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Different Account of the Nyonoksa Explosion - No Nuclear Rocket Engine

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Scott Rittera former Marine Corps intelligence officer, writing in the The American Conservative, August 26, 2019, has a different account regarding the August 8, 2019 Nyonoksa (aka Nenoksa) explosion. Ritter's account is partly in line with Pete's belief (part expressed here) that there is no way, with Russia's limited military budget, and competing weapons' project demands, that it could be up to the nuclear reactor rocket engine test phase for the Skyfall cruise missile. 

Ritter's full report is at 

The Media’s Russian Radiation Story Implodes Upon Scrutiny

What really happened at Nenoska was less explosive than everyone, including Trump, wanted you to believe.

How the mainstream media reported an August 8 [2019] accident at a top-secret missile test facility in northern Russia should serve as a cautionary tale regarding the dangers of rushed judgments via institutional bias.

In the days following the initial report of the accident, the media exploded with speculation over both the nature of the device being tested at the Nenoksa State Central Marine Test Site and the Russian government’s muted response.

...They’re all wrong. Here’s the real story of what actually happened at Nenoksa.
...Russia has long been pursuing so-called “autonomous” weapons that can be decoupled from conventional means of delivery—a missile silo or a submarine—and instead installed in canisters that protect them from the environment. They would then be deployed on the floor of the ocean, lying in wait until remotely activated. One of the major obstacles confronting the Russians is the need for [constant temperature of rocket fuel and oxidizer and electrical/electronic] system equilibrium, including the onboard communications equipment, prior to activation. The power supply for any system must be constant, reliable, and capable of operating for extended periods of time without the prospect of fuel replenishment.
The solution for this power supply problem is found in so-called “nuclear batteries,” or radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTG). [also see Wiki] An RTG generates electricity using thermocouples that convert the heat released by the decay of radioactive material. RTGs have long been used in support of operations in space. The Russians have long used them to provide power to remote unmanned facilities in the arctic and in mountainous terrain. Cesium-137, a byproduct of the fission of U-235, is considered an ideal radioisotope for military application RTGs.
On August 8 [2019], a joint team from the [Russian] Ministry of Defense and the All-Russian Research Institute of Experimental Physics, subordinated to the State Atomic Energy Corporation (ROSATOM), conducted a test of a liquid-fueled rocket engine, in which electric power from Cesium-137 “nuclear batteries” maintained its equilibrium state. The test was conducted at the Nenoksa State Central Marine Test Site (GTsMP), a secret Russian naval facility known as Military Unit 09703. It took place in the waters of the White Sea, off the coast of the Nenoksa facility, onboard a pair of pontoon platforms.
The test had been in the making for approximately a year. What exactly was being tested and why remain a secret, but the evaluation went on for approximately an hour. It did not involve the actual firing of the engine, but rather the non-destructive testing of the RTG power supply to the engine. 
The test may have been a final system check...
When the actual testing finished, something went very wrong. According to a sailor from the nearby Severdvinsk naval base, the hypergolic fuels contained in the liquid engine (their presence suggests that temperature control was one of the functions being tested) somehow combined. This created an explosion that destroyed the liquid engine, sending an unknown amount of fuel and oxidizer into the water. At least one, and perhaps more, of the Cesium-137 RTGs burst open, contaminating equipment and personnel alike. 
...The Russian Meteorological Service (Roshydromet) operates what’s known as the Automatic Radiation Monitoring System (ASKRO) in the city of Severdvinsk. ASKRO detected two “surges” in radiation, one involving Gamma particles, the other Beta particles. This is a pattern consistent with the characteristics of Cesium-137, which releases Gamma rays as it decays, creating Barium-137m, which is a Beta generator. The initial detection was reported on the Roshydromet website, though it was subsequently taken offline. 
Specialized hazardous material teams scoured the region around Nenoksa, Archangesk, and Severdvinsk, taking air and environmental samples. All these tested normal, confirming that the contamination created by the destruction of the Cesium-137 batteries was limited to the area surrounding the accident. Due to the large amount of missile fuel that was spilled, special restrictions concerning fishing and swimming were imposed in the region’s waters — at least until the fuel was neutralized by the waters of the White Sea. The damage had been contained, and the threat was over.
The reality of what happened at Nenoksa is tragic. Seven men lost their lives and scores of others were injured. But there was no explosion of a “nuclear cruise missile,” and it wasn’t the second coming of Chernobyl. America’s intelligence community and the so-called experts got it wrong — again. The root cause of their error is their institutional bias against Russia, which leads them to view that country in the worst possible light, regardless of the facts.
At a time when the level of mutual mistrust between our two nuclear-armed nations is at an all-time high, this kind of irresponsible rush to judgement must be avoided at all costs.
Scott Ritter is a former Marine Corps intelligence officer who served in the former Soviet Union implementing arms control treaties, in the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Storm, and in Iraq overseeing the disarmament of WMD. He is the author of Deal of the Century: How Iran Blocked the West’s Road to War.
See Ritter's FULL ARTICLE HERE

Nyonoksa incident: Attempted Recovery of Reactor or Nuclear Weapon

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Josh and I continue to discuss the August 8 (or before) 2019 Nyonoksa Russia nuclear incident possibilities. In response to Josh's August 30, 2019 comment:

I reply:

Yes a failed submarine recovery of a reactor sounds plausible.

1.  The scenario may be:

with"The tests apparently showed that the nuclear-powered heart of the cruise missile failed to initiate and, therefore, the [Skyfall missile] weapon was unable to achieve the indefinite flight Putin had boasted about.". So it sounds like the liquid fuel Skyfall stage taking off from Nyonoksa succeeded. But then Skyfall's transition to reactor powered ramjet failed.

The submarine Losharik (see here and here) was tasked to recover the Top Secret Skyfall reactor before a Western submersible could snatch it. But then Losharik suffered its own battery explosion https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_submarine_Losharik#2019_fire

A second recovery of the Skyfall reactor was attempted by an X-ray class submersible https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/678.htm or similar.

But the Skyfall reactor was running hot. Perhaps deep cold ocean water + the casing were sufficient to contain the heat but as it was brought to the surface by the X-ray, shallow water + disintergrating casing + even contact with air caused a heat increase amounting to explosion of the Skyfall reactor.

2.  Other possibilities were Losharik and then X-ray were attempting to recover:

A. what may be an old or newly lost submarine reactor that was running hot.

B. (before a Western submersible snatched it) a missile nuclear warhead

C. a dropped in error free-fall nuclear bomb (recalling a 1957 US incident
     https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_17_nuclear_bomb#1957_incident ), or

D. a site where a Russian aircraft crashed into the sea with a nuclear weapon aboard.

In cases B, C and D the conventional explosives portions of the warhead/bomb may have exploded  spreading and/or fissioning nuclear material (similar to this old 1966 accident which included a "dirty bomb" effect  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1966_Palomares_B-52_crash#Contamination ).

Pete

Call for Suggestions for Modern US Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles

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So with the 500 km - 5,500 km range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty being dead since February 1-2, 2019 the US has already test-launched medium range cruise missiles from ground platforms.

But what of:

-  the perfectly good Pershing II designs and hardware that were eliminated in 1991. Can the US
   develop "Pershing IIIs" (noting some coast-based ASBMs suggestions). Maybe deploy Pershing III
   as anti-ship (on continental US coasts, Hawaii, Midway Island, Guam, Diego Garcia) and where
   relevant land attack versions (in Alaska, even Singapore?)  as an answer to China's famous
   DF-21Ds and DF-26s.

-  longer than 500 km rangefuture versionsof the US MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile
   System
 (ATacMS) as an answer to the likely 500+km range of Russia's Iskander-M variant of the
   (NATO SS-26 Stone), ground launched versions of Russia's new 
Kh-47M2 Kinzhal ALBM and
   modern variants of the Soviet SS-20.

   :  
Maybe for ATacMS-ER GLBM basing in NATO central-eastern European countries.

Any other overlooked or "black programs" for eligible intermediate-range US missiles out there?

2.  There's a whole range of modern technologies that could improve on old INF Treaty terminated
     1991 missiles. This includes:


      -  vastly more accurate guidance for DF-21D style changes of course and more accurate
         (3 meter?) CEPs,
      -  more stealth and decoy measures, 

      -  improved rocket fuels for longer range per kg propellant, 
      -  ramjets, and 
      -  lighter, stronger, composite material booster casings for longer range.

Any other ballistic missile improvement technologies?

Pete

Revolutionary Change in the US Alliance in Northeast Asia Coming

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Anonymous reports that now we are going to experience the most revolutionary change in US alliance relations in Northeast Asia since the Korean War. 

According to the most influential Japanese commentator on Korean matters, Takabumi Suzuoki [1], in the near future, the US and South Korean (SK) alliance will be eliminated [2]. The geopolitical structure of the "red team" (China/Russia/North Korea (NK)) vs the "blue team" (US/Japan/SK) might change to China/Russia/Unified K vs US/Japan. The current border confrontation of the red and blue teams along the 38th parallel might shift to the Sea of Japan (the New Acheson Line). 

"SK is secretly establishing a nuclear propelled submarine and is going to equip it with nuclear missiles from NK. Such a situation is a nightmare for the blue team, but it is possible."

[1] Suzuoki predicted the eventual elimination of the US-SK alliance years ago. Many predictions by Suzuoki have been realized.

[2] The SK President, Moon Jae-inn, and Trump are expecting the elimination of the SK-US alliance. The recent withdrawal of SK from the SK-Japan intelligence sharing agreement, known as "General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)" is one of the signs of the crumbling US-SK alliance.

Pete Comment

Trump's policy of bilateral talks with NK's Kim Jung-on, with minimal US confidential or publically demonstrated consultation with SK, has shaken SK.

SK's fear of growing (near-neighbour) Chinese economic and military power has led to SK efforts to strengthen relations with China. This has been at the expense of SK relations with the US.

Trade disputes between the US and SK also have increased tension. Additionally the Trump induced US-China trade dispute has impacted the SK economy and SK strategic confidence.

Anonymous and Pete

Existing US Missile Becoming Intermediate Anti-Ship Missile like DF-21D

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Josh made some valid points here and here on September 4, 2019 (in response to my article) regarding the unlikelihood of the US developing new land launched intermediate range missile systems. 

Reasons for unlikelihood include missile development costs, nuclear warhead redevelopment and production costs, pre-existence of US cruise missiles, guided bomb and ballistic missile dropping airpower and lack of allies willing to host land launched intermediate range missile systems.

On the assumption existing weapons are cheaper to further develop, hence "sell" to the US taxpayer and US government budgeters one exception might be extending the short (160 km) range of the US MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATacMS) to the now irrelevant 499 km intermediate treaty range.

The US has been studying intercontinental-global strike hypersonic weapons but they require much mere time and funds to develop than 2 intermediate range weapons that China has already developed. The US has been impressed with the hypersonic (with suspected but not yet fully demonstrated) anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) capabilities of land launched Chinese DF-21Ds and DF-26s.

These represent new types of anti-ship weapon systems that US airpower and cruise missiles cannot match for speed-range.

A Possible US (DF-21D and DF-26 like) Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile  

The most likely candidate may be a future anti-ship version of an extended range MGM-140 (ATacMS). 


Helpfully the writers of Wikipedia have already broached the subject but, significantly they did this before the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty expired on February 1, 2019. Hence their reservations about limiting ATacMS range below the treaty limit of 500 km is no longer limiting. 

Wiki reports:

"In October 2016, it was revealed that the ATacMS would be upgraded with an existing seeker to enable it to strike moving targets on land and at sea.[18]
In March 2016, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Raytheon announced they would offer a missile to meet the U.S. Army's Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF) requirement to replace the ATACMS. 
The missile will use advanced propulsion to fly faster and further, out to 310 miles (500 km) ([no longer] limited by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty),[19] while also being thinner and sleeker, increasing loadout to two per pod, doubling the number able to be carried by M270 MLRS and M142 HIMARS launchers.[20][21]
Lockheed and Raytheon will test-fire their submissions for the renamed Precision Strike Missile (PRSM) program in 2019, with the selected weapon planned to achieve Initial Operational Capability in 2023; the initial PRSM will only be able to hit stationary targets on land, but later versions will track moving targets on land and sea.[22] 
If the United States withdraws from the INF Treaty [as it now has], the range of the PRSM could be increased beyond the '499 km' limitation placed upon it by the treaty.[23]

As well as ships an ATacMS with a nuclear warhead could be used as a rapid intermediate range defense against enemy submarines and against Russia's Poseidon (Status-6)(NATO Kanyon) nuclear armed, nuclear propelled torpedo/AUV.

There are many points on US territory that a conventional or nuclear warhead, land based 500+ km range, anti-ship, ATacMS could be placed including:

-  east and west coast continental US
-  Alaska to block the Bering Strait and against Russia's Rybachiy SSBN and SSN Base
-  Hawaii (particularly if its range were boosted out to 5,500 km (like China's DF-26)
-  Guam to hit Chinese ships and submarines in the Yellow, East and South China Seas and Chinese
    coastal bases. 

-  Also acting as a second strike against Chinese nuclear tipped DF-21D and DF-26 use.

---

Pete

Report South Korea Wants to Break from US alliance!

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Following Anonymous’s comments in Revolutionary Change in the US Alliance in Northeast Asia Coming of September 4, 2019 Anonymous has provided further comments below:

“As South Korea’s (SK) missile defense system depends on Japanese reconnaissance satellites, withdrawal by SK from the SK-Japan intelligence sharing General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)is nonsensical [1, 2] but is reasonably understandable in the context of elimination of US and SK alliance [3].


Surprisingly, SK will not have a reconnaissance satellite capable of detecting a North Korean (NK) missile launch until 2023. [This is noting THAAD’s long range radar for missile detection is part of a US (not) South Korean system]. Neglecting military common sense, SK asked Israel, France and Germany for rental of the reconnaissance satellite in 2017 (August or September), and they soon refused.


South Korea is playing into the hands of North Korea and its allies”


SK President Moon Jae-in made Trump lose his face by the GSOMIA withdrawal. But, SK’s GSOMIA withdrawal has not resulted in the elimination of the US and SK alliance, because the relationship between US and SK is already damaged. In fact, GSOMIA is not important in terms of defense. As SK leaks military information of US and Japan to NK, US and Japan do not communicate important information to SK. GSOMIA, therefore has only symbolic meaning of US-SK-Japan cooperation against China. With the disappearance of US and SK as common enemies of China and NK their is a movement in President Moon Jae-in’s  administration for the unification of SK and NK. A unified Korea will try to retain nuclear weapons.

SK President Moon Jae-in and his supporters believe the US and SK alliance is the biggest obstacle to unification of SK and NK, but if Moon Jae-in manifests the elimination of US and SK alliance, his government will definitely collapse by strong resistance of SK citizens and conservatives. If the US government manifests [opposes the breakup of the US-SK alliance] SK citizens and conservative politicians will give up their opposition to the alliance breakup. That’s why SK is purposely irritating the US. The main purpose of GSOMIA withdrawal is to calm NK leader Kim Jong-un, who is furious at the dishonesty of SK President Moon Jae-in.

For Trump the elimination of the US-SK alliance is an ace in his sleeve to have NK leader Kim Jong-un give up nuclear weapons. That’s why Trump hides his enthusiasm for the breakup. Trump believes US military forces in SK are a waste of money. Relations between the US and SK are very bad, but they are becoming calmer with the hope of a breakup of the US-SK alliance.

Attention should be paid to Moody's [stable] credit rating for SK, “because in the past US conducted financial sanction against SK when SK was against US.” [This is noting NK has not been assigned a credit rating by Moody’s or any other agency, presumably because NK is such a bad credit risk!]

Pete Comment

Much more corroborating evidence from many (especially US and South Korean) sources is required to support the above report's credibility.

India's S-5 SSBN Model Undraped

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Submarine Matters has kept abreast of Indian SSBN developments over the years. Most recently at Update on India's SSBN and SLBM Evolution of January 21, 2019, which in part reported:

"The K-5 and K-6 [SLBMs] are reportedly planned for follow-on SSBNs, displacing more than twice that of the Arihant class.

The 13,500 ton SSBNs of the so-called S-5 class are to carry twelve of the 5000 km range K-5 – development of which started in 2015, with no tests done to date – or a similar number of the 6000 km range K-6” which is to have MIRVs. The longer-ranged K-5 could replace the K-4 on the Arihant class to enhance its effectiveness and flexibility.

“the Arihant class is a relatively modest vessel by the high standards set by the five larger nuclear powers which operate much more potent vessels.

“In fact, it might have been expected for India to develop an SSN – like the Akula class submarine currently leased as the INS Chakra. By opting for an SSBN, it is clear India allocated priority to the Arihant project with plans for six SSNs being left for the future.”"


Diagram of  Provisional India's S-5 Next Generation SSBN. The distinctive hump seems to owe much to Russia's Delta class SSBNs. (Diagram courtesy S I Sutton at Covert Shores, September 2, 2019)
---

H I Sutton at Covert Shores, September 2, 2019 has published a most interesting article Indian Next Generation S-5 SSBN revealed which states in part:

"Indian Vice President Shri M. Venkaiah Naidu tweetedphotos from his August 28 [2019] visit to the Naval Science & Technological Laboratory (NSTL) to celebrate its Golden Jubilee. NSTL is part of DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organization) in Vizag, Andhra Pradesh. 

A yellow hydrodynamic test model of a submarine, partially visible in one of the photos may provide new insights into India's next generation ballistic missile submarine program, the S-5 Class. The S-5 class is expected to enter service before 2030s and will likely carry the new K-6 SLBM (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile) which is also under development.

... The new design will be a larger boat with 12 or 16 launch tubes for the new K-6 intercontinental ballistic missile, which is expected to have a range in the order of 3,200 nautical miles, about twice that of the current K-4 missile....”

Read the FULL EXCELLENT REPORT by H I Suttom of Covert Shores including photos of the provisional S-5 yellow submarin model.

Crumbling US-SK and Japan-SK Alliance Debate Continues

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Following this and this article Anonymous has provided the following text and footnotes

As the Korean War remains a ceasefire, such as status of United States Forces Korea (USFK) or US-SK exercise is more suitable than RIMPAC in discussion on US and SK alliance.

On October 20, 2018, the US announced suspension of Vigilant Ace that was to occur December 2018 (a large-scale exercise designed to enhance the interoperability of the US and SK Air Forces through combined and joint combat training) [1, 2].

On November 26 2018, US Ambassador to SK, Harry Harris, threatened that if SK disturbed the denuclearization of NK process, the US would withdraw the alliance with SK [3].

On July 30, 2019, the US State of Secretary, Michael Pompeo said, in exchange for denuclearization of NK, the US would provide a new set of security arrangements amounting to a withdrawal from the alliance with SK) [4].

On June 2nd-3rd 2019, the relocation of the US-SK Combined Forces Command (CFC) Headquarters from Seoul, transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) of Korean forces from US to Seoul and denial of restore of suspended U.S.-South Korea military drills were announced. It suggested future withdrawal of possible US-SK alliance [5, 6].

[1] https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/us-announces-suspension-of-vigilant-ace-2018-exercise-with-south-korea/, by Ankit Panda, THE DIPLOMAT paysite, October 20, 2018. The US Announces Suspension of Vigilant Ace 2018 Exercise With South Korea.

[2] https://business.nikkei.com/atcl/report/15/226331/120600206/?P=4 , T Suzuoki, Dec/07/2018, Nikkei Business. According to Japanese experts, US personnel said “We do not fight together with SK military anymore. Then, joint exercise is meaningless.”

[3] , Nov 28, 2018. On November 26, the testimony of the grand prize of the 2018 Korean Unification Contribution Award was revealed. (snip) It (=Ambassador’s speech) is interpreted as the point that there should be no lifting of sanctions and inter-Korean dialogue without denuclearization. Ambassador Harris said, “I will tell you one last time.” “Our (ROK) alliance is firmly maintained, We shouldn't take this for granted. ”(snip)

[4] https://www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-michael-r-pompeo-with-buck-sexton-of-iheartmedia/ Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary Of State, Sheraton Maria Isabel Hotel, Mexico City, Mexico, July 22, 2019. MICHAEL R. POMPEO: In exchange for that (=denuclearization of NK), President Trump’s been very clear: We’re prepared to provide a set of security arrangements that gives them comfort that if they disband their nuclear program, that the United States won’t attack them in the absence of that; and second, a brighter future for the North Korean people. That’s the outlines of the agreement that Chairman Kim and President Trump have made. We now need the North Korean negotiators to begin to build out on those principles that the two leaders have set forward.

Explanation ( https://www.dailyshincho.jp/article/2019/07300559/?all=1&page=3 , by T Suzuoki, DAILY SHINCH, July 30, 2019  “A security arrangements that gives them comfort “ is a commitment of non-attack by USA suggesting withdrawal of US-SK alliance.

They (SK Defense Minister Jeong Kyeong-doo and acting US Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan on Jun/03/2019) agreed to relocate CFC, now at the U.S. Forces Korea's Yongsan Garrison base in Seoul, to the US Camp Humpheys in Pyeongtaek, citing operational efficiency.(snip)

At the US SK Defense Ministers' meeting, Shanahan and Jeong agreed on the early transfer of wartime OPCON of Korean forces to Seoul, and the relocation of the South Korea-U.S. CFC to Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province, as opposed to the SK Defense Ministry compound in Yongsan, Seoul, which was discussed in 2018.(snip)

Explanations ( https://www.dailyshincho.jp/article/2019/06071730/?all=1 , by T Suzuoki, DAILY SHINCH, July 7, 2019): "Unlike NATO Treaty (chapter 5), there is not clause of automatic intervention in the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of [South] Korea. Relocation of CFC reduces possibilities of military conflict between US and NK where intervention by US military needs time-consuming approval by President or Congress. Relocation of CFC to means withdrawal of key military intervention of US Army and cursory support by Navy and Air Force in emergency. The early transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) of Korean Forces from US to Seoul suggests reduction of USFK, because, in US law, small number of US military can be under the foreign commander."

[6] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-southkorea/acting-pentagon-chief-says-no-need-to-restore-suspended-us-south-korea-military-drills-idUSKCN1T30BT , by Idrees Ali, AFP, June 2, 2019. SEOUL (Reuters) - Acting US Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan said on Sunday that for now it was not necessary to resume major joint military exercises with South Korea that were suspended in the last year to support diplomatic efforts with North Korea.

Anonymous

Are Australia's Two Main Naval Bases Too Far South?

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Pete Comment

Babones' contention (bolded below) that Australia's 2 main naval bases (in Sydney and just below Perth) are too far south, could be refuted on several grounds. This includes:

- cost of moving bases 
- psychological impact of moving bases from the major population centers 
- loss of personnel, as they and families would reject living in isolated (hot, cyclonic) northern towns.
- need for large cities to support major naval bases 
- loss of distance protection from Chinese airstrikes
- ships and submarines can transit from Perth area and Sydney anyway.

ARTICLE

Salvatore Babones, for The National Interest has written an excellent article of August 28, 2019, titled "If Australia Wants Collective Defense, Then It Should Get Its Own Navy in Ship Shape". 
I have bolded the parts directly on submarines and base locations. Here it is below:

"China’s rise and rearmament has introduced a security schizophrenia into Australian politics. This is what lawmakers can do to address their fears of a Beijing invasion.
If Australia Wants Collective Defense, Then It Should Get Its Own Navy in Ship Shape
With the South China Sea dispute back on the front burner and trade tensions between the United States and China bubbling over, some of America’s regional allies are starting to feel the heat. Yet when Mike Pompeo told a Sydney forum that “You can sell your soul for a pile of soybeans or you can protect your people,” Australia’s good and great were “gobsmacked,” according to an eyewitness account from The Spectator Australia. Substitute a lump of Australian coal for a pile of American soybeans, and Pompeo’s message was clear.
China’s rise and rearmament has introduced a security schizophrenia into Australian politics. Canberra’s China doves argue that Australia should accommodate its giant neighbor and number one export partner, sign up to Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative, and do whatever it takes to avoid attracting China’s ire.
Meanwhile a certain species of Australian hawk believes that the United States is no longer a reliable ally, and that Australia should muscle up for a potential future confrontation with China. The most prominent of these is Professor Hugh White of the Australian National University, who thinks thatAustralia should be considering the development of an independent nuclear deterrent.
He’s not alone in worrying about American staying power in the Pacific. One of Australia’s most prominent conservative commentators, Paul Kelly, says that “the strong and astute America [that Australia] needs is not on display,” while the governor of Australia’s central bank says that he does “not have a clear idea of what strategy the U.S. has” for dealing with China.
Now a major research paper from the University of Sydney’s United States Studies Centre concludes that the United States “no longer enjoys military primacy in the Indo-Pacific” region and “has an atrophying force that is not sufficiently ready, equipped or postured for great power competition.” The paper was partly funded by the Australian Department of Defence, American defense giant Northrop Grumman, and the French multinational Thales Group.
The paper’s authors, Ashley Townshend, Brendan Thomas-Noone, and Matilda Steward, call for a NATO-style strategy of “collective defense” in the Indo-Pacific as a “way of offsetting shortfalls in America’s regional military power.” They repeatedly highlight the “decline,” “inadequacy,” and “questionable abilities” of the United States Armed Forces.
Meanwhile they laud Australia’s “significant submarine modernisation” program, which consists of the construction of twelve new diesel-electric boats to enter service in the 2030s and 2040s. Australia’s [former] Defence Minister Christopher Pyne has described the submarines “regionally superior,” which only makes sense if the region they’re talking about is Southeast Asia. He can’t mean the Indo-Pacific region. India and China already have nuclear-powered attack and ballistic missile submarines.
They also praise Australia’s “surface vessel recapitalisation” program, with nine new frigates to be built on a British design. Like the submarines, these likely won’t enter service until the 2030s. They are mainly designed for anti-submarine warfare, but as the Royal Australian Navy’s new workhorse vessels, they will have to do general duty as well.
They criticize the United States for planning to buy “only” 2457 fifth-generation F-35 fighters and cancelling the F-22. For the record, Australia has committed to buying just seventy-two F-35s in total. They expect to have ten by the end of the year. The USAF, Navy, and Marines already fly more than three hundred.
A Look in the Mirror
If, as the Australian report claims, the United States “no longer enjoys military primacy in the Indo-Pacific” region, then who does? If the United States is “not sufficiently ready, equipped or postured for great power competition,” then who is? Webster’s defines primacy as “the state of being first,” and no one seriously doubts that the United States is first in the Indo-Pacific region. Great-power competition implies a great-power competitor, and no one seriously believes that China is better-prepared for competition than the United States.
If Australians really are worried that the United States is no longer able to come to their defense, then perhaps they should take White’s advice and take a long, hard look in the mirror. No one expects a country of twenty-five million people to match the military spending of a global superpower thirteen times its size. But since the turn of the millennium, Australia has spent an average of only 1.8 percent of its Gross Domestic Product on defense, compared to 3.7 percent for the United States.
What the Australians do spend, they often spend inefficiently. For example, Australia’s politicized navy is buying diesel-powered submarines out of an ideological aversion to nuclear power. The United States, which has a real fighting navy, hasn’t built a diesel submarine since 1959.
There are also questions about readiness. Australia’s two main naval bases, Fleet Base East and Fleet Base West, are located in the pleasant southern cities of Sydney and Perth, ideally placed to defend the country against the march of the penguins from Antarctica. Meanwhile the U.S. Marines are sweating it out in Australia’s remote northern outpost of Darwin, where they serve as a rapid reaction force ready for deployment throughout the Indo-Pacific region.
Naval Gazing
The Royal Australian Navy's Sydney headquarters is particularly self-indulgent. Strategically stationed in the posh inner-Sydney suburb of Potts Point, the RAN’s top brass can comfortably grab a croissant on their morning walk to work from subsidized housing in one of Australia’s most expensive neighborhoods. In 2018, the city of Sydney wanted to acquire the base, which has golden sunset views of the landmark Sydney Opera House and Harbour Bridge, to use as a cruise ship terminal. The Navy turned them down.
Yet the base is incredibly insecure—and incredibly dangerous. Pedestrians walk on a public inner-city street within ten yards of the bows of the nearest ships. The whole base is hemmed in by a city park on one side and a luxury hotel on the other. Any decent quarterback could hit six ships with bombs lobbed from the park overlooking the base; a determined terrorist could sink half the fleet with a portable rocket launcher. Even an onboard accident could take out the civilian hotel just one hundred yards away.
A serious fighting navy would move north to the country town of Townsville, fifteen hundred sea miles closer to any potential threat emanating from China or emergency arising in the Pacific. The RAN has refused to move out of congested Sydney Harbour to nearby suburban Botany Bay. They say the reason is “tradition.” Another word for it is “lifestyle.”
Australia’s Fleet Base West should also be relocated fifteen hundred sea miles north to Port Hedland (population fifteen thousand). Australia’s iron miners tough it out on the country’s remote northwest coast, but then they have to: that’s where the iron is. The RAN prefers the comfortable climate and urban amenities of metropolitan Perth (population two million). And who can blame them? But if Australians prefer the good life to the rigors of military readiness, they’re in no position to demand additional American sacrifices on their behalf.
The Political Reality of Collective Defense
As the experience of NATO amply demonstrates, “collective defense” is really just a polite way of saying “American defense.” When it comes to collective defense, what is everyone's responsibility becomes no one’s responsibility—except America’s. In 2018, America’s European NATO allies spent an average of 1.5 percent of GDP on defense, in flagrant violation of their long-standing commitments to raise spending to 2 percent. Only five NATO members meet their 2 percent spending commitments: three frontline Eastern European countries, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Australia is an important political ally that has provided welcome symbolic support for American missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and (most recently) the Persian Gulf. Australia lost forty-one soldiers in fierce fighting in Afghanistan after taking up the call of Operation Enduring Freedom. Americans will always be grateful and proud to have Australians standing beside them in time of need.
But if Australians are serious about defending freedom in the Indo-Pacific region, then they should take a more active role in their own defense. That means buying the most effective weapons systems available and deploying them as efficiently as possible. It also means accommodating and hosting American forces, when its own aren’t sufficient to do the job. But most of all, it means making a genuine commitment to security partnership.
Opinion polls consistently show that the Australian people are willing to take on these responsibilities. It’s long past time for Australia’s political class to step up to the plate.
Salvatore Babones is the author of  The New Authoritarianism: Trump, Populism, and the Tyranny of Experts.

German vs Swedish Advanced AIP for Submarine Sales to Poland, the Netherlands and India

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Summary

Germany’s TKMS and Sweden’s Saab-Kockums have released latest generation Air Independent Propulsion (AIP)details. AIPprolongs submerged endurance of diesel electric submarines. The overall strategy is likely:

-  TKMS packaging its latest AIP in submarine Types 214, 212A, 212CD, South Korean KSS-IIIs
   and Israeli Dolphin 3s.

-  while Sweden is likely offering its latest Stirling AIP in the three A26 submarine sizes

The release of details may be with a view to sales in the long running future submarine competitions for:

-  up to 4 submarines for Poland’s long running ORKA Program

-  around 4 submarines for the Netherlands Walrus Replacementand

-  6 submarines for India’s 75 (I for India) with Saab-Kockums and TKMS still on the shortlist of 4

Analysis and Background in More Detail

TKMS appears to be developing its (see B. below) 4th Generation Fuel Cell (FC4G) technology in competition against:

-  Saab-Kockums'A.5th Generation Stirling AIP, and

D. methanol reforming fuel cell (MRFC) that TKMS itself is co-developing with Spain’s SENER. 

So, in C. TKMS indicates its 4th Generation Fuel Cell technology is superior to reformer AIP of which D.TKMS’ co-development with SENER could be an example, and A. Sweden’s Stirling engine technology.

A.  SWEDEN Saab-KockumsRichard Scott for Jane's International Defence Review reported June 17, 2019 in part, “Sweden set to test ‘Double Stirling’ AIP plant”

“Saab Kockums and Sweden's Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) are preparing to begin testing of a prototype 'Double Stirling' air-independent propulsion (AIP) system aimed at a nascent Swedish future submarine programme.

The 150 kW module, which occupies the same footprint as the original 75 kW Type A19 Gotland-class installation, represents the fifth generation of Stirling cycle AIP to be developed for Swedish submarines.

Saab Kockums' Stirling engines burn oxygen (stored in liquid form [LOX] in cryogenic tanks) and diesel fuel in a pressurised combustion chamber to generate electricity for propulsion or for charging batteries within a conventional diesel-electric plant. The company has iteratively developed Stirling AIP technology since testing a prototype plant that went to sea in 1989; the latest Mk 4 version was refitted to HMS Gotland and HMS Uppland as part of the Gotland-class mid-life update (MLU).

Want to read more? For analysis on this article and access to all our insight content, please enquire about our subscription options at  ihsmarkit.com/janes... To read the full article, Client Login  (162 of 444 words)”

B.  GERMANY TKMS- on September 11, DEFPOST reportedTKMS unveiled the 4th Generation Fuel Cell (FC4G) for submarine indicating that:

after having finished an extensive test program with more than 70,000 operating hours in the test environment, an improvement over TKMS existing fuel cell AIP which has been used by customers for over 15 years.

TKMS indicated FC4G has “huge improvements in availability, redundancy, and stealth.”
“The FC4G is designed to be a high-availability modular system composed of redundant components to retain a maximum performance at all times. In terms of H2-storage, the systems rely on the well-proven and exceptionally safe system of metal hydride cylinders as previous generations. These cylinders do not contain any active components; thus, reducing failure to a minimum holding hydrogen molecules safe in place in the crystal lattice of the hydride. Since hydrogen is fed to the system in its purest form, no chemical conversion is required and, therewith, the efficiency of the overall system remains very high.”
Overall signatures of the FC4G are the most favourable ones on the market. No by-products put overboard, the thermal and the acoustic signatures are kept to a minimum while the overall system efficiency is twice as good as any combustion engine.”
“Philipp Schön, Head of Product Sales Submarines: “These are the reasons, why 38 [submarines with AIP] systems [have been sold to] 7 customer navies, another 10 [submarines with AIP] systems presently being under negotiation.”
C.  TKMS compares its fuel cell AIP with competing AIP technologies
DEFPOST continues“In contrast, reformer systems inevitably create CO2 out of a liquid fuel such as diesel oil leaving a trace of CO2 – and potentially other by-products contained in diesel oil such as Sulphur – that must be dissolved into the surrounding sea water by operating electrical pumps. 
The same applies to AIP systems based on other principles, such as Stirling engines, closed-cycle diesels, or closed-cycle steam turbines. Not so the FC4G system. The only by-product besides electrical energy is pure water, which is stored on board for weight compensation. H2 is easily available where ever chemical industry is operative, typically in every customer country, or may be produced by utilizing green energy sources by splitting water into H2 and O2.”
D.  Anonymousadvised on September 12, 2019 that Germany’s TKMS is also developing another AIP technology with SENER of Spain.

TKMS is developing methanol reforming fuel cell (MRFC) technology with SENER to minimise hydrogen risks. Carbon dioxide exhaust, which is a major issue of MRFC, has been improved [1]. I once heard that improved fuel cell AIP would be developed before the establishment of MRFC. Development of MRFC in SENER started in 2012. When does TKMS expect MRFC-AIP development to be completed? Germany's Siemens, which developed hydride fuel cell technology, does not welcome any adoption or competition from MRFC.

MK III V4-275R for Japan's Soryu submarines is a 4-cylinder double acting type Stirling engine which is compact and high performance. The fifth generation Stirling engine (MK V V4-275R?) belongs to this family [4]. Though the footprint of MK V is as same as MK IV, its output increased twice (150kW). The combustion chamber of the MK V may have been  significantly improved.





Like other systems (eg. combat systems, batteries, diesels and hull stealth) AIP is a major technology  arena to give a seller of submarines the edge over the opposition.

Pete and Anonymous

US Developing 3+ Missiles (eg. Pershing III?) - Post INF Treaty

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Kingston Reif wrote an excellent article “Trump Increases Budget for Banned Missiles” at the Arms Control Association website, on May 2019 at https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-05/news/trump-increases-budget-banned-missiles. Parts (with some bolding and redding by Pete) include:

“The Trump administration has requested nearly $100 million in fiscal year 2020 to develop three new missile systems that would exceed the range limits of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a pact the United States [exited on August 2, 2019]

... The budget submission includes $76 million in the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Prompt Global Strike Capability Development account to develop a mobile, conventionally armed, land-based cruise missile and a ballistic missile system...”

...Defense Department officials told reporters in March that the Pentagon is planning to test [1]a ground-launched variant of the Navy’s Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile that has a range of about 1,000 kilometers in August and [2] a ground-launched ballistic missile with a range of 3,000 to 4,000 kilometers in November [2019]. [Is this a Pershing III or extended range AtacMS?] 

...The officials estimated that the new cruise missile could be deployed in 18 months while the new ballistic missile would not be ready for at least five years....”

“...[officials] noted that there have been no discussions with allies in Europe and Asia about hosting the missiles. One official said the new ballistic missile could be deployed in Guam, a U.S. territory, which would allow the missile to strike targets in mainland China.

[3]A New, Third Weapon

The budget request also contains $20 million for the Army to begin development of a mobile, land-based, medium-range missile“that can attack specific threat vulnerabilities in order to penetrate, dis-integrate, and exploit in the strategic and deep maneuver areas.” The Army is planning to request to total of $900 million for the missile through fiscal year 2024.”

“...the congressional aide confirmed that the weapon would fall within the range prohibited by the INF Treaty. The Defense Department classifies a medium-range missile as having a range between 1,000 and 3,000 kilometers.

In addition, the Army is pursuing [4+] several other ground-launched missile systems with ranges that could exceed 500 kilometers.”

“Gen. John Murray, the chief of Army Futures Command, told Congress last September that the service is “looking very hard and starting down the path of hypersonics and then also looking at what we call the [5] Strategic Long-Range Cannon, which conceivably could have a range of up to 1,000 nautical miles.”

“...Several countries, including Poland, have made it clear that any deployment of the new systems in Europe would have to be approved by all NATO members...”

SEE Kingston Reif’s whole great article HERE.

Some See Serious Stresses in US-South Korean Alliance

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Following the September 10, 2019 article Anonymous, on September 14, 2019, provided further comments and links on what some see as serious tensions in the US-South Korean (SK) alliance:

US expert on Asian, Michael J. Green, has begun to doubt the continuation of the US-SK alliance. Green is not only fed up with the anti-American administration of SK President Moon Jae-in, but also concluded that SK was not originally an alliance partner. See“U.S.-China Relations in 2019: A Year in Review” by Michael J. Green, Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, pages 5-6, September 4, 2019, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Panel%20II%20Green_Written%20Testimony.pdf

-----------------------------
Separately the following is a Question and Answer interview of Japanese commentator on Korean affairs Takabumi Suzuokiin “South Korea originally subject state of China-Inherent weakness of USA-SK alliance spoken openly in USA” by T. Suzuoki, in [Japanese newspaper] DAILY SHINCHO, of September 13, 2019.

(Suzuoki) A notable change has occurred in US. Dr Green, Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair of CSIS said continuation of the US-SK alliance was difficult.

(In source text) “Korea has a very different history and a very different geopolitical situation from Japan and the Chinese view Korea as a much more likely candidate for dealignment from the U.S.”

(Q) What does “Korea has a very different history and a very different geopolitical situation” mean?

(A) It means, “The successive dynasties of the Korean peninsula belonged to the dynasty of China.

Therefore, the US-SK alliance is extremely unstable.”

(In source text)“Korea was historically more associated with the Chinese tributary state system than Japan and Beijing has put significant coercive pressure on South Korea to dealign from the United States since Xi Jinping came to power.”

(Suzuoki) As SK is originally pro-China country, maintenance of the US-SK alliance is difficult whether SK government is anti-America or not. Whatever US makes effort, eventually the alliance will be withdrawn. This is already pointed out “Withdrawal of the US-SK alliance), but the fact that Asian experts in America began to point out inherent weakness of the US-SK alliance is important. Left wing Moon Jae-in administration results in collapse of the US-SK alliance “ is dominative view in US, but, it is too optimistic idea. Asian experts in US used to think, “As SK is a democratic country, it will eventually select US not China.” But, now, Asian experts conclude, ”SK will select China.”

(Q) Why did they conclude, “SK will select China.”

(A) Because SK is hesitating participation in “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) Strategy”, China encirclement network. Also, SK withdraw GSOMIA.

(In source text) Seoul took over a year to participate in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, for example, and South Korea ambassadors in Southeast Asia often steer clear of the like-minded coordination meetings of U.S, Japanese, Australian and European embassies.

(A) China ordered SK, “Do not military cooperation by US, SK and Japan”, and Moon administration accepted this order. SK sucked up to China by withdrawal of GSOMIA.

(Q) Is there any other Asian experts except Dr. Green who Give up SK?

(A) Mr. Michael Armacost (ex-Ambassador to the Philippines and also to Japan, former Acting Secretary of State) doubts continuation of the US-SK alliance.He pointed out the anti-American sentiments by Korean and suggested the possibility of withdrawal of the US military. In SK, not only the left wing but also conservatives believe, “the US wants to place troops in the continent. So, whatever Korea says, US will not pull the its troops in Korea.” But, Professor Gi-Wook Shin of Stanford University pointed out, “We left the Philippines with which we allied for 100 years. I can't say it won't happen in SK.”

(Q) Are there conservatives in SK?

(A) That is problem. They chant pro-America, but, in their heart, have strong antipathy against US who dominates their destiny. In critical situation, their anti-America sentiment will explode. In May 2019, Goldon Chan published “Losing South Korea” where nationalism of SK results in withdrawal of the US-SK alliance. Ordinary American still believes, “SK is our side.” But, experts begin to face ex- subject state of China, deep anti-America sentiment and increasing nationalism which will change public opinion in US.

(Q) Is change in a view point of experts reflected in diplomacy of US?

(A) Of course. President Trump said, “SK probably doesn’t like us too much.” Deep anti-America sentiment of Korean is recognized by political leaders in US. Asian experts and security experts checked withdrawal trend of Trump administration, but, now, Asian experts begin to say, “The US-SK alliance is not maintained.” Resignation of John Robert Bolton will result in restart of dialogue between US and NK.

(Q) How Korean think mind change of US?

(A) Conservatives pointed out risk of national security caused by light wing, but, can not say to join FOIP. They scare China. Light wing must be very happy. Because, US may withdraw the US-SK alliance. On Sept/09/2019, Special Assistant to SK President, Moon Chung-in called demonstration by citizen in front of US embassy to change the US-SK relation. See “Special Advisor Moon Chung-in said,”The biggest obstacle for NK-SK relations is the UN Command”” [in SK language] Chosun Online, September 10, 2019 http://www.chosunonline.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/09/10/2019091080020.html

(Q) How can Special Assistant to the SK President call anti-American demonstration?

(A) Currently US is fed up with SK. Special Assistant is going to shake the US-SK relation in this opportunity. If citizen surrounds the US embassy, anti-Korea sentiment will definitely increase in USA. Conservatives severely criticize Cho Kuk's nomination as SK's next justice minister and try the overthrow of a government. Full collision between Left wing and Conservatives started in SK. Collapse of the US-SK alliance will be brought forward. ENDS

Excellent The Diplomat Article on South Korea, Japan, US, GSOMIA.

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DongJoon Park at The Diplomat (paysite) has written an excellent article which corroborates 

much of Anonymous’ advice here, hereand here. DongJoon Park’s article, of September 19, 2019, at https://thediplomat.com/2019/09/the-us-japan-and-south-korea-should-shelve-gsomia-for-now/is titled:

The US, Japan and South Korea Should Shelve GSOMIA (For Now)”. Parts include:

“Insisting that Seoul rejoin [the
General Security of Military Information Agreement] GSOMIA may make South Korea more skeptical about Washington’s ability to arbitrate impartially.

...In Washington, experts are alarmed at Seoul’s decision to discontinue GSOMIA, arguing that it plays right into the hands of North Korea and China by weakening trilateral security cooperation between the United States and its two most important allies in East Asia. 
Many have pointed to historical animosity between [Seoul and Tokyo's] contrasting views over the “final and irreversible” nature of the 2015 agreement, and lack of mediation by the United States as key reasons behind this rapid downturn in bilateral relations. Even the threat posed by Pyongyang evidenced by its frequent missile tests in recent months appears to have done little to curb rising tensions.  
...Jennifer Lind has noted how the “crisis fits a predictable pattern” in which a progressive [Seoul] government tends to be “more dovish toward North Korea and more prickly toward Japan and the United States.”
...Seoul has also used its quarrel with Tokyo to signal its independence from Washington. High-ranking South Korean officials have openly retorted that Seoul would not seek mediation because they would then get slapped with a hefty bill in return.
...Though it may resemble similar instances from the past, what is unique about this present moment is U.S. President Donald Trump’s apparent eagerness to pursue negotiations with North Korea...Recent reports suggest that the United States and North Korea may meet again as early as late September
However unrealistic a breakthrough may seem to be, the fact that there is an ongoing dialogue of sorts between the United States and North Korea gives Seoul further leeway to maintain its current conciliatory stance vis-à-vis Pyongyang. 
Moreover, this unique set of circumstances has exposed the stark differences that lie in how Seoul and Tokyo perceive North Korea as a threat to their national security. North Korea’s missile and nuclear weapons programs often overshadow the fact that most South Koreans still believe unification between the two Koreas to be both desirable and feasible. And in this regard, Pyongyang will never be an adversary for Seoul in the same way it is for Japan. 
...Historically, calls for a stronger partnership between Seoul and Japan, and by extension trilateral cooperation including the United States, have been predicated on the notion that it is necessary to deter North Korean aggression, and for good reason.
 ...Much like it did a few years ago, the United States can and should play a positive role in facilitating reconciliation between its two allies through such processes. But to do so, it must not overly stress the importance of a vigorous trilateral relationship when it rests on such shaky ground. Insisting that Seoul rejoin GSOMIA, for example, will only exacerbate the situation by making South Korea more skeptical about Washington’s ability to arbitrate impartially...”
 DongJoon Park is a Ph.D. candidate at the Department of Government at Georgetown University.”
-----------------------------------------
Read the whole excellent THE DIPLOMAT (paysite) article, by DongJoon Park, HERE.

Details Emerging on the German-Norwegian Type 212CD Submarine

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Following Submarine Matters' German vs Swedish Advanced AIP for Submarine Sales to Poland, the Netherlands and India of September 16, 2019, Anonymous has kindly provided the following comments on the Type 212CD under development for the German and Norwegian navies.

Information on the Type 212CD (Common Design) is limited. The 212CD:

i) is a Norwegian-German TKMS joint development with Norway purchasing 4 and Germany 2. Deliveries are expected in 2016 [1]. The 212CD are based on the Types 212A and 214

ii) will have a displacement of 2,400 tons [source? displacement not in 4 . This is similar in size to the Netherland’s Walrus-class (see Table in [4][Pete comment - source or calculation? because [4] or its table do not point to 212CD's beam or displacement. I don't believe the Germans would make a 2,400 ton submarine for use in the Baltic), displacement of 2,400-3,000 tons, [or less see right sidebar] and hull is made out of non-magnetic steel [1][3],

iii) will have extended range, speed and endurance(6 to 8 weeks) [2] [3, 4]. Hence it will use two MTU 12V 4000s because just one diesel (used in the 212A) is not suitable or safe for long range operation. To accommodate the two MTU diesels the beam/diameter has been enlarged to 8m. This is an increase from the 212A 6m beam useed for just one MTU 396 diesel

iv) use of SAFT made lithium iron phosphate batteries (LFP) is likely [source?]. This is more stable [than other LIBs and/or more stable than LABs?] at the low Baltic and North Sea, North Atlantic and Arctic Ocean temperatures the 212CD will operate in.

v) The latest Permasyn magnetic propulsion motor will be used.

vi) As with the 212A and 214 for safety the AIP oxygen tanks and hydrogen cylinders are outside the pressure hull and inside the light outer hull. The 212CD will use fourth generation fuel cell (FC4G) AIP

vii) Italy, the Netherlands [1] and Poland could buy into the 212CD program (does it satisfy their requirements?) [5]. But, published data on 212A and 214 may provide some important information on 212CD [6].

[1]“The Royal Netherlands Navy’s Submarine Replacement Programme”, European Security and Defense, May/09/2019, https://euro-sd.com/2019/05/articles/13140/the-royal-netherlands-navys-submarine-replacement-programme/ 

The Type 212CD followed the [curtailed Type 212NG (Next Generation) program], a design by tkMS for the German Navy. In turn, the NG was derived from the Type 212A and the Type 214. When Norway joined the programme, the requirements were merged into a new design: Type 212 Common Design. Not much has been disclosed about these submarines, except that their displacement is 2400 tons and their hulls are made of amagnetic steel.”

[2]“German-Norwegian Type 212 CD submarine contract to be signed early 2020”, NAVAL TODAY. COM, Jun/014/2019, https://navaltoday.com/2019/06/14/german-norwegian-type-212-cd-submarine-contract-to-be-signed-early-2020/ 
The new Type 212 CD submarines will share the low signatures of the Type 212 boats in service with the navies of Germany and Italy but will have extended range, speed and endurance to allow worldwide operations, according to TKMS.”

[3]“U 212 CD, the next Norwegian submarine, but what for? (1/2)” , DefenceChronicles, https://www.defencechronicles.eu/u-212-cd-the-next-norwegian-submarine-but-what-for/ 
Of course, in terms of the RNN submarines’ capabilities, the Norwegian Sea surveillance mission is very demanding since they must keep submerged almost permanently in sectors of the North Norwegian Sea or along some fjords. This requires endurance at sea (6 to 8 weeks), keeping watch in a patrol area between two long dived snorkeling transits on the way out of the home base and on the way back.”

[4]“U 212 CD, the next Norwegian submarine, but what for? (2/2)” https://www.defencechronicles.eu/u-212-cd-the-next-norwegian-submarine-but-what-for-22/   
By selecting the U 212 German class, the Norwegian MOD made certainly the best choice of a coast guard submarine, while objectively giving up the ambition to extend its Navy control to the open Norwegian Sea and play a combined role with other friendly ocean going submariners, in the hunt for the new “Red Octobers”. Also see Table.

The design of the new boats has yet to be locked down, which may reflect a last glimmer of hope in Berlin and Oslo that other countries in the market for submarines — namely Italy, the Netherlands or Poland - could join the effort.”

[6][source?]The “TYPE 212A is a small and stealthy submarine design. Both oxygen tanks and hydrogen cylinders are stowed outside of the pressure hull on [safety grounds]. In line with the stealth, extensive use of non-magnetic steel, supplemented by light weighted [graphite fiber reinforced plastic] GFRP for hull outer coverings and the fin.” “TYPE 214 is described as an evolution of 209 with the addition of a number of innovations found in 209.”




Pete Comment: I estimate "2,400 tons" displacement for the 212CD to be too high for the shallow Baltic. Perhaps 2,200 tonnes submerged may be more accurate - more similar to TKMS latest launched 2 or 3 diesel Singaporean Invincible (was 218) class. The Invincible/218 for the shallow Malacca and Singapore Straits is estimated at 2,000 tonnes (surfaced), 2,200 tonnes (submerged). The 212CD is likely to have X-plane rudders (below) like the 212A and Invincible class. The the photos of Invincible/218 model above and below may be most like the future Type 212CD.


Anonymous (with some editing by Pete)

Larger diesel sections better for long range submarines. A Dutch Type 212CD?

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Following the article of September 23, 2019 Anonymous has kindly provided, in late September 2019, further comments and links here and here. This is on submarine (diesel section) hull diameter matters. Pete has done some editing to put the comments into standard English and added some extra comments in [...] brackets.

The article below is most useful in calculating the probable diameters of the “double hull” (ie. pressure and light outer hulls) of the future Norwegian and German TKMS designed and built Type 212CD (Common Design) and possibly a larger Type 212CD design for the Netherlands.

The German and Norwegian Type 212CD will be designed for short to mid range missions. [But the Netherlands might in future purchase an enlarged (eg. wider diameter (aka beam)) long range (for Caribbean and Middle East missions) version of the Type 212CD. This is noting that the diameter of a double hull around the diesel section, discussed here, may be less than the largest diameter (published beam) measure. The largest diameter published as “Beam: 8.4m” for the Walrus class may be around the crew quarters and/or control room of a submarine, with a small diameter/beam around the diesel section.]

On long range (oceanic) submarine missions diesels must be capable of a relatively complex level of maintenance at sea. [The maintenance crew need space to use large tools and to slide bulky spare parts into the diesels.] This requires sufficient space in the diesel section. The space inside the double hull of the Netherlands’ Walrus submarines is extremely tight for the Walrus’ 3 diesels [1]. Therefore, this space must be improved/enlarged for the Netherlands’ “Walrus Replacement” future submarine.

Case 1: for the fuel cell air independent propulsion (FC AIP) system oxygen tanks and (hydrogen storing) metal hydride cylinders are placed, for safety, outside of pressure hulls (Type 212A style). The outer diameter of the diesel section should be at least 1m wider than the pressure hull [2-4]. This means the [diesel section] diameter of a 212CD is 7.8m ( = 6.8m + 1m). In this case, the maintainability of diesel will not be as good as case 2 (but still better than the Walrus current diesel section beam?). Still having hydrogen and pure oxygen outside the pressure hull is safer.


Case 2: oxygen tanks inside the pressure hull and metal hydride cylinders outside the pressure hull [but still within the light outer hull] (Type 214 style). For better maintainability, the space between each of the 3 diesels should be 400mm-500mm wider (ie. diesel section diameter of 7.5m-7.8m = 6.3m + 400-500mm x 3 [5] [6] ). [This is greater than that of a [2 diesel, maximum 6.3m beam] Type 214 submarine.

Considering Cases 1 and 2, a diesel section diameter of approximately 8m is reasonable (= around 15% wider). Increase of 15% in beam means an increase of 30% in displacement (2,000t for Type 214 becomes 2,600t for a wider beam) [for a Netherland’s Walrus Replacement/future submarine 212CD]. 

[Note this is not suggesting the smaller/standard Type 212CD for Norway and Germany will be 2,600 tons – more likely their 212CDs will be approximately 2,000 tons maximum/submerged].



[1] from https://naviesworldwide.com/navy-news/do-conventional-submarines-need-diesel-engines/ (above) Diesel engines in the Netherland's Walrus class submarine take up a lot of space, require staff and maintenance. [The engine maintainer in the photo looks exposed to the danger of hot engines.] (Photo courtesy Jaime Karremann / Marineschepen.nl)


[2] above is a cutaway diagram from http://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2019/02/tkms-type-212cd-submarine-propulsion.html The complexity of hull diameters along the single diesel 212A above is evident. The maximum diameter of the light outer hull (the "Beam") is known to be 6.8m and the diameter of the pressure hull may be approximately 5.5m. If a 212CD had 2 diesels its pressure and outer hull measures would need to be approximately 1m greater.

[3]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_214_submarine
Beam of Type 214 submarine is 6.3m (General characteristics).




[4] from https://ameblo.jp/calorstars/entry-12157790493.html (above) the lower 2 pictures show the installation of the 2 side-by-side diesels into a South Korean Son Won-II (Type 214 variant). These pictures show the tightness of the diesel section [which may be adequate if South Korea's Son Won-II 's are only used for short missions, close to South Korea's naval bases.]

[5] (see an Oyashio engine room below) For Japan's medium range mission 
Oyashio and Soryu class submarines there is more space (perhaps >400mm) between the 2 diesels than in the South Korean Son Won-II/Type 214 engine room in [4]. This permits a higher level of maintenance at sea in the Japanese submarines.


[6] http://japanese.china.org.cn/politics/txt/2012-09/16/content_26536166_12.htm (above) Inside the diesel section of a Japanese Oyashio class submarine. The double hull structure consists of an outer light hull (diameter 9.1m) and inner pressure hull (approximately 7.2m?) for the diesel section. A KAWASAKI diesel is on each side of the metal walkway. 12 square-shaped dark metal cylinder head covers can be seen. 

For Japan's newer generation Soryu submarines 2 x KAWASAKI 12V/25/25 diesels are installed, with a bore of  250mm. The width of the passage is approximately 1.2 m which is considerably bigger than those of a Type 212A [2] or the Walrus sub's crowded and dangerous (?) engine room [1]

A larger space for the diesel section facilitates maintenance of diesels during the long mission (such as 10 weeks) of an oceanic submarine [like Australia's Collins class. With the Collins having 3 diesels but only within a beam of 7.8m is the Collins' engine room crowded?]

Mainly Anonymous (and Pete)

Indian Nuclear Submarines Update

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Since 2009Submarine Matters has regularly provided updates on India's nuclear submarines. This goes back to the old name of this website “Australia By The Indian Ocean” (which Pete wrote around 2007 – 2011) and then increasing interest in submarines. In more recent years GhalibKabir(GK) has provided comments and links on these matters.

INDIAN SSBNs

The sequence of Indian SSBNs goes by S numbers:

S-1 (or S1) was an onshore test nuclear reactor reliant on extensive and expensive Russian assistance.

S-2 is INS Arihant, launched 2009, around 6,000 tonnes, a prototype SSBN constructed to test: 
-  stealth/quieting architecture, 
-  nuclear propulsion of the slow start-stop 83MW reactor, 
-  inadequate K-15 or "K15" missiles (with a safe firing point-range only adequate to hit coastal
   Pakistani cities, like Karachi) and K4 (3,500km range capable of hitting all Pakistan, central and
   southern-most China (eg. China’s Yulin/Hainan SSBN/SSN base, Guangzhou and Hong Kong)
-  central computer processing
-  combat system including sensors also to operate the 6 torpedo tubes
-  command and control, and crew procedures including damage control

S-3INS Arighat (with expected name "Aridhaman" cancelled) incorporates upgrades and refinements which would likely include improved stealth/quieting, improved quality of missile cold launch capabilities while the sub is still moving (Pete thinks the numbers of silos remain at 4 rather than less likely 8(?)) and other SSBN aspects. GK commented September 25“The older [2011] videos of the Layner SLBM launch by Russia are clear proof imho that the K-4 Cold launch technique was taught by Russia to India.” GK commentedSeptember 25 “The S-3 should trial [in 2020] hopefully as it is just a replica [hence 4 silos?] of Arihant (S-3 Arighat launched 11/2017)

S-4 and S-4* S-4 [not launched in 2018]  GK commented September 25. 2019  "I really don't know if they will be constructedSome say, the S4 keel has been already laid and it is under construction. I am not so sure. I think the 6,000 ton Arihant and Arighat will serve as good training platforms" [Pete comments – My November 2018 report may be wrong. At just 7,000 tonnes (1,000 tonnes heavier than Arihant and Arighat) once thought future S4 or S4*’s hull diameter could not accommodate the tallness of a K-5 or K-6 missile – so S4 and S5 would only amount to high priced make-work projects for a SSBN continuous build program]

S-5 [at Wiki and at Submarine MattersGK commented September 25, 2019 "S-5 should trial by late 2020s. [The S5 weighing 13,500 tonnes will have] K-5 or K-6 MIRV SLBMs [to] takes over as the sea leg of India's Nuclear Triad.
[Pete comment – a K-5 SLBM with a range of 5,000km would be inadequate from a Bay of Bengal launch point to hit all of China (especially Beijing). So India’s S-5 SSBN will need to be large enough/have a sufficient diameter to fit or retrofit a taller K-6 missile with a range of 8,000km. Also increased range to 8,000km would provide for a safer Indian SSBN launch point south of the rather closed Bay of Bengal (a bay where Chinese SSNs and SSKs may lie in wait for Indian SSBNs). China, with its improved relations with Bangladesh, Thailand and maybe Myanmar, may also more readily be able to string fixed undersea sensors that could focus on Indian SSBNs in the Bay of Bengal). Similarly Chinese undersea sensors strung across the Indian Ocean to the Seychelles and/or Mauritius may improve China’s ability to track nuclear submarines.]

INDIAN SSNs

CIMSEC commented"in February 2015, the Modi government accorded political approval for six SSNs." [Pete Comment - The main function of SSNs are to carry out patrols to protect SSBNs. For India this would be especially when its SSBNs are leaving the main Indian east coast naval base of Vishakhapatnam to go on deterrent patrol and re-entering Vishakhapatnam.].

GK commentedSeptember 25, 2019  [Russia turned down India’s offer to lease a Yasen SSN or provide related late model SSN Yasen level help]. [Russia instead offered “Chakra-3” an Akula lease and India accepted.] "Considering the perennial French struggle with LEU [submarine] reactors and their perceived drawbacks, I think India will try to or is already possibly duplicating the [Russian] HEU 190MWt OK-650B Akula reactor for [India’s] own SSN."

[CIMSEC commented "in February 2015 "Consequently, for [India's next SSBN may be called Arindhaman], there is a clear need to upgrade the reactor. The Arihant has an 85-MWt reactor (≈17 MWe, since in a naval reactor, roughly 5 MWt = 1 MWe). The one for the larger and heavier Arindham[an] will need to be somewhere between 160-190 MWt (32-38 MWe) and this is an upgrade that is ongoing."]

GK commented September 25, 2019 "As far as [GK is] concerned, the bigger focus should be on the SSN combat suite and sonar capability, where I think India should put its experience with TKMS and DCNS [now Naval Group] to good use. Especially the low frequency cylindrical array passive sonar etc. which are useful in hunting enemy SSNs. But a fully Indian SSN is unlikely before 2035 as things stand.”

GK commented September 25, 2019 I don't think the French gave any [SLBM] missile or reactor related help. [The French] consultancy I assume (ongoing) is for non-reactor/[Exocet?] missile design aspects of subs (probably SSNs under the garb of the Scorpene project). This is conjecture at best and very likely the French 'help' way more limited than the Russians.” [Pete Comment: France's Naval Group (was DCNS) may possibly have passed on some non-nuclear details useful for SSNs as part of India's current Kalvari class Scorpene Project and maybe in the future Project 75I (for India) bid.]

GhalibKabir (GK), Pete and CIMSEC  

China's Airborne Laser to Detect Submarines is Old News

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A headline from a Chinese newspaper"Chinese scientists develop airborne laser device that could track submarines deep underwater" October 3, 2019 is old hat among Western scientists.

In January 16, 2014 Submarine Matters reported "LIDAR an anti-submarine warfare sensor."see https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2014/01/lidar-anti-submarine-warfare-sensor.html

For the West's “LIDAR” (LIght Detection And Ranging) read China's "LASER" (Light Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation).

The Submarine Mattersarticle contains a diagram illustrating LIDAR/lasers and an abstract of John Olav Birkeland's 2009 University of Glasgow MPhil(R) thesis "The potential of LIDAR as an antisubmarine warfare sensor." Birkeland wrote his thesis 10 years before China's 2019"development".

The Abstracct for Birkeland's thesis begins:


Traditionally, antisubmarine warfare (ASW) has been dominated by acoustic sensors, active and passive. Ending the Cold War, the ASW forces have refocused towards a theatre of war in the littorals, and the traditional acoustic sensors do not perform very well in such an environment. The sensors are working much closer to the surface, and there is a lot more surface traffic to disturb the acoustic environment. Environmental and topographic factors also play a major role. Removing or significantly reducing the acoustic capability, one forces the ASW forces to look to other technologies and sensors to compliment or replace the acoustic ones. This is where the interest of LIDAR as an aerial ASW sensor comes into play.
The aim of this thesis is to evaluate“the potential for using LIDAR technology for aerial ASW on Norwegian ASW platforms”. In addition to this main research question, the history of LIDAR has been researched, in order to find historical and existing LIDAR projects for ASW purposes.”
So. What is apparently new for China in 2019 was already a published area of research for Western scientists 10 years earlier, in 2009.

Pete

Interesting Japanese Viewpoint on North Korean SLBM Launch

SAAB-DAMEN Ahead in Netherlands’ Walrus Replacement Program: But Wait!

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In early October 2019 Anonymous kindly supplied further useful comments and links on the Netherlands’ Walrus Replacement Program (competition). Submarine Matters interest in Dutch submarine affairs goes all the way back to 2015 when "Kevin" provided useful insights.

Anonymous continues - Spain’s Navantia (marketing the S-80 Plus submarine) has been definitely excluded from the Walrus Replacement Program, because Navantia continuously committed serious and foolish design errors [1, 2].

COMPARISON

In the Walrus Replacement Program the following submarines might be compared:

a large TKMS Type 212CD with such technologies as Fuel Cell AIP = FC-AIP of the Type 212A
   in 
a broader beam Type 216-like submarine
and

-  a large SAAB-DAMEN modified A26, with such technologies as a Stirling engine AIP, in a wider
   Collins-like hull of broader beam [3].

A large Type 212CD can be compared with a large SAAB-DAMEN A26 against criteria (1) - (10) below:

(1) Efficiency: 212CD’s AIP greater than SAAB-DAMEN A26’s
FC (which is an electrochemical system) is superior to the Stirling engine (a heat engine) in efficiency .

(2) Diving depth of AIP: Type 212CD greater than SAAB-DAMEN A26
Metal hydride FC (non-CO2 reforming type) generates water and is not affected by diving depth. The efficiency of the Stirling engine is reduced with an increase in diving depth because of increased exhaust back pressure (max. operation depth = ca.200m). Actual operation of the Stirling seems to be considerably shallower than 200m.

(3) Safety: the SAAB-DAMEN A26 is safer than the Type 212CD
The Stirling engine has greater safety than metal hydride FC [which releases flammable-explosive pure hydrogen].

(4) Availability of Fuel (Hydrogen and diesel): SAAB-DAMEN A26 superior to Type 212CD
This might be a Netherlands’ specific requirement [4, 5]. As the mission of a Walrus-class submarine is sometimes quite long (max. 3 month), reloading of fuel is required in remote areas [eg. the Dutch Caribbean, and Middle East. For Metal hydride FC, availability of hydrogen in remote areas seems to be difficult [6]. In comparison availability of diesel for a Stirling engine is no problem.

(5) Reliability of hull: SAAB-DAMEN A26 superior to Type 212CD
A base model of a Type 216 (which would strongly influence a large Type 212CD if required by the Netherlands) does not exist. Meanwhile a large SAAB-DAMEN A26 would presumably be based on the Collins-class which does exist and with proven hull and performance.

(6) Output of diesel: SAAB-DAMEN A26 superior to Type 212CD
The Type 212CD and a large SAAB-DAMEN A26 would be equiped with two and three MTU diesels respectively. The three MTUs-system of SAAB-DAMEN complements lower performance of Stirling engine.

(7) Job creation and technological contribution in Netherlands: SAAB-DAMEN A26 superior to Type 212CD

(8) Business situation of builder: SAAB-DAMEN A26 superior to Type 212CD
There is a rumor that of the parent company (Thyssen Krupp) will eventually sell TKMS.

(9) Product quality of builder: SAAB-DAMEN A26 superior to Type 212CD
TKMS was heavily criticized on bad quality – see [7, 8 below].

(10) Appropriateness for mission in hot and remoted area: SAAB-DAMEN A26 superior to Type 212CD
The inappropriateness of the TKMS 212A in hot and remote sea areas has been reported in the Netherlands [9 below]. These issues should be resolved in the tender of WRES. In the case of SAAB-DAME, experience of Collins-class in hot and remoted area is expected to be used.

ANONYMOUS CONCLUDES

On the basis of criteria (1) - (10) a large SAAB-DAMEN modified A26 appears to be superior to a large Type 212CD for the Walrus Replacement Program (competition).

REFERENCES

[1]“£2 billion Spanish navy submarine will sink to bottom of sea”, Fiona Govan, May/22/2013, The Telegraph, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/spain/10073951/2-billion-Spanish-navy-submarine-will-sink-to-bottom-of-sea.html
“A new submarine commissioned by the Spanish navy at a cost of 2.2 billion euros (£1.9billion) has been discovered to contain a serious design flaw – it is too heavy and will sink like a stone.”

[2]“Spain's new submarine 'too big for its dock'”, BBC, July/18/2018 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44871788
“The S-80 boat was redesigned at great expense after an earlier mistake meant it had problems floating, and it was lengthened to correct the issue.”

[3] The beams of the Type 212A (6.8m), Type 214 (6.3m) and A26 (6.4m) are considerably smaller than that of the Walrus-class (8.4m). The extension of beam means new design of hull, and it is very expensive and time-consuming work. The most effective extension method is diversion of existing hull design with bigger beam such as Type 216 (8.1m) and Collins (7.8m) and application of existing information and data such as strength calculation and hydrodynamics. The beam of the Type 216 and Collins is smaller than Walrus-class, capacity of the former two is bigger than that of the later where tear-drop shape and double hull structure are applied.

If displacement of the Walrus Replacement-new Netherlands submarine is ca. 3,000 tons, the length of the required larger Type 212CD and SAAB-DAME A26 will be ca. 65m, where ratio of length/beam is ca.8 closed to its ideal value of 7.

The availability and cost of fuel must be considered for the long-range, long-term submarine missions to the Dutch Caribbean Sea - which contains the overseas territories of Aruba, Curaçao, and Sint/Saint Maarten.

[5]“Marineschepen.nl” (Walrus class submarines : Operational deployment), Jaime KarremannFeb/16/2019marineschepen.nl,https://marineschepen.nl/schepen/walrus.html 
[Long range] Deployment of Walrus-class submarines: the Persian Gulf, the waters around the Arabian Peninsula and the Indian Ocean, the Caribbean (max. 3months), the coast of East Africa, etc.

As maximum mission period of Japan's Soryu-class submarines is 70 days depending on food stock (the Collins-class is also the same), reloading of food and fuel and rest of crews are needed for a 3 month mission of a Netherlands’ submarine.

[6] Die Brennstoffzelle auf U 212 A, page22/24, 23/24, Sept/23/2008
In Europe, Gaseous or liquid hydrogen is carried by tank truck and is stored in cryogenic tanks in Europe. But, in remote areas, affordability of (gaseous or liquid) hydrogen is difficult. Liquid oxygen (oxidizer) is needed for both FC and Stirling engine, but, its affordability is not so great or difficult.

[7]Das Boot”, Jan/15/2015, SPIEGEL ONLINEhttps://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-131355085.html
“The new, expensive high-tech submarines (212A class) should be the pride of the [German] Navy. But internal documents prove how breakdowns and deficiencies delay their use by years.”
Here, a range of problems regarding the Type 212A have been reported. “The engineer is annoyed above all that the manufacturer of the submarines, ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems in Kiel, apparently has learned nothing from the mistakes of the past.”

[8]“MKS 180 program : the master stroke of German Naval Yards”, Defence Chronicles, Aug/16/2018, https://www.defencechronicles.eu/mks180-program-the-master-stroke-of-german-naval-yards/
“Technical failures and bad management have inflated the costs and imposed significant delays to both programs, leading the German procurement authorities to oust them from the MKS 180 race.”

[9]“Marineschepen.nl” (Somali waters too warm and too far for German submarines), Jaime Karremann, Mar/14/2016, marineschepen.nl, see https://marineschepen.nl/nieuws/Duitse-onderzeeboot-niet-naar-Somalie-140316.html
“Last year, the German navy announced that a German submarine would go to Somalia to collect intelligence about pirates. After months of research, Germany has canceled the mission: the water around the Horn of Africa is too hot and the distance is too long for German submarines.

Pete Comment - A third alternative, Naval Group, appears to be becoming a more serious contender in the Walrus Replacement Program (competition) - see further details later this week.

Anonymous (with some editing by Pete)

Dutch Navy Document Clarifies Dutch Future Submarine Competition

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Anonymous has identified an excellent Dutch article that, to an extent, clarifies the issues of the Walrus Replacement Program (ie. Dutch future submarine competition). The article is centered on a Dutch Navy document.

The article is by Olof van Joolen and Niels Rigter in the Dutch language De Telegraaf,
October 2, 2019 titled “Angling fishing for submarines” at

(Pete has translated it into English, bolding some parts and adding the links)

"THE HAGUE - The four new submarines for the Navy must be of Dutch origin as much as possible. The large trade unions and the employers' organization VNO-NCW advocate this at the [Dutch] House of Representatives and the Cabinet.

They are doing this just before the matter is raised at the central political structures at The Hague [The Hague is the seat of the Dutch Cabinet, the States General, the Supreme Court, and the Council of State.]. From an internal comparison that De Telegraaf was given insight into, the Dutch / Swedish combination Damen / Saab seems to have the “best papers” for the multi-billion euro selection but the French Naval Group is chasing the consortium.

The unions, including FNV, CNV and De Unie, have already put agreements with Damen on paper that the shipbuilder use Dutch personnel, Dutch knowledge and development and production sites on Dutch soil as much as possible. The unions have also made agreements with the yard about internships, flexible staff and the remuneration of freelancers. “The parties will sign the agreements next week.”

This means that those involved anticipate things.With the Swedish Saab, Damen is only one of the four candidates to develop and build the replacement for the Walrus submarines now in use by the Navy.

Rough

However, the purchase of the four new submarines is not going smoothly. Ministries involved all want something different. Moreover, there are concerns about the risks of the multibillion euro project.

Pros and cons. An internal candidate comparison document written by the Dutch Navy shows which of four yards (in the race to build the future submarines) has the best characteristics. Saab / Damen scores best for Dutch industry and for maintaining strategic knowledge. The Swedish-Dutch consortium can also show sufficient projects (frigates and submarines) to inspire confidence in the piece that De Telegraaf was given access to. A 'risk management plan' is essential. Not unimportant for a project that costs at least 3.5 billion euros.

Injection

The [Dutch Navy's] candidate comparison shows that the role of the Spanish submarine builder Navantia “has been played out.” [eliminated?] The German TKMS is second to last in the ranking. The French Naval Group is chasing Saab / Damen. If the [Dutch] navy were in charge, the choice had already been made. The Netherlands would have Saab design the new submarines, have them built at Damen, with a pendulum of Dutch companies on board. After all, a good injection for Dutch industry and the Netherlands as a knowledge country. Moreover, Dutch defense would remain hooked on the very latest military technology and get exactly the boat it wants.

But the Navy is not in control. And the Ministry of Defense cannot decide independently. The Department of Economic Affairs and Climate is also on board and seems sensitive to the Dutch industrial map that Saab / Damen have drawn. But Finance, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs and General Affairs are also involved. They want something different. An "initiate" [insider]  summarizes it as follows:

"Broadly speaking, the

Defense organization wants a state-of-the-art submarine quickly,

Department of Economic Affairs and Climate wants a boost for the Dutch defense industry,

Finance wants as cheap as possible,

Home Affairs (with D66 minister Ollongren at the helm) wants TKMS, because it is European, and

Department of Foreign Affairs wants to maintain a good relationship with the French. ”

Prime Minister Rutte would also be sensitive to this.

The decision about which party or parties will continue to the next round therefore becomes more a political than a technical decision. It should have been decided last year. It is now expected in the coming weeks.

The postponement is due to a change in direction of this government, in which the importance of Dutch industry became more prominent, followed by a strongly intensified lobby by two participating parties.The German TKMS promising to place the construction of the Dutch submarines with the naval company in Den Helder and the French teaming up with the Dutch dredger IHC builder.

Risk

Since the 1990s, Damen has built all large ships for the Navy, but not yet a submarine. This is a  risk. Moreover, making boats that are completely tailored to the wishes of the Navy is much more expensive. The fact that the defense budget is not rising as fast as expected means that a new submarine built on Dutch soil is far from certain.” ENDS

Pete Comment

So the competition continues to be undecided. The decision timeline is still vague. Being “more a political than a technical decision” (a reality suffered by submarine selectors in many countries) adds to uncertainty. 

If risk is a worry then an enlarged version of a submarine that does not yet exist (eg. the A26, S-80 Plus and Type 212CD) is risky. The Dutch may see a large version of Naval Group's Scorpene as less risky than a small version of the not yet developed conventional Shortfin Barracuda.

Other major issues include do the Dutch require Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) and/or Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) or neither?

Next week Pete will describe Naval Group's progress in developing second generation AIP.

Anonymous and Pete
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