Was the main failing of the Collins submarines in their Construction?

Despite the problems I [will highlight below] our submarines deliver a significant capability and that this is because of the whole package, not just the platform but all other components as well. This could not happen without a solid commitment and strong leadership by government and the most senior levels of defence to sustain the capability. 

Submarines are highly complicated machines and being a submariner has always required a skilled blend of operator/technician unique within naval service; but the Collins Class has taken the technical arguments to a whole new level. The planned maintenance requirements are onerous enough but the constant stream of defects and operation control limitations makes getting to sea difficult, staying at sea harder and fighting the enemy a luxury only available once the first two have been overcome. The submarines have maintained an operational capability for most of the past 15 years, but that is often despite many aspects of the submarine’s design rather than because of it.

“Lack of available stores inventory, increased equipment failure rates and submarines living with reduced capability is something I expect will persist for the remaining life of the [Collins] Class.

... The seagoing workforce currently consists of three submarine crews with a desire to stand up a fourth as soon as practicable, each crew consists of about 60 officers and sailors of various skill sets and experience levels. 

...  Skills shortages here also impact on submarine maintenance schedules, work quality, availability and ultimately capability.

 Some components of the submarine are either not able to be changed or to do so would carry a prohibitive mix of risk and cost. The Collins Class has many components that we are simply stuck with for the life of the platform. For example the diesel generators fit into this category because of their size; unfortunately they are quite possibly the least reliable diesel engines ever built. They have been problematic throughout the life of the class and, despite some design modifications and improvements, are only kept running by ingenuity and sheer determination of the crews at sea and supporting contractors alongside. Because of components and immutable design issues such as these, Collins has a finite service life.

numerous advances have occurred in batteries, electric motors, air-independent propulsion, sonars and electro-optics – all of which have revolutionised submarine design even further...most advances can’t be retrofitted and the boat will most likely be so technically obsolete by 2022 that the credibility of the capability it offers will be seriously eroded.

China continues to build submarines at a rate unmatched anywhere in the world whilst the quality and capability of the Chinese submarine fleet increases faster than the nation’s GDP.

I don’t believe that the Collins Class are sustainable in the long term and many of the expensive upgrade plans which have been proposed would be throwing good money after bad. Though sustaining what we currently have is essential until we can get a replacement class of submarine commissioned.

Lack of platform reliability is the single most limiting factor for the Collins Class, let’s never repeat that mistake.”

See the whole ASIA-PACIFIC DEFENCE REPORTER ARTICLEby James Harrap.

James Harrap (Photo courtesy Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter)

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1.  Could constructing the Collins better in Adelaide have made a difference?

Pete