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Australian future submarine components and combat systems

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Possibly the best available diagram of the Soryu? It has a very rough indications of the locations of such combat system components. See names of some components in red at the base of this article. 

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The following discussion is relevant to the important issues of the compatibility of submarine components and combat systems. Combat systems consist of a submarine's weapons, data management facilities (including work stations) and sensors (such as sonar). 


MHalblaub on November 29, 2014 said
"This is again the old discussion about what is compatible. The [floating communications bouys deployed by submarines] are just dumb radio transmitters. With an US radio on board there would be no difference which bouy would send the signals.

The problem for an US combat system on any submarine from DCNS, Saab-Kockums, TKMS or Mitsubishi/Kawasaki will be a huge price difference between inherent system and US system. Not to mention the delays for introduction into service due to modifications on both sides.

The SeaFox is in use by Royal Navy, Thai Navy and US Navy just to name a few.
http://www.marinelink.com/news/america-seafox-atlas347530.aspx [the latter link didn't seem to work but this did http://www.navaldrones.com/seafox.html ][on SeaFox Pete replies "Yes I agree PORTIONS of a combat system might be shared but a whole combat system is more built around weapons and sensor networks."]

The SeaFox is maybe to cheap for RAN and ASC."
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Pete replies November 30, 2014
"I agree with your points about the bouys.
However the combat system is a much more comprehensive item that must interface with weapons. Australia is highly unlikely to put the US weapons on the scrap heap and change to German or French. Japanese weapons are sometimes the same as [Harpoon missiles] or similar [the torpedos, maybe mines] to the Australian weapons. Australia also wishes to operate the US Tomahawk. See "Australia and the United States Navy are in a partnership for the cooperative development, production, and through-life support of a replacement Heavyweight Torpedo (HWT)." at: http://www.dsto.defence.gov.au/projects/heavyweight-torpedoes#sthash.UbEKNZ5J.dpuf

Australia has spent around 10 years working with the US Navy to develop the combat system used in the Collins with the longer term plan of migrating this system (including the weapons) to the Future Submarine. See http://www.dsto.defence.gov.au/projects/collins-class-submarine-replacement-combat-system

See this extended discussion on Australia future combat system issues http://www.asiapacificdefencereporter.com/articles/193/SEA-1000-COMBAT-SYSTEMS-SELECTION-FOR-SEA-1000 which supports and refutes some of our arguments.
  
The combat system is also designed to interface with US undersea sensor arrays, surface, air and satellite sensor networks. I don't know how intensive this interface is. I don't know how easily German, French or Japanese combat systems could be used instead. I also don't know whether the US would be willing to share US-Australian version of the AN/BYG-1 combat system with Germany, France or Japan. 

I also assume that the Japanese submarines interface with US sensor network.

As well as electronic efficiency interoperability with the US is an important consideration.

See in the article below's discussion of the combat systems frequently used by:

-  TKMS - the ATLAS ELEKTRONIK ISUS

-  DCNS - SUBTICS

-  used in the Collins - General Dynamics AN/BYG-1

 - while not mentioning othe overall term for the Japanese Soryu combat system is thought to be of mainly of Japanese design but incorporates (right-hand sidebar of http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S%C5%8Dry%C5%AB-class_submarine ):


Sensors and
processing systems:
ZPS-6F surface/low-level air searchradar
Hughes/Oki ZQQ-7 Sonar suite: 1× bow-array, 4× LF flank arrays and 1×Towed array sonar
Electronic warfare
& decoys:
ZLR-3-6 ESM equipment
2× 3-inch underwater countermeasure launcher tubes for launching of Acoustic Device Countermeasures (ADCs)
Armament:6×HU-606 21 in (533 mm) torpedo tubes with 30 reloads for:
1.) Type 89 torpedoes [similar to Collins Mark 48 torpedo]
2.) UGM-84 Harpoon
Mines [type unknown]

Pete

Swedish A26s and the Australian Future Submarine Selection

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Artist's conception of a Swedish A26 submarine operating in littoral waters while deploying special forces divers. Graphic courtesy of Saab site .
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Comments from "TKMS HDW 216 or Soryu Mark 2 for Australia's Futur...http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2014/11/tkms-hdw-216-or-soryu-mark-2-for.html :




 Michael R said...
Hi Pete,

How do you see the chances for the A26? Australia’s government confirmed that it has already received the unsolicited bid from Saab: “It includes a lower price than its competitors and a smooth flow of Japanese submarine [propulsion] technology from the Soryu Class boat, because Sweden is a partner in the Japanese project. There will also be substantial technology transfer and industrial offsets for Australia, including jobs in Adelaide during the build phase.”

See more here: http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/saab-story-swedens-new-submarines-024760/
Sweden wasn’t part of the Australian government’s initial submarine evaluations, because Kockums was still trapped and suppressed within TKMS. That has changed. Saab CEO Hakan Bushke says that they’re willing to design a 4,000t submarine for Australia, and take ASC and Royal Australian Navy engineers and technicians to work on its new A26 design
December 5, 2014 at 1:33 AM
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Blogger Pete said...
Hi Michael R

The A26 would probably have less of a chance than the TKMS-HDW 216. Both are design board subs. Saab has never overseen the build of a complete submarine.

Sweden overall has national knowledge (including FMV and Kockums-in-Saab) of submarine building but Sweden hasn't built submarines (the Gotlands) since 1996 or arguably Collins since 2001.

Price is very elastic - more an artform of itemisation than an accounting science.

Given the Soryu is less than 3,000 tons surfaced Australia is probably not wedded to 4,000 ton surfaced designs anymore.

Japan may be extricating itself from Swedish intellectual property issues by leaving Stirling engines out of the Soryu Mark 2s.

Technology transfer and training are strengths with the European contenders - something probably difficult for Japan.

Some offsets are probably a necessary political and technical benefit or burden for the Australian Government vis a vis South Australia and unions.

It is an unusual corporate dynamic when only 2 A26's are set to be built in Sweden but 6-12 larger Aus Future Subs might be built in Sweden and/or Australia. This effectively places more development cost and risk on the much larger Australian bought portion.

All this is a far cry from the (assumed) Japanese offer of 6-12 Future Subs off Japan's 2 functioning Soryu production lines.

Regards

Pete

South Asian Submarine Issues

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Sandeep Unnithan of India Today, December 4, 2014, has produced a higly detailed article on South Asian submarine issues - and also an excellent map. I have added some hyperlinks and additional comments and some corrections in [square brackets] to the article. It may take India 20 years to deploy K4 SLBMs (not yet developed) in Indian SSBNs (not yet launched). Article string is http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/china-submarine-noose-using-undersea-vessels-to-project-power-in-india/1/405191.html :

China's submarine noose around India

Submarine game: How China is using undersea vessels to project power in India's neighbourhood
  December 4, 2014 


Four decades after the 1971 India-Pakistan war, India's intelligence agencies are once again scanning a stretch of coastline in southern Bangladesh. Cox's Bazar [in what was East Pakistan - now Bangladesh]  was rocketed and strafed by [the old] INS Vikrant's fighter aircraft to cut off the enemy's retreat into the Bay of Bengal. Today, 43 years later, it sets the stage for China's dramatic entry into India's eastern seaboard.

Assessments from [Indian external intelligence service known as] the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and naval intelligence say the Bangladesh Navy will station two ex-Chinese Ming-class submarines on bases that are less than 1,000 km away from [India's main east coast naval base] Visakhapatnam, home to the Indian Navy's nuclear powered submarine fleet  [INS Chakra II and INS Arihant] and the Defence Research and Development Organisation's (DRDO) missile test ranges at Balasore.

The developments on India's Arabian Sea flank are equally ominous. Intelligence officials say that over the next decade, China will help Pakistan field submarines with the ability to launch nuclear-tipped missiles from sea. Submarines, analysts say, are China's instrument of choice to not just challenge the Indian Navy's strategy of sea domination but also to undermine India's second-strike capability. These developments have been accompanied by a flurry of Chinese submarine appearances in the Indian Ocean this year-Beijing sent two nuclear submarines and a conventional submarine. Two of them made port calls in Colombo [Sri Lanka], triggering concern in New Delhi.

Toehold in the Bay

"No one interested in geopolitics can afford to ignore the Bay of Bengal any longer," [semi-governmental US] geopolitical analyst Robert Kaplan wrote in a seminal essay in Stratfor in November. "This is the newold centre of the world, joining the two demographic immensities of the Indian subcontinent and East Asia." For India, the Bay of Bengal is the launch pad for a 'Look East' policy that has received renewed attention under [Indian] Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

The Indian Navy is enhancing force levels at its Visakhapatnam naval base even as it has begun building a secret base for a proposed fleet of nuclearpowered submarines at Rambilli [at what will be INS Vasha] , south of Visakhapatnam.

[Future Indian SSBN Base INS Varsha]

[Wikipedia's at length advice is http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/INS_Varsha will "de-congest the Visakhapatnam Port, which is used by both the navy and the civilian Ministry of Shipping. The navy's dockyards at Vizag are facing shortage of berthing space due to the rapid expansion of the Eastern fleet, which grew from 15 major warships in 2006 to 46 in 2012, and is still expanding. Varsha will have a large near-by [east coast] facility of the [west coast headquartered] Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), and will include modern nuclear engineering support facilities and extensive crew accommodation. It is designed to support the fleet of 8-12 Arihant-class [SSBN] nuclear submarines to be built for the Indian Navy. It will also have underground pens to hide the submarines from spy satellites and protect them from enemy air attacks. The navy is seeking foreign technical assistance [French or Russian?] pertaining to nuclear safety features for the base.[5] While designed principally as a nuclear submarine support facility, the new base can accommodate other naval vessels because of the Indian Navy's expansion. This facility has been compared to the top-secret [Sanya] Hainan nuclear submarine base for the Chinese PLA Navy. This east coast base expansion program by the Indian Navy was started due to India's Look East policy and the Chinese naval expansion into the region.[1][3][6]
In addition to Project Varsha, in late 2009, the Hindustan Shipyard Limited (HSL), located at Visakhapatnam, was transferred from the Ministry of Shipping to theMinistry of Defence in order to support the Arihant-class nuclear submarine construction program. These new vessels will be based at INS Varsha.[1][7] INR1.6 billion (US$26 million) were sanctioned for the project in the 2011-12 budget, of which INR580 million (US$9 million) were for civil works and the balance INR1 billion(US$16 million) were for setting up a VLF communication system.[8]]

[Article continues] "Equipped [in 5 years time? with the "B05" more widely called "K-15", SLBMs] with the 700-km range, the Arihant-class submarines will have to patrol closer to the shores of a potential adversary. But equipped [in 20 years time?] with the 3,500-km range K-4 missiles currently being developed by the DRDO, the Arihant and her sister submarines can cover both Pakistan and [part of China] with nuclear-tipped missiles from within the Bay of Bengal, providing the "robust second-strike capability" as stated in India's nuclear doctrine.

Inputs suggest Bangladesh has acquired land and fenced locations at the Kutubdia Channel near Cox's Bazar and the Rabnabad Channel near West Bengal. Kutubdia, intelligence officials say, is likely to feature enclosed concrete 'pens' to hide submarines. The possibility of Chinese submarines using this base provides a fresh equation to the strategic calculus.

"Our submarines become susceptible to tracking from the time they leave harbour," says veteran submariner and former Southern Naval Command chief vice-admiral K.N. Sushil (retired). "But a far more worrying strategy is China's ability to be able to threaten our assured second-strike capability. That effectively tips the deterrence balance."

West Coast Worries

Of greater long-term worry to Indian analysts is a strategic submarine project China finalised with Pakistan in 2010. Intelligence sources say this three-part programme will transform the Pakistan Navy into a strategic force capable of launching a sea-based nuclear weapons strike [initially from Pakistan's French designed Agosta Khalid class SSKs]. Pakistan will build two types of submarines with Chinese assistance: the Project S-26 and Project S-30. The vessels are to be built at the Submarine Rebuild Complex (SRC) facility being developed at Ormara, west of Karachi. Intelligence sources believe the S-30 submarines are based on the Chinese Qing [apparently an export version of China's Type 041 Yuan class SSK] of 3,000-tonne which can launch three 1,500-km range nuclear-tipped cruise missiles from its conning tower.

[The purported Projects 26 and 30 tie in with rumours for several years that China might sell some SSKs to Pakistan. The more public reason the sale has not occurred is that Pakistan doesn't not have the money. Also it was only recently that Pakistan upgraded its 3 Agosta-Khalid SSKs with AIP. Perhaps political pressure on China and Pakistan from India and the US has delayed such a Chinese submarine sale. Also perhaps financial pressure on Pakistan [in terms of overt and covert US aid money] has terminated or delayed such a China-Pakistan submarine deal.]

A [Pakistani-Chinese] Very Low Frequency (VLF) station at Turbat, in southern Balochistan, will communicate with these submerged strategic submarines [and probably Chinese subs in the Indian Ocean]. The Project S-26 and S-30 submarines will augment Pakistan's fleet of five French-built submarines, enhance their ability to challenge the Indian Navy's aircraft carrier battle groups and carry a stealthy nuclear deterrent. "Submarines are highly effective force multipliers because they tie down large numbers of naval forces," says a senior naval official.

Steel sharks on silk route

Speaking in Indonesia's Parliament last October, Chinese President Xi Jinping articulated a "21st century Maritime Silk Road". His vision calls for investments in port facilities across south and south-east Asia to complement a north Asian route. This year, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) put steel into Xi's vision. In February, a Shang class nuclear-powered attack submarine made China's first declared deployment in the Indian Ocean. This was followed by port calls made by a [Chinese Type 091 Han class SSN in November 2014] in Colombo to coincide with a state visit by President Xi [CORRECTION: preceded by a visit from a Chinese Type 039 Song class SSK in September 2014].

China's heightened activity in the Indian Ocean region is underscored by investments in a new port in Gwadar at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz, Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, a container facility in Chittagong and Kyaukpyu port in Myanmar. "Such developments have sharpened China's geopolitical rivalry with India, which enjoys an immense geographic advantage in the Indian Ocean," says Brahma Chellaney of the Centre for Policy Research. "Aspects related to their (Chinese) deployment in international waters are part of securing their maritime interests," Navy chief Admiral Robin K. Dhowan told journalists in Delhi on December 3.

China's new military posture reflects the 'Malacca dilemma' faced by the world's largest oil importer. Close to 80 per cent of China's crude oil imports of 11 million barrels per day, the life blood of its economy, is shipped through the narrow Malacca Strait. Any disruption to this could threaten its economic growth. "Hence, China's economic interests in the Indian Ocean have now taken on an overt military dimension," says an intelligence official.

Naval intelligence officials who correctly predicted that China would use anti-piracy patrols as a pretext for deployments in the Indian Ocean feel vindicated. Their prognosis of this game of 'weiqi'-a game of Chinese chess which uses encirclement, is gloomy. "A full-scale Chinese deployment in the Indian Ocean is inevitable," an admiral told India Today.

"You can only watch it and prepare yourself for it." The preparations include acquisitions of long-range maritime patrol aircraft such as the US-made P8-I Poseidon, investment in anti-submarine warfare and inducting new submarines and helicopters to fill up critical deficiencies in force levels.

Measured Response

China's submarine thrust into South Asia coincides with Narendra Modi's renewed emphasis on securing India's perimeter. "India's response has to be nuanced, a mixture of coercion and largesse," says Jayadeva Ranade, a former RAW official and member of the National Security Advisory Board. While the [previous Indian Government of former Prime Minister] Manmohan Singh-led UPA government scoffed at encirclement theories, the new Government is clearly concerned over the creeping Chinese presence.

National Security Adviser Ajit Doval voiced India's concerns at the 'Galle Dialogue' in Sri Lanka on December 1. He cited a 1971 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution mooted by Sri Lanka calling on the "great powers to halt further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean".

India's defence diplomacy has been severely limited by its inability to offer military hardware to offset the Chinese presence. Over half the military hardware of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are of Chinese origin. In 2008, India called off a plan to transfer the INS Vela to the Myanmar Navy when it discovered the vintage Russian-built submarine was past its service life.

When plans to transfer hardware materialise, they are too feeble to make a difference-a solitary helicopter such as the one gifted to Nepal by Modi in November and a small ex-Indian naval patrol craft gifted to Seychelles recently. Often, there is a demand for capabilities where India itself is deficient. Bangladeshi officials stumped Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) officials last year when they asked India, and not China, to provide submarines. The Indian Navy is down to just 13 aging conventional submarines. The MEA suggested Bangladesh buy Russian submarines instead. Their efforts are yet to bear fruit. It is a gap China willingly fills."

Link this with Submarine Matters'India's Plans for 21 More Subs including SSNs of August 24, 2014

Pete

Australian Future Submarine Choices – Need for a Plan B

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A Scorpene class submarine. A relatively simple purchase for Australia?
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Australia's Abbott Government's newly stated preference for a quick submarine selection has increased the emphasis on existing submarine designs. This excludes the HDW 216 and also the conventional Barracuda-SMX Ocean which would both need years of design-development. What is left are the existing, in-production, Soryu's, HDW 214s (perhaps in Dolphin 2 form) and the Scorpene.

The Abbott Government might announce Australia’s future submarine, likely to be Japan’s Soryu, following the Japanese elections to be held on December 14, 2014. It makes sense for Australia not to hold a tender if the Government wants an in-production submarine rather than a risky drawing board design. If the unprecedented sale of Japan’s Soryu (Plan A) falls through Abbott needs a Plan B. Given Australia’s financial situation six new submarines make more sense than twelve.

This article follows my earrlier On Line Opinion submarine articles hereand here.

The Australian Government’s preference for Japan’s Soryu is partly based on three aspects that could not be part of any tender process. One is deepening Abbott’s friendship with Japanese Prime Minister Abe (like Abbott Abe is a political conservative). Another aspect is the Australia-Japan regional alliance value of purchasing the Soryu. Australia would gain no such alliance benefits in buying submarines from the major European hopefuls (Germany, France and Sweden). The increased interoperability of Japanese and Australian Soryus would be an additional aspect.

Japanese Political Uncertainty

The December 14, 2014 Japanese election involves at least three levels of uncertainty. First it is for the lower House (of Representatives) where Prime Minister’s Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is in a ruling coalition with the basically pacifist Komeito party. If the LDP loses seats or Komeito gains seats Abe will have a weaker mandate to push through his defence export (Soryu largest item) policies. Secondly, and depending on the election’s result, Komeito might break from its conservative LDP ally and ally itself with leftist opposition parties. Thirdly the Japanese electoral rules require the existing Cabinet, including Prime Minister Abe, to resign. Abe then expects to be re-elected by LDP members, as Prime Minister, but that isn’t a sure thing.

Australia is unfamiliar with such nuances of Japanese politics even though such politics might impact a Soryu selection, delivery and maintenance process for over forty years. The enormity of the Soryu sale will be a test case for Japanese politics, Japan’s constitution and its defence industry as Japan has no major defence sales record.

A German or French Plan B

Japanese uncertainties mean Australia needs a Plan B to buy from European submarine sellers. These sellers have no serious political uncertainties and have proven defence sales records. Problems exist for the European sellers in anticipating what Abbott wants. This uncertainty demands an expression of Australian needs short of a formal tender.

In 2009, at the peak of the mining boom, it was calculated that Australia needed specially designed large submarines. But now we are in a mining trough this seems an unsustainable extravagance. It may well be that the European contenders have anticipated that Australia is still wedded to the 2009 requirements for submarines that weigh 4,000 tons (surfaced). Germany’s TKMS has apparently proposed the Type 216 https://www.thyssenkrupp-marinesystems.com/en/hdw-class-216.htmlto the Australian Government. France’s DCNS has proposed the so-called conventional Barracuda, also called the “SMX Ocean”, http://en.dcnsgroup.com/news/dcns-unveils-smx-ocean-a-new-blue-water-ssk-with-expanded-capabilities/ that apparently weighs 4,700 tons (surfaced). As both submarines would basically be Australia only (“orphan”) designs they are handicapped compared to the, in production (for Japan) Soryu. Meanwhile Sweden is offering a larger version of the drawing board design (A26). Sweden built its last complete submarine in 1996 or arguably 2001 if you count the Collins class.

The tonnage Australia really wants, or is prepared to tolerate, is a pivotal issue. If Australia is prepared to select submarines at the upper tonnage end of European designs then Australia could then make decisions that result in minimal design lags. This would increase the chances that the European submarines are built on-time and on-budget. Australia has practiced flexibility in (apparently) choosing the Soryu, that is less than 3,000 tons (surfaced). Such flexibility should also apply to current designs built by Germany and France.

If Japan’s proposed Soryu deal falls through the Australia government might really be after extended range versions of existing German or French submarines. These are Germany’s Type 214and France’s Scorpene.

If Australia applied the same design realities of the Soryu Mark 2 to the 214 or Scorpene then lower tonnage would be more reasonable. The new batch of Soryu’s (which I call the Soryu Mark 2s) apparently will be without the extra weight of air independent propulsion (AIP) plants. Instead they will rely on new Lithium-ion batteries that have a higher performance than existing lead-acid batteries http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140929/DEFREG03/309290032/Japan-Make-Major-Switch-Sub-Propulsion. Germany and France also appear to be developing Lithium-ion batteries. For the Soryu, 214 or Scorpene lighter Lithium-ion batteries should allow extra diesel fuel to be carried for the extra range required (already 21,000 kms for the Collins).

A vertical launch system (VLS) appears to be absent in the Soryu’s and therefore should not be a weight gaining requirement for German and French proposals. Tomahawk cruise missiles can be fired from existing horizontal torpedo tubes. Modified VLS is not required for divers as divers are increasing being catered for in detachable dry dock shelter technology that sits behind a submarine’s sail-fin http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2014/08/navy-seal-and-submarine-capabilities.html .

Six Submarines Not Twelve

To save many $Billions in purchase, manning and sustainment costs it would be better if Australia aimed at acquiring just six submarines not twelve. This takes into account Australia’s tight financial circumstances with many competing demands within and outside the defence budget. A requirement for twelve submarines was an uncosted, minimally justified, extravagance included in Australia's  2009 Defence White Paper (page 70, section 9.3 http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2009/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf ) drawn up under the Rudd Labor Government. 

There appears to be a historical trend of shooting high in Australian submarine numbers. The numbers of UK built Oberon class submarines (operating 1967-1999) proposed for Australia shrank from eight to six http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Australian_Navy_Submarine_Service#1945_to_present. The proposed number of the Collins (operating 1996 - present) went from ten, to eight, to six http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collins-class_submarine#Development_and_design .

Australia's naval budget should not be spread too thinly given that the major new ship acquisitions will need to be maintained. These new acquisitions are the two 27,000 ton Canberra Class Landing Helicopter Docks and the three 7,000 ton Hobart Class AirWarfare Destroyers. The Navy also plans to build eight mainly ASW Future Frigates (Project SEA 5000) perhaps of 7,000 tons, in the 2020s. All of these new ships will arguably double the combat tonnage of the Navy.


Despite the political, financial and strategic uncertainties the Abbott Government needs to make a series of reasonable decisions for the future submarines. By having a reasonable Plan B the political risks of Plan A (choosing Japan’s Soryu) can be reduced. Plan B involves existing German and French submarines that are also in production (like the Soryu). Given Australia’s rapid naval expansion choosing a reasonable six submarines makes more sense than twelve. Whatever happens a repeat performance of designing a very large “orphan” submarine like the Collins should be avoided. 

Peter Coates

Japan's Soryu - less promising Future Submarine (FSM) for Australia

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Immediately below is a diagram of Australia's Collins submarine (launched 1993)

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The rapid growth and turnover of Japan's 3 most recent submarines (shaded) over the last 25 years. At bottom the Harushio (launched 1989),  middle the Oyashio (launched 1996) and upper the Soryu (launched 2007)
Peter Briggs has written the excellent article below on the many downsides and risks of chosing Japan's Soryu "Option J" for Australia's Future Submarine (FSM). Peter Briggs is a retired Royal Australian Navy (RAN) submarine commanding officer and past President of the Submarine Institute of Australia.  He wrote this article on The Strategist the blog of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). I've put particularly interesting facts and views in red. The string for the article is http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/option-j-for-fsm-a-japanese-solution/ :

Option J for FSM—a Japanese solution?

26Sep 2014
A Collin's submarine at sunrise transiting Gage Roads. Gage Roads is the sea channel in the Indian Ocean offshore from the Collins' main base of Fremantle, Western Australia.
[ASPI's] Andrew Davies raised some interesting issues regarding the possible acquisition of Japanese submarines for Australia in his recent post, ‘Getting the submarine we want’. I’d like to take a closer look at the suitability of the Soryu.
Comparisons with the Collins class are difficult given the scarcity of published information and the fact that the Japanese platform and combat system components have been developed in an environment isolated from competition with Western/NATO suppliers.
Still, the table below provides a comparison of the Soryu and Collins class submarines using publicly available information.
CharacteristicSoryuCollinsRemarks
Surface Displacement (tonnes)2950*3100Regularly quoted displacement for Soryu (4200 tonnes) is submerged displacement, which means that Soryu carries 1300 tonnes of ballast water/external fuel. Useable space on-board is determined by the surfaced displacement. Note: since Soyru is a double hulled design some of the ballast tanks may be convertible to fuel tanks, improving the useable volume calculation.
Range (NM)6000 @ 6.5 knots9000 @ 10 knotsAustralian operations require long distance transit to reach patrol area within a reasonable timeframe. Soryu is not designed for such long transits.
Diesel Generators2 x 1400 kW3 x 1400 kWOne fewer similar powered diesels means longer snorting time for battery charging and higher indiscretion rate, i.e. reduced stealth.
Propulsion (electric motor)5900 kW5400 kWThe higher installed power on Soryu is required due to the extra ballast water carried when submerged.
Combat SystemC2 (Japanese)AN/BGY-1 (US/Aus)US based combat system fully integrated on Collins. Integration of US combat system into Soryu would be required.
TorpedoesType 89 – (Japanese)MK 48 (US/Aus)MK 48 torpedoes fully integrated on Collins. Integration of US combat system into Soryu required.
MissilesHarpoon (US)Harpoon (US)
Crew6558
Legislation and Naval RequirementsJapaneseAustralianModification of Soryu is required to meet Australian safety and technical regulatory standards.
Operational Life 16 years28 yearsChanges in design and support philosophy required for Soryu. New maintenance program required.
It’s apparent that Soryu would need to be heavily modified to meet Australian requirements, particularly for long ocean transits and patrols. This would carry cost, performance and schedule risks, and will effectively amount to a new design—it won’t be a MOTS acquisition.
The Coles Review highlighted the vital importance of establishing through-life logistic support arrangements in Australia during the submarine construction phase. For that to be done successfully it’s critical Australia has full access to the boat’s technologies—otherwise the effectiveness of the new submarines will always be reliant on the relationship with the overseas parent navy and its industrial base. To expect to access all relevant technologies during the course of an overseas build of such a complex vessel as a submarine for the initial collaboration with a country, which has no experience in such matters, is extraordinarily ambitious and inherently risky.
The cultural differences between European ship and submarine builders and ourselves have been sufficient to cause significant problems for the Collins and the Air Warfare Destroyer. The prospects for difficulties arising from cultural differences with Japan are all too apparent and real.
Careful, measured consideration of risks is required, and any proposal for a Japanese solution for the Future Submarine must address those issues. Based on the assessment possible from the limited amount of information available that doesn’t seem to have been done.
Despite the apparent political attraction of this solution, it seems most unlikely that Soryu is as capable as Collins, and it almost certainly can’t offer the sort of improvements required in FSM. Considerable development would be required before a Soryu or its successor could achieve that.
Nor can continuing political support in Japan be assumed, the current positive atmosphere is highly dependent on the personal commitment of the Japanese PM—a position that has changed 14 times in the last 15 years.
The $20bn program cost being used in the media softeners lacks any details or credibility. For example, does it include the 25–30% contingency appropriate for a developmental project with the risks and issues identified above?
Finally, all this will take time; time we don’t have if a capability gap is to be avoided. We do have time to do it properly. Using Collins as an indicator, the contract was signed in 1987 and the first submarine was delivered in 1996. While there were issues to resolve, this was a nine-year design and build program for the first of class from a greenfield site.
Option J is a distraction. An Australian-led project definition study, utilising reputable European designers, is the way ahead to provide Government with the information and maximum options for the key decisions necessary to avoid a capability gap.
Peter Briggs is a retired RAN submarine commanding officer and past President of the Submarine Institute of Australia."
PETE'S COMMENT
The article's preference that Australia work with a European submarine builder is in line with my own preference that Australia work with Germany's TKMS-HDW. For my concerns about the risks of an Australian choice of Japan's Soryu see my earlier articles on One Line Opinion

Our submarines to be built overseas?
International - 12/09/2014, and


Pete

Swedish Bid for Australian Future Submarine Selection

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Artist's conception of a Swedish A26 submarine operating in littoral waters while deploying special forces divers. Graphic courtesy of Saab site .
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Sweden's early December 2014 claims might be summarised as:

Sweden is designing the A26 which will be around 2,000 ton surfaced. Australia’s government indicated it has received an unsolicited bid from Saab for an enlarged design. Sweden's claims that this includes a lower price than its competitors. Sweden would facilitate the smooth flow of Japanese submarine [Stirling air independent propulsion (AIP)] technology from the Soryu Class sub. Sweden also promises substantial technology transfer and industrial offsets for Australia, including jobs in Adelaide during the build phase.

See more here: http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/saab-story-swedens-new-submarines-024760/
Sweden wasn’t part of the Australian government’s initial submarine evaluations, because Kockums was barred from export activities by its then corporate parent TKMS. This also prevented Sweden from bidding for Singapore's 2013 two SSK selection - subsequently won by Germany's HDW [as the 218SG proposal]. Saab Kockums is also offering to take ASC and Australian Navy engineers and technicians to work on its new A26 design in Sweden.
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PETE'S COMMENTS

The current A26 design or an enlarged Australian version might be competitive with the German Type 214 or enlarged Type 216 respectively. Sweden's Saab and its subsidiary Kockums need to develop the A26 rapidly not only to be competitive in submarine sales but to face the resurgent Russian threat.

France (offering the existing Scorpene and overweight 4,700 ton (surfaced) "conventional version" of the Barracuda SSN) has been distrusted by Anglo counties in the long term and in the short term due to the proposed sale of Mistral amphibious assault ships to Russia.

Sweden overall has national knowledge (including FMV and Kockums) of submarine building but Sweden hasn't built submarines (the Gotlands) since 1996 or arguably Collins since 2001. Kockums under German control heavily modified two ex-Västergötland class subs - relaunching them in 2009 and 2010 for Singapore as two AIP equipped Archer class subs.

On lowest price claims - price is very elastic - more an artform of itemisation than an accounting science.

Given the Soryu is less than 3,000 tons surfaced Australia is probably not wedded to 4,000 ton surfaced designs anymore.

Japan may be extricating itself from Swedish intellectual property issues by leaving Stirling AIPs out of the Soryu Mark 2s.

Technology transfer and training are strengths with the European contenders - something probably difficult for Japan.

Some offsets are probably a necessary political and technical benefit or burden for the Australian Government vis a vis South Australia and unions.

Pete

Future submarine selection December update expected - Sydney Siege

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A fleeing hostage from Sydney Siege December 15-16, 2014 beckoned by a policemen to a safer place.

Brendan Nicholson in The Australian December 15, 2014 provided a commentary on Prime Minister Abbott's expected future submarine selection update. The Sydney Siege that same day may have delayed any submarine update by several days. Full string of the submarine commentary is http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence/tony-abbott-to-surface-with-plan-for-submarines/story-e6frg8yo-1227155893557:

Title "Tony Abbott to surface with plan for submarines"


TONY Abbott is expected to announce within days the start of the process for selecting the navy’s new submarines from a range of international options and for building and maintaining them.
The Australian has been told the Prime Minister’s announcement is likely to include the creation of a new defence industry entity to work with an experienced international submarine designer and builder.
The expected re-election of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s government with a substantial ­majority will remove a significant hurdle to Japan providing new submarines for Australia.
Japan, Germany, France and Sweden are all keen to provide the submarines. The Japanese are ahead of the others because they have the most experience building conventional submarines large enough to meet Australia’s needs.
The government is developing a three-stage strategy to save the shipbuilding industry, involving buying submarines overseas but maintaining them in Adelaide, completing the navy’s three Air Warfare Destroyers and building eight new frigates in Australia.
While a Japanese submarine has for months been the most likely option, Japanese domestic politics remained an issue.
Defence officials are in discussions with their Japanese counterparts to see whether the submarine technology they have on offer would suit Australia’s ­requirements.
If that deal does go through, Australia is likely to share in the design and building of a new class of submarine that will be an evolution of Japan’s Soryu.
If Australia does buy a Japanese submarine, it will be modified to extend its range and fitted with the same potent combat system and torpedoes as US nuclear-powered attack submarines.
The new submarine is likely to be powered by advanced lithium batteries, which take up less space than lead-acid batteries. More batteries can be carried, which significantly increases the submarine’s range and reduces the time it needs to run on or near the surface while running its diesel engines to recharge the batteries. Modern conventional sub­marines using such systems can stay submerged, without snorkelling, for three weeks." ENDS.
Connect with my own commentary of December 10, 2014 Australian Future Submarine Choices - Need for a Plan B at : http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2014/12/australian-future-submarine-choices.html
Pete

New Defence Minister Kevin Andrews

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Today Australia's Abbott Government announced that (as expected) Defence Minister David Johnston has been demoted to the backbench - without portfolio.

Unexpectedly Johnston has been replaced by Kevin Andrews MP, who has been the cabinet level Minister for Social Services. Andrews' appointment to Defence Minister comes as a surprise to many who were expecting Immigration and Border Protection Minister Morrison to take the portfolio given Morrison's militarisation of the immigration portfolio. 

In past years Andrews has held roles as Workplace Relations Minister and Immigration Minister. Unlike Johnston Andrews is considered a "safe pair of hands". Andrews brings to the Defence portfolio long experience in higher decision-making and economic matters but not in military technical matters.

Now that Andrews has been appointed it is possible he will make a future submarine selection update before Christmas.

See details of all today's appointments in the Abbott ministry.

Pete

Christmas in Australia 2014

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Australia's Christmas (in the Southern Hemisphere) is the hottest time of year. Temperatures average around 30ºC (86ºF) during the day and 17ºC (63ºF) at night. Christmas feasts are frequently at midday on December 25 and are often cold cut seafood, ham and turkey or hot barbecued meats cooked outside. 


Here's an Aussiefied Christmas Carol:

An "Esky" is a portable insulated container for keeping food or drink cool!


CHRISTMAS sandman 
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SURFIN SANTA AND FRIENDS IN AUSTRALIA 
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A TYPICAL CHRISTMAS BEACH SCENE IN AUSTRALIA
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 australia is very much part  of the
anglosphere. here is a carol from elsewhere in the sphere. 

mERRY CHRISTMAS

Pete 

Mixing Australian Conventional and Nuclear Submarines

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Click on image to expand. Submarine program matters are highly complex being a mixture of what would be ideal (such as the Virginia SSN above) and what is politically, economically and technically feasible. Timeframes are also essential considerations.
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On December 26, 2014 Alexander Judzewitsch provided a comment on my post Future submarine selection December update expecte..:

"Collins subs cost us more than $605m per year to maintain. An early replacement can save us billions which could be spent on new subs with lower maintenance costs. Replace 10 years early saves more than $6Bn and that is possible.

Nuclear powered subs are the only ones that give us the capability we need in a production submarine. Both these have been stated as essential for our new subs. So why not arrange with the USA to crew and possibly lease two Virginia class subs starting in say 5 years? It would save huge sums in maintenance and two operational SSNs have far greater capability than all of our Collins. The Americans would be happy to have us pay for two boats to work in our region as it would save them the cost of doing it. That leaves open the options of having all SSNs or a mix of diesel-electric plus SSNs as we could add SSKs or SSNs to our capability depending on what is available and our perceived needs in the future. The above suggestion meets all of the requirements stated so far and saves heaps of money."

PETE's REPLY:

Hi Alexander Judzewitsch:

I agree the maintenance costs and low availability (dry dock downtime) 6 Collins subs is excessive.

Your claim that $6 Billion can be saved in retiring the Collins ten years early is incorrect on several counts:

-  the Collins has become a more efficient sub for Australia’s needs operationally due to many sunk costs expended over the last twenty years. This included fixing such deficiencies as the combat system, propulsion system and quieting.

-  The 6 Collins would not be suddenly removed all at once then replaced by a new subs all at once. The 6 Collins would be steadilly retired at a rate of one-per-year (perhaps 2020-2025) or slower. Rather there is a staggered purchasing, building, launching and commissioning process for each new sub.

-   New subs would have high initial startup infrastructure costs.

-  New subs would have their own maintenance costs.

-  “Nuclear powered subs” mainly meaning the Virginia SSNs do many things well but there are niches for conventional subs (SSKs) as well.

-   A US crewed and leased Virginia may serve the interests of the US in a major war rather than risk destruction in the defence of Australia. It mayalso respond to US orders that might effectively bring Australia into a major war in Northeast Asia.

-  Australian would need to be fully aware of how a Virginia operates and preferably partly or wholey crew it.

-   Two Virginia's are not enough. If one is in dry dock the other couldn't cover east coast, west coast, south and north, as well as forward deployment (say in the South China Sea).

-   Four Virginias would be better.

-   I agree a “mix of diesel-electric plus SSNs” would be even better.

-   Nothing in submarines “saves heaps of money” until deals are made and purchasing-building-commissioning and downstream program costs are experienced and finalised over the three decades of a submarine’s service life

On December 24, 2014 - two days before you made the 26 December comment -I commented as "plantagenet" on On Line Opinion pretty much in line with Alexander Judzewitsch arguments but over a more extended period :    

"Getting Virginia nuclear powered subs would be a longshot in the next few years. So we need to work with what is likely...I see Australia ultimately needing two classes of submarines:

6 x medium conventional subs ([2020-2025]). Ideally they would be currently in-production subs (with extended range). That is:
- Soryus (Abbott's Plan A?)
- Plan B? HDW 214 (Dolphin 2 version?) or Scorpene? Their introduction from around 2023 would gradually remove the 5 working Collins from our navy.

4 x Virginia nuclear powered attack subs (SSNs) (Plan C) from 2035, but ultimately serving as SLBM carrying "baby boomers" the main platform for Australia's nuclear weapons (talking 2040 at least). This would depend on a perceived increase in threats - most likely from China.

Combining nuclear and conventionally propelled subs in a fleet is fairly common (India, China, Russia and eventually Brazil). Nuclear and conventionally propelled subs can perform a wider range of missions more economically than just one class.

Pete
[as] plantagenet, Wednesday, 24 December 2014"

Submarine program matters are highly complex being a mixture of what would be ideal and what is politically, economically and technically feasible.

Pete

Bangladesh, Philippine and Burma Submarine Issues

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One of China's remaining Type 035 Ming-class conventional submarine soon to be scrapped or sold off to Bangladesh (and other small nations?).
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A Russian built Kilo conventional submarine - main users are Russia, India and China. Vietnam is a growing operator (having bought 6).
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India feels threatened by the prospect of increasing Chinese submarine proliferation in the Indian Ocean. Such proliferation comes through such means as:

-  Chinese anti-piracy conventional and nuclear propelled subs moving across the Indian Ocean for operations off the Horn of Africa,
-  submarine visits to such ports as Columbo, Sri Lanka, and
-  sale of Chinese subs to such Indian neighbours as Bangladesh (around 2019) and perhaps in future to Burma and Pakistan.

For more than a year there have been reports of a pending sale of obsolescent Chinese Ming-class submarines to Bangladesh. See my article http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/12/china-selling-two-type-035-ming-class.htmlof December 24, 2013. It is highly likely that, after expected delivery of the Mings in 2019, part of a Bangladesh Ming crew and on-shore maintainers would be Chinese for a transition period. This would cause a range of anxieties in India.

In late 2014 Indian intelligence and the Indian Ministry of External Affairs have pushed the possibility (or for India a hope) that Bangladesh might buy Russian submarines instead.

It is unclear whether these "Russian" Submarines would be:
- new build Kilos (surely too expensive for Bangladesh without credit-finance)
- used Kilos from Russia (cheaper but probably unreliable with a short remaining service life) or
- ex-Indian Kilos (cheaper but probably unreliable with a short remaining service life).

Two nations that probably will not buy submarines in the short to medium term are:

- the Philippines (it usually receives low-or-no cost used naval and coastguard vessels) - see http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/the-philippine-navys-submarine-quest/ December 31, 2013, and


Pete

Japan Offer to Australia - Soryu Submarine Steel Making - Swedish Intellectual Property?

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As expected in my December 2014 On Line Opinion article Australia's Abbott Government has announced Japan's Soryu as Australia's future submarine following the result of Japanese December 14, 2014 election. That election which confirmed the supremacy of the non-pacifist Abe Govenment which is in favour of exporting the Soryu to Australia. Yesterday [see BACKGROUND below for SBS-AAP Article] Japan offered to assist Australia in making steel for an Australian purchase of Japan’s Soryu. The Soryu deal might be finalised by the end of this year (2015).

As will be demonstrated below the flow of steel-making knowledge may not be one-way, Japan to Australia, but there may be Australian submarine steel advances amounting to a reverse flow of technological knowledge (Australia to Japan).

According to http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/2900ton.htmThe [Soryu 1] hull is HY-80 alloy (the same as the USN's Los Angeles class SSN)” On what “HY-80” and “HY-100” mean see BACKGROUND below.

In comparison the Collins class “hull is constructed from a high-tensile micro-alloy steel, developed by Swedish steel manufacturer SSAB, and improved by BHP of Australia, which was lighter and easier to weld than the HY-80 or HY-100 nickel-alloy steel used in contemporary submarine construction projects, while providing better results in explosion bulge testing [see Yule & Woolner, The Collins Class Submarine Story, pp. 165–174].

So Japan’s (and perhaps Australia’s) future Soryu 2s may benefit from Swedish-Australian developed submarine steel used for the Collins class. This steel is apparently beyond the capabilities of HY-80 or HY-100.

It is likely that an Australian steel maker will only contribute a portion of the steel tonnage to a pre-existing stockpile in Japan of submarine grade steel. It is highly unlikely that Japan would rely on Australia to be the sole/only source of submarine grade steel for the Soryu.

Australian companies approached by Japan may include BHP-Billiton and BlueScope Steel. However the main company Japan approaches is likely to be current naval steelmaker Bisalloy Steels Pty Ltdbased in Port Kembla-Wollongong, New South Wales, Australia. 

Bisalloy Steels Pty Ltd (company website) has connections in Indonesia (PT Bima Bisalloy), Thailand (Bisalloy Thailand) and from July 2011 and China the investment in the Chinese CJV - Bisalloy Jigang (Shandong) Steel Plate Co. Ltd.

In the 1980s-1990s Bisalloy supplied 8,000 tonnes of hardened steel for the Collins submarine program with research and development involvement of BHP and the Defence Scientific and Technology Organisation (DSTO).

The DSTO connection is interesting because in July 2014 it was announced that Australia and Japan had agreed to jointly carry out submarine related defence research under an Agreement on the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology.

An items in that Agreement may have involved submarine steel and the DSTO Maritime Division. See DSTO Maritime Division Naval Architecture Project: “Structural materials and fabrication systems - Our Structural Materials and Fabrication Systems group encompasses the performance and assessment of structural materials and fabrication methodologies that may be used in naval structures or critical components within a naval platform. This includes metallurgical assessments and material assessment technologies for both initial selection as well as ensuring through life performance for fatigue.”

BACKGROUND

SBS-AAP ARTICLE "Japan offers to build Aust submarines" - Australia may accept a Japanese offer to jointly-build a fleet of new submarines by the end of 2015, media reports say. Source:  AAP
“Australia has reportedly welcomed a Japanese offer to jointly-build a fleet of new submarines, with a possible deal by the end of the year.
Japan has proposed to help build the submarines instead of exporting a new fleet following concerns in Canberra over the effect on the local shipbuilding industry, media reports said.
Under the proposal, Japan's defence ministry is to co-operate with Australia in developing special steel and other materials for its new submarines, while Tokyo will be in charge of assembling them, the Mainichi Shimbun newspaper said.
The Australian side has taken "a positive stance" on the proposal, the report said, adding the two countries may strike a deal by the end of 2015.
Australia needs to replace its fleet of diesel and electric-powered subs, which date from the 1990s, and Japan's high-tech ship-building industry is thought to be well-placed to win the contract.
But the federal opposition and industry groups protest that losing the contract could deal a potentially fatal blow to naval shipbuilding at home, with a knock-on effect for associated industries.
However, critics point out that Japan may be able to supply the fleet for as little as half of the cost of making it at home.
Mr Andrews was unavailable for comment while overseas accompanying Prime Minister Tony Abbott in Iraq.
The Department of Defence is expected to issue a statement on Tuesday.
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WHAT DO “HY-80” AND “HY-100” MEAN?

"A submarine's hull is normally constructed of steel, or exceptionally of titanium. Special High Yield [HY] steel alloys have been developed to increase the diving depth of submarines, although the improved depth performance of these alloys imposes a price of increased fabrication challenges. These special steels are denominated by their yield stress in thousands of pounds per square inch -- thus HY-80 steel has a yield stress of 80,000 pounds per square inch [corresponding to a depth of 1,800 feet], HY-100 a a yield stress of 100,000 pounds per square inch [corresponding to a depth of 2,250 feet], and so on.

During World War II, American fleet submarines normally operated at a depth of 200 feet, though in emergencies they would dive to a depth of 400 feet.

Post-War American submarines, both conventional and nuclear, had improved designs and were constructed of improved materials [the equivalent of "HY-42"]. These boats had normal operating depths of some 700 feet, and a crush depth of 1100 feet.

The Thresher, the first American submarine constructed of HY-80 steel, reportedly had a normal operating depth of 1,300 feet, roughly two-thirds the crush depth limit imposed by the HY-80 steel.

The Seawolf, the first American submarine constructed of HY-100 steel, is officially claimed by the Navy to have a normal operating depth of "greater than 800 feet," but based on the reported operating depth of the Thresher, it may be assumed that the normaly operating depth of the Seawolf is roughly double the official figure.


The Soviet Alfa submarines, constructed of titanium, reportedly had an operating depth of nearly 4,000 feet.” 

Pete

LDUUVs and Undersea Cable Tapping?

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US Navy image of a Penn State ARL developed Sea Stalker large-diameter unmanned underwater vehicle (LDUUV).
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As well as looking at submarines this blog looks at many related hardware and software issues. To that end unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) are an increasingly interesting topic. The Sea Stalker provides an example of a large-diameter UUV (LDUUV). For undersea cable tapping a more highly developed, specialised and deeper diving LDUUV is a possibility.

The current status of UUVs in the US Navy paints a confusing picture. Perhaps such confusion is  intentional for security and commercial competition reasons. There are small UUVs, medium size torpedo tube fitting UUVs (like the Bluefin-21 deployed by the US Navy in search of Malaysian Airlines MH370 off Western Australia). Then there are LDUUVs. The US Navy is learning what to ask for in LDUUV requirements by simultaneously testing LDUUVs like the Sea Stalker.

There may be widely varying degrees of remote control and autonomy of LDUUVs. LDUUVs might increasingly be used in littoral waters too shallow for full sized submarines or full sized high value warships. LDUUVs might also be used for missions too dangerous due to high possibilities of detection by anti-submarine or anti-shipping forces (eg. defending foreign submarines, ships, aircraft, anti-ship missiles etc).

The ability of a surface ship to deploy a LDUUV potentially permits that ship to have some of the intelligence gathering and weapons capabilities of a submarine. By weapons that might mean an LDUUV attaching small limpet mines to ships in harbour or an entire LDUUV exploding under a high value ship in harbour or other chokepoint.

LDUUVs as CABLE TAPPERS

The following is a logical outgrowth of the publication decades ago of undersea cable tapping under  Operation Ivy Bells http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Ivy_Bells  Also see the Wikipedia entry on modified Seawolf-class SSN USS Jimmy Carter"Past submarines outfitted this way were used to tap undersea cables, to intercept communications of foreign countries."  It is therefore assumed undersea cable tapping remains a reality.

For the delicate task of tapping undersea fibre-optic cables LDUUV's offer advantages over medium-large submarines (close to cables) or divers.

LDUUVs:

-  being without a crew are semi-deniable (unlike manned submarine crews and divers they cannot be questioned in front of the world media)
-  do not involve friendly deaths or risk of injury
-  may be capable of far deeper operation (1,000s meters?) than manned submarines and divers. LDUUVs could operate at or beyond estimated "crush depth" as there is no crew at risk
-  if the capture of a LDUUV is imminent remotely initiated or autonomous destruction could take place (of electronics, including hard-disc records and other high technology). The whole LDUUV could also self-destruct (preferably keeping would-be capturers at a safe distance)
-  are potentially of shallow water tapping in the littorals (too shallow)
-  can operate in areas too dangerous or too politically sensitive for manned submarines
-  would present a far lower sonic, visual and magnetic signature (and other emissions) than a manned submarine (thus reducing detectability)
-  can utilise their thrusters and specialised splicing technology for tapping or other work
-  are less likely to damage or break a cable, by mistake, than a much larger submarine attempting to work on a cable directly
-   not only submarines could operate, release and retrieve LDUUVs but mine-sweepers on up in a navy or more delicately large "trawlers" on up in commercial shipping terms
-   are not restricted to the US Navy or other agencies but LDUUVs may be possessed by foreign navies and agencies such as those of Russia (near Stockholm in late 2014?) and China.

SEA STALKER LDUUV DETAIL

The US Navy appears to be sponsoring the development of LDUUVs by private companies and academic institutions while it sets requirements for upgraded LDUUV technology. The Navy's approach is pragmatic. It is difficult to set requirement for a technology if one does not have some idea of its ever greater practical capabilities.

Since conducting a 2006 study, the US Navy has been developing requirements for submarine-deployable LDUUVs with payload capabilities much greater than the limitations posed by medium sized UUVs (that can fit in 533mm (21 inch) diameter torpedo tube). Examples of medium sized UUVs are the Bluefin-21 (hence 21 inch - which transmits data to the mother ship or sub) or upgraded Mark 48 torpedos (which carry sensors for data transmission). 

The Sea Stalker is a 38-inch (0.97m) diameter platform with a speed of nearly 5 knots. The US Navy has conducted some experimentation with the Sea Stalker UUV, a development of the Sea Horse UUV built by the Pennsylvania State University Applied Research Laboratory (ARL).


In August 2014, the Sea Stalker was delivered to Naval Undersea Warfare Center Keyport, Washington state (northwestern USA) to be employed by Commander, Submarine Development Squadron FIVE, Detachment UUV for capabilities testing and proficiency training in preparation for the delivery of future large diameter UUVs

On November 25, 2014 US Naval Sea Systems Command (with Sea Stalker, other public LDUUVs and covert LDUUVs in mind) released a refined draft of top-level requirements. The requirements or instructions were

"The Increment 1 LDUUV will have mission capabilities to include Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment and below-water Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance to improve battlespace awareness. [Increment 1] will be capable of launch and recovery by...Virginia-class submarines [by] Virginia Payload Modules or Modernized-Dry Deck Shelter." 

The Sea Stalker may already have been tested  (as Large Training Vehicle 38) including:
-  launched and recovery from the USS Bainbridge (DDG-96), and
-  launch and retrieval using the dry-deck shelter of an Ohio-class SSGN submarine and modified SSN USS Jimmy Carter?. 

Sea Stalker can be powered by a lithium battery when operated from US surface ships with an endurance of seven to 10 days. On submarines it may currently only use alkaline (D-Cell) batteries (for safety reasons?) in which case its endurance may only be three days. It can loiter offshore, [and in-harbour (etc?)] collecting intelligence with two antenna masts, transmit and receive information via an Iridium satellite or (presumably) other US satellites. It is also useful for command and control [of what? special forces? other LDUUVs?].
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(Sea Stalker) AUV System Spec Sheet

[Base] Platform: Seahorse
Developer and 
ManufacturerPennsylvania State University Applied Research Laboratory

Sensors of a Seahorse-Sea Stalker in Semi-submersible mode 

For further Sea Stalker details download PDF


Sources

Autonomous Underwater Vehicles Application Center reports http://auvac.org/people-organizations/view/244 and http://auvac.org/configurations/view/202

 On requirements and some physical realities SEAPOWER Magazine, December 1,   2014 reports http://www.seapowermagazine.org/stories/20141201-lduuv.html:

navaldrones.com reports http://www.navaldrones.com/Sea-Stalker-UUV.html:

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SEA STALKER USV

In what may be a future brand-name legal battle the Penn State ARL Sea Stalker LDUUV-UUV-AUV should not be confused with another Sea Stalker - the unmanned surface vehicle (USV). 
The Sea Stalker USV is a robot boat developed by General Dynamics Robotic Systems (GDRS) and associated companies - see http://www.navaldrones.com/Sea-Stalker-USV.html The Sea Stalker USV is a 5 meter unmanned surface vehicle (robot boat). Sea Stalker can deploy the even smaller 1.5 meter RiverRat recon craft.
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FINAL COMMENT (STOCKHOLM)

LDUUVs are probably capable of deep or shallow water cable tapping and attaching small mines to ships.

Other types of intelligence gathering are possible. For example if a mission payload module includes specialised antennas then targetted interception of limited frequencies in an adjacent city may also be possible. The late 2014 publicised sighting (and sonaring) of a suspected Russian mini-submarine just off Stockholm (Sweden) may be a case of such activity. See this blog's post of January 15, 2015 on the Stockholm mini-submarine or LDUUV issue.

Pete

Second Swedish sighting of Russian mini-submarine or LDUUV - Malsten

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Location of the publically known (Swedish websiteMalsten (Island) Station (with observable facilities) which operated  undersea cables joining SOSUS and magnetic anomaly sensors. Now modernised?
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See Malsten Station (blue arrow) in relation to Stockholm. Malsten's Cold War vintage equipment may have been replaced by a much more extensive wireless  "Seaweb" style anti-submarine network in the Swedish archipelago. A modern Seaweb network would rapidly detect and track any Russian mini-submarine or LDUUV.
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This is a continuation of my October 25, 2014 article on Sweden's first sighting (and sonaring) of a suspected Russian mini-submarine just off Stockholm in mid October 2014. That article theorised that the suspected Russian mini-submarine's close proximity to Stockholm may have indicated its mission was for a Russian agent's drop-off or pick-up or interception of telecommunications signals emanating from Stockholm. In retrospect this seems unlikely and unnecessarily complicated as any agent could cross land borders, go by air or just transmit. Interception might be more efficient within Stockholm - say equipment in the Russian Embassy there.

More likely activity in October 2014 is Russian electronic monitoring of nearby Swedish and/or North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) naval exercises. The submarine may not have been in authentic "distress" rather it used distress messages as a ruse intended to draw "trip" more Swedish and/or NATO sensor "interrogations".

Reconnaissance aircraft indulge in a similar radar tripping activity by flying close to borders -  basically forcing a would-be adversary to turn-on its usually covert sensors. Russian Bear reconnaissance aircraft, under increasingly combative Putin, have stepped up activity against NATO allies partly for the intelligence take. It is unknown if Russian mini-submarines have been engaged in similar activities, but possible.

If such mini-subs have no crew (being large diameter unmanned underwater vehicles (LDUUVs)) the financial and political costs and risks are less. See my earlier post on LDUUVs and the discussion below.

"SECOND" SIGHTING OR LATER SIGHTING OF THE SAME SUBMARINE OR LDUUV

Subsequent (presumably) authorised leaks by Swedish and UK sources in mid January 2015 indicate that Swedish and NATO forces continued to look for suspected Russian submarine activity later in October 2014. UK concern about a suspected Russian submarine off the Scottish coast may be a totally separate (perhaps routine?) matter. A Russian attack submarine (SSK or SSN) may routinely station itself off the coast of northwest Scotland in order to intercept (or gain intelligence) concerning UK (and perhaps US) nuclear submarines entering and, more importantly, leaving UK naval base HMNB Clyde.

Having looked at US advances in large diameter unmanned underwater vehicle (LDUUV) technology I think that a crewed Russian mini-submarine is unnecessary and dangerous when a remotely controlled LDUUV could be used. This is assuming Russia is technically advanced enough to deploy developed LDUUVs? LDUUVs can include unmanned "conning towers" of the type photographed off Stockholm (see intentionally blurry image with little sense of size/scale). If Russia sent a LDUUV Russia could "trip" (activate) Swedish (and NATO?) fixed and mobile anti-submarine warfare (ASW) sensors. The Swedish reaction against a LDUUV (Swedish corvettes, smaller craft, helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft) would be worth the Russian military intelligence "take" - even at the calculated risk of a LDUUV being destroyed or captured. 

Sweden alone has insufficient national power to threaten or more fully embarrass Russia. So Sweden likely feigned its inability to find the Russian LDUUV rather than admitting Sweden's limitations in exerting force on the Russian craft. The risk of a self-destruct mechanism in the Russian craft may also have played on Swedish minds. An enterprizing Russian controlled LDUUV may have also moved into the international waters or territorial waters of NATO allies in the Baltic or less likely (due to LDUUV range limitations) the North Sea. The more NATO reacts in military terms the more it reveals to Russian naval intelligence. 

Off Stockholm in 2014 the Russian submarine or LDUUV is likely to have also deployed antennas to send any vaunted "distress calls". The intelligence take (if necessary) could also be sent by UHF radio to Russian UHF receivers or by satellite relay to Russian naval intelligence. Alternatively the Russian craft could merely store the take for handing over once it reached a Russian port or mothership. 

MALSTEN STATION

In terms of Swedish fixed anti-submarine sensors Malsten Station SOSUS (and magnetic anomaly) sensors have been public knowledge in Sweden for decades. Malsten is a small island on which a small hut stands. The hut is (or was) used to power cables that carry sound (SOSUS) and magnetic anomaly sensors. The cables stretch out for a few 100 metres on two sides of Malsten island. The cables and sensors were originally decades old technology - perhaps 1950s vintage. The sensors presumably are (or were) sensitive enough to detect mini-subs or LDUUVs crossing over the cables - alerting the Swedish Navy of illegal entries into Swedish waters. Here is another link on the Malsten Station. With advances in electronics and communications there would no longer be a need for Malsten to be physically manned - other than for security. Sensor detections could (can?) be automatically relayed to Swedish naval bases or to a more centralised Swedish military HQ in Stockholm itself.

Malsten may have been modernised and re-activated (since the Cold War) to meet the resurgent Russian threat. Possibly Malsten and other Swedish SOSUS arrays have been replaced by a much broader undersea and islet-rock-mainland wireless network of the Seaweb type that may cover much of the Swedish Archipelago. Whether Sweden would coordinate its network with any larger NATO "Seaweb" network is unknown.

So in conclusion there is much (probably Russian) undersea activity in the Swedish archipelago. Much would happen that is not admitted publically by Sweden, NATO or Russia. When a member of the Swedish public spots a Russian mini-submarine or LDUUV there is some embarrassment in  Sweden. Sweden's defence efficiency is called into question (by Swedish politicians and the Press) due to an evident inability to stop encroachments or (in theory) identify who or what is encroaching.

The Swedish Government feels obliged to reveal some of what it knows - but only a small portion due to diplomatic and security reasons. The UK and NATO might reduce Swedish embarrassment, while increasing Russian embarrassment, by mixing in headlines about what is probably regular detection of Russian submarines off the Scottish coast. The press is happy. The public is reassured - perhaps, and specialist submarine blogger-journalists have more to write about :)

Pete

Updated History of the Japanese Submarine (After WWII)

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The following is based the excellent Japanese document "History of the Japanese Submarine (After WWII)". It is at http://www3.ocn.ne.jp/~y.hirama/yh_e_papers_sub_f.html . The document's precise date is unknown - but it is more recent than its record of an Oyashio submarine launched in 2006. The document seems to precede introduction of the first Soryu-class submarine that entered Japanese Navy service in 2009. Who or what organisation wrote the document is unknown. Perhaps someone from Japan could advise?

As the original document only went to 2006 I am steadily updating it for the period 2007 through to January 2015 (updates are in RED). I'm also improving some of the grammar. 

Grateful for any suggestions - particularly about the current and future Soryus and also flotillas under "Submarine Organisation chart" at end of document

Pete.
--------------------------------------------

History of the Japanese Submarine (After WWII)











Defense Plan and Submarines 

Japan had constructed 242 submarines in the Imperial navy era (1869 - 1945), and operated 3530 ton (6560 ton  submerged) I-400 submarine carry three floatplanes during the World War II. However, 58 submarines that remained with the defeat in 1945 were taken over by the Allies Forces and have been dismantled or sunk in the Pacific Ocean.

      By outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the National Police Reserve(Later Ground Self-Defense Force) was born in August. While, in April 1952 the Maritime Security Force was organized in the Maritime Safety Agency, and in August the Maritime Self-Defense Force(Hereafter JMSDF) was reformed from the Maritime Security Force and independent from the Maritime Safety Agency.

      During the cold war era, the mission of the JMSDF was aimed the command of the sea of the west Pacific in cooperation with the U.S. navy, against Soviet navy as one of the west side navy, influenced by the confrontation between the east and west. But after surrender the Pacific War, as Japan was enforced by the Allied Occupation Forces to accept the constitution, which declared renunciation of war, as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. By this historical background, and strong anti-military feeling among the peoples, the National Defense Council draw up the Basic Policy for National Defense and it was approved by the Cabinet in May 1957. This policy declared Japan has been making efforts on its own initiative to build a modest defense capability under the Constitution in accordance with the fundamental principals of maintaining an exclusively by defense-oriented policy of not becoming a military power that might pose a threat to other courtiers. Though the Maritime Self-Defense Force esteemed to strengthen operational capability of anti-submarine and mine sweeping operation as allies that the U.S. navy is lacking in the northeast Asia area.

        By this defense policy, the main mission of the JMSDF submarine was surveillance and interception of Soviet combatants in major straits. In order to ensure the safety of Japan’s maritime transportation, the JMSDF needs to maintain the posture capable of deploying two submarines each in the three straits of Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima, where necessary. In order to maintain such capability, it was necessary to possess six divisions with 16 submarines, taking into account geographical relations between submarine bases and sea areas where engage in surveillance and interception operation.


        However, early stages of the 1950s, there were strong opposition to have submarine by left wing political party and peoples. They opposed that submarine is an aggressive weapon and violate what is called “Peace Constitution”. By these oppositions, the construction of the submarine was delayed in comparison with the surface combatants, such as a destroyer and escort ship. So, the JMSDF had to ask the assistance for the U.S. navy for the target submarine needed for ASW training. Then fleet type submarine Mingo(SS-261) of U.S. navy was lent, on the basis of the Japan-U.S. Weapon Loan Agreement that was concluded in August 1955 and she was turn-over to the JMSDF and named Kuroshio(SS-501).Thus after 10 year’s interval of defeat of the Pacific War, Japanese new navy ? the JMSDF could hosted the Rising?Sun flag again to the sale of the submarine.

        Thereafter, Kuroshio carry our the duty as the underwater target boat and submarine’s crew OJT(On the Job training) ship, as the sole submarine of the JMSDF for about 5 years until the first domestic submarine come out and take over this role. As there was very strong anti-military feeling among peoples of Japan, the JDSDF could not use the word of submarine, so it was called as “an underwater high-speed target” for budge requirement and public announcements. These feeling still continued and Japanese submarines are still imposed several fateful restriction from the time of the birth to nowadays.

        From FY1958 to FY1977, the JMSDF was reinforcing by Five Years Defense Built-up Program four times, accordance with the Basic Policies for National Defense. This Basic Policies for National Defense include an exclusively defense-oriented policy, and also, adherence to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, -- “Japan do not make or use any nuclear weapons and do not permit to bring into any nuclear weapon in Japanese territories”, also maintaining firmly the Japan - U.S. security arrangements.

         But in 1970s there aroused the strong opinion that Japan should restrict armament accordance with the world situation of the U.S and Soviet peace talk, the National Defense Policy and National Defense Buildup Program Outline were reviewed in October 1976. Further more as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the defense power of the necessary minimum as an independent state which means not to become over the unstableness in our country periphery and self "becomes the blank of power” was decided by the National Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet in November 1995. Accordance with this new National Defense Buildup Program Outline, first Mid-Term Defense Built-up Plan (FY1980-FY1983) was adopted in December 1979.

        By this new National Defense Buildup Program Outline, defense capabilities and major units and main equipment of the JMSDF were again reviewed, and due to the deterioration of finances, necessary expenses were significantly reduced in December 1997. The submarine forces were also reviewed by this new National Defense Buildup Program Outline, but six divisions sixteen submarines were maintained, thought about 10% of the JMSDF forces were reduced by the policy of streaming, making it more efficient and compact.

Oyashio class:First home built submarine

                       







The idea of the construction of the domestic production proceeded as an alternation of Kuroshio in early 1954. The construction idea of the shift Kuroshio sprouted three types of boats, 1,000 tons class(10 knot on surface, 20 knot in submerged), 500 tons class(9 knot on surface 17 knot in submerged) and 250 tons class(9 knot on surface, 13 knot in submerged) and these three plans were examined by the Under Water Weapon Study Committee of the Maritime Staff Office .
However, on that time, it was difficult to get 20 knot in underwater as lack of space to install big engines, so finally 1000 tons plan was adopted in December 1957 by the Maritime Staff Office. Construction began at the Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd. Kobe Shipbuilding Yard from December 1957, she launched in May 1959 and after half year’s sea trial, she joined the Fleet in June 1960, as the name of Oyashio(SS-511).

        During construction stages, there aroused many difficulties, as technical blank of not constructing submarine for 10 years. Though basic design was adopted from the high-speed submarines I-201 class(1070ton, Lx79m, Wx5,8m, surface 2750 horsepower 15,8 knot, underwater 5000 horspoer 19 knot) of the Imperial Japanese navy. And also technology of the Imperial navy such as the automatic depth holding system was adapted, but the snorkel and other new devices were introduced from the U.S. navy sending technical missions and submariner to the U.S. navy, and learned not only technology, but also submarine operation and tactics.

        The JMSDF learn from the U.S. navy and also the submariners were tamed to the devices and system of the U.S navy through the Kuroshio, so if there was not big difference between Japan and America, applied the U.S. navy’s methods. During the construction increased 130 tons, and finally displacement became 1130 tons. She equipped four tubes for 533mm torpedoes. Power system was diesel-electric, two diesel Kawasaki MAN type of V8V22/30MATL, 2700 horsepower, two main motors of 5900 horsepower and two shaft, speed was 13 knot on surface, 19 knot in underwater , the battery was 4 groups of 120 cells. NS 46 high tension steel was used in hull, this high tension steel NS46 means 46kg pressure on 1mm square.

        On that time, as there were no training facilities for submariners in Japan, there aroused a demand to dispatches submarine to Hawaii to use the U.S. navy’s training facilities, and to learn tactics. This training is continued from 1968 to now and expanded to the LimPac Exercise including not only submarines, but also surface ships and air plain to improve tactical level and closer relations between the JMSDF and the U.S. navy.

Characteristics of Oyashio
● Displacement 1130 ton(double hull) NS 46 high tension steel.
● Length 79 m×beam7.0 m×depth 5,9 m×4,6m, L/D(Length/Depth Ratio) 13,4,
● Power Plant:Diesel-electronic, 2 diesel engine(Kawasaki V8V24/30AMTL) 2700 horsepower 13 knot on surface, 2 main motor 5900 horsepower 19 knot in submerged(Battery 120 set 2 groups)
● Armament 533mm torpedo tubes x 4
● Complement 65
● Contractor Kawasaki Heavy Industries Kobe

Remarks 1:The name of submarine of the JMSDF was name after from oceanographic phenomenon of “Shio(Tide)” in Japanese
Remarks 2: Submarine is constructed at the ex-Imperial navy’s main submarine Contractor of the New Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Kobe and the Kawasaki Heavy Industries Kobe alternately at a rate of one per two years in fiscal year.

Hayashio/Natsushio class: Small type submarine











The plans for next submarine Hayashio(SS-521) begin with 700 tons but it become 750 tons, and first Hayashio class boats begin construction in June 1960 at New Mitsubishi Heavy Industry Kobe and lunched in June 1962, other was constructed by Kawasaki Heavy Industry in Kobe in June 1960 and also lunched in June 1962, and two more Natsushio class boats constructed in 1963. Hayashio class was firstly esteemed for coastal defense and for blocking the three straits as a attack-submarine(SSK) in war time, and also aimed to be under-water target submarine for ASW training in the peace time.

        The speed decreased 14 knot in submerged with 2300 horsepower and surface 11 knot with 900 horsepower. Battery system was 120 shell and 2 groups. Due to the small boat, torpedo tubes were limited only six, but from this class hydrographic launching tubes were introduced from air launching tubes. Also from this class, two sonar systems were adopted, one is passive bow sonar, and the other was active sonar under the sail covered by FRP dome for ranging. The big difference of Hayashio and Natsushio is length, from Natsushio class canning tower were expanded 1.5 m for astern and overall length became 59m to 61m and displacement increased 790 tons.

        The JMSDF constructed three classes of ten submarines by the First(FY1958 - FY1962) and the Second (FY1962 ? FY1967) Defense Built-up Programs. But, as Hayashio was constructed after long blank of construction, there were many malfunctions and troubles, and that Hayashio class was too small for stable snorkeling in the rough sea around Japan, and also as restricted in endurances capability because of poor habitability. By theses reasons, small size submarine 750 ton class were not considered in Japan after Hayashio class. Hayashio class constructed 4 boats,

Characteristics of Hayashio(Natsusio)class 
● Displacement 750(790) ton(double hull, partly single in astern section),NS 30 high tension steel
● Length 59(61) m×beam 6,5 m×depth 6,4×draft 4,1m, L/D 9,2
● Power Plant Diesel-electronic, 2 diesel engines(Mitsubishi Kobe 6LDA25B), 900 horsepower 11 knot surface, 2 main motors, 2300 horsepower 14 (15)knot in submerged(Battery 120 set 2 groups)
● Armament 533mm torpedo tubes x 3
● Complement 40

Name(Commissioned/Decommissioned)
Hayashio(SS-521) (Commissioned 1962)(Decommissioned 1977) (Mitsubishi)
Wakashio (SS-522)(Commissioned 1962)(Decommissioned 1979)(Kawasaki)
Natsushio(SS-523)(Commissioned 1963)(Decommissioned 1978)(Mitsubishi)
Fuyushio(SS-524)(Commissioned 1963)(Decommissioned 1980)(Kawasaki)

Ooshio/Asashio Class: Ocean type submarine 











From operational experiences of small submarines, these small submarines were lacking operational stability in the rough sea, especially in snorkeling. Next submarine was considered for large multipurpose submarine for patrol, surveillance, reconnaissance and crew’s training. Ooshio class went to the sea in March 1965, then Asashio of 1650 tons improved type of Ooshio was commissioned in October 1966.
      By enlargement of displacement, eight 533mm torpedo tubes in bow and two short range homing torpedo tubes in stern which aimed as the counter-attack for anti-submarine ships(Later short range torpedo tubes were take off). Bow Torpedo tube became from air pressure launching to hydraulic launching. New steering and engines automation systems and auto-course holder were adapted. From this class provided a steering system became aircraft type stick control at the diving stand.

        This class was expected, as an underwater target use, so boat was esteemed high speed to carry out may services with a few submarines, so compromised with 18 knots in underwater with main motor of 6300 horsepower, 14 knot on surface with Man V8V24/30AMTL 2900 horsepower, two shafts. From these reasons underwater performance as a submarine was not realized until appearance of tears drop submarine. The L/D ratio become 11,7 in this class while Hayashio class was 9,2. From Asashio class screw propeller become 5 blades and safety depth increased by high tension steel NS 46.

 Charactlistics of Ooshio(Asashio)class
● Displacement:1600(1650) ton (double hull, partly single in astern section),NS 46 high tension steel
● Length 88 m×beam 8,2 m×depth 7,5×draft 4,7(4,9)m (L/D 11,7)
● Power Plant:Diesel-electronic, 2 diesel engines(Kawasaki V8V24/30AMTL), 2900 horsepower×2 14 knot on surface, 2 main motor 6300 horsepower, 18 knot in submerged(Battery 120 set 4 groups)
● Armament 533mm torpedo tubes×8, 533mm Anti Submarine Torpedo×2 astern
● Complement 82
Name(Commissioned/Decommissioned)
Ooshio(SS-561)(Commissioned 1965)(Decommissioned 1981)(Mitsubishi)
Asashio(SS-562) (Commissioned 1966)(Decommissioned 1983)(Kawasaki)
Harushio(SS-563)(Commissioned 1967)(Decommissioned 1984) (Mitsubishi)
Michishio(SS-564)(Commissioned 1968)(Decommissioned 1985) (Kawasaki)
Fuyushio(SS-565)(Commissioned 1969)(Decommissioned 1986) (Mitsubishi)
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Uzushio class: The first tear drop type submarine 

                      








Uzushio class was the historic mile stone for the Japanese submarine that changed the application of the submarine which esteemed the surface ability than underwater ability. Ten kinds of models were made, to design the hull that demonstrated underwater performance, and conducted the water tank experiment to collect data for design of submarine figure and could get tears drop type submarine with one axis, L/D changed from conventional submarine 11,7(Oyashio class) to 7,1 in tear drop type. Also, the development of new steel necessary to expand safety depth was started.

        First boat of the Uzushio class began construction in January, 1971 and seven boats were constructed in the Third Defense Build-up Programs (FY1967-FY1972), and the Fourth Defense Build up Programs (FY1972-FY1977). By the adoption of tears drop type, underwater performance increased largely in comparison with the conventional submarine. Power plant was diesel-electric propulsion with two Kawasaki MAN V8V24/30AMTL diesel engines and speed was 12 knot by 3400 horsepower, output of main electric motor was 7200 horsepower, and estimated speed was 20 knot pulse in the under water. Battery became 240 set 2 groups from this class.

       New high tension steel NS63 was used on hull to increase the safety submerge depth to 300m(est). Increased tonnage brought space, deck becomes three layers, and this improved not only habitability of performance but also could equipped many devices. Carbonic acid gas absorbent air cleaner, the emergency blow system(Main blow tank), installation of spare torpedo, and could equipped the steerage device, trim and depth adjustment automatic controller, automatic direction holder, and automatic steerage of three dimensions.

       From the Uzushio class increased tonnages to 1850 ton, torpedo tube in bow was removed to the mid-ship section to install large sonar ZQQ-1 in bow(from Isoshio ZQQ-2, from Takashio ZQQ-3), also plane removed from bow to the sail. This plane characterized the tears drop style submarine from external form. In Japan, when the Uzushio commissioned, some member of the opposition political member pursue question in the Diet that the JMSDF was aiming to use nuclear power to submarine contrary to the "The three Non-Nuclear Principles", if an engine was changed to nuclear reactor, it could convert to nuclear submarine easily.

 Characteristics of Uzushio class
● Displacement:1850 ton(double hull, partly single in astern section),NS46 high tension steel
● Length 72 m×beam 9,9 m×depth 10.1 m×draft 7,5m(L/D 7,1)
● Power Plant Diesel-electronic, 2 diesel engines(Kawasaki V8V24/30AMTL), 3400 horsepower 12 knot, 1 main motor 7200 horsepower, 20 knot in submerged
● Armament 533mm torpedo tubes×6
● Complement 75(80 Takashio and Yaeshio)
Uzushio(SS-566)(Commissioned 1971)(Scraped 1987) (Kawasaki)
Makishio(SS-567) (Commissioned 1972) (Scraped 1988) (Mitsubishi)
Isoshio(SS-568) (Commissioned 1972)(Converted ASU-8001 1989)(Used as a target of
new torpedo and then scraped in 1992) (Kawasaki)
Narushio(SS-569)(commissioned 1973)(Converted ASU-8002, 1990)(Scraped 1993)
(Mitsubishi)
Kuroshio(SS-570)(Commissioned 1974)(Converted ASU-8003 1991)(Scraped 1994)
(Kawasaki)
Takashio(SS-570) (Commissioned 1976)(Converted ASU-8004 1992)(Scraped 1995)
(Mitsubishi)
Yaeshio(SS-572) (Commissioned 1978)(Converted ASU-8005 1994)(Scraped 1996)
(Kawasaki)
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Yushio class: Second Tear Drop type Submarine 















Yushio class submarine was the second generation of tear-drop boats, from FY1975 to FY1985, 10 boats were constructed. This class is double hull structure and used new high tension steel NS80 and safety depth increased 400m(est). The main engines are Kawasaki MAN V8V24/30ATMTL type, 12 knot at snorkel, and 20 knot in the water. From this class, high capacity new battery were installed, screw rotation are lower than Asashio class with five blades husky propeller. Automatic steerage system of three dimensions, automatic depth and direction holder system were equipped. VLF communication was also possible, net-work-centric combat systems were incorporated in operation room, which enhance adaptability of operations.

        Serial improvement were tried on Yushio class, while constructing 10 boats, from 1984 Nadashio (SS-579) equipped Harpoon missiles launcher with 533mm torpedo tube, by this new system, displacement increased 50 tons and become 2250 tons from 2200 tons. From 1981 Mochishio(SS-574) installed masker, in 1987 from Okishio (SS-576) equipped TASS(Towed Array Sonar System), Hamashio(SS-578) installed modified bow sonar ZQC-4 and attack sonar(active) in the sail in 1986, inertia navigation system was adapted in 1991, sixth boats are still active among ten constructed.

       The reason why Japanese submarine increased displacement constantly are installation of many kind of the weapons aiming a various functions for one submarine, as the total number of submarines are limited within 16 by the National Defense Buildup Program Outline. By this limitation, the JMSDF must decommissioned all boat which passed 16 years then assigned reserve, consequently all Japanese boat served sixteen years of front line, then assigned an axially training submarine for three years, then scraped and finished 19 years life. Furthermore as Japan strictly adopts a firm policy of banning prohibiting the exportation of a submarine or any weaponry, so mass production of auxiliaries equipments are push up high price because of small production, this also enforced effective usages of defense expenditures and oppressing defense budget.

 Characteristics of Yushio class
● Displacement 2250 ton (Complete double hull, partly single in astern part),NS80 high tension steel
● Length 76 m×beam 9,9 m×depth 10,2 m×draft 7,4 m(L/D 7,5)
● Power Plant Diesel-electronic, 2 diesel engines(Kawasaki V8V24/30AMTL), 3400 horsepower 12kt on surface, one main motor, 7200 horsepower 20 knot in submerged (screw 5 high-skew blades)
● Armament 533mm HU603 type tubes for torpedo and Harpoon×6
● Complement 75

Present states of Yushio class(Constructed 10 boats)
Yushio(SS-573)(Commissioned 1980)Converted 1996 ASU-8006(Scraped 1999) (Mitsubishi)
Mochishio(SS-574) (Commissioned 1981)Converted 1997 ASU-8007(Scraped 2000) (Kawasaki)
Setoshio(SS-575) (Commissioned 1982)Converted 1998 ASU-8008(Scraped 2001) (Mitsubishi)
Okishio(SS-576) (Commissioned 1983)Converted TSS-3603(Scraped 2001) (Kawasaki)
Nadashio(SS-577) (Commissioned 1984) (Scraped 2002) (Mitsubishi)
Hamashio(SS-578) (Commissioned 1985)Converted 2002 TSS-3604(Kawasaki)
Akishio(SS-579) (Commissioned 1986) (Mitsubishi)
Takeshio(SS-580) (Commissioned 1987) (Kawasaki)
Yukishio(SS-581) (Commissioned 1988) (Mitsubishi)
Sachishio(SS-582) (Commissioned 1989) (Kawasaki)
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Harushio class: Third Tear drop type submarines 



The Harusio class is the third generation of the tear-drop submarine construction began from FY1986 to FY1992, and seven boats were constructed. Harushio class followed fundamentally adapted design of Yushio class, but increased 250 tons in displacement. This type was esteems improvement of the underwater maneuverability, expanded search and attack ability. The main motor’s rotation is slower than Yushio class with seven blades high-skew propeller.
       
          The various measures have been carried out to improve noise and tried to make silent submarine cut on noise of not only main engines but also auxiliary machines. Main engines and main motor were fitted on emission double anti-vibration rubber to reduce of a noise, pipe system, gears, and gaskets were improved, and also snorkel noise are reduced. Harushio class became a considerably quieter boat adapting noise-cut in auxiliary machines, while underwater speed, underwater endurances, safe submerge depth are greatly improved. High tension steel NS110 is adopted with a double shell hull and safety depth is extended 500 m(est). New inverter of electric power transformation(CVCF), which transform of 400 Hz and 60 Hz of the power supply, this help noise reduction and also saving electric power. From this type, torpedo/USM tubes were equipped from constriction stages, fitted with ZQQ-5 sonar system(From Nadashio ZQQ-5B type) combined with TASS and side-array-sonar as a unit. The reception of the communication became possible at the submerged states by the introduction of VLF receiver.

      Length of the ship become longer than Yushio class by 1.2 m and increased 190 tons and become finally 2,490 tons. Main engine are adopted newly developed Kawasaki MAN 12V25/25S, output became 3,100 horsepower, main battery were 240 shells of 2 groups. The IR detection and ESM devices and comfortable habitability of the crew were also improved. For weapons torpedo are changed to Type 89 torpedo in 1989.The tears drop submarine’s construction began from 1971 and constructed 7 Uzushio class, 10 Yushio class, 7 Harusshio class, totally 24 tear-drop boats to the fleet until 1990.

Characteristics of Harushio class

● Displacement 2450 ton(Asashio 2500 tons) (Double hull, partly single in astern part)NS110 high tension steel
● Length 77 m×beam 10.0 m×depth 10.5 m, draft 7.7m(L/D 7.3)
● Power Plant:Diesel-electronic, 2 diesel engines(Kawasaki 12V25/25S, 3400 horsepower 12kt on surface, one main motor 7200 horsepower 20knot plus in submerged
● Armament 533mm Hu603B type torpedo tubes for 89 type torpedo and Harpoon×6
● Complement 75(Asashio 71)
Same type ships(Commissioned)
SS-583 Harushio(November 30, 1990) (Mitsubishi)
SS-584 Natsushio(March 20, 1991) (Kawasaki)
SS-585 Hayashio(March 25, 1992) (Mitsubishi)
SS-586 Arashio(March 17, 1993) (Kawasaki)
SS-587 Wakasio(March 1, 1994) (Mitsubishi)
SS-588 Fuyushio(March 7, 1995) (Kawasaki)
SS-589 Asashio(March 12, 1997) Converted TSS-3601(March 2000) (Mitsubishi)
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Oyashio type: Cigarette type submarine



Oyashio class is the successor of the Yushio class, and the first submarine of the cigarette type submarine in the JMSDF. While planing Harushio, there began two studies for next submarine. One is material for secrecy from active sonar to absorb reflection. Another is automatic steering, trim control system which were also carried out in parallel in these studies. From 1991 to 1992, integrates submarine operation(Fire control) system was discussed by the Next Term Submarine Technology Examination Committee, member of a committee was Technical, Equipment, Defense Department of MSO, Submarine Fleets and Technology Research Center. These studies are applied to new tactical integrated operation(fire control) system.

        From this class to improve search ability, new ZQQ-5(from Michishio ZQQ-5B, Makishio ZQQ-6) sonar was equipped in bow and passive detecting sonar was top of the sail. Also developed array sonar fitted on hull and TASS sonar was fitted astern part. By these sonars capability of the detection in a long-distance was greatly expanded. Main engine is same as Harushio class, but output of main motor is increased 550 horsepower. From Arashio(SS-586) screw changed 5 to 7 blades with high-skew propeller. For weapon new 89 type torpedo and six torpedo/USM(Harpoon) combined tube are in bow and two automatic mine launchers are fitted on stern part. The big different of Oyashio class is changed hull structure to the simple shell partly from double shell with new high tension steel NS110. Torpedo tubes in bow were removed to mid-ship section, and for anti-detection stealthy for reflection hull is slanted and also sail is covered noise absorptive tile. Main engine is same as Harushio, Kawasaki 12V25/25S, but output power increased 550 horsepower.

       Construction of the first Oyashio class began January 1994, and commissioned in March 1998, and now six are in active and more two are under construction. During construction, in 2000 from Uzushio(SS-594) the solid aminn carbonic acid gas absorption device was adopted, and from Isoshio(SS-593) floating antenna was introduced.From 1960 to now the JMSDF constructed 40 diesel powered submarine, 10 were pre-tear-drop type boats, 24 were tear-drop type boats and 6 were cigarette type boats. But as there is the restriction of "The Non-Nuclear Three principle" ,nuclear engines are not allowed to use, so the JMSDF started next population Project of the AIP(Air Dependent Propulsion) engine from 2000, installing Stirling engine of the Swedish Kockums Co. ITD. , fitted on Asashio (TSS-3601) and started test from December, 2001.

Charactlistics of Oyashio class
● Displacement: 2750 ton, (double hull partly simple hull in astern)NS110 high tension steel)
● Length 82 m×beam 8,9 m×depth 10.3 m×draft7.9m(L/D 8,0)
● Power Plant Diesel-electronic, 2 diesel engines(Kawasaki 12V25/25S,3400 horsepower 12kt on surface, one main motor one shaft 7700 horsepower 20k plus submerged with 7 blades propeller
● Armament 533mm type 87 torpedo Hu603B type tubes with Harpoon×6
● Complement 70

Same type of boat   (Commissioned)    (Company built by)
SS-590 Oyashio      (March 16, 1998)   (Kawasaki)
SS-591 Michishio   (March 10,1999)    (Mitsubishi)
SS-592 Uzuishio     (March 9, 2000)     (Kawasaki)
SS-593 Makishio    (March 29, 2001)    (Mitsubishi)
SS-595 Isoshio        (March 14,2002)    (Kawasaki)
SS-595 Narushio     (March,15, 2003)    (Mitsubishi)
SS-596 Kuroshio    (March 8, 2004)       (Kawasaki)
SS-597 Takashio    (March 9, 2005)       (Mitsubishi)
SS-598 Yaeshio      (March 9, 2006)      (Kawasaki)
SS-599  Setoshio    (February 28, 2007) (Mitsubishi)
SS-600  Mochishio (March 6, 2008)      (Kawasaki)
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Soryu type: Cigarette type submarine




The Sōryū-class submarines (16SS) are diesel-electric submarines that entered service with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force in 2009. The design is an evolution of the Oyashio class submarine, from which it can most easily be distinguished by its X-shaped tail planes. The Sōryūs have the largest displacement of any submarine used by post war Japan.

At 84 m long and 4,200-tons submerged, Soryu is significantly larger than the original 11 Oyashio-class boats (81 m and 3,500 tons), in order to incorporate a Kockums Stirling air independent propulsion (AIP) system. With the Kockums Stirling AIP system the submarine doesn't have to surface to charge the batteries and thus increases the submerged endurance from days to weeks. Components for the AIP, which will enhance the vessel's stealth and special operations capability, were supplied by the Swedish company for assembly in Japan.

The Soryus design features higher automation (particularly in combat systems) and computer-aided X control planes. The revolutionary X rudder configuration was first developed by Kockums for the Swedich Gotland-class. The X rudder provides the submarine with extreme manoeuvrability and also enables it to operate very close to the seabed. The Soryu's hull is clad in anechoic coating and the interior features sound isolation of loud components. An anechoic coating has a major effect on the avoidance of detection. 

The Soryu was was launched at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries' Kobe shipyard on December 2007 and commissioned in March 2009. It was formerly known as the "SS 2,900 ton" and the "16SS" project as it originated in the 16th year of the current Emperor's reign (2003).

The cost of the sixth Soryu ( the "Kokuryu") was estimated at 540 US$ million.

Japanese submarines since World War II were named after ocean currents. However, the JMSDF changed its naming convention with the Sōryu and submarines will now be named after mythological creatures. Sōryū (そうりゅう) means blue (or green) dragon in Japanese.

Characteristics of Soryu class (main source)




Displacement:
Surfaced: 2,900 tonnes (2,854 long tons)
Submerged: 4,200 t (4,134 long tons)
Length:
84.0 m (275 ft 7 in)
Beam:
9.1 m (29 ft 10 in)
Draught:
8.5 m (27 ft 11 in)

Steel - Japanese Ministry of Defense Standard Naval Steel (NS)80 and NS110
Depth:
Propulsion:
1-shaft 2× Kawasaki 12V 25/25 SB-type diesel engines diesel-electric
4× Kawasaki Kockums V4-275RStirling engines
3,900 hp (2,900 kW) surfaced
8,000 hp (6,000 kW) submerged
Speed:
Surfaced: 13 kn (24 km/h; 15 mph)
Submerged: 20 kn (37 km/h; 23 mph)
Complement:
65 (9 officers, 56 enlisted)
Sensors and
processing systems:
ZPS-6F surface/low-level air search radar
Hughes/Oki ZQQ-7 Sonar suite: 1× bow-array, 4× LF flank arrays and 1×Towed array sonar
Electronic warfare
& decoys:
Combat System locally designed and built. ZLR-3-6 ESM equipment
2× 3-inch underwater countermeasure launcher tubes for launching of Acoustic Device Countermeasures (ADCs)
Armament:
6×HU-606 21 in (533 mm) torpedo tubes with 30 reloads for:
1.) Type 89 torpedoes
2.) UGM-84 Harpoon
Mines

The Soryus are envisaged to be a class of ten. As at January 2015 five AIP equipped Soryus (which I call Soryu 1s) had been Commissioned. One more AIP Soryu/Soryu 1 is due to be Commissioned in March 2015. 

While the first six Soryus (SS-501 to SS-506) utililize AIP the Soryus from SS-507 onwards are expected to be "improved" Soryus . The "improved" Soryus are expected to have no AIP, no lead-acid bateries, but instead Lithium-ion batteries. I call these improved Soryus "Soryu 2s". One report of September 29, 2014 indicates:"Six of 10 Soryu-class submarines which take about four years to build...have been completed. Japan’s Defense Ministry has just requested 64.4 billion yen (US $589.5 million) to start building [four Soryu 2s, starting with SS-507] from April 2015, and this — and three other boats — will use Lithium-ion batteries."


Project no.Building no.Pennant no.Name/NamesakeLaid downLaunchedCommissionedBuilt By
S1318116SS-501Sōryū (そうりゅう?) / Blue Dragon31 March 20055 December 200730 March 2009Mitsubishi
S131'''''8117SS-502Unryū (うんりゅう?) / Cloud Dragon31 March 200615 October 200825 March 2010[11]Kawasaki
8118SS-503Hakuryū (はくりゅう?) / White Dragon6 February 200716 October 200914 March 2011Mitsubishi
8119SS-504Kenryū (けんりゅう?) / Sword Dragon, Stegosauria31 March 200815 November 201016 March 2012Kawasaki
8120SS-505Zuiryū (ずいりゅう?) / Auspicious Dragon16 March 200920 October 20116 March 2013Mitsubishi
8121SS-506Kokuryū (こくりゅう?) / Black Dragon21 January 201131 October 2013(March 2015) Kawasaki
S131'''''8122SS-507Jinryū (じんりゅう?)/ Benevolent Dragon14 February 20128 October 2014(March 2016) Mitsubishi
S1318123SS-508 ?2015?2017? 2019?) Kawasaki
S1318124SS-509 ? 2017 ? ? Mitsubishi?
S1318125SS-510 ? 2019? ? ? Kawasaki
S131                   ? SS-511     ?                                 2021         ?                 ?                        Mitsubishi   

Submarine Organization

In February, 1960 in accordance with the increase of submarines, submarine base was opened at Kure in the Inland Sea of western part of Japan, in there Kure Submarine Education Department was established as the attachment of the Kure Submarine Base. In 1961 submarine rescue ship ASR Chihaya (1340 tons diving bell type) was commissioned and in August 1962, the First Submarine Division was formed to conduct submarine operation and submarine rescue operation. In February, 1965 accordance with increase of submarines, the First Submarine Division reformed to the First Submarine Flotilla.

In 1981 along with the reinforcement of the submarines, the Submarine Fleet was newly formed in Yokosuka, under the Self Defense Fleets with the 1st and 2nd submarine Flotilla, the Submarine Education and Training Division(SETD) and the 1st Submarine Training Division. The Submarine Fleet commander is responsible to all operations of submarine including the submarine rescue activity and also unification of submarine tactics. Each submarine flotilla consists of a submarine base and 2 or 3 submarines divisions. The Submarine Flotilla Commander is type commander and responsible to the training, the Submarine Base commander is responsible for logistics support.

Submarine Education and Training Division(Kure Base) has a detachments in Yokouska, Submarine Education and Training Division has Submarine diving simulation trainer, Submarine Tactics Simulatio Trainer and navigation Simulation trainer which help level up of tactical skill. Yokosuka Tactics Support Division(YTSD) operate DSRVT(Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle Trainer) for rescue crew of DSRV craft. The escape training installation and fire-water fighting facility located at the First Service School (Etajima) in the Inland Sea, opposite side of the Kure Submarine Base.

Submarine Organization chart

In the following chart there are more submarines than the 16 meant to be in service - hence there are question marks (?). Firm records are out of date. So advice is sort on the correct submarine names and numbers. 

Note that Japan intends to expand its submarine fleet to 22 active submarines - in doing so creating a new Division.

Defense Fleet(Yokosuka)
Submarine Fleet(Yokosuka)

1st Training Submarine Division (Kure)
- Hayashio (TSS-3606, SS-585)?
- Fuyushio (TSS-3607, SS-588)?
- Asashio (TSS-3601 - a AIP testbed, now Lithium battery testbed? SS-589)
Submarine Education and Training Division (Kure)
Submarine Education and Training Detachment (Yokosuka)

1st Submarine Flotilla (Kure)
Submarine Rescue ship Chihaya(ASR-403) (Kure)
First Submarine Division (Kure)
- Michishio (SS-591)? 
- Makishio (SS-593)?
- Isoshio (SS-594)?
3rd Submarine Division (Kure)and/or 5th Submarine Division (Kure)?
- Kuroshio (SS-596)?
- Takashio (SS-597)?
- Yaeshio (SS-598)?
- Setoshio (SS-599)?

- Mochishio (SS-600)?
Soryu (SS-501)
- Unryu (SS-502)
- Hakuryu (SS-503)
- Kenryu (SS-504)
Kure Submarine Base
 
2nd Submarine Flotilla (Yokosuka)
Submarine Rescue ship Chiyoda (ASR405) (Yokosuka)
2nd Submarine Division(Yokosuka)
- Oyashi (SS-590)?
4th SubmarineDivision(Yokosuka)
- Uzushio (SS-592)? 
- Narushio (SS-595)?
6th Submarine Division(Yokosuka)
- Zuiryu (SS-505)?
- Kokuryu (SS-506)?
Yokosuka Submarine Base

Remarks:ASR Chihaya(5400 tons), ASR Chiyoda(3650 tons) both installed DSRV (Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle)

The Soryu, Oyashio and Harushio classes to scale.

Is Japan's Soryu Sales Pitch Too Arrogant? Andrews at ASC tomorrow.

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The Soryu lobby (Japan of course but to an extent the US) issued what amounts to a Soryu Press Release (see below) on January 20, 2015. This is possibly to influence a short statement Australian Defence Minister Kevin Andrews is expected to make during his visit to the Australian Submarine Corporations (ASC) submarine facility in Adelaide tomorrow (January 22, 2015).

COMMENT

The "Soryu Press Release" is a Japan Times article of January 20, 2015. The article/Press Release:

- starts with an unusual interview attributed to a retired Japanese submarine admiral. The "interview" (and entire Press Release) would have been written by and cleared by the Japan Ministry of Defence.
- discusses the purportedly superior technical virtues of the Soryu without giving any numerical figures to back up the claims
- that Australia is interested in the Soryu.
- there is the exaggerated implication that Australia is privileged to be allowed to receive such a Japanese technical achievement.
- but nevertheless Japan may not carry out the standard industrial task of revealing to Australia what technical secrets are behind the Soryu "Japan...has yet to decide which secrets to share",.
- that the US is in favour of the Soryu export to Australia for the US's own financial reasons
- the implication that Japan is the only supplier of Lithium-ion batteries for submarine (Germany and France are also offering such batteries)
- makes the standard claim that is Australia is happy to work in strategic alliance with Japan and the US over Japan's interest in contested islands in the East China and South China Seas
- basically Japan's Soryu pitch is put in an arrogant way - that the sale is about Australia's strategic obligations.

There is no recognition that Australia will incur major economic costs by sacrificing much of its ship-submarine building industry to service the US and Japan alliance.

The risks for Australia of being Japan's first major defence customer are ignored.

That Japan should feel fortunate in having such a compliant and trusting first major customer is also ignored. 

An incentive for Japan is, of course, is Australia's money to offset Soryu 2 (Lithium battery) development costs.

 The article/pitch/Press Release is below - with string  http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/01/18/national/stealth-tech-no-given-in-japanese-sub-deal/#.VL3UDUeUen8 :


"Stealth tech no given in Japanese sub deal

BY REIJI YOSHIDA
Retired Vice Admiral Masao Kobayashi commanded Japan’s submarine fleet from 2007 to 2009. In a recent interview in Tokyo with The Japan Times, when asked to explain one of the country’s most tightly guarded military secrets, he seemed reflective.
Kobayashi pointed to the ceiling lights in the quiet interview room and said: “Take those fluorescent lights, for example. Any fluorescent light generates sound.”
Other than our voices, there were no other sounds in the room.
“Fluorescent lights generate extremely small vibrations. We take anti-vibration measures for every single light in a submarine,” he said.
Japan’s engineers have painstakingly worked to minimize the vibrations given off by the multitude of components in submarines to prevent even those undetectable by the human ear from being picked up by the super-sensitive sonars of enemy subs and sonobuoys from anti-submarine aircraft, Kobayashi said.
Noisy components include fans, pumps, motors and fluorescent lights. Some are carefully muted with vibration-damping rubber, he said.
“The quiet submarines we have today are the result of numerous long, patient efforts,” Kobayashi said.
The Maritime Self-Defense Force’s submarines are not nuclear-powered but have a reputation for being ultra-quiet.
Now Australia, seeking to build a new fleet of large, long-range submarines, seems keen on acquiring Japan’s latest Soryu-class subs, or at least their technology.
If the deal goes through, the top-secret submarines will become the first major pieces of military hardware Japan has authorized for export since the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe lifted the decades-long blanket ban on arms sales last year.
Vice Adm. Robert Thomas, commander of the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet, reportedly said Oct. 24 in Tokyo that then-Australian Defense Minister David Johnston was very interested in Japan’s Soryu-class subs.
“I talked to him about it four years ago and I said: ‘You want to find the finest diesel-electric submarine made on the planet — it’s made at Kobe works in Japan,’ Thomas was quoted as saying by Bloomberg News.
The U.S., which has close but separate security pacts with Japan and Australia, probably wants Australia to buy Japanese submarines because it would greatly strengthen their strategic military ties, Kobayashi said.
Deeper Japan-Australia military cooperation would help ease the heavy burden on the U.S. fleet, which is busy decommissioning many of the nuclear-powered attack submarines it built during the Cold War, he said.
“The U.S. rapidly built many Los Angeles-class nuclear submarines during the Cold War. Many of them are being decommissioned now,” Kobayashi said.
“I think the U.S. wants to create a strategic triangle of Japan, Australia and the United States. That’s probably a factor behind” the apparent U.S. nod to Australia’s proposal to Japan, he added.
Japanese defense officials are thought to be pleased for the same reason Washington is. They want to deepen strategic military ties with Australia.
“Australia would make a good partner for cooperation. There are no major diplomatic problems between the two countries other than whaling,” a senior Defense Ministry official said on condition anonymity. Australia opposes Japan’s annual whaling expeditions.
Japan has just started receiving the submarine specifications sought by Australia but has yet to decide which secrets to share, two senior defense officials said.
Japan soon plans to use lithium-ion batteries to drive the motors in its latest Soryu sub, making them even quieter. Australia is believed to be interested in this advance, the officials said.
But advanced lithium-ion batteries are one of Japan’s top military secrets, one warned.
“(Exporting) them would be a rather sensitive issue. We’d need to study if it’s really appropriate for an outside party (to have that technology),” the Defense Ministry official said.
In Australia meanwhile, opposition lawmakers and trade unions are strongly opposed to procuring Japanese submarines because it could considerably undermine the domestic defense industry and reduce jobs in South Australia.
Joint development might be an option, the two Japanese officials said, noting that nothing concrete has been officially proposed.
Teruhiko Fukushima, a professor at the National Defense Academy in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture, who is an expert on Australia, said Prime Minister Tony Abbott seems eager to procure the subs to bolster Canberra’s military ties with Japan and the United States.
“Abbott should be considering a Japan-U.S.-Australian alliance as a kind of insurance” against the recent rise of China’s powerful military, Fukushima said.
“The introduction of Soryu-class submarines would be a plus to strengthen that alliance,” he added.
“If the Abbott administration survives the next election and wins a second term, there will be a greater chance that Soryu-class submarines will be introduced in Australia,” he said.
Last June, Australia and Japan conducted “two-plus-two” talks between their foreign and defense ministers.
In the joint statement that followed, Australia expressed “strong opposition to the use of force or coercion to unilaterally alter the status quo in the East China Sea and the South China Sea,” an apparent warning to China to not aggressively press its territorial claims in those areas, which include the Japan-controlled Senkaku Islands, which China and Taiwan also claim. China calls the uninhabited islets Diaoyu and Taiwan calls them Tiaoyutai.
Fukushima also said that on Nov. 26, 2013, only three days after Beijing declared the establishment of an air defense identification zone over the East China Sea that included the Senkakus, the Abbott administration summoned the Chinese ambassador in Canberra to express its concerns after the ADIZ drew strong protests from Tokyo and Washington.
“There is no doubt Abbott puts great emphasis on the relationship shared by Japan, the U.S. and Australia,” Fukushima said.
But he also noted that China is Australia’s No. 1 trade partner and that the public would never approve of political actions that could seriously damage those economic ties.
“The best way for Abbott is to strengthen the Japan-U.S.-Australian relationship while maintaining good economic ties with China at the same time. Australia would never turn its back on the Chinese market,” he said." ENDS

Pete

Future Australian Submarine - French and German Sales Activity

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Two days after meeting Australian Defence Minister Johnston, in Perth on 2 November 2014, French Defence Minister Mr Jean-Yves Le Drian (front row, 3rd from right) was spotted (4 November 2014) aboard the DCNS produced Scorpene submarine KD Tun Abdul Razak at Sepanggar Naval Base, Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia. 
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It is natural that the French Government would be working alongside DCNS to market such a major potential export as the SMX Ocean large conventional submarine.

What may have been the initial phase of marketing the SMX Ocean to Australia at Euronaval 2014, Paris ended on 31 October 2014

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Now in November 2014 marketing continues with Australia future submarine needs likely to have been an item for discussion between the French and Australian Defence Ministers meeting in Perth, Australia on 2 November 2014

The Media Release following the meeting between Australia's Defence Minister, Senator David Johnston and French Defence Minister, Mr Jean-Yves Le Drian, did not specifically mention marketing weapon systems. However the Media Release noted:

"Both Ministers noted close cooperation on naval capabilities and the importance of continued exchanges. The Ministers concluded that France and Australia should continue to work closely on defence capabilities and to share best practices and lessons learned in operational and technical fields."

Corridor discussions with the French Delegation were likely - probably including defence officials, military officers and officials from DCNS Group Australian Branch (the Branch is based in Canberra).

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Later in November the Submarine Institute of Australia is holding a Centenerary Conference (100 years since Australia's first submarines were commissioned) 11-13 November 2014, Fremantle Western Australia. In terms of marketing opportunities the publically available program includes short presentations by potential main contractors from:

France

DCNS - Benoît Gueguen - Submarine Naval Architect, DCNS concering "The SMX Ocean, a world première" 

also a representitive of French company Sagem Defense and Security.

Germany

TKMS - Manfred Klein - Senior Vice-President, Product Management, TKMS on "Establishing a new submarine design capability: the TKMS experience."
     
TKMS - Daniel Mahon - Design Concepts Submarines, TKMS on "AIP - Reflections of a former German Submarine Captain."

also representatives from the German Navy and Siemens.

Note that a high level delegation from TKMS earlier visited Canberra in mid-October 2014.

TKMS Australia has offices in Adelaide and Melbourne, Australia.

Spain, US and Sweden

Representatives of Spain (Navantia), the US and Sweden (Navy) will also be giving presentations.

Speakers from the Japanese Navy and Japanese submarine building firms were notable by their absence - reasons may be many and varied.

COMMENT

All this French, German, Spanish and Swedish marketing activity may be in vain if the frequent Australian-Japanese ministerial level negotiations going on now result in increasingly firm proposals to buy Japan's Soryu, Mark 2 (non-AIP but Lithium-ion battery). 

Pete

Japanese Concerns Over Any Soryu Sale to Australia

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Prime Ministers Abbott and Abe, on April 7, 2014, when they concluded a framework agreement for co-operation on defence equipment and technology (including submarine hydrodynamics). This is/was a preliminary to any Soryu sale. Abbott's political position is now threatened. 
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As Prime Minister Abbott - the main Australian advocate for a Soryu deal  steadily weakens politically it is valuable to consider possible Japanese concerns and misgivings over a Soryu sale.

Several days ago an Anonymous commenter said [retired Admiral]"Kobayashi is not arrogant, he just does not want to sell sub tech, that’s all. Australian thinks that Japan wants to sell her subs like Germany, Sweden or France. But this idea is perfectly wrong and huge misunderstanding, Japan does not want at all. Soryu’s secret is more important and valuable than money which Australia will pay Japan." 

Enlarging on possible Japanese concerns yields the following possibilities.

Unlike other western countries involved in Australia's submarine selection - Japan is the only country actually in danger of conflict - with North Korea and to a lesser extent with Russia and China. Other contenders - Germany, France and Sweden - are not at risk. For these latter three countries the submarine selection is only a commercial-trade matter - while for Japan it is most importantly a strategic alliance, national security matter.

A sale of Soryus to Australia may weaken Japan's national security:

Selling to Australia would involve a major diversion of Japanese industrial and submarine corps resources to plan, train and generally liase with Australian industry and Australian submariners. Japan's limited resources might be better focussed monitoring or more active measures against Japan's potential enemies.

Sales to Australia might disrupt Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI) and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) submarine production lines to supply the Japanese submarine corps. This particularly in view of Japan's goal of expanding its submarine corps from the current 16 operational submarine to the goal of 22 submarines. More specifically there may be strategic pressure for a Soryu earmarked (by contract) for Australia on a production line to be diverted to thJapan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) instead. Such a diversion might raise political and contractual difficulties for Japan.

The prospect of sales to Australia may encourage the Soryu's submarine builders (MHI and KHI) to modify the Soryus to a standard configuration that does not suit JMSDF requirements. For example it is possible that two reasons for Japan's decision to delete Stirling air independent propulsion (AIP)  from the future batch of Soryus were:
- Australia's assessment, since the 1980s, that AIP is problematic, involving negative trade-offs, that  do not meet Australia's needs, and
- for legal property right reasons Japan could not sell Swedish Stirling engine AIP technology to third countries, including Australia.

It is also possible the future batch of Soryu will have much longer range, to suit Australia's operational requirements but this longer range might not be ideal for the JMSDF's needs.

Due to China's trade value to Australia Japan cannot rely on Australia to support Japan in any confrontation or outright conflict with China (eg. arising from East China or South China Sea matters). Australains see the islands in the East China and South China Seas as more to do with current opportunistic economic claims than national historical claims. This means that in any conflict in those seas Australia may support the claims of its major trade partner - which is China.

Australia's security laws and rules may be detrimental to Japan's security overall. Part of the weakness would stem from Chinese government and corporate  influence over Australia. For example Australia's China situation may result in Australian steel-making companies inadvertently sharing newly acquired Japanese steel secrets with Chinese steelmaking business partners.

Australia's laws overall make racial discrimination illegal in employment - particularly for government jobs, including the submarine corps. A main area of Japanese concern might be Australian tolerance of former Chinese citizens, or ethnic Chinese generally, being inducted as Australian submariners or into broader Australian government or submarine-shipbuilding industry positions. China has a reputation for pressuring ethnic Chinese in the West - even if they have only distant cousins or elderly grandparents still living in China. The Chinese government can deny Chinese citizens careers, lose jobs, lose pensions or worse if their Australia based relatives are not cooperative. Australia cannot match Japan's ability to control the ethnic security of submarine crews or such security in the broader submarine industry.

Australians would reject siding with Japan Over Diaoyu Islands Dispute, Survey Finds - Soryu

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Mr Xiangmo Huang with Vice-Chancellor of the University of Technology Sydney (UTS) Professor Ross Milbourne in December 2013. Mr Xiangmo Huang, from China donated the $1.8 million in order to establish the Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI).
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Bob Carr with UTS Vice-Chancellor Professor Ross Milbourne in April 2014. Mr Carr became the Director of the independent Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI)
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Survey Reports Lack of Australian Public Interest in Japan's Disputes or in Japan's Point of View. 

The Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) on January 6, 2015 reported results of a Survey that indicates most Australians would reject siding with Japan and the US against China should a conflict in the East China Sea arise. This may underline the need for Japan to lock in a defence relationship with Australia including by using a Soryu submarine deal.

Few Australian know about or care about several disputes in the East China Sea involving South Korea, China, Taiwan and Japan. Possibly the most dangerous Japan versus China dispute is over the Diaoyu Island chain in the East China Sea - a chain known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan and the Diaoyu Islands in China. Taiwan also claims these islands, calling them the Diaoyutai Islands. Taiwan's capital, Taipei, is the closest capital city of the three countries to these islands, however as it has the weakest navy and weakest national strength Taiwan's claims are ignored. In this three-way contest might clearly makes right - so we will call them the Diaoyu Islands. 

For the results of Australian Attitudes on ANZUS and the East China Sea see the six statistical Survey tables at http://www.uts.edu.au/sites/default/files/ACRI%20Poll.pdf.

The Survey indicated that of "more than" 1,000 Australians [Surveyed] 71% would prefer to remain neutral should a conflict arise. Only 15 per cent of respondents said they supported backing a Japan-US alliance. 4% said Australia should back China and 9% were unsure.

From a slightly different angle the survey found should the US President call and ask the Australian Prime Minister to join in supporting Japan, 68% said Australia should declare itself neutral and not make a military contribution. Only 14% of those surveyed said Australian troops should join allies US and Japan in war while 17% were unsure.


Now it needs to be explained that the survey was commissioned and financed by the recently established Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI) at the University of Technology in Sydney (UTS). ACRI is Chinese financed. ACRI commissioned UMR Research to carry out the Survey (see UMR's website here). 


The Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Treaty Does Not Cover Japan


In the ABC article of January 6, 2015 the Director of ACRI former Australian Foreign Minister Bob Carr is recorded as saying:

""The [Survey] confirms Australians overwhelmingly want their country to stay neutral,"...Mr Carr said as far as the public was concerned, Australia was not obliged under the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) treaty to make a commitment.""

 The ANZUS treaty binds Australia and New Zealand, and, separately, Australia and the United States to co-operate on defence matters in the area of the Pacific Ocean.


Bob Carr added"We know that Australians overwhelmingly support the ANZUS treaty but this Survey confirms they do not want it invoked in conflict between China and Japan over the islands in the East China Sea," he said.


The ANZUS Treaty is open to interpretation mainly because is has hardly been used in a conflict. A lawyer or judge would say there is hardly any case law to provide guidance on when and where the treaty would apply in a conflict. A fairly authoritative commentary records  / http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook43p/adfafghanistan :

"Australia first committed military personnel to Afghanistan in October 2001 after the 11 September attacks on the World Trade Centre. Prime Minister John Howard invoked Article VI of the ANZUS Treaty in support of Australia’s involvement—the only time the Treaty has been invoked. The Australian Parliament supported the commitment on 17 September 2001.” 

In the 2001 case the Treaty was interpreted as coming into force because a Party to the Treaty was attacked. This was even though the attack and response did not take place in the Pacific Ocean and the attackers were a terrorist group not a State. 

The 2001 case underlines how flexible and unpredictable the ANZUS Treaty is. This may be an argument for Japan locking in a relationship with Australia using the Soryu submarine deal. In the case of the East China Sea perhaps ANZUS might be interpreted as coming into force only if US armed  forces (which includes the US Navy) where attacked or especially if a US Base in the region was attacked. This means that if Japanese forces alone were attacked ANZUS probably would not come into force and Australian forces need not come to Japan’s aid.

Chinese Financial Influence in Australia Equating to Political Influence


The Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI) was established in December 2013 with a grant of $1.8 million from the Founder and Chairman of the Yuhu Group, Mr XiangmoHuang, a citizen of China. Despite this direct funding ACRI is frequently described as "independent".

In December 2013 Prime Minister Abbott sent a congratulatory letter to praise the contribution Yuhu Group and its Chairman Huang Xiangmo made to the Australia-China relationship, business communications and social assistance.

In February 2014 it was reported that "Annual financial disclosures published yesterday by the Australian Electoral Commission reveal that Shenzhen-based Yuhu Group and its chairman, Huang Xiangmo, donated $350,000 to the Australian Labor Party (ALP) in 2012-13, accounting for one-quarter of donations to the party's NSW branch." On other Chinese donors see here and here . Other mechanisms of Chinese economic power in Australia include the Australian Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Unification of China and the Australia China Business Council.   
On overall Australian Government assessment on the Australia-China economic relationship is  http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/china_brief.html :
"The Australia-China economic and trade relationship continues to steadily expand. China is now Australia's largest two-way trading partner in goods and services (valued at almost A$160 billion in 2013-14), our largest goods export destination (A$100 billion in 2013-14), and our largest source of merchandise imports (A$50 billion in 2013-14). The Government is pursuing a number of initiatives to strengthen and diversify this relationship."
Implications for Any Soryu Sale
The Guardian (Australian edition) reported January 6, 2015 that ACRI Director and former Foreign Minister Bob Carr said the [Survey] underlined the sensible strategic decision for Australia to make clear its intention to stay neutral.

“The ANZUS Treaty [a security pact between Australia and New Zealand and the United States] commits us to nothing more than consultation … and Australia should be making it known that it is very much disinclined to join any conflict should it break out.”

The Abbott government has raised the ire of Beijing with statements interpreted as supportive of Japan in the dispute, but Carr said the Abbot government had, in fact, been “impeccable neutral” in its approach to the dispute.

And he claimed the government had also “effectively corrected” the balance after Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s statements – early inhis prime ministership – that Japan was Australia’s “best friend in Asia”.

But according to Carr the long-delayed decision on Australia’s next submarine contract could also be seen as taking sides on regional security issues.

There has been a lot of speculation that the government may award the submarine contract – Australia’s biggest defence contract – to Japan’s Soryu class submarine without a tender or other competitive process, despite highly competitive potential alternatives, including from German company ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems and French shipbuilder DCNS.

“If the government doesn’t go to tender it could be seen as a statement about its strategic direction,” Carr said."

Pete

Australian Prime Minister's Decline Weakening "Buy Soryu"

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Are the sinking fortunes of Prime Minister Abbott also sinking the Soryu?

The last week has presented a further example of Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott's  lamentable political  judgement. Abbott's influence in his own Liberal Party and in Australia has further declined.

Abbott has gone beyond the normal prime ministerial role to push a special relationship with Prime Minister Abe and with Abe the Soryu. Abbott's support for the Soryu has always been opposed by most in his own Party and by Defense officialdom . With Abbott's decline the Soryu's chances of selection has declined. If or when Abbott is removed by his Party from the prime ministerial position it is not clear whether Abbott's policy of "buy Soryu and build in Japan" will be maintained.

Abbott may have a loyal supporter in new Defense Minister Kevin Andrews. However Kevin Andrews is too new to Andrews' Defense portfolio, with no track record on defense issues, to have his own base of power to support a Soryu purchase. 

There is powerful support in Abbott's own Party and defense officialdom for the build of part or all of the future submarine in Australia. After Japan Germany's TKMS probably has made the strongest future submarine bid. Germany supports "build in Australia" meaning that if Abbott goes the German bid may win. Japan may need to be flexible enough to counter with a genuine "part build in Australia" (not just submarine steel built in Australia) plan to defeat the German bid.

On another matter China is likely to be pragmatic over an Australian purchase of the future (conventional) submarine even if that submarine is likely to be superior to any Chinese conventional submarine. China would recognize that such an Australian submarine will be a second rate submarine compared to China's increasing numbers of SSNs. China would be much more concerned if Australia bought superior submarines, that is SSNs from the US, UK or France. The nuclear option was raised by the US Ambassador to Australia in 2012 http://www.afr.com/p/national/us_floats_nuclear_subs_option_uPMgRrev3KjNwBLfFxpdeO .

Background

Detail on Prime Minister Abbott's lamentable mistake is:

MELBOURNE Australia - "Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott said on Wednesday he stood by his controversial decision to award Britain's Prince Philip a knighthood and was taking the firestorm of criticism "on the chin".  Several ministers have walked away from Mr Abbott's appointment of the nonagenarian Duke of Edinburgh to the ranks of the Order of Australia, MPs on all sides have mocked the move and the media condemned it severely."

The Australian, a major newspaper from Rupert Murdoch's powerful media empire, ran a highly critical editorial asking: "Tony Abbott is in office but is he prime minister?" http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/editorials/tony-abbott-is-in-office-but-is-he-prime-minister/story-e6frg71x-1227198890579 
"The decision to turn a distant duke into a knight Down Under suggests a prime minister who is tone deaf or, worse, complacent in his power to push through a personal preference indifferent to the fact that it is bound to enrage and bewilder many," it said."

Pete
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