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Australia buying UK Astute class SSNs unlikely

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An Astute class submarine with detachable pod. In this case dry-wet cell for divers (not a minisub itself - see The Sun). Other pods could take a mini-sub, diver delivery vehicle, LDUUVs or even missiles ejected horizontally.  
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Astute class submarine inside (Courtesy UK Daily Mail).
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Some 2012 or still continuing(?) Astute class submarine problems, including noise (Courtesy 2012 Daily Mail report).
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"Nicky" in comments June 15, 2015 raised the issues of Australia perhaps buying the UK newly built Astute class SSNs or non-Soryu SSKs. 

It looks like the UK Astutes have not yet become fully mature and efficient submarines. That even the 2nd in class HMS Ambush was almost a decade from being laid down (October 2003) to commissioning (March 2013) suggests program problems. See problems with the Astutes. UK production of Astutes may be as delayed and overbudget as would be achieved if a sub were built in Australia.

Australia buying any nuclear submarine is unlikely due to major domestic and regional political issues, cost and basing issues.

Problems with the UK Astutes include or included "As of March 2008 the programme was 48 per cent (or £1.2 billion) over-budget and 47 months late. Further delays due to a range of technical and programme issues brought the programme to a position of 57 months late and 53 per cent (or £1.35 billion) over-budget by November 2009, with a forecast cost of £3.9 billion for the first three Astute boats.”

"Some serious quality assurance problems have been identified in the first boats built. Due to the failure of a pipe cap, made of incorrect material although construction records indicated the correct metal had been used, Astute was forced to surface following a leak that was flooding a compartment. Other problems have been identified, including the wrong type of lead being used in a reactor instrument, and other quality issues leading to early corrosion of components." Maybe such problems happen with new subs - but it causes any customers to be cautious.

Such problems are major for the UK Navy even when operating its Astutes right near UK repair facilities. If any Australian Astutes experienced similar problems then a 20,000 nautical mile (80 day) round trip to-from UK shipyards would be crippling.

I'm also not sure whether the US would allow Astutes to be marketed in competition with US Virginias given all the US technology transfers to the UK nuclear submarine programs over the years including nuclear weapons and reactors.

No French Barracuda class SSNs have been launched. They suffer the same relatively distant repair facility issues with the added problem of needing "refuelling and complex overhauls (RCOHs)"every  10 years.

Regarding US Virginias and possibly Los Angeles class SSNs the US made Ambassadorial level soundings to Australia around February 2012.

If Australia did go the nuclear submarine route then buying US makes more sense. Buying Virginias would yield Pacific alliance benefits, constant interoperability, even more commonality in common combat systems and relatively close repair facilities at Guam (my next article), Pearl Harbour, Diego Garcia and other US Indian Ocean naval bases.

Other SSKs are being looked at under Australia competitive evaluation process (mainly the Soryu SMX Ocean (conventional Barracuda), TKMS-HDW 216, but also some information sought on HDW 209, HDW Dolphin 2 and DCNS Scorpene). Major program problems with S80 (Isaac Peral class) have eliminated it.

Pete

Lack of Japanese legislation slowing Soryu selection?

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A Soryu submarine. Soryu means "blue" or "green dragon". More Japanese legislation and public support are needed for the sale of an enlarged Soryu to Australia.
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Yuki Tatsumi for The Diplomat, has written an interesting article (June 16, 2015) indicating that Japanese Prime Minister Abe is having difficulty pushing through crucial alliance legislation. Implicitly this legislation is necessary to justify the sale of enlarged Soryus to Japan’s emerging ally Australia.

It appears that pushing the legislation through Japan’s Parliament (“Diet”) will not happen next month, as hoped, but maybe next year. The political hesitation is, in part, prompted by legal arguments that difficult constitutional change is necessary earlier than first thought. Also too many of the Japanese public remain hesitant about the Japanese military becoming more active as an alliance partner (regionally and further afield).

This complicates the Soryu sale because Abe has been painting the sale as an alliance cementing activity with Australia. Also Australian Soryus would be more inter-operable with Japanese Soryus in coordinated patrols.


This political uncertainty in Japan makes it difficult for Australian selectors to choose the Soryu, or eliminate one of the contenders, early next year after the “competitive” evaluation process is completed. On a favourable note for Abbott a Soryu decision is better made AFTER the next Australian election, which may be as late as November 2016. Choice of the Soryu is likely to be politically unpopular in Australia as it is strongly assumed to mean fewer submarine building jobs for Australians.

Pete

Guam nuclear submarine and air base

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Guam (nuclear submarine) naval base is at Apra Harbor, west central Guam. Andersen Air Force Base is on the northeast tip of Guam.
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This article is about the nuclear submarine and aerial bomber facilities in Guam. These benefit Australia and have relationships with at least two Australian bases.

Australian nuclear free activists were opposed to French underground testing from 1974 to 1996 at Moruroa Atoll at the extreme range of 6,800 km from Australia. Little did they know that around three US submarines armed with a total of 48 (or more) nuclear missiles were based between 1963 and 1981 only 2,700 km from Australia :-)

(USS Proteus, 3 SSBNs and an SSN at Guam naval base, Apra Harbor (Courtesy the late McDowell, Donald Bratton, CPO)
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So at the height of the Cold War, from 1963 to 1981 usually three SSBNs within Submarine Squadron 15 permanently operated out of Guam – an island only 2,700 km north of Australia. Those SSBNs were the early ones including some of the George Washington class, armed with nuclear tipped Polaris SLBMs. These were serviced by submarine tender USS Proteus

Guam enjoys the political permanency of being a US possession in the ideal strategic position of the central west Pacific. Guam is within quick nuclear propelled sub “steaming” distance of (and bombing distance from) Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia.

Given the relatively limited 4,600 km range of Polaris missilesforward basing some SSBNs made sense at the time. Guam based SSBNs, after around 2 days at sea, were in a comfortable position to hit such major targets as China, the eastern-central Soviet Union (including land based ICBM silos)  and the Soviet naval base at Cam Ranh Bay (Vietnam).

The thaw in the Cold War, increasing political sensitivity of forward nuclear bases and especially the longer range of Poseidon then eventually Trident II SLBMs (11,000 km range) meant that basing at US mainland ports or Hawaii became adequate. Hence Submarine Squadron 15 was disestablished in 1981.

Submarine Squadron 15 was reactivated in 2001(to the present), again at Guam, this time operating Los Angeles Class SSNs.

Today, the squadron consists of theLos Angeles classUSS Oklahoma City (SSN-723), USS Chicago (SSN-721), USS Key West (SSN-722). In the last few weeks USS Topeka (SSN-754) has joined the suadron.. The submarine tender USS Frank Cable (AS-40) is also homeported at Guam. The squadron also supports every deploying SSN in the Pacific Fleet Area of Operations, as well as SSGNs USS Ohio (SSGN-726) and USS Michigan (SSGN 727). Note that Australia’s submarine base at Rockingham, Western Australia also hosts some of the same US SSNs and SSGNs on a much more temporary basis. Eventual replacement of Guam Squadron 15’s aging Los Angeles subs with newer Virginia SSNs is likely.

USS Frank Cable (AS-40) and USS Salt Lake City (Los Angeles class SSN 716) Apra Harbor,  Guam.

US SSNs have many possible roles including: shadowing Chinese and Russian SSNs, SSBNs and major surface ships; intelligence collection; contributing to the SEAWEB sensor network; escorting US strike carrier and amphibious warfare groups; and interacting with Japanese and Australian subs and surface ships.

HA-51 is a former Japanese mini-submarine on display on Guam. In July 1944 it ran aground off Guam's southeastern coast. It was crewed by two Japanse soldiers who held off American troops for three days before surrendering. It is a Type C Kō-hyōteki-class submarine. Japanese forces occupied Guam from December 8, 1941 until Guam’s recapture by US forces on July 21, 1944.
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Submarine Tenders

From 1964 to 1971 the USS Proteus serviced submarines at Guam. From around 1997 (to this day)  USS Frank Cable has that job. Submarine tenders these days are very large with USS Frank Cable displacing up to 23,000 tons. Submarine tenders are very lightly armed with USS Frank Cable only having 25mm and 40mm anti-aircraft guns – more likely used to deter and destroy suicide boats. Submarine tenders therefore require protection, in any time of conflict by warships (such as frigates) and airpower (if in port). Guam hosts the necessary protective US Air Force jets and warships including the SSNs.

Tenders and/or more extensive port facilities are essential to support SSNs between missions. This is because SSNs carry very limited stocks of food, torpedoes, small missiles, other supplies, limited maintenance equipment and few repair specialists. Tenders can voyage to a sub in need (for at sea replenishment) or provide these services in port. In the US Navy tenders are equipped with workshops and can accommodate Gold/Blue relief crews. Tenders can also replenish naval surface ships. 

Andersen Darwin and Tindal Air Force Bases

A B-2 stealth bomber and 2 F-15s fly over Andersen Air Force Base, Guam.
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Andersen Air Force Base (AFB) on Guam has been a heavy bomber base since 1944. From B-29s bombing Japan (World War Two) the bombers grew to B-52s bombing Cambodia, Laos and of course Vietnam (Vietnam War). Since the end of that war Andersen has continued to host B-52s, defensive jetfighters and occasional deployments of B-1B and B-2 (stealth) bombers. Andersen also hosts KC-135 refueling aircraft which extends the range of bombers sufficiently to bomb the Asian mainland (only when necessary).

To underline the strategic importance of Andersen AFB – it is still occasionally circled by Russian Bear spy planesthat are annoyingly refueled by Russian IL-78 aircraft based at Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay.

Australia’s Tindal Air Force Base at Katherine, Northern Territory, also occasionally hosts US B-52, B-1, B-2 bombers and KC-135s on scheduled or emergency stops on a semi-secret basis. RAAF Darwin Air Base also hosted US bombers until recently - with hosting now at Tindal due to noise and perhaps secrecy concerns. These bombers and refuelers are more frequently based at Guam, Okinawa, Diego Garcia, Hawaii, Middle East bases and the US mainland.

A B-2 stealth bomber lands at RAAF Darwin, Australia, foExercise Green Lightning. (Photo Courtesy, Air Power Australia).
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Another link between Andersen-Guam and Tindal is bombing range viability. Bombers from Andersen have historically used the very small, uninhabited, island of Farallon de Medinilla just north of Guam as a practice target. But political, environmental sensitivities, very small size and other limitations means that US heavy bombers no longer bomb Farallon de Medinilla. Instead bombers from Guam can use the larger, 200,000 hectare Delamere Air Weapons Range about 120 km south of the Tindal Australian Air Force Base.

Conclusion

So Guam is an ideal base for US submarines and bombers. Its location allows these weapons to use there nuclear propulsion and inflight refuelling to major advantage. The US bases at Guam are important to Australia’s and broader regional security. Guam can also host Australian submarines and aircraft. Australia pays for such US security through the high cost of US weapons and through hosting US visits at Australia’s submarine base at Rockingham, Western Australia and Tindal Air Force Base.


Pete

Submarine's beware of China's seabottom sensor arrays

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From Page 16 of 21 pages
http://csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/CSBA6117-New-Era-Undersea-Warfare-Reportweb.pdf
leadin   http://csbaonline.org/publications/2015/01/undersea-warfare/

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-submarine_indicator_loop

http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/04/10/five-charts-that-show-the-rapid-expansion-of-chinas-navy/

Note that even as early as 1997 there were increasing reports indicating for China "Passive bottom arrays protect harbor entrances, extending out to sea about 20-30 nm." 

Western submarines can no longer move near the Chinese and Russia Pacific coast with any confidence that submarines won't be detected by undersea sensor arrays, Such enemy arrays are increasing common in

- across the mouths and approaches of Chinese naval bases, for example Yulin Naval Base, Hainan Island, China and Ngong Shuen Chau Naval Base, Hong Kong

- harbours of important cities such as Hong Kong and Shanghai

- arrays in narrows or other strategic waters such as the Taiwan Strait, Yellow Sea, Diaoyu Islands (East China Sea) and near newly enlarged islands-rocks of the South China Sea

Once a Western (including Japanese) submarine is detected China has an increasing capability to positively identify the nattionality of a submarine or even its individual sonar signature.

China has been steadily developing anti-submarine anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) weapons. The quickest reacting , hence most dangerous weapons being land launched or sea launched missiles. During low to medium level conflict such missiles might deploy light submarine killing torpedos. During high intensity war nuclear warheads on light torpedos or powerful nuclear warheads on the missiles themselves are powerful enough to ensure a kill. Carrier killer missiles. At the upper end of the spectrum China's DF-21D "carrier killer" ballistic missiles could be used a high value submarine target. China has increasing numbers of subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles that can deploy warheads against submarines.  

New long-range sensors, such as LF active sonar or wake detection, and emerging undersea communication capabilities will enable the development of new undersea fire control networks analogous to those using radio signals in above-the-surface warfare. For example, long-range ASW weapons such as a missile with a CVLWT warhead could be networked with long-range sensors to create an effective standoff ASW capability that delays or drives off submarines by exploiting their inherent limitations in speed, situational awareness, and self-defense.

* Disruptive technological shifts. With computer processing power continuing to rapidly increase and become more portable, dramatic breakthroughs are imminent in undersea sensing, communications, and networking. Advancements are also underway in power generation and storage that could yield significant increases in the endurance, speed, and capability of unmanned vehicles and systems. These improvements would compel a comprehensive reevaluation of long-held assumptions about the operational and tactical employment of undersea capabilities, as well as the future design of undersea systems.


Why France has no hope in Future Submarine Selection

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French missile guidance technology is likely to improve the accuracy and lethality of BrahMos and closely related Russian Yakhont missiles. Above (1 minute, 15 seconds in) is a Russian made Yakhont missile being tested by the Indonesian Navy in 2012. Also note Cakra class (Type 209) submarine KRI Nanggala (No. 402) - from 55 seconds in.
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France has no hope in Australia's submarine selection (SEA 1000) because companies in the French defence sector have too strong a record of transferring sensitive military technology to Russia - soon Mistral amphibious assault ships and technology improving the BrahMos and Yakhont missiles. Hence the US will not supply sensitive submarine combat system for integration into French submarine builds - which sinks France's chances.

A timely report from OneIndia, June 18, 2015 http://www.oneindia.com/international/france-to-supply-key-technology-for-brahmos-1781273.html

"France to supply key technology for BrahMos missiles

Paris, June 18 [2015]: France has agreed 'in principle' to India's request for a crucial internal guidance technology to be provided by French company Safran (Sagem) for the BrahMos missiles. The issue was discussed in a bilateral meeting between the French Minister of Defence Jean-Yves Le Drian and visiting Indian Minister of State for Defence Production Rao Inderjit Singh at a meeting in Paris on Wednesday.

Singh told Media India Group in an exclusive interview in Paris that he had already discussed the issue with the senior management of Sagem, which of course had agreed to provide the technology, if the French government gave its permission."Following this, I raised the issue with the French minister and he told me that he did not see a problem in this technology being given to BrahMos and now Sagem will have to apply for the permission to the French government for the technology transfer to happen," a confident Singh said."

Singh pointed out that Sagem would not be transferring the technology to the Indian government but to BrahMos, which is an Indo-Russian joint venture, even though the navigation system is for missiles of below 300 km range."

See WHOLE ARTICLE

COMMENT

The Indo-Russian BrahMos and closely related Russian Yakhont (SS-N-26 "Strobile") missiles are devastating supersonic anti-ship and potential land attack missiles. India and Russia wish to market them to countries in Australia's region, including Indonesia. 

Pete

Defence distances itself from Tony Abbott's submarine claims

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 Australia's Prime Minister should not be a salesmen for Japanese subs.
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Tom Richardson for INDaily ADELAIDE Independent News has written an excellent article which indicates that Prime Minister Abbott's claims favouring Japan's Soryu are not supported by the Australian Defence Department http://indaily.com.au/news/2015/05/25/defence-hoses-down-pms-soryu-sub-hype/

"Defence hoses down PM’s Soryu sub hype

TOM RICHARDSON | 25 MAY 2015

ADELAIDE | The federal Defence Department has refused to back Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s assertion that the Japanese Soryu submarine is “the best in the world”.

The PM made the claim in [23 February 2015], telling parliament that discussions over the multi-billion dollar Future Submarines contract “have been more detailed with the Japanese, because the Japanese make the best large conventional submarine in the world”[!]

But written answers from Defence to questions put on notice by Senator Nick Xenophon from an Estimates hearing are considerably less effusive.

Asked whether authorities have briefed the Prime Minister that the Soryu is the best in its class, the department replies: “Defence has provided a range of advice to Government on the future submarine program, and through engagement with Japan, Defence has established that Japan has been successful in the design and build of the Soryu class, which is of a size similar to that required by Australia.”
Xenophon told InDaily: “The political rhetoric doesn’t match the technical realities.”

In similarly measured terms, Defence responds to a question about whether it has technical information to support the PM’s claim: “Defence has technical information that helps us to understand aspects of the Soryu design that relate to our submarine capability needs.”

However, it continues, “publicly available information does not provide a true indication of the capabilities of the Soryu design”.

“Submarine capability is judged against a number of attributes, including range, endurance, payload, stealth and sensor performance. The Soryu and Collins class differ in various ways when each of these attributes is considered. There are particular requirements for the Future Submarine that the Soryu class has not been designed to meet. Incorporation of the preferred combat and weapon systems for the Future Submarine would also entail design changes.”

Defence revealed senior navy submarine command-qualified officers have “been to sea in a Soryu class submarine” early this year as part of their research.

“My mail in terms of people that I’ve spoken to, the inside running is with the Japanese,” Xenophon said.

“They’re the favourites to win this, the process seems to be stacked towards [Japan] and that is a real concern because they have never built a sub overseas let alone shared their technology, unlike the French or the Germans,” he told ABC Radio.

He also highlighted fears an overseas design would not yield local jobs in manufacturing, highlighting another response to a Question on Notice, with Defence Minister Kevin Andrews confirming the much-hyped 500 new jobs would instead be in “design assurance, combat system integration, and land-based testing of submarine systems”. WHOLE ARTICLE

Pete

Submarines beware of China's seafloor sensor arrays

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The diagram on page 16 of American ex-submariner, Bryan Clark’s important paper The Emerging Era in Undersea Warfare, January 22, 2015 is interesting.

Anti-submarine detections systems have a long history. The UK Royal Navy (RN) successfully developed a hydrophone system and "indicator loop" magnetic anomaly technology during WWI. By 1918 it was an effecient system defending the RN Grand Fleet's base at Scapa Flow. The German submarine UB-116 was detected by hydrophones on 28 October 1918 attempting to enter the base. Two hours later UB-116 was detected by a magnetic anomaly system defending the base. Unfortunately for UB-116 that system was interlaced with a remotely controlled minefield which was exploded by electical impulse from on-shore RN personnel - thereby destroying UB-116. 

By 1941 the RN had deployed magnetic anomaly and hydrophone systems to defend strategic harbours all over the British Empire including several Australian harbours. The RN also shared all this technology with the US Navy to defend many US harbours during WWII. The US then developed the much more extensive Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) since against the Soviet Navy from around 1950. The UK and presumably Empire/Commonwealth countries benefitted from (maybe participated in) SOSUS networks. 

China with land wars and/or Mao to cope with for decades was a latecomer - likely having magnetic anomally and SOSUS networks since the 1990s. China had "Passive bottom arrays protect harbor entrances, extending out to sea about 20-30 nm" by 1997. 

Now Chinese SeaWeb (Chinese sensors of all types on all platforms orientated to sea targets). Chinese SeaWeb is quicker reacting due to increased computer processing power and data storage capacity. China's NSA provides the essential network backbone. Such capacity makes Chinese SeaWeb better able to store and recognise the sonic (and other signatures) of foreign submarines. For example it is important to be able to distinguish between similar submarines such as Chinese, Vietnamese and Russian versions of the Kilo SSK. Once a Western (including Japanese) submarine is detected China is moving toward the ability to positively identify the nationality of a submarine or even identify an individual sub by its sonar signature or other signatures (including the submarine motion habits-routines of particular Captains).

The US-Western SEAWEB is assumed to be more advanced.

Non-acoustic (active or passive sonar) sensors may include:

-  magnetic anomaly
-  water pressure
-  non-natural water anomaly
-  IR light
-  visible light (underwater CCTV)
-  lasers-LIDAR
-  light emitting diodes (LED) bouncing light off the submarine hull
-  anti-submarine nets or lines
-  water temperature (from engine and hull heat)
-  unnatural chemical levels from AIP (sniffers) 
-  unnatural radiation
-  electronic emissions including sigint.

Weaponisation

In a wartime situation China's SeaWeb would be transformed from just an intelligence tool to being the trigger for various types of anti-submarine weapons. 

Around 30 seconds after detection a submarine could be detroyed by mines that are intergrated with these seafloor arrays including mines that float upward from the seafloor and/or mines that are rocket powered

Around 2 minutes after detection a torpedo carried by missile might destroy the submarine. The weapon to destroy the detected submarine could be an Anti-Submarine Rocket (ASROC). ASROCs have existed for decades. They can carry Common Very Light Weight Torpedo (CVLWT) which may weigh less than 100kg. Multiple CVLWT could be launched with the onboard "intelligence" to strike particularly vulnerable parts of the sub.

China has been steadily developing Anti-Submarine missiles with: 

-  a rocket engine, such as the CY-1 (supersonic flight out to 20km) 
-  or jet engines. The CY-2 uses a C-802 missile for subsonic flight out to 55 km. 

At the upper end of the anti-submarine spectrum China's DF-21D "carrier killer" ballistic missiles could deploy one or more light weight torpedos or depth bombs with conventional or nuclear warheads against high value submarine targets.   

Response

As Bryan Clark indicated in May 2015 a logical response to this greater sensitivity and lethality of anti-submarines sensors is increased use of Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs). This saves manned submarines from harm or capture. UUVs can be launched and serviced by manned submarines. The relatively small size of UUVs makes them harder for undersea sensors to detect. Manned submarines can also install recharging and data download depots on the seafloor (one depot is called OceanWorks "sub-sea dock").

Types of UUVs

UUVs with sufficient range for a 100 km (round trip) reconnaisance mission, towards an opponents coast, might be the size and weight of a Mark 48 heavyweight torpedo. Hence launchable from current 533mm torpedo tubes. Such ranges are possible because UUVs do not have to move quickly (against higher water resistance) to perform a mission. Their propulsion would ideally be different from a Mark 48's

Shorter range missions could be performed by lightweight torpedo sized UUVs - including the Bluefin range of Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs). These can also be launched in 533mm torpedo tube fitting containers. 

Near static missions can be performed by Wave Gliders and static pods have been used by superpowers since Operation Ivy Bells.

It does not necessarily follow that UUVs larger than heavyweight torpedos are necessary. These "large diameter" or "large displacement"LDUUVs may the latest "must have" according to some American corporations but electronics are increasing in capabilities while shrinking into smaller packages. 

There are always tradeoffs between weapon system choices. Rather than Bryan Clark's suggestion that a very large LDUUV launches several CVLWTs a very long range (even if slow moving) heavyweight torpedo would also make sense. Such a torpedo could pass over the undersea sensor danger zone and hit ships/subs in harbour or leaving harbour. 

Pete

Technical problems: Fuel Cell AIP and Hull Cutting

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Illustrated by the Type 214 submarine - it shows how potentially difficult it may be to rearrange the Proton Exchange Membrane Fuel Cell (PEMFC) AIP and "Main components" (FCPPs) when  replacements are required. Type 214s apparently use a large hatch. But such a hatch or hull cutting may weaken the hulls of deep diving Soryus.  (Diagram originally from thaifighterclub.org)
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A SINAVY PEM Fuel Cell module. Difficult to squeeze such a large awkward item into a submarine while rearranging parts already in the submarine. The module's dimensions are 500mm x 530mm x 1.47 meters long (making for a 500mm x 530mm diagonal measurement of approximately 720mm (too big to squeeze through a torpedo tube!)
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In Commentson June 24, 2015 at 9:48 PM“S” raised the following interesting issues. I have altered some of the English for clarity:

The Japanese Ministry of Defence (MOD) was researching fuel cell AIP but decided to end this research. The MOD indicated one of the main reasons was that it could not overcome the issue of hull-cutting required when exchanging fuel cell stacks. The lifetime of a Proton Exchange Membrane Fuel Cell (PEMFC) is 40,000 hours for continuous running. But for actual submarine operations, the lifetime is expected to be shorter because of adverse effect of inevitable start-and-stop conditions. In a test taking into account realistic start-and-stop cycles the estimated lifetime of the PEMFC AIP is 2,000-4,000 hours.

[S provided the source for the above figures which is http://batteryuniversity.com/learn/article/fuel_cell_technology[Last updated May 4, 2015]:
“If operated in a vehicle, the PEMFC stack has an estimated service life of 2,000-4,000 hours. Start-and-stop conditions induce drying and wetting that contribute to membrane stress. Running continuously, the stationary stack is good for about 40,000 hours. Stack replacement is a major expense.
]

S added “[Lithium-ion Batteries] LIBs and Lead Acid Batteries can be exchanged through a [Soryu’s existing hatch], but PEMFCs cannot. A PEMFC is too big. It means that we would have to exchange a PEMFC by hull-cutting, which is very complicated and expensive and includes rearrangement or adjustment of hydrogen stage or delivery system. Various impacts (reduction in hull strength, life shortening, hull-cutting and rewelding periods, verification periods, increase cost, etc) must be considered every 4,000[?] hours or less running time.

[S asked the following questions]

1.  How many times do we have to cut the hull during the 22 years of operating a Japanese submarine?

2.  Should we avoid possible hull-cutting by significantly reducing the operating period of a Japanese submarine?

I asked whether squeezing the PEMFC into the submarine through a torpedo tube was possible (I measured the Fuel Cell module's recorded height (500mm and width 530mm to give a diagonal approximately 720mm - which is too big for a 533mm torpedo tube)

S responded that it might be possible to fit a PEMFC through a hatch as occurs with German submarines. 

The illustrations of PEMFC at the top of the article are probably the most helpful - also see  http://www.industry.siemens.com/verticals/global/de/marine/marineschiffe/energieverteilung/Documents/sinavy-pem-fuel-cell-en.pdfFig.5 (page7) of and Table (page9).

MHalblaub indicated that on http://www.industry.siemens.com/verticals/global/de/marine/marineschiffe/energieverteilung/Documents/sinavy-pem-fuel-cell-en.pdfpage 10 ' that a SINAVY PEM fuel cell module size is 500mm x 530mm x 1.47 meters.


COMMENT

Japan has a whole range of technical tradeoff (costs and benefits) decisions to make. For example making a large hatch in the hull to exchange PEMFCs may weaken the hull for especially deep diving Soryus.

Please connect with my article Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) Technologies and Selection, August 5, 2014 http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2014/08/air-independent-propulsion-aip.html 

Pete

Chinese Yuan Submarines for Thailand?

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What may well be a Chinese Type 039A "Yuan" class submarine. An S-26T derivative may be  exported to Thailand.
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On a recent Comments thread Nicky identified Bangkok Post reports that Thailand is buying submarines from China.
To go back three months mDeletey post Thailand may eventually purchase two submarines, March 25, 2015  identified the possibility the Thai Navy may want two diesel-powered submarines with displacement of 2,400-3,000 tonnes. The source said the Chinese-made Yuan class is favoured by the committee due to its specifications. The "U-class" [do they mean U-209 class?] from South Korea and Germany also pinged the sonar screen." 

Later, on June 25, 2015. a Bangkok Post article indicated:
the navy said a committee working on a plan to buy submarines has finalised its option - it's likely to go for the Chinese-made submarines - and will submit the proposal to the cabinet for approval next month...The 36-billion-baht [US$1.07 Billion] budget covers twosubmarines, as well as maintenance and training of the navy's personnel. Some reports say China has offered special, undisclosed packages to win the deal. Sources in the navy said there are two short-listed countries. China is the No.1 option, followed by South Korea."

The next day (June 26, 2015) the Bangkok Post reported China is offering three submarines (“12 billion baht [US$355 million] each”) with Germany or South Korea possible second choices and Russia, Sweden and France eliminated.

COMMENT

The unusual decision making process of the Navy declaring a possible result may be a strong encouragement for the Cabinet to finally make a decision after much submarine acquisition hesitancy over the years. Lack of Navy clarity on whether it will get three or two submarines, for the US$Billion total, might indicate the Navy is hoping for three.

China is an unconfirmed choice with room that the Thailand may still be aiming for a better deal from South Korea or Germany before the Thai Cabinet (including the dominant Army representation) makes the final decision.

If China is finally chosen then a submarine with some features of the large Type 039A "Yuan" class submarines and some features of the smaller Type 035 Ming class is possible. The result of this Yuan-Ming combination may be the "S-20" with specifications including: 1,850 tons (surfaced), Range: 8,000 nm at 16 kn, crew of 38, with or without Stirling AIP. China more specifically may be offering a Yuan S-26T (T for Thailand) version .

Three new subs (with support and training) for US$1 Billion is mysteriously cheap. Despite the Yuan S-20 or S-26T drawing-board designs it is unclear whether China is offering:

-  new build submarines?

-  used and refurbished?

-  Stirling AIP included?

China’s submarine sales at low prices campaign is a major new political phenomenon. Economically this is in competition with European, South Korean and potential Japanese suppliers. In late 2013 China had its first submarine export success in concluding a deal to sell two obsolete Type 035 “Ming” class submarines to Bangladesh

Pakistan has long repeated claims over the years that China is “about to” export varying numbers of submarines to Pakistan. To date this has appeared wishful thinking - however a more substantial news article has come to hand that records a visit of a Chinese Yuan to Karachi around May 22-29, 2015 - it being possible the Pakistan's body politic are being provided a pre-purchase or pre-gift inspection.

In the area of possibilities North Korea is always a potential recipient of submarines as is Myanmar. The Philippines and Cambodia are other ASEAN countries without submarines so far.

Pete

Two A26s Ordered by Sweden

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Saab-Kockum's new video on the A26. (Courtesy Saab A26 website)
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Sweden's AFP/The Local (news@thelocal.se) reports June 30, 2015 http://www.thelocal.se/20150630/saab-signs-deal-worth-billions-for-swedish-subs:

Saab signs deal worth billions for Swedish subs
[What the two new A26s might look like. (Artwork by Saab AB)]

Saab signs deal worth billions for Swedish subs

UPDATED: A deal between Swedish defence giant Saab and Sweden's military for two submarines worth 8.6 billion kronor (US$1.04 billion) is set to boost jobs in the Nordic country, chief executive Håkan Buskhe said on [June 30, 2015].
“We are of course very pleased,” Saab chief executive Håkan Buskhe told reporters at a press conference in Visby, where he is attending Sweden's politics festival Almedalen Week.
He said the order would create around one hundred jobs at the Swedish defence and security company.
“This means some hundred new employees in both Malmö and Karlskrona,” he said.
The order from the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) covers the construction of two new Type A26 submarines, as well as a mid-life upgrade for two Gotland-class submarines.
Deliveries of the two new subs will take place in 2022 and 2024, Saab said in a statement.
The upgraded subs will be delivered in late 2018 and late 2019.
Saab said the A26 was a high-tech submarine with “long-endurance submerged performance and excellent manoeuvrability in all waters”.
It added the new subs would be “highly survivable thanks to modern underwater stealth technology and a unique heritage of shock resistant design”.
The subs will be powered by conventional diesel-electric propulsion machinery and equipped with the Kockums Stirling Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) system, making them difficult to detect.
In April, the Swedish government announced plans to raise defence spending by 10.2 billion kronor ($1.18 billion) for 2016-2020, mostly to modernize ships to detect and intercept submarines, amid increasing Russian military activity in the Baltic Sea region.
Sweden has a long-standing tradition of military non-alliance, but support for Nato membership has increased in recent years, largely due to fears of a potentially aggressive Russia.
A major poll last month suggested that nearly one in three think Sweden should join the defence alliance
AFP/The Local (news@thelocal.se)"
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COMMENT

At around 1,900 tonnes (surfaced or submerged?) the A26 will be much heavier than Sweden is used to. This would be a large sub to move in the very shallow and narrow waters of its mainly Baltic operating area. The A26's size will improve Sweden's ability to confront Russian forces outside the Baltic - in the North, Norwegian or Barents Seas.


With a large horizontal diver/diver delivery vehicle tube large displacement UUVs (LDUUVs) could be launched to more safely approach the Russian Baltic Fleet's Base at Kaliningrad Oblast (an enclave). 

Sweden is accustomed to working with 1,500 tonne (surfaced) Gotlands and 1,400 tonne (surfaced) Sodermanlands. One reason Sweden may be building A26s at 1,900 tonnes is to provide a sub with increased export potential to the Asia-Pacific market where ever heavier subs are being bought. It is possible a smaller version A26 might also be exported to Poland and Norway and larger version to Canada and the Netherlands.

While the two A26s are being built and 2 Gotlands overhauled Sweden will rely on three subs - the two Sodermanlands and the third Gotland class.

Pete 

Russian Torpedos

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[pictures to follow]

In the area of Russian submarine weapons Submarine Matters has been remiss in only mentioning Russian SLCMs like the Klub. So MHalblaub's mention at of Russian torpedos is useful. MHalblaub  advises that “The Russian do use a hypergolic propellant (Kerosene + hydrogen peroxide) for torpedoes (remember the Kursk!)" The Kursk leakage of its hydrogen peroxide fuel onto metals and oxides in the torpedo, resulting in a chemical reaction that culminated in an explosion of the fuel and a kerosene tank and the Kursk's eventual destruction.

This hydrogen peroxide propellant is used on several heavyweight Russian torpedo types including:

-  VA-111 Shkval torpedo - This extremely noisy rocket powered torpedo is supercavitating . It is a thought to be used as a revenge weapon (when the host sub is about to be destroyed) hence the host sub being detected due to the noise is a low consideration.

-  Type 65 for 650mm torpedos originally developed to counter US Navy aircraft carrier battle groups, large merchant ships like supertankers, and advanced enemy submarines . Russian officials believe that a 65-76A modification of this torpedo is responsible for the explosion of the Kursk. Range: 50 km at 93 km/h (50 knots), 100 km at 56 km/h. Homing: active/passive sonar and wire guidance. Warhead: 450/557 kg high explosive. Propulsion probably gas-turbine powered by hydrogen peroxide, kerosene and compressed air fuel. Driving contra-rotating propellers.

-  Type 53 - a 533mm torpedo. The 53-65 torpedo family are wake-homing torpedoes designed to destroy surface ships. The 53-65 became operational in 1965, while the 53-65K and 53-65M both became operational in 1969. The 53-65KE is an exported version. China received an unknown number of 53-65KE torpedoes from Russia after purchasing 4 Kilo class submarines in the 1990s. The Type 53 torpedo is carried by almost all Russian submarines, including Kilo class and  Akula class. Range: quite low 18+ km, Speed: 83 km/h (45 kt), Warhead: 307.6 kilograms.



Russian mines next.

Pete

Russian Submarine Swarm Tactics Against Carrier Groups

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Russia's Yasen (aka Severodvinsk) class SSN up to 40 (8 x 5) SLCMs using the VLS, 8 x 650mm torpedo tubes (and 2 x 533mm). Deep diving to 600m.
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Another diagram of the Yasen SSN (not "Graney") partly Russia's response to the Seawolf SSN.
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Inside an Akula 2 (commentary in Russian). Youtube uploaded April 2011. Large 8,500 tons (surfaced). No command center digital displays shown. Like other Russian weapons it looks low-tech but this also means "rugged" less delicate electronics to go wrong.  After the Nerpa disaster there is a gas drill.  
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MHalBlaub's and Vigilis' have been having an interesting discussion at Current Heavyweight Russian Torpedos, July 1, 2015. This has prompted me to write about Russia's potential use of its most potent current torpedo, the over-the-horizon Type 65 650mm. This torpedo is unlikely to be used alone with its host submarine. Instead the host submarine for the 650mm (which seem restricted to Akula and Yasen SSNs) would launch these torpedos as part of a swarm attack also involving cruise missiles launched by that submarine This may be in the context of a medium intensity war  against high value targets, especially strike or amphibious carrier groups.

It appears Russia would logically take on a carrier group with a swarm attack both for targeting  (directing or redirecting) weapons and to overcome the defences of the escorts. Technological change has improved the ease of targeting. There are also improvements in Akula and Yasen launched cruise missiles (eg. the SS-N-27A "Sizzler"/Klub-S and a future SLCM the SS-N-26 "Strobile"(aka P-800 Oniks/Yakhont related to the Indo-Russian BrahMos)). These SLCMs need not be individual actors but can work as a team  eg. a higher altitude Klub working as scout to direct a simultaneous attack of sea-skimming Klubs and pre-launched 650mm torpedos to complicate the job of the carrier group escorts. 

The scouting Klub could coordinate the other missiles with direct radio links and coordinate the torpedos via satellite, mother sub and other links in the Russian SeaWeb. Submarine launched UAVs (small and stealthy) could also be part of the Russian communications (SeaWeb) network.

So Russian satellites, missiles and UAVs can all offer solutions to avoid the Russian over-the-horizon 650mm torpedos hitting the wrong targets. 

China may also have the capability to organise such a swarm attack (also noting China has the DF-21D anti-ship (or anti-sub) ballistic missile. 

A second Russian sub may be present that is closer to (in the path of) the carrier group. The second submarine might perhaps be a Kilo SSK that can deploy its shorter range 533mm torpedos and Klubs at the carrier group. The Kilo may also be well positioned to detect (passive sonar) any approach  of a US SSN that may well be a forward escort for the carrier group. In the major task of detroying a carrier group there may be a third submarine (an SSN) for redundancy. I'm hoping the US wins of course!

The land attack capabilities of Klub, Yakhont and other Russian SLCMs also improves the prospects of attacking a carrier group while in port. 

FIGURES

Russia has altered its SSN weapons' mix for the technical, strategic and and tactical reasons touched on in the description above.

Figures are that:

-  Kilo SSKs - in Russian service since 1982 - 6 x 533mm (18 x torpedos/missiles or 24 mines).

-  Akula SSNs (in service since 1984) are recorded as having 4 × 533mm torpedo tubes (28 x Type 53 torpedoes) and 4 x 650mm torpedo tubes (12 x Type 65 torpedoes) 

-  Yasen SSNs (Severodvinsk (first of class) in service 2014) being introduced with:

- 32 (8x4) VLS missiles OR can launch

- 40 (8x5) VLS missiles Klub or other SLCMs

Significantly the Yasen's heavy SLCM capability is supplemented by an increased 650mm torpedo capability (8 x 650mm torpedo tubes and 2 x 533mm).

CONCLUSION

So the Yasen's increase in number of quick launchable SLCMs and 650mm torpedos implies a rapid fire swarm intent. 

China, with its history of adopting Russian naval weapons and tactics, presents a special risk to US carrier groups in the South China Sea and open ocean.

"New Interceptor and Carrier-Killer Nuclear Submarines"

A report in the Moscow Times, July 5, 2015"Russia Plans New Interceptor and Carrier Killer Nuclear Submarines" merely describes Russia's regular intention to gradually develop an SSN-SSGN replacement to follow on from the Yasen.  The generalist press are attracted by the terms "Interceptor and Carrier Killer" just as the generalists have been attracted by such terms a "stealth submarine" in the past. Such a post Yasen submarine might enter initial service in 2035.

Pete

Liberals in South Australia Nervous about Build in Japan

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Respected Liberal Member for Hindmarsh, Matt Williams, stands to lose his seat if Prime Minister Abbott carries through the "build in Japan" Captain's Pick.
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Portrait of an Abbott supporter. 
Cabinet Minister for Education Christopher Pyne (Liberal, South Australiamay lose his  seat of Sturt.
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There remain cracks in Prime Minister Abbott's Coalition Liberal Party over the "build in Japan" submarine issue. Federal Liberals in South Australia are concerned that they will lose their jobs (Federal seats - electorates) if Abbott makes his "build in Japan" Captain's Pick. Even Cabinet Minister (for Education) Christopher Pyne a Liberal and close Abbott supporter, may lose his seat. 

Eliza Borrello, ABC News Online, has written the following revealing article, July 7, 2015 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-07-07/japanese-submarine-contract-would-threaten-federal-seats-in-sa/6599998:

"Liberals fear South Australian seats at risk if submarine contract goes to Japan

With the state still reeling from the loss of thousands of car manufacturing jobs, employment remains a hot button political issue.Liberal MPs say they fear several of their federal seats in South Australia could be at risk if the Government gives Japan the contract for the next fleet of submarines.
Liberal sources have told the ABC the contract for the next fleet of submarines will play a big role in its fortunes at the next federal election.
One Liberal said seats like Hindmarsh, held by first-term MP Matt Williams, would be under threat if the contract goes to Japan.
"I don't think it would be an electoral wipe-out ... [but] it would make it really hard for guys like Matt," he said.
"The easiest option [politically] would be for it to be done in South Australia."
Another MP said it would compound the risk of Lower House seats going to Independent Senator Nick Xenophon's party.
"[A] Japanese build would take Xenophon from a potential problem to a real threat," he said.
"A local build may not even see him run Lower House candidates."
But Hindmarsh MP Matt Williams said he would not speculate on talk he may lose his seat and was confident there would be more jobs in South Australia.
I can give an absolute, categoric guarantee there will be more sub jobs in SA.
Prime Minister Tony Abbott
"I'm working as hard as anyone with some of my colleagues to maximise the opportunities and the jobs in South Australia for the defence ship industries, having meetings with senior Government ministers who are listening to the various options," he said.
"The Government has already committed to at least 500 more jobs in various areas of the next submarines project which is good news for South Australia.
"We've also got the frigate program which we'd hope to get some work for South Australia so there's opportunities for the defence sector and industry in South Australia."
Prime Minister Tony Abbott said while the Government was yet to decide how or where the submarines would be built, he gave a guarantee there would be more jobs for South Australian ship builders.
"Whatever happens, I can give an absolute, categoric guarantee there will be more sub jobs in SA and I think that's what South Australians understandably want," [Abbott] said.
"They want a good deal for our country. They want a good deal for their state. They want the best possible submarines and that's what we are determined to deliver."
The Government is running what it has called a competitive evaluation process for the contract — which could go to France, Japan or Germany.
In February, Defence Minister Kevin Andrews said he expected significant work would be undertaken in Australia, particularly during the build phase, leading to the creation of at least 500 new jobs.
Mr Andrews said many of those jobs would be in South Australia."
Pete

AIP for Australia's Future Submarines? July 2015 Debate.

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Pete's Comment

There are tradeoffs (strengths and weaknesses) with any AIP system including fuel cell. It is significant that Japan and India's DRDO appear to be interested in developing their own fuel cell AIPs. Australia relies on lead acid batteries (LABs) with no AIP for the Collins and with improved Li-ion batteries (LIBs) Australia may not choose any AIP for the future submarine.

Article

Geoff Slocombe writing for ASPI's The Strategiston June 18, 2015 has authored a thought provoking article on many aspects of submarine function, particularly AIP systems and LIBs. Geoff Slocombe's article was first published at http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/air-independent-propulsion-is-a-must-for-australias-next-submarines/ :

"Air Independent Propulsion is a must for Australia’s next submarines


18 Jun 2015|

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Holland Type 8 Sub
The definitive statement on the roles and required capabilities of future Australian submarines must await the release of Defence White Paper 2015 and associated Force Posture Review, both due in August-September this year.
It seems likely that Australia’s area of operational submarine missions, as opposed to training and exercises, will be focused principally on our north-west approaches; the Malacca, Singapore, Sunda and Lombok Straits; and the South China Sea.
Potential roles for the future submarines could include intelligence gathering, surveillance, reconnaissance, insertion and extraction of divers or special forces, attacking enemy submarines and their surface warships, mine laying, together with other littoral or choke point operations. Effective prosecution of these roles will necessitate that the submarines go about their business undetected—meaning that apart from transits between their Australian base to around 200 nautical miles from their operational area, they’ll need to spend all of their actual mission time underwater.
A conventional diesel electric submarine travelling relatively slowly still has to recharge its lead acid accumulators every few days, by coming up to periscope depth so that its snorkel can take in air for the diesel generators. Modern surface, airborne and satellite sensors have become so sensitive that they can readily track surface wakes, acoustic and thermal signatures caused by snorkels, diesel engines and their exhausts. Submarine designers and Navy submariners use an indiscretion ratio to indicate the proportion of mission time a submarine is detectable while charging its batteries. For conventional modem submarines the indiscretion ratio ranges typically 7-10% on patrol at 4 knots, and 20-30% in transit at 8-10 knots.
This is where Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) comes in. It offers the possibility of increasing underwater endurance by a factor of up to three or four, which reduces the indiscretion ratio significantly.
AIP isn’t a new concept. In 1945, the Allies captured German submarine U1406 which used an early form of AIP.
Fast-forward to the 1990s when Sweden’s Kockums developed their Stirling AIP engine which was fitted to three new build submarines of the HSwMS Gotland-class. In 2005 the US Navy leased Gotland initially for a year and were devastated to discover that it could penetrate their defensive screen undetected when running under AIP. On one famous occasion Gotland got close enough to new CVN Ronald Reagan to take photos of it, then slipped away unnoticed.
If an AIP-fitted submarine realises it’s been detected, it has the escape option of diving deep and slowly, making its silent escape over several days. Underwater endurance can be up to 20 days.
AIP is about two separate choices. The kinds of batteries used in a submarine’s design, and the technology available to generate electricity deep underwater, which directly drives the submarine’s engine and supplies other electrical requirements.
Once batteries are chosen for a design, they can’t be swapped for different technologies. Currently, focus is on the promise of Lithium ion Batteries (LiB), which offer significant weight, space and power advantages over classic lead acid accumulators.
Power required to propel a submarine is proportional to the cube of hull speed. To cruise at low speed, LiBs require about half the space of classic accumulators, but at higher speeds they require around 25% of classic accumulator space to provide the same propulsive power. This means more LiBs can be fitted in place of classic accumulators, offering greater underwater endurance. Dependent on their chemistry, if LiBs become overheated or overcharged they can experience thermal runaway, damaged cells and even a fire or explosion. Therefore, the right selection of chemistry—together with stringent control systems—are required to prevent this happening.
The three Competitive Evaluation Process (CEP) contenders should consider offering different AIP electricity generation systems to power the main engine and other electrical systems deep underwater, rather than off batteries. Japan traditionally has used the Kawasaki Kockums Stirling engine and France the MESMA system, both driving generators and less efficient than Germany’s HDW/Siemens fuel cell plant configurations which produce electricity directly.
The invisibility AIP offers is an obvious advantage, but are there any downsides? Yes. Installing AIP increases length and weight of submarines; requires pressurised liquid oxygen (LOX) storage on-board and supply for all three technologies; MESMA and the Stirling engine have some acoustic noise from moving parts; and production costs increase the submarine’s unit cost by around 10%.
DWP 2015 has to analyse and make recommendations for capabilities still needed in place and effective into the 2050s and beyond. Given the stealth advantages of AIP in most likely roles, is this a capability that Australia can afford not to choose?
A SEA 1000 project team spokesperson advised that:
The Competitive Evaluation Process offers participants the opportunity to propose the use of technologies they consider best meet Australia’s requirements for the Future Submarine, which extend to considerations of through-life costs, schedule, risk, design and safety, and sustainment as well as capability.
AIP has not been specified as required in the CEP creating uncertainty about how much importance Defence attaches to this capability in the Future Submarine Program. Surely they would want their next submarines to be significantly less detectable, and therefore much more effective, when carrying out missions close to potential adversary locations.
Let’s hope the Government makes the right decision on AIP capability, and it becomes  a mandatory requirement.

India Accelerating its Project-75(I) Future Submarine Selection

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Model of a Russian drawing-board design Amur 1650 being marketed bstate-run arms seller Rosoboronexport for India's new submarine project P-75(I). Amur's strengths include much in common with India's current Kilos and Amur might be able to be fitted with joint Indian-Russian BrahMos cruise missiles or Klubs as land attack and anti-shipping weapons. An Amur weakness is the lack of a mature AIP system.
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Comment

Increasing number of Chinese submarines are visiting or even patrolling the Indian Ocean. This is causing increasing concerns in India. With India's small mainly aging submarine fleet India may be accelerating its Project-75(I) to buy 6 new AIP equipped SSKs. China can also extend its naval power through selling Type 039A Yuan SSKs to Thailand and Pakistan along with the two Ming class submarines China is selling to Bangladesh.

Article

Rahul Singh for the Hindustan Times, July 12, 2015 has written an excellent summary of the Indian submarine fleet's current state of play. Singh does not make the frequent mistake of reproducing Indian Government visions of building x numbers of SSNs and SSBNs in short time periods. Rahul Singh's article is at http://www.hindustantimes.com/business-news/govt-shortlists-5-shipyards-for-rs-64-000-cr-submarines-project/article1-1368341.aspx :

"Govt shortlists 5 shipyards for Rs 64,000-cr submarines project


Rahul Singh, Hindustantimes.com , New Delhi | Updated: Jul 12, 2015 


Five Indian shipyards, including the one in which Reliance Group chairman Anil Ambani recently picked up controlling stake, have been shortlisted by a top government committee to compete for a Rs 64,000-crore [US$10 Billion] [1 crore = 10 million then convert Indian Rupees to US$] project to build high-tech submarines for the navy.

Six advanced submarines will be built under project P-75(I). One of the costliest projects under the Make in India programme, it is expected to scale up the navy’s undersea warfare capabilities and is critical to counter the rapid expansion of China’s submarine fleet.

The shipyards shortlisted by the high-powered panel are Mazagon Dock Limited, Hindustan Shipyard Limited, Cochin Shipyard Limited and private sector yards Pipavav and Larsen & Toubro, a top government official told HT. Ambani’s Reliance Infrastructure bought controlling stake in Pipavav this March.[could shipyards be considered the Indian partners to the foreign contenders?]

The shipyards, identified after a seven-month rigorous process, will be invited to submit bids to build the submarines in partnership with foreign yards of their choice.

[Project-75(I) Contenders Countries/Companies that have shown interest and their products are:

-  Germany’s TKMS - HDW Type 214

-  Russia’s Rubin Design Bureau - Amur 1650 (as a sweetner Russia has offered to make India the "regional hub" for mainly Kilo submarine upgrades)

-  French DCNS – Scorpene

-  Spain’s Navantia - S-80 class, and 

-  Sweden’s Saab-Kockums - A26]

The new submarines will have the capability to operate underwater for several weeks with air-independent propulsion systems, greater strike power against land targets and improved stealth features that make them harder to detect.

Already, six Scorpene submarines are being built at the Mazagon Dock Ltd with technology from DCNS under a Rs 23,562-crore [US$3.72 Billion] project [called "P-75"]. But the first of these will be ready only by late 2016, almost five years behind schedule [due to Indian hesitation and perhaps slow defence expenditure].

India currently operates 13 ageing conventional submarines:

[- 10 (now 9) Kilos India (Sindhughosh class) mainly delivered in 1980s - so mainly aging but refitting is extending the lives of 9. One, the Sindhurakshak, exploded and sank in 2013 and may well be unrepairable.

- 4 HDW Type 209 (Shishumar class) of which 2 launched around 1984 and commissioned 1986. Two commissiond 1992 and 1994.]

[India also has a semi active(?) part Russian crewed/advised(?)] Akula-II nuclear-powered attack boat [INS Chakra] leased from Russia at Rs 5,500 crore [per year?]. 

In contrast, China’s submarine fleet is growing in numbers and sophistication – Beijing possesses 53 diesel-electric attack submarines [especially Yuan under mass production], five nuclear attack submarines and four nuclear ballistic missile submarines. [and Pakistan has 5 Agosta SSKs, 3 of which have AIP].


India will complete its nuclear triad — the ability to launch strategic weapons from land, air and sea — only when it inducts the indigenous ballistic missile submarine, Arihant. The boat will carry out weapon trials later this year, including the testing of nuclear-capable [B-05 is a new name for the K-15 Sagarika] submarine-launched ballistic missile. The navy, however, has refused to set a deadline for the submarine to take up deterrence patrols."

Pete

Previous use of Titanium in Russian Submarines

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For larger image click here (Courtesy Business Insider Australia) so you can see current Russian submarine diving depths. Diagram gives the speed, diving depth, crew and length of all of Russia's current submarines with images mostly to scale. This and other amazing Russian military diagrams were created by Anton Egorov of Military Infographics on Behance, Saint Petersburg, Russia.
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The following is about Titanium (really Titanium alloys) that were used to build some Russian submarines in the Cold War (ending in the early 1990s). Titanium alloys are metals that contain a mixture of Titanium (Ti) and other chemical elements. Such alloys have very high tensile or yield strength and toughness. They are light in weight compared to steel and are very corrosion (including seawater) resistant.

The NATO designations for most (or all?) Russian submarines that used Titanium alloy in their pressure hulls were: Mike, Alfa, Sierra and Typhoon. Despite its benefits, the high costs of Titanium submarine construction led to its abandonment as the Cold War ended.

Titanium alloys used for the pressure hull (or hulls) allow a major increase in depth, but other submarine systems need to be redesigned for extreme pressure as well. A submarine's test depth my be limited to  1,000 meters - the depth a Mike Komsomolets dived to in 1984 the only Titanium pressured hulled Mike class submarine built.

Seven Alfa class SSNs were commissioned between 1971 and 1981. One may have dived to 1,300 metres though continuous operation at such depths caused excessive stress for many submarine systems. For sustained operation at such a depth complete redesign of the plumbing and other inter-hull systems would have been required. The diving to 1,300 meters, caused damage to equipment, which in a few cycles (dives) would make an Alfa very unreliable. The 1,300 meter test may have been conducted just prior to decommissioning.Alfas were high speed test submarines never used operationally. Project Sapphire connected to the Alfa is worth a novel.

The 4 submarine Sierra class SSNs (commissioned 1987 to 1996) were successors to the Alfas. With only 4 Sierras built their cost may have been similar to the 3 hugely expensive, limited production, US Seawolfs (still operational). A 2013 report indicated two Sierra class might be modernised and recommissioned. The Sierras have a more sustainable Titanium pressure hulls than the Mike and Alfas with the Sierras diving 550 meters.

The 6 Typhoon SSBNs commissioned in the 1980s (none now operational - one used for SLBM tests) had two separate pressure hulls made of Titanium alloy. As Typhoons weighed 24,000 tonnes (surfaced) their pressure hulls may have consisted of 1,000s tonnes of Ti making Typhoons significant contributors to the eventual bankruptcy of the Soviet Union.

With Titanium pressure hulls making only small numbers of Alfas and Sierras possible the Russians  decided to use lower cost steel in the SSN successors to the Sierras, the Akula SSNs. The Akulas are relatively successful with 15 completed. One steel hulled Yasen SSNhas been completed since it was laid down in 1993.

The cost and difficulty of working with Titanium alloy suggests Russia will not return to using it for submarine pressure hulls.

BACKGROUND

Titanium costs up to nine times more than steel and is technically difficult and expensive to manufacture into marine vessel hulls - so it has been generally avoided by the shipbuilding industry. Titanium needs a totally different manufacturing process; shipyard workers must be retrained; construction halls must be reconfigured; and bending and shaping of heavy plates of Titanium alloy are far more difficult compared to steel.

Arguments for Titanium alloy is that it can be built thin - making it even lighter. For maximum diving depth submarines could be constructed of welded steel many mm thick however this makes hull weight excessive. Many other heavy essentials need to be packed into a submarine including including reactors or diesels/batteries, fuel oil, crew spaces, weapons and electronics. Heavy hull weight also adversely effects buoyancy and manoeuvrability. If constructed in Titanium submarines have lighter weight for the same size and virtually no corrosion. 

Specific factors which control the economics of joining/welding Titanium alloys may include:

-  the need for extreme cleanliness and careful gas shielding to prevent harmful contamination during fusion welding, 
-  the high cost of available weld filler materials (approximately $40 per pound decades ago - much higher now) and
-  the unavailability of an electrode for shielded-metal-arc welding (SMAW). 

The difficulty of welding Japan's submarine steel (equivalent to HY-156/157) may involve similar challenges.

Up to the 1990s Russian Titanium for submarine technology was far in advance of the West's, requiring fewer passes to achieve weldsNon-weldable Titanium alloys of HY-175 and greater are possible. 

"S" located information about Russia’s current Titanium alloy situation specifically concerning the VSMPO-AVISMA Corporation at http://www.vsmpo.ru/en . VSMPO-AVISMA used to make submarine Titanium alloy in former Soviet Union and is still the world leader in Titanium manufacturing. It is the major Titanium supplier to Airbus Industries and second largest supplier to Boeing. 

VSMPO-AVISMA's export business is: Aircraft  (35%) and Aircraft engines (12%). Customers include Airbus, Rolls Royce, Boeing, Pratt & Whitney, etc. VSMPO-AVISMA and Boeing co-developed new Titanium alloy (known as Ti-5553 used in the Boeing 787) and established a joint venture, Boeing Ural Manufacturing near VSMPO, Russia.

I'll write a future article about Chinese use of Titanium and also HY hull strengths of Chinese and Russian submarines.

Pete

Thailand Puzzling Whether to Buy Chinese Submarines

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A Chinese Type 039A or Type 041 Yuan class submarine - with many Russian Kilo characteristics. Thailand has been puzzling whether to buy 3 small version Yuans - called "S-20" or "S-26T".
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COMMENT

Please connect with my Chinese Yuans for Thailand and Pakistan? June 27, 2015. It looks like I was right (in the June 27 article) in being cautious - I said "China is an unconfirmed choice" and "If China is finally chosen".

The whole process of Thailand selecting Chinese submarines looked strange from the beginning. The "process" being a mere Naval Committee deciding on Chinese submarines and then publicising the decision before the Thai Cabinet had signed off on it. 


It all looks like a face saving formula where the Thai military government only indirectly proposed submarines. But high defence spending was/is unpopular with sections of the public. Other competing spending priorities, such as reformed healthcare, were raised. 

Perhaps only two Chinese submarines, or other subs, might be bought at some point in the future.

ARTICLE

The Financial Express, July 16, 2015 reports http://www.financialexpress.com/article/null/thailand-puts-1bn-chinese-submarines-purchase-on-hold/101548/:

Thailand puts $1bn Chinese submarines purchase on hold

Thailand has put on hold the purchase of submarines from China, the Thai defence minister said on Wednesday, raising questions about its commitment to acquiring its first such vessels.


Thailand has put on hold the purchase of submarines from China, the Thai defence minister said on Wednesday, raising questions about its commitment to acquiring its first such vessels.
Defence Minister Prawit Wongsuwan said this month the navy had approved a 36 billion baht ($1.06 billion) plan to buy three submarines from China.
Thailand, a staunch U.S. ally for decades, has stepped up engagement with China as China increases its influence in the region with loans and aid for infrastructure, and as a 2014 coup in Thailand strained Thai-U.S. relations.
Prawit, known to be a strong backer of the plan to get submarines, told reporters the acquisition was on hold while the navy re-considered the role of the vessels and their cost.
“We will wait for now and not introduce it to the cabinet for approval,” Prawit told reporters.
“For now, the navy must inform itself and educate itself on whether the submarines are worth it and how much they will add to the Thai navy.”
Thailand has been considering getting submarines since the 1990s with both Germany and South Korea seen as possible suppliers, though deals have never been concluded.
In November, Thailand’s navy chief said he had revived plans to procure submarines.
Officials say Thailand’s quest for submarines makes sense strategically and could help ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Thailand if territorial disputes in the energy-rich South China Sea blow up.
Vietnam has taken possession of three Russian-built Kilo-attack submarines and has three more on order.
Singapore, which has four second-hand submarines, has ordered two from Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems . Indonesia has ordered three from South Korea’s Daewoo Shipbuilding.
China this year surpassed Germany, France and Britain to become the world’s third-largest arms exporter, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute think-tank.
China was the first major power to acknowledge Thailand’s ruling junta following a May 2014 military coup."
Pete

DCNS Shortfin Barracuda - Australian Submarine Evaluation Continues

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A sidenote is this stirring Youtube of France's all nuclear submarine force. Youtube mainly features the Rubis class-AMETHYSTE rebuilt, Saphir SSN. Saphir displaces 2,400 tonnes (surfaced), crew 70, powered by a 48 MW reactor, 60 day mission endurance only limited by food. New Rubis-AMETHYSTEs are no longer built with French DCNS due to launch the first Barracuda SSN replacement by 2017. Initial picture above is the Le Terrible SSBN. The Youtube mainly kicks in at 45 seconds, with Saphir interior action at 4 minutes 30 seconds.
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COMMENT

There have been many media reports announcing the Shortfin Barracuda. This may be the most  detailed. All the future submarine contenders, Japan, France and Germany, are putting forward designs with varying degrees of newness. This means none are precisely "off-the-shelf" not even Japan's.

The article indicates "The preferred bidder is expected to be announced in the first quarter of 2016." If, as is likely, the preferred bidder is Japan the announcement would probably be after the next  Australian Election. This is because a win by Japan, meaning "build in Japan", would be a very unpopular decision with voters - especially those in Western Australia, South Australia, Victoria and New South Wales. So if the Election is in March 2016 the final announcement of Japan would be made around April 2016 or later.

ARTICLE

naval-technology.com, July 16, 2015 reports http://www.naval-technology.com/news/newsdcns-offers-shortfin-barracuda-australia-future-submarine-programme-4624492

"DCNS offers Shortfin Barracuda for Australia’s future submarine programme


shortfin barracuda
France's DCNS is set to propose its Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A design for Australia's future submarine competitive evaluation process (CEP).
Claimed to be the world's most advanced conventionally powered submarine, the vessel is in its pre-concept design stage and has been named after an indigenous species of the Barracuda found in Australia's Great Barrier Reef.
The Shortfin Barracuda is the smaller version of the French Navy's Barracuda nuclear-powered attack submarine.
DCNS Australia CEO Sean Costello said: "While exact details remain confidential, DCNS can confirm the Shortfin Barracuda is over 90m in length and displaces more than 4,000t when dived.
"If selected, the Shortfin Barracuda will remain in service until the 2060s and the Block 1A platform will be updated and upgraded with new technology developed in France and Australia.
"The technical evolution of the submarine will be enabled by a strategic level government-to-government agreement between France and Australia."
DCNS's design will compete against Japan's Soryu-class and German firm TKMS's Type-216 submarines, reported Sky News.
"DCNS can confirm the Shortfin Barracuda is over 90m in length and displaces more than 4,000t when dived."
The future submarine project is the country's largest defence procurement programme, representing an investment of $50bn.
Australia is seeking to build submarines with range and endurance similar to the Collins-class vessels, as well as superior sensor performance, and stealth characteristics.
This new submarine fleet is expected to fill a capability gap in the mid-2020s, when the Collins-class submarine is scheduled to retire from service.
Last month, the Australian Government established the Expert Advisory Panel to oversee the competitive evaluation process for the submarine programme.
In February, it announced the acquisition strategy for the programme, providing further details of the competitive evaluation process.
The preferred bidder is expected to be announced in the first quarter of 2016.
Image: The Shortfin Barracuda is more than 90m long. Photo: courtesy of DCNS"
Pete

Australian Labor Party Policies Less Close to US and Japan. China?

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COMMENT

The following article is something that Japanese submarine builders and the Abe Government might need to consider if Labor wins the next Australia Election (probably in 2016). Over the 15 years of the build of Australia's future submarines (in Japan or Australia) Labor is likely to win government. Under Australian Coalition or Labor Governments Japanese submarine technology might be increasingly at risk when sent to Australia's close economic ally, China.

ARTICLE

The Business Spectator, July 17, 2015 reports http://www.businessspectator.com.au/news/2015/7/17/national-affairs/labor-tones-down-us-embrace:

Labor tones down US embrace

Labor has watered down its ­language on the US-Australia ­alliance, abandoning references to the ANZUS Treaty as “one of Australia’s great national assets’’ and “the bedrock of regional stability’’ as part of its policy blueprint for government.
The significant foreign policy shift, which could hand a future Labor government more room to balance the relationship between the US and China in the Asia-­Pacific, was drafted by foreign affairs spokeswoman and deputy leader Tanya Plibersek, in consultation with members of the party’s shadow cabinet national security committee.
Labor’s draft national platform drops a reference to Japan being “Australia’s closest partner in Asia’’, and strengthens the party’s position on China’s re-emergence, describing it as “one of the most significant developments of the 21st century”.
The changes did not “cause any ripples” with committee members who include right and left-wing Labor MPs: Bill Shorten, Ms Plibersek, Stephen Conroy, Mark Dreyfus, David Feeney, Richard Marles and Jacinta Collins. But The Australian understands the US has noted the shift in Labor’s stance.
The party’s existing national platform, agreed to in December 2011, states: “Labor believes that the ANZUS Treaty, which is central to the alliance relationship, is one of Australia’s great national assets.”
It says: “Labor’s response to the security challenges in our region is multifaceted. Labor strongly supports the US Alliance and continued US military engagement in the region, which has provided the bedrock of regional stability for decades.’’
The platform was endorsed a month after then prime minister Julia Gillard hosted US President Barack Obama in Australia, and the pair visited Darwin where they launched to great fanfare the stationing of US marines on Australian soil.
Labor’s draft platform, to be ­debated at the ALP national conference in Melbourne at the end of next week, has streamlined the language on the ANZUS Treaty and US-Australia alliance. The changes come amid an internal Labor push to give greater foreign policy prominence to the relationship with China, despite the party’s industrial wing running a ­protectionist-style scare campaign against the China-Australia free trade agreement."
Pete

Chinese and Russian Submarine Pressure Hull Strengths

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Yield Strength (YS = yield strength or proof stress)
YS US    UK FranceGermanyChinaRussiaJapanAustraliaSweden
550MPaHY80Q1N1.3964* 1)
NS56
590MPa60HLES921A
TA5-A
AK-25
48-OT3
630MPa1.3974
690MPaHY100Q2NAB-2* 2)
NS70
700MPa80HLESBIS812
EMA
Weldox
700
785MPa980AK-29NS80
890MPaHY130100HLESAB-3?NS90Weldox
900
980MPaAK- ??
1078MPa* 3)
HY156
NS110
1175MPaAK- ??

* 1) steel of 550MPa and NS56 is equivalent to HY80 grade steel.
* 2) steel of 690MPa and NS70 is equivalent to HY100 grade steel.
* 3) steel 1078MPa and NS110 is equivalent to the HY156 grade steel.

The Table is from towards the end of Japanese Document "High-tensile steel Summary of national submarine" or Summary of High Tensile Steel for Submarines by Country 2013 http://seesaawiki.jp/w/doramarine/ .

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    "S" has identified the document below which provides a comprehensive summary of some nuclear and conventional submarine pressure hull steel (and some Titanium) strengths. This is for at least 11 major submarine producing countries. The document is attributed to a vast number of open sources. 


    The higher the yield (stronger) the steel alloy or Titanium alloy in a submarines pressure hull the deeper it can dive in operations. As well as alloy strength other factors also influence diving depth including:

    - supports for the the pressure hull

    - compartments or multiple pressure hulls, and

    - strength of the welds used to join sections of the pressure hull.

    It is not possible to verify the accuracy of most of the figures. Commenters who know more are invited to supply corrections.

    Please connect with Submarine Matters"Previous Use of Titanium in Russian Submarines" July 14, 2015 http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2015/07/previous-use-of-titanium-in-russian.html


    Document Link


    Click http://seesaawiki.jp/w/doramarine/  - document will appear to be mainly in Japanese - if you have Windows right click mouse - then click Translate to English (or Russian or Chinese etc). The English translation is not great - which is why I have provided a summary of some Chinese and Russian pressure hull strengths below.

    Document Name and Year

    "High-tensile steel Summary of national submarine" or Summary of High Tensile Steel for Submarines by Country 2013.

    Summary of Chinese and Russian High Tensile Alloys Pressure Hulls by Submarine Class


    Below are some of the details for China and Russia. Many more details are in the Document text.


    Utilising converters 
        Chinese Submarine pressure hulls 
    Type 093 "Shang" class SSN (2 or 3 active) and Type 094 "Jin" class SSBN (4 active) "980" steel which has a strength between 784MPa and 802MPa = average of 793MPa = NS81 = HY115 

    Type 039 "Song" class SSK (13 active) and possibly Type 039A "Yuan" class SSK (13 active, 7 building) 921A steel: strength 590MPa = NS60 = HY86 


    Chinese GJB944-90 Titanium alloy (TA5-A) strength 588MPa = NS60 = HY85 seems to be the equivalent to Russian 48-OT3 Titanium alloy.

    Russian submarine pressure hulls

    Akula class SSN commissioned 1991 onwards, ten still active (possibly uses "AK-33" steel alloy) = 979MPa = NS100 = HY142
    Lada class SSK one commissioned 2010 uses "AB-2 "steel: strength 588-686MPa = NS60 - NS70 = HY85 = HY100  (thickness in mm?)

    Sierra class SSN one launched 1983, four built, perhaps two still active - uses Titanium alloy hull - average strength 690MPa = NS70 = HY100 

    Victor class SSN commissioned from 1967 - early Victors (classes I and IIs) may have used "AK-29" steel: strength 784MPa = NS80 = HY114. Eight Victor IIIs still active - may use "AK-33" = 979MPa = NS100 = HY142.

    November class SSN in commission 1959-1990 used "K-25" low magnetic steel 588MPa = NS60 = HY85

    I'll summarise other parts of the document in the future.

    Pete

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