Submarine & Other Matters

The new construction (probably submarine pens) is less than 3km from Mayang Do Primary Naval Base on the east coast (see See Naval Bases and Fleet HQs map above) of North Korea. Sinpo "SSBs" might operate out of Sagin Ni (under West Sea Fleet Command) and Sinpo/Mayang Do (under East Sea Fleet Command). (Map courtesy US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)) For Sinpo class "SSBs" (see diagram below)

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For Background on Submarine Pens (WWII and Cold War) see the previous article of July 25, 2016.

IHS Jane’s, July 22, 2016, reports North Korea is constructing a concrete fortified structure near the port of Sinpo that looks like pens capable of covering conventionally powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBs). I would guess that UK and US naval intelligence have been doing the observing and analysis then feeding the following to Jane’s (the conduit to we the public).

The construction is 2.25 km south of Sinpo shipyard and close to the Mayang Do Primary Naval Base (see it marked on map above), on the east coast of North Korea.

Commercial satellite imagery shows construction began August 2009 - November 2012 with the harbour blocked off by a sea wall and filled in by November 2012. Visible dock excavations have been made and concrete pored for protective slab roofs.

Two pens are approximately 150m long, 10m wide, and 14m apart. I would say these are large enough to take 5,000 – 6,000 tonne submarines that have beams less than 10m.

Satellite imagery from 8 May 2016 revealed construction on the pens had progressed to portions being covered with earth. Construction was still ongoing on the front of both pens and a barge was tied to the seawall. The new pier, now 137m long and 13m wide, was nearing completion.

North Korea already has several submarine bunkers, at least some of which are capable of accommodating its obsolescent Romeo classSSKs.

This diagram of the Singpo clas SSB (at 68m long, 6.5m beam) is clearly small for the pens. Maybe 2 to 4 could be squeezed into the larger pen space of 137m long and 13m wide. H I Sutton of Covert Shores has produced excellent artwork, photos and description here depicting a North Korean "Gorae" Sinpo class SSB with two SLBMs mounted in the fin.

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Pete

Combat divers, be they SEALs or otherwise, have dangerous jobs. Target countries can make life that much more dangerous by protecting ports, or other facilities, with potentially deadly devices, including the ZEVS Hydroacoustic Protection System.

Probably several countries sell deadly anti-diver devices, but one of the most explicit is the ZEVS Mobile Hydroacoustic System. It is a sound through water projector. It is designed for protection of objects in aquatic areas (ports and harbours, private property, various hydrotechnical facilities, large vessels, nuclear plants). The sales brochure adds "as well as for traumatizing trespassing divers and swimmers."

The ZEVS Mobile Hydroacoustic System can be nasty to trespassing swimmers or divers.
Between 15m to 100m the ZEVS noisemaker can cause "Minor bodily injury, painful impact", 4m to 15m grievous bodily harm, maybe "fainting". "Fatal" between 0m to 4m.
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Below are photos and specifications for ZEVS from the sales brochure.

The last feature of the specs indicates "Special feature: Requires no special permission". I would imagine that is for the Russian seller. Importer Deadly Weapons buying rules and public safeguards are likely to be very restrictive in responsible buyer countries.

Main specifications [for ZEVS Hydroacoustic Protection System]
Dimensions	∅ 0.4×0.95 m
Weight	95 kg
Power supply parameters	220 V 50 Hz or 24 V DC
Length air- and water-tight cable	100 m
Beam pattern	38 deg.
Protection range	100 m
Special feature
· Requires no special permission

Other countries market (likely) similar devices. For example US company "HAI has developed extremely effective hydroacoustic based Diver Interdiction Systems (DIS). These defense systems are designed to neutralize terrorist divers and thereby providing marine and underwater protection. The DIS acts against the threat of an underwater terrorist by delivering non-lethal acoustic low frequency energy into the environment which causes the diver to come to the surface for effective prosecution. HAI provides fixed, portable and mobile systems. The DIS is a great compliment to Diver Detection Systems (DDS). Now there is a non lethal deterrent to force a diver to the surface. The DIS is classified as EAR99 by the Department of Commerce. HAI has developed and delivered the DIS to multiple customers including for the US Navy, Coast Guard, commercial agencies and foreign militaries."

Kathryn Diss. Australia’s ABC News online, July 26, 2016, reports, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-07-26/christopher-pyne-refuses-to-break-down-wa-shipbuilding-share/7662582 :

"Christopher Pyne refuses to 'break down' WA's shipbuilding share"

PHOTO: Christopher Pyne (in illfitting hat, second from right) toured Austal's Henderson yard on his WA visit. (Supplied)

"The head of the new Defence Industry portfolio Christopher Pyne has visited Western Australia to promote the state's role in constructing a new fleet of defence vessels, but has repeatedly refused to say what percentage of the work it will receive. [more in article]"

COMMENT

Actually it is highly subjective to estimate what percentage of Australia work (by that parts and/or labour) is in anything - from a mobile phone to a ship or sub.

BUT, if Defence Ministers want to gain political advantage by using percentages, they need to explain them.

It was one of Christopher Pyne's LNP Coalition Government Ministerial colleagues who first brought up the percentage claims.

As Submarine Matters recorded in September 17, 2015:

"It has yet to be confirmed in Hansard (officially recording Parliamentary House of Representatives statements) whether Kevin Andrews, who [was then] Defence Minister, stated in Parliamentiary Question Time (September 17, 2015) that perhaps 70% to 80% of new submarine work could be done in Australia. If so this may signal a change in policy. Note that the current feeling by industry in Australia is that Australia will order 8 submarines overall – not 12.

[Fairfax, Sydney Morning Herald journalists reported (September 17, 2015) the same Andrews statement: "I see that one of the bidders has said that they can build a significant part of a submarine here in Australia - some 70 to 80 per cent," Mr Andrews told Parliament. "That means that we're going to have more jobs, a significant part of that build, perhaps 70 to 80 per cent of submarines, built here in Australia." Note the DCNS offer described in the same article.]"

Pete

COMMENTS

Few countries have truly efficient defence industries. Efficient countries usually need:

1. A large domestic arms market (eg. the US, Russia and China) and

2. a stable arms export market which owes much to the international political power of the

exporter (especially the Soviets/Russia and the US, how otherwise could the US have

continually forced the F-35 on Canada?) or

3. Mainly a highly efficient and stable arms export market (eg. South Korea, Spain, to an

extent Sweden) or

4. Specialised needs to meet constant national threats (eg. India and Israel in conventional

weapons and even more in their nuclear weapons.) but

5. For other countries there are ongoing debates about clearly inefficient defence industries

(amounting to massive central government subsidies) versus arguments of defence self-

reliance and "nation-building". Australia has not attempted to build the latest 4th or 5th

generation jetfighters, so why build the latest large warships?

Australia lacks points 1 to 4 but 5 fits it well, as the following article illustrates.

ARTICLE

Andrew Robertsonfor Australia’s ABC News, July 26, 2016, in part reports http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-07-26/productivity-commission-on-south-australia-submarines-build/7662296

"Productivity Commission: Building submarines in SA is 'a return to bad old days of protectionism'

…the Productivity Commission has now said without a better product to justify the extra cost of building submarines at home, "productive resources (labour, capital and land) are diverted away from more efficient uses".

In other words, the billions of extra dollars spent on building submarines in Australia instead of buying them from Germany, Japan, or France could be better spent on developing the industries of the future.

…South Australia, with its heavy reliance on old-world industries, has long been a problem child for politicians of all persuasions.

With the Government having bitten the bullet and allowed the heavily subsidised car industry to walk, the $50 million bailout of Arrium to keep its Whyalla steelworks open shows the political reality of keeping voters happy will trump painful structural change.

In its latest report on Trade and Industry Assistance, the Productivity Commission said the 30 per cent cost premium to build submarines in South Australia is "a major step back from the historical reduction in using Government procurement preference as industry policy".

[30% is a vast underestimate – more like the build-in-Australia price will be 100% higher than the build in France price!]

"It's hardly surprising that the state with the most protectionism — South Australia — also has towards the highest unemployment rate, some of the lowest growth and is a significant net recipient of Government subsidy," said Simon Cowan, research manager at the Centre for Independent Studies.

"It's literally just a small niche industry being protected to the tune of billions of dollars a year. It just doesn't make sense from any perspective other than how do we try to shore up votes in Adelaide."

According to its research, the Productivity Commission said the effective assistance being given to the companies who will build Australia's next generation submarines is "higher than the peak historical levels recorded for the automotive and textiles clothing and footwear industries prior to the significant economic reforms of protection".

…However the Australian Industry Group, which represents the manufacturing sector, said the submarine deal is not protectionism but nation building…” See WHOLE ABC Article.

RELEVANT PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION DOCUMENTS

The main relevant document is the Australian Government Productivity Commission, Trade & Assistance Review 2014-2015 (Productivity Commission Annual Report Series) at http://www.pc.gov.au/research/ongoing/trade-assistance/2014-15/trade-assistance-review-2014-15.pdf- see mainly pages 36 to 38 on submarine building cost premiums.

Also see with “Key points” and the Media Release

COMMENTS CONTINUED

New submarine selling countries find it is difficult to break into the submarine export market. Submarines are high cost, specialised products that frequently need to be tailor-made for each customer country.

A country usually needs an already proven reputation that it can maintain subs as they age in terms of ongoing advice/expertise for overhaul and ongoing spare parts availability. I understand that there were problems in the ongoings for the Collins.

As with the Collins (Australia entertaining the notion of selling 2 to New Zealand?) certain submarine building Australian Defence Ministers will imply Australia can build and export Shortfin submarines or at least be a regional hub for DCNS Scorpene parts.

- This is unrealistic because of licensing and intellectual property restrictions and realities.

- Also Australia would be competing in Shortfin selling against the Shortfin experts DCNS of

France.

- France would remain the main place where the original submarine parts and spare parts are

manufactured

- Also Australia would be competing against the world’s most successful submarine seller -

Germany's TKMS and against the TKMS designs that South Korea builds.

- Russia is also a low cost builder of repute, and

- China is becoming a serious low cost competitor.

Pete

No subamarines, submariners, commanders, Admirals, or Ministers of Defence, like being associated with surprising and expensive indiscretions. Hence HMS Ambush's misfortune on July 20, 2016.

Apparently Ambush surfaced too quickly into a third party - in this case a tanker. Not only the repair bill, but the downtime of having one of Britain's latest SSN types out of circulation will be unwelcome.

Before. It was all shiny and new.

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After. Looking very sorry.

All crumpled, dull (probably plastic taped over the damage) and unhappy.

The collission apparently happened during the UK Royal Navy run "Perisher" course for SSN Captain/Commander trainees. Whether Ambush was under the command of a trainee or instructor (known as "Teacher") is unknown.

Trainees captaining subs in Perisher occasionally duel with a Royal Navy destroyer or frigate or two. While trainees, under pressure, may be mainly focussed on their destroyer/frigate foe, they might not always sufficiently consider third parties, like tankers, who turn up when least expected.

Sonar operators and trainees viewing periscopes ideally spot third parties before the sub surfaces, but not always.

UK Perisher once included RAN trainees, but as Australia has no SSNs Australian trainees now do "Dutch Perisher" for conventional subs, run by the Royal Netherlands Navy.

On Australians in "Dutch Perisher" see this RAN Submarine Squadron magazine"The Trade" pages 10 -13 - large PDF.

Ouch!

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Pete

In Part One I argue China's 4 x Type 094 "Jin class" SSBNs are currently too limited to be effective due to:

- geography - very shallow water around the actual SSBN Base at Yulin, Hainan Island then a
restricted South China Sea operating area, then sea depths too shallow especially south of the
Natuna Islands (see Map B),

- 094s are known to be too noisy to be stealthy

- their commanders and crews lack operational SSBN patrol experience

- the JL-2 SLBMs missiles with an estimated range of up to 8,000 km are too limited to hit US
mainland targets from the protected (near Chinese) waters the SSBNs have to operate in.

- China's military-political command and control system may not be flexible enough to allow SSBN
commanders to carry armed JL-2s or deliver the codes commanders to launch. Basically against
Communist Party's tight control of military.

Map A - The inner "J" indicates China's "First Island Chain" is where China's four Type 094 SSBNs are effectively restricted. These SSBNs are based in China's South Sea Fleet bases (Map A above) specifically at Sanya/Yulin Naval Base on Hainan Island. Moving outside that chain would take SSBNs away from protective Chinese aircraft and these SSBNs would need to pass between island narrows where undersea sensors (see Map C) and enemy aircraft, surface craft, SSKs and SSNs are likely to be waiting.

Also the following could intervene into the South China Sea to destroy Chinese SSBNs: enemy aircraft and submarines from Vietnam, Singapore (passing through the Philippines) also submarines further out from Guam, Japan, Australia, Hawaii and US West Coast.

Map B - The water (ideally 1,000+ m deep) restricts the already narrow South China Sea operating area and the sea becomes radically too shallow (less than 100m deep) south of the Natuna Islands.

Useful water depth for a submarine could be all the way down to "crush depth" which may be 1,000+ meters for a Chinese SSBN. While deep water past crush depth (maybe 1,000 meters) may not benefit a submarine there is a correlation between depth and usable surface area.

The lack of adequate 1,000+ meter depth in large areas of the 3,500,000 square kms South China Sea may limit usable SSBN operational area to less than 2,000,000 square kms.

This reduced area to cover with sensors makes it easier for the US to lay seafloor or tethered sensors (including SOSUS) in and around that reduced usable SSBN area.

Tethering means that even in a 2,000 meter deep area a sensor with a 1,200 meter long tether (from the seafloor) would be very useful detecting Chinese SSBNs.

Map C - Map depicts some of the likely Western SeaWeb undersea sensor array positions. Chinese, Russian and North Korean submarines and surface vessels are likely to be of most sensor interest. (Map from page 54 “Map 4. The US ‘Fish Hook’ Undersea Defense Line” of Desmond Ball and Richard Tanter, The Tools of Owatatsumi Japan’s Ocean Surveillance and Coastal Defence Capabilities (2015, ANU Press) http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p309261/pdf/book.pdf?referer=444.

FURTHER COMMENT

I've made several generalisations that might be disputed by reading of other websites and documents including:

- http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/strategic-warning-and-chinas-nuclear-posture/

- US DoD's "Chinese Military Power 2016") large PDF at:
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20Military%20Power%20Report.pdf

- China's Defense White Paper 2015

- rightwing US and most Taiwanese websites should be treated with caution as they might tend to exaggerate China's SSBN "threat" as being serious and current.

China may take 25 years to attain the quality of US, UK and French SSBNs of today and to develop a JL-3 or a JL-4 SLBM with the range and accuracy of the Trident II SLBM.

Pete

As argued in Part One (August 1, 2016) compared to the open ocean (where SSBN commanders prefer to operate) the South China Sea is restrictive.

China's SSBNs might possibly be sent, from their main Yulin/Sanya/Hainan Island Base, north to operate in the protected East China Seas or Yellow Seas. But movement north would put them in closer range of Japanese and South Korean SSKs and Russian SSKs and SSNs. Very quiet, experienced US SSNs (that can range far and fast) might be the main hazard for Chinese SSBNs.

Seafloor sensor map from The Tools of Owatatsumi Japan’s Ocean Surveillance and Coastal Defence Capabilities (2015, ANU Press) .

If a Chinese SSBN wanted to break out of these restricted waters into the wider Pacific Ocean it might move east through the gap between Northern Luzon and Kyushu (Japan's most southern main island). But this would put the SSBN further away from the protecting Chinese air force. And also the the SeaWeb undersea array (see the Map above) has been intentionally laid by Japan and the US between Luzon and Kyusho to detect just such a submarine breakout attempt. Noisy Chinese SSBN signatures would be easily picked up.

To make life even more difficult the SeaWeb sensors can be positioned in restricted waters so as to be just below a Chinese SSBN's maximum diving depth and above it.

THERMOCLINES NO COVER

People sometimes think that if a submarine dives deep enough it can take advantage of the major change in water temperature (thermocline) by sitting safely below the layer. This would be correct and comforting to the submarine commander if the sensor threat were only on the surface.

Problems occur for the SSBN if the enemy can deploy gadgets that can get TO (or are below) the sub's protective thermocline layer. These gadgets-tactics include:

1. an ASW surface ship's towed sonar array ("Picture 5:" below) which is most likely to be set deep
(say 300 or 400m sonar).

2. long dipping sonars from helicopters that can suddenly appear. Like towed sonars, dipping sonars
may well "active" - hence able bounce off the hull and detect even subs that are hardly moving.
An SSBN switching its reactor to silent mode, while using battery powered thrusters, will not
totally hide it from active sonar.

3. sonobuoys dropped in a pattern, in front of the sub's likely path and set to reach the same depth as
the sub

4. seafloor arrays (sitting on the black line at "Picture 5:" above) or tethered sensor arrays can be
usefully laid for long term use in restrictive waters (like the Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South
China Sea). Or, in addition to sonobuoys, they could be laid (especially air-dropped) on a shorter
term basis in front of the likely path of the SSBN.

Diagram 1 courtesy USN 2006. A seafloor array, called "Fixed Surveillance System (FSS)" is neatly described in U.S. Navy Program Guide 2015 (large PDF 6 MB) which explains, on page 128: "...FSS comprises a series of arrays deployed on the ocean floor in deep-ocean areas and strategic locations. Due to its long in-situ lifetime, it provides indications and warning of hostile maritime activity before conflicts begin. The system consists of two segments: the integrated common processor (ICP), which handles the processing, display, and communication functions; and the underwater segment, which consists of SOSUS, a long array of hydrophones,.." .

So this US openness on seafloor arrays feeds China's concerns over Chinese SSBNs having to operate in restricted waters. Concerns came to a head in 2009 when US sonar survey ship USNS Impeccable operated just 75 miles south of China's Yulin/Sanya/Hainan SSBN Naval Base. Chinese aircraft and naval militia boats buzzed Impeccable constantly and quite understandably.

The chances that Impeccable was dropping seafloor and tethered sensors were real, bothering the Chinese and it still bothers them.

Pete

"America Is Hacking Other Countries With Stealthy Submarines

[Courtesy Brian Fung & Andrea Peterson, Washington Post, July 29, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/07/29/america-is-hacking-other-countries-with-stealthy-submarines/ ]

When Donald Trump effectively called for Russia to hack into Hillary Clinton's emails Wednesday, the GOP nominee's remarks touched off a (predictable) media firestorm. Here was a presidential candidate from a major U.S. party encouraging a foreign government to target American interests with cyberspying - an act that could not only expose national security information but also potentially undermine the actual security infrastructure of the United States.

Cyberwarriors working for Moscow and other regimes are already poking and prodding at our networks, so there's little reason to think Trump's words were all that damaging in themselves. But it's a good opportunity to talk about the state of state-sponsored hacking, and to offer a reminder that the United States is just as active in this space as the next government.

The U.S. approach to this digital battleground is pretty advanced. For example: Did you know that the military uses its submarines as underwater hacking platforms?

In fact, subs represent an important component of America's cyber strategy. They act defensively to protect themselves and the country from digital attack, but - more interestingly - they also have a role to play in carrying out cyberattacks, according to two U.S. Navy officials at a recent Washington conference.

"There is a - an offensive capability that we are, that we prize very highly," said Rear Adm. Michael Jabaley, the U.S. Navy's program executive officer for submarines. "And this is where I really can't talk about much, but suffice to say we have submarines out there on the front lines that are very involved, at the highest technical level, doing exactly the kind of things that you would want them to do."

The so-called "silent service" has a long history of using information technology to gain an edge on America's rivals. In the 1970s, the U.S. government instructed its submarines to tap undersea communications cables off the Russian coast, recording the messages being relayed back and forth between Soviet forces.

These days, some U.S. subs come equipped with sophisticated antennas that can be used to intercept and manipulate other people's communications traffic, particularly on weak or unencrypted networks.

"We've gone where our targets have gone" - that is to say, online, said Stewart Baker, the National Security Agency's former general counsel, in an interview. "Only the most security-conscious now are completely cut off from the Internet." Cyberattacks are also much easier to carry out than to defend against, he said.

One of America's premier hacker subs, the USS Annapolis, is hooked into a much wider U.S. spying net that was disclosed as part of the 2013 Edward Snowden leaks, according to Adam Weinstein and William Arkin, writing last year for Gawker's intelligence and national security blog, Phase Zero. A leaked slide showed that in a typical week, the Navy performs hundreds of so-called "computer network exploitations," many of which are likely the result of submarine-based hacking.

"Annapolis and its sisters are the infiltrators of the new new of cyber warfare," wrote Arkin and Weinstein, "getting close to whatever enemy - inside their defensive zones - to jam and emit and spoof and hack. They do this through mast-mounted antennas and collection systems atop the conning tower, some of them one-of-a-kind devices made for hard to reach or specific targets, all of them black boxes of future war."

But even this doesn't compare to what the Navy wants to be able to do next: turn its submarines into motherships for underwater drones that can maneuver themselves even closer to shore and conduct jamming or hacking operations while allowing the sub to work at a distance.

"We want the boat to grow longer arms," said Rear Adm. Charles Richard, director of the Navy's undersea warfare division. "We are at all-ahead flank [speed], both on unmanned aerial and undersea vehicles."

It's unclear how far behind - or ahead - other navies may be when it comes to submarine-based cyber offense. Many of the cybersecurity and military experts we interviewed for this story had hardly heard of the Defense Department's own undersea cyber capabilities.

But, Baker said, "espionage is a game where there's a lot of following the leader - so it's perfectly possible it's happening in this field as well."

What is clear is that the U.S. military operates some of the most sophisticated information networks ever designed, and it's using them to penetrate foreign computer systems as part of an evolving cyber strategy.

We may never know precisely what dirt the Pentagon is digging up with its submarine espionage, or be able to draw a link between it and any political or military events in the real world. But despite the rising prominence of Russian hackers in this news cycle - and Chinese hackers before that - it's worth pointing out that the United States has grown fairly proficient in cyberspace, too.

© 2016 The Washington Post"

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See a National Interest commentary, August 4, 2016 on the above.

This, to scale diagram, permit comparison between the US Ohio and Chinese "Jin class" Type 094 SSBNs. Diagram courtesy China Power (an interesting source in itself on China's SSBNs).

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COMMENT

China's SSBNs are only effective through their missiles, SLBMs. The latest developed missile, the JL-2, suffers from inadequate range (perhaps 8,000 km with a light payload - one 500 kg warhead). The main inadequacy is the inability, from "bastion waters" (protected by Chinese defence forces) to hit targets in the continental US.

China also lacks the opportunities to fully test (with sufficient secrecy) the JL-2 over its full, estimated 8,000 km range. China lacks Russia's long national length and the US's California to distant Pacific testing range facilities.

Lack of full range testing also prevents the JL-2 being tested for accuracy, as measured by CEP. Lack of CEP assurance denies China knowledge of whether its missiles can destroy enemy missiles in their silos. Computer modelling provides only partial assurance.

As illustrated below the USN and Pentagon appear to continually over-estimate the operational numbers, maturity and capabilities of Chinese SSBNs and SLBMs. Perhaps justification of a high tempo building program for US SSNs and SSBNs comes into this.

It is relevant that the total number of very likely inferior JL-2s mounted by China's four known Type 094s (Jin class) is 48. In comparison only two of the USN's superior Ohio class SSBNs are needed to mount a total of 48 (superior) Trident II D5s.

ARTICLE

The following is an extract from Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris Chinese nuclear forces, 2015 (July 2, 2015) which was published on The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists:

"Submarines and sea-based missiles

China has built two types of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), the JL-1 and JL-2, which were developed for two types of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.

The 1,700-km-range, two-stage JL-1 (CSS-NX-3) SLBM developed for a single old Xia-class (Type 092) submarine first entered service in 1986 and is not considered operational. The Xia is based at the North Sea Fleet base near Qingdao in the Shandong province. The submarine underwent a lengthy shipyard overhaul in 2005 and 2006 but appears to have stayed in port since then. The Xia/JL-1 weapon system is expected to be retired soon.

Development of the new JL-2 (CSS-NX-14) SLBM for the second-generation Jin-class (Type 094) submarine is nearing completion. The US intelligence community has predicted for several years that the missile was about to become operational, only to see further delays. After several setbacks, China appears to have overcome technical difficulties and successfully test-launched the JL-2 in 2013.

The JL-2 is a modified version of the DF-31. Equipped with a single warhead and possibly penetration aids, the JL-2 has never been flight tested to its full range but is estimated to have a range of 7,000-plus km. The 2015 Pentagon report estimates the range as 7,400?km (Defense Department, 2015: 10). Such a range is sufficient to target Alaska, Guam, Russia, and India from waters near China—but, unless the submarine carrying the weapon sails significantly eastward, not the continental United States.

Four Jin-class submarines are operational (without missiles) and all homeported at the South Sea Fleet base on Hainan Island, according to the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) (Office of Naval Intelligence, 2015: 20). There is some uncertainty about how many nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) China plans to build. The ONI predicted nearly a decade ago that China might build five Jin SSBNs (Kristensen, 2007 12). That projection was repeated in 2013 when ONI estimated that there would be four to five boats by 2020 (Kristensen, 2014b 17). The 2015 Pentagon report appears to agree with that projection, saying “up to five may enter service” before China begins work on a next-generation SSBN (Defense Department, 2015 10).

Yet in early 2015 other government sources began suggesting that China might produce more Jin SSBNs. In his prepared testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2015, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said that China “might produce additional JIN-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines” (Clapper, 2015 6). And in April 2015 Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, commander of US Pacific Command, told the same committee that “up to five more [Jin SSBNs] may enter service by the end of the decade” for a total of eight Jin submarines (Locklear, 2015 19).

The reason there are different estimates of how many Jin-class SSBNs China plans to build is unclear. The higher number seems strange given that China is already expected to proceed to development and production of a third-generation (Type 096) SSBN over the next decade.

With 12 missile-launch tubes per submarine, four operational Jin SSBNs could carry 48 missiles with as many warheads—a significant increase from the 12 SLBMs that the sole Xia-class submarine was equipped with.

The Pentagon asserts that the Jin/JL-2 weapon system “will give the PLA [Chinese] Navy its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent” (Defense Department, 2013 9). Yet the Chinese SSBN fleet faces several doctrinal, technical, and operational constraints. Under current doctrine, China’s Central Military Commission does not allow the military services to have warheads deployed on missiles under normal circumstances. Handing over custody of nuclear warheads to deployed submarines in peacetime would constitute a significant change of Chinese doctrine.

Moreover, no Chinese ballistic missile submarine has ever sailed on a deterrent patrol so China’s navy and the Central Military Commission have essentially no experience in operating a submarine force during realistic military operations. Developing this capability will require development of new command and control technologies and procedures.

But even if China deployed warheads on the SSBNs and sent them to sea in a crisis, where would they sail? For a JL-2 to reach the continental United States, for example, a Jin SSBN would have to sail through the East China Sea and well into the Pacific Ocean, through dangerous choke points where it would be vulnerable to hostile antisubmarine warfare⁵(see Map below).

Figure 1. Potential Julang-2 SLBM launch areas for targeting continental United States

The map indicates why (with the JL-2s limited range) Type 094 "Jin" SSBN need to dangerously sail east away from Chinese protected "bastion" waters of the "South Sea Base" (South China Sea) or from the "North Sea Base" Yellow-Bohai Seas.

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China’s main concern is making sure that its minimum nuclear deterrent would survive a first strike, and for that reason it spends considerable resources on modernizing and hiding its land-based missiles. This makes its submarine program puzzling, for it is much riskier to deploy nuclear weapons at sea, where submarines can be sunk by unfriendly forces, than to hide them in caves or forests deep inside China’s extensive territory (Kristensen, 2014a 16)."

See the whole article Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris Chinese nuclear forces, 2015 (July 2, 2015).

Shallow Sea Disadvantage

Map A - The map above indicates that China's whole coast is uncomfortably shallow for SSBNs (less than 200 meters (m)) from China's main SSBN Base (Yulin/Sanya on Hainan Island) then north:

- on the edge of the South China Sea

- up through the Taiwan Strait,

- East China Sea

- Yellow and Bohai/Po Hai Seas.

This shallowness makes Chinese submarine (including SSBNs, SSNs and SSKs) movements partly channeled and more predictable for opposing submarines and Western undersea sensor layers. For the sensor map see August 1's, Part One Map C). This makes quietness/discretion all the more important for Chinese SSBN.

In addition to China's shallow coastal water the ability of Chinese SSBNs to break out into the more desirably open Pacific Ocean is corralled by the islands of Japan, Ryuka Islands/Okinawa. Senkaku Islands, Taiwan, Bashi Channel/Luzon Strait, Philippine Islands, then Indonesian Islands (including Borneo) in the South. I'll talk about alternate Chinese territorial actions in Part Five.

Opposing Forces

Between all of thes islands Japanese and US laid sensors are likely (or definite August 1's, Part One Map C) and act as trip-wires to rapidly indicate Chinese SSBN breakout attempts.

In a shooting (medium to high intensity) war the US and Japan could act quickly to weaponize the undersea sensors, with:

- rising from the seafloor mines-small torpedos (which may have been already laid/laced in the

sensor network)

- MPAs (eg. P-8s, P-1s and P-3 Orions) dropping depth bombs or small torpedos. More rapid B-1

bombers, F/A-18s or F-15s dropping the same.

- SUBROCs (available since the 1960s) and cruise missiles (from Harpoons to Tomahawks and

similar) carrying warheads-torpedos.

Map B - The HQ of each of the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army - Navy (PLAN's) Fleets are indicated, along with ship and submarine numbers in each. China's 4 Yulin-Sanya based SSBNs (South Sea Fleet) are at Hainan Island just south of Zhanjiang HQ. (Map courtesy page 29 of US DoD, Annual Report to Congress - Chinese Military Power 2016 large 7 MB PDF. Pages 25 - 26 itemises all the PLA-N subs)

As reflected on the Chinese PLA-N orbat on Map B China has many SSKs and some SSNs to protect and/or run decoy actions for the SSBNs. The top-cover from Chinese aircraft and missiles (including Chinese SUBROCs, cruise missiles and DF-21Ds (in an ASW role) could also protect Chinese SSBNs as could Chinese surface ships and undersea sensors-mines.

See Map C (below) for all the Asia-Pacific submarine forces. USN subs are not included in part because they can be rapidly redeploy from the US West coast, Hawaii and Indian Ocean patrols.

Opposing Submarine Forces

In peacetime to low intensity confrontation Western submarine forces, on station and/or alerted by SOSUS (plus other sensor) sensors could be directed to tail the Chinese SSBNs. Assuming the Chinese SSBN set out from Hainan or are already in the South China Sea (SCS), Western submarine forces could include:

- about 4 to 10 US SSNs (from Yokosuka Japan, Guam or elsewhere) coming from any direction.

- from north and east about 4 Japanese SSKs (of 16-18 available) from Yokosuka or Kure, Japan or

already on patrol down to the Philippines area.

- from south and west of the SCS subs from 2 more of the US's allies (namely Singapore (4) and

Australia (3?))

- Indian SSN's may have reason to track Chinese SSBNs as well

- meanwhile South Korea's and others subs from the Japanese Navy might be available for any

Chinese SSBN deployments in the Yellow of East China Seas.

Of course in a confrontation all Western navies in northeast Asia would also be watching out for Russian and North Korean submarine activities.

India Relevant

Map C - (can be made much larger scale here) All the Asia-Pacifics submarine forces (except the USN's). India can be included because Indian sub's (including SSBNs) may need to, or want to, venture into the Pacific to put China's eastern seaboard cities at risk. India's current SSBN (INS Arihant) may eventually mount 1,000 km range K-15s (insufficient to hit much of China from Indian Ocean launch points).

Until India fully develops the long range K-4 SLBM Indian SSBN may need to operate in the Western Pacific if it is to plausibly put China's main cities (on the east coast) at risk.

Part Five - on Chinese geographical strategies will follow later this week.

Pete

Models of a Triomphant class SSBN (left) and a Barracuda/Suffren class SSN. They have, and in future shall continuously contribute to, what will be the Shortfin SSK. (Photo courtesy DCNS).

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Please be advised I've been neglecting my South China Sea (including not yet responding to Josh's, Eurowussies' and Nicky's (longer) comments) duties while writing and sending Submarine Matters Report France’s Submarine Development and the Shortfin to donors, this evening.

It being midnight here-now I'll respond later this morning.

Donors, please check you spam bins, just in case my email to you has ended up there.

Regards

Pete

Democratic ASEAN did so well reining in the Philippines'own Marcos and Indonesia's Suharto that the Philippines'New President Duterte should be a cinch.

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As readers will have noticed Submarine Matters covers more than just submarines. Broader East Asian issues often come up.

Filipinos seemed to know what they were in for when they voted in Duterte as President in May 2016. Duterte was already infamous for his Davao Death Squad henchmen. He has a largely impenetrable accent matched by Trump-like, shock jock charm. So he must be a bit of a star, right? Maybe not.

The beginnings of a human rights failure in a key South China Sea state prompt strategic concerns. During the Marcos years the US could backup Marcos's power, but the US no longer enjoys such relative power. However the US may find itself pole-axed by Duterte's special brand of diplomacy.

If the excesses of a dictator causes popular reactions then the Philippines may unfortunately entertain a PRC puppet master. First economic power (by a narrow margin China is now the Philippines'third highest trade partner). Money builds political influence.

China taking over Subic Bay and Clark military facilities by 2040? Who knows? Certainly some try to insist things never change.

In that regard it is encouraging that ASEAN has a plan to investigate matters in the Philippines. The habit of non-interference concerning abuse of power, including death squads, would be so much more convenient. As abuse of power becomes dictatorship then legitimacy is lost. Radical change then unfortunately (or fortunately in the case of People Power) may happen.

"More than 400 suspected drug dealers have been killed by police across the Philippines since Mr Duterte took over [a few weeks ago], officials say" http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-08-08/philippine-officials-surrender-after-being-linked-to-drugs-trade/7702758

Britain’s Daily Mail advises“60,000 people turn themselves in to authorities in the Philippines after the president tells citizens to'go ahead and kill' drug users”... “At least 43,000 alleged drug traffickers have been 'neutralised"' whatever that means.

“[Duterte] vowed on one occasion during the election campaign that 100,000 people would die, and so many bodies would be dumped in Manila Bay that the fish there would grow fat from feeding on them, according to the South China Morning Post.”

Certainly a vision statement not to be emulated. But Suharto succeeded in his own violent rise to power. But as in 1965 the use of death squads to secure power is a bad look for any respectable member of ASEAN. ASEAN has just managed to lift Burma from dictatorship but now the Philippines appears to be slipping in to it.

Despite shared Spanish influences the Philippines is not Argentina on a bad day Mr Duterte.

China's NSA HQ, in northern Beijing, is innocent, in this case, of hacking the Australian Census for 2016 Website (the cartoon below reflects the chaos).

Following the July 2, 2016 Election the Government of Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull, is hanging by a proverbial thread. It governs with only a one member majority in the Lower House of Parliament (ie 76 seats vs 74 see sidebar)

All Turnbull needs is more bad news. This has indeed come to pass concerning the national Census of every Australian which mercifully is held every 10 yeas. BUT this was the first time the public were invited to mainly fill out their forms using a huge, "perfected", Census Website.

Over the last month Australian public opposition on privacy and surveillance grounds to a Census stored on computer database grew.

On Census Night, Tuesday August 9, 2006 bad become worse when, not thousands but millions of Australians tried to fill out their Census Forms online. But the Census website crashed when most tried on "Census Night" August 9, 2016.

China, always easy to blame, was blamed for launching a diabolical Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on Australia Census website. China's motive? Displeasure, over what an Aussie swimmer said at the Olympics, would you believe (I don't believe).

Two problems of fact seemed to be weakening this easy anti-China story:

1. the Australian Government is gradually admitting the DDoS originated in Australia, and

2. the attack by Australians then moved via US servers and only then crashed the Census website

back in Australia.

China's NSA or alternatively mass Chinese “netizen” action thus appears in the clear.

Confirming the accuracy of this sequence, once the government's contradictory statements are ironed out, Australia’s SkyNewsreported today (August 12, 2016) http://www.skynews.com.au/news/top-stories/2016/08/12/no-resignations-yet-over-census-debacle.html:

“Mr Turnbull told reporters [today] the attacks appeared to have originated in the United States, but the actors were not necessarily American.

'It is not very difficult to route traffic through another country using private networks and virtual techniques,' he said.

...Earlier on Friday Senior Minister Christopher Pyne appeared to confirm the disruption of the census came from within Australia."

CONCLUSION

So instead of an attack by "the usual suspect, China" it appears more likely that Australian citizens who were unhappy with computer storage of their private details, expressed their displeasure using a DDoS attack against the Census website.

I’ve been writing on SigInt and Cyber-warfare matters since 2007. See my 2007 article: "The fifth battle domain - cyberspace" at http://www.newsweekly.com.au/article.php?id=2999

Pete

The Global Hawk sized (and altitude) Chinese Divine Eagle UAV (above) can look (with broad spectrum radar and infrared cameras) at long range for approaching US stealth aicraft. This UAV could in future be armed with air-to-air missiles to deal with such aircraft.

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The chink that China has detected in the LM F-35's armor is heat signature. Detectable by a great wall of cheap unmanned aerial vehicles with high gain infrared cameras that China can deploy.

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It has been many years since Lockeed Martin's (LM's), customers (including the US taxpayer) started to fund LockMart's US$100,000,000s per year F-35 commercial risk. LM's grand vision to gain revenue from customers a decade before delivery was faultless, in a US Power Sell, sense.

However, advancing (Russian-Chinese) detection technology is now gradually negating stealth assumptions. Technically LM's focus on radar-stealth (as a replacement to the 1980s-2008 F-117 radar signature minimisation) has suffered what will amount to 2 decades of delay. The F-35 with its cannon and other software delays will only be truly operational for foreign customers in the 2020s.

If the superior 2 engined F-22 had been available to non-US customers from its 2005 operational commencement foreign customers would have F-22s that would have superiority over detection technology. The delay to field the F-35 in 2025 will mean F-35s will have fallen behind (Russian and Chinese) detection even before the F-35s are fielded.

Detection Technology

Unlike radars (which require high electrical power) infrared can be miniaturized and only require low power - so can be mounted on a mass basis on cheap to build and field UAVs.

China's rising ability to mass produce UAVs covers:

- low (up to 1km) altitudes (infrared camera)

- medium 15km altitudes Reaper sized (radar and infrared), and

- up to 25km Divine Eagles (SubMat article) high altitudes (infrared camera and broad frequency

radars)

China is developing its own high-tech detectors and can increasingly buy technology from Russia (that needs the money due to low oil/gas revenues). High power distributed radar on the ground and manned aircraft will complement to Russian and Chinese UAV detectors.

BACKGROUND

Defense World reports, August 12, 2016:

“Stealthy F-35 Is Visible To Thermal Imagers”

The much-touted ‘stealth’ features of the Lockheed Martin F-35 making it nearly invisible to radar, could be negated by a pronounced ability to be detected by infrared devices.

The heat signature released by the aircraft engines and other power consumption devices such as the radar could negate gains main by its stealthy characteristics aimed at remaining invisible to radar.

Fighter aircraft add-on devices such as the infra-red scan and track (IRST) sensor which several European and Russian aircraft are equipped with for certain missions, can easily detect the F-35 in beyond-visual range engagements, a defence website said.

A video released by FLIR Systems which specializes in the manufacture of infra-red sensors shows the heat signature of the plane in clear detail. The sensor used is the FLIR Star SAFIRE 380-HDc and tracking the heat signature has been done from a rather close range.

Nevertheless, it could be a potential chink in the armor for the US Air Force and other countries which have put billions of dollars in buying the F-35 whose main USP is its stealth capability."

Pete

Above is an illustration of a country's concept of using distributed sensors to detect and target threats from stealth aircraft and also from attacking missiles. In this case the defending country is Japan, which sees possible threats from Russian and Chinese stealth aircraft and missiles from North Korea, Russia and China. (Diagram courtesy of Japanese defense agency ATLA)

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In response to very useful Comments arising from my previous article F-35 heat signature: Chink in its Emission Armor - One, August 14, 2016.

Air Defense Networks

Infrared sensors, like other categories of a distributed air defense network, have some physical limitations. But it is the whole network including aerial, space and ground based radars (more broadly sensors, database, decisions and weapons) that makes for effectiveness.

Countermeasures against a defense network (such as knocking out nodes and releasing IR decoys/flares) my become less effective the more distributed the defending network becomes.

The main concern is the top "predators" Russia and China incrementally filling out the quality and quantity of sensors. An early success story for Russia and China was assisting North Vietnam to build its air defense systemagainst the US - with most impact in that theatre in the 1960s-early 70s.

Anticipating the routes that an enemy's air armada may come from is of major importance. The armada can also include eg. stealthy Tomahawk range missiles, not only stealth fighter-bombers crossing borders.

Israel (in limited territory and the US (with Western allies aruably being global) have achieved over the last 30+ years have built deep air defense networks that Russia may want to re-emulate and China emulate.

Actual air defense campaigns also included offensive portions eg.

- Israeli versus Syrian Airforce, 1982 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Mole_Cricket_19 and

- US+Allies, First Gulf War, 1991 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_War#Air_campaign

Israel, US and main NATO allies heavily invested in air defensive/offensive technology from a high base.

Russia had high base expenditure, but it has problems maintaining the tempo of modernising the network. China has the money but is still building from a low base.

Problems of initial detection of F-35s/B-2/F-22s approaching and then database-decision making and passing to actual SAM or AAM targeting will force the Chinese to build a deep/intense network.

As China extends its militarisation into the South China Sea this may over-extend its air defences or deepen the network. Its hard to discern which trend.

Creeping F-35 Evolution

The software delays for the F-35 doesn’t diminish the severity of these delays. This is given getting software up to scratch is taking years. The dynamic of Russia working with China (and also perhaps Indian electronic know-how) to build sensor countermeasures against stealth (eg. F-35s) should not be under-estimated.

Radar Cross Section (RCS) materials were not such a delaying factor because they were demonstrably well understood on the F-22s by 2005 when the F-22s became operational.

Lockheed Martin (LM) trying to get all the F-35 features to work certainly contributes to the “too big to fail edifice” that LM has built for the US and foreign customers. The F-35, as the only new horse in the race on quality has an unlimited development budget beneficially yielding an unlimited revenue stream for LM. Good on LM :)

A President Clinton II is unlikely to alter this LM F-35 edifice but a President Trump might revisit The Deal and be more inquisitive.

What it means for Australia?

The evolution of the F-35 to acceptable standards may take so long that Australia's RAAF may need to buy another tranche of 24 Super Hornets. This is particularly in view of high usage of existing legacy Hornets and existing Super Hornets in the current air campaign over Iraq and Syria.

Australia may not buy all 72 F-35s intended or the 72 may be bought over an extended time (several decades). Australian defense officials, RAAF enthusiasts and politicians are of course deeply embarrassed they caved into LM and US Government pressure to put 100s of $millions of prepayments for the F-35s over a decade before these jets will be ready. Against this embarrassment is the jobs LM provides for retired senior officers - a recent example.

Australia's purchase of 12 Growler Super Hornet variants were to be most beneficial to "blind" an enemy while F-35s "snuck in" to bomb the enemy. But the Growlers will still be useful working with Super Hornet bombers, before the F-35s are ready.

Pete

Taiwan’s 1940s US-built ex-Tench class Hai Shih (foreground) is the world’s oldest serving (but not truly operational) submarine. Taiwan has another 1940s vintage sub. The two ex-Dutch submarines in the background are “new” by comparison. Taiwan wants eight replacements – virtually for free.

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It is beyond doubt that Taiwan relies on a Taiwan Lobby of old American rightwingers and younger paid lobbyists to hopefully pressure the US Government. Taiwanese Cold Warriors hope that the US will return to near conflict with China. China is, however, too important economically to the US, now days. Since the 1970s the US One China policy steadily shifted to the PRC not Taiwan (including the US's weapons' policy).

After WWII the US donated many old Tench and Balao class subs to countries in Latin America, Europe and also Taiwan. After receiving the old US subs, renamed Hai Shih and Hai Bao in 1973, Taiwan seems to be the only country that still expects such donations from the US. Taiwanese "headlines" like "Establishing a Submarine Development Center" are more a US-Taiwan Lobby lever on the US Government than a Taiwanese intention to foot US$Billions for a whole class of new submarines.

In order to get the Taiwan lobby off his back, in 2001, President George W. Bush made a policy decision he could not keep and never intended to honor. That decision was the US would, by some means, organise the supply of conventional submarines to Taiwan. The central problem, then, as now, is that the US does not build conventional submarines - this is for military, commercial, political and career reasons that are dear to the US.

Tellingly, even in 2001, Taiwan was unwilling to pay market prices to the US or a third country for submarines. Instead Taiwan decided to rely on the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system. FMS for submarines - large weapons systems the US did not actually produce - was a non-starter from the beginning.

Also Taiwan wanted medium to large conventional submarines. It would not settle for submarines of less than 1,000 tonnes - more than adequate for Taiwan Straits defense against China...

As well as not paying for the submarines Taiwan had and has ludicrous ideas on how to acquire them. These ideas all involve the US taking on the financial, political and technical burdens upfront and presumably for ongoing upgrades. For example potential scenarioslike:

- the US buys old submarines from Australia and custom upgrades them for Taiwan.

- the US organises for Japan to build the Soryu submarines for Taiwan and then Lockheed Martin
integrates the US highly secret combat system into the submarines

- that the US pressures Australia to participate with Taiwan in a joint purchase of Shortfins from
DCNS

- that the US assists Taiwan in building a submarine production line (in effective competition against Japanese, South Korean and European submarine makers)

To achieve this Taiwan expects that the US (not Taiwan):

- obtains submarine blueprints and organises technology transfer (perhaps from Japan? Russia?

DCNS? Australia? TKMS?).

- “clones” or "reverse engineers" more of Taiwan's existing two 1960s technology Dutch built

Zwaadvis-class design so the US can help Taiwan build more,

and/or

- the US returns to building conventional submarines, but tailor-made, to Taiwan's specifications.

More details in a subscription-only Diplomat article.

Hence even accepting that China is putting up economic obstacles to any US or third country supply of submarines to Taiwan, Taiwan will still not receive submarines.

1. As I've said Taiwan needs to be prepared to pay international prices by contract for submarines. Israel, equally unpopular internationally has managed to organise Germany as a long term provider of TKMS Dolphin submarines. Israel is now reputedly paying full prices - including for maintenance. If Taiwan were serious Taiwan would not be waiting for the US to magically give Taiwan submarines.

2. Countries also need to be confident any submarine secrets passed to Taiwan do not find their way to China in the medium to long term (in any political settlement with China).

3. There is no way around Taiwan building its own - the smaller (for defense) the easier to do.

Pete

What I'm researching now, for publication in Submarine Matters tomorrow, is Why are fewer SLBMs being planned in each of the US and UK SSBN Replacements?

US 24 SLBMs down to 16 per sub.

UK 16 SLBMs down to 12 per sub.

So far variables I've taken as relevant are:

1. improvements in CEP?

2. improvements in SLBM reliability?

3. increases in numbers of penetration aids (eg. decoys)?

4. that the number of SLBM slots in the US Ohios and UK Vanguard SSBNs were always/usually excessive and/or under-used - so the reduced SLBM numbers are a rationalisation downwards.

5. are there only so many targets you need to hit to acheive an optimal deterrence?.

6. are arms limitation treaties relevant? Something I don't keep across of - as I would assume that its not only the US and Russia needing to agree these days. I also assume agreement (a political issue) would be a function of technical advantage or disadvantage.

7. are the planned reductions initial low-ball estimates, for domestic financial reasons or to keep opponents guessing?

8. A combination of variables. There will be increases in the number of MIRVs and penetrations aids per SLBM and connected with that lighter and more accurate (CEP wise) warheads/reentry vehicles.

Pete

As Russia wishes to sell 6 submarines to India (for Project-75(i)) Russia's Sputnik News, August 12, 2016, has been quick to report that:

"French Firm DCNS Fails to Find Takers in India for Its AIPS Technology"

"Sources from India's Ministry of Defense say that the AIPS technology proposed by the DCNS is similar to what is being used in Scorpene class submarines.

NEW DELHI (Sputnik) — In what could be a major setback to French naval ship-building company DCNS, its proposal to set up a 100% Indian subsidiary for manufacturing air-independent propulsion systems (AIPS) for submarines is likely to be rejected by the Indian government.

Amit Cowshish, former financial adviser to the Ministry of Defense says, "They (DCNS) are offering something which is already available in India." The Defense Research Development Organization is already developing AIPs in collaboration with DCNS for Scorpene class submarines...." SEE WHOLE SPUTNIK ARTICLE

COMMENTS

This may initially effect the existing Scorpene "Kalvari" class contract that DCNS has with India. DCNS won the Kalvari contract in 2005 to build 6 (non-AIP) Scorpenes for the Indian Navy. AIP is now relevant because India subsequently indicated that the last 2 Kalvaris would have AIP. India's DRDO has maintained that it can supply the AIP, but this is highly ambitious.

It would then mainly fall to DCNS to organise the AIP for the last 2 Kalvaris. But India seems to be playing hardball. France may have offered an updated version of its existing AIP called MESMA. MESMA has been installed in 3 of Pakistan's DCNS designed Agosta 90Bs (Khalid class) subs, not in anyone's Scorpenes (so far).

I suspect that India is really holding out for the advanced Reformer/Fuel cell AIP that DCNS may be working on.

This impasse in the already delayed Kalvari program not only effects the last 2 Scorpene Kalvaris. India and DCNS both know that India will (sooner or later) be selecting a winning tenderer for
Project 75(i) class submarines. This is for 6 further, specifically AIP submarines. India also wants them to feature VLS for a number of India's touted supersonic Brahmos cruise missiles.

The ability to provide AIP and VLS is a tall order. Only Sweden's Kockums, Germany's TKMS and DCNS offer developed AIP (China is virtually India's enemy - so it has no hope of offering anything).

Russia is the only provider of proven VLS for conventional subs (that I know of). That is, Russia has already launched Kalibr/Klub by VLS (see Youtube below).

A Russian Kilo sub, using VLS, launches Kalibr missiles at targets in Syria (December 2015).
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So India, by rejecting France's AIP, at this stage will tend to pressure DCNS to make a low price offer for the 6 future Project-75(i) submarines AND/OR France may be prepared to transfer more technology specifically advanced AIP to India.

RUSSIA AND AIP

Russia has had a great deal of trouble developing AIP (no working AIP I know of so far). India is well known to work closely with Russia on advanced submarine technologies . So if India acquired advanced AIP technology from anyone Russia may benefit and be eternally grateful... India typically stops-starts-stops on arms purchases (as France also recalls concerning the MRCA jet competition).

What might result is that advanced AIP is imprudently supplied to India - it finds its way to Russia - then Russia installs this advanced AIP and VLS into new 6 new Kilo / Amur / or Kalina class subs that Russia sells to India for Project-75(i).

SCORPENE BACKGROUND

What is making DCNS particularly hungry to sell Scorpenes is the low revenue turnover not only for the Kalvari Program (signed in 2005 but only 1 sub produced so far) but also the Brazilian Scorpene program (no subs produced (ie. launched) since the 2009 commencement. See Table below

Scorpene SSKs (14 ordered)	First Sub Laid Down	Last Sub Commissioned	9 still building
2 built	1999 O’Higgins Chile	2006	No
2 built	2004 KDs...) Malaysia	2009	No
1 launched so far	2009 INS Kalvari India	2016 (maybe) (1 so far)	5 x Kalvaris 1 per year
none completed so far	2010 SBR-1 Brazil	2020 (maybe, SBR-1)	4 x SBRs (1 per year)

Low revenue from Scorpenes also likely made DCNS all the more competitive on price and technology transfer in the Shortfin bid for Australia’s future submarine competition.

India's non-aligned status, and rising wealth, helps make it a shrewd and unpredictable arms buyer.

Pete

INS Kalvari Scorpene SSK launched October 2015. India need 5 more Kalvaris, 3-5 Arihants, 6 P75(i) SSKs and 6 SSNs (twice the size of the Kalvaris).

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On August 20, 2016 PARIKRAMA commented[20/8/16 4:13 PM] on a wide range of submarine and torpedo topics involving DCNS/France, India and Russia.

Pete has made very minor word changes for clarity and added links, where useful. Pete cautions that all this information about France-India may still be an Indian bargaining ploy to beat down the price of a German TKMS Type 214 to win India's Project-75(I or i) competition.

PARIKRAMA on:

[AIP, Kalvari and Project-75(I or i)]

DCNS is being roped to setup a shop in India via 100% subsidiary route for the fuel cell based AIP . so you are correct on the hints that you gave. Of course they initially tried to offer us a better MESMAupgrade which [Indian Ministry of Defence (MOD)] declined.

The fact is almost 15+ months ago, it was clear that DRDO AIP may not be in a position to [be used for the last 2 Kalvari class Scorpenes] nor may DRDO be in a position to get its AIP on board the Project-75(I or i) (P75i) SSKs. So the contingency plan was [to rope in the] French side into multiple things.

[Linkages With F21 Torpedo and Shortfin and Indian SSN]

Here are a few examples of the DCNS/French products India aims to buy:

1. Instead of the Blackshark heavyweight torpedo (HWT) it will be [mainly French developed] F21 for Scorpenes, Arihants and future P75i SSK with derived technology going into India's Varunastra HWT to make it more lethal.

2. The winning SSK in all probability under P75i will be the Shortfin because India is very keen to get a part of the subcontract for the Australia deal and also wishes to use the technology of Barracuda in its first 6 [Indian] SSN Project. The SSN project is basically a amalgamation of Russian known tech with us and upgrading it with Barracuda tech particularly for noise, stealth and reactor compartment and shielding.

The Amur 1650 or Lada Russia proposed is not cutting much ice with the Indian Government. In fact [India’s] Reliance Defence and Engineering Ltd had submitted a proposal to build 12 Kilo 636 in Pipavav [Shipyard, Gujarat, India] with first 2 being built in Russia and next 10 in India. GOI did not even look into it till this date.

The reason is straight and simple, the product line which comes in P75i should have features which are the latest technology available in the market and which can be fed into Indian SSN/SSBN programs.

French and Indian cooperation will be unprecedented. I am sure you will see a lot more of a new Australia-France-India troika in submarines.

PARIKRAMA also commented on India's second indigenous aircraft carrier (IAC2) and aircraft (MRTT and IL76/78) issues but Pete will write a separate article around these and also Indian SSN reactors later this week.

PETE’S COMMENTS

So India appears to be wishing to buy DCNS/French SSK technology (and perhaps Russian VLS) technology to use in India next 6 x SSK P75i and also in its 6 x future SSNs.

Part of this interest in France is India wants more recent SSN hull ideas than the 25 year old Akula I (INS Chakra) that India is longterm leasing from Russia. Also the Akula is probably larger (at 8,140 tonnes surfaced) than India would want in its first class of SSNs.

So it seems India wishes to obtain hull ideas from France’s Barracuda SSN (due to be launched for the French Navy in 2017) or from the Shortfin SSK variant (both are a more economical 4,765 tonnes (surfaced)).

It is unclear whether:

- India and DCNS expect the Shortfin to be sold to India OR

- India just receives 6 x P75i AIP Scorpenes but with transfer of some technology from the

Shortfin/Barracuda overtly or quietly included in a deal.

A NOTE OF CAUTION - TKMS?

Pete cautions that all this information about France-India may still be an Indian bargaining ploy to beat down the price of a German TKMS Type 214 to win India's P75i competition. After the decade long Indian negotiations over the Kalvari contract and fifteen years for the MRCA France may well be cautious about transferring substantial AIP and Barracuda SSN technology to India. France would expect a great deal of money.

India has a pattern of not buying subs from the same country twice - not having bought from Germany since the 1980/90s. It is also TKMS that is likely to have the mature fuel cell AIP that India wants for P75i. So beating down the price of 6 Type 214 (or 218s) from TKMS for P75i may be India's long term objective.

By PARIKRAMA and Pete

Question: Why is the 16 SLBM SSBN-X larger than a 24 SLBM Ohio? (see Table way below. Displacement and Beam is larger).

Cutaway of SSBN-X from page 9 of 2016 Report to Congress.

COMMENTS

The larger the submarine the smaller the influence of its weapons on displacement and length.

The displacement of the future SSBN-X's 8 fewer SLBMs (16) than the Ohio’s 24 and dimensions for 8 fewer tubes doesn’t mean the SSBN-X is 33% less in displacement/length/beam.

- Beam always needs to be the same or greater to accommodate the length of the

SLBMs.

- The Ohio’s 24 SLBMs were a break in the decades old pattern (page 36) of 16 SLBMs.

- The most pessimistic predictions (of many opposing Russian SSBNs) didn't

materialise. (see comparative Table below).

- The USN must be calculating that threat, stealth and budget means 12 x 16 SLBM

SSBNs is adequate for the 2030-2080 SSBN-X era.

- But more Common Missile Compartment (CMC) quad-packs and more MIRVs

per SLBM can always be retrofitted if need be.

The SSBN-X crew (at 155) remains the same because all the requirements needed to maintain the submarine and its SLBM payload involve the same crew specialities, damage control and other fixtures for 16 as they do for 24. There may even be a need for a few more crew in, say 22 years time, to improve stealth.
- the task of safely operating the reactor requires many crew no matter how many missiles are carried

An inbuilt capacity to absorb improvements and stealth over the 42 year life of SSBN-X involves room to grow into spaces left empty in the hull. Much of this is expanding the computer power by adding more memory and other processing on spare racks in the combat system database. See “must be fitted with the most up-to-date capabilities and stealth to ensure they are survivable throughout their full 40-year life span.”(# below), So more electronics and memory for future active stealth and combat system upgrades may take up much extra space-displacement.

Perhaps more decoys the size of HWT sized UUVs (if the 4 torpedo tubes are retained?).

The tubes for SSBN-X's SLBMs are the same 87-inch diameter as on the Ohio-class, but are a foot longer - leaving some margin for a future missile design. This explains the need for a space/displacement increasing Beam of 43 feet compared to the Ohio’s Beam of 42 feet.

The new reactor may be very slightly heavier and larger, with more 90+% HEU for the longer life between refuels (stretched from the Ohio's 19 year mid-life, to being sufficient for the SSBN-X’s whole 42 year service life).

SSBN-X and Ohio class Comparison Table

Measure/Replacement or Ohio	*Ohio Replacement, SSBN-X, Columbia* class**	Ohio class
Number of SLBMs	16*** In Common Missile Compartment (CMC) quad packs #	24* But just 20 after 2018*
Launch tubes	Same 87 inches SLBM launch tubes ***	Same 87 inches SLBM launch tubes ***
Length	560 feet ***	560 feet ***
Beam	43 feet ***	42 feet ***
Displacement	Larger, 20,815 tons “(as of August 2014)”submerged ***	Smaller, 18,750 tons submerged ***
Crews Blue/Gold	2 x 155 #	2 x 155
Years between HEU refueling	42 (service life) ***	About 19 *
Drive, propulsion	electric-drive propulsion train *** pump jet, X-plane rudder#	mechanical-drive propulsion train*** bare propeller, cruciform-H rudder
UK Successor and Vanguard classes	On UK Successor class 8 x Trident IIs, In Common Missile Compartment (CMC) quad packs # UK made warheads **	UK Vanguard class carry 16 x Trident IIs, UK made warheads**

* page 3 Ronald O'Rourke Specialist in Naval Affairs, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic
Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, May 27, 2016
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R41129.pdf(5 MB PDF)

** page 4 https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R41129.pdf

*** page 8 https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R41129.pdf

# page 9 https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R41129.pdf

For an even more up to date CRS report on the SSBN[X] see Ronald O'Rourke’s Navy Columbia Class (Ohio Replacement) Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, of August 18, 2016 CRS 7-5700 www.crs.gov R41129 https://news.usni.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/R41129-1.pdf . This August 18, 2016 Report was not publically available when I wrote the Submarine Matters article above.

Pete

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China's current SSBNs limited by their SLBMs - Part Three

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Why is the 16 SLBM SSBN-X larger than a 24 SLBM Ohio?