure hulls, and - strength of the welds used to join sections of the pressure hull. It is not possible to verify the accuracy of most of the figures. Commenters who know more are invited to supply corrections. Please connect with Submarine Matters"Previous Use of Titanium in Russian Submarines" July 14, 2015 http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2015/07/previous-use-of-titanium-in-russian.html.
Document Link
Click http://seesaawiki.jp/w/doramarine/- document will appear to be mainly in Japanese - if you have Windows right click mouse - then click Translate to English (or Russian or Chinese etc).
The English translation is not great - which is why I have provided a summary of some Chinese and Russian pressure hull strengths below.
Document Name and Year
"High-tensile steel Summary of national submarine" or Summary of High Tensile Steel for Submarines by Country 2013.
Summary of Chinese and Russian High Tensile Alloys Pressure Hulls by Submarine Class Below are some of the details for China and Russia. Many more details are in the Document text. Utilising converters
Type 039 "Song" class SSK (13 active) and possibly Type 039A "Yuan" class SSK (13 active, 7 building) 921A steel: strength 590MPa = NS60 = HY86 Chinese GJB944-90 Titanium alloy (TA5-A) strength 588MPa = NS60 = HY85seems to be the equivalent to Russian 48-OT3 Titanium alloy.
[S has located an interesting reference on Chinese Titanium alloy research for pressure hulls. The reference is “Research progress in titanium alloys for naval ships in China” by YANG Ying-li, et al., The Chinese Journal of Nonferrous Metals, 2010, vol. 20, special 1, pages 1002 to 1006. http://www.ysxbcn.com/down/upfile/soft/20101012/215-p1002-6-033.pdf
The composition of Ti80 is Ti-6Al-3Nb-2Zr-1Mo with properties of high toughness, weldability, corrosion resistant, good low-cycle fatigue. Yield strength of Ti80 is 880MPa = NS90 = HY128. While Ti80’s while proof strength is 785MPa.
Stages in R&D on marine Titanium in China which may potentially be used in pressure hulls are:
1962-1987 Initial stage: TA5, believed to be an imitation of Russian or US Titanium alloy. 1987-2009 Independent innovation stage: Various Titanium alloys developed including Ti80. 2008-present Industrial research and promotion stage.
Summary of “Research progress in titanium alloys for naval ships in China” Conclusion: Chinese development of Titanium for marine uses is mature in research institutes but still needs further and systematic testing under conflicting performance parameters. Much more work needs to be done before Titanium alloys can be used in Chinese submarine pressure hulls.]
Russian submarine pressure hulls
Akula class SSGN-SSN commissioned 1991 onwards, ten still active , may use AK-33 steel alloy = 979MPa = NS100 = HY142 Yasen-Severodvinsk class SSGN (or SSN) one commissioned 2013, four being built, may also used a low magnetic steel alloy - perhaps a development of AK-33. See Russian website.
Lada class SSK one commissioned 2010 uses "AB-2 "steel: strength 588-686MPa = NS60 - NS70 = HY85 = HY100 (thickness in mm?)
Oscar I, II and III SSGN commissioned 1980 onwards, five still active, may use AK-33 steel alloy.
Sierra class SSN one launched 1983, four built, perhaps two still active - uses Titanium alloy hull - average strength 690MPa = NS70 = HY100
Victor class SSN commissioned from 1967 - early Victors (classes I and IIs) may have used "AK-29" steel: strength 784MPa = NS80 = HY114. Eight Victor IIIs still active - may use "AK-33" = 979MPa = NS100 = HY142.
November class SSN in commission 1959-1990 used "K-25" low magnetic steel 588MPa = NS60 = HY85
I'll summarise other parts of the document in the future.
It is not often that Australian news cartoons accurately depict everyday life in a submarine. The Government of Prime Minister Abboott (above) has been suffering depth charges of its own making. This has led to a series of leaks. Even details of how to handle leaks have been leaked. (All three cartoons are coutesy of David Rowe for AFR).
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Defence Minister Kevin Andrews at the periscope is also suffering from public doubts about the "Competitive Evaluation (Process)". The smiling "Cheshire Cat" is Communications Minister Malcolm Turnbull who is enjoying the leaks. Turnbull wants Abbott's job. The torpedos include bumbling Treasurer Joe Hockey and Peta Credlin.
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The good boat Abboott sinking. Directed by Peta Credlin (Abbott's Chief of Staff - who is the real leader of the Government). "Barnacles" are all the problems of the Government, dragging it down. The paddle of former Defence Minister, David Johnston's "canoe" has been thrown in for fun.
Soryu class submarine SS-506 "Kokuryu" being built at the KHI shipyard in Kobe, Japan. SS-506 was commissioned in March 2014.
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At http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2015/08/7-problems-with-japanese-option.html in Comments on August 23, 2015 at 11:42 AM a Japanese representative (possibly from the Japanese Ministry of Defence) responded to Australian Made Defence’s"7 Problems [Questions in red] With The Japanese Option" I have asked follow-up questions at 2 and 6.
Question 1 “What are the risks?”
Japanese Response:
1-1) Hull stability and operation temperature
The pressure hull is designed for [operational temperature ranges of] ca. -30C to ca. +50C. This temperature range does not depend on country. [Information from China, Russia and Australia is within that] temperature range. [Adaptation of a cold water-hull to warm water conditions is not a problem. Rather a greater concern would be hull steel brittleness if a hull designed for warm water is used in cold water].
1-2) Modification [to increase operational] range
For increasing of operation range, hull must be elongated [lengthened] for carrying extra fuel. The Soryu is the hull elongation [lengthened] version of Oyashio, but there are no problem related to hull elongation.
Question 2 ”Will Australia have to pay for the development of a new shipyard and workforce in Japan to build it submarines?”
Japanese Response:
In the case of knock-down production, I do not think that additional new shipyard is required.
Pete follow-up question: What does “knock-down production” in the case of a new submarine mean?
Question 3 ”How long do Japanese submarines last?”
Japanese Response:
Design and building of submarine may be optimized for achieving given submarine life based on modern quality control concepts. If submarine user requires a longer life-time, the design and building will be optimized again. But, I do not think that it will not be a big modification, because the safety factors are considered well in the original 15 years-operation submarine.
Question 4 ”What will be Australia’s capacity to sustain submarines built in Japan?”
Japanese Response:
If new hull material is developed by a [Australian-Japanese corporation] Australia and Japan will share the related intellectual properties according to contribution.
Question 5 ” Can the hulls be built in Japan and fitted-out in Australia?”
Japanese Response:
[A] modular building system is adopted for the current Soryu submarine. Beside hull welding-connection work, involvement of Australian manufacturers in constructing and installation of each module will be important issue, too.
Question 6 “ How do we go in times of trouble?”
Japanese Response:
Trouble related to black box will be fixed in Japan or by Japanese experts.
Pete follow-up question:
What does “black box” mean?
Question 7 ”Will we repeat the problems of the past?”
Japanese Response:
The Japan lacks experience of arm export. But, many companies involved in Japanese submarine building are very famous and first class, they export their products and some of them have foreign branches." Pete
One of North Korea's 40 (or so) 300 ton Sangeo class mini-submarines. The 40 Sangeos represent more than half of North Korea's submarine force of 70. The photo is of one that ran aground in 1996. (Photo and description courtesy Globalsecurity)
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North Korea may have built 10 x 130 ton Yeoneo class submarines. Note one of its two outside strapped torpedos is shown. It may have been a Yeoneo that sank South Korean corvette ROKS Cheonan in 2010.
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COMMENT News that 70% of North Korea's submarines have submerged and cannot be detected may or may not be significant. North Korea is estimated to have: - 40 x 300-ton Sangeo-class mini-submarines N Korea's largest known domestically built submarine. The 40 Sangeos represent more than half of North Korea's submarine force of 70. - 10 x 130-ton Yeoneo-class mini-subs and - 20 x 1,800 ton 1950s vintage Romeo-class which would probably be only semi-functional . - 1 SINPO class submarine (up to 1,800-tons) which may be one of the Romeos with one or two vertical launch tubes fitted for future missile use. If all 50 of the Sangeo + Yeoneo mini-submarines have submerged/disappeared then that is 71%. So perhaps none of the Romeo's, requiring much larger crews, have submerged? The mini-submarines have only a limited endurance (perhaps 1 week or 2?) so they will need to resurface soon. ARTICLE Shin Hyon-hee of the The Korean Herald reported late on August 23, 2015 http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20150823000453:
N.K. beefs up frontline forces The Koreas’ cross-border standoff showed more signs of flaring up on Sunday as the North Korean military sharply beefed up its frontline artillery forces and [allegedly] forward-deployed a majority of its submarines and other offensive assets despite the high-level talks over the weekend.
...The South’s military was also unable to locate about 50 undersea vehicles, or 70 percent of the North’s submarine fleet, which have left their bases.
...In particular, the movement of North Korean submarines is a critical indicator of provocation that Seoul closely keep tabs on at all times, he noted.
...“It’s around 10 times the usual. We have not seen in decades that many submarines that are simultaneously out of their bases,” the official said.
“This is the level where we can expect something really worrying to happen ― we don’t know what kind of operations they are and will be undertaking where.”
...To head off any unanticipated provocation, the South Korean military is maintaining full readiness and mobilizing more antisubmarine assets such as destroyers, P-3C patrol planes and Lynx antisubmarine helicopters, the official added.
The South Korean Navy operates a 13-submarine fleet, consisting of nine 1,200-ton 209-class and four 1,800-ton 214-class. It is pushing to add five 214-class submarines by 2019 and nine 3,000-ton submarines carrying vertical launchers for submarine-to-ground missiles. It launched a submarine force command last February to better counter North Korean threats and carry out underwater operations, training and education, and maintenance...."
Japan had a submarine building industry for 100 years before is began to build the Soryus. The class immediately preceeding the Soryus are the Oyashios. Above is Oyashio class submarine SS-599 (Setoshio) under construction at MHI shipyard, Kobe in 2006. SS-599 was commissioned on February 28, 2007.
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Little is known publically in Australia about Japan’s submarine building concerns. Submarine Matters provides one forum for discussions. To that end Japanese concerns are being highlighted. I have clarified the English in some sentences [...] brackets - hoping this remains faithful to S's intended meaning.
"Requirements for submarine performance significantly depend on design concept which is based on various factors such geopolitical situation, geographical conditions, technological issues and diplomatic relations. Therefore, the ideal design concept of submarine becomes highly country specific. The design concept of the Soryu is continuous improvement of performance by batch building [in order to respond to a highly defense-oriented policy of surveillance of the sea around Japan]. The operational period and range of the Soryu are purposely set to be short [with the design concept optimised for this]. [Introducing quality upgrades and extra fuel will make the submarine design heavier (i.e. increase in size, therefore increase in water resistance). This will lead to performance degradations].
The design concepts of the Collins, Type 216 and Conventional Barracuda are long [range], [high endurance] and multi-purpose functions including deployment of special forces. [These] are very different from design concepts [for the] Soryu. But, I think Japan can achieve many capabilities in the table “How They Compare” [see http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2015/08/7-problems-with-japanese-option.html].
I think there [are] two key issues, i.e. 1) development of new hull materials and 2) establishment of submarine building management system in Australia should be addressed.
1)I do not think that the JSMDF agrees with a NS110 [very high yield pressure hull steel] technology transfer. So new low magnetic and high strength [steel] for a single pressure hull [rather than the Soryu's double hull design] should be developed, but evaluation and testing will be very time-consuming.
2)Low performance of the [production] management system is a huge problem. It means lack of information security management, and how Japan shares top secret technology with Australia. Many people, including a former executive of ASC, say that ASC has enough ability to build submarine without reason or planning. ASC must show [management plaaning with clear and measurable aims, clear training plans, education of people for awareness, internal checking [quality control?] system. [Performance measures are required to achieve the RAN's requirements such as time and budget, corrective action schemes, etc.)].
Finally, I [pass on] rather unpleasant information. Germany says that Australia is demanding in [this CEP?]."
PETE'S COMMENTS Just as Japan builds cars for Australia's specific requirements Japan can build subs for Australian requirements. Japanese car exports to Australia far outstripped German + French exports, of course.
As Australians often do not know what they want at the beginning of a submarine batch - Japan's "continuous improvement of performance" procedures should do nicely.
The Super SoryuAU (term first used here) will be heavier than subs for the Japanese Navy but greater engine power and a more hydro-efficient shape should maintain performance for the Super SoryuAUs.
Yes 1. new pressure hull steel for Australian welders is important and 2. the establishment of a submarine building management system in Australia that is up to Japan's high standards is important (a bit like the former Mitsubishi car factory in Adelaide)
Regarding:
"1)" Yes NS110 should not be transferred as it is difficult to reweld and Australia's security system is not like Japan's.
"2)" ASC management system standards have indeed been poor as shown in the Collins and now in the AWDs. Appointing a Japanese senior executive would be a good idea for a start.
Thankyou for passing on Germany's frustrations. I'm sure Germany appreciates the kind gesture.
Drawing board Amur 1650 with its very large, heavy, looking AIP system (Diagram courtesy Aviation Forum). Morocco may be buying an Amur 1650. See reference to "Russian" AIP.
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The drawing board Amur 950 showing 5 of the 10 vertical launch tubes behing the sail (Courtesy Russia's Rubin Design Institute)
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COMMENT-BACKGROUND
It appears the World Tribune, August 9, 2015 gained a scoop - that the King of Morocco, Mohammed VI, will visit Moscow in late 2015 to sign a contract for one Amur-1650 submarine. Other news agencies picked up the story and some added important details.
Russia has been attempting to sell the Amur conventional submarines for years. The never built Amurs (smaller 950, larger 1650) might be seen as export versions of the Lada class (1 completed so far) built for the Russian Navy. A weak point of the Amur-Lada has been the under-developed or non-existent air independent propulsion (AIP) system. Either Russia has had difficulty developing AIP or Russia is satisfied with nuclear propulsion (which could be seen as “super AIP”) for its own navy.
The US$342 million (€300 million) being quoted for the Amur 1650 sale to Morocco is remarkably lower than the usual cost for conventional submarines of around US$500 million. Note that the Wikipedia entry (presumably from Russian sources) quotes US$450 million for an Amur. A number of possibilities may explain the low price to Morocco:
- Russia wants to secure its first sale of an Amur with a very low price.
- Russia will apply add-on costs for training, advisers and spare parts and eventually overhauls to recoup the sale price.
- If the Saudis are financing the Morocco sale this may be part of a larger Saudi arms buy from Russia (giving Russia room to reduce the Moroccan submarine price).
- Russia wishes to generate more sales from prospective buyers inside the region (expanding the arms race) and/or outside the region.
The smaller Amur 950 is marketed with the extraordinary capability of 10 vertical launch tubes (VLSs) – presumably for Klub missiles. Perhaps weighing 1,100 tonnes (surfaced) depending on whether it has AIP. This is at the expense of only 4 horizontal torpedo tubes – only 2 of which have reloads – meaning a total of 16 torpedos/missiles for the Amur 950.
The Amur 1650 Morocco may perhaps have 10 VLS and also 6 torpedo tubes – each with 2 reloads – 18 torpedo/missiles horizontally fired. Perhaps weighing 1,800 tonnes (surfaced) depending whether it has VLS and/or AIP options.
"Morocco to Buy Russian Amur-1650 Superquiet Submarine
Morocco and Russia are close to reaching a deal on the delivery of a Russian-made Amur 650(project 677E) submarine which would be the kingdom’s first submarine, World Tribune reported.
The contract is expected to be signed during King Mohammed VI’s trip to Moscow later this year. The two countries have been in talks on the issue in several stages since 2013, according to the media outlet.
The sum of the deal may be €300 million ($342 million), Afrik.com reported.
During the DSA-2014 international arms forum in Malaysia, the Malaysian navy also expressed interest for the submarine.
"Malaysian navy commander visited our display and expressed interest in our Amur 1650 submarines," a Rosoboronexport spokesman told Rossiskaya Gazeta.
The Amur 1650 diesel-electric powered submarine was developed by the Rubin design bureau. In addition to an air-independent power plant, the submarine is equipped with a regular diesel generator and a set of accumulator plants. While surfaced it is propelled by the diesel-electric power plant, and by the accumulators and the air-independent power plant while submerged. Thus, the submarine has the technical specs close to a nuclear-powered one.
In comparison with its predecessors, the Amur 1650 submarine is capable of multiple missiles firing (up to six missiles at once) and has a hydroacoustic system with unique sonar for detecting low-noise targets at various distances.
The main feature of the Amur 1650 is its extreme quietness. According to experts, the new submarine outperforms the submarines of Varshavyanka (project 636) class which are now believed to be the most silent submarines in the world.
The Amur 1650 [specifications] has a length of 66.8 meters and a beam of 7.1 meters. While submerged, the submarine can reach speed of 21 knots (39 kmh) at a distance of 650 miles. The submarine can submerge at a depth of 250 meters. The armament includes 18 torpedoes and 10 vertical silo-based missiles."[It is unclear whether the submarine Morocco is buying will have the vertical launch feature.]
The Japanese submarine delegation for the briefing in Adelaide, August 26, 2015. Admiral (ret.) Takashi Saito is in the center.
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COMMENT With Germany and France having been engaged in selling weapons to Australia since the 1950s Japan is feeling the competition. Arms sellers have to sell to many interest groups. The arms buying public are concerned about jobs and taxpayer's money. Arms buying governments, like the Abbott Government, also need to play a positive role in selling. The Abbott Government's reputation has been changing every 3 months or so - some times for the worse. Below are some snippets reflecting what the Japanese submarine delegation experienced in Adelaide today. ARTICLES
UPDATE 1-Japanese officials struggle to woo Australia over
submarine contract
Aug 26 (Reuters) - Japan's effort to charm Australian politicians and the public over its bid for a A$50 billion ($35.60 billion) submarine project appeared to stumble on Wednesday, with officials from Tokyo resisting pressure to commit to building the vessels in Australia.
Japanese defence officials and executives from Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Heavy Industries made their first major pitch to build 12 stealth submarines for Australia's navy during public briefings for defence contractors and the media in Adelaide, a ship-building hub.
Once seen as the frontrunner to win the contract, the Japanese bid has since come under scrutiny because of Tokyo's unwillingness to commit to building any submarines in Australia, where manufacturing jobs are a hot-button political issue.
Rivals ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) of Germany and France's state-controlled naval contractor DCNS have both said they would build entirely in Australia, targeting members of the Australian government with the economic and political benefits of their proposals.
Both European firms have also courted the Australian defence industry and media in key cities.
Two sources present at separate meetings between the Japanese delegation and Australian officials said the Japanese did not seem to have much understanding of the political sensitivities and appeared to have lost ground to the rival bidders.
They said the delegation gave few details about the Japanese proposal beyond reassurances they would adhere strictly to the rules of the process.
"It seems like the (Australian) federal government just told them that they had to come down here and talk to us," one source told Reuters under the condition of anonymity because he was not authorised to speak to the media.
"I think they're really struggling to connect to the public. It's just not in their DNA to speak publicly about defence issues."
A defence industry source in Tokyo said the German bid was shaping up as the one to beat…..WHOLE ARTICLE
Submarines contract: Japanese delegation in Adelaide for public relations offensive
A Japanese defence adviser has conceded the country needs to improve its public relations in order to win the contract to build Australia's next fleet of submarines.
…Japanese defence adviser and former submarines commander Yoji Koda said Japan initially failed to understand the public relations game its competitors were playing.
French and German companies bidding for Australia's $20 billion submarine contract have been courting both the Federal Government and public opinion via the media.
Japan had been avoiding that second battleground, but the current delegation will hold a news conference today in Adelaide, ahead of meeting industry officials and a visit to the defence construction facilities in Adelaide's north-west.
Retired rear admiral Yoji Koda now works as an adviser to one of Japan's shipbuilding companies and for the national security secretary.
It is the first time the pacifist country has competed in a defence bid such as this and he said being "rookies" had posed some problems.
"[The] Japanese team is gradually solving those problems, but still there are some areas [where] Japan is not so doing well," he said.
Public relations the new submarine battlefield for the Japanese
The Japanese have been criticised for being secretive, an issue which has been amplified by the PR offensive their German and French competitors launched.
Mr Koda said the Japanese team was now learning that approach.
"I strongly believe [with] the engineering capability or technology ... of building the larger submarine, I think Japan is still in the lead," he said.
"But at the same time there are several other things we need to take into consideration. One is the public relations so, yes, for the first time the Japanese team shows up at Adelaide and speaks to the public and also have a conference with [the] Australian team and I hope that will be convincing to the Australian people." WHOLE ARTCLE
Japanese submarine bid delegation visits Adelaide, denying any secret deal to win contract
…Masaki Ishikawa from the Japanese defence ministry said speculation of a secret deal had not come from Japan.
"We are not the one to be blamed for ... others speculating there may be a secret deal," he said.
"[We are] a little bit confused and perplexed why such speculation is still amongst the people's voices."
…At a news conference held during a visit to Adelaide, the Japanese delegation sought to end speculation a secret deal had been made even before the Federal Government mounted what it called a "competitive evaluation process".
The Japanese said they would ensure the Government had full details of their bid by the end of November.
Asked if construction in Adelaide was his preferred option, Admiral Takashi Saito said three options all were under serious evaluation.
"We are requested from the Australian Federal Government to come up with all three build options - Japanese, hybrid and Australian build options," he told reporters.
"Team Japan are considering and investigating all the possibilities to come up with all three build options and in that effort we are also seriously considering the Australian build option."
…South Australia's Defence Industries Minister Martin Hamilton-Smith…met Admiral Saito and said he made that position clear.
"He was very respectful, very receptive and the Japanese contingent under Admiral Saito made it very clear that they were considering all three options, including an Australian build and I commend them for it, as I did the Germans and the French," he said.
Chris Burns from industry body the Defence Teaming Centre said the push for a 100 per cent local build was "well received" when discussed with the Japanese delegation.
"They fully understand that we have to be part of the process from the outset and why we want to build our own submarines," he said.
"It's not just about jobs, it's about ensuring our security and the security of our country."
The contract for the future submarines is expected to be awarded by the Federal Government next year."
The Soryu hull structure consists six sections. From right-hand side head to left-hand side tail the:
i) first section (head) has double and single hull structures [Pete Comment – complicated due to varying loads/considerations for bow streamlining, torpedo tubes, front escape tube and hatch to sail];
ii) second, third and fourth sections have a single hull structure;
iii) fifth and sixth sections have double hull structures. [Pete Comment – complicated due to rear escape tube and rudder-propeller hydrodynamics considerations]
The double hull consists of the outer non-pressure hull (non-magnetic alloy) and the inner pressure hull (magnetic NS-80). The inner pressure hull (NS-80) is not as strong as the single pressure hull (NS-110), because the outer hull (alloy) shows high strength.
The single pressure hull is made of low magnetic NS-110, in S’s opinion.
[For a future Australian submarine] To achieve overall low magnetism for this submarine (as it will not use NS-110) new low magnetic and high strength steel is needed for the single pressure hull, i.e. first partial area and second/third/fourth areas.
[Pete Comment – so the difference between “double-hulled submarines” and “single hulled submarines” may not be as distinct as is generally thought - rather its as complex as most other submarine matters. In the absence of NS-110 use various steels between HY-100 and NS-110/HY-156 may be appropriate.]
Below is an excellent article of April 25, 2014 byHans M. Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS). The value of the article concerning Chinese SSBN issues is enhanced by its detailed description (in prose and graphics) concerning Chinese shipyards and submarine bases. These facilities may not be as sexy as weapons but they form essential components of a rising military giant. The article's string is http://fas.org/blogs/security/2014/04/chinassbnfleet/: "China SSBN Fleet Getting Ready – But For What? Posted on Apr.25, 2014 in China, Nuclear Weapons by Hans M. Kristensen
By Hans M. Kristensen
China’s emerging fleet of 3-4 new Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines is getting ready to deploy on deterrent patrols, “probably before the end of 2014,” according to U.S. Pacific Command.
A new satellite image taken in October 2013 (above) shows a Jin SSBN in dry dock at the Bohai shipyard in Huludao. Two of the submarine’s 12 missile tubes are open. It is unclear if the submarine in the picture is the fourth boat or one of the first three Jin SSBNs that has returned to dry dock for repairs or maintenance.
The U.S. intelligence community predicts that “up to five [Jin-class (Type 094) SSBNs] may enter service before China proceeds to its generation SSBN (Type 096) over the next decade,” an indication that the noisy Jin-class design might already be seen as outdated.
This and numerous other commercial satellite images (see below) show how China over the past decade has built an infrastructure of naval facilities to service the new SSBN fleet. This includes upgrades at naval bases, submarine hull demagnetization facilities, underground facilities and high-bay buildings for missile storage and handling, and covered tunnels and railways to conceal the activities from prying eyes in the sky.
Apart from how many Jin SSBNs China will build, the big question is whether the Chinese government will choose to operate them the way Western nuclear-armed states have operated their SSBNs for decades – deployed continuously at sea with nuclear warheads on the ballistic missiles – or continue China’s long-held policy of not deploying nuclear weapons outside Chinese territory but keeping them in central storage for deployment in a crisis.
Nuclear Submarine Sightings
Over the past decade, a total of 25 commercial satellite images made available on Google Earth have provided visual confirmation and information about the status and location of the Jin SSBNs (see table below). They show the submarines at four sites: the Bohai shipyard at Huludao on the Bohai Sea where the submarines are built; the Xiaopingdao naval base near Dalian where the submarines are fitted out for missile launch tests; the North Sea Fleet base at Jianggezhuang near Qingdao where one Jin SSBN is homeported along with the old Xia-class SSBN from the 1980s; and at the South Sea Fleet base at Longpo on Hainan Island where at least one Jin SSBN has been based since 2008.
Bohai Ship Yard
The Bohai shipyard at Huludao builds China’s nuclear-powered submarines. The shipyard, which is located in the north of the Bohai Sea, is immensely busy with numerous large tankers and cargo ships under construction at any time. The submarine hulls are assembled in a large 40,000-squaremeter construction hall at the western end of the shipyard, rolled across a storage area into a dry dock for completion, and then launched into the harbor where they spend years tied up to a pier fitting out until handed over to the Chinese navy (PLAN).
Commercial satellite photos provide snapshots of the status of submarine construction and the quality is good enough to differentiate different submarine types and identify design details such as dimensions and layout of the missile compartment. One of the most recent photos (see below) shows a Jin-class SSBN in dry dock with two of 12 missile tubes open. Additional unassembled submarine hull sections are laid out on the ground next to the assembly hall.
The busy Bohai shipyard mixes nuclear submarine construction with commercial tankers and cargo ships in half a dozen dry docks. In this composite image from October 11 and 25, 2013, a completed Jin-class SSBN can be seen in dry dock and what appear to be hull sections for another submarine awaiting assembly.
In addition to satellite photos, tourists also occasionally take photos and post them on Google Panoramio or other web site. One such photo (see below) shows most of the shipyard with other overlaid photos showing dry dock cranes and two missile submarines first seen in 2007.
Image: Google Panoramio; inserts from Chinese internet. Click for large version.
Xiaopingdao Submarine Refit Base
After completing construction at the Bohai shipyard the submarines sail to the Xiaopingdao refit base near Dalian. This base is used to prepare the submarines for operational service and is where test missiles are loaded into the launch tubes for test launches from the Bohai Sea across China into the Qinghai desert. Xiaopingdao is also used by China’s single Golf-class SSB, a special design submarine previously used to test launch SLBMs.
The base has been upgraded several times over the past decade-and-a-half including an extended pier to service the larger Jin-class SSBNs.
On two occasions, in March 2009 and March 2011, two Jin SSBNs have been seen docked at Xiaopingdao at the same time.
Xiaopingdao is also where the first Jin-class SSBN was spotted on a commercial satellite photo in July 2007.
Click for large version.
Jianggezhuang (Laoshan) Submarine Base
The oldest nuclear submarine base is the North Sea Fleet base at Jianggezhuang (Laoshan) approximately 18 kilometers (11 miles) east of Qingdao in the Shandong province.
The Jin-class SSBN was first seen at Jianggezhuang on a commercial satellite image in August 2010.
The base is also home to the old Xia-class SSBN, the lone unit of China’s first experiment with ballistic missile submarines. The Xia completed a multi-year dry dock overhaul in 2007 but has probably never been fully operational and has never conducted a deterrent patrol.
This base is where we in 2006 spotted the long-rumored submarine cave, also described in Imaging Notes. The cave has a large water tunnel with access from the harbor and three land-tunnels providing access from various base facilities.
A satellite image from July 2013 (see below) shows both the Xia and a Jin SSBN at the base, with the Xia being assisted by two tugboats. Water turbulence behind the submarine indicates the Xia’s engine is operational.
Both Jin- and Xia-class SSBNs are based at Jianggezhuang submarine base, which includes an underground submarine cave. A possible underground weapons storage site is located northeast of the base. Click for large version.
Jianggezhuang also has a dry dock, the only one at a naval base that has so far been seen servicing nuclear-propelled submarines. There are also several nuclear-powered attack submarines homeported at the base.
Only a few miles north of the base is an underground facility that may be storing munitions for the submarine fleet. As such, it could potentially also serve as a regional storage facility for nuclear warheads for the SLBMs once released to the navy in a crisis by the Central Military Committee.
Several buildings have been added since 2003, possibly in preparation for accommodating the new Jin SSBN and its larger JL-2 SLBMs.
Hainan Island Submarine Complex
The South Sea Fleet naval facilities on Hainan Island are under significant expansion. The nuclear submarine base at Longpo has been upgraded to serve as the first nuclear submarine base in the South China Sea. The first Jin-class SSBN was seen at Longpo on February 27, 2008, and a new photo from November 2013 shows a Jin SSBN with its missile tubes open (see below).
In this image from November 30, 2013, a Jin-class SSBN can be seen flashing its 12 missile tubes while docked at Longpo naval base on Hainan Island.
Longpo submarine base includes four piers for submarines, an underground submarine facility with tunnel access from the harbor and land-tunnels from the other side of the mountain, as well as a demagnetization facility. Longpo was the first base to get a demagnetization facility, which has since also been added to the East Sea Fleet near Ningbo.
The Hainan naval complex also includes the conventional submarine base at Julin, which also appears to be under expansion with new piers and a sea break wall under construction.
Approximately 12 kilometers (7 miles) northeast of Longpo is a military facility that appears to include four tunnels connecting to one or several underground facilities inside the mountain. Tugged away at the end of a lake inside a valley, the facility has a significant infrastructure with administrative and technical buildings as well as several camouflaged high-bay buildings surrounded by berms for blast protection during explosives handling.
The naval complex on Hainan Island is spread across several locations with nuclear submarines based at Longpo, conventional submarines based at Julin, and a possible underground weapon storage facility north of the bases. Click for large version.
The Longpo base does not have a dry dock so nuclear submarines would have to sail to another base for maintenance or repair. The conventional submarine base at Julin has a 165-meter (550-feet) dry dock that could potentially accommodate a Jin-class SSBN, but it would be a tight fit. More likely are the 215-meter (706-feet) dry docks at the Zhanjiang Naval Base on the mainland north of Hainan Island, or the East Sea Fleet submarine base near Ningbo. Yet so far available commercial satellite images have not shown a nuclear submarine at either Julin, Zhanjiang (South Sea Fleet headquarters), nor Ningbo (East Sea Fleet headquarters), and it is unclear if the bases are certified for nuclear-propelled submarines. If not, then nuclear submarines based on Hainan Island would have to use a dry dock as far north as Jianggezhuang or Bohai for maintenance and repairs. That seem strange so I’m sure I’ve missed a naval dry dock somewhere closer to Hainan.
A unique new feature at Longpo is a 1.3-kilometer (0.8-mile) long covered railway completed in May or June 2010 (see below). The railway connects a high-bay building with possible access into the mountain at the eastern part of the base with one of the land-based tunnels to the underground submarine cave on the Longpo peninsula. The covered railway clearly seems intended to keep movement of something between the two mountains out of sight from spying satellites. Two turnoffs from the railway lead to a large building under construction with rail tracks inside. The purpose of the new facilities and rail is unknown but might potentially be intended for movement of SLBMs or other weapons between storage inside the mountain to the submarine cave for arming of SSBNs or SSNs.
A new covered railway constructed in 2010 might connect a missile handling building with the submarine cave on the other side of the mountain. Click for large version.
Before a roof was constructed to conceal the land-tunnel into the submarine cave, the rail tracks into the tunnel were visible on satellite images. Other features at this portion of the base include five ventilation stacks, the roof between the covered railway and tunnel entrance, and a coverage being constructed over a second tunnel road entrance (see above). These features are also visible on a tourist photo posted on Google Panoramio (see below).
The east side of the underground submarine cave at the Longpo naval base on Hainan Island includes rail- and road-tunnels, ventilation stacks, and a covered railway.
Implications
With the emerging Jin-class SSBN fleet, China appears ready to add an important component to its nuclear deterrent. Although the focus of China’s nuclear posture is the land-based missile force, the Chinese leadership appears to view a triad of nuclear forces as a symbol of great power status. Commercial satellite images clearly show that the Chinese leadership has been spending considerable resources over the past decade building the infrastructure needed to support the SSBN fleet. The development is watched closely in India, Japan, and the United States as an example of China’s (modestly) growing and more sophisticated nuclear arsenal.
In building the Jin-class SSBN fleet, however, China appears more to mirror the nuclear postures of the United States, Russia, Britain and France rather than demonstrating a clear purpose and contribution of the SSBN force to China’s own security and crisis stability in general.
As a new second-strike capability added to the Chinese nuclear arsenal, the Jin SSBN fleet only makes strategic sense if it is more secure than the Second Artillery’s land-based ICBM force. Its justification must be based on a conclusion that the ICBMs are too vulnerable to a first strike and that a more secure sea-based second-strike force therefore is needed.
The ultimate test of the Jin SSBNs will be whether they can survive long enough at sea in a hypothetical war situation to provide a back-up deterrent at all. If they are too noisy, the Jins could be vulnerable to early detection and attrition, especially if they had to deploy to distant patrols areas in order for the missiles to be able to reach important targets. With a range of 7,200 to 7,400 kilometers (4,470 to 4,600 miles) – the range estimate given by the U.S. intelligence community for the JL-2 SLBM carried on Jin-class SSBNs, a submarine would need to sail deep into the Pacific Ocean to be able to target the U.S. west coast. To threaten Washington DC, a Jin SSBN would have to sail halfway across the Pacific (see map below). Not exactly safe travel for a submarine that is noisier than the ancient Russian Delta III SSBNs built in the 1970s.
It is probably a fair assumption that U.S. attack submarines have already been trailing or monitoring the Jin SSBNs to record individual sound characteristics and observe operational patterns. Such information would be used to locate and, if necessary, sink the Chinese submarines in a hypothetical war.
The value of the Jin SSBNs is also dependent on their capability to communicate with the national command authority on land from submerged patrol areas. Secure and reliable communication is essential for the Chinese leaders to be able to exercise command and control of the nuclear missiles on the SSBNs. If communication is poor, the SSBNs could become irrelevant or, perhaps more importantly, downright dangerous to crisis stability if loss of contact caused Beijing to mistakenly conclude that one or more of the subs had been sunk by enemy action. That could, potentially, cause the Chinese leadership to conclude that the nuclear threshold had already been crossed and decide to activate its land-based nuclear forces in a way that would be seen by an adversary as preparation to launch.
Some of these issues may become clearer when China begins to operate the Jin submarines as a real SSBN force. Part of the public debate has been somewhat overblown with claims that Jin SSBNs will be able to target the continental United States from Chinese waters. They will not. And the DOD assessment that the Jins “will give the PLA Navy its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent” is probably premature and certainly depends on what is meant by “credible.”
Whatever their ultimate capability may be, however, the Jin SSBNs and the infrastructure China is building are symbols of the extensive nuclear modernizations that are underway in all the nuclear-armed countries. The Chinese government says it “will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country,” but it is certainly in a technological race with the United States, Russia and India about developing improved and more capable nuclear weapons."
"Contrary to popular opinion, my assessment is that Shortfin Barracuda may only require fairly minimal changes from the [Barracuda SSN]:
1) Essentially half the hull modules would be unchanged. This includes the SSN's entire forward section, up to right behind the sail.
2) Behind the sail is the standalone nuclear reactor module. This module is of similar length (~8m) to the equally standalone fuel cell module. They can be switched, much like inserting MESMA before. The fuel cell module will also have space for fuel and ballast tanks.
3) Which leaves the rear propulsion module, where most of the changes will happen. The good news is that scaling-up Scorpene's diesel-electric propulsion should be straightforward. Diesels are a lot more compact than the nukes' steam/electric turbines + generators, so there is plenty of space in Barracuda for 3 diesels side-by-side, with batteries/fuel tanks below deck.
I have checked versus Scorpene's detailed plans to confirm (these plans are available online... but hush that's a secret!).
So all in all, the biggest challenge with Shortfin Barracuda is not going to be the conventional propulsion. The real potential show-stopper is the U.S.'s willingness to allow the integration of a US combat system [see AN/BYG-1] and weapons [within the Shortfin], and to a lesser degree questions about whether the fuel cell technology is ready for prime time (but the [Australian Navy] may not even have a requirement yet)."
PETE's COMMENT
It is nice to hear from the French side. What immediately worries is that while Australia has an admittedly vague requirement for a 4,000 ton submarine the Shortfin Barracuda may be over-weight with a surfaced displacement of "4,765" tons (see right sidebar) and a submerged displacement of 5,300 tons. Presumably to maintain "minimal changes" the Shortfin Barracuda will need to retain the displacement figures of the SSN.
With a heavier displacement than its 4,000 ton competitors the Shortfin Barracuda may suffer from higher up-front costs, higher diesel fuel usage and higher maintenance-spares costs.
Also the Shortfin's buoyancy dynamics will be very different from the SSN due to the need to place diesel oil in several (many?) fuel tanks around Shortfin - then the need to backfill them with seawater.
Yes having an American, Donald C. Winter, as the most senior member of the Submarine Advisory Panel not to mention, hidden negotiations, may well work against DCNS. Fuel cell AIP may well become a requirement when/if Australia recognises the need to have a backup for the new technology risks of Li-ion Batteries (batteries presumably in all three contenders' bids).
However the Shortfin's higher displacement may accommodate much large fuel capacity than the Japanese and German competitors. This might translate to longer range (18,000 nm?) or the same range (11,000 nm?) at higher snorting speeds than the competitors. Of course Australia will need to decide whether higher cost is worth the speed-range advantages. There are also many comparative factors that are important, including stealth, crew size and common maintenance facilities. Notably Malaysia in Australia's region operates DCNS Scorpenes and India will soon. Japan operates Soryus. Indonesia and South Korea operates German designs and Singapore will operate larger than usual Type 218SGs in the 2020s.
The photos above and below may be the only photos of the Barracuda SSN (also called Suffren (first of) class in existence. It shows the submarine(s) under construction at the DCNS shipyard in Cherbourg, France. This may be for French national security and/or commercial security reasons. The photos may be of the Suffren and/or the Duguay-Trouin(second of class)) under construction - perhaps taken earlier than February 2015. Photo appeared in the February 2015 article http://corlobe.tk/spip.php?article37145 for Xavier Vavasseur of Navy Recognition’s interview with the Barracuda Program Manager.
Model of TKMS-HDW Type 218SG taken at IMDEX ASIA [Singapore, May 19-21] 2015 (Courtesy Defense Studies blog)
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Type 218SGs X-plane rudder is similar to the Type 212A's. Photo of model May 2015 (Courtesy "Coffee and Bullets" andDefense Studiesblog).
Predictions that the TKMS-HDW Type 218SG would be a renamed Type 214have been scuttled. TKMS has indicated the 218 weighs around 2,000 tons surfaced and is 70 meters long (while the 214 is up to 1,700 tonnes surfaced and 65 meters long). MHalblaub correctly pointed out several times a year ago that the combined purchase price of the 2 x 218s was less than US$ 2 Billion - a sum only enough for a slightly evolved design. My original prediction of a much larger 3,000 ton (surfaced) design was incorrect - as a radically new 218 design would have cost considerably more. Singapore ordered the 218s in November 2013. The Type 218SGs are being built at TKMS-HDW shipyard at Kielin northern Germany
From the photos and briefing information (see below) the 218 appears to have features evolved from several TKMS-HDW designs including Types 212A, 214 and Dolphin 2. As they are all SSKs built by TKMS-HDW this evolutionary heritage is not unexpected.
The 70 meter long 218 is approximately 2,000 tons (surfaced). For comparison the 69 meter long Dolphin 2 is 2,050 tons surfaced.
The 218's beam (width) is 6.3 meters and the 214's beam is also 6.3 meters. The 214's draught is 6.0 meters and the Dolphin 2's draught is 6.2 meters making it likely that the 218's draught is in that narrow range - perhaps 6.1 meters.
One might plausibly describe the 218 as a:
- 214 with a long, 5 meter, plug and a 212A X-plane tail OR
- a slight derivative of the Dolphin 2 (without the Dolphin 2's cruciform tail but retaining the Dolphin 2's X-plane rudder tail portion.
FromDefense Studies the figures TKMS indicated have beenbolded here:
“torpedo tubes will be used for landing troops and deep sea submersible vehicles for special forces” The mention of "8 x 533mm torpedo tubes" with part job "used for landing troops and deep sea submersible vehicles for special forces." is contradictory given 533mm's narrowness for troops and vehicles. While 6 tubes may be 533mm one the two remaining tubes might need to be of greater diameter (650mm (as in the Dolphin 2). Or perhaps the 7th and 8th tube places could accommodate what I call a 1.5(?) meter horizontal multi-purpose lock (HMPL) a large diameter tube. A HMPL is seen on the 1,000 ton Type 210mod design (below) which - in design - sacrificed 4 or its previous 8 torpedo tubes.
The 210 (Ula class) is an operating submarine. The diagram depicts a new possibility in a future 210mod - that is a 1.5(?) meter horizontal multi-purpose lock (HMPL) in the torpedo section. This HMPL feature may become part of other new build subs or be retrofitted into existing subs. (Diagram courtesy TKMS website for 210mod)
So the 218s 5 meter plug may enable or be ready for many things including a much larger torpedo room for fitting the HMPL. This enables easier, more rapid operations for swim out divers/special forces, diver delivery vehicle(s), large diameter LDUUV(s), or rapid fire of 6 cruise missiles (+ 6 more in the 6 torpedo tubes).
The 5 meter plug may also or alternatively:
- provide room in the 218's mid-section behind the sail for diver/special forces accommodation and diver wet-dry chamber
- and/or vertical multi-purpose lock or provision for a future one OR
- extra room for a variety of purposes (eg. extra diesel fuel, extra batteries, extra AIP capacity, extra crew accommodation for longer missions).
The first Type 218SG submarine will be completed in 2020. To enter service two years later, after passing through the sea acceptance tests and final test, as well as the completion of the training program for the crew. Both units should be in line [commissioned by?] 2025.
Length -70 meters
Width/beam -6.3 meters
Draught - unknown (but perhaps 6.1 meters)
Displacement (surfaced) - approximately 2,000 tons (submerged displacement unknown - but based on Dolphin 2 figures the 218 submerged displacement may be 2,400 tons)
Crew/complement -28 officers and sailors
Diesel Engines - unknown (although likely an MTU product)
Electric motors - unknown (although likelySiemens Permasyn)
Batteries – unknown (lead acid or Li-ion)
Speed and range - unknown.
It has been previously reported the combat system is being developed by Singapore Technologies (ST) Electronics and Bremen, Germany based Atlas Elektroniks.
PEM fuel cellAIP
Pressure hull steel - unknown (may be the same non-magnetic steel used in the 212).
PETE’s COMMENT
Note that TKMS and Singapore do not compare the 218 to the Dolphin 2. This may be due to the greater secrecy involving the Dolphin 2 which is widely seen as designed for nuclear cruise missile delivery from its 650mm tubes. Singapore via the 218 similarity would not want to associate itself with such Dolphin 2 capabilities. A half century of close Israel-Singapore military relations remains obscure. Both Israel and Singapore are surrounded by much larger, majority Muslim countries. Both Israel and Singapore have higher GDPs per capita than almost all of their neighbours. This allows both countries to have major technological advantages including buying the most advanced conventional submarines available. The 218 may have a reinforced bottom like the Dolphin 2's.This would allow the 218 to sit on the seafloor (important for the 218 in/around Malacca and Singapore Straits).
The 218s will replace the 2 remainingChallenger classsubmarines (RSS Conqueror and RSS Chieftain). Singapore also has twoArcher classsubmarines which will continue to operate until they to will likely be replaced by 2 more 218s.
Note that what became TKMS previously built another large design - 2 x 2,000 ton TR-1700s for Argentina in the 1980s (after the Falklands War).
BACKGOUND - Singapore Strait and Malacca Strait
The Singapore Strait is the most immediately important body of water for Singapore in military and economic terms. This Strait is the deepwater approach for warships, cargo ships and tankers to the port of Singapore. The Singapore Strait is 16 km wide and lies between Singapore Island (north) and the Riau Islands (south) which are part of Indonesia.
It includes Johore Strait (around 12 meters deep max - unnavigable by submarine), Keppel Harbour, and many small islands. The Singapore Strait is a channel extending for 105 km between the Strait of Malacca (west) and the South China Sea (east).
The southern part of the Malacca Strait closest to Singapore rarely exceeds 37 meters deep. The Malacca Strait is up there with the Strait of Hormuz, Suez and Panama canals as being the world's most impotant narrow waterway.
The islands and undersea rocks on the approaches (like the Singapore Strait) to the Malacca Strait provide many places for experienced submarine captains to hide on the shallow seafloor. The shallows are also dangerous if subs collide with rocks and the seafloor and due to the increased danger from ASW platforms. Air independent propulsion (AIP), that Singpore has heavily invested in, is a major advantage. (Map courtesy welt-atlas).
What may be past or current SeaWeb undersea array positions (eastern Asia - inner western Pacific sub-section). Map already on Google images as at August 4, 2015 at 2.40 PM Eastern Australian time - courtesy of "press.anu.edu.au 733 × 858" and "japanfocus 683 x 800"
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COMMENT
Submarine Matters has focussed on the SeaWeb all platform sea surveillance system since May 2014. Also see October 2014 and May 2015. SeaWeb is not only about surveillance but a system that relies on a huge electronic database with most of the data stored in the US. The closest allies of the US can access and benefit from SeaWeb through a variety of means including installing hardware and software portions of submarine combat systems.
These “keys” are expensive but may well be worth it. It is important to the US that allies pay “rent” for the installation and maintenance of SeaWeb. SeaWeb is provided not only by US Navy activities and the Navy budget but relies on the legitimate military role of the NSA.
SeaWeb has many mobile and fixed platforms. Mobile include submarines and fixed include undersea arrays. Where the arrays may be historically and/or currently is part of the article below. The article is based around the work of two of Australia’s most resourceful academics, who published a more complete text earlier in 2015. See the article below.
“The US and Japan have quietly cornered the Chinese navy with an undersea surveillance ring that is framing Australia’s defence policy.
…'Fish Hook' line
…a new study by two Australian experts suggests it is the Chinese who are cornered. Desmond Ball, the Australian National University nuclear strategist and analyst of electronic spy craft, and Richard Tanter, of Melbourne University, an expert on North-East Asian security and nuclear issues, suggest Japan and the US have China’s forces surrounded by trip-wires.
The trip-wire around the Chinese navy extends across the Tsushima Strait between Japan and Korea, and from Japan’s southern main island of Kyushu down past Taiwan to the Philippines. When first revealed, in a little-noticed article by Taiwan military intelligence official Liao Wen-chung in 2005, it was described as a “Fish Hook Undersea Defence Line”.
Controversially, the curve of the hook stretches across the Java Sea from Kalimantan to Java, across the Sunda Strait between Java and Sumatra, and from the northern tip of Sumatra along the eastern side of India’s Andaman and Nicobar island chain. Unlike the northern stretches around Japan and Taiwan, these extensions into South-East Asia would be largely American installed and operated.
Indonesia and India, both historic adherents of non-alignment despite recent warming to the US in the face of rising Chinese power, would be loath to admit to allowing the Americans to wire up their nearby waters, and would be perhaps even more embarrassed to learn that it had been done without their permission or knowledge.
Ball himself is not sure whether these South-East Asian sections of the line consist of fixed acoustic surveillance arrays in the manner of the long northern sections from Tsushima down past the Philippines. “I would expect the more southern segments to have been fully surveyed and prepared for expeditious deployment of other elements of the integrated undersea surveillance system in contingent circumstances,” he told The Saturday Paper.
These include towed arrays trailing behind surface ships and small acoustic sensors that can be scattered across the seabed unobtrusively at short notice in a program called the Advanced Deployable System.
“Outward movement of the Chinese subs based at Hainan would be very closely monitored, whether they headed south or north,” Ball said.
Information sharing between the US and Japan joins the undersea defence line up, effectively drawing a tight arc around South-East Asia, from the Bay of Bengal to Japan. Chinese vessels, above or below water, can’t move in or out of this net without being spotted by their rivals.
It is with all this in mind that one might reconsider the purpose of the US-led Exercise Balikatan in the Philippines – and the presence of the RAAF’s AP-3C Orion. It is for fishing inside the net.
The undersea system has not gone unnoticed by the Chinese. Their surveillance ships have sailed close to the Japanese shore stations where data from the arrays is processed. In 2006, Japan arrested for espionage a naval petty officer at its Tsushima Island anti-submarine base. He had made eight trips to Shanghai and been compromised by a relationship with a hostess from a karaoke bar.
In July 2013, Chinese newspapers reported that Japan and the US had built “very large underwater monitoring systems” north and south of Taiwan, and that large numbers of hydrophones had been installed “in Chinese waters” close to Chinese submarine bases.
…“The underwater approaches to Japan are now guarded by the most advanced submarine detection system in the world,” Ball and Tanter write. In addition, the “Fish Hook” ensures that Chinese submarines are unable to move undetected from either the East China Sea or the South China Sea into the Pacific Ocean. “It suggests that even without recourse to the overwhelming US assets, Japan would be ascendant in any postulated submarine engagement with China,” they said.
…Risk of escalation
However, it raises two uncomfortable conclusions. One is that the US and Japan now have more reason than ever to discourage Taiwan from reunifying with the Chinese mainland, because it would irreparably break the trip-wire.
…This vulnerability brings pressures to escalate any clash – on Japan to take out Chinese naval forces before the ability to track them is lost, on China to take out the shore stations first. Some facilities, such as the Japanese naval data processing centre at White Beach, Okinawa, “might be regarded as sufficiently important to warrant pre-emptive nuclear attack”, they write.
The US could not avoid entanglement. Aside from its treaty obligations to Japan, its own surveillance systems are co-located with Japan’s and the northern sections of the “Fish Hook” are as vital to US interests as those of Japan.
“The US Navy could not abide its degradation,” Ball and Tanter said. “At a minimum it would be compelled to attempt to destroy any Chinese missile-carrying submarines while aware of their locations, before they are able to pass through a broken ‘Fish Hook’ line and come within firing range of the continental United States.”
This is the standoff that our own defence forces are equipping themselves to join – with procurements of advanced submarines, air warfare destroyers, large amphibious ships, Poseidon and F-35 aircraft and drones – backed by “interoperability” with US and Japanese forces, and participation in exercises such as Balikatan.
At least we are starting to get a better idea of what type of engagements Australia should be preparing for, and what kind of conflicts might be regionally ignited.” SEE WHOLE ARTICLE
"Poland may buy submarines with other NATO members: minister
WARSAW - Poland may join forces with other NATO members such as Norway or the Netherlands to buy submarines in a bid to cut costs, instead of buying them alone, Deputy Defence Minister Czeslaw Mroczek said on Sunday.
The ministry had planned to buy three submarines with delivery set for 2020-25 and at a cost of 7.5 billion zlotys ($2 billion) in a tender due to be launched at the start of this year.
This was postponed when Poland decided to change the contract specification to arm the fleet with maneuvering [cruise] missiles.
"We are considering obtaining submarines, for instance together with Norway or the Netherlands," Mroczek told state news agency PAP.
He said work was being completed on the initial specifications for the fleet. The aim of partnering up with NATO members was to save on costs, PAP reported him as saying.
"From the point of view of the procedure and how we do it - whether in one or two proceedings - will depend on if we buy the submarines alone or as a joint project of two or more NATO members," he said.
According to PAP, French industrial group DCNS, Swedish Saab Kockums and German ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems have shown interest in a tender for building the submarines.
…Asked to comment on the deputy minister's announcement, Dutch Defence Ministry spokeswoman Lisa Hartog said the Dutch government was in talks with countries that it cooperates with on naval strategy on replacing its "Walrus" class submarines in the coming years.
"What we're going to be doing, in concrete terms, will only be decided toward the end of this year," Hartog told Reuters.
The Norwegian Defence Ministry spokeswoman Marita Wangberg said Poland could potentially qualify as a partner in the purchase of submarines.
"A future acquisition is yet to be decided, but as part of the process, cooperation with other countries is being assessed. In such cases Poland can be a relevant candidate," Wangberg said.
(Reporting by Adrian Krajewski in Warsaw, Stine Buch Jacobsen in Oslo, and Toby Sterling in Amsterdam; Editing by Raissa Kasolowsky)." See WHOLE ARTICLE.
PETE's COMMENT
It is difficult enough for countries to decide on their own new submarine requirements let alone attempting a joint purchase with other customer countries. That may be one reason why joint purchases so rarely happen. Bilateral or multilateral politico-military bonds help. Poland, Norway and the Netherlands are joined by being members of NATO and Poland and the Netherlands are in the European Union (which includes arms trade issues in common). There is a web of less known arrangements (which special correspondent "Kevin" has identified in Background at the bottom of this post).
As reported in Submarine Matter'sNetherlands Needs New Submarine's Quickly, July 31, 2015, the Netherlands has been contemplating a joint strategy with Norway in procuring replacement submarines. One problem is that these countries have had very different needs - hence bought or built very different submarines. Norway has been an established buyer of (Ula and Kobben class) submarines of 1,000 tons or less while the Netherlands has regularly built submarines of over 2,000 tons (most recently the Walrusses).
Other possible builder-seller countries may be France (marketing Scorpenes) (see the two Youtubes below ) and Germany (marketing Type 210mods, 214s, 216s and possibly 218s).
A Scorpene exhibited by DCNS at MSPO 2015, the International Defence Industry Exhibition, Kielce, Poland, September 1-4, 2015. DCNS is marketing Scorpenes for Poland's ORKA submarine replacement program. This Scorpene solution (Youtube above) includes a second generation AIP (using fuel cell (diesel fragmenter)) and a long range MBDA's Naval Cruise Missile (NCM) which (important for Poland) has a land attack capability. See Naval Recognition's longer article on this Scorpene solution for Poland.
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The Scorpene 1000 ("900 tons") drawing board design is another Scorpene solution that might be appealing Norway, Poland or other customers internationally. The claim (1 minute, 15 seconds in) of "No equivalent in littoral waters" may have forgotten the 1,000 ton Ula class built by TKMS and owned by Norway.
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KEVIN's BACKROUND ON THE NETHERLAND and GERMAN SITUATION
The German submarines will, at the end of 2015, be under Dutch Command due to a bilateral agreement outside of NATO or the EU. The Dutch and German Armed forces are in the process of merging into one common armed force. This is seen as precursor to a common EU Army.
The Air Mobile Infantry of both countries are already merged and are under German command and there are plans to merge the last of the Dutch tanks [both Germany and the Netherlands use the German made Leopard 2 tank - the world's second best tank!] and artillery with the German counterparts.
Next step is to place elements of the German Navy under the Dutch Admiralty (like the Belgian navy [is already?]). The first units will be the German subs.
The Dutch and British expeditionary [surface?] forces are also merging and being placed under the British admiralty.
The European F-35 partners are talking about sharing training, maintenance and logistics facilities for the F-35.
European law is complex and full with exemptions due to entry negotiations and the freedom a member state have in interpreting European law
The general rule is an EU member state does not go shopping for arms outside the EU unless it can't buy it in the EU. If the member wants to buy outside the EU it needs to clear it with the EDA. This is to protect the EU's military industrial complex. Since the Cold War EU member states have cut defence spending to a point that it threatens Europe's capacity to produce its own arms.
If Sweden can sell more fighter planes by buying Brazilian transport planes the EDA will look the other way because this deal will strengthen the European industrial complex.
For the Netherlands, the Dutch airforce is a clone of the USAF [the Netherlands has F-16s, Apache helicopters and is buying Reaper UAVs]. And the Dutch navy is co-developing the [SM-3 anti] ballistic missile shield with the USN, so the Dutch warships are equipped with VLS. The Dutch cannot get more exemptions from the EDA.
Kevin indicates he is Dutch and associated with a political party in the Netherlands
Kevin advised that there may possibly be mention of the Dutch (Walrus) submarine replacement program in the Netherland's September 15, 2015 "State of the Kingdom" speech,
Kevin believes it highly unlikely that the Netherlands would want fuel cell AIP because Dutch subs operate without support ships and the hydrogen ingredient of the necessary purity is generally unavailable at ports [hint Germany should develop diesel fragmenter].
An often forgotten submarine matter on the blogosphere is submarine rescue. Australia has two new submarine rescue ships - described below. They use a range of mini-sub and UUV appliances to save crews from stricken submarines. Mini-submarines for rescue (weighing around 20 tonnes)can be airlifted by C17 (or larger) aircraft within trucking distance of the rescue ships.
Various alliances, organisations and companies pool submarine resources to save submariners of allies and competitors (like Russia). I don't know whether China has a submariner rescue agreement.
Photo courtesy Jan de Vries MarineTraffic MV Besant (3,600 tonnes gross) completed 2015 and the somewhat heavier MV Stoker.
[Australian Fleet Base West, HMAS Stirling, Rockingham, Western Australia] "The latest enhancement to Navy's submarine search and rescue capability steamed into her new home at Fleet Base West, Rockingham, Western Australia recently [mid 2015]. As one of two ships being acquired to further enhance the capability, [motor vessel] MV BESANT will be the submarine escape gear ship.
The 83m ship will embark a side-scan sonar, and the SCORPIO SC45 remotely operated vehicle [see photo below] to conduct surveys, damage assessment, debris removal from around the rescue seat and deploy transponders for the LR5 rescue vehicle [see photos below] tracking system, and recompression chambers to provide medical support to submarine escapees.
Submarine Escape and Rescue Manager, Commander Ken Marr, said that the delivery of the ships would enhance Navy's existing capability.
"Planning is well underway for BLACK CARILLION 15, our annual submarine and escape and rescue exercise, where MV BESANT will play an important part as we utilise and incorporate her many functionalities into our existing procedures.
"The longer 93m rescue gear ship, MV STOKER [after the Commanding Officer of submarine AE2], is currently undergoing final fit-out and is scheduled to join MS BESANT in early Jan 16.
"Both vessels will provide more flexibility to respond," Commander Marr said.
Both ships will be operated by Defence Maritime Services and will provide a long term and extremely capable role in supporting submarine escape and rescue activities. Being larger ships than the existing vessel, MV Seahorse Standard, the ability to embark more personnel such as medical and other rescue system members will ensure sustained operations can be conducted at sea. Enhanced onboard medical facilities and the ability to accommodate a full submarine crew will also ensure the best medical support is provided.
The acquisition of MV BESANT and MV STOKER will replace the existing submarine escape and rescue support vessel, MV Seahorse Standard, which may be redeployed to the east coast of Australia in late 2015."
MV Besant's stern showing crane. MV Seahorse Standard is on the right. (Photo courtesy CPOIS David Connolly (photographer) Royal Australian Navy Daily) ---
The ROV (Remotely Operated Vehicle) SC-45 "Scorpio" (for search and debris removal etc) from James Fisher Submarine Rescue Service is craned outboard from ADV Ocean Shield. It is being used to locate submarine HMAS Farncomb on the sea floor in the East Australian Exercise Area during Exercise Black Carillon 2013. (Australia Defence Image Library here and here).
Air transportable LR5 rescue vehicle from James Fisher Submarine Rescue Service. Following text based on. Lines are attached to the James Fisher Defence LR5 rescue vehicle by a Franmarine underwater services swimmer in preparation for recovering the LR5 onboard the MV Seahorse Standard. The Australian Navy has completed a successful personnel transfer from the submarine HMAS Waller, while it sat on the seabed off the West Australian coast. The LR5 weighs 21.5 tonnes so a large aircraft, large truck, rescue ship (or US submarine?) is required to move it.
Diagram of most of the future TKMS-HDW 216. Note the Vertical Multi Purpose Lock (VMPL) behind the sail and what I call a Horizontal Multi Purpose Lock (HMPL) (the thick tube) in the torpedo section. The VMPL and HMPL will allow the Australian Navy to quickly change and release equipment for specific missions. (Diagram courtesy TKMS).
Germany’s bid for the SEA 1000 Future Submarine project could reasonably be described as coming from a safe pair of hands.
Since 1960, ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) through its Howaldwerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW) subsidiary has delivered 161 diesel-electric submarines to 20 navies. Of this total, 123 have been built for international customers —including six NATO navies—51 of them in South Korea, Turkey, Greece and Brazil.
All have been built to fixed price contracts, a model which clearly works otherwise, as noted by TKMS Board member Torsten Konker ‘we’d be broke’.
Notwithstanding the company’s experience, TKMS has yet to construct a submarine in the 4,000 tonne range that’s generally regarded as the size needed to meet Australia’s requirements.
That isn’t seen as a problem by TKMS, whose designs have steadily grown in size and capability to meet customers’ specifications.
Such an evolutionary approach, based on the consistent use of the same design philosophy, is apparent in the Type 216 reference design on which the company’s SEA 1000 proposal is based.
Predicated on a 4,345 tonne (submerged displacement) platform but designed to be scaled up or down, the Type 216 is 89 metres long with a hull diameter of 8.1 metres, two pressure-tight compartments, and a two-deck layout.
At the heart of the boat is a propulsion system that employs a methanol reformer air independent propulsion (AIP) system to achieve a submerged range without snorkelling of 2,600 nautical miles (4,815 km) at four knots, assisted by lithium ion batteries as a supplementary energy source.
Snorkelling under diesel electric power at 10 knots adds a further 10,400 nautical miles (19,260 km), during which the indiscretion rate—the percentage of time during which the snorkel is raised—is less than 20%.
Overall endurance is about 80 days during which, according to unofficial but informed sources, a submerged AIP period could, if required, exceed more than 20 days. By contrast, Collins boats have no AIP and their endurance without snorkelling is understood to be about three days.
While a 33-strong crew would be sufficient to man and operate the Type 216, 60 bunks will be provided to meet Navy’s requirements that presumably include accommodation for embarked special forces; a gym area can be included for crew wellbeing.
The Type 216 design provides space for up to 18 heavyweight torpedoes or a mix of weapons that could include missiles and mines, fired through six bow tubes.
The design also provides an option for an innovative vertical multi-purpose lock just aft of the sail for cruise missiles, unmanned systems or divers, together with pressure-tight containers inside the aft and forward casing for torpedo countermeasures systems and garaging of unmanned aerial vehicles.
An intercept detection, ranging sonar and a new conformal array sonar in the bow are included in the sensor suite, as are an expanded flank array incorporating passive ranging, an aft sonar array, a towed array and underwater cameras.
The 2,200 tonne Dolphin II class now in service with Israel—and reputedly nuclear-armed—is the largest submarine yet produced by TKMS. Two variants known as the Type 218SG are reliably reported to have been ordered by Singapore with delivery expected in 2020.
Scaling up a pressure hull is assessed as low risk, entailing as it does the same hull material, the same calculation systematics and engineering tools, the same stealth calculations and design, the same underlying layout parameters, and the same degree of quality assurance and documentation.
The design risk is therefore in the reliability and integration of systems and subsystems, of which TKMS says more than 80% are already at sea in the company’s Type 214.
Obviously these don’t include the AN/BYG-1(V) combat management system and the Mk48 Mod 7 CBASS heavyweight torpedo that equip the Collins-class and are mandated for its successor. Nor are they likely to include several RAN-specified underwater and surface sensors.
Yet capabilities even within a given class can vary widely depending on the requirements, skills and presumably the pockets of the operators, and TKMS says that the integration of diverse systems and the handling of sensitive information is a well-established part of its normal business.
Close engagement with the Israeli Navy on a variety of systems had seen the Dolphin II—arguably the company’s most capable type to date—‘emerge as a unique submarine that precisely meets their needs’.
A $20 billion offer by the parent company to deliver 12 Type 216-based submarines built in Germany, Australia or a mix of both, had been based on RAN’s anticipated top-level requirements, Dr John White, chairman of the Melbourne-based subsidiary TKMS Australia (TKMSA), clarified to the Senate Economics References Committee in July.
Although the actual requirements had since been made available, the comparative evaluation process (CEP) involving all three SEA 1000 contenders wouldn’t be long enough to produce a revised figure.
Both Defence Minister Kevin Andrews and Navy chief Tim Barrett have visited the sprawling TKMS shipyard in Kiel, where Andrews saw nine submarines either under construction, refit or repair.
A subsequent paper was prepared at Andrews’ request predicting the additional facilities and expertise required at ASC should the Type 216 be constructed there under TKMS management. This paper was also copied to and discussed with Finance Minister Mathias Cormann.
Dr White, head of the successful 1990s ANZAC frigate programme, told the Senate committee that as with all complex infrastructure projects, including SEA 1000, when done properly the most efficient, lowest cost option was to engineer and plan from the very beginning for building all boats in Australia.
TKMS would also provide options for building all or some boats in Germany as requested in the CEP. If selected, the company would follow the ANZAC model and utilise multiple sites to make best use of the skilled labour located around Australia.
Perhaps surprisingly, Dr White disclosed that TKMS would find it difficult to achieve a continuous build from eight submarines—the number on which current speculation is centred—even if planned refits and potential upgrades were included in the time frame.
Since time is money, it wouldn’t be prudent to achieve a continuous build process simply by extending the build schedule."
A Typhoon SSBN 24,000 tons (surfaced), 48,000 tons (submerged) with thousands of tons of expensive Titanium alloy in its several pressure hulls. Those tiny red specks on it are men.
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It appears Russia has permanently or temporarily relocated the world's remaining Typhoon submarine (world's largest) to the Mediterranean or Black Seas. The Typhoon SSBN Dmitri Donskoy (TK-208) used for Bulava SLBM testing (some failures) for the last few years, has recently shifted to the Mediterranean. It is known from the Bulava tests that at least one of that Typhoon's missile tubes has been converted for Bulava firing but perhaps not all 20 tubes. The movement of an SSBN would have no direct military application to a civil war in Syria or in Crimea-Ukraine but it would be a symbolic act escalating political tensions in those areas. Russia would hope that it was in favour of Russia and its allies. In the confined waters of the Mediterranean or Black seas a Typhoon would be as vulnerable to ASW forces as a barracuda in a barrel. About as hard to hide in those seas as the object below:
Even more bizarre has been reports this week of a future Kanyon nuclear armed very Large LDUUV (below). The Kanyon would make for an extremely slow (10 knots over 2,000 nm tops) underwater missile as against Mach 10+ for an ICBM.
It is very likely Russia will NOT build the "Kanyon" UUV and certainly not nuclear arm it. Fertile minded terrorists could "hack into it" and pre-detonate it in a Russian city naval base, Saint Petersburg or Vladivostok?
I would say Kanyon is an imaginative hoax story dreamt up by Russian or (more likely) American rightwingers. Pete
"Submarines have long been used for special operations - carrying commandos, reconnaissance teams, and agents on high-risk missions. Most special operations by US submarines are carried out by SEALs, the Sea-Air-Land teams trained for missions behind enemy lines. These special forces can be inserted by fixed-wing aircraft, helicopter, parachute, or surface craft, but in most scenarios only submarines guarantee covert delivery.
Once in the objective area, SEALs can [travel from submarine then near to shore by SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) to] carry out combat search-and-rescue operations, reconnaissance, sabotage, diversionary attacks, monitoring of enemy movements or communications, and a host of other clandestine and often high-risk missions.
US nuclear powered submarines have repeatedly demonstrated the ability to carry out special operations involving many swimmers. During exercises, which include Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps special operations personnel as well as SEALs, submarines recover personnel who parachute from fixed-wing aircraft and rappel down from helicopters into the sea, take them aboard, and subsequently launch them on missions. These Special Warfare Team Missions include combat swimmer attacks, reconnaissance and surveillance, infiltration and exfiltration across the beach, beach feasibility studies, hydrographic survey, and Surf Observation Teams in support of amphibious landing operations." (Source FAS org).
And then there is nuclear deterrence or mutually assured destruction via Trident II SLBM (below):
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Just for fun. Launches can also be peaceful. Australia, including the lights of Rockingham, feature from 4 mins, 35 secs in.
