OYASHIO - SORYU TABLE (latest as at January 17, 2016)
SS No. | Building No. | Pennant No. | MoF approved amount ¥ Billions) & FY* | LAB, LIB, AIP ** | Laid Down | Laun -ched | Commi-ssioned | Built By |
5SS | 8105 | SS-590/ TS3608 | ¥52.2B FY1993 | LAB only | Jan 1994 | Oct 1996 | March 1998 | KHI |
6SS- 15SS 10 subs | 8106 -8115 | SS-591 -600 | ¥52.2B Per sub FY1994 -FY2004 | LAB only | Feb 1994 | March 2008 | MHI & KHI | |
16SS SoryuMark 1 | 8116 | SS-501 | ¥60B FY2004 | LAB + AIP | March 2005 | Dec 2007 | March 2009 | MHI |
17SS | 8117 | SS-502 | ¥58.7B | LAB + AIP | March 2006 | Oct 2008 | March 2010 | KHI |
18SS | 8118 | SS-503 | ¥56.2 | LAB + AIP | Feb 2007 | Oct 2009 | March 2011 | MHI |
19SS | 8119 | SS-504 | ¥53B | LAB + AIP | March 2008 | Nov 2010 | March 2012 | KHI |
20SS | 8120 | SS-505 | ¥51B | LAB + AIP | March 2009 | Oct 2011 | March 2013 | MHI |
21SS | 8121 | SS-506 | ? | LAB + AIP | January 2011 | Oct 2013 | March 2015 | KHI |
22SS | 8122 | SS-507 | ¥52.8B | LAB + AIP | Feb 2012 | Oct 2014 | March 2016? | MHI |
23SS | 8123 | SS-508 | ¥54.6B | LAB + AIP | March 2013 | Nov2 2015 | 2017? | KHI |
24SS | 8124 | SS-509 | ¥54.7B | LAB + AIP | 2014 | 2016? | 2018? | MHI |
25SS | 8125 | SS-510 | ¥53.1B | LAB + AIP | 2015 | 2017? | 2019? | KHI |
26SS | 8126 | SS-511 | ¥51.7B | LAB + AIP | 2016? | 2018? | 2020? | MHI |
27SS Soryu Mark 2 | 8127 | SS-512 | ¥64.3B | LIB only | 2017? | 2019? | 2021? | KHI |
28SS | 8128 | SS-513 | ¥63.6B | LIB only | 2018? | 2020? | 2022? | MHI |
29SS | 8129 | SS-514 | ? | LIB only | 2019? | 2021? | 2023? | KHI |
Aus1 *** | Super Soryu Australia | LIB only | 2023? | 2025? | 2027? | Kobe? | ||
Aus2 to 6? | Super Soryu Australia | LIB only | 2024? | 2026 | 2028 | in Aus? |
Table mainly courtesy of updates provided to Submarine Matters by Japanese sources. Note that it summarises the 11 submarines of the Oyashio Program (5SS - 15SS) then continues through the Soryu Program (16SS onwards)
* The Dragon names have been removed – while important in Japanese culture such names are not important to Australian or Americans. Instead the column is filled with Japanese Ministry of Finance (MoF) approved Budget Amounts in Yen (¥) Billions (B) (¥1 Billion = A$12 million on Jan 15, 2016). FY = First Year of Budgeting. These Yen and FY years were provided by S to Submarine Matters for the article of January 13, 2016.
** LAB = lead-acid batteries, AIP = air independent propulsion, LIB = lithium-ion batteries.
On January 16, 2016 in the Comment Thread S explained:
“The budgets for the Soryu are 20SS (¥51B), 22SS (¥52.8B), 23SS (¥54.6B), 24SS (¥54.7B), 25SS (¥53.1B) and 26SS (¥51.7B). [I found a gap in the Table, 21SS was missing, now fixed. S do you have the ¥B figure for 21SS?] The fluctuation of the cost is due to a combination of yearly small modifications and a continuous effort toward cost reduction as follows:
- the MoD investigates the flow of funds to private companies on payee, expenditure and contract for procurement of submarines, and confirms that there are no problems. The cost audit after fulfillment of submarine building has been conducted from FY2002.
- as a result of effort toward cost reduction including use of government supply, adoption of open tender and reduction of man-hours, the executed price has gradually decreased from FY2004 to FY 2007.
The man-hours of the second batch of MHI and KHI launched submarines (18SS and 19SS respectively) is about 10% lower than for the first batch (that being MHI 16SS and KHI 17SS) achieved by reduction of man-hours. This is achieved through learning, setting of standard man-hours for similar work and through time management.
- the MoD investigates the flow of funds to private companies on payee, expenditure and contract for procurement of submarines, and confirms that there are no problems. The cost audit after fulfillment of submarine building has been conducted from FY2002.
- as a result of effort toward cost reduction including use of government supply, adoption of open tender and reduction of man-hours, the executed price has gradually decreased from FY2004 to FY 2007.
The man-hours of the second batch of MHI and KHI launched submarines (18SS and 19SS respectively) is about 10% lower than for the first batch (that being MHI 16SS and KHI 17SS) achieved by reduction of man-hours. This is achieved through learning, setting of standard man-hours for similar work and through time management.
PETE COMMENT
The broad future decisions on the Australian choice (of Japan, TKMS or DCNS) are up to the National Security Committee of the Australian Cabinet with a decision likely late 2016. Much will then depend on a managerial-industrial mix of Australian companies and the "winner" (eg. Japan) building 2/3s of the subs and US companies (Raytheon and/or Lockheed Martin (as possible integrator) for 1/3 = Combat System and Weapons). Ideally Japanese expertise/experience will have main carriage of the 2/3s + 1/3s integration as a it would be messy if all three countries were constantly negotiating throughout the Program.
Undelining that the Submarine Program would not be just an Australian-Japan affair is that politically powerful Lockheed Martin has opened a Combat System Laboratory in Adelaide. A US citizen (Rear Adm (rtd) Stephen Johnson US Navy) has already been appointed General Manager, Australian Future Submarine Program - presumably he is well placed to manage and balance US, Japanese and Australian interests.
Regarding “Aus1 ***” in the Table the dates and places where the subs are built inevitably involves opinion. Aus1 is the first of class for Australia. It may make sense to have it built in Kobe, Japan to ease initial construction, testing and certification issues. From Aus2 the numbers only go up to Aus6 in the Table because only 6 subs might be built (based on the formula 6 + 2 (maybes) used for the Oberons and Collins). Building Aus2 to Aus6 in Kobe need only be a last resort if a re-run of the Collins or Air Warfare Destroyer (see 2010 onwards) problems are developing. Such a things-going-wrong situation obviously needs to be picked up early (eg. in 2023).
Whatever happens, if Japan is chosen, the materials for the submarines will mainly be produced in Japan (mainly by MHI and KHI?) and the Combat System in the US.
As with other Japanese ventures in Australia (eg. car factories) a large number of Japanese managerial and technical advisers should be in Australia.
The clear record of Japanese submarine building discipline should produce a positive industrial and political (Federal and State levels) experience, thus minimising anarchy.A useful and basically new background reference on the Future Submarine (Collins Replacement) Program is here.
Pete