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Japan Providing Information for Future Submarine Selection

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A crewmen dangerously perched on a sail-plane of a Soryu (with is submarine number removed for security).
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What I see as the most interesting parts of a Japan Times May 18, 2015 article are:

“The National Security Council of Japan on [May 18, 2015] approved disclosing some technical data on the nation’s submarine technology to Australia, which is conducting a feasibility study on possible joint development and production of its next-generation submarine fleet…The scope of disclosure will be decided through negotiations but it will be limited to what Canberra would need for its feasibility study, the official said. Japan plans to propose joint development and production with Australia, based on Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s earlier decision to ease the nation’s self-imposed regulations on arms exports. Complicating matters, though, many aspects of the nation’s submarine know-how have likely been classified as top secret.”

MY COMMENT

Presumably development would center on achieving longer range for “SoryuAU” and perhaps more radically a vertical launch system. I assume negotiations might be through letter/email/Embassies or Minister Nakatani talking to Minister Andrews directly at the annual 2+2 talks in Canberra or Tokyo perhaps in early June 2015. See the June 2014 “2+2”

S has provided many useful insights and 2 internet documents - see Commentsfor Minister Andrews Phone Call to Minister Nakatani, May 7, 2015.

The first document was Defence Programs and Budget of Japan Overview of FY2015 Budget Requesthttp://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_budget/pdf/261003.pdf. Very relevant parts of it are:

Page 4: "Construction of a submarine (1 ship: ¥64.4 billion)

Construct the 11th Soryu-class submarine (2,900t class) to increase the number of submarines from the current 16 to 22 ships. [Comment 11thSoryu is 27SS with AIP? and LIB? costing ¥64.4 billion? Will 28SS still be LIB no AIP?]

Improve underwater endurance [Comment– Yes Australia wants greater endurance] , etc. compared with the existing Soryu-class submarines by mounting lithium-ion batteries ○ Life extension of submarines (life extension work for 2 ships and parts procurement for 3 ships: ¥3.4 billion)

Implement life extension measures for Oyashio-class submarines in order to increase the number of submarines from the current 16 to 22 ships.[Comment – hopefully as Japan implements more life extensions Japan will be more able to build subs that can operate to the Australian goal of 30 years]

Page 18:“Increase the number of Defense Attachés, etc. (Ukraine, Poland and Australia)” [Comment– I wonder if the first Attaché in Canberra might be a senior Submarine Officer]

Page 20:“Promoting bilateral, trilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, including those with Australia, ROK and India, as well as Japan-U.S.-Australiaand Japan-U.S.-ROK defense cooperation”



Pete

North Korean Submarines - Useful Stratfor Analysis and Diagram

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The following Stratfor analysis of May 19, 2015 North Korea's Submarine Problem is republished with permission of Stratfor.

"North Korea recently [claimed it] tested its new KN-11 submarine-launched ballistic missile, part of a program to develop weapons technology beyond ground-based systems.
Submarine-launched ballistic missiles would give North Korea two distinct advantages. First, they would extend the reach of North Korea's missile systems, theoretically enabling it to strike targets outside of ground-based missile range. Second, submarine-launched missiles, because they are offshore and mobile, would give North Korea a second-strike capability, allowing it to retaliate against attacks on its land-based nuclear bases and launch pads.
These benefits assume, however, that North Korean submarines have two important characteristics: sufficient size to carry ballistic missiles and an adequate level of endurance, or the amount of time a vessel can remain at sea unsupported.
The smallest submarine to ever carry a submarine-launched ballistic missile is the Soviet Zulu IV-class. It displaces approximately 2,000 metric tons of water carrying its one to two nuclear ballistic missiles. It is also heavier than the Type 033, currently North Korea's largest model. Pyongyang will need bigger vessels in the future to carry one to two missiles in an operational capacity. To carry more would require a new and entirely different class of submarine.
Submarines would also need to be able to continue without support long enough to reach targets beyond the range of land-based missiles. In order to fulfill a second-strike role, vessels would need to be deployed for months far from vulnerable ports and be ready for counterattack. Even with modifications, North Korea's Type 033 submarines cannot meet these endurance requirements.
Without an adequate submarine, the resources Pyongyang is investing in new missile technology will not improve the capability of its existing land-based missile program, and a suitable ballistic missile submarine would take several years to complete. Until then, the missiles under development will not provide the major benefits associated with a submarine-launched system."
MY COMMENT

I agree with most of the above. However some countries are developing miniature ballistic missiles and supersonic cruise missiles that can perform the role of the tradition large (Polaris and larger) SLBM. This miniaturisation can potentially allows submarines smaller than 2,000 tons to fire supersonic missiles (though not necessarily ballistic missiles). For example India is developing the mini K-15 ballistic missile for submarine. This is in addition to the supersonic BrahMos cruise missile and Klub cruise missile. The Klub is supersonic and torpedo tube launched.

It may not be essential for a submarine to be "deployed for months". If a submarine has evaded enemy sensors it might be a threat after 4 days travel - in which time an SSK might have arrived at a desired launch point 1,000 nautical miles from port.

Pete

India's Rising Nuclear and Conventional Submarine Force

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Abhishek Saksena for the India Times, May 15, 2015, has written an excellent analysis of India's past, present and future submarine programs. So good that I've taken the liberty of reproducing it in full. The title is courageous, but currently true of a regional power in the Indian Ocean. If India succeeds in building and fielding 6 SSNs and 6 SSBNs by 2030-35 it will probably be in the top four submarine nations, along with the US, Russia and China. By 2035 the UK and France may have dropped to 5th and 6th.

"No first use" is politically and strategically useful, but if there was proof Pakistan was about to launch a first strike in 10 minutes I think India would try to preempt it. I've added the occasional comment in [  ] brackets and added bolded links. The string for Abhishek Saksena's article is http://www.indiatimes.com/lifestyle/technology/indian-navy-soon-to-be-the-most-formidable-submarine-force-on-the-planet-heres-what-you-need-to-know-232694.html :

"Indian Navy Soon To Be The Most Formidable Submarine Force On The Planet! Here's What You Need To Know"


May 15, 2015

"The most important thing about having nuclear weapons is a second strike capability. In a nuclear conflict, one who strikes first may win the war, but one who strikes second makes sure there is no one left to celebrate the win. That’s nuclear deterrence in a nutshell. While it sounds easy in theory, building a nuclear doctrine with a working second strike capability is anything but. India, for example, has declared a no-first-use of nuclear weapons. Which means, that though India will not initiate a nuclear conflict, if attacked it will retaliate with such ferocity, that it will wipe the enemy off the face of the map. How does India intend to do this? Like any other superpower, India wants to use submarines.
Submarines for projection of power
INS Arihant
thehindu
If you think about it, submarines are the perfect weapons. Lurking in the depths of the oceans, they move around without being detected and surface to launch the attack on the unsuspecting enemy. Erstwhile superpowers USA and Russia continue to use their SSBNs (ballistic missile submarines) to great effect, projecting their might even today. These SSBNs ensure that even though the land-based missiles and airplanes may have been taken out, the enemy is guaranteed a sending off that it will never forget. And if India wants to be taken seriously on the world stage, it will have to start acting like a superpower, by being able to extend the country’s power across the globe. These submarines are therefore just what India needs.
Current state of submarine force
The current state of the Navy’s underwater fleet is, for lack of a better word, worrisome. India currently has 9 Sindhughosh class (Soviet Kilo class) and 4 Shishumar-class (German HDW Type 209) diesel electric subs and a single nuclear powered INS Chakra (Akula II class) sub. For a country with a coastline that measures more than 7,500 km, a fleet of 15 submarines is just not enough. And 15 isn’t the actual number of subs available for duty, because some of them are in ports for refits and maintenance. In comparison, China has a total of 67 submarines in its Navy. [In comparison Australia has a mainland coastline of 35,876 km and only 6 subs. How do you think we feel?]
Nuclear Submarine Program
INS Arihant
hisutton.com
India started building its first nuclear submarine, the INS Arihant, under the highly secretive ATV program. In fact the project was such a secret, that it wasn’t until July 2009, when it was actually launched, that it was even officially acknowledged to exist. Work though had started back in the 80s, with Soviet help, to build a nuclear powered hunter-killer sub. India also leased a Charlie-I sub named the INS Chakra between 1987 and 1991 to gain experience in operating nuclear subs. The ATV though moved on from being an attack sub to a ballistic missile carrier as India conducted the second set of nuclear tests in Pokhran. The biggest challenge faced was in miniaturising the Pressurised Light Water Reactor which could fit in the tight confines of the sub’s hull. Based on a Russian design, a land-based version was built by BARC before the actual reactor, of a reported 83 MW capacity, was placed in the sub.
The INS Arihant, after launch in 2009, went through an extensive set of tests including harbour acceptance trials with the on-board reactor going critical in 2013. But it was only in December 2014 that it left the harbour for its sea trials. The Navy Chief, Admiral R K Dhowan, had recently stated that the sea trials of the sub are going “very well”, but refused to give a deadline for their completion.
INS Arihant
wikimedia commons
According to reports, the Arihant should be commissioned by the end of this year, after which it can be put on active patrol duty. But before that can happen, it will have to integrate its primary weapon, the K-15 SLBM (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile). The Arihant will carry up to 12 of these nuclear capable missiles with a range of 750 km. While this reach is quite low to hit deep inland targets from the middle of the seas, another missile, the K-4 with a range of 3,500 km is also in the works. In fact, a test of the K-4 has reportedly been carried out in secret. Beyond these, the K-5 missile, with a range of 5,000 km, is also being planned. The latter will likely be deployed with MIRVs (Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle) which give each missile the ability to target up to four or more targets.
Although the INS Arihant can carry either 12 K-15s or 4 K-4s, the 3 boats which will follow, will be able to carry up to 8 K-4s or 24 K-15s. The next one will be christened INS Aridhaman. [I estimate Aridhaman may weigh 8,000-9,000 tons surfaced] And since the rest of the Arihant-class boats will be bigger than the lead boat, they are also expected to have a more powerful nuclear reactor. The crews for these missile carriers are gaining experience in operating nuclear boats on the Akula II class INS Chakra that India had leased in 2012 for ten years.
Future Nuclear Boats
But it doesn’t stop here. A follow-on class of 6 SSBNs codenamed S5, almost twice as big as the Arihant-class, was also approved for development. These will be able to carry up to 12 K5 intercontinental ballistic missiles with MIRV warheads. And SSBNs aren’t the only nuclear submarines that the Indian Navy will field. Early this year, the government cleared a project to build six new hunter killer boats (SSN) for the Navy. A joint Navy, BARC and DRDO project, the boats will be designed by Navy’s Directorate of Naval Design and be powered by a new reactor being developed by BARC. SSNs are as important as SSBNs as they can blockade important sea routes, denying the enemy access to important resources in an event of war, and shadow enemy ships. This new SSN will be similar in size to the Arihant-class but will carry advanced torpedoes and be able to move much quicker. Also, India is likely to lease another Akula II for 10 years in 2018, most likely the Kashalot that is 60% complete and in need of funds.
Conventional Submarines
INS Kalvari
Things are looking up for India’s conventional submarine fleet too. Under the Project-75, six French-Spanish Scorpene submarines are being constructed at Mazagon Dock Ltd. The first of these, named INS Kalvari [Scorpene], has recently been ‘undocked’ and will undergo sea trials next year and is expected to be commissioned into the Navy by September 2016. Incidentally, Indian Navy’s first ever submarine, which was a Soviet Foxtrot-class sub, was also called the INS Kalvari [Foxtrot]. The name Kalvari means Tiger Shark, and in naval tradition, the line of subs will be called the Kalvari-class. Although late by nearly four years, the Kalvari-class will add a punch to the dwindling underwater arm of the Navy. The nearly 1600-tonne subs have a complement of 31 men and can stay out to sea for 50 days. Its two diesel generation sets give it a submerged top speed of 20 knots (37 km/h). Its weapons suite includes Black Shark heavy weight torpedoes that can sink a ship 50 kms away and Exocet anti-ship missile [SM39] that travels a few feet from the surface of the sea and hits the hull of a target that’s 180 km away. It’s also one of the stealthiest diesel electric submarines in operation with emphasis on reducing hydrodynamic noise, which makes it invisible to enemy sonar. The last two boats of the class will also feature a DRDO designed Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system which will give it longer endurance and make it stealthier because they won’t need to surface for air to charge the batteries.
Alongside the Kalvari-class will be six of the next generation P75(I) diesel electric submarines, all of which will be built in India. Apart from the ability to fire long range heavy weight wire guided torpedoes and an AIP system, this new line of subs can also feature land attack capability. For this, the submarines will have to integrate a Vertical Launching System in the hull. The VLS will allows subs (and surface ships) to carry the world’s fastest cruise missile, the Brahmos [BrahMos], with a range of 290 km and the under development Nirbhaya cruise missile which has a range of 1,000 km. The Brahmos has already demonstrated the underwater launch capability and Nirbhaya too is being designed for launch from multiple platforms. But it remains to be seen if this capability can be integrated into the boats that are likely in contention. DCNS is expected to offer the Scorpene, while Russia is pitching the Amur 1650 which is the export version of the Lada class, which itself is an advance variant of the Kilo-class already in service with the Indian Navy. Other contenders include the S-80 by Navantia of Spain and the German HDW Type 214. India has also asked Japan to participate in the competition with its Soryu-class subs.
INS Chakra
So India is likely to field nearly 28 submarines including Arihant class subs, Follow-on SSBNs, New SSNs, 6 Kalvari class SSKs and 6 more P 75(I) boats, making it the most formidable submarine force in the Indian Ocean region." ENDS
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Also see Submarine Matters articles:

-  India’s Plans for 21 More Subs including SSNs, August 24, 2014

-  South Asian Submarine Issues, December 7, 2014,  concerning construction of India's emerging SSBN base at INS Varsha on the East coast below Visakhapatnam. 



Pete

UUVs Need to Complement Manned Submarines in Future

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Ex-submariner and unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) analyst Bryan Clark.
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Here is an interesting 8 minute video interview with full transcript at http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2015/s4240310.htm with Bryan Clark. He is increasingly becomming an unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) analyst. 

Clark was the retired US submariner, top aide to the US Chief of Naval Operations and
Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, who published The Emerging Future in Undersea Warfare on January 22, 2015. While all of his comments are in the transcript I’ve summarised his more significant comments below:

-  what we're seeing is the increasing ability to take a look at large areas and amass a large amount of information at one time and then process it very quickly [My comment - This underlines the trend towards the Navies of countries working closely with their NSA equivalents towards four dimensional modelling.]

-  new detection techniques are emerging that would allow you to find man-made objects in the water more easily

-  it is increasingly difficult for subs to operate with impunity in areas close to other countries. Manned sub coastal work is going to be come to an end against advanced adversaries in the next 20 years or so

-  with new detection technologies out to a couple of hundred miles off an adversary's coast this will demand changes in the way subs are built and operate

-  Subs may have to operate more like an aircraft carrier where they stay offshore, staying away from the threat, while subs deploy UUVs towards an adversary's coast

-  for Australia’s future submarine selection Australia must consider the “new detection technologies.” Subs “may have to be larger" with much more communications equipment using more comms methods

-  There are two big limitations to UUVs 

   :  one is short endurance, short range and slow speed on battery. Although a small diesel engine might help. 

   :  the other big UUV limitation is they don't have any accountability in terms of the human control over weapons use. And so even though you could autonomously program a UUV to go and shoot a torpedo at a target that it recognises, who will be accountable for the result if that torpedo hits a civilian ship instead of hitting a military ship? [My comment - Clark seems to be asking "Will Chinese UUVs be less constrained regarding these moral and legal aspects than the West?"].


-  A UUV is not going to be susceptible to the fear factor that a manned sub might be. A limitation of a manned sub is if you shoot at it, it generally has to run away because it doesn't have a lot of self-defence systems and your crew's life is at stake. The UUV will not respond in that way. A UUV will continue to carry out the mission until you physically destroy it. So, countering UUVs is going to be a huge challenge - which the US Government is looking at.
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Please connect with:

 LDUUVs, UUV, AUVs and Undersea Cable Tapping, January 14, 2015 at http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2015/01/sea-stalker-uuv-lduuv-auy-and.html .

Pete

Singapore Recommends Submarine Safety Regime - Exercise with India

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Malacca Strait - narrow and many rocks, islands and shallows. Its at its narrowest just south of Singapore. A ship and submarine captain's nightmare (Map courtesy IMO).
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About one third of oil carried by sea (worldwide) is moved through the extremely congested Malacca Strait. Large tankers and other subs can accidentally collide with subs. (Map courtesy US Energy Information Administralian (EIA))
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I have reproduced an excellent commentary by Prashanth Parameswaran who wrote for The Diplomat, May 21, 2015. I have added some links bolded and some comments, bolded in [...] brackets. The link is http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/a-new-plan-to-manage-asias-submarine-race/

"A New Plan to Manage Asia’s Submarine Race?"


"This week, Singapore co-hosts the Asia Pacific Submarine Conference (APSC) with the United States. Founded in 2001, the APSC has established itself as a major forum dealing with submarine rescue, and this year reportedly saw the highest attendance with 23 navies and organizations.
At the conference, Chief of the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) Rear-Admiral Lai Chung Han delivered a speech, seen by The Diplomat, outlining how Asia should take multilateral submarine rescue cooperation [see last para of a 2014Diplomat article] “to the next bound.” More specifically, given the busyness and shallowness [eg. 20meters to 50meters in some parts of South China Sea] of some of the Asian waters as well as the rapid rise of submarines expected in the region over the next few years, Lai suggested that Asian nations should enhance submarine operational safety and proactively minimize the risk of incidents by developing a regional framework.
Such a framework, Lai argued, would comprise four elements. The first would be better information exchange. This would not involve sharing sensitive information about submarine positions and movements, but other sorts of information like the real-time movement of fishing vessels and very large crude carriers. He suggested that the effort could be supported by the Information Fusion Center (IFC) at the Changi Command and Control Center through a dedicated Submarine Safety Information Portal. In his view, the information platform, along with the extensive network of International Liaison Officers [most probably including US and Australian] at the IFC and the information technology and command and control support of the Multinational Operations and Exercises Center, would provide robust infrastructure for this information exchange to occur.
The second element would be the sharing of best practices. While he acknowledged that some of this is already being done at APSC, he encouraged such exchanges to extend beyond just submarine rescue to encompass best practices, certification, and training to enhance the safety of navies and submarine operators.
The third element, Lai said, would be the setting of common standards. For instance, he recommended leveraging an established material safety standard, such as the United States Navy’s SUBSAFE regime, to ensure that submarines are in the best technical condition for safe operations.
The fourth element, and the most ambitious one, is coming up with a Code of Conduct for submarine operations or underwater “rules of the road.” He noted that given the confined and congested waters in some parts of the Asia-Pacific, there is a need to develop regulations for the underwater domain to help avert catastrophic incidents should submarines encounter each other unexpectedly underwater.
The challenges to such a regional framework are clear, and Lai acknowledged some of these himself. First, even the more basic elements of such a framework, such as information sharing, are hard to accomplish fully because of a classic catch-22: more information is required to build greater trust, yet it’s precisely the lack of initial trust — rooted in a range of factors including history, current geopolitical competition, and unresolved disputes — that often makes parties unwilling to share that information in the first place. While that does not make this an unworthy goal to strive for, it does mean that achieving it will not be as easy as it looks, even though the infrastructure exists and it makes sense to do so.
Second, although the sharing of best practices and the adoption of common standards may seem like no-brainers, they may take time to implement fully in practice. In reality, the speed through which practices are shared and standards are harmonized is the product of a variety of factors, including the extent to which there is similarity in capabilities; the degree to which different countries exercise with each other to facilitate interoperability; and, of course, the level of willingness of the different actors to make this a priority.
Third and lastly, the wide divergence in the experience of Asian states — both in terms of operating submarines as well as cooperation on submarine safety — will likely make the specifics of a regional framework more complicated. [Singapore's suggestion might particularly be aimed at other sub owning ASEAN nations (Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam) also at China] While some countries have robust submarine fleets, other major states have just acquired them within the past few years and still others have plans in the pipeline to get them in the future. That has significant implications for designing a regional framework, including the dilemma usually inherent in such arrangements about how to balance inclusivity and high standards.
Given these challenges as well as others, Lai was right to note that Asia has a long way to go before getting anywhere near the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) preventive system for submarine operational safety, which has the [NATO Submarine Movement Advisory Authority] deconflicting underwater activities as well as endorsed procedures and standards by NATO’s International Submarine Escape and Rescue Liaison Office. But he was also right to stress that while this is probably a bridge too far, that should not stop countries from taking small steps now. Otherwise, as he gloomily suggested, it may not be a matter of whether, but when, a submarine-related crisis occurs in the future in the Asia-Pacific."

Meanwhile Times of India, May 23, 2015 reports "NEW DELHI: India has dispatched four warships, including a frontline destroyer and a stealth frigate, on a long overseas deployment to the South Indian Ocean and South China Sea in consonance with the country's "Act East" policy. As part of the endeavor, two of the warships -- stealth frigate INS Satpura and anti-submarine warfare corvette INS Kamorta [against the sub RNS Archer] also kicked off the four-day SIMBEX exercise with the Singaporean Navy on [May 23, 2015]..."

German TKMS-HDW's Bid to Build Australia's Future Submarine

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Highly skilled and experienced workforce ... TKMS workers fitting out one of six new subm
Highly skilled and experienced workforce ... TKMS workers fitting out one of six new submarines now being built at the TKMS shipyard in Kiel. Supplied: German Submarine Source 
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The following are excerpts from news.com.au’s“Why German company ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems wants Australia’s Future Submarines contract” of MAY 23, 2015. Extra comments are in [...] brackets and links that I have added are also in [...] brackets http://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/why-german-company-thyssenkrupp-marine-systems-wants-australias-future-submarines-contract/story-fnpjxnlk-1227363429952:

BIDS TO BUILD AUSTRALIA’S FUTURE SUBMARINES
TKMS has constructed 161 boats for 20 navies around the world since 1960 at Kiel including more than 50 built in customer countries that have benefited from a philosophy of total technology transfer.
The parent company [TKMS] operates in 80 countries, has a $60 billion turnover and employs 160,700 people globally. In Australia it employs 900 mainly engineers.
TKMS is the world leader in non-nuclear submarine construction and it is pushing very hard to win the contract to build Australia’s future submarine.
The navy wants to buy more than eight 4000-tonne submarines to replace its six ageing Collins Class boats from about 2026.
Germany, Japan and France are engaged in a bizarre “competitive evaluation process” by the Abbott Government for the $20 billion plus contract, which will be the most expensive and complex defence project ever undertaken to provide the nation with a vital deterrent and force multiplier for the next 50 years.
Sadly there is no “transparency” requirement in the process but that hasn’t stopped the Germans from opening their doors to share almost everything about their submarines and what they can offer Australian taxpayers.
The same cannot be said for Japan and France whose submarine proposals are shrouded in secrecy.
For TKMS this is a rare opportunity to win the biggest contract in history for non-nuclear submarines and the firm is pulling out all stops.
INSIDE TKMS’ HEADQUARTERS
This week it opened its door to a group of Australian defence writers to explore in detail both its submarine and surface ship operations.
TKMS board member [Torsten Konker] described the Japanese bid as a “white elephant” because no one knew anything at all about what it is offering with its evolved Soryu Class boat.
Many observers agree and regard the Soryu as being optimised for Japan rather than Australia. They see the huge sovereign risk issues such as the lack of an export record as well as language, political and cultural differences as a bridge too far.
With nine submarines either under construction or being upgraded the Kiel facility is the world leader in non-nuclear boats.
TKMS Australia chief executive and former submarine commander [Philip Stanford] said all the German technology was exportable and the firm was willing to design an Australian built capability tailored to Australia’s needs.
“We don’t hide things,” he said.
Mr Stanford said another major advantage was the fact that the synergies between the German and Australian navies were very strong and likely to become even closer.
“The German navy is similar to ours,” he said.
That means cooperating in a variety of areas including submarine, technology and weapons development.
TKMS’ VIEW ON USING ADELAIDE FACILITIES
The company also visualises an Australian submarine and warship hub in Adelaide possibly building boats for countries such as Canada and maintaining TKMS submarines for regional nations and its bid is strongly supported by a German Government that is keen for close cooperation with Australia.
According to Mr Konker the German firm has a good record of cooperating with very different companies and diverse cultures including Israel, Turkey, Italy and Colombia to deliver cutting edge submarines.
“We have quite a good track record,” he said.
At the Kiel yard [Israeli Dolphin boats] are built alongside Greek or German submarines and when the time comes to install sensitive equipment — and there is a lot of it in an Israeli submarine — the vessel is “locked up” and everyone apart from Israeli engineers are banned from entry until the installation is complete.
Blohm and Voss sub contracts its huge yard to TKMS and today turns out hi-tech Frigates and other warships for navies around the world.
It was a robust Blohm and Voss Meko design that was chosen for the navy’s [Anzac Frigate] project that is widely regarded as the most successful Australian navy shipbuilding project ever.
According to TKMS senior vice-president of strategic sales and former South African Rear Admiral Jonathan Kamerman, the company’s key pillars that made the Anzacs such a success — such as seakeeping and fighting survivability — still applied today. TKMS has supplied 143 warships to 16 navies in 17 new classes since 1970 with half built in customer shipyards such as Williamstown in Melbourne.
He said Australia should learn the lesson from the flawed Air Warfare Destroyer alliance and look to the company that has done it before for Australia.
The man behind the Anzac ship was Dr John White who is now the chairman of [TKMS Australia]. When John White speaks governments usually take notice and he is speaking a great deal of sense when it comes to the navy’ future submarine and future frigate projects.
He was recently contracted by the government with American expert Donald Winter to examine the troubled Air Warfare Destroyer Alliance that is running years late and hundreds of millions over budget. The report remains a closely guarded secret.
Dr White sees a clear and logical path for the nation’s most important weapon projects.
He said TKMS was committed to replicating its German naval capability in Australia and specifically at Techport in Port Adelaide on the site of the taxpayer owned ASC. The company will push to take over ASC as part of its push to build subs, frigates and Pacific Patrol boats at the site.
“If not we will establish our own facilities at Techport and work with other facilities to build both Sea 1000 [submarines] and Sea 5000 [frigates] if we won them competitively,” Dr White said.
The Howard Government first raised the prospect of Adelaide becoming the national shipbuilding centre of excellence back in the late 1990s.
Sadly successive governments have been unable to make it happen, but the future submarine and frigate projects present an ideal opportunity for “national interest and sound business decisions to triumph over political bastardry and stupidity.” ENDS

India's Unnamed Project for 6 SSNs Begins

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Russian built INS Chakra (Akula 2) - along with INS Arihant (nuclear propelled testbed) are the only public hardware manifestations of India's SSN project - so far.
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Thanks to ZuluEcho at Comment Thread (May 22, 2015) for drawing my attention to Sandeep Unnithan's superb India Todayarticle of March 26, 2015. The article mainly deals with India's project to indigenously build 6 SSNs. The project has no name - so far? If the SSNs are built after the 4th Arihant class submarine is launched we may be talking 2025 for first launch of an SSN. The following are excerpts with my comments in [...] brackets and added links in [...] brackets.

Article string is http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/india-china-relations-modi-government-indian-ocean-naval-expansion/1/425929.html :


The Indian Ocean riposte
The Modi government signals a new push into the Indian Ocean with a diplomatic offensive and naval expansion to counter China's growing presence

Sandeep Unnithan  March 26, 2015
On February 18, 2015 the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) formally cleared India's single-largest defence project: a joint Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)-Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC)-Navy project to build six nuclear-powered attack submarines or SSNs for [very low price of] roughly [US] $12 billion (Rs 74,400 crore). This mammoth 'Make in India' project, nearly the size of the budget allotted this year to the three services to buy hardware ($15 billion), was not an isolated policy decision.

A senior naval official says India's ramped-up Indian Ocean push is a direct response to the expansion in China's naval capabilities including submarine deployments in the Indian Ocean over the past year, and oceanographic surveys meant to legitimise its presence in the region.

India's response is part of a recognition of not just its maritime capabilities, a comprehensive linkage between diplomacy and power projection capability and the fact that China's game plan has huge security implications. "We look at capabilities, not intentions. Intentions can change overnight. If the Chinese have the capability to base their ships in the Indian Ocean Region, it has huge security implications for us," the senior naval officer adds.

Late last year, the government dusted out a 2008 naval proposal for six SSNs...the six SSNs that will form the lynchpin of India's response to the Chinese navy.

The Indian Navy envisages multiple roles for a future nuclear-powered attack submarine fleet: two SSNs each to escort each of the three Carrier Battle Groups, protect the "bastion areas", or bases of the Arihant-class SSBNs, and hunt enemy submarines in the Indian Ocean Region. In the event of a Chinese offensive in the Himalayas, the SSNs will form the backbone of a future Indian riposte. They will run interdiction missions at vital choke points and conduct operations in enemy waters.

All of these tasks are presently carried out by a solitary [INS Chakra], which is to be supplemented by a second SSN, possibly the [Kashalot] to be leased from Russia for $2.7 billion in 2018. "SSN's utility in denial operations, raising the cost of hostile military intervention and shadowing high-value units such as carrier groups and SSBNs, is unparalleled," says Shankar.

The SSN project comes at a time when India's three-decade-old nuclear submarine project is finally coming up to speed. The [INS Arihant] or the S2, the first of a class of four 6,000-tonne ballistic missile submarines, recently began her sea trials in Visakhapatnam. [My calculations are the 2nd [INS Aridhaman], 3rd and 4th subs of the Arihant class will weigh around 8,000+ tons surfaced in order to accommodate the 8 K-4 missiles planned. Arihant itself is a testbed highly unlikely (too light and with too shallow a draught of 11m) to be commissioned with the 12m long-high K-4s.].

The submarine's performance in surface trials has enthused naval officials to plan for its commissioning in December this year. The INS Arihant cost around Rs 6,000 crore to build and can carry either 12 short-range [K-15 missiles] or four K-4 nuclear tipped ballistic missiles with a range of 3,500 km. The DRDO has set up an SSN cell headed by a retired vice admiral in its nuclear submarine building hub, the [Ship Building Centre (SBC) in Visakhapatnam]. The [Navy's Delhi based Submarine Design Group] is now working to complete a design for these undersea vessels in the next two years. The shipyard to build the vessels is yet to be decided but officials say this programme will run parallel to the seven strategic submarines of the Advanced Technology Vessel Project (ATV).

THE TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGE

At roughly Rs 12,000 crore a unit, one SSN would equal the cost of two 7,500-tonne Project 15A Kolkata-class destroyers. Cost, however, has never been a hurdle. The belief in the need for a nuclear navy has led a series of PMs from Indira Gandhi to Narendra Modi to ensure generous budgetary support.

The ATV programme has spent over Rs 30,000 crore, most of it in secret funds which do not form part of the defence budget. Politicians have occasionally questioned if they were getting value for money. In 2005, then finance minister P. Chidambaram, a member of the apex political committee steering the classified project, wondered why the Arihant, costing over a billion dollars (Rs 6,200 crore), [was to carry only 4 K-4 missiles]. The project team doubled the missile load on three subsequent vessels [to 8 K-4 missiles  for the 2nd [INS Aridhaman], 3rd and 4th subs of the Arihant class]. The only challenges in the project have been technological. The CCS approval marks the start of a new challenge for scientists and nuclear engineers.

...the technical challenge of designing and fitting a compact reactor inside a space the size of a two-storeyed building is insurmountable for all but the P5 countries which build such vessels. [Not quite. Brazil is on the way to building a "ProSub" SSN and South Korea (KSS-N) and Japan certainly have the technical know-how].

India's ATV project started as a troika of agencies. Steered by the DRDO which also developed the vessel's long-range ballistic missiles, it was staffed by naval project teams that brought in design expertise and BARC that built and developed the reactor. By the late 1990s, it had spent over Rs 2,000 crore on its classified ATV programme without results. The failure to produce a submarine had in 1998 piqued then navy chief Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat to call for a technical audit. Considerable Russian design assistance that followed the May 1998 nuclear tests breathed new life into the project. Even so, it took the Arihant 15 years from the start of construction to begin sea trials. The navy fought a pitched but unsuccessful battle to wrest the project away from DRDO control five years back.

A former DRDO chief is optimistic about the next line of submarines. "We are on schedule with the SSNs and we have the capability to design the submarine and build the reactor," he says.
The six SSNs will be a spin-off from a project that is building four Arihant class SSBNs or ballistic missile-firing nuclear submarines. The downstream effect of this Make in India project will be tremendous. One private sector official says the $12-billion project will have a force multiplier effect of $40 billion on the Indian economy, generating over a million skilled jobs and sustaining the ecosystem that has grown around the ATV project.

One admiral points out that while the SSN will be Arihant's size, designing and building it will be far more challenging as both platforms have different tasks. An SSBN like the Arihant is a stealth underwater bomber ready to launch nuclear-tipped missiles at an adversary. Its reactor needs to deliver steady speeds as it prowls undetected.

An SSN, on the other hand, is like a fighter jet. It needs a high-performance nuclear reactor which delivers tremendous speed with rapid acceleration and deceleration. It needs a reactor that can perform multiple tasks such as pursuing enemy warships and striking land targets. Opinion seems to be divided regarding the type of reactor that will power the SSN.

BARC wants the Arihant's 83 MW reactor to lead the way. "It's better to build on a proven design. The SSN should have a compact version of the same reactor," says Anil Anand, former head of the BARC reactor design team. A former admiral, also part of the project, differs and calls for a new 190 MW reactor such as the one on the Chakra to be designed.

The new SSN programme, experts say, is an opportunity to learn from past mistakes. Admiral Arun Kumar Singh, former eastern naval commander, calls for stringent supervision to ensure the project stays the course. "The Prime Minister must monitor its progress every year and the defence minister every three months. Otherwise what happens is that the DRDO gives us ambitious projections which it fails to meet," he says. Clearly, old ghosts will continue to haunt the project. Also Read : India's string of flowers"ENDS
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Please Connect with Submarine Matters articles:


-  Indian Possible Interest in Buying-Building Japan’s Soryu Submarine – Australia, January 30, 2015

-  South Asian Submarine Issues, December 7, 2014,  concerning construction of India's emerging SSBN base at INS Varsha on the East coast below Visakhapatnam.

-  India’s Plans for 21 More Subs including SSNs, August 24, 2014

Pete

Vietnam's 4th Klub Missile Armed Kilo Sub Due to Arrive June 2015

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Various sizes of Klub/Sizzler/SS-N-27 missile, with submarine launched 3M54 second from top 8.22 meters long, 533mm diameter for torpedo tube launch.
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Animation of land attack by submarine launched 3M54 Klub/Sizzler/SS-N-27 missile.
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The location of cargo ship Rolldock Storm, which is carrying the fourth [Kilo submarine for Vietnam] submarine codenamed HQ-185 Da Nang, at 6:20 p.m. on [May 28, 2015]. Photo credit: Marine Traffic [via thanhniennews.com]
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I have added changes and links in [...] brackets to the following articles.

US StrategyPage reports, May 31, 2015, https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htsub/20150531.aspx:

Submarines: China Objects To Getting Klubbed


"May 31, 2015: China is making angry noises to the UN, Vietnam and Russia about the little publicized Russian sale of Klub submarine launched cruise missiles to Vietnam. China wasn’t happy about Russia selling Vietnam six Kilo class diesel electric submarines in 2009. Russia and Vietnam were quiet about the sale of 50 Klub missiles but the news eventually got out, in part because 28 of the Klub missiles have already been delivered,… The [Russian 3M54 (also known as the SS-N-27, Sizzler or Klub)] anti-ship missiles can also be aimed at targets on land and that’s what really bothers the Chinese…

Weighing two tons, and fired from a 533mm (21 inch) torpedo tube on a Kilo class sub, the 3M54 has a 200 kg (440 pound) warhead. The anti-ship version has a range of 300 kilometers, but speeds up to 3,000 kilometers an hour during its last minute or so of flight. There are also air launched and ship launched versions. The land attack version does away with the high speed final approach feature and that makes possible a larger 400 kg (880 pound) warhead.

What makes the 3M54 particularly dangerous when attacking ships is that during its final approach, which begins when the missile is about 15 kilometers from its target, the missile speeds up. Up to that point, the missile travels at an altitude of about 30 meters (a hundred feet). This makes the missile more difficult to detect. That plus the high speed final approach means that it covers that last fifteen kilometers in less than twenty seconds. This makes it more difficult for current anti-missile weapons to take it down."
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"4th Russian-built submarine set to arrive in Vietnam next month" 

"The [fourth of the six Kilo-class submarines] that Vietnam has contracted to buy from Russia is scheduled to arrive in Vietnam [in June 2015].
The submarine codenamed HQ-185 Da Nang is currently carried by the Dutch-registered cargo [ship Rolldock Storm] which is on its way to Vietnam.
It is docking at a port in the Canary Islands off the southern coast of Morocco for fuel filling.
The submarine is scheduled to be delivered to Cam Ranh Port in late June.
Meanwhile, the fifth submarine codenamed HQ-186 Khanh Hoa completed a two-week trial run and returned to Svetly Shipyard (Kaliningrad) on Thursday, according to Russian media.
The first three submarines named after Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City and Hai Phong, arrived in Vietnam in 2014 and early 2015.
The delivery of the sixth and last one, HQ-187 Ba Ria-Vung Tau, is scheduled for [2016].
The six submarines are built under a US$2-billion deal signed during a Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung's visit to Russia in 2009.

Russia will deliver all by 2016, train Vietnamese crews, and supply necessary spare parts."
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Please connect with Submarine Matters:
-  Vietnam's Russian Speaking Submarine Service, April 21, 2015  http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2015/04/vietnams-russian-speaking-kilo.html and
-   Vietnam's Kili Subs Being Steadily Built by Russia, July 7, 2013 http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/07/vietnams-kilo-subs-steadily-being-built.html.
Pete

US Nuclear Subs That Temporarily Docked at Fremantle, Western Australia

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Comment - Visits by US nuclear submarines to Australia's main submarine base, HMAS Stirling, Fremantle, Western Australia, are beneficial to Australia. Here are two subs:

The SSGN USS Ohio temporarily docked at Fremantle, Western Australia on January 1, 2010. Note  the 2 pods behind the sail - mainly to house SEAL Delivery Vehicles. (Photo Courtesy Ian Johnson http://navysite.de/ssbn/ssgn726_1.jpg). 

USS Ohio was the first of the US’s Trident (missile) class nuclear powered submarines. From November 2003, Ohio’s 24 Trident nuclear missiles were removed and 154 conventional Tomahawk cruise missiles were put in theirplace. Ohio rejoined the fleet in January 2006 having been redesignated a guided missile nuclear powered submarine (SSGN 726). 

Ohio's positioning in the Indian Ocean makes it easier and quicker for her to launch Tomahawk missiles onto targets from the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. Ohio can also support operations of up to 66 Navy SEALS for up to 90 days. 
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The SSN USS Houston at Fremantle, Western Australia, on September 4, 2005. (Photo Courtesy Ian Johnson, http://navysite.de/ssn/images/ssn713_9.jpgUSS Houston is the 26th submarine in the Los Angeles class of SSNs. In December 2004, Houston changed homeport from San Diego, Calif., to Apra Harbor, Guam. In January 2012, her homeport again changed from Guam to Pearl Harbor.

US SSNs in the Indo-Pacific region can protect US carrier groups, amphibious forces and shadow nuclear submarines or surface forces (such as the Russian cruiser Varyag).

Pete

Li-S or Lithium Sulfer Batteries (LSBs) for Submarine On the Way

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Energy density diagram comparing batteries including Lead Acid (LABs), Lithium-ion (LIBs) and Li-S or Lithium Sulfer (LSBs)  in watt-hour per kilogram (Wh/kg) and watt-hour per litre (Wh/l). LSBs are projected to be superior. (Diagram courtesy Oxis Energy)
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In late May 2015  “S” and I discussed Lithium Sulphur Batteries (LSBs) in the Comments section.
Currently diesel-electric operate using Lead-acid Batteries (LABs). From the 2020s some new-build submarines (including Soryu Mark 2s (28SS) will be utilising Lithium-ionBatteries (LIBs). If HDW 216 or Conventional Barracuda are ever built Australia is probably expecting them to have LIBs.

So Japan has decided to adopt LIBs for the next batch of Soryus the “Mark 2s” (first named here on November 5, 2014 :-). LSBs are intended to have a higher energy density than LIBs or, of course, LABs. However the reliability and safety of all battery types in submarines are essential traits. S advises that GS Yuasa Corporationwill be the LIBs supplier for the Soryu Mark 2 which will deliver the LIB sample by 2020. I think this may delay the launch of the first Soryu Mark 2 (28SS) until 2021?

So LIBs may be the new in-operation batteries for submarine from the 2020s while LSBs may be the next advance in batteries for use from the 2030s.

Submarine generational turnover is less a problem in subs for the Japanese Navy (continuous build, one per year with 20 year operating life) than it is in the Australian Navy (non-continuous build, batches of 6 to 12? 30 year operating life).

For Australia it will be a major issue whether retrofitting LSBs in subs already fitted with LIBs will be a practical option. If a sub's whole electrical system (wiring etc) needs to be upgraded then LSBs might need to await the next generation of new-build submarines (2050s on). Australia may be more interested in nuclear propulsion by that time.

If upgrading with LSBs in the 2040s? after 15 years? is considered advantageous by Australia this may perhaps be done during "deep maintenance" when the hull is cut anyway - to replace major engine components.

Probably no-one knows how many years LIBs for submarine will remain efficient. Hence decisions on LSB replacement are far in the future.

Several companies worldwide are researching-developing LSBs. This includes UK company Oxis Energy Ltd. Oxis has provided the diagram above and the description below http://www.oxisenergy.com/technology/which explains:

"Sulfur represents a natural cathode partner for metallic Li and, in contrast with conventional lithium-ion cells, the chemicals processes include dissolution from the anode surface during discharge and reverse lithium plating to the anode while charging. As a consequence, Lithium-Sulfur allows for a theoretical specific energy in excess of 2700Wh/kg, which is nearly 5 times higher than that of Li-ion.

Oxis’s next generation lithium technology platform offers the highest energy density among lithium chemistry:

-  300 Wh/kg achieved at cell level in 2014
-  400 Wh/kg forecast in 2016

Oxis patented chemistry provides inherent safety allowing it to meet international standards concerning shock, crush, thermal stability and short circuit...Thanks to its two key mechanisms, a ceramic lithium sulfide passivation layer and a non-flammable electrolyte, our cells can withstand extreme abuse situations such as bullet and nail penetrations with no adverse reaction."
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Naturally companies need to sell their product and many details need to be worked out with new technologies.

For submarine use batteries need to be very safe (under normal and abnormal conditions) and reliable. Other issues under Australia mission conditions are their:

-  weight
-  charge speed to minimise indiscretion
-  rate of self-discharging
-  memory effect
-  propensity to surge
-  discharge rates (speed, volume, percentage)
-  cycle life and operational life 
-  degree of maintenance needed


It would be interesting which German, French and US companies are developing LSBs?

Pete

ABC Online article wrong concerning likely competitive evaluation process outcome

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Senator for South Australia, Nick Xenophon - wrong this time.
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The following article, and Senator Xenophon, are wrong in several major respects. If you want me to indicate why please contact me using my email.

James Hancock of Australia's ABC Online reported June 2, 2015  http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-06-02/xenophon-grills-defence-officials-over-submarine-tender-process/6516018 :

[Australia's] Senate estimates: Tender winner may not be chosen to build submarines, Senator Xenophon warns

"The winner of the Federal Government's "competitive evaluation process" on who will build Australia's next submarine fleet may lose out to strategic considerations, Independent senator Nick Xenophon says.
The South Australian senator has grilled defence officials about the process during a late Senate estimates hearing in Canberra on Monday, pointing to a 2001 competitive evaluation process where a German company won the right to build a submarine combat system.
Despite winning the right, a United States company was awarded the contract on "strategic grounds".
Senator Xenophon today said it did not seem to matter if a tender could build the best value, "most capable submarine on Australian soil".
"Ultimately you could lose out on the vagaries of 'key strategic considerations'," he said.
He feared the competitive process to build Australia's next submarine fleet was just a facade and Japan was already the preferred bidder over France and Germany.
Senator Xenophon added that the Navy could no longer confirm it would still need 12 submarines, despite the 2009 and 2013 Defence White Paper saying a fleet of 12 was required for future strategic requirements, and despite "an increase in regional tensions since those papers were released".

Strategic decisions to be 'taken into account'

Defence Department submarines general manager David Gould told the hearing that strategic considerations would be taken into account.
"I don't know if there'll be a clear winner," he said.
"I suspect it's much more likely that there'll be a series of considerations of differently valid risks."
He said the task would be to reconcile recommendations "with broader strategic considerations".
Defence Department secretary Dennis Richardson said Senator Xenophon's questioning was hypothetical.
"You could develop all sorts of hypothetical scenarios in relation to the future submarine and the competitive evaluation process that would give you different answers," he said.
"I think it's far too premature for us to be engaging on speculation about hypothetical scenarios that may or may not come to life."
Federal Attorney-General George Brandis said the outcome of the 2001 competitive process was not very instructive.
"All of these decisions tend to turn on their own particular facts," he said.
Federal Industry Minister Ian Macfarlane last week said South Australian shipyards might not make the first of the nation's next submarines, but he remained optimistic about Australian prospects down the track."
Pete

Problems with submarine purchase from Japan emerging

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The reluctance of Japan to share full technical details of the Soryu with Australia is a major problem for Australia. The Soryu's operating life of only 20 years is another major problem, but this is under-rated by Australian selectors.
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This article from ABC Online, June 3, 2015 appears to be accurate in what the 3 representatives of Japan say and when Defence Minister Andrews said:

"the submarine was about the size Australia is looking for, but required some alterations, and the purchase of the subs has the personal backing of Prime Minister Tony Abbott."

The thread for the article is  http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-06-03/australia-not-capable-of-top-secret-soryu-submarine-build/6517730 :

"Submarines program: Adelaide shipyard not capable of building Soryu subs, former Japanese commander says"

The assessment comes as Defence Minister Kevin Andrews visits Japan to inspect Soryus, tipped as the preferred option to replace Australia's Collin Class fleet.
Mr Andrews said the submarine was about the size Australia is looking for, but required some alterations, and the purchase of the subs has the personal backing of Prime Minister Tony Abbott.
But former commander of the Japanese submarine fleet Masao Kobayashi said he was not sure the high-tech build could be successfully carried out in the Adelaide shipyards.
"They don't enough skilled workers to fashion the high-tension steel; it's even hard to do in Japan," he said.
[Submarine Matters records indicate the strength of steel used in the Soryu is HY-156. This is much stronger and harder to weld than most submarines (including those from TKMS) which have a HY-80 strength rating. The safe depth most submarines can dive may be around 400 meters - but Soryus with their stronger steel may be able to dive to 600 meters.]

Captain Hisayuki Tamura from the Japanese Ministry of Defence also said Japan was best placed to build the high-tech submarines.
"It's the best conventional non-nuclear submarine and we have the best technology to build them," he said.
Another former Japanese submarine captain, Toshihide Yamauchi, said it was still to be negotiated just how much of the top secret Soryu technology can be handed over.
Releasing the core technology is not an option for Japan. We're worried about leaks to China once our technology is in Australia.
Former Japanese submarine captain Toshihide Yamauchi
"Releasing the core technology is not an option for Japan," he said.
"We're worried about leaks to China once our technology is in Australia.
"We need to sort out expectations from both sides."
Mr Andrews said deciding how much of the secret technology was shared with Australia would be part of the competitive evaluation process.
"What we need to know is what they are at the outset, have an understanding of what's involved in making those design modification changes and ultimately we need to know what the cost is as well," he said.
Mr Andrews said a deal with any of the countries could involve the long-term training of staff in Adelaide."
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Submarine Matters biodata file photo and description of former commander of the Japanese submarine fleet Vice Admiral ("retired") Masao Kobayashi indicates that he is not fully retired. Kobayashi remains an adviser to Japan's National Security Council.


 Vice Admiral Masao KOBAYASHI, JMSDF (Retd) photo (above) courtesy Sub Summit

Masao Kobayashi is now an adviser to Japan's National Security Council"Masao graduated from the Japanese Defense Academy in 1973 and commenced a career in the JMSDF submarine service. 

He had held many posts in the submarine force. Shore billets included Submarine Branch Head in the Ship Systems Section in the Maritime Staff Office and Operations Officer in the Fleet Submarine Force. He has commanded TAKASHIO SS-571, (Uzushio class), and has been the Commander of Submarine Division Two. In 2001/2 he was the Commander of Submarine Flotilla One, and was Coordinator of Exercise at sea for Pacific Reach 2002. 

Masao’s last post was as Commander of the Fleet Submarine Force. He retired from the MSDF in 2009. Vice Admiral KOBAYASHI served with distinction in the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and is well regarded as an authourity in the submariner community." See Kobayashi's comments on submarines to the Japanese press - reported January 18, 2015.

Pete

If Soryus Sold to Australia - secrets leaking to China part of business

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As ill-feeling in Australia grows due to Japanese unwillingness to share Soryu construction - Japan will need to become used to age-old Australian worries about the Japanese militarists (current or retired officers) returning to power in Japan. Minister Nakatani being a former soldier. Japanese naval officers increasingly vocal.
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COMMENT

Selling major weapons systems involves some political and security downsides and distortions. Japan will need to become accustomed to this. The arms business can lead to an odd situation like Stirling AIP engines being sold to China

Captain Toshihide Yamauchi's worries (in the article below) about Australia's ability to safeguard sensitive Japanese intellectual property are well founded:

-  Australia is closer economically to China than it is to Japan

-  Selling Japanese submarine steel composition and welding details to China would be lucrative to a  selling company

-  An Australian change of Government to Labor would bring in some politicians who still prize their socialist comradely relations with China

-  Some Australian companies that would be involved in a submarine enterprise have links to China

-  Australia cannot ban ethnic Chinese-Australians from working in the submarine commercial or related government defence sector

-  A previous Minister judged to be too close to Chinese interests was removed years ago

ARTICLE


"Australian senator slams Japan over submarine capability comments

SYDNEY, JUNE 4 BY MATT SIEGEL

An influential Australian senator on Thursday hit out at Japanese defence officials over comments that Australia was incapable of building a version of a high-tech Japanese-designed submarine at home.

Germany's ThyssenKrupp and France's state-controlled naval contractor DCNS separately are competing with a Japanese government-led bid for Australia's A$50 billion ($38.84 billion) next generation submarine project.

Japan, which had been the front-runner in the planned sale of about 12 vessels to replace Australia's ageing Collins class submarines, is under pressure to build at least some of the boats in South Australia.

But on Wednesday, the former commander of the Japanese submarine fleet, Masao Kobayashi, cast doubt on Australia's ability to build them.

"They don't have enough skilled workers to fashion the high-tension steel; it's even hard to do in Japan,"he told the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC).

Another Japanese submarine captain, Toshihide Yamauchi, raised concern to the ABC about Australia's ability to safeguard sensitive Japanese intellectual property.

"We're worried about leaks to China once our technology is in Australia,"he said.

Independent South Australian Senator Nick Xenophon hit back over the comments, calling them a "disgrace".

"It's widely known that both the German and French teams are ready, willing and able to build state-of-the-art, ultra-reliable submarines on Australian soil," Xenophon said.

"The Japanese appear to be trying to find excuses to have $50 billion worth of Australian taxpayers' money spent largely entirely in Japan."

A deal to supply a variant of Japan's 4,000 tonne Soryu-class submarine would give Japan its first major overseas deals after Abe eased curbs on arms exports last year that had isolated defence contractors for seven decades.

Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott is eager to deepen security ties with Japan, reflecting a U.S. desire for its two allies to take a bigger security role in Asia as China's military might grows.
Eager for that deeper cooperation, the United States is backing the Japanese-built submarine packed with American surveillance, radar and weapons equipment, sources familiar with Washington's thinking have told Reuters.

But Abbott is facing intense domestic political pressure to secure the thousands of manufacturing jobs that the build would bring, and Japan had previously seemed willing to compromise over where the submarines would be built.

Xenophon said the comments showed that Japan was not ready to take part in the biggest defence procurement project in Australian history.

"The Japanese have not exported submarines before and these comments show that they are simply out of their depth," he said. ($1 = 1.2875 Australian dollars) (Editing by Robert Birsel)"

Pete

Advisory Panel for future Australian sub project - US Panellist Winter the Most Senior

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The senior member of an Australian panel and former US Secretary of the Navy, Donald C. Winter will bring a wealth of US defence supplier experience (including Corporate Vice President Northrop Grumman). The "competitive" evaluation process has already selected the US made combat system. (Photograph Courtesy Northrop Grumman)
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COMMENT

Submarine Matters on March 26, 2015 indicated Defence Minister Andrews' intention to appoint an expert advisory Panel for the "competitive" evaluation process. 

The biggest surprise among the four Panellists selected is that the most senior is an American Donald C. Winter, "senior" by virtue of his position as a former senior politician (US Secretary of the Navy).  A foreigner would normally bring a degree of disinterested neutrality. However Defence Minister Andrews has already indicated that the future submarine's combat system (20% to 30% of the project?) is to come from American defence companies. On February 20, 2015 Defence Minister Andrews declared:

"...the Government has endorsed a set of key strategic requirements for our future submarines:...c) The combat system and heavyweight torpedo jointly developed between the United States and Australia as the preferred combat system and main armament." 


This makes Winter (with his business background) an interested party. It should be noted that Winter held senior positions in Northrop Grumman which may well supply systems and sensors to the Australian submarine. It is appropriate to ask "will the Panel be involved in vendor participation and pricing issues involving US vendors or with BAE Systems Australia" (see below)?


DEFENCE MINISTER ANDREWS MEDIA RELEASE - June 5, 2015


Defence Minister, Kevin Andrews has released "Transcript – Expert Advisory Panel on the Future Submarine Competitive Evaluation Process – 5 June  2015  http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2015/06/05/minister-for-defence-transcript-expert-advisory-panel-on-the-future-submarine-competitive-evaluation-process-5-june-2015/ :


"...The Expert Advisory Panel will assure the Government that the competitive evaluation process remains sound, is conducted in accordance with probity and accountability principles, and that participants have been treated fairly and equitably.

The members of the Expert Advisory Panel are:
• Professor Donald Winter [an American businessman, academic and] former Secretary of the United States Navy; [well placed to represent US political and US business interests - including the pre-determined US Combat System that will be incorporated into the Soryu.] 
• The Honourable Julie Anne Dodds-Streeton, a former Justice of the Federal Court of Australia;[well placed to anticipate some of the inevitable legal battles including those with the US (see Donald Winter).]
• Mr Ron Finlay, one of Australia’s leading infrastructure specialists with very extensive legal experience; and
• Mr Jim McDowell, who was a member of the First Principles Review team with very extensive Defence experience. [former Chief Executive, BAE Systems Australia. Now currently listed as CEO BAE Systems, Saudi Arabia.]
Collectively, these advisers share experience in complex military acquisition programs, legal and probity matters, and major projects...."


Pete

Major Soryu hull life issue? - Maintenance/Emergency Welding in Japan only?

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The following discussion of the Soryu hull, short operational life and welding in Japan only issues arises from "S"'s and my discussions on June 3-4, 2015 see Comments section for http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2015/06/problems-with-submarine-purchase-from.html.

"S" explained on June 3, 2015, that one of the key technologies for the Soryu is the hull design and way of building it - which includes welds. "Submarine structure is made of series of cylindrical hulls reinforced by beams. Joints between hulls, connection of seam in hull, and connection between hull and beams are welded."

"In the case of [the] Collins submarine, GMA (Gas Metal Arc) welding was used for these hull buildings.[also called hull sections]"

"But it is not the case for Soryu submarine, GMA welding [is only?] used for hull-beam connection, [while] GTA (Gas Tungsten Arc) welding [is] used for hull-hull joint and seam connection in my opinion. [The] quality of GTA welding is superior to that of GMA welding, this technology is quite difficult to learn and it’s welding speed is very slow. There is no GTA welding technology in Australian submarine building sector. So hull building in Australia is rather risky and I can not recommend it in terms of Aussie submariners’ safety.

I then asked S "is Japan's hull making and welding practices designed for 20 years of submarine operational use, with problems developing if there are 10 more years of use?" [This is important because Japanese subs are typically operational for 20 years while Australian subs are ideally designed for 30 years service.] 

On June 4, 2015 S indicated:

"I think that [the Soryu] submarine may have material degradation issues for very long time use.

1. Fatigue which is structural damage from repeated loading: Submarine is exposed to very high pressure repeatedly. Sometimes tiny crack generates, propagates and finally leads fracture.

2. Corrosion which is damage caused by electrochemical reaction: Especially non-uniform corrosion like pitting is very dangerous. In the case of Soryu type subs, we’d better...pay special attention to the situation of interfaces [with the] anti-vibration rubber/hull.

3. We also must pay attention to stress corrosioncracking (SCC), the growth of crack formation under corrosive (sea water) and stress condition.

Prediction of these damages is difficult. But in the case of Soryu subs, JMSDF [the Japanese Navy] may accumulate important material data including degradation thanks to long operational experiences and consecutive building one of same type of submarine." [there is a life extension program for the Oyashio class and may be a future life extension program for the Soryu class.] 

QUESTIONS

I would be most grateful for answers to:

Noting Submarine Matters records January 20, 2015 indicate the strength of steel used in the Soryu is "NS110" (equivalent to HY-156). This is much stronger and harder to weld than most submarines (including those from TKMS) which have a HY-80 strength rating. The safe depth most submarines can dive may be around 400 meters - but Soryus with their stronger steel may be able to dive to 600 meters.

1.  Is the high yield strength (equivalent to HY-156) of Soryu pressure hull steel the reason why GTA (Gas Tungsten Arc) welding is used?

2.  Or has GTA became the standard Japanese submarine welding method for other reasons?

3.  Does the deeper diving ability of the Soryu come at the expense of shorter 20 year old operating life?

4.  Put another why does the use of HY-156 (NS110) which allows deep diving put extra stress on the hull effectively shortening operational life to 20 years?

5.  If "[GTA] technology is quite difficult to learn and it’s welding speed is very slow. [And] There is no GTA welding technology in Australian submarine building sector. So hull building in Australia is rather risky and I can not recommend it in terms of Aussie submariners’ safety." Then

5(a)  How can deep maintenance, involving cutting and rewelding a Soryu hull, be done in Australia?

5(b)  If there is major battle damage to an Australian Soryu requiring cutting and rewelding the hull, how can that be done in Australia?

Pete

Australian Defence Minister Meets Japanese Prime Minister Abe, Tokyo, Soryu Discussed

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Australian Defence Minister Andrews had a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Abe, Tokyo, June 3, 2015 during Andrews' mainly submarine related visit (Photo courtesy Government of Japan)
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At the meeting Defence Minister Andrews (left), Prime Minister Abe (center) Defence Minister Nakatani (right) discussed security and Soryu issues, Tokyo, June 3, 2015 (Photo courtesy Government of Japan)
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On June 3, 2015 Japanese Prime Minister Abe took the unusual step of having talks with a foreign defence minister below Prime Ministerial level - that was Australian Defence Minister Andrews. This underlines how seriously Japan takes deeper alliance relations with Australia - with the pending Soryu sale being a major symbolic and practical component. Japanese Defence Minister Nakatani also attended. Note that Minister Andrews did not meet the German Chancellor or French President (or Prime Minister) when he visited those countries on submarine issues on April 23 and April 24, 2015 respectively. 

On June 4, 2015 Minister Andrews visited the KHI and MHI submarine building yards at Kobe.
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Japan's Jiji Press Agency via the Japan News, June 4, 2015, reported http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0002196895 :

"Abe offers cooperation in developing subs"

"Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on [June 3, 2015] told visiting Australian Defense Minister Kevin Andrews that Japan hopes to cooperate with Australia on the development of Australia’s next-generation submarines.

In a meeting held at the prime minister’s office in Tokyo, Andrews told Abe that he will visit shipyards in Kobe on [June 4, 2015] that are run by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. and Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd. The two companies build submarines for the Maritime Self-Defense Force.

At a National Security Council meeting last month, the Japanese government decided to participate in the procedures for Australia’s selection of a partner to develop the submarines. Japan also decided to disclose some of its submarine technologies to Australia."

Pete

Strengths & Weaknesses of the Contenders for Australia's Submarine Replacement Programme

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Xavier Vavasseur of  NavyRecognition has provided this interesting comparison of the three contenders for the future submarine (SEA 1000) process. Original link http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2777 .

I would be most grateful for your comments on it. 

Pete
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Strengths & Weaknesses of the Contenders for Australia's Submarine Replacement Programme
By Xavier Vavasseur

Plans to replace the existing Royal Australian Navy's (RAN) Collins-class submarines began in 2007 with the launch of "SEA 1000" also known as the Future Submarine Programme. In February this year, the Australian Government announced the acquisition strategy for the Future Submarine Program and invited three countries: France, Germany and Japan to participate in a competitive evaluation process. Here is our analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each contender:
» The Japanese Soryu class
» The German Type 216
» The French evolution of SSN Barracuda 
Plans to replace the existing Royal Australian Navy's (RAN) Collins-class submarines began in 2007 with the launch of "SEA 1000" also known as the Future Submarine Programme. In February this year, the Australian Government announced the acquisition strategy for the Future Submarine Program and invited three countries: France, Germany and Japan to participate in a competitive evaluation process. Here is our analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each contender:The Royal Australian Navy aims at replacing its Collins-class submarines (HMAS Rankin pictured)
(U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman James R. Evans)

Before we start focusing on each of the three contenders, it is important to understand the fairly new and unique requirements of the RAN. So far and to this day, the majority of export submarines (such as the Kilo, Type 212 and 214, Scorpene, Agosta, A17…) displace around 2000 tons. They answer the needs of navies looking to patrol their coastal area, maritime approaches. Deployment on farther operational theatres requires long weeks of transit and probably port call for refueling and other logistic needs. The RAN needs are fairly unique (even though both TKMS and DCNS somewhat anticipated these needs) as it is looking for a multi-role, long endurance, long range submarine able to take part in joint operations with its allies. The combination of these factors translates into a well above 3000 tons submarines design. In addition, Navy Recognition understands the general consensus is that no matter which design gets selected, the RAN requires it to be fitted with US made combat management system (CMS) and weapons.
Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) Soryu class submarine Hakuryu (SS-503)Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) Soryu class sub Hakuryu (SS-503)
(U.S. Navy photo by Cmdr. Christy Hagen/Released)

Soryu class submarineThroughout 2014, several news outlets (all of them US based such as Reuters) tried to infer that the Soryu class was favored by Australia and the procurement of Japanese submarines was almost a “done deal”. Today’s situation however appears to be more complicated for the Soryu as the Australian government decided to study proposals from two extra competitors.
The strengths of the Soryu class are:
- it appears as the only sea-proven design of the three contenders
- it is favored by the United States for political reasons (driven by the "Shift to Asia-Pacific region")
- because of the aforementioned political reasons, the aspects of US CMS and weapons are non-issues.

But will the Soryu really answer Australia’s needs? Looking closely at its reported performance it must be noted that these performance are actually quite similar to existing small or medium modern SSK such as the Kilo, Scorpene or Type 214. The reason may simply be the needs and doctrine of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF): Looking at a map of Japan, one may realize that as soon as it leaves its base, a Soryu class SSK is already in patrol in proximity to North Korean or Chinese waters.



To match the Australian needs for long range and endurance, the Soryu will have to be modified with a new Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system and new Lithium Ion batteries among other things. In other words the end result would almost be a new submarine because of the major modifications required: For example, fitting new Lithium Ion batteries means a completely new electrical architecture, new ventilation schematics, newly designed engines to optimize the use of the batteries…

Another issue with the Soryu is Japan’s lack of experience in the fields of transfer of technology and industrial cooperation related to complex defense programmes.
The Type 216 is TKMS' long-range submarine project. Picture: ThyssenKrupp Marine SystemsThe Type 216 is TKMS' long-range submarine project. Picture: ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems

Type 216 submarine
Revealed at Euronaval 2012, the Type 216 is German Shipbuilder TKMS' view of what a conventional propulsion long-range submarine should be.

The strengths of the Type 216 is that it is fully compliant (on paper) with the needs of "ocean going" navies (such as the RAN) looking for long-range submarines. In addition TKMS' past and present order book speaks for itself: TKMS submarines of all types (209,210,212A,214) are in service with the navies of 17 countries in addition to the German Navy. Finally, unlike the Japanese offer, TKMS is used to complex defense programmes cooperation with local partners.

However, what may limit the Type 216 chances in the SEA 1000 programme is uncertainty on two aspects:
The first uncertainty aspect is TKMS' lack of experience in building large submarines. The design of submarines requires a pre-sizing capability: For example, the basic requirements in terms of speed and endurance drive the electrical and engine power requirement of the submarine which themselves impact the volumes and compartments of the submarines. This pre-sizing capability is based on both experience and empirical knowledge.The design rules (which may even be considered "empirical laws") when building submarines are not linear. In other words, TKMS will not be able to use all of its extensive experience in building under 2,000 tons submarines if it ever starts constructing the 4,000 tons Type 216 one day. Again, the pre-sizing phase is critical. Navantia's (which is another reputable shipbuilder based in Spain) issues with the S80 class SSK is a recent example. The first unit of this new type of submarine needs to be redesigned because a "weight imbalance" was detected. In a large submarine, all of the equipment needs to be "over sized" and this impacts everything on board: Larger or more machinery implies larger or more sea water circuit which requires more weight and room...
A submarine designed for long range and endurance needs to be designed with more reliability, more redundancy and even a workshop for maintenance on the go (as is found on board most nuclear submarines [SSN]). Last but not least, other important parameters need to be considered such as human factors (possibly more space for the crew, better atmosphere, more fresh water...).

The second uncertainty aspect is the issue of US made CMS and weapons. Nothing guarantees that the US government will agree to share sensitive CMS data and weapons blueprints with TKMS for integration. While some TKMS built submarines are fitted with UGM-84 Harpoon (with the Portuguese Navy Type 214), it remains to be seen whether the US will agree to share its Tomahawk cruise missile data with Germany.
A Barracuda type (Suffren class) SSN. Picture: French Navy A Barracuda type (Suffren class) SSN. Picture: French Navy

Evolution of SSN Barracuda into a conventional submarine
DCNS proposes an evolution of the Barracuda type SSN - currently in production for the French Navy- into a conventional submarine fully compliant with the needs of “ocean going” navies.

The main strength of this submarine is that it exceeds the capabilities of its competitors in terms of speed, endurance and weapons. According to DCNS, a number of key innovations give the submarine a truly outstanding performance.

* NB: These performances are those of the nuclear version.


The transit speed is at least 40% higher than those of its competitors which is significant. It is important to understand that the faster a submarine can deploy, the more operational it becomes because it can spend more time in the mission area.

Like TKMS, DCNS is used to complex defense programmes cooperation with local partners so the industrial aspect is definitely not a problem. There may even be some historical commonality if Australia selects the DCNS solution: The Collins class submarines currently deployed by the RAN are fitted with French Jeumont-Schneider engines, a manufacturer present in all DCNS submarines. Likewise, many systems on board the Collins class such as the sonar systems are Thales products, and so is the case for all DCNS submarines.

Last but not least, DCNS has extensive experience in designing and building large submarine since the company was in charge of designing and building the (former) Redoutable and (current) Triomphant class ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), the backbone of French nuclear deterrence.

The main factor that is not in favor of DCNS is again the issue of US made CMS and weapons. The issue is definitely not technical: Since the Agosta 90B, DCNS submarines are "open architecture" to facilitate the integration of new systems and weapons (therefore the installation of a CMS and weapons of American origin are not a technical problem). Regarding that (political) aspect, DCNS is in the same situation as TKMS: nothing guarantees that the US government will agree to sharing information for weapons and systems integration.
The Chief of Royal Australian Navy, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, and Australia's Defense Minister, the Honorable Kevin Andrews (pictured here with France's Defense Minister) visited TKMS shipyard in Germany and DCNS submarine shipyard in France. In April 2015, the Chief of Royal Australian Navy, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, and Australia's Defense Minister, the Honorable Kevin Andrews (pictured here with France's Defense Minister) visited TKMS in Germany and DCNS submarine shipyard in France.

The formal RAN requirements for the Collins submarines replacement have not been made public yet, but like in many international procurement contracts, it is likely that political aspects will be given priority with the technical aspects coming a distant second. It appears also that no matter which platform Australia selects, their American allies will give the ultimate "green light"... or not.

That being said, despite many US media picturing the Japanese Soryu as a "done deal" last year, Australia is giving full consideration to the three contenders invited to participate in a competitive evaluation process earlier this year. A simple illustration of this fact: The visit last April by the Chief of Royal Australian Navy, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, and Australia's Defense Minister, the Honorable Kevin Andrews, of TKMS shipyard in Germany and then of DCNS shipyard in Cherbourg (where the Barracuda type SSNs are being assembled for the French Navy).

Philippines Increasingly Interested in Submarines

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The Philippines is acquiring new patrol boats and perhaps submarines (in future) to defend several territorial claims. This includes claims in the South China Seas - called "West Philippine Sea" in the Philippines (Map courtesy Wall Street Journal via Chinh's news)
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Which South Korean submarine might be right for the Philippines' defence budget, needs and tastes? The Philippines is interested in acquiring submarines. However submarines are expensive, rapidly become obsolete and cannot be bought used without substantial upgrades and repairs. The Philippines' usual US Navy or US Coast Guard suppliers have no conventional submarines to sell. 

Korea may possibly be a submarine seller and could use the opportunity to build alliance relations with the Philippines.

  Too expensive? To maintain parity with such neighbours as Malaysia and Indonesia the Philippines would need two or three middle sized subs - perhaps the South Korean made Chang Bogo class ? But the Chang Bogo costs $500+ million apiece. 
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Too small? Too old? South Korea has two Dolgorae class mini submarines (above) launched 1990 and 1991, 175 tons, with two small 410mm torpedo tubes. They have crews of 14 and may be used for surveillance and perhaps special forces. They were bought by South Korea in the 1980s to accustom its Navy to submarine operations.
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Just right? In 2011 South Korea indicated it would be building new subs to replace the Dolgoraes. These are known as KSS-500As. Specifications 510 tons, 37m long, 4.5m wide, diving depth 250m, max speed 20 kn, cruise speed 7 kn, endurance 3 weeks, range up to 2,000 miles, crew of 10. Propulsion Lithium-ion batteries (LIBs) charged at wharf or LIBs and diesel engines. If South Korea also wants 500As for its own Navy this may reduce any development cost burden.

BACKGROUND

The Philippines is becoming sufficiently concerned about maritime territorial disputes (eg. in the South China Sea, known as the "West Philippine Sea" in the Philippines) that it is seeking new vessels and aircraft. Japan is seeking stronger bilateral relations with key countries in the region, including the Philippines:

- Japan is selling (or planning to sell?) the Philippine Coast Guard 10 patrol boats (44m long) with a loan of  ¥19 billion ($150 million total) from Tokyo based Japan Marine United
-  Japan may also be offering (used?) P-3C Orion patrol aircraft built by Japan's KHI

Japan became an expert mini-sub user/builder in World War Two (even attacking a ferry boat in Sydney Harbour) but I don't know of any current Japanese plans to build modern mini-subs.

Philippines ABS-CBNnews.com reported May 27, 2015 http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/05/27/15/philippine-navy-eyes-submarines-deterrence :

"Philippine Navy eyes submarines for 'deterrence'

MANILA - The Philippine Navy said acquiring submarines is part of the plan to modernize the military, but admitted it won't be easy and can’t happen overnight.

Nonetheless, an office to handle the development of submarine capability has been put up, said Navy chief Vice Admiral Jesus Millan.

“What we are pursuing of course is to take the initiative. The first important thing is to acknowledge the importance of such capability for our future requirements,” he said.

He said the office can help the military gain knowledge of a new defense capability.

“That is why, our initial step in the Navy is to establish an office to start learning about this discipline. It’s important that we learn about it and prepare our troops who will be involved in the development of such capability,” said Millan.

Navy vice commander Rear Adm. Caesar Taccad said in December [2014] that the submarines can be used as “deterrence.”

The Philippines is embroiled in a dispute with several nations over ownership of the potentially oil-rich West Philippine Sea. China is aggressively pursuing its claim via reclamation in several islands and reefs within the area.

Taccad had said the submarines will serve as a deterrent “so other countries will not try to interfere with our [peaceful] exercise of sovereignty over our maritime areas.”

Millan said the submarines, “can bring a lot of help to us. As you can see, there are instances that it can perform non-traditional roles, even in search and rescue or in doing things that are beyond the capabilities of surface assets. These things can help us.”" ENDS

Pete

Japanese Submarine's Inside Functioning

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Here is a 2009 Japanese language video on the insides of the preceding Oyashio class submarine. The last of the 11 Oyashios was commissioned in 2008. They are still in service alongside the new Soryus. Oyashios are very similar to the Soryus except Oyashios don't have Stirling AIP

The Oyashios have a crew of 70 and weight is 2,750 tonnes (surfaced) - which implies long endurance even if they don't have the long transit stages of the Collins. 

Note in the video how large the work areas seem - though the sleeping areas look more cramped. Note damage control training facilities 5mins 20secs in. Many Australian Navy and submarine maintenance people will need to become much more aware of the Japanese spoken and written language.

Pete 

Australian "Soryus" Will Not Be Off-The-Shelf - Much Larger

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If Australia chooses a Japanese submarine this submarine is very likely to be fundamentally different from the Soryu Mark 2 (28SS) in several respects. Australia’s Japanese designed submarine:

1.  should last for 30 years in-service including the diesels, hull, welds and Lithium-ion batteries (not just the Japanese standard of 20 years) 

2.  should be made of a hull and welds that can be cut and rewelded in Australia, by Australians

3.  will be heavier to give it twice the range (12,000 nautical miles (nm)) rather than the current Soryu’s 6,000 nm

4.  will be heavier to accommodate a vertical launch system (VLS) which may perform other duties (divers, LDUUVs) making it a vertical multi-purpose lock (VMPL)

5.  is required by the US to have a US AN/BYG-1 Combat System which may (or may not be?) the new combat system fitted to Japan new Soryu Mark 2 (28SS).

6.  it may be true to say the Australia's version of the AN/BYG-1 has almost the same access to the US run Seaweb network that US SSNs have (?).

7.  unlike the Soryu Mark 2 Australia's sub will be fitted for and with Tomahawk cruise missiles and Mark 48 torpedos rather than Japanese Mark 89s

8.  like the Soryu Mark 2 Australia's will not have Stirling AIP

9.  this non-off-the-shelf submarine will therefore have specifically Australian only requirements. "Off-the-shelf" is more a political slogan, implying quick, uncomplicated and inexpensive. The reality is all countries want some modifications in major weapons systems and these systems (even "interim") usually take more than 8 years to be delivered.

10.  it is likely to be much heavier, perhaps 3,600-4,000 tons (surfaced), than the 3,000 ton (surfaced) Soryu Mark 2

11.  the heavier and Australian only features will make it much more expensive than the Soryu Mark 2 in terms of up-front price per vessel and this is not including all the very expensive backup-training-facilities costs (including translating 100,000s of owners manual pages into English).

12.  Australia will require the transfer of more secret intellectual property details than the Japan’s military have transferred before

To keep his job and win the next Federal Election Prime Minister Abbott (most probably) cannot choose Japan until after that Federal Election which may be as late as November 2016.

The first 1 minute 30 seconds of this video http://video.news.com.au/v/301610/Paul-Kellys-view reflects the political dangers to Prime Minister Abbott of giving the appearance of a personalised Captain's pick. Abbott likes to be photographed with weapons and with men in uniform but his submarine policy too obviously leaves out much of the Australian Defence Department's and Navy's advice.

If the choice of Japan is inevitable Japan can make the political risks of "Build in Japan" less by offering industrial offsets. The submarine builders, KHI and MHI, can offer much work for Australians in sectors unrelated to submarines. For example Kawasaki HI builds oil and gas rigs which could be built in Australia for the Australian market. Mitsubishi HI builds heavy machinery - much could be built in Australia for the Australian market.

Pete
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