China is
not the only country that claims and builds on islands, reefs and shoals in the South China Sea. Above is a map of the Spratly Islands, South China Sea. What looks like the US Stars and Stripes is, in fact, Malaysia's flag. The red flag with large star, dead center, is Vietnam's. Flat Island and Commodore Reef etc are claimed by the Philippines.
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Peter Jennings, the Executive Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has written a thought provoking commentary, of March 29, 2017. The
commentary is an “edited extract of a speech he delivered to the Japan Institute of International Affairs in Tokyo [on March 28, 2017]”
His main themes are: challenges to the global order generally; especially in the Asia-Pacific, and the need for greater Australia-Japan strategic cooperation.
Some parts I disagree with but I agree with most.
I disagree on:
- countries “quite explicitly challenging the rules-based order, specifically:
: “Russia invaded and annexed the Crimea in 2012 it broke a European norm”. I think Russia has
had a naval base/enclave in
Crimea since 1783. The change of status/government in Ukraine
upset a strategically stabilising Russian influence. Russia used its power to retain the enclave.
Significantly this Russian resistance is no worse than the US maintaining its enclave/naval base
base for decades. Equally the government of
Spain has opposed the
British enclave/base of Gibraltar since 1727. Britain secured Gibraltar by force of arms in 1704.
: Iran has forces in neighbouring countries that may be even more legitimate than the concept of
great powers and middle powers far from that region injecting their naval, ground and air forces
into the oil rich countries near Iran (especially Iraq and Syria).
: Israel is a constant disturbance to regional stability eg. in the Syrian (Golan Heights) territory and : China considers some South China Sea islands its own just as other countries (Vietnam,
Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei etc) in the region consider other South China Sea islands their own and build structures on them (sea map above).
The most extreme challenger to the international order is North Korea but that goes unmentioned
I agree on:
- Need to build closer military and strategic Australia and Japanese partnership for regional stability.
- that ASEAN is not a strategic alliance hence fragmented and ineffective in holding China back
- that Japan has much to be worried about China’s rapid military expansion in military capability.
- but even more so Japan should worry about North Korea’s rising nuclear military capability
- useful common ground for Australia-Japan that includes:
: the uses and maintenance of F-35A, “Joint Strike Fighter”
: anti-submarine warfare,
: ballistic and cruise missile defences,
: maritime and air combat capability (eg. Aegis destroyers, maritime patrol aircraft, large
reconnaissance UAVs etc)
UAVs etc)
: space cooperation
: cyber offensive, defensive capability and cooperation.
: closer interoperability in all military functions with US and Japan
: special forces capabilities for counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency
With mention of “high-end military operations” - could this include submarine operations from Australia in the South China Sea and/or even into the East China Sea?
Agree that when President Trump visits Japan later in 2017 Turnbull (and his advisers) could be invited to participate in trilateral talks with Abe and Trump for two hours). China should be confident of its own place not to try to scuttle trilateral talks with more
Demarches of the type that scuttled the
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in June 2007. Again, see Peter Jennings'
commentary here.
Peter Coates