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India May Be Interested in Buying-Building Japan's Soryu Submarine

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Two Prime Ministers - Japan's Abe and India's Modi. Are their countries close enough for a Soryu deal?
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The Indian press reported on January 29, 2015 that India, under submarine purchasing-building Project-75-I (I for India), may wish to select six Japanese Soryu submarines for building in India. The Rs 50,000 crore project price converts to $US8,133,990,000 that is $US8.13 Billion (where one crore is 10,000,000 Indian Rupees and one Rupee is worth 0.016 US Dollars).

This would be in competition with Germany (TKMS-HDW), Russia (Rosoboronexport), Spain (Navantia), Sweden (Saab) and France (DCNS). 

COMMENT

Several problems already seem evident in the possibility of Japan selling Soryus to India:

India's "build in India" intention may clash with Japan's (to date) insistence that any Soryus it markets should be built in Japan.

Japan would be mindful of India's closeness to Japan's strategic opponent Russia. Japan is very sensitive to the security of its submarine technology secrets. Therefore Japan would not want the secrets of any Soryu sold to India, or even more so built in India, to be passed on to one of Japan's opponents. India has been close to Russia on a defence sales, weapons development and on secondment of personnel, levels for decades. India and Russia are particularly close on submarine high technology. 

India may have a poor submarine buying reputation with Western firms. Note that France (DCNS) is already building 6 Scorpenes for India under a separate, problem plagued project that is confusingly called "Project 75". India has expressed displeasure with alleged French caused delays although these delays appear to lie with the notoriously slow Indian political-bureaucratic establishment. See third paragraph of this Indian article. India is also frustrated that those 6 Scorpenes do not come with air independent propulsion (AIP). India sees AIP as important - in part to match the AIP equipped DCNS Agosta submarines operated by Pakistan.

If India insists on AIP this may cause problems for Japan, which in its first 5 Soryus has included Stirling engine AIP from Sweden. It is unlikely that Japan would receive Swedish permission to sell Soryus with Stirling AIP to India. Sweden, after all, would prefer to sell its own Saab-Kockums  submarines, with Stirling technology, to India. 

If there is a prospect of "build Soryus in India" - even whether or not it happens - this would have implications for any Japanese Soryu sale to Australia. Perhaps "build Soryus in part or whole in Australia" might be more possible?

If India is serious about buying 6 very large conventional submarines - built in India - with AIP - then Germany's HDW 216 and France's SMX Ocean may both be stronger contenders than Japan's (build in Japan - maybe no AIP) Soryu. This may increase the production runs and drive down costs for the 216 and/or SMX making them more attractive to Australia. Canada has also been grouped with India and Australia as a country with a relatively large budget, in need of large, long range, replacement submarines.

Pete

Balance of Power Senator Lambie AND Limited Submarine Competition?

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Balance of Power Senator Lambie

See February 1, 2015 revisions in Red.

The intervention on January 30, 2015 (see ABC article) of Australian Senator Jacqui Lambie in favour of Build the Future Submarine in Australia is of major significance. On that date Senator Lambie and Senator Nick Xenophon visited ASC in Adelaide, South Australia. The significance of the visit and statements by Lambie and Xenophon have been basically ignored by the international submarine industry and commentariat.

Senator Lambie does not tick all the superficial boxes considered important in the industry. She is not a tall, alpha male in a suit, with long experience as a senior politician or a retired senior military commander. She is relatively new to the Australian Parliament and rose to the rank of Corporal in the Army Reserve (however a certain German, who became powerful, rose to Corporal 100 years ago :)

Independent Senator Lambie, however, is one of the major holders of the balance of power in the Australian Federal Parliament with a record of threatening to block - or actually blocking - major $Billion dollar bills (also called "legislation"). Lambie, with other Senators, could potentially block or hinder the Abbott Government's pro-Soryu policy. 


Balance of power comes by way of the governing Liberal/National Coalition not having a majority of seats in the Australian Parliament’s Upper House – the Senate. There are 76 Senators, including:
Liberal/National Coalition - 33 seats
Australian Labor Party the main opposition party - 25 seats
The Minor Parties are:
Greens (who often vote with Labor) - 10 seats
Liberal Democrats– 1 seat
Family First Party– 1 seat
The Independents are:
John Madigan – 1 seat
Nick Xenophon – 1 seat, and
Jacqui Lambie– 1 seat.

The Coalition requires 6 non-Coalition Senators to pass bills. Labor and the Greens regularly vote against the Coalition. This often leaves a Balance of Power situation where the governing Coalition needs 4 Senators from the other Minor Parties and/or Independents to vote with the Coalition. 

Jacqui Lambie has been the most recent Senator to become an Independent and she is the most unpredictable Senator.

Before voting the Coalition Government often has to "horse trade" on issues to avoid the embarrassing situation of having legislation blocked in the Senate because there are too many Senator votes against the Coalition's piece of legislation.

Senator Lambie is highly principled and represents Australia's smallest State, Tasmania. She might  expect some components for any new submarine would be made in Tasmania.

Senator Nick Xenophon from the submarine building and sustainment State of South Australia is coordinating efforts with Senator Lambie to potentially threaten to block any Submarine Made in Japan moves.

They admit they are coordination efforts because Prime Minister Abbott's power is declining making more amenable to the idea of Build in Australia. They recognise the major push for Soryu Made in Japan comes from Abbott's parliamentary office not Defence Minister Andrews' office.

The fall of the Coalition State Government in Queensland on the night of January 31, 2015 has further weakened Abbott's position.

Limited Submarine Competition

Separately in the ABC article is the prediction that: The Abbott government "is expected to announce a limited competition for the new generation submarine project involving firms from Japan, Germany and France in a matter of weeks." 

A limited competition is quite possible, but given a submarine purchase may cost $20+ Billions, the competition and the bids (or re-bids) from Japan, Germany and France would probably be long and comprehensive. The "competition" may also be used by Abbott and Andrews as a false exercise in "due diligence" to confirm that the current choice - the Soryu - has "won" the "competition". Choice of the Soryu, after all, is heavily about alliances - about alliance obligations to the US and by extension Japan - not only about the usual tender technical parameteres.

Pete

Possible Australian Future Submarine Competition Again Raised

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DCNS SMX Ocean concept submarine - being offered to Australia as the "conventional Barracuda".
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Dramatic DCNS sales video for the SMX Ocean.
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news.com.au published an article on January 31, 2015 that confirms the expectation (recorded here) that the Australian Government may announce (in the next few weeks) that it is holding a submarine selection competition. news.com.au is owned by Murdoch's News Limited. 

In any competition France's DCNS is likely to include the "conventional Barracuda" (SMX Ocean) in any bid (see artist's conception and video above).

Comments in the news.com.au article are very much in line with what I have argued in Submarine Matters over the last few weeks.

Within the article the submarine expert at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Andrew Davies, commented that any Soryu deal "...is government-to-government and the Japanese are not interested in a commercial competition. This would be their first submarine collaboration and they don’t see themselves as a commercial bidder.”

This Japanese assumption that it is above commercial bidding may already render a "competition" a meaningless exercise that endorses the Soryu as the winning "bidder". 

The only major error in the news.com.au article is the statement one-third the way down that "...DCNS [is bidding] an evolved nuclear boat that is already in service." This is incorrect. DCNS is offering what it calls a "conventional Barracuda" (also called "SMX Ocean"). The Barracuda itself is a not-yet-launched nuclear submarine-"boat". Launch of the first Barracuda may occur in 2017. That Barracuda may be in-service in 2018 but probably later. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Barracuda-class_submarine

Due to the complexity of a conventional Barracuda's propulsion system any conventional Barracuda might not be in service until 2025 - and that is if DCNS finds a customer.

See my earlier article of October 31, 2014 which describes how different a conventional Barracuda-
SMX Ocean would be from the nuclear version (that is still under construction). 

Still it has to be said that while conventional Barracuda-SMX Ocean is at the conceptual stage, the likely German bid, the TKMS-HDW 216, is even more conceptual. The increasingly used term "vapour-ware" applies to the 216.

The Australian Government may be ensuring decades of problems if it assumes that the Soryu challenge can only be met by very large submarines that don't exist. Instead a large version of the existing Scorpene or of the HDW Dolphin should be seriously considered as contenders. The automatic assumption held by the Government since 2009 that the future submarine MUST be heavier (surfaced) than  the Collins forgets that the relationship between size and range is not linear. The range of the already built HDW 214 is already 12,000 miles. See more argument here.

Pete

Australia - the future junior ally of Japan

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Vice Admiral Robert Thomas, Commander US Seventh Fleet and special advisor to Australia (a country under the Admiral's purview) - see below.
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As the political reputation of Australia's Prime Minister, currently Tony Abbott, plummets, some of his more outlandish foreign policy ideas are being seen for what they are. This article doesn’t raise the bright ideas of rushing Australian troops to Ukraine, presumably to hold back Russian tanks, or to rush to the Middle East, in order to wait for an Iraqi invitation for the first two months, but the policy of buying into an alliance with Japan.

News.com.au reportedon July 9, 2014 that: “AUSTRALIA and Japan have become partners in a “special relationship” that will see both countries join with the US in a powerful military alliance aimed at curbing China’s influence in the region. During an extraordinary day in the long Australia-Japan relationship, yesterday in Canberra both Prime Minister Tony Abbott and his Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe pledged to create a partnership for “peace, prosperity and the rule of law”. Fresh from reversing almost 70 years of pacifism embedded in his nation’s post-World War 2 constitution, Mr Abe placed Australia alongside the US at the forefront of Japan’s future defence strategy.”

Alliance maintenance through weapon system purchases has long been a factor in Australia’s relationship with the US. However, as the US has no conventional submarines to sell, there is a joint US-Japanese scheme to sell Japanese submarines to Australia. The purchase price for Australia to secure this alliance with Japan is now around $25Billion (with the recent depreciation of the Australian dollar compared to the US dollar). This is specifically for 12 Made in Japan submarines. Abbott’s budgetary ideas have skimped on health, education and welfare but money is no object when paying for a military alliance from Abbott’s friend, the likeminded conservative Japanese Prime Minister Abe.

By having Japan build our submarines Abbott can also run down Australia’s ship and submarine-building industry, which he sees as a hotbed of Labor, leftwing, union interests anyway.

So what’s in it for Japan? Well the money helps. Japan also frets about what it sees as rising threats from China, North Korea and increasingly Russia. However Japan is mainly thinking about the potential economic benefits of contested islands in the South China and East China Seas.

Few Australians know or care about several disputes in the East China Sea involving China, Taiwan, Japan and others. Possibly the most dangerous Japan versus China dispute is over a small island chain - which is known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan, the Diaoyu Islands in China and the Diaoyutai Islands in Taiwan. The importance of the Senkakus are that great unmentionable factor - oil. Oil draws military forces – be they Australian forces in the Middle East or future Australian forces in Northeast Asia.

The US, for its part, is worried about the cost of keeping the world’s oceans open for trade, including oil. Although the US, in the next 12 months, will be spending many extra $Billions to maintain the Asia-Pacific “pivot” against China the US increasingly wants Japan to spend more on defence. Japan’s current defence spending is only about 1% of its GDP. The US also wants Japan to secure military alliances – that is with the few countries interested – not South Korea or most Southeast Asian countries - after Japan’s horrific conduct in World War Two.

The US and Japan are quite explicit in seeing a submarine sale as Australia-Japan strategic alliance cement. A US Admiral has condescended to interpret what an Australian Defence Minister really wanted. The Japan Times of January 18, 2015 reports: "Vice Adm. Robert Thomas, commander of the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet, reportedly said Oct. 24 [2014] in Tokyo that then-Australian Defense Minister David Johnston was very interested in Japan’s Soryu-class subs. “I talked to him about it four years ago and I said: ‘You want to find the finest diesel-electric submarine made on the planet — it’s made at Kobe works in Japan,’…”

Also in that Japan Times articleretired Japanese submarine admiral Masao Kobayashi said."The U.S., which has close but separate security pacts with Japan and Australia, probably wants Australia to buy Japanese submarines because it would greatly strengthen their strategic military ties.”

When anyone bothers to ask ordinary Australians whether Australia should be drawn into a conflict by an additional senior ally (Japan) the response appears encouragingly negative. ABC News (online), January 6, 2015, reportedthe results of a Survey of over 1,000 Australians, which indicated “Australians would overwhelmingly reject siding with close ally Japan against top-trade partner China over a dispute in the East China Sea and prefer to remain neutral.” In the article Australia's former Foreign Minister Bob Carr said “…as far as the public was concerned, Australia was not obliged under the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) treaty to make a commitment…".

Now it needs to be explained that the Survey, Australian Attitudes on ANZUS and the East China Sea, was commissioned by the Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI) . ACRI was established in December 2013 with a grant of $1.8 million from a citizen of China. Bob Carr is the Director of ACRI.

Before one writes off ACRI as a support system for Chinese interests and for Bob Carr it must be said that ACRI was officially launched on May 16, 2014 by Foreign Minister Julie Bishop. Given the Coalition’s declining fortunes Bob may be a “former Foreign Minister” for a very short time. He may again be Foreign Minister after the next Federal Election.

If Abbott has his way Australia will be junior ally not only of the US but of Japan with either of those two drawing Australia into their wars. It must be asked “If or when Abbott stands down as Prime Minister would a Coalition Government still pursue an alliance with Japan?”

If Labor wins in the next election would Bill Shorten (who agrees with Abbott’s Middle East policies) pursue an alliance with Japan?


Is a survey a genuine gauge of what Australians’ want? How else can we, the public, influence basic foreign and defence policy changes - including multi $Billion defence alliances with “friends” likely to draw Australia into wars?

Pete

Abbott's "Open Tender" Future Submarine Call Doesn't Go Far Enough

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Prime Minister Abbott seems to be the main advocate for "Buy Soryu and Built it in Japan" however his hold on the position of Prime Minister (PM) is still threatened. Yesterday (February 8, 2015) PM Abbott appeared to say that the future submarine issue should go to open tender But Abbott was not definite in stating what he meant. He did not say "Build the submarines in Adelaide". It was unclear whether the government owned Australian Submarine Corporations (ASC) would be ordered to ally itself with the Japanese Soryu (KHI and MHI) "bid". It remains likely the Soryus would mostly be built in Japan but as is already anticipated the US-Australian developed combat system might be mostly fitted in Adelaide by ASC.
The extract in that article "It is understood that France, Germany, Sweden and Japan were to be named in a selective tender process that would allow Australia to solicit bids from other governments, rather than just corporations."  is ambiguous. It may be aimed at the US Government providing the combat system. It may also suggest there will be much weight given in choosing the winning "bid" on what bidding governments have to offer. This would favor Japan in the context of the Japan-Australia free trade agreement . The Japan-Australia strategic alliance issue I wrote about in my previous article would also favor Japan. The other contenders (Germany, France, Sweden) do not bring such economic and strategic benefits to the table.

On February 8, rather than making a serious effort to plan the future submarine build Abbott appeared to be just securing votes from Federal Liberal Party politicians from South Australia to support him in a No-confidence meeting on February 9, 2015.

Although Abbott won enough votes (at the 9am February 9, 2015 meeting in Canberra) from his Liberal Party to stay PM Abbott's survival as PM remains unresolved. This is because there was a split vote, 61 votes he should stay on and a substantial minority of 39 votes that he should stand down. This reflects continuing unhappiness at Abbott's non-consultative leadership style. More no-confidence votes are likely in the months to come.

Now that the immediatte threat to Abbott's PM job is over continuing submarine discontent of politicians in Adelaide is being heard. This more recent article (February 9, 2015) from Australia's ABC indicates: The South Australia State Defence Minister, Martin Hamilton-Smith, believes the newly promised shift to an open tender process for future submarines falls short of the Federal Government's promise that ASC would build the submarines in Adelaide. He believed the open tender process could still result in the ships being built overseas. So he believes that Build 12 submarines in Adelaide should be a definite condition of the tender.
Independent Federal Senator Nick Xenophon said he was also deeply sceptical about Mr Abbott's new promise for an open tender process. Mr Xenophon said the PM should have announced that the tender process would lead to the subs being built in Australia.
- Federal Defence Minister Kevin Andrews urges caution and patience

Overall Abbott needs to be more explicit that he now supports a truly open tender with most of the build in Adelaide - not a rigged tender that favors a build in Japan. If Abbott remains vague, without Prime Ministerial OR Defence Ministerial Media Releases, Abbott may easily renege-backtrack as his 2014 broken promise of "Build in South Australia". 

In terms of what submarines should be built I think the cost of a totally new or heavily modified 3,000-4,000 ton (surfaced) submarines would be too expensive and involve overly long lead-times. Also since the end of Australia's mining boom, 2 years ago, Australia doesn't have the $20-$25 Billions for 10 to 12 large, possibly orphan, subs. More money towards other voter-popular causes (health, education, welfare) would keep Abbott in his job as PM and the Coalition in power.

Large, heavily modified submarines, built in Australia or overseas, are such a tough choice I think Abbott would describe it as a lose-lose decision. 

If I had my way I'd just buy 6 medium size (Scorpene, HDW 214, Dolphin 2, or Kockums A26) from France, Germany or Sweden for $5 Billion TOTAL price (ie. just over A$800 million per submarine).

Odds on Abbott makes no major decision till 2017 - that is AFTER the next election. - even if the US is applying pressure. Regarding US pressure, note this timely scholarly comment of MIT’s Jonathan D. Caverley “The thumb on the scales that has Australia leaning towards Japan for its submarines has an American fingerprint.” (page 19 of Running Faster to Stay in Place: U.S. Defence Exports in 2030 within RSIS’s  http://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/idss/the-global-arms-industry-in-2030-and-beyond/#.VNhLU_mUen8 )

Pete

Australian Nuclear Submarine Option - Virginia SSNs

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Large Virginia SSN diagram. Click on image for expansion. Much larger image at Luke Roberts page then click again..
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Largest diagram of Virginia SSN. Click to expand. Note the 12 vertical launch tubes near the bow will be replaced with Virginia Payload Tubes (VPT) at the mid-section for various uses (28 missiles, divers, autonomous underwater vehicles  (AUVs). Also see huge diagram.
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PETE'S COMMENT


If Australia is considering paying $2 to 3 Billion per Soryu and per 4,000 ton (surfaced) competitors then Virginia (nuclear propelled attack submarines) SSNs should also be an option.

However I think the political considerations make SSNs a remote buy. There would need to be a major threat, amounting to a strategic need, for SSNs. Domestic opposition is, at present, too great. There is too much opposition at the political left and even the center in Australia. 

When the US raised in February 2012 selling or leasing Virgina SSNs to Australia Australian concerns may have also been:

- the complete infrastructure and basing costs and issues seemed too expensive financially and politically. For example any nuclear submarine facilities could be nowhere near the current Fleet Base East which is in Sydney. Public opposition and separation safety standards may have meant a whole new base would need to be built on Australia's east coast for temporary or emergency uses. 

- the degree of US sincerity that it was a real offer may not have convinced Australia. Australia would have had to rely on much US influence in placating Australia's neighbours.

-  the crew number requirements of a Virginia are daunting. Crew may be 115-135 or even around 250+ if there are alternating Blue-Gold crews (2 x 115 to 135). This means the Australian submarine service, as it is, would not have the money to pay, train and maintain such large crews. Decades of training in reactor maintenance and safety is required. SSNs mean an extra national effort would be needed - hence strategic would need to be major. 

Australia and the US would also be concerned about igniting a nuclear propelled arms race in the wider region (eg. from such nuclear knowledgeable countries as Japan and South Korea). There might also be increased acceleration in the current SSN building programs in India and China.

Australia's near neighbour Indonesia can also increasingly afford nuclear technology (with Indonesia's GDP now passing Australia's by some measures). So Australia didn't/doesn't not want an arms race so close to home.

Accepting Australia's current budgetary worries, but leaving some room for escalation to SSNs, my ideal Australian submarine buying plan would be a low-then-high mix:

- 6 medium size SSKs within next 10-15 years (each less than $1Billion). With crews of around 30 so at least 4 could be crewed at any one time.

- at some point in future, and based on strategic need, 4 Virginias (or the US follow-on SSN at that time).

SSNs have major advantages in less-or-no indiscretion time (fully submerged so cannot be seen by Chinese or Russian satellites), much more range, speed (great for the 3,000 km transit gap) and much greater operational availability.

In terms of possible threat - China is likely to be pragmatic over an Australian purchase of future (conventional) submarine even if that submarine is likely to be superior to any Chinese conventional submarine. China would recognize that such an Australian submarine will be a second rate submarine compared to China's increasing numbers of SSNs. China would be much more concerned if Australia bought superior submarines, that is SSNs from the US, UK or France.

The SSN option was raised by the US Ambassador to Australia in early 2012.

ARTICLE

To read the whole article see the Australian Financial Review (AFR) of February 22, 2012  http://www.afr.com/p/national/us_floats_nuclear_subs_option_uPMgRrev3KjNwBLfFxpdeO

"US floats nuclear subs option - 22 Feb 2012 [following written by John Kerin]




VIRGINIA CLASS AT A GLANCE

  • Type: Attack submarine
  • Cost: $2.5 billion
  • Displacement: 7900 metric tonnes (submerged)
  • Length: 240 metres
  • Beam: 10 metres
  • Propulsion: S9G reactor
  • Speed: 25+ knots (46km/h)
  • Range: unlimited
  • Crew: 135
  • Armament: 12 Tomahawk cruise missiles, 4 533mm torpedo tubes
  • Built: 2000 - present
  • Active: 8
  • Planned: 30
  • Ships in class include: Virginia, Texas, Hawaii, North Carolina, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Missouri, California, Mississippi, Minnesota, North Dakota, John Warner
The United States has indicated for the first time it would be willing to lease or sell a nuclear submarine to Australia in a move that will inflame tensions with China and force the Coalition to declare its policy on ­bolstering regional defence.
US Ambassador to Australia ­Jeffrey Bleich told The Australian Financial Review yesterday that whichever option Canberra pursued as a replacement for its Collins class submarines, Washington viewed ­Australia’s subs program as crucial to security in the Asia-Pacific region.
“Decisions about the design of the Australian submarine are up to Australia’s leaders, including whether they pursue diesel power or nuclear power,” Mr Bleich said. “Whatever they decide the US is willing to help.’’
His comments suggest the US would be open to discussing nuclear submarine technologies with Australia at a time of severe budget constraints here and in the US, despite Defence Minister Stephen Smith restating Labor’s opposition to any nuclear submarine purchase. But Australian sources maintain they have been told by opposition figures that Coalition leader Tony Abbott will consider the nuclear option if he wins an election due in 2013.
Opposition defence spokesman David Johnston has gone as far as saying the Coalition would support Labor if it sought to examine the nuclear submarine option. Neither Mr Abbott’s office nor Mr Johnston were prepared to comment on Mr Bleich’s intervention last night
But leading defence analysts, including former Liberal minister Peter Reith, have urged both sides of politics to consider nuclear subs.
A senior Defence source said ­Australia would probably be able to buy a 7500 tonne Virginia Class submarine for around $2.5 billion, but because it would come off a mature production line its price would reduce over time.
Labor has been considering the purchase of 12 conventional submarines to replace the Collins, with an Australian designed and built option costing up to $36 billion, or $3 billion each." 
To read the whole article see the Australian Financial Review  http://www.afr.com/p/national/us_floats_nuclear_subs_option_uPMgRrev3KjNwBLfFxpdeO

"Open tender" versus "Competitive evaluation process" makes little difference

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The removal of "open tender", used on February 8-9, 2015, and its replacement today with "competitive evaluation proces" underlines that Australia's selection of a future submarine:

- involves political considerations at the level of Prime Minister that are paramount

- therefore decisions are being made at the level of Prime Minister, his subordinate Prime Minister's Office and his subordinate Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet. These (mostly) men have already drawn advice from many Departments including Defence

- put another way the hundreds of technical considerations that would have been considered important in a tender are less important or have already been decided on

- there is no room left for submarine experts under the now obsolete term "tender"in the Navy, DMO or broader Defence Department, to be allowed to contradict the decision of the Prime Minister

- the Prime Minister level decision probably has been made with Japanese Prime Minister Abe - that Australia will buy the Soryu. Abbott probably made a Captain's Pick of the Soryu

- the Soryu decision is made for political, economic and strategic reasons. Those reasons include:

  : the US wants Japan to supply the submarine for US reasons (economic, alliance dynamics, political, technical etc). Those reasons include the US preference that Japan's submarine sale serves as a source of income and encouragement for an expanded Japanese defence budget and to help Japan build an alliance system. The US is also selective as to which nations it will supply the its highly sensitive submarine combat system

  : the Soryu involves less technical and economic risk compared to the unbuilt competing bids (HDW 216, DCNS SMX Ocean and Saab-Kockums 4,000 ton Type 61)

  : a deal with Japan is because Japan (not Germany, Sweden and France) is an important Australian  regional ally that can offer many future benefits in strategic support, information sharing and broader trade areas.

  : buying the 3,000 ton (surfaced) Soryu should involve lower price and shorter lead-times than
buying the competing 4,000 ton (surfaced) drawing board only competitors.

Basically, whether the selection is called "open tender" or "competitive evaluation", the same person, Prime Minister Tony Abbott, is making the same decision for the same reasons. Due to US (and to a lesser extent Japanese) preferences those reasons would apply to any Coalition Prime Minister that might replace Tony Abbott.

A Labor Prime Minister may or may not be swayed by some Build in Australia (union, ideological, electoral) reasons.

It is unknown whether Japan (including Mitsubishi and Kawasaki) would be prepared to resolve many Australia public misgivings, by agreeing to do much of the Soryu build in Australia. I already take is as given that the major Australian industrial input will be ASC doing some work on the evolved AN/BYG-1 combat system - also Australia making some of the submarine steel.

I would say the only way to defeat the Soryu "bid" would be to appreciate Australia's budget crisis. This is to respond by offering a submarine at vastly lower price. That could not be achieved with a 4,000 ton (surfaced) design. Only modifications of existing submarines (around 2,000+ tons) have a chance of beating the existing Soryu submarine.

Pete

Technical issues and the Soryu - Lithium-ion batteries no AIP

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A bank of lithium-ion batteries (LIBs) for marine use. LIBs are being developed and offered for future Japanese, German, French and probably Swedish submarines.
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The new batch of around 6 Soryus being built for the Japanese Navy (known as Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF)) over the next 8 years will be built around Lithium-ion batteries (LIBs). LIBs represent a very significant technical departure from the existing lead acid batteries. This influences the structure of the submarine's entire electrical system (wires etc) not just the batteries themselves.

Use of LIBs may allow a submarine to stay submerged for a longer time than lead acid batterries as long as the submarine is not driven too quickly for too long as this runs the batteries flat.

Air independent propulsion (AIP)

Some confusion has been created that LIBs are some separate component replacing  air independent propulsion (AIP). This is basically untrue. LIBs are replacing lead acid batteries in new submarines to be built from around 2015. LIBs cannot be retrofitted to replace lead acid batteries in individual submarines already operating. Any battery, LIB or lead acid, will almost always rely on regular recharging from a submarine's air dependent diesel engines. Some AIP technologies can charge batteries - but there are downsides-tradeoffs. The relatively few subs in the Asia-Pacific region that have AIP (none are Australian) might still use AIP even if they are in future built with LIBs. Those that use AIP might typically want their subs capable of a close to shore (closed shallow waters, littorals, straits and harbour mouths etc) near motionless, defensive missions of up to 3 weeks submerged.

AIP, unlike batteries, cannot be recharged during a mission.

AIP has been compared (by submarine sales teams and the mainstream media) to nuclear propulsion. This is not true. AIP might allow a submarine to move at 20+ knots for 5+ hours while a nuclear reactor can run at 30+ knots for 3 months or until a crew's food runs out.

Australia decided not to use AIP in the Collins class due to Australian submarine mission profiles which need much diesel for long range rapid transit. This is even though Australia bought its subs from Kockums who are AIP experts. I haven't heard of any Australian interest in AIP for the future submarine. It is unclear whether Singapore's two HDW 218SG's on order will use AIP (but likely) and LIBs (maybe). Some Chinese subs are believed to use AIP, most likely mainly in defensive mode, not far offshore.

AIP is basically a 200 ton plug in the submarine for inclusion of a small engine and storage of extra fuel, alcohol or hydrogen and an oxidiser. The first batch of 6 to 7 Soryus (up to SS-507?) do operate with Swedish designed Stirling engine AIP technology. The next 6 Soryu will most probably use LIBs.

The downsides of using AIP include: dangerous highly flamable oxidiser, heavy moving parts that need maintenance, less effective in warm seas, 3rd party contractual issues, technical advances including LIBs partly bypassing AIP, have persuaded the Japanese Navy that AIP is not worth including in their future Soryus. The 200 tons might be better used for more diesel or batteries. Australia, Malaysia and Indonesia have not used AIP in their submarines due to AIP's marginal worth.

More on LIBs

Returning to LIBs - LIBs are reputedly lighter (than the traditional lead acid batteries they are replacing). LIBs carry more charge (greater energy density) translating into more speed or a longer period the submarine can submerge. LIBs should take less time to recharge, so there is less "indiscretion" time when the submarine has to snorting-snorkel near the surface. The increased capability of anti-submarine sensors, including those mounted on satellites and UAVs, mean that  submarines in near surface snorting mode are becoming more vulnerable.

LIBs involve potential technical risks. LIBs may be more prone to catch fire (based on experience with the 787 aircraft LIBs). LIB use for submarines may be becoming safer than aircraft use due to heavier submarine LIBs with the extra mass more able to absorb heat. This should mean submarine LIBs do not get as hot as aircraft LIBs - hence submarine LIBs should be less prone to catching fire.
A second major difference is that aircraft LIBs have (or had) no dedicated fire suppressant systems while such systems should be built around submarine LIBs. Overall the experience of ironing out bugs on aircraft and car LIBs is valuable in the development of submarine LIBs.

New technology always involves some uncertainty. Lead acid batteries have a record of over a century of use (hence their characteristics are more predictable) while LIBs probably have no operational use on submarines. The replacement cycle for submarine LIBs is also hard to predict.

Before Australia operates Soryus Japanese Navy Soryus will most probably have had several years experiece of using LIBs - hopefully ironing out all the bugs. Australia may be better placed if there is an option of deciding on LIBs or lead acid batteries before Soryus earmarked for Australia begin to be built.

Germany, and France are also developing and beginning to offer LIBs for submarine use. Presumably Sweden, South Korea and the US (for backup batteries) are also developing submarine LIBs.

Life Cyle Differences

One additional issue is that the Japanese Navy has been running its submarines with the assumption the service life is 15-20 years while Australia assumes submarines should be in service for at least 30 yours. This may or may not be a problem. After 15-20 years moving parts may or may not start to wear out. This may be most significant in the submarine's diesel engines and the very large electrical motor. Changing engines-motors is very heavy maintenance involving cutting into the submarine hull. This might only be possible in Japan for the Soryu? Maintenance realities may or may not be a problem.

If all these issues prove too hard over the next 5 years there are submarines operated by Germany,  France and Sweden (all of around 2,000+ tons surfaced) that may be adequate for what Australia needs. This is particularly under limitations in funds for purchase and crew availability problems.

Pete

Costs for the Soryu - As there is no Competition

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Pricing is a major part of selection. But what if there is no competition to the Soryu? Diagram courtesy of The Australian.

INFORMATION

When researching the Saab-Damen submarine development  agreement two interesting bits of information on Australia future submarine selection came to light. Marc Brandt, a Brussels-based industry analyst made two significant comments, probably in late January 2015 -  http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/submarines/2015/02/01/damen-saab-sweden-subs-deal/22535665/ : 

1.  "…I understand that there is a general acceptance within Saab, and government circles in Sweden, that Australia's preference for the Japanese Soryu-class sub has put this program effectively out of reach..."

2.  "...the AUS $17 billion (US $13.7 billion) Collins-class submarine replacement program...".

COMMENT

The first statement supports the increasing belief that Australia's Federal (Abbott) Government has chosen Japan's Soryu. If Saab believes the Soryu is a done deal then the Australian Government's claim that there is genuine "Competitive Evaluation Process" is not being accepted by key players.

The second statement supports indications that Australia is no longer after 12 submarines - just 6, 7 or 8. Choosing as little as 6 submarines is a wise move considering the serious limitations of available Australian funds. Six is also a recognition that Australia has only been able to crew about 2.5 existing Collins at most.

Australia's previous submarine purchases also show a steady reduction in numbers. The numbers of UK built Oberon class submarines (in the Australian Navy 1967-1999) proposed for Australia shrank from 8 to 6 The proposed number of the Collins (operating 1996 – present) went from 10, to 8, to 6). 

The cost of 6, 7 or 8 may be for a "discount" of around US $14 Billion, ie. "discounted" from the original figures of US$20 to 30 Billion. Of course figures are academic until the last submarine has been launched, commissioned and paid for.

Japan's pricing for Australia, which will be Japan's first major defence customer in 77 years, will be a highly political matter. Japan sold 4 Matchanu class submarines to Thailand in 1938 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matchanu-class_submarine .

Part of Japan's estimate might take into account:

1. how much is Australia (as a new junior ally to Japan) prepared to pay? and

2. how much of the cost of Japan's decade's old submarine development program, including the new  Lithium-ion battery (LIB) Soryu, can be transferred to Australia?

Japan, can only transfer some of its submarines development costs to one country, Australia. This is unlike Germany's TKMS which can, and has, spread the development cost load among 17 customer countries.

Pete

Sweden and the Netherlands Replacement Submarine Needs

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A Dutch Walrus class submarine. Note the serrated fin - probably for quieting and/or improved hydro-dynamic efficiency.


The issues of the Dutch Walrus class submarine replacement and the future Swedish Saab-Kockums A26 development-construction are relevant to Australia's future submarine selection. This would become more important if the Soryu is not selected for whatever reason, forcing Australia to seriously consider European submarine designs. 

Saab-Damen Agreement

Since mid-late January 2015 there have been several reports that Saab and Dutch shipbuilder Damen Shipyards Group have signed an exclusive teaming agreement. This is  to  http://subseaworldnews.com/2015/01/20/damen-saab-join-forces-on-submarine-front/ :

- explore future opportunities in the international submarine market including bidding jointly on submarine procurement programmes, and

- explore development of a potential Walrus-class submarine replacement for the Netherlands. 

Netherlands' Situation

The Netherlands operates 4 teardrop hulled Walrus class submarines which are a development of the Dutch Zwaardvis class (2 Zwaardvis were sold to Taiwan). The Zwaadvis was based on the US teardrop hulled Barbel class (the US's last conventional subs).

Walrus specifications:

- 4 launched 1989-1992
- displacement 2,350 tons (surfaced)
- range 18,500 km at 9 knots (snorting) vs Collins 17,000 kmat 10 knots (snorting)
- 20 US weapons Mark 48 torpedos and Harpoon missiles (weapons the same as the Collins. Collins has 22 torpedos) which suggest part use of a US combat system already.
- US heritage
- no reliance (like the Collins) on AIP
- like the Collins it has four combined rudders and diving planes in an "X" configuration
- with most NATO submarine being either nuclear or brown water Baltic the Walrus are considered blue water submarines. 

The Netherlands envisages acquiring just 2 submarines to replace the 4 Walruses. Just 2 may mean the Netherlands might want to use/select a common-overlapping design with Sweden. Maybe the Netherlands may settle for modified A26s.

Possible Swedish Role

While Sweden is building its own 2 - 5 A26s Sweden might build the 2 Walrus replacements or at least supply the components for assembly in the Netherlands. 

Sweden's 3 Gotland Class submarines (launched 1995-96) need replacing by 2025 and 2 Sodermanland class (relaunched 2003) for replacement by 2035(?).

Some extra issues/questions are:

1. How many A26s does Sweden intend to build? Two or five (?) - given the rising Russian threat and the Gotland-Sodermanland two tiered "gap".

2. Will the A26 have the same specifications as provided on http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A26_submarine (1900 tons surfaced? A mixture of regular 533mm torpedo tubes and unique 400mm tubes?). Saab-Kockums'own website does not give specifications of diplacement or range. 

3. Will the A26 be built with Lithium-ion batteries?

4. Would there be some technical, industrial and political overlap in the Walrus-class submarine replacement and development and construction of Sweden's future submarine A26?

Pete

Possible Japanese Submarine Deployment Area

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Differing submarine patrol areas strung along China's First Island Chain. Japan's submarine patrol area may be from Kyushu, along the Ryukyu island chain (which includes Okinawa), south to Taiwan, then across the Bashi Channel down to Luzon Island, Philippines.
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Part of the "First Island Chain" is what Japan calls the Senkaku Islands. A potential China-Japan-(maybe)Taiwan flashpoint due to undersea oil deposits. These deposits may become economically extractable as oil prices rise and technology permits. 
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Below is an interesting snippet which may reflect how Japan's submarine fleet is deployed:

Tetsuo Kotani, U.S.-Japan Allied Maritime Strategy: Balancing the Rise of Maritime China, (Strategic Japan, Japan Chair) Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), Washington DC, April 2014, pp. 1-15. http://csis.org/files/publication/140422_Kotani_USJapanAlliance.pdf wrote on page 12:

"In addition, the submarine fleet will be increased from 16 to 22. Due to the lack of Chinese ASW capabilities, the expansion of the submarine fleet enhances sea-denial capability vis-à-vis the PLAN. To patrol the waters along southwestern Japan, it is estimated that at least eight submarines are necessary (six for the Okinawa island chain [Japan to Taiwan] and two for the Bashi Channel [Taiwan to Luzon island, Philippines]. Typically, a [submarine] requires two backups for training and maintenance. Thus a submarine fleet of 24 is ideal, but a fleet of 22 provides more operational flexibility than the current fleet of 16. [35] On the other hand, for the effective use of the reinforced submarine fleet, the JMSDF needs to recruit and train more submariners." 

[35] =  [retired Vice Admiral] Masao Kobayashi, “Sensuikan 22 sekitaiseino Kaijoboei” [Maritime Defense under a 22-Submarine Force], Gunji Kenkyu [Japan Military Review], December 2011. http://gunken.jp/blog/archives/2011/11/10_0000.php

COMMENTS

Page 1, 2nd paragraph indicates Japan's submarine deployments are in relation to "Beijing’s attempts to deny access by other maritime powers to its Near Seas (the Yellow Sea and the East and South China Seas), which are enclosed by the first island chain (a chain of islands from Kyushu, Okinawa, to Taiwan and Borneo)." 

Instead of excluding forces from the seas surrounding China Japan appears to be part of a blockading force (in time of conflict) to keep China forces and trade bottled up in those seas. Japan, its SSK owning allies, and the US SSN force could block Chinese naval vessels and supplies (such as oil) from reaching China. 

As the CSIS excerpt above indicates Japan's main submarine patrol area would be from the the southern home island of Kyushu, along the Ryukyu island chain (which includes Okinawa), south to Taiwan, then across the Bashi Channel down to Luzon Island, Philippines. 

Countries in the region may make frequent use of undersea arrays (along with future use of UUVs (including wavegliders)), particularly in narrow straits and harbour mouths. Such use would diminish reliance on virtually stationary submarines guarding critical straits and harbour mouths. 

South Korea would monitor movements in all the congested seas and straits near South Korea. In those seas are threats or possible competitors North Korea, China, Russia and Japan itself.

The US with its wide ranging SSNs may guard some straits and narrows but the speed and range of its SSNs allow open ocean (blue water) coverage. The vast capabilities of the US Navy the Pacific Rim and the Ocean in between. US SSNs would also act as backup to the SSK navies (Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Australia) particularly against Russian and Chinese SSNs. All of the allies would directly or indirectly (via the US as the common ally) work together.

Naturally submarines are not the only blockers or monitors. Working with submarines in the whole of defence mix (under the blanket term SeaWeb are: surface warships, surveillance satellites, UAVs, UUVs, patrol aircraft including helicopters and ground stations (deploying radar, intercept and other arrays). 

Pete

Australia Narrows the Future Submarine Bidders to Japan, Germany and France.

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On Friday 20, 2015 the Australian Governments decided to select a new submarine from Japan, Germany or France (but not from Sweden). The Government stressed that weight was given to the bidders actually building submarines now.

The best succinct mainstream media article, on February 20, 2015, was probably http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-02-20/japan-france-germany-to-compete-for-submarine-build/6159834

The longest article is http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/at-least-500-jobs-to-come-from-submarine-project-but-no-guarantee-of-local-construction-20150220-13k5c0.htmlwith more on South Australia’s expected negative reaction

For the leadup to the Friday 20, 2015 decision see http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2015/02/open-tender-versus-competitive.html particularly about the main Australian workforce involvement being the integration of the US-Australian evolved AN/BYG-1 combat system.

As things stand I would say the Australian Government's favourites are Japan, Germany and France - in that order.

Pete

Latest on India's Aircraft Carrier Projects

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India's old and new aircraft carriers. Image courtesy of The Times of India, February 23, 2015
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INS Vikrant "2" on launch November 2014. Photo courtesy.
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2016 - expected retirement of INS Viraat– acquired from UK 1987 – 28,000 tons displacement, 11 Sea Harriers.
2016 - INS Vikramadityarebuilt and handed over by Russia (2013) will be India’s only carrier, 45,000 tons, 24 MiG-29Ks.
2019 - INS Vikrant "2" India’s first indigenous aircraft carrier (IAC-I), under construction, expected ready 2019, 40,000 tons, 12 MiG-29Ks, 8 Tejas light combat aircraft (LCA). Construction of Vikrant has already been delayed by four years with repeated technical and budgetary issues. The "2" is sometimes informally used as Google searches simply for "INS Vikrant" often turn up the preceding INS Vikrant that was decommissioned in 1997.
2030 - INS Vishal(may be completed 2030) known as indigenous aircraft carrier-II (IAC-II), maybe nuclear propelled, 65,000 ton (displacement equal to China’s carrier Liaoning). May feature Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) being developed by the US for its new Ford class supercarriers. EMALs would allow full sized carrier aircraft, like the Super Hornet, to be launched. Vikramaditya’s and Vikrant’s ski-jumps only allow up to MiG-29 weight aircraft. If a successful design Vishal may be the first of class for 2 to 3 more 65,000 ton carriers (perhaps around 2035-2040) allowing Vikramaditya to retire.
India, like Russia, US, and even Australia often under-estimate the costs and build time of weapons system. Politicians, bureaucrats, military officers and arms builders all can under-estimate cost-length-complexity of their projects. The main aim is to placate the public and Treasuries whose tax-payer dollars go into paying for weapons systems that may take twice as long for twice the price.
Please connect with Submarine Matters:


also connect with other recent sources:


http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-now-puts-aircraft-carrier-plan-on-fast-track/articleshow/46336472.cms


Artist's conception of INS Vikrant "2" - indigenous aircraft carrier (IAC-I)
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This Submarine Matters post originally carried an update of India's nuclear submarine INS Arihant and Chakra (enlarge design here. They will feature in a new Submarine Matters article TBA.

Pete

Reaper (Armed) Drones for Australia?

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One of the armed Reapers operated by the UK Royal Air Force, were over Afghanistan, now over Iraq and Syria.
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Approximate position of Reaper/Predator bases in region with greatest concentration now on Iraq-Syria. Note other drones are deployed: high altitude Global Hawks and high altitude, stealthy Sentinels. Map courtesy of http://dronewars.net/2014/05/07/analysis-where-are-british-reaper-drones-heading-after-afghanistan/ which also lists the drone bases.
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Several Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) personnel are now being trained in the US to operate Reaper armed drones. This only became public in the last few days. From just a few Australians in training Australia may ramp up to a squadron sized capability of three to five Reapers over the next few years.

Reaper drones are more technically known as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and by militaries as remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs).  

Australia has operated unarmed 1,150 kg Heron drones in Afghanistan for a few years in surveillance roles. Senior Australian officers have expressed interest inacquiring armed drones since at least 2012. The Australian Army has worked closely with US armed drones in Afghanistan since 2012, if not before. The war against Islamic State in Iraq has made training remote aircrew for drones and acquisition of armed drones themselves a high priority for the RAAF. It is also a high priority for the Australian Army who will most probably be unofficially fighting on the ground before 2016.

In a Media Release of February 23, 2015 Australian Parliamentary Secretary for Defence, Darren Chester, announced: “…that the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) has commenced training aircrew and support staff on [Reaper] operations in the United States.

Mr Chester said that the training program provides a cost effective method to increase the ADF’s understanding of complex [drone] operations and how this capability can be best used to protect Australian troops on future operations.

“Unmanned aerial systems are an advancing technology with a proven record of providing ‘eyes in the sky’ in the Middle East region,” Mr Chester said.

“It would be remiss of Australia not to continue to develop our knowledge of this technology to ensure we are able to gain the greatest benefit from unmanned aerial systems and the best protection for our troops on future operations.”

“For this reason, the RAAF is training personnel in USAF MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial system operations in the United States.”

[The RAAF] currently has five personnel training to be [Reaper remote pilots and weapons and sensor] operators at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico, and a communication systems engineer at Creech Air Force Base, Nevada.”

The UK and the US have operated armed Reapers since 2007. The US has also operated the closely related, but much smaller, Predator since 1995. The 4,780 kg Reapers can carry 1,760 kgs of weapons including Hellfire missiles, GPS programmed bombs or laser guided bombs. When carrying a couple of weapons a Reaper can loiter for around 20 hours. Scroll a third way down  http://dronewars.net/2014/05/07/analysis-where-are-british-reaper-drones-heading-after-afghanistan/ for a useful map and list of drone air bases that can send drones over Syria and Iraq.  

Unmanned drones and manned aircraft are limited by their pilot-equipment-network mix. Australia is operating several Super Hornets in the bombing role over Iraq. Pilots of those aircraft may only have a quick glimpse or no direct view of their target before they destroy it while Reapers drones can silently loiter for hours to be sure of their target.

One role for the eagle eyed Reaper is to detect if potential enemy are digging in improved explosive devices (IEDs) in front of an advancing allied patrol. Another role is detecting the enemy setting up ambushes against that patrol. That Reaper could fire Hellfire missiles at the enemy.

Reapers have advantages over fast jets like the RAAF Super Hornets currently over Iraq including longer loiter times, many lower operating costs, no vulnerable pilots who can be killed or captured, no jet engine wear, no mid-air refuelling needed. Reapers, unlike jets, also have the ability to silently protect patrols or convoys as these ground elements slowly move.

Reapers will complement the Super Hornets rather than replace them. One advantage of Super Hornets is that they can move, during the one mission, over long distances to trouble spots in Iraq much more quickly than Reapers. A particular problem with the Super Hornets though is that they frequently spend more time in transit (4 hours all up) from their base in the United Arab Emirates then the 3 hours at work over Iraq. Super Hornets can last longer than 7 hours with mid-air refuelling, but pilots suffer significant fatigue during these long missions while one Reaper crew can handover to a fresh crew every few hours over a 20 hour Reaper mission.

The RAAF may be asking for $300 million to buy several Reapers ($20 million per Reaper plus all the training, simulators and other network costs) . Judging from the UK Royal Air Force precedent Australia may buy 3 to 5 Reapers in the next 2 to 3 years. After piloting US Reapers in training Australian pilots at Creech Air Force Base, Nevada, might possibly graduate to flying US Reapers operationally. This may be prior to moving onto Australian Reapers within 2 to 3 years.


Moral issues about US use of drones over Afghanistan and Pakistan may be related to their increasing use by the US over the years, with more targets attacked. Another issue is the use of armed drones by the CIA against countries the US is officially at peace with. Use by the RAAF over Iraq in the next two or three years should hopefully be different.

Abbott's Choice of Japan Possibly Influences Defence Testimony

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Australia's Senator Nick Xenophon. He comes to Senator Committe meetings well prepared with research. He then asks questions defence officers would prefer he forgot.
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As the Abbott Government has already chosen Japan's Soryu even the most senior defence officials are limited in what they can say to Australian Senate Committees. To provide full and accurate answer to Senators risks being considered disloyal to Australia's (current) Prime Minister Abbott's decision - increasingly know as the Captain's Pick. Put another way accurate information should be avoided if it potentially provides ammunition for politicians who oppose the Japan decision.

Australia has stated a preference for the US submarine AN/BYG-1 combat system (made for US weapons) and US Admiral Thomas is enthusiastic that Australia buy the Soryu. The implication from this is that the US is more likely to supply its combat system with associated US weapons if Australia chooses Japan's Soryu, 

Like many countries Australia has a number of Senate Committees that seek answers from defence civilian and armed services officers. In late February 2015 in a Senate Committee meeting Senator Nick Xenophon (from South Australia) asked questions concerning Australia's known preference in “competitive evaluation process” for a submarine that is highly compatible with, or already uses US weapons. The relevant US weapons include the Harpoon (short-medium range) cruise missile, Mark 48 heavyweight torpedo, and, in future, the Tomahawk (longer range) cruise missile.

More specifically Senator Xenophon asked Australia’s Chief of Navy and the head of the Defence Material Organisation (DMO) whether Australia's defence sector could reply to the Senate Committee's Question on Notice 171. Part of 171 was:

 “Do any German designed submarines carry US weapons?” 

To this they responded that:

 “Defence is not aware of any German designed submarines that carry US weapons”.

Senator Xenophon then pointed out that a range of Wikipedia articles and official US government documents confirmed that a number of German designed submarines used or can use some US weapons, including those owned by South Korea (in Australia’s region) Greece, Turkey, Israel and Brazil.  

Most have accepted the response to Senator Xenophon as ignorance or oversight, but there is an equally likely explanation.

The head of the Navy and the head of DMO would have been aware that those who oppose "build in Japan" (such as Senator Xenophon) would have been able to use "German built submarines can use US weapons" as an argument for "build German designed submarines in South Australia". 

Naturally Abbott does not want Xenophon or the Labor opposition to be able to say "but the Navy  and DMO have already indicated that "compatibility with US weapons" is a non-argument when claiming Japan's Soryu is preferable to the German contender". 

The defence heads therefore had to rely on seeming ignorance. To provide political ammunition to Senator Xenophon would be entering into the highly political submarine selection issue, after all... 

Another possibility is that the Prime Minister's Office took carriage of the question, provided the wrong answer and the defence heads were forced to live with it. It has already been established that the Prime Minister's Office has taken much of the political carriage of the Soryu issue. After this office handled the Senate Committees questions the defence heads had to wear the acute embarrassment at the Senate committee meeting on the day.

So all this mean's that Abbott's Captain's pick of Japan's Soryu, for the sake of alliance with Japan and the US's advocacy of the Soryu, is influencing otherwise expert testimony on Australia's multi billion (taxpayer) dollar submarine selection.
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This is the testimony in question given to Senator Xenophon at the Senate Committee meeting.


Misleading advice to US Congress on Chinese Submarine Numbers?

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Thirteen of these MING-class improvements on the Type XXI U-Boat of 1945 are believed to boost the Pentagon's Chinese submarine fleet to "more than 60".
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The US Navy and the Pentagon have always been totally truthful in their advice to Congress or that is the ideal, anyway.   

The latest example are comments of a senior US Admiral in late February 25, 2015 who said  “[China's] submarine force has grown over a tremendous rate. They now have more diesel and nuclear attack submarines than we have so they’ve passed us in total quantity - but in quality they are still not there,”  

"but in quality they are still not there” is correct.  

Admiral M's use of flowery language - particularly China is building some "fairly amazing submarines" - should put any cynical politician on guard. 

So how many submarines does China have? The answer from the Pentagon is "more than 60"

The Pentagon's Annual Report to Congress: China Report 2014 (ever after called China Report 2014) reported on Page 7 "more than 60 submarines" and on Pages 7-8 actual submarines types and quantities were identified - which were less than 60. These were: 

- 3 JIN-class (Type 094) second generation SSBN. The JL-2 SLBM's are still being tested and PLAN doctrine suggests the JL-2s are not usually carried, for security and political reasons. 

-  2 SHANG-class (Type 093) second generation SSNs are in service,


-  4 "aging" HAN-class (Type 091) first generation SSNs . These rely on 1960s technology. China Report 2014 does not specify numbers. However only 5 were built of which at least 1 is considered decommissioned.

-   12 YUAN-class SSP (called Type 039A or Type 041) as the 039A has very little resemblance to the 039 it is commonly referred to as the Type 041. The Type 039A/041 possibly has Stirling Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) sold to China by Sweden

-  13 SONG-class SS (Type 039)


-  12 KILO-class submarines acquired from Russia in the 1990s and 2000s

The China Report 2014 only details 46 submarines. 

Question: So how is "more than 60" derived?

Answer: reach 61 Chinese submarines (presumably) by adding:

-  13 MING-class (Type 033/035). These are 1950's technology that are not mentioned in China Report 2014. They are used by China for training only. These are totally obsolete, being closely based on the 70 year old Russian ROMEO-class which in turn were based on Germany's Type XXI U-Boat of World War Two. Two of them may now be going to the navy of Bangladesh. Figure of 13 here. MINGs may be equivalent to US post-war GUPPY uprades. and

-  2  XIA-class (Type 092) SSBNs. They are 1970s technology and also are not mentioned in China Report 2014. One may be active. The other is considered lost in an accident.

So "more than 60" means 61. One of those 61 (a XIA) may be permanenetly submerged and two MINGs might soon be gifted to Bangladesh - hence 58 on publically known figures - and that is a stretch. 

Meanwhile "A spokeswoman said the U.S. Navy had 71 commissioned U.S. submarines." 

It should be left to the reader to assess whether Admiral M and the China Report 2014 are accurate or misleading.

Pete

US Submarine Campaign from Australia in World War Two

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Submarine Matters attempts to present political and technical issues concerning submarines. Less frequently presented is the historical context in which submarines, and their crews, operated.

The following two "Rising to Victory" articles by Edward C. Whitman have been reproduced here to indicate:

- how dependent Australia was on the US in World War Two
- how active US submarines forces were in the Western Pacific-East Asia, and
- especially the heroism and high losses suffered by US submariners.

I hope that the author, Undersea Warfare Magazine, US Navy and US Navy Submarine Force do not mind this extended tribute.

Hyperlinks to submarine classes, some US and Japanese submarines and other subjects added March 2015.

Pete
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Edward C. Whitman, "Rising to Victory: The Pacific Submarine Strategy in World War II Part I: Retreat and Retrenchment", US Navy Submarine Force's, Undersea Warfare Magazine, Vol. 3, No. 3, Issue 11Spring 2001

Current Homepage of Undersea Warfare Magazine.


Rising to Victory The Pacific Submarine Strategy in World War II by Edward Whitman
by Edward C. Whitman
Previous UNDERSEA WARFARE articles on U.S. submarines in the Pacific during World War II have focused largely on individual “submarine heroes” and their extraordinary war records. In contrast, the present two-part article attempts to step back and view the Pacific submarine campaign from a theater perspective that illuminates both its wartime context and the evolution of a top-level strategy.

Part I: Retreat and Retrenchment

Strategic Background

Since the era of the Spanish-American War, when the United States first assumed territorial responsibilities in the western Pacific, contingency plans had been prepared to deal with the possibility of war with Japan. Known as the “Orange” series in their many revisions, these war plans all assumed that the Japanese would initiate hostilities against the United States with an attack on the Philippine Islands. In response, the U.S. Asiatic Fleet and the in-country Army garrisons would be tasked with fighting a delaying action there until the U.S. Pacific Fleet could arrive from the West Coast to defeat the Japanese Navy in a classic Mahanian sea battle.

In the late-1930s, with Japanese aggression in East Asia an increasing threat, the Orange Plan – by then named “Rainbow Five” – loomed ever larger in the Navy’s strategic thinking. Consequently, just before the opening of World War II in Europe, President Franklin Roosevelt ordered the U.S. Pacific Fleet to shift its operating bases from the West Coast to Pearl Harbor. Simultaneously, the Asiatic Fleet – consisting nominally of a small surface force and a handful of antiquated submarines – was reinforced by transferring several newer submarine divisions to the Philippines from San Diego and Hawaii.

Thus, at the outbreak of war with the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, 29 U.S. submarines were stationed in Manila Bay and 21 at Pearl Harbor itself. Of the Manila boats, six were of the old “S” class, seven were “fleet submarines” of the transitional “P” class, and 12 were more modern fleet boats of the USS Salmon (SS-182) class. These units were commanded by CAPT John Wilkes and serviced by two tenders and a converted merchant ship. The 21 submarines of the Pearl Harbor force, under RADM Thomas Withers, included six early V-class fleet boats, three “P” class, and 12 new USS Tambor (SS-198)-class submarines. When the war began, however, 11 of the Pearl Harbor boats were in the United States in various stages of overhaul.

The Japanese Onslaught – Retreat to Australia

Simultaneously with the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese moved against Burma, Malaya, Hong Kong, and the Philippines. On 8 December, they bombed out most of the American air force in the Philippines; on the 10th, invaded northern Luzon; and on the 22nd, came ashore at the Lingayan Gulf, 300 miles northwest of Manila. U.S. Army GEN Douglas MacArthur had been responsible for defending the Philippine Islands since 1935. Recognizing that his small garrison and the Philippine Army were no match for the invaders – and in accordance with the original Orange/ Rainbow plans – MacArthur began withdrawing southward into defensive positions on the Bataan Peninsula west of Manila Bay and just north of the island fortress of Corregidor at its entrance. 


Meanwhile, ADM Thomas Hart, Commander of the Asiatic Fleet, had moved his surface forces southward, out of range of Japanese aircraft on Formosa. This left only the submarines to oppose the coming onslaught, and by 11 December, 22 of his 29 boats had left Manila on their first war patrols to seek out and destroy the expected Japanese invasion forces. On the 10th, however, a massive Japanese air raid on the Cavite Naval Station south of Manila damaged USS Sealion (SS-195) beyond repair and destroyed the Cavite repair facility and most of the torpedoes in storage there.Sealion was the first U.S. submarine lost in World War II. 


Photo of Three Officers (caption follows)

Pacific Theater Submarine Force commanders early in the war: (left to right) RADM Thomas Withers, COMSUBPAC at the outbreak of war; RADM Robert English, who relieved RADM Withers in April 1942; and CAPT John Wilkes, Commander of the Asiatic Fleet’s Submarine Force and Commander of the Fremantle force until June 1942.

Because of inexperience, poor intelligence, and bad luck, the Manila-based submarines sent out to oppose the Japanese invasion were almost totally ineffective. Patrolling the approaches to Luzon, many succeeded in making contact with enemy forces, but their 45 separate attacks produced only three confirmed sinkings – all freighters. Six U.S. boats managed to converge on the Lingayan Gulf on 22 December, but even so, the Japanese stormed ashore virtually unimpeded. Finally, with the fall of Manila clearly imminent, Wilkes decided at the end of the year to abandon the Philippines and move his submarines south to Surabaja in Java. The invaders occupied Manila on 2 January 1942. 


Pearl Harbor Photo (caption follows)
Tied up at the Submarine Base during the Pearl Harbor attack, USS Narwhal (SS-167) (left foreground) nonetheless earned partial credit for destroying at least one Japanese torpedo plane with hastily- organized machine gun fire.





























As the Asiatic Fleet retreated southward, the Japanese overran Burma, Malaya, and Thailand. Britain’s great bastion at Singapore capitulated on 15 February, leaving the Japanese to concentrate on the Dutch East Indies, where Celebes and Borneo had already been invaded a month before. Withdrawing under relentless Japanese pressure, U.S. submarines nonetheless attempted to stem the tide by concentrating off Japanese staging bases and attacking the invasion forces wherever they could be found. But despite the Navy’s courageous rearguard defense, the Japanese were able to take Java in little more than a week after annihilating the surface forces of America, Britain, the Dutch, and Australia (the “ABDA” fleet) in the Battle of the Java Sea on 28 February.

After the loss of the East Indies, U.S. submarines withdrew to ports on the southwest coast of Australia. Since the outbreak of war, they had managed to sink only ten of the enemy: eight merchants, a destroyer, and an aircraft ferry. And of the original 29 Manila boats, four had been lost. Despite the success of nearly a dozen individual submarine missions in re-supplying the beleaguered U.S. troops on Bataan and Corregidor and removing key personnel before Corregidor’s final surrender on 6 May 1942, it was not an auspicious beginning.

First Submarines West from Pearl Harbor

Six hours after the Pearl Harbor attack, the Navy Department issued their now-famous order, “EXECUTE UNRESTRICTED AIR AND SUBMARINE WARFARE AGAINST JAPAN.” With three just-overhauled submarines newly arrived from the West Coast, the number of boats available at Pearl Harbor rose to 14 soon after the Japanese attack. Almost immediately, RADM Withers sent seven out on initial war patrols – four to reconnoiter Japanese strongholds in the Marshall Islands, and three to the home waters of Japan. The first submarine to undertake an “Empire” patrol to the Japanese homeland – some 3,500 nautical miles distant – was USS Gudgeon (SS-211), which departed Hawaii on 11 December, the fifth day of the war. The first of the Marshall Island patrols commenced on 18 December, when USS Pompano (SS-181) left Pearl Harbor for surveillance of Wake Island and Wotje.


Ultimately, 24 war patrols were mounted from Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and the first three months of 1942. Of these, eight had targeted Japanese home waters, while the remainder had patrolled the Japanese Pacific islands and the China coast. In the post-war accounting, they were credited with sinking a total of 19 enemy ships, only one of which was a Japanese combatant – the submarine I-173, ambushed by Gudgeon on 27 January 1942 near Oahu.

Defending the “The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” 

By the end of March 1942, Japan had achieved virtually all of her initial objectives in seizing the Philippines, Southeast Asia, and the Dutch East Indies. Moreover, the continuing Japanese pressure on eastern New Guinea placed Australia itself at grave risk, and both Bengal and Ceylon were within striking distance. Japan’s primary war aim had been to insure self-sufficiency in strategic materials, and the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” gained in her lightning campaigns of late 1941 and early 1942 had only to be defended successfully to consolidate that goal. To protect the supply lines that brought oil, rubber, and minerals from Sumatra, Borneo, and Malaya to the homeland, the Japanese created a powerful system of layered defenses. Their World War I mandate over former German possessions in the Mariana, Marshall, and Caroline Islands was transformed into a powerful complex of central Pacific bases centered on the fleet anchorage at Truk in the Carolines. Additionally, to protect their new colonial empire, the Japanese established staging bases in the Palau Islands east of the Philippines and at Rabaul on New Britain, just northwest of the Solomon Islands. 




Map of Battles (caption follows; also further explained in article)
By March 1942, the Japanese had conquered the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Southeast Asia, and half of New Guinea to establish their “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.” Their first setbacks occurred in the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. in May and June 1942.


After the Allied retreat to Australia in March 1942, the U.S. high command decided to leave the remaining submarines of the Asiatic Fleet “down under,” rather than withdraw them to Pearl Harbor. Not only would they be well positioned there to attack Japanese supply lines between southeast Asia and the homeland, but they could also support the larger Allied decision to divide the theater into two major command areas – one for the southwest Pacific under GEN MacArthur in Australia; and the other for the central and northern Pacific under ADM Chester Nimitz on Oahu. These separate responsibilities also reflected a spirited difference of opinion on how to regain the offensive, with MacArthur – not surprisingly – intent on driving northward from Australia to retake New Guinea and the Philippines – and Nimitz recommending a move westward across the Central Pacific against the Japanese island bases and the enemy homeland. In fact, the two strategies were eventually pursued simultaneously, with frequent top-level squabbling about materiel and manpower priorities. 

Initial Moves in the Southwest Pacific 

When CAPT John Wilkes re-established his headquarters at Perth/Fremantle in southwestern Australia in March 1942, he had 25 submarines under his command. This force was augmented by four fleet submarines from Pearl Harbor, but his five S-boats were sent to Brisbane – on Australia’s east coast – when six Atlantic Fleet counterparts under CAPT Ralph Christie were reassigned there from Panama. This left 20 submarines in Fremantle to deploy against Japanese supply lines in the southwest Pacific, as well as to undertake “special missions” ordered by GEN MacArthur to pick up and deliver personnel and supplies behind enemy lines. In March and April, the Fremantle boats scored only a half-dozen sinkings.


In late April, the Japanese moved again, mounting a dual sea-borne thrust to occupy Tulagi in the Solomon Islands and complete their conquest of New Guinea by seizing Port Moresby. Although Tulagi fell easily, the Port Moresby force was intercepted in the Battle of the Coral Sea the first week of May, and despite the loss of the aircraft carrier USS Lexington (CV-2) by the United States, Japanese designs on the last remnants of New Guinea were thwarted. Four of the Brisbane S-boats managed to get to sea in time to attack several elements of the Japanese invasion force, but their only confirmed kill was a minelayer. Three weeks after the Battle of the Coral Sea, newly-promoted RADM Charles Lockwood relieved John Wilkes as commander of the Fremantle force. He chose CAPT James Fife, formerly Wilkes’ Chief of Staff, to lead a newly re-formed SUBRON TWO, and – more importantly – undertook the first in-water tests to investigate growing evidence that U.S. torpedoes were malfunctioning in combat and were at least partially responsible for the apparent lack of effectiveness of his submarines. Almost immediately, he found that the standard Mark XIV torpedoes were running at least ten feet deeper than their settings and reported those findings to Washington as the first step in fixing torpedo problems that would take at least another year to resolve. 

When the Japanese attempted to build on their success on Tulagi by constructing an airstrip on neighboring Guadalcanal, the renewed threat to Port Moresby and Australia’s supply lines stimulated the invasion of Guadalcanal by U.S. Marines on 7 August 1942. Planning the initial attack on the Solomons revealed one disadvantage of the Pacific theater’s separate commands. The original dividing line between the two areas of responsibility passed east of the Solomon Islands, putting them in GEN MacArthur’s domain. However, the only amphibious forces and supporting combatants available for the assault lay under the control of ADM Nimitz, who was naturally loathe to “chop” them to the general. Accordingly, the authorities in Washington dictated a compromise: The boundary line of the Southwest Pacific Area was moved westward to the 159-degree meridian, just west of Guadalcanal, and the initial invasion of that island was entrusted to VADM Robert Ghormley’s South Pacific command, reporting to ADM Nimitz. Then, after Guadalcanal was secured, the responsibility for reducing the rest of the Solomons and regaining New Guinea would revert to GEN MacArthur. To further complicate matters, when the submarine force at Brisbane, under CAPT Christie, was beefed up in anticipation of the Solomons campaign, it functioned under Commander, Submarines Southwest Pacific (COMSUBSOWESPAC – then RADM Lockwood) for operations west of 159 degrees east longitude and under Commander, Submarines Pacific (COMSUBPAC) for operations on the other side of the line.

SUBPAC Operations and the Battle of Midway

Just before the Battle of the Coral Sea, ADM Nimitz had appointed RADM Robert English to succeed RADM Withers as COMSUBPAC. English promptly concluded an agreement with CAPT Wilkes to exchange submarines between their two bases so that Fremantle’s boats could be cycled back to the United States for overhaul. Moreover, in transiting to Australia, the Pearl Harbor submarines could undertake war patrols off the Japanese-held islands. Under this arrangement – and with new arrivals from the United States – the number of war patrols from Pearl Harbor increased sharply during April and early May 1942, evenly divided between “Empire” forays and “stake-outs” of the Japanese bases in the Central Pacific. All told, however, between January and May 1942, the Pearl Harbor boats were eventually credited with sinking only 33 enemy ships – approximately 130,000 tons – almost all on patrols to Japanese home waters and the East China Sea. 


Then, in mid-May, “ULTRA” crypto- graphic intelligence provided advance warning of a major Japanese offensive intended to seize first the Aleutians, and then Midway Island, only 700 miles from Pearl Harbor. ADM Nimitz immediately deployed his three remaining aircraft carriers to intercept the multi-pronged enemy attack, and the result was the U.S. victory in the Battle of Midway, 4-6 June 1942, often described as the “turning point” of the Pacific war. As a key element of the riposte, RADM English had sortied all his available submarines and deployed them in two groups: 12 boats west of Midway and seven to the west and north of Oahu. Simultaneously, the Japanese assigned 16 submarines to support their invasion force, but U.S. ULTRA intercepts and radio-direction-finding (RDF) kept them at bay. Unfortunately, the American submarines did no better. Confusion, indecision, and poor contact reporting limited them to making only negligible contributions to the U.S. victory. Four Japanese carriers and a heavy cruiser were lost to U.S. aircraft, but of the submarines, only USS Nautilus (SS-168) managed to score a hit – on the already-damaged carrier, IJS Kaga – and her torpedo was a dud. In contrast, a Japanese submarine, I-168, got within range of the crippled aircraft carrier, USS Yorktown (CV-5), and sank both her and an escorting destroyer before the former could be taken under tow for Pearl Harbor. 


Photo of USS S-36 (caption follows)
Photo of USS Holland (caption follows)(above) USS S-36 (SS-141) was one of six old S-boats stationed at Manila at the outbreak of the war. Commis-sioned in 1923, she displaced approximately 1,100 tons submerged and was armed with 4 21-inch torpedo tubes. Limited to only 14 knots on the surface, the S-boats soon proved inadequate for the Pacific theater. After sustaining serious battle damage, S-36 ran aground and was lost in the Makassar Strait in January 1942. (left) A pre-war view of the submarine tender USS Holland (AS-3) with a nest of six S-boats alongside. Holland was commissioned in 1926 and arrived at Cavite just prior to Pearl Harbor. She survived the retreat to Australia and after a 1943 overhaul at Mare Island, served for the duration of the war. 

































In the northern Pacific, a total of ten old S-boats had been transferred to Dutch Harbor, Alaska, to defend the Aleutians. This was no impediment, however, to a Japanese carrier-based air attack on Dutch Harbor in early June and the seizure of the outer islands of Attu and Kiska as a diversion from the main Japanese thrust at Midway. After that battle, seven fleet submarines joined the S-boats in Alaskan waters, where they mounted an attrition campaign against Japanese occupation and support forces there. Operating in vicious weather and challenging ocean conditions, the Dutch Harbor submarines ultimately sank two destroyers and a pair of patrol craft, but it cost them two of their own number – one to enemy action, and the other to grounding. Notwithstanding the dedication of disproportionate U.S. resources, the Alaskan theater remained a backwater for the duration of the war.

A Disappointing 1942 Winds Down

The U.S. invasion of the Solomon Islands in August 1942 followed the Japanese rebuff at Midway by only two months. Thus, for the remainder of 1942, the U.S. focus shifted to the Southwest Pacific, and even SUBPAC submarines from Pearl Harbor were regularly assigned interdiction missions in support of the Solomons effort. Guadalcanal was not completely secured until February 1943, and for the Navy, the Solomons contest devolved into preventing the Japanese from reinforcing their island garrisons by sea. This led to a series of violent surface actions up and down the island chain, the diversionary attack on Makin Atoll in the Gilberts by Carlson’s Raiders, and a concerted submarine campaign to cut Japanese communications from Truk and Rabaul.


For this reason, the submarine force in Australia was significantly augmented in the latter half of the year. After VADM William Halsey relieved VADM Ghormley as the South Pacific commander in November 1942, SUBRONS EIGHT and TEN were transferred from Pearl Harbor – giving Brisbane, under CAPT Christie the largest concentration of U.S. submarines in the Pacific. Earlier – despite RADM Lockwood’s strong objection – SUBRON TWO had also been transferred from the Fremantle area, leaving him only eight boats to cover Japanese supply lines from the East Indies and Malaya. Meanwhile, the Pearl Harbor force, now numbering less than 20 boats – but making increasing use of an advanced base at Midway to shorten transit times – was split between blockading Truk and undertaking commerce raiding in Japanese home waters and the East China Sea.

In late 1942, only RADM Lockwood’s Fremantle boats and perhaps half of the Pearl Harbor submarines were actively engaged in attacking the supply lines that sustained the enemy war effort. Virtually all of the Brisbane war patrols focused on the Solomons and Rabaul, while many of Pearl Harbor’s were targeted at Truk and similar bases, often in reaction to fruitless ULTRA clues. Despite extraordinary individual accomplishments, the resulting dilution of effort seriously limited the effectiveness of U.S. submarines in undermining Japan’s war-making capability early in the conflict. As Clay Blair points out in his classic account of the Pacific submarine campaign, Silent Victory, the 180 Japanese ships destroyed by U.S. submarines in all of 1942 were matched by German sinkings in the Atlantic during February and March of that year alone. Significantly, 45 percent of all the successes that were achieved resulted from the 15 percent of war patrols identified as “Empire” missions from Pearl Harbor – which should have been a powerful argument for concentrating on Japanese shipping early in the game. 

The record against Japanese combatants was even more disappointing: U.S. submarines sank only two major warships in all 1942 – a heavy and a light cruiser. In contrast, Japanese submarines destroyed two U.S. carriers and a light cruiser, as well as heavily damaging another carrier, a battleship, and a heavy cruiser. Japanese submariners paid a stiffer price, losing 23 boats during the first year – whereas U.S. losses since the beginning of the war totaled only seven submarines, and three of these came from running aground.

For Want of a Nail...



Map of Attacks (caption follows; also further explained in article)
After the retreat southward from the Philippines, initial Allied counter-offensives concentrated first on defending the approaches to Australia in the Southwest Pacific. U.S. submarines operated from both Fremantle/Perth and Brisbane to attack Japanese supply lines between the Solomons and their bases at Truk, Rabaul, Palau, and the Marianas.


Our relatively poor submarine performance early in the war was due to a number of factors. First – as in the opening phase of any conflict – gaining combat experience, shedding peacetime attitudes, and winnowing out “less-aggressive” and tactically-inept commanding officers took months of actual fighting. Second, it was only the test of war that revealed materiel problems in both the submarines themselves and their torpedoes that crippled the Submarine Force until well into 1943. The older S-boats, for example, were largely inadequate for the demands placed on them in the Pacific, and even nine of the newer fleet boats – to be joined by a whole squadron in 1943 – were equipped with the notoriously unreliable Hoover-Owens- Rentschler (H.O.R.) main propulsion diesels, which frequently broke down on patrol.

But the gravest and most demoralizing technical problems emerged in torpedo performance. As early as the withdrawal toward Australia, many skippers had begun to suspect incidents of torpedo failure that robbed them of “sure” kills. Even as the experience of more and more inexplicable misses and dud hits began to accumulate, and the operators tried to raise the alarm through the chain of command, they were thwarted by a technical community that preferred to blame “human error” for their own failures. It was only when RADM Lockwood undertook his “unofficial” in-water tests in southwestern Australia that the truth about U.S. torpedoes began to be believed, and it was late-1943 before the problem was completely solved. In the interim, countless submarine crews put their lives in danger stalking enemy targets, only to be cheated of their quarry by defective torpedoes.

Early 1943 – the End of the Beginning

On 20 January 1943, COMSUBPAC RADM English departed Hawaii by air to inspect submarine support facilities on the West Coast. Caught in a storm off northern California, English’s aircraft was driven off course and crashed 115 miles north of San Francisco. All on board were killed. Just prior to this tragedy, Brisbane’s CAPT Christie had been transferred to command the Newport (Rhode Island) Torpedo Station and promoted to rear admiral. Although Christie had high hopes for becoming RADM English’s replacement at Pearl Harbor, the Navy’s Commander-in-Chief, ADM Ernest King, instead selected RADM Charles Lockwood for the job. To the Submarine Force, Lockwood soon proved that he was the right man at the right time, and from then on, their mutual fortunes turned sharply upward.
(Part II of this article, [now below] which will appear in the Summer issue of UNDERSEA WARFARE, will describe the turning of the tide under VADM Lockwood’s leadership and the concerted anti-shipping campaign that led to the Navy’s decisive undersea victory in World War II.)


PART II FOLLOWS
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Pacific Submarine Strategy in World War II"

Rising to Victory

The Pacific Submarine Strategy in World War II 
by Edward C. Whitman
photos courtesy of the Naval Historical Center

Part II: Winning Through

The Man of the Hour 

   Although he was born in Virginia in 1890, Charles Andrews Lockwood, Jr. was raised in Missouri. He entered the United States Naval Academy in 1908, joined the Submarine Force two years after graduation, and rose to command the old gasoline-powered A-2 (SS-3) and B-1 (SS-10) in the Philippines during World War I. Later, he led the First Asiatic Submarine Squadron and served as the Assistant Naval Attaché in Tokyo. Subsequently, he commanded the Simon Lake boats G-1(SS-19-1/2) and N-5 (SS-57), took the ex-German submarine minelayer UC-97 into the Great Lakes on a Victory Bond drive, and commissioned R-25 (SS-102), S-14 (SS-119), and V-3 (SS-165). In his varied career, Lockwood also commanded the venerable monitor USS Monadnock(BM-3) and two gunboats on the Yangtse Patrol, served on the U.S. Naval Mission to Brazil, held down both headquarters and naval shipyard jobs, and headed SUBDIV THIRTEEN at San Diego from 1935 to 1937. Before his assignment as COMSUBSOWESPAC at Fremantle, he had been the U.S. Naval Attaché in London from January 1941 until May 1942. Thus, Lockwood's accomplishments were extraordinary even before the untimely death of RADM English brought him to COMSUBPAC in February 1943.

Fremantle and Brisbane - Early 1943

   Two months before Lockwood took up his new position at Pearl Harbor, CAPT James Fife, then a Navy liaison officer at GEN MacArthur's new headquarters at Port Moresby, was ordered to replace the recently-reassigned Ralph Christie at Brisbane. In the aftermath of RADM English's death, however, Christie - now a rear admiral - was hurriedly brought back from the Newport Torpedo Station to replace Lockwood at COMSUBSOWESPAC in Fremantle.

   In response to the demands of the Solomons campaign in late 1942, Brisbane was by then home to three submarine squadrons - some 20 boats and their associated tenders and support facilities. Between the build-up to the invasion of Guadalcanal in August 1942 and its final pacification in February 1943, the Brisbane boats mounted nearly 60 war patrols, including forays into the Solomon Islands and inter-force transfers to Pearl Harbor by way of Truk and Rabaul. This offensive - largely steered by ULTRA cues into heavily-defended areas - accounted for only two-dozen enemy ships, nearly half of those near Truk. Moreover, three of the five boats that left Brisbane in February were lost to enemy action, leading to an internal investigation of Fife's leadership. In any event, with the Solomons campaign winding down and the war moving north and westward, Fife's command would be reduced to only one squadron by mid-1943.

   During their last several months under Lockwood, the small Fremantle force mounted just over 15 war patrols, but a third of these had been devoted to minelaying off Siam and Indochina, and another third had been associated with transits to Pearl Harbor. Postwar analysis credited 16 enemy ships to this effort, but as the only submarines well positioned to interdict the flow of petroleum - only lightly protected - from the Dutch East Indies to the Japanese operating bases and home islands, the Fremantle boats lost a significant opportunity. With Christie, in the first half of 1943, this pattern began to change, and half of the Fremantle sorties targeted Japanese convoy routes to the north and west. 23 sinkings were eventually confirmed - about one per patrol - but two more boats were lost to the enemy.


Seizing the Initiative
from Pearl Harbor 



   With their failure to retake the eastern Solomons in late 1942, the Japanese turned in 1943 to defending what remained of their earlier conquests. Thus, with new war materiel arriving daily from the United States, the Allies quickly regained the initiative, took back Attu and Kiska in May and August and - under GEN MacArthur - attacked the northern Solomons and "leap-frogged" westerly along the coast of northern New Guinea while isolating and bypassing Rabaul. Late in the year, ADM Nimitz's island-hopping campaign across the central Pacific got under way in earnest with the invasion of Tarawa and Makin in the Gilbert Islands in November.

   Accordingly, during 1943 the COMSUBPAC submarine force at Pearl Harbor - now under RADM Lockwood - gradually came to predominate over their counterparts in Australia. Because the Solomons action had drawn so many submarines to SOWESPAC, SUBPAC could only muster 28 war patrols for the first three months of 1943, and over half were sent to Truk, Palau, and the Marianas. 


VADM Charles Lockwood. Caption follows.
Chosen as COMSUBPAC after the death of RADM English in January 1943, VADM Charles Lockwood - "Uncle Charlie" - formulated the strategy that won the U.S. Submarine Force their unprecedented undersea victory in the Pacific. Lockwood's extraordinary submarine career had begun with command of A-2 (SS-3) in the Philippines during World War I.
   
      A notable exception was the first penetration of the Yellow Sea in March by USS Wahoo (SS-238) under "Mush" Morton, with a total bag of nine enemy ships. Unfortunately the other Pearl Harbor patrols for that same period saw only limited success, at least partially because of the high priority placed on hard-to-target enemy capital ships. By mid-spring 1943, however, Lockwood's force had grown to 50 submarines. Between April and August, he was able to send an average of 18 to sea each month for war patrols of 40-50 days, with over half targeted at enemy shipping in Empire waters and the East China Sea. A significant innovation occurred in July, when Lockwood and his brilliant Operations Officer CAPT (later RADM) Richard Voge sent three submarines into the Sea of Japan, entering from the north through the La Pérouse Strait. The three boats only managed to sink three small freighters in four days before withdrawing, and two subsequent patrols the next month - one under "Mush" Morton - did little better. In September, however, Morton returned to the Sea of Japan a second time and apparently sank four ships before Wahoo was lost to a Japanese anti-submarine aircraft in early October while attempting to come back out.


Photos of RADM Ralph Christie left and RADM James Fife right. Caption follows.
In April 1942, RADM Ralph Christie (left) was the first commander of the U.S. Submarine Force at Brisbane, Australia and became COMSUBSOWESPAC at Fremantle in early 1943. RADM James Fife (right) relieved Christie at Brisbane in December 1942 and remained there until March 1944. Then, following an assignment in Washington, Fife relieved RADM Christie again - as COMSUBSOWESPAC in December 1944.






















Tackling the Torpedo Problem 

   Much of Lockwood's command attention during 1943 was consumed by several nagging materiel problems that had crippled U.S. submarine effectiveness early in the war. Foremost among these was torpedoes - not only a shortage of numbers, but continuing evidence of the design defects the admiral had already encountered during his tenure as COMSUBSOWESPAC. 

   Lockwood's earlier investigations at Fremantle had established that U.S. torpedoes were running too deeply, but even when this deficiency was corrected, torpedo performance continued to be suspect. Following an increasing number of attacks foiled by premature warhead explosions apparently due to a too-sensitive magnetic influence exploder, Lockwood prevailed on ADM Nimitz in June 1943 to order the magnetic "pistol" disabled on COMSUBPAC torpedoes and to rely solely on the contact exploder. But even with the magnetic feature disabled, Pearl Harbor submarines continued to experience a significant percentage of "duds," and it soon emerged that there were also major defects in the contact exploder. This led Lockwood to a series of careful experiments in Hawaii in which torpedoes were fired against underwater cliffs to determine potential causes of failure. These revealed that the firing pin was too slender to withstand the shock of a 90-degree encounter without buckling and "dudding" the torpedo. When this last piece of the puzzle fell into place in September 1943, performance of the Mark XIV submarine torpedo finally reached acceptability, but it had taken literally half the war to get there. That the problem had to be solved in the field by the operators themselves - and in spite of a technical community that only wanted to minimize the deficiencies - still evokes bitter memories.

   Moreover, the dubious reliability of the H.O.R. main-propulsion engines - apparent from the beginning of the war - became even more critical in May 1943 when the twelve boats of SUBRON TWELVE arrived at Pearl Harbor, all fitted with H.O.R. diesels. In both shakedown cruises and their European service with the Atlantic Fleet, all of the SUBRON TWELVE submarines revealed engine problems. These only became worse under combat conditions in the Pacific, where virtually all the H.O.R. boats were handicapped by catastrophic breakdowns that often required curtailing war patrols and returning to base for repairs. One by one, the H.O.R. submarines were shuttled back to Mare Island for new Winton engines, but it was nearly a year until all had been returned to duty and the H.O.R. maintenance problems eliminated.      


Photo of the Mark XVIII electric torpedo. Caption follows.
The Mark XVIII electric torpedo shown here during loading was slower than the troublesome Mark XIV but left no wake and could be produced in greater quantities. By mid-1944, three-quarters of the standard patrol load-out consisted of Mark XVIIIs.























Japanese Supply Lines - a New Focus

   For the bloody, but successful, invasion of the Gilbert Islands in November, a dozen submarines provided direct support: conducting reconnaissance, landing commandos, performing "lifeguard" duty to pick up downed U.S. pilots, and blockading Truk. During this same period, however, Lockwood and Voge introduced two additional tactical innovations: deploying small, coordinated submarine "wolf-packs" as tactical units; and concentrating more anti-shipping efforts in the Luzon Strait between the northern Philippines and Formosa, where several Japanese north-south convoy routes from the conquered territories converged. The first three three-boat wolf-packs departed Pearl Harbor in September, October, and December - the first for the East China Sea; the others for the Marianas. Results were mixed. The first Marianas effort sank seven ships, but the total score for the other two was only four. Even as tactics and techniques improved, communications and coordination among wolf-pack members at sea remained difficult, and "blue-on-blue" engagements were a worrisome possibility. Nonetheless, in 1944, wolf-packing became increasingly common,
 particularly for commerce-raiding north of Luzon. 

"The Submarine Force played a key role in the victory -
  not only by providing crucial sighting reports,
                         but by sinking or heavily damaging six enemy combatants."
   
      Although both Fremantle and Brisbane maintained a steady level of activity throughout 1943, the latter steadily lost importance as a submarine base in the later stages of the conflict. Early that year, the number of submarines stationed in Australia had been fixed at 20, nominally with 12 at Brisbane under CAPT Fife and eight at Fremantle under RADM Christie. As the war moved up the Solomons chain and westward into New Guinea, the boats were reapportioned in favor of Fremantle, and when the total number of Australia-based submarines was increased to 30 late in the year, Fremantle was allocated 22 and Brisbane the rest. Fife made the best of this disparity by establishing an advance base at Milne Bay, New Guinea, 1,200 miles closer to his operating areas off Truk, Rabaul, and Palau. In the latter half of the year, his 33 war patrols resulted in 29 confirmed sinkings along the supply lines linking the three Japanese bases. During that same period, after Japanese tankers were moved up the priority list, Christie's growing force at Fremantle turned aggressively to attacking the oil traffic from Borneo and Sumatra. Nearly 50 enemy ships were sunk by the Fremantle force between June and December, and a dozen of these were oil tankers.    
       
1943 - the Year of Transition

   For all of 1943, the Submarine Force was credited with sinking 335 Japanese targets - or 1.5 million tons of shipping - essentially twice the corresponding figures for 1942. More importantly, after diminishing only slightly in 1942, the total tonnage of the Japanese merchant marine (including oil tankers), dropped 16 percent in 1943, despite a vigorous shipbuilding program not yet disrupted by Allied air attacks. Correspondingly, the importation of bulk commodities (not including petroleum products) into Japan had diminished by the end of 1943 to 81 percent of the pre-war level. Surprisingly, though, Japanese tanker tonnage actually increased by nearly 30 percent over the year due to need to transport oil from the East Indies. 


   Starting in mid-1943, the gradual introduction of the Mark XVIII electric torpedo into the theater brought substantial relief from the persistent torpedo shortages of the early war years. Although slower than the Mark XIV by 10 to 15 knots and somewhat limited in range, the Mark XVIII left no tell-tale wake that could give away a submarine's position, and it was much easier to manufacture in quantity. By the middle of 1944, when all their teething problems had been solved, Mark XVIII torpedoes constituted three-quarters of the standard patrol load-out. Despite the large percentage of U.S. war patrols targeted specifically at major Japanese bases or cued against Japanese combatants by ULTRA information, U.S. submarines sank only one major Japanese warship in 1943 - the light aircraft carrier IJS Chuyo. That same year, fifteen U.S. submarines were lost in the Pacific - plus two in the Atlantic. The Japanese lost 23.                


Chart of the percentage of Japanese shipping remaining and the total number of war patrols per month. Caption follows.
As the number of war patrols from Pearl Harbor, Fremantle, and Brisbane mounted in 1943 and 1944, the percentage of Japanese merchant tonnage remaining afloat dropped relentlessly from its pre-war level. Of note is the peak of U.S. submarine activity in May 1942 in preparation for the Battle of Midway.


Thrusting Westward - Early 1944 

   By the time ADM Nimitz's cross-Pacific thrust reached the Marshall Islands at the beginning of 1944, over 60 submarines were assigned to Pearl Harbor and 36 to Australia. Moreover, in recognition of the submarine contribution to the war effort, RADM Lockwood had been promoted to vice admiral just before the turn of the year. He quickly took advantage of the capture of Kwajalein and Majuro in the Marshalls in January 1944 to establish an advance submarine base on the latter in April, which put his Pearl Harbor boats 2,000 miles closer to Japan. Even before the fall of Eniwetok in February, and with Truk coming under increasing carrier-based air attacks, Japanese commander-in-chief ADM Mineichi Koga, had ordered his heavy units to abandon Truk and fall back on the Palaus. Then, under further pressure in late March and early April, Koga ordered a further dispersal of his fleet to Davao and Tawi Tawi (in the southern Philippines), Surabaja, and Singapore. 


   Accordingly, Lockwood's and Christie's submarines at Pearl Harbor and Fremantle were kept busy supporting both the Marshalls campaign and U.S. carrier air strikes. With ULTRA intercepts to give advanced warning of the resulting Japanese withdrawals, numerous attempts were organized to intercept both enemy men-of-war and supply ships. Although a number of Japanese freighters and auxiliaries were sunk, the only major warships destroyed during this period were three light cruisers. Simultaneously, however, Lockwood increased pressure on the Empire, East China Sea, and Kurile Island supply routes, and in March and April sent two more wolf-packs to the Luzon Strait. Only the first of these produced significant results - seven freighters confirmed for about 35,000 tons - but all told, U.S. submarines sank 183 ships or nearly three-quarters of a million tons of shipping in the first four months of 1944.                    

Decision in the Philippine Sea

   In the SOWESPAC area, GEN MacArthur's forces continued their advance westward across New Guinea, and by June 1944 the entire northern coast of the island had been secured. Simultaneously, Nimitz moved on toward the Mariana Islands with the intention of seizing Saipan, Guam, and Tinian as staging bases for the push toward Palau and the Philippines. To soften up those objectives, the 15 carriers of Task Force 58 under RADM Raymond Spruance mounted a series of powerful air strikes, while Lockwood sent a new wave of submarines westward to interdict any Japanese attempts to reinforce the islands and to provide lifeguard services for downed airmen. 


   To defend the Marianas and Palaus, ADM Soemu Toyoda, replacing ADM Koga, had earlier concentrated the Japanese fleet at Tawi Tawi, and he sortied a powerful force under ADM Jisaburo Ozawa on 13 June in an attempt to thwart the gathering attack on the Marianas. The result was the Battle of the Philippine Sea a week later, pitting Spruance's 15 carriers against Ozawa's nine. Subsequently dubbed "the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot," in which Ozawa lost nearly 350 aircraft without sinking a single American ship, the encounter on 19 and 20 June also cost the Japanese three large aircraft carriers, including two - IJS Taiho and IJS Shokaku - sunk by U.S. submarines. By the time Ozawa broke off the engagement and retreated northward, Japanese naval aviation had suffered a devastating loss that would never be redressed. Instead, Japan began training kamikaze pilots. Meanwhile, Saipan had been invaded on 15 June, to be followed by Guam and Tinian later in the summer. By 10 August, the entire Marianas had been taken, and additional advance submarine bases were promptly established at Saipan and Guam.              



Photo of the USS Proteus (AS-19) and 12 submarines of SUBRON 20. Caption follows.
Present at the formal Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945 were the submarine tender USS Proteus (AS-19) and 12 submarines of SUBRON 20. (Fifteen years later, Proteus was converted to serve as a tender for the first of the Polaris SSBNs and performed in that capacity in both Scotland and Guam until 1982. She was decommissioned less than ten years ago.)
   

The emphasis on attacking Japanese shipping continued to grow. An analysis of submarine patrol assignments from the beginning of 1944 until the end of the war shows a steady increase in the percentage targeted at Japanese supply lines - rising from approximately 40 percent at the beginning of that period to more than double that by August 1945. Consequently, Lockwood began sending wolf-packs into the Luzon Strait on a regular basis, redirecting a group of three boats that had participated in the Battle of the Philippine Sea, and dispatching three more wolf-packs by mid-July. All told, these four efforts netted 17 enemy ships. Additionally, COMSUBPAC increased his emphasis on the East China Sea and also established a series of so-called "polar routes" that vectored submarines northward past the Aleutians and westward to the Kurile Islands and the Sea of Okhotsk, where they could prey on Japanese fishing fleets and coastal traders before slipping southward to patrol off Hokkaido and Tokyo Bay.

   With Brisbane's importance steadily diminishing in early 1944, CAPT Fife was re-assigned to staff duty in Washington, and overall command of the Australia-based submarines devolved on RADM Christie. Meanwhile, the Fremantle operation was approaching a peak of activity in September and October, when a total of 38 boats - most in wolf-packs - joined patrols against the Japanese oil "pipeline" from Sumatra and Borneo and enemy attempts to shore up the defenses of the Philippines. These COMSUBSOWESPAC operations were facilitated by establishing two new advance bases north of New Guinea in mid-year: at Manus in the Admiralty Islands, and at Mios Woendi, just east of Biak. In July through October alone, Christie's boats sank nearly 100 enemy ships, joining over 150 more destroyed by their counterparts at Pearl Harbor. Exacerbated by the growing toll exacted by air attacks, the effect on the Japanese war effort was catastrophic. Total Japanese importation of bulk commodities for 1944 was half the pre-war level, and by the end of the year, their merchant tonnage (again including tankers) had dropped to 47 percent of the pre-war figure.                 


Map of Japanese submarine trail. Caption follows.
The trail of submarine advance bases established by COMSUBPAC westward from Pearl Harbor - and by COMSUBSOWESPAC northward from Australia - clearly marks the convergence of the Allied offensive on the Japanese homeland in the last years of the war. Japanese defeats in the Battles of the Philippine Sea and the Leyte Gulf marked the beginning of the end.

The Beginning of the End

   In preparation for the ensuing invasion of the Philippine Islands, GEN MacArthur's forces invaded the island of Morotai, northwest of New Guinea, in September 1944, and ADM Nimitz moved on Peleliu and Angaur in the Palau group. When U.S. troops came ashore on eastern Leyte on 20 October, however, ADM Toyoda had already initiated a series of countermoves. His overall plan was to bring VADM Ozawa's carriers down from Japan to lure VADM William Halsey's Task Force 38 away from Leyte Gulf so that a powerful surface fleet, including the super-battleships IJSYamato and IJS Musashi, could come up from Singapore, penetrate the San Bernardino and Surigao Straits, and catch the invasion forces at Leyte Gulf in lethal pincers. The result was the Battle of the Leyte Gulf, 23-25 October 1944, perhaps the largest naval encounter ever fought. 


   To support the U.S. invasion, RADM Christie positioned a dozen submarines southwest of Luzon to interdict Japanese forces coming up from the south, while VADM Lockwood deployed over twenty boats off Japan's Inland Sea and near the Luzon Strait to counter enemy moves from the north. Christie's submarines drew first blood early on the morning of 23 October by sinking two Japanese heavy cruisers and severely damaging two others west of Palawan. Then, on the 24th, U.S. carrier aircraft badly mauled the enemy surface forces in the San Bernardino and Surigao Straits - sinking Musashi - and then turned northward to find Ozawa's carriers. In subsequent surface actions, VADM Thomas Kinkaid annihilated the Surigao Strait force, but found himself badly outmatched at the San Bernardino Strait to the north, where the debouching Japanese battleships sank two escort carriers, two destroyers, and a destroyer-escort before withdrawing - inexplicably - without attacking the landing force. 

   Then, on the morning of the 25th, Halsey found the approaching Japanese carriers and sank all four of them, leaving only two hybrid carrier-battleships, IJS Ise and Hyuga, and their escorts to run a gauntlet back to Japan through several scouting lines of U.S. submarines deployed to intercept the "cripples." Among these, the U.S. boats managed to pick off a light cruiser and a destroyer. In addition to guaranteeing the successful invasion of the Philippines, the Battle of the Leyte Gulf reduced the Japanese Navy to a mere remnant of its former self, almost entirely bereft of carrier aviation. The Submarine Force played a key role in the victory - not only by providing crucial sighting reports, but by sinking or heavily damaging six enemy combatants.

   The re-conquest of the Philippines continued with the invasions of Mindoro and Luzon in December 1944 and January 1945, leading to the recapture of Manila in early February. Meanwhile, with the remains of the enemy war fleet withdrawn into home waters, U.S. submarines were free to concentrate almost entirely on Japanese shipping. During all of 1944, more than 600 Japanese ships - or 2.7 million tons - were eventually credited to the U.S. boats, including a battleship, seven aircraft carriers, nine cruisers, and numerous smaller combatants. In the same period, the Pacific boats rescued 117 downed airmen from the sea in lifeguard missions. On the negative side, 19 U.S. submarines were lost to enemy action during 1944 - plus one sunk in a training accident - but in contrast, the Japanese sacrificed 56.

Final Victory in the Pacific 

   1944's anti-shipping campaign was so successful that by the beginning of 1945, virtually nothing was left to sink. Few enemy targets remained outside the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea, and narrow coastal lanes plied only by day. Nonetheless, U.S. submarines pursued their remaining quarry wherever it could be found, patrolling up and down the Japanese coast and often penetrating deep into their harbors, while performing lifeguard duty in support of a crescendo of air attacks on mainland targets by both carrier-based and long-range bombers. In February, the Australia-based Submarine Force - now under newly-promoted RADM James Fife - established another advance submarine base at Subic Bay north of Manila, and within a few months, VADM Lockwood had moved his own headquarters forward to Guam. By then, more than 120 U.S. submarines were operating in the Pacific.


   By the time of the invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa in February and April 1945, Japan's war-making capacity had been virtually eliminated, and continuing air-raids on the major cities and military complexes were wreaking horrendous destruction on the civil and industrial infrastructure. Although detailed planning had begun for a massive invasion of the Japanese home island of Kyushu in November 1945, the unleashing of atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in early August brought a merciful end to the conflict on the 14th of that month. The formal surrender instrument was signed on the deck of USS Missouri (BB-63) in Tokyo Bay on 2 September. Appropriately, VADM Lockwood participated in the ceremony, and a dozen submarines and the tender USS Proteus (AS-19) were anchored nearby. 

   Reflecting how completely the Japanese merchant marine had been swept from the seas, U.S. submarines sank only 190 enemy ships - most of them quite small - in the seven and one-half wartime months of 1945, equivalent to half the monthly average achieved in 1944. Since 1941, the Pacific Fleet Submarine Force had sunk over 1,300 enemy vessels - or 5.3 million tons of shipping - approximately 55 percent of all Japanese ships lost during the conflict. (The remainder was lost to aircraft, mines, and other causes.) 

   Although this destruction was wrought by less than two percent of U.S. Navy personnel, our undersea victory in the Pacific exacted a heavy toll of ships and men. A total of 52 U.S. submarines were lost in World War II, most with all hands. Over 3,500 officers and enlisted men sacrificed their lives - 22 percent of those who went on patrol - the highest casualty rate in the U.S. armed forces. Lest we forget.


"There is a port of no return, where ships
May ride at anchor for a little space
And then, some starless night, the cable slips,
Leaving and eddy at the mooring place…
Gulls, veer no longer. Sailor, rest your oar.
No tangled wreckage will be washed ashore."
                                                   - Leslie Nelson Jennings
 ("Lost Harbor")

Bibliography. Most useful among the many references consulted in the preparation of this article and its predecessor have been: 

Alden, John D., 
The Fleet Submarine in the U.S. Navy, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1979.
Alden, John D., U.S. Submarine Attacks During World War II, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1989.
Blair, Clay, Silent Victory, the U.S. Submarine War Against Japan, Lippincott, New York, 1975.
Liddell Hart, B.H., History of The Second World War, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1971.
Morison, Samuel Eliot, History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II, 15 volumes, Little, Brown, Boston, 1947-62.
Roscoe, Theodore, United States Submarine Operations in World War II, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1949.

Major explosion near US carrier a while ago

Update on Japan's legislative process for Soryu sale to Australia

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Shinzo Abe when appointed Prime Minister in December 2012. He is steadily altering Japan's defence policies and laws, in response to the threats from China, North Korea and terrorism.
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Japanese air force F-15s, based in Okinawa. They mainly protect Japanese territorial interests in the East China Sea area. Amended laws will provide greater legal backing for broader Japanese military activities.
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Japan's competitors (Germany and France) in the submarine sale to Australia have policies and legal systems well in place to sell to Australia. Japan's own defence sales legal system probably needs years of work to make sales to Australia sufficiently legal under Japanese law and more acceptable to the broad Japanese public. The time-lag is made more serious by Australia being Japan's first multi-billion dollar weapons customer. So as things stand today Japan is at a legal disadvantage compared to established weapon exporters Germany and France. 

The Abe Government also needs to establish greater legal certainty while Abe's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has so many seats in both the lower (House of Representatives) and upper (House of Councillors) houses of the Diet (Parliament).  

The mass of decisions and documents required by Japan’s Government and companies to sell Soryu submarines to Australia require major legislative changes. This is a short update on part of the legislative process.

In July 2014 the Cabinet of Japan’s Abe Government agreed on three new requirements for using the right of collective self-defence. The three requirements were (and are) that:

1.    there is an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan and also in some cases its allies,
2.    there is no appropriate means to repel this incursion other than the use of force in self-defence, and
3.    the use of force is confined to the minimum level needed to repel the attack.

On March 6, 2015a council meeting of the majority LDP and its coalition partner Komeito further discussed revising laws. It was decided that an outline of security legislation will be formulated by the end of March 2015, and the government will start writing the texts of the bills in April 2015. The bills will amend such laws as:

-          the Law on Response to Armed Attack Situations, and
-          the Self-Defense Forces Law

The LDP sees actual changes to Japan’s Constitution as a long term goal requiring agreement in the Diet and also a referendum. Article 96 of the Constitution provides that a proposed amendment must first be approved by both houses of the Diet, by at least a super majority of two-thirds of each house (rather than just a simple majority). It must then be submitted to a referendum in which it is sufficient for it to be endorsed by a simple majority of votes cast. A successful amendment is finally promulgatedby the Emperor, but the monarch cannot veto an amendment.

Soryu to Australia

The legislative changes mentioned above add legal legitimacy and also help build consensus for a non-pacifist Japanese defence policy. Actual Principles and Guidelines form part of the mass of decisions and documents required to sell Soryu submarines to Australia. Principles and Guidelines include:

1.     The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology of April 1, 2014 http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press22e_000010.htmland 

2. The Implementation Guidelines for 1 Implementation Guidelines for the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000034954.pdf
This was adopted by Japan's National Security Council on April 1, 2014 .

Within the Guidelines I understand that Provision 1,2)A will be applied in possible the Soryu or related technology transfer to Australia. The Provision is:

1. Cases in which Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology may be
Permitted

2) Overseas transfers that contribute to Japan’s security, only if the transfers have positive meaning from the viewpoint of Japan’s security, and that:

A. are related to international joint development and production with countries
cooperating with Japan in security area including the U.S.,"

COMMENT

The Abe Government appears to be steadily working towards changes in laws needed to permit such exports as the Soryu to Australia.

The agreement of Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) with its more centrist coalition partner Komeitoseems required for these changes in laws. Komeito’s power comes from its centrist nature and its numbers in both the lower and upper house of the Diet (Parliament). Komeito’s agreement to the wording the LDP wants in the laws may be an obstacle, if Komeito hesitates from April 2015 onwards.

It is difficult to assess whether the Principles and Guidelines needed to sell Soryus to Australia are currently overly strict or prescriptive. There are sensitivities in the Australian military over how Sweden, due to Sweden’s export guidelines, decided to embargo Carl Gustav anti-tank weapon ammunition to Australia during the Vietnam War. Sweden’s decision not to sustain the Carl Gustav weapon system with ammunition, in time of great need, was probably the main Australian concern.

I do not know whether Japan’s submarine sale competitors, Germany and France, have similar Principles and Guidelines that may potentially restrict sale or sustainment of their submarines.

Japan's defence laws may be modified to be less pacifist but most depends on how they are interpreted, by politicians, the judiciary and the public.

I would be grateful to Japanese readers if you could comment whether I have an accurate view or not.

Regards

Pete

Brazil's New Submarine Program (ProSub) - March 2015 Update

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https://images-blogger-opensocial.googleusercontent.com/gadgets/proxy?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.defesanet.com.br%2Fsite%2Fupload%2Fnews_image%2F2015%2F01%2F24151_resize_620_380_true_false_null.jpg&container=blogger&gadget=a&rewriteMime=image%2F*

Artist's impression of Brazil's new Submarine Program (ProSub) Base and Shipbuilding facility at Port Itaguai, Sepetiba Bay. Brazil's decision to build its own submarines of French-DCNS designs is, of course relevant, to the submarine building aspirations of many in Australia. 
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See Guanabara Bay(Baia de Guanabara) to the right of central Rio. Guanabara Bay is the home of Brazil's current submarine base. To the left of Rio is Sepetiba Bay (Baia de Sepetiba). The move of Brazil's base from Guanabara to Sepetiba Bay may partly be due to lack of space for base growth, environmental and population concerns including dangers from stored ammunition and the remote possibility of nuclear reactor leakage.
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There are many question marks (?) that follow due to language, repetition and assessing what is current information matters. Brazil's new submarine base-shipyard complex at Port of Itaguaí, is 80 km west of the city center of Rio de Janeiro. The Port was started in the 1980s and the naval complex was begun around 2012(?). The complex was (or is?) being constructed by the Sociedade de Proposito Especifico (SPE) consortium, which includes Brazil’s Odebrecht (50%), France’s DCNS (49%) and the Brazilian Navy (1% “golden share,” with veto power).

Brazil's Future Submarine Program (ProSub)

In French and Portuguese Submarine Program is reversed to Program Submarine, hence ProSub. With base-shipbuilding facilities now (fully?) established actual submarine building has commenced. Brazil's decision to build its own submarines of French-DCNS designs is, of course relevant, to the submarine building aspirations of many in Australia.

A major difference from (some) Australian aspirations is that the fifth and last Brazilian submarine will be nuclear propelled - known as SN-BR. French company DCNS produces conventional diesel-electric and nuclear propelled submarines - which makes it the only Western company that can assist on both propulsion types.

Enlarged Scorpene conventional diesel-electric submarines

Four of the five submarines will be enlarged (75 m long, 2000 tons displacement) Scorpenes of DCNS design "CM-2000" and ProSub designation "S-Br". Crew up to 45. 18 torpedos or missiles. It is unclear whether these Scorpenes will have AIP(?). The hull of the first Scorpene (S40) was laid down at Cherbourg, France on 27 May 2010 and flown in prefabricated sections ("jumboized") by Airbus to Brazil in late 2012. Sections (including steel fabrication) for the next three Scorpenes are being made in Brazil.

No.     Name            Laid down               Launched      Commissioned   Based

S40     Riachuelo       27 May 2010              maybe 2015      maybe 2017             Itaguai, Sepetiba Bay

S41     Humaitá         1 Sept 2013                 maybe 2017      maybe 2019             Itaguai, Sepetiba Bay

S42     Tonelero         maybe 2015                maybe 2019      maybe 2021             Itaguai, Sepetiba Bay

S43     Angostura       maybe 2017                maybe 2021      maybe 2023             Itaguai, Sepetiba Bay

Brazilian Nuclear Submarine (SN-BR)

Due to non-proliferation and broader political sensitivities DCNS and Brazil claim that DCNS will not actually help Brazil place the reactor in SN-BR. This claim may be somewhat disputed due to the reactor being of partly French design and SN-BR perhaps being based on the French Barracuda SSN. Training of some Brazilian crew on French SSNs is likely - on Rubis-Amethyste SSNs and/or Barracudas.

No.        Name                  Laid down          Launched         Commissioned    Based 

SN10    Álvaro Alberto     maybe 2017        maybe 2022       maybe 2027         Itaguai, Sepetiba Bay

Brazil has medium-long term plans for 5-6 further SSNs if Álvaro Alberto is successful.  

There currently appears to be expectations that SN-BR will be around 100m long and 9m wide. This coincides with France's Barracuda SSN dimensions of:  99.4 m long and beam: 8.8 m. The Barracuda , when launched around 2016-2017 will be 4,765 tons (surfaced) and 5,300 tons (submerged). Therefore the future SN-BR may have a similar displacement when launched in the early 2020s. The broader Brazilian nuclear submarine program involves Brazil's aim to fully enrich and shaping uranium for placement in the submarine reactor.

The currently proposed(?) reactor is known as2131-R Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). France assisted in the reactor design, but the reactor itself will be built in Brazil (?). An earlier NTI article (first paragraph) talked of  land-based test reactor RENAP-11 (of 11 MW), which may not yet have been developed. The submarine reactor itself may be of 48 MW. 48 MW for a 5,000 ton submarine appears to be very low given the 5,000 ton Barracuda will have a 150 MW reactor. 

Brazil has probably gone beyond the following description. Currently, Brazil mines and perhaps buys some uranium, converts it into yellowcake. The yellowcake is shipped from Brazil to Canada for enrichment using the hexafluoride gas method. The gas (?) is then shipped to Europe for enrichment by the US-UK-Dutch-German Urenco Group.

In December 2014 it was reported"A demonstration plant was built at the Aramar Experimental Center in Iperó (São Paulo state), which remains a naval facility to provide fuel enriched [by hexafluoride gas cascade] to less than 20% for the submarine program. Currently enrichment here is reported to be to 5% U-235." "less than 20%" enriched is stated because more than 20% enriched is considered Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) which is considered a heightened nuclear proliferation concern. Brazil and France do not want to push things by venturing into political pressures from non-nuclear neighbours or from legal nuclear weapon states like Russia and the US.

Current Brazilian Submarines

Brazil's currently has five TKMS Type 209s commissioned 1989-2006 and designated the Tupi Class. Four were built in Brazil. It is unclear whether the first of class, BNS Tupi(commissioned 1989) is still active(?). They are based at Guanabara Bay, Rio Base Naval Almirante Castro e Silva (see first NTI paragraph).

Value to Brazil of Submarines

Brazil’s submarines are seen as a key part of the country’s national defence strategy which includes protection of Brazil’s offshore energy reserves, protecting the Amazon's fresh water and countering great power nuclear submarine supremacy (including that of the US). Nuclear submarine supremacy became a major issue when Britain's SSNs totally dominated (Brazil's neighbour) Argentina's Navy in the 1982 Falklands War. SN-BR can more effectively monitor (remaining submerged longer) and neutralize naval forces - as it can patrol a wider area more quickly.
The nuclear submarine project, because of the dual-use nature of its reactor development and uranium enrichment, has been touted as holding the promise of enhancing both civilian and military exports.
Nuclear propulsion also contributes to Brazil's great power aspirations - short of actually building nuclear weapons.


Sources 

The following sources are useful although there is much repetition and it is unclear what is old and what is current information. Therefore there are many question marks (?).  Comments from Brazilian readers are welcome to fill in the blanks :) 

The website http://www.defesanet.com.br/prosub/ contains a wealth of updates on ProSub.  

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/brazil-france-in-deal-for-ssks-ssn-05217/  

Drawn from USNI http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2009-06/why-does-brazil-need-nuclear-submarines

Pete
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