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What should be in a Brief to Cabinet on the Future Submarine Decision

April 25, 2016, 3:36 am
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After looking at only unclassified material on the Australian Future Submarine issue what I would put in a Brief to the National Security Committee of Cabinet on the Future Submarine Decision is the following [no doubt reams of attachments on bid technical and other comparisons would go in a real one]. Prior to the Prime Minister announcing any likely submarine decision on 27, 28 or 29 April 2016 :

ISSUE:  Gaining pre-electoral benefits through a future submarine announcement

TALKING POINTS

1.  Most of the Future Submarine build will take place in Adelaide

2.  All States will benefit from the Future Submarine build. South Australia and all other States will supply parts and services for the submarines in the building and sustainment phases.

3.  Australia deeply values its strategic and trade relations with Japan.

4.  Two finalists will be chosen by mid-2017 after further consideration of the bids.

5. [[If thought advantageous to say at this stage, but this holds dangers] the two finalists in the Competitive Evaluation Process are TKMS and DCNS in no particular order at this stage.]

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

[Regarding Talking Points 1 and 2]

Our Government has decided to "call" (ie. once authorised by the Governor-General) (between 4 May and 8 May 2016) a Federal Election to be held on 2 July 2016.

It is important/essential to secure at least 6 of the 11 Electorates in South Australia (SA) and at least
5 (of 12) Senate positions in SA .

“Swinging” (non-aligned) voters in SA and other shipbuilding States (NSW, WA, QLD, Tasmania and Victoria, in that order of likely obtainable vote importance) see the submarine build as a major, federal expenditure, business and job generator on practical and core-value (faith) levels.

Regarding Point 2 - even if all submarines are built in Australia around 50% of the parts will be primarily sourced from overseas but then assembled into submarines in Australia.

[Talking Point 3]

A previous Prime Minister made pre-emptive statements which unhelpfully raised Japan’s/Prime Minister Abe’s hopes, eg. in Parliament when an Australian said "the Japanese make the best large conventional submarine in the world." 

The leak over the last two weeks has caused deep offence in Japan. Abe considered the submarine sale to Australia as a special symbol and export project for Japan's evolving change of defence outlook. It was also to be a symbol of near alliance with Australia. 

Japan and Abe would lose more prestige (“face”) by being publicly told before 2 July 2016 that what Abe sees as his Japanese submarine project has been lost. It is recommended that any announcement implying winners/losers take the form of announcing two finalists around mid 2017. A further selection process could then take place with a decision point as distant as 2018.

The leak indicating Japan is third is a sufficient message which requires no further public comment. It is recommended the PM, Defence and Foreign Minister should eventually travel to Japan (if invited) (or meet at a regional/G20? Conference) to explain (apologise for) the leak. The frequent mentions of Japan in the 2016 Defence White Paper DWP can in retrospect be seen as a consolation prize - that Japan remains an important partner of Australia strategically and economically.

[Talking Points 4 and 5]

It is recommended any announcement on winners/losers can take the form of announcing One Winner in 2018.

-  There is little to be electorally gained by announcing, before the 2 July Election, one CEP
    winner. Every utterance/Media Release by a declared winner, or two finalists, could become
    an uncontrollable feature of the 2 July Election campaign.
-  There is time to further assess the two finalists (TKMS and DCNS) with a view to announcing the
    winner by 2018. This consideration can include build in Australia industry plans proposed by
    the bidders.
-  Announcing a winner or the two finalists now would focus intense 
   media/public scrutiny on the business/location/build plans of that winner or the two finalists. 
-  More time is genuinely needed to technically compare the bids of the two finalists.
-  There is time because the mid-life Collins submarine upgrade will extend the working life of the 
   Collins through to the early-mid 2030s. This permits the time extension of the CEP through to
   2017-2018 as the first Future submarine only needs to be built from 2027. 

Not declaring one winner or the two finalists can be justified in that the much earlier Future Frigate and Offshore Patrol Vessel Programs are themselves only at the shortlist stage. 

That extended CEP timeline being the case bipartisan agreement from the ALP Opposition (as the ALP may actually win the 2 July Election) should be secured if Cabinet makes decision to announce an actual winner before the Election.

As US companies Raytheon or Lockheed Martin need also to be selected to supply the highly classified combat system (most of the database/weapons/sensors) the US DoD should continue to be copied into the selection process.
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Joint Media Release, from PM and MinDef Future Submarine Program

April 25, 2016, 7:30 pm
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Prime Minister, Minister for Defence – Joint media release – Future submarine program

26 April 2016
The Turnbull Government today announces that the next generation of submarines for Australia will be constructed at the Adelaide shipyard, securing thousands of jobs and ensuring the project will play a key part in the transition of our economy.
DCNS of France has been selected as our preferred international partner for the design of the 12 Future Submarines, subject to further discussions on commercial matters.
Along with our recent naval shipbuilding announcements, the commitment to an Australian build will create a sustainable Australian naval shipbuilding industry and provide the certainty that industry requires to invest in innovation and technology and grow its workforce.
The Future Submarine project is the largest and most complex defence acquisition Australia has ever undertaken. It will be a vital part of our Defence capability well into the middle of this century.
This $50 billion investment will directly sustain around 1,100 Australian jobs and a further 1,700 Australian jobs through the supply chain.
Today’s announcement follows the comprehensive Competitive Evaluation Process (CEP) involving DCNS, TKMS of Germany and the Government of Japan. Each bidder submitted very high quality proposals and the Australian Government takes this opportunity to thank both TKMS and the Government of Japan for their ongoing commitment to Australia and their participation in the process.
The CEP has provided the Government with the detailed information required to select DCNS as the most suitable international partner to develop a regionally-superior future submarine to meet our unique national security requirements, as detailed in the 2016 Defence White Paper.
This rigorous and independent process was led by Head of the Future Submarine Program, Rear Admiral Greg Sammut AM CSC, and General Manager Submarines, Rear Admiral Stephen Johnson USN (retired), who was previously in charge of the program to replace the Ohio Class ballistic missile submarines.
The process was overseen by an independent Expert Advisory Panel, chaired by former Secretary of the United States Navy, Professor Donald Winter. It was peer reviewed by Vice Admiral Paul Sullivan USN (retired) and Rear Admiral Thomas Eccles USN (retired).
This decision was driven by DCNS’s ability to best meet all of our unique capability requirements. These included superior sensor performance and stealth characteristics, as well as range and endurance similar to the Collins Class submarine.  The Government’s considerations also included cost, schedule, program execution, through-life support and Australian industry involvement.
Subject to discussions on commercial matters, the design of the Future Submarine with DCNS will begin this year.
The Turnbull Government is also conducting a strategic review of the workforce, skills and infrastructure needs to deliver this key capability as part of its Naval Shipbuilding Plan, to be released this year.  The Plan will bring together the requirements for the Future Submarine program, along with the more than $35 billion Future Frigate program and the more than $3 billion Offshore Patrol Vessel program, as part of the broader continuous naval shipbuilding philosophy to which the Government is committed.
The Turnbull Government will maximise Australian industry involvement in the program and will work closely with DCNS to identify opportunities for local businesses to integrate into the supply chain."
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DCNS wins Australia's Future Submarine contest - Youtubes, Pictures, Anthem.

April 25, 2016, 7:53 pm
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Youtube featuring the winning DCNS Shortfin contender.
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Approximate DCNS Shortfin Barracuda's specifications. Displacement of 4,500 tonnes (surfaced) is indeed likely. Displacement submerged may be 5,100 tonnes. DCNS estimate a length of 94 meters, hence less than the 97 meters in diagram above. Diagram courtesy of Financial Times.
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DCNS artist's conception of the clean lines of the Shortfin Barracuda.
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Midday 26 April 2016 - Announcement by Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull

- DCNS is the preferred bidder [comment - Australia to build 12 DCNS Shortfin Barracuda's]

-  Most of build to take place in Adelaide, South Australia

-  US submarine experts a big part of CEP submarine selection process

Background

-  Most of the submarine design work will take place at the DCNS submarine shipyard at Cherbourg, France and in Adelaide

-  Australian made steel will go into submarine, The Collins steel was mainly made in Port Kembla-Wollongong, NSW, not in South Australia. So Shortfin steel likely to be made in Port Kembla-Wollongong, NSW (which is also the State where Defence Minister Senator Marise Payne comes from).

-  DCNS is mainly French Government owned

-  There will now be intense media interest before the 2 July 2016 Election, on everything DCNS especially DCNS Australia says and writes on DCNS build details. See DCNS Australia "pitch" on Shortfin.

See dcns australia submarine on Twitter.

More Australian Government detail from the Prime Minister and Defence Minister is in today's Joint Media Release.


Short NavyRecognition and DCNS presentation at PACIFIC 2015 Trade Show in Sydney, October, 2015.
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DCNS's Shortfin concept was, in 2014, called SMX® Océan.
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Vive la France!


Pete
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Why DCNS Won.

April 27, 2016, 3:43 am
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Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A (Artwork courtesy DCNS).
In the avalanche of DCNS win articles over the last 2 days Hans J. Ohff has written this excellent explanation in The Conversation, of April 26, 2016. This is republished in full under The Conversation's generously provided Creative Commons Licence. The string is https://theconversation.com/why-the-french-submarine-won-the-bid-to-replace-the-collins-class-58223:

"Why the French submarine won the bid to replace the Collins-class

France will be awarded the contract to partner with Australia to build the next generation of submarines to replace the Collins-class, Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull announced today.
But what was at stake in this A$50 billion program? What were the real technological differences between the submarines on offer?
In early 2015, the Department of Defence issued invitations to Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) of Germany, Direction des Constructions Navales Services (DCNS) of France, and the Japanese government – represented through Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) and Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI) – to submit concepts for a submarine design by November 30, 2015.
The proposal was also to address the construction and managing of Australia’s most complex defence project ever undertaken. Sidestepping competitive tendering, the government opted for a competitive evaluation process (CEP) to determine its overseas partner(s) for the future submarine program (FSP) project SEA1000.
Headed by Rear Admiral Gregory John Sammut, the Commonwealth’s CEP evaluation team was scheduled to submit its recommendation to an expert advisory panel by early June 2016.
This process has been brought forward in order for the government to announce the overseas submarine design house and, importantly, where FSP will be built before the Senate and the House of Representatives are dissolved for a double-dissolution election.

The French option

DCNS’s Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A, a derivative of its Barracuda nuclear-powered attack submarine currently under construction in France, has turned out to be the winner.
Because of the endurance and long range stipulated by the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), the French have selected the Barracuda as their design reference. The Shortfin Barracuda will be equipped with four diesel alternators to generate electricity, a >7 megawatt permanent magnet motor and ample battery storage.
These should allow it to meet or exceed the RAN’s requirements of range, endurance and indiscretion rate, which is the time the submarine spends exposed while recharging its batteries.

A video by DCNS profiling the Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A.

The Shortfin Barracuda uses a pump-jet propulsor that combines a rotor and stator within a duct to significantly reduce the level of radiated noise and avoids cavitation.
The aftcontrol surfaces on a single propeller submarine are likely to disturb the water flowing into the rotating blades. This, according to DCNS, will generate cavitation, which is best mitigated by the introduction of a propulsor where the rotor and stator are shrouded.
DCNS also claims it has incorporated the most sensitive passive sonar ever offered with a conventional submarine. Matched to the US AN/BYG-1 combat system requirements and equipped with sophisticated above-water sensors, the French claim that the Shortfin Barracuda will offer operational capability beyond the RAN’s requirements..

The Japanese option

Buttressed by a handshake between then-prime minister Tony Abbott and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, the Japanese were sure that MHI/KHI would secure Australia’s largest-ever defence contract. The companies began to work on their evolved Sōryū-class submarine for the RAN, called the Goryu-class, or “Australian Dragon”.
The agreement signed on July 8, 2014, by the governments of Australia and Japan for the joint development of submarine technology, and more specifically the Marine Hydrodynamics Project, provided the Japanese with the requisite peace of mind to work on an optimal Australian submarine submission.
The introduction of the CEP in early 2015 did not unsettle the Abe government unduly as long as Abbott was in charge in Canberra. However, the ousting of Abbott and the appointment of a new defence minister, Marise Payne, meant Japan could no longer be assured of automatic selection. The CEP for the FSP became thoroughly and hotly contested.

The Japanese Soryu-class submarine Hakuryu was to be adapted for Australian use. United States Navy

Caught by surprise when Germany and France were invited to compete for the coveted submarine contract, the Japanese government countered by agreeing to build all 12 submarines in Australia and use the construction facilities in Adelaide as a future base for a major innovation centre.
In a further move, it indicated its preparedness to share its most secret submarine stealth technology with the RAN. And to demonstrate the unique capabilities of the Sōryū-class, the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force was sending the JS Hakuryu to take part in Exercise Nichi Gou Trident with the RAN and RAAF off the Sydney coast.
Not to be distracted by this move, the opponents of the Japanese option let it be known that the RAN would not attain regional superiority even with the evolved Sōryū-class.
Critics asserted that the lack of Japanese submarine technology and know-how meant that the Sōryū offered less capability than the existing Collins-class. It was a deficiency so fundamental, they claimed, that the lengthening of the Sōryū by six-to-eight metres for improved crew habitability and increased range made little difference to the Goryu-class when matched against the submarine designs of the French and the Germans.
The Japanese had planned to install proven high-tech lithium-ion battery technology in numbers 11 and 12 of their current class, and claim that their submarines are quieter and dive deeper than any other conventional submarine in service.

The German option

Arguably the German Navy’s submarines are among the world’s stealthiest underwater platforms. Aside from their traditional combat roles, they are employed as “vehicles of position” that gather intelligence, perform surveillance and reconnaissance at maritime choke points, shipping lanes and harbours.
The design philosophy of “as small as possible and as large as necessary” has so dictated the Type 212A submarines of the German and Italian navies. It also uses air-independent propulsion, which is quieter in operation than conventional diesel-electric.
The latest submarine of the world’s most prolific submarine builder remains small at 1,660 tonnes submerged displacement. Yet the new class is more than three times larger than its predecessor, the Type 206A.

The compact German Type 212A submarine. United States Navy

With this successful upsizing, TKMS answered the sceptics who claimed that the Germans would have found it difficult to evolve their existing submarines designs to the >3,810 tonnes Type 216 Australian variant.
In conjunction with Siemens, TKMS also offered the integrated 3D Digital Shipyard. The application of simulation software was to ensure issues that could affect construction were identified before the first steel is cut. They claimed it is a risk mitigator in the evolution and up-scaling of an existing design.
In this regard, the Germans were countering DCNS’ propulsor with Siemens’ Permasyn propulsion motor and MTU’s proven submarine diesels. While the drive train on the Type 216 required up-scaling of the main motor to over 6MW, Siemens believed that this would have been accomplished without undue difficulty.

Strategic outcome

All three companies have proven track records in submarine design and construction. Building overseas would have seen the Japanese leave their comfort zone. However, they brought defence and geostrategic advantages to the negotiation table. Offering the RAN supply and repair bases in Japan was one of their most persuasive arguments.
The Germans pushed their vast submarine design and building experience – more than 160 submarines delivered to 20 navies over the past 50 years. This experience, TKMS claimed, would have put the FSP in a “safe pair of hands”.
The French Navy operates submarines across the five oceans. DCNS argued that the experience and propulsion technology they transferred from their conventional and nuclear submarines made them the preferred candidate for the FSP. And they turned out to be right."
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Specifications Table - Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A

April 27, 2016, 9:01 pm
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After internet searching no current, precise, detailed, list of DCNS Shortfin specifications has been located. Instead I've drawn together (and sometimes inferred) specs from a variety of internet sources (see links in Table). Some details are available through DCNS Youtubes, diagrams and pictures.

DCNS has limited the publication of Shortfin’s projected specs as keeping the specs secret was a requirement of the CEP. Detailed specs would reflect Australia’s detailed needs. Some/most specs will remain secret.

Also experienced arms sellers (like DCNS) don’t telegraph all the particulars of their product offers.

Now that DCNS has won, it and Australia are likely to be more forthcoming with the specs.

Specs and shapes for other French submarines are also useful indicators. These subs include the Scorpene SSK (2005-present), Triomphant SSBN(1997-present), the 2014 SMX Ocean concep and, of course, the Barracuda SSN (due to be launched 2017).

SHORTFIN TABLE

Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A - Figures at 28 April 2016
Class overview
Name:
DCNS Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A
Operators:
Only envisaged is the  Royal Australian Navy (RAN)
12 to be commissioned:
Approx. commissioned and operational 2030–2070. [may be an initial batch of 6 diesel-electric. By 2040s serious planning for 6 SSNs may occur - depending on strategic threats.]
Preceded by:
steel
[Likely to be 100 HLES high-yield pressure hull steel, roughly equivalent to US HY-130 - see Submarine Matters article Table that uses Japanese document.]
Crew
60 + around 16 divers/special forces (depending on mission)
Speed/range
and
Endurance
Transit speed 10 to 14 knots (kt) over [12,000?] to18,000 nautical miles (nm).
Maximum submerged speed 20+ kt. Endurance at sea 90 days depending on fuel, food and crew exhaustion. Max range at achieved at constant speed approx 10 kt.

Typical mission profile maybe mix of Transit at average speed (snorting or surfaced?) of 14kt for a week, one month Patrol, Transit back to Fleet Base West at 14kt for week.
Displacement:
 4,500 tonnes (surfaced) [numerous sources]
 5,000 tonnes (approx) (submerged) [numerous sources]
Length
97 meters [numerous sources]
Diameter (Beam)
8.8 meters
Height
15.5 meters (hull + fin/sail)
Pumpjet propulsion
[Important to use the same pumpjet tried and tested on the Barracuda rather than a special new propeller only developed to the Shortfin. Pumpjet superior at higher submarine speeds but may have downsides at typical low Patrol speeds]
Acoustic stealth
Rubber/elastic mountings for moving and reverberating parts inside.
Capable of projecting
Unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), 
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
Underwater decoys (against torpedoes and mobile mines)
On hull behind fin/sail.
Dry dock shelter for divers, diver delivery vehicles and large displacement UUVs (LDUUVs)
Weapons
· 4 [?] × 533 mm (21.0 in) tubes
Around 30 heavyweight shots including: including Mark 48 torpedoes, mines, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, Tomahawk (land attack and anti-ship cruise missiles) and perhaps anti-air missiles.
Sensors
Sonars from Thales and other makers. “The sonar suite performance provided by Thales will be the best available ever for a submarine this size.”
Combat System
Updated AN/BYG-1 (the network of sensors, databases and weapons costing about one third of the upfront price of the submarine)
Max Depth
300+ meters (operational)
Exterior stealth
Anechoic coating on hull to deflect and dampen sound waves inside and mainly outside the sub
Propulsion:
 Likely 6 x MTU 12V 4000 diesels
  [note Chilean, Indian and Brazilian Scorpenes have 4 x MTU 16V 396 SE]
  7 MW (9,400 hp) permanent magnet motor
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DCNS YOUTUBE


As this is a very recent (April 14, 2016) DCNS Youtube the claims/comments in it are useful. I have recorded most word-for-word and how many seconds in:

0:12 - 97 meters long,

0:20 - Stealth capabilities from France’s nuclear submarine program,  

0:24 - pumpjet propulsion [important to use the same pumpjet tried and tested on the Barracuda rather than a special new propeller only developed to the Shortfin]

0:27 - “Hydroplances can retract to reduce drag and noise.”

0:32 - “Most powerful sonar ever produced for a conventional submarine” [Conventions sub’s sonar are less powerful because the sub’s are smaller with no reactor to produce high amounts of electricity for sonars.]

0:42 - “As new technology is developed between France, Australia and the United States upgrades are easily made via quick access tech insert hatches”

0:47 - “By adopting DCNS’ technology Australia will join an elite club which includes only the UK, US and France.” [thats the Western nuclear submarine hull club].

I'll add more details to the Shortfin Table as these details are published on the internet.

Pete
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Shortfin's Pump Jet Propulsor - A Sales Feature?

April 29, 2016, 3:24 am
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Note that a Scorpene (2,000 tonne "small" conventional submarine (SSK)) is depicted with a pump jet. Was the Scorpene pump jet only an idea in 2005 that was phased out/cancelled? Or is pump jet a possible future inclusion for Scorpene? Pump Jets have been on French submarines since the first Triomphant class SSBN was launced in 1994. (Artwork courtesy DCNS Australia)
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Here the Scorpene has no Pump Jet, on the Shipbucket graphics website (circa 2010).
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Shortfin concept displaying its proposed pump jet. Also note its X-plane rudders. (Artwork courtesy Navy Recognition)
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DCNS' 2016 "pitch" for the Shortfin stated: "Pump jet propulsion means the Shortfin Barracuda can move more quietly than submarines with obsolete propeller technology. In a confrontation between two otherwise identical submarines, the one with pump jet propulsion always has the tactical advantage." 

Will a pump jet (which appeared then disappeared from DCNS' Scorpene SSK) disappear from the Shortfin SSK? Will the Shortfin then have the bare propeller which practically all SSKs have?  

The submarine speed threshold (14 knots? 20 knots? somewhere in between?) of when a pump jet becomes tacticly advantageous depends on the situation and needs to be weighed against the downsides of pump jets.

High pump jet weight compared to a bare propeller is a common downside. But wouldn't pump jet weight be scalable? That is would a pump jet for an average 1,800 tonne SSK be proportionatly smaller and lighter than a pump jet for a 5,000 tonne Shortfin?

If the scalability argument is valid - what is the main thing distinguishing SSKs from SSNs? Engine power and resulatant speed.

An SSN can operate at 20+ knots for weeks-months while a SSK fully submerged on battery (and even AIP) can only operate at 20+ knots for (probably) 2 days or less. 

(POSSIBLE) ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF PUMP JETS OVER BARE PROPELLERS

Advantages:

-  In the rare but crucial tactical situation where high speed is required to fight another submarine or flee from a surface ASW threat, a pump jet can allow a higher speed before the onset of cavitation. This means lower acoustic signatures.

-  the shroud of a pumpjet can protect the rotating element (the impeller) from striking hard objects (like rocks or the seafloor). This can assist littoral, shallow water operation.

-  If the pump jet is steerable it may make the submarine more maneuverable at slow speeds. 

Disadvantages compared to Bare Propeller

-  Can be less efficient than a propeller at low speed, leading to higher consumption of limited fuel (not a concern for unlimited nuclear reactor). This may well include an SSK's typical efficient submerged speed (5 knots?) on battery or AIP.

-  Inability to efficiently reverse or reverse at all to slow down or reverse the submarine? Therefore the sub needs a bow thruster? Or would there be a bow thruster anyway for a Shortfin?

-  heavier, more expensive, complex?

-  Punp jet intake grill can become clogged with debris; e.g., seaweed. (Can be mitigated by being able to reverse?)




The Kilo submarine B-871 ("Alrosa") (launched in 1989 (with pump jet? or retrofitted?) has a large pump jet with 7 stators and 11 propulsors. It spends more time in dry dock for repairs and upgrades to its pump jet than at sea.  The pump jet appears to be of excessive size - perhaps implying Alrosa is a test vehicle for a pump jet intended for much larger SSN's or SSBNs. 

COMMENT

It is unclear why pump jets have not been used for SSKs - leading to more questions than answers, at this stage:

-  are the usual 2,000 tonnes or less size SSKs too small?
-  do the relative lower power of SSK diesels limit their ability to reach pump jet effective speeds?
-  only used once(?) for a larger 2,350 tons (surfaced) SSK (that being Kilo B-871 Alrosa)
-  artwork of a pump jet included on a DCNS Scorpene (2,000 tonne SSK) but no evidence (?) it has been adopted for Scorpene.
-  are pump jets are a recent, expensive, high end, technology only used in already expensive nuclear submarines?
-  pump jets have not been retrofitted on DCNS' small (2,400 tonne surfaced) Amethyste-Rubis class SSNs, so does that prove small size eliminates pump jets or cost of retrofitting on Amethyste-Rubis would be too high?

It is very difficult to nail down whether the pump jet proposal for the Shortfin is of sales value but a technology that may be of marginal practical value.

There is the argument that the Barracuda SSN can serve as a prototype to iron out any technical problems before the Shortfins are built? But then, will the speed envelope of the Shortfin be similar enough to the Barracuda for Barracuda to be a pump jet prototype for Shortfin? Ultimately much will rely on how many knots Shortfin can reliably move - something that may only be apparent in about 2031.

Artwork courtesy DCNS.
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Sources included:

-  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pump-jetand https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Propulsor

and KQN's comments at https://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=19245896&postID=3070342239950420359

Pete
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Turnbull's Pre-Election Shipbuilding Rush - Table of Ship/Sub Acquisitions

May 5, 2016, 3:08 am
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Opposition Leader Bill Shorten (left) may remain ahead in the polls (as at May 1, 2016) while Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull (right) continues his naval shipbuilding spending offensive.
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Prime Minister Turnbull is hurling vast sums at naval shipbuilding, prior to the July 2, 2016 Election, in the hope that it will slow any lead by the Labor Opposition and the Nick Xenophon Team (NXT). If Labor wins (meaning yet another new Prime Minister!...) the Labor heartland shipbuilding State of Victoria (neglected by Turnbull) is likely to win more of the shipbuilding action.

Submarine Matters thinks its time to tabulate the avalanche of Australian shipbuilding announcements on:

February 25, 2016 – the 2016 Defence White Paper documents including the At A Glance summary Maritime Operations and Anti-Submarine Warfare

April 18, 2016 Media Release “Continuous Naval Shipbuilding” of Offshore Patrol Vessels, Future Frigates and Pacific Patrol Boats - see Sub Matters article

April 26, 2016 – that Media Release on announcement that DCNS won, - see Sub Matters article, and

May 3, 2016 – Turnbull Government Budget which included a Defence Budget Media Release and within that a “Naval Shipbuilding Strategy” Section. On May 3, 2016 the Government announced that the Defence Budget 2016-17 had risen to A$32.3 Billion [US$24.24 Billion] representing 1.9% of GDP.

The 2016-17 Defence Budget for 23 million Australians (when added to the list) will exceed the Defence Budget for 60 million Italians.

Over the next 10 years the Australian Government’s naval shipbuilding strategy will invest around $90 billion in the naval capability and shipbuilding industry.

I’ve used figures from the February to May 2016 announcement to compile the Table below.

NAVAL SHIPBUILDING TABLE

SHIP class/typeDETAILS

12 x DCNS Shortfin SSK Submarines (announced April 26, 2016)

Raytheon and/or Lockheed Martin Combat System
$50 Billion + $5 Billion Combat System. Expensive planning began years ago. Build at/near Techport Australia, Adelaide. High degree of interoperability with USN. Likely begin to enter service in early 2030s to around 2050. Rolling acquisition program to maintain a fleet of 12 subs as sub and ASW technologies develop. A review of strategic circumstances and developments in submarine technology will be conducted in the late 2020s to consider whether the configuration of the submarines remains suitable or whether consideration of other specifications should commence.
Raytheon and/or Lockheed Martin participating in a Integration CEP for the AN/BYG-1 (and other components) Combat System - to be decided later in 2016. 
6 x Collins Class
Total sustainment costs around A$600 million/year. Mid-life upgrades will cost $Billions to extend life into the 2030s when Shortfins will be enter service.

9 x Future Frigates (FFs)
$35 Billion build. Announced April 18, 2016 has shortlisted: BAE Systems with the Type 26 Frigate; Fincantieri with the FREMM Frigate, and Navantia with a redesigned F100. First Pass Approval by Cabinet. Shortlist stage. Build starts 2020. ASW, air warfare and land attack cruise missiles. Entering service from the late 2020s. Replacing 8 existing ANZAC frigates.

12 x Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPVs)
$3 Billion to build. Will replace the 13 Armidale Class patrol boats. Announced April 18, 2016 has shortlisted: Damen of the Netherlands, Fassmer of Germany, and Lurssen of Germany. First Pass Approval by Cabinet.  First OPVs will begin build in Adelaide, 2018 before moving to Henderson, Perth, when the Future Frigates begin construction in Adelaide in 2020.

2 x Replacement Replenishment ships
Contract announced May 6, 2016 for 2 new Replenishment “Supply” ships to replace HMAS Success and HMAS Sirius for A$640 million (total). New ships (Spanish Cantabria class) to be built by Navantia in Spain. Can carry 2 - 3 MRH‐90 helicopters.

1 new Icebreaker
Not a RAN ship - has military patrol value. Australian Antarctic Division ship, homeported Hobart, Tasmania, Australia.  24,000 tonnes. Built by Damen/DMS Maritime. Designed by KNUD E. HANSEN A/S.

24 x MH‐60R Seahawks
Naval combat helicopters being accepted into service for AWDs and ANZAC Class Frigates’ anti‐ship and anti‐submarine warfare operations.

21 x Pacific Patrol Boats (PPBs)
A$280 million (total) Austal to build up to 21 steel-hulled PPBs in Henderson, Perth, beginning 2017. Announced April 18, 2016. PPBs mainly for some Pacific Island nations.

hydrographic survey vessels
Current fleet of 2 x large and 4 x smaller to be retired from early 2020s.
3 x Hobart class Air Warfare Destroyers (AWDs)
AEGIS equipped, being built in Adelaide. In service by early 2020s.
2 x Canberra class
Landing Helicopter Docks (LHDs) have just entered fleet.

8 x MRH‐90 helicopters
will support the LHDs.
4 more P-8As
Maritime surveillance and response aircraft with ASW, anti-shipping, over sea and land intelligence gathering capabilities in addition to 8 x P-8A’s already ordered, 3 more to be ordered = total of 15 P-8As.

2 more Airbus 
KC-30As
Multi-Role Tanker Transport [MMRTT] [which can refuel P-8As] aircraft to bolster the Royal Australian Air Force’s existing fleet of five = total of 7 KC-30As

COMMENT

Australia is undertaking the largest naval shipbuilding program in its history (this is including the WWII period when most major ships (cruisers, destroyers and the 2 post-war carriers) were built in Britain).

With the many shibuilding programs competing for limited defence funds DCNS may be making efforts to commence the Shortfun program early. 

Just prior to the July 2, 2016 Election the Coalition Government of Prime Minister Turnbull has been  pouring money into shipbuilding because this allocation of scarce Australian funds cannot be criticised by the Labor Opposition. This is because the money benefits a key Labor constituency – the Shipbuilding Unions. Turnbull hopes that this money might drive a wedge between the Labor Right, the Unions and the anti-Defence Labor Left.

Whether this shipbuilding spending will reverse the slight Labor lead in polling (as at May 1, 2016) is unknown. Arms exporters would need to be philosophical about yet another new Australian Government with a new Prime Minister.

This high spending is in an economic climate of reduced government revenue due to low prices for all the minerals and energy Australia exports. 

Any suggested additions/changes (with a kind donation :) welcome.


Pete
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Caustic French Take on Not Yet Signed Submarine "mégacontrat"

May 6, 2016, 6:46 pm
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COMMENT

French blog The Jack Turf Journal has a caustic take (of May 1, 2016) on Australia's and President Hollande's coming submarine contract of the century. Jack expects "heated discussions" before the actual contract is signed. He adds the 8 Billion euros France stands to gain is but a drop in the ocean compared to France's 2.2 trillion euro national debt.

Still DCNS and around 200 French subcontractors will benefit. This includes Thales, Sagem, Jaumont Electric, Schneider Electric France, Aubert & Duval, Manoir Industries, etc. 

ARTICLE

"Jack" remains unimpressed. I translate "Comme foutage de gueule gouvernemental, on ne fait pas mieux..."to be Typical government bollocks, it is no big deal. 

SUBMARINES AUSTRALIA, OR CONTRACT OF THE CENTURY foutage MUG OF THE CENTURY?



The translation from French into English:
"Australia has awarded France a "mégacontrat"? to build its next-generation submarines but it is the US that will equip the ships of ultra-secret weapons systems.
The French group DCNS naval defense specialist held by the State and Thales won a contract last week to 50 billion Australian dollars (34 billion euros) of which 8 billion only return to France  on 50 ...

Do the math: That makes us 160 million euros turnover  per year  (no profit, if done, what remains to be proven, the contract is not yet signed, being subject to heated discussions )   short, a drop in the ocean of 2.2 trillion debt.

Other problem: France does not seem so good that in weaponry, since weapons systems and combat that will equip these submarines will be American.  The American giant Lockheed Martin, which is in the race, explaining "learnedly" that it was "in fact the eyes, ears and the sword of the boat," leaving us so I understand the role of mere assembler welder to construct the frame submarines ... 
Contract of the Century?

Comme foutage de gueule gouvernemental, on ne fait pas mieux..."

"Remember one thing people are idiots." 
What President Hollande is quoted as saying on October 10, 2013.
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DCNS had a good 2015 and 2016 may be even better

May 8, 2016, 2:13 am
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The French (DCNS) made version of the French FREMM (multi-purpose) Frigate is known as the Aquitaine class. Delivery of one to Egypt in 2015 and the Languedoc to the French Navy, in March 2016, helped DCNS return to profit in 2015. (Image Courtesy NavalAnalyses.blogspot.com. See larger image here)
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Thales, with a 35% stake in DCNS, is delighted DCNS has won the Australian SEA 1000 Future submarine order. This will boost DCNS and Thales revenue.

Defense News, April 29, 2016 carried information: "France’s share of the prospective deal is €17 billion (US $19.5 billion), according to sources close to defense minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, weekly Le Point reported, while Reuters reported some €8 billion (US $9.2 billion) for DCNS. DCNS chairman Hervé Guillou welcomed the support from the Direction Générale de l'Armement procurement office, Navy chief of staff Adm. Bernard Rogel, Thales, Sagem, and Schneider Electric, a French energy company with a significant business presence in Australia.…[As well as Thales' gaining a share of DCNS' revenue] Thales' share of the Australian program is expected to be some €1 billion (US $1.2 billion), with €100 million ($115 million) per sub based on the sale of sonar systems, electronic warfare and periscopes, a Thales executive said."

The way Thales may benefit may be from its local subsidiary supplying sonars for the (Lockheed Martin versus Raytheon) Combat System for Shortfin. The Combat System Integration (CSI) competition may be decided in July-August 2016.

DCNS delivered a FREMM frigate of the Aquitaine class to Egypt in 2015 and the Languedoc to the French Navy in early 2016. DCNS is also overhauling the nuclear carrier Charles de Gaulle in Toulon. Later in 2016 DCNS is delivering the two Mistral helicopter carriers to Egypt. The Mistrals were previously sold to Russia but blocked by the western arms embargo. The Mistrals will still use Russian communications equipment and Ka-52 attack helicopters.

All this activity and construction of the Barracuda SSNs and work on the Triomphant SSBNs helped generate a 2015 profit for DCNS. DCNS reported a net profit for 2015 of €58.4 million after a loss in 2014 of €347 million. This was on 2015 sales of €3.03 billion compared to 2014 sales of €3.07 billion. 

If DCNS and Australia sign a Shortfin design contract in 2016 profits may even be higher for DCNS.

DCNS sale of 2 Mistrals (previously intended for Russia) to Egypt helped lift DCNS into profit in 2015. The Egyption Mistrals will still use Russian communications equipment and Ka-52 attack helicopters.
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Pete
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Why DCNS Won - Some reasons not yet covered in the media.

May 10, 2016, 1:44 am
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This diagram reflects the difference in detail between DCNS bids and publically assumed details. For example: Many people would be happy with "Weight 4,500 tonnes" but those closer to submarine issues would expect two figures eg. "displacement surfaced" and "displacement submerged". Some closer to DCNS insist the eventual Shortfin length will be "94" meters, not "97" meters. Also all figures are likely dependent on the results of a three year design contract that might be finally signed-off as late as 2020. (Diagram courtesy Financial Times).
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"BK" in https://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=19245896&postID=3317250524802114105[7/5/16 2:49 PM] asked a question along the lines:

The difference between the DCNS and TKMS bids were said to be significant, others spoke of marginal. What is your take on that - was there really such a big difference in the two bids (apart from nuclear of course)?"

If I had the CEP Assessment Team's access to the TKMS and DCNS extensive bid documents, and unrecorded verbal assurances between senior negotiators (and politicians), I could more easily identify the big differences. This is also noting DCNS and TKMS would have offered the CEP Team vastly more detail than will ever be publically available. Some major DCNS/TKMS response specifications may vary significantly from the published specifications for the Shortfin/Type 216 concepts.

That said the following may be major reasons why DCNS won:

In terms of due diligence (with taxpayers money) there would be attention to whether DCNS offered the lowest upfront bid to build 12 subs or maybe for the first batch of 6.  
-  Australian Senate Commitees would object to revelations that any French bid was many $Billions higher than TKMS or Japanese bids.
- It is possible the French Government will (or has promised to) cross-subsidise DCNS to achieve the lowest bid. Money can be recouped (with internal "loan" repaid) through sustainment charges (eg. spares) placed on Australia down the track.

As the April 26, 2016 announcement that DCNS won is a Pre July 2, 2016 Election announcement for the Turnbull Government then Turnbull would need to feel confident that South Australian voters (and broader Australian voters) would like the announced choice. 
-  Turnbull would need to be confident DCNS Australia and DCNS Internatonal, would not make any significant public relations mistakes before the Election.

TKMS advantages of an advanced air independent propulsion (AIP) system and small crew may not have been valued highly by the CEP assessors.
-  this is noting there is little evidence Australia values AIP, since the 1980s to the present day, and 
-  there appears to be an assumption, probably valid, that the long missions (7 weeks?) Australia subs go on require large crews (about 60) to avoid sleep disrupted exhaustion.

The larger size of the DCNS Shortfin (compared to the TKMS Type 216) sub provides for greater capability upgrades, more fuel for greater range at 12 knots(?) snorting, more "heavyweight" (torpedo and missile) shots, more special forces in addition to the 60 crew.
-  this is not discounting the difficulty of converting a nuclear sub into a conventional one (with diesel propulsion and fuel tanks (with many buoyancy adjustments))

A major technical difference is that DCNS will in 2017 be able to point to the very similar Barracuda SSN hull as a vehicle for sonic and electronic emissions/stealth tests about a decade before such tests could be made on a TKMS 216. 

Also a TKMS 216 could only be tested in the same way AFTER Australia had bought 216s.

DCNS is dedicated to the very similar Barracuda SSN hulls so, Australia in buying Shortfins, won't have yet another ORPHAN submarine the Collins (for testing and spares) turned out to be. 

It still needs to be said that TKMS can offer no nuclear option if Australia changes its mind and (say, in 2025) actually wants "regionally superior" submarines, especially if China and/or Putin become threatening. 
-  This might mean Australia would want the Barracuda SSN for the first batch of 6 (2030 - 2040) and/or for a second batch of 6 (2040 - 2050) Nuclear Barracuda option for second batch.
-  putting complacency aside, an isolationist US alliance posture could emerge under yet another geo-political threat - one President Trump (see Trump's most detailed speech on foreign policy, of April 27, 2016)

I'll describe some lesser known reasons Japan didn't win next week 

Note a crew of "33" (possible for a one week (on average) mission for such a large sub) probably did not offer TKMS a competitive advantage. 33 is very likely smaller than Australia wants. (Diagram courtesy Financial Times)
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Pete
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A poorly timed Media Release on Future Submarine matters?

May 10, 2016, 8:25 pm
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Is the following the first public relations problem involving the DCNS win?

There may be no Design Contract signed between the Australian Government and DCNS until 2017 but naval-technology.com is carrying a Media Release by Jeumont Electric, May 10, 2016 http://www.naval-technology.com/contractors/electrical/jeumont-electric/pressjeumont-electric-australian-submarine-programme.html : 

"Jeumont Electric One of Top Five Suppliers in Australian Submarine Programme

Jeumont Electric announced today that it has been selected as a major supplier in the Australian government's Sea 1000 Future Submarine Programme, French naval defence and energy company DCNS is the Australian government's exclusive partner on the programme.
The contract covers the construction of 12 submarines to replace the fleet's six current Collins-type submarines and also includes the transfer of stealth technology, production, and the combat system, plus maintenance throughout the submarines' lifetimes.
Jeumont Electric, a recognised expert in rotating electric machines for more than a century, had been working on the technical and business aspects of the bid since October 2015, earning a position among the programme's top five largest and most strategic suppliers.
Jeumont Electric will supply the propulsion pack, which includes manufacturing permanent-magnet synchronous motors and the associated power electronics cabinets, and will also provide maintenance training.
"We are pleased that the Australian government has entrusted DCNS with this contract," said Daniel Marlot, Director of Sales, Marine Industry at Jeumont Electric.
"We are working closely with DCNS and with most of the other suppliers involved in this exciting programme. Our teams in France had demonstrated the quality of their work on several previous projects.
"We are pleased to bring our know-how to this demanding and far-reaching new programme. We plan to build a close working relationship with the Australian government to ensure their full satisfaction."
COMMENT
Australia's Collins submarines notoriously had/have problems with unreliable propulsion. Parts of the Collin’s propulsion (see right-sidebar) are:

3 × Jeumont-Schneidergenerators (1,400 kW, 440-volt DC), and

1 × Jeumont-Schneider DC motor

Has Jeumont jumped the gun with an early Media Release? Might it be part of an unreliable propulsion system(?) years down the track? 

As at 1pm (Australian Eastern Time) May 11, 2016 there has been no Australian Defence Minister Media Release confirming Jeumont Electric's victory. 

To do this situation justice the Australian Govenment is now constrained by pre-election  "Caretaker Conventions"which, on page 3, require:


"1.3...the conventions are that the government avoids:..

•  making major policy decisions that are likely to commit an incoming government;
•  making significant appointments; and
•  entering major contracts or undertakings"

Parts of the future submarine propulsion systems, costing $100s millions (in total), might be seen as "major".
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Nuclear Propelled Australian Submarines (work in progress)

May 13, 2016, 4:30 am
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How can Australian submarines, conventional or nuclear propelled, influence the strategic problem of the South China Sea disputes, if at all?  (Map courtesy Mike Nudelman/Business Insider)
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Australia has a wide area of interest. Submarines are often about places where interests are concentrated... "In peacetime, tension and war they can collect intelligence and conduct surveillance and reconnaissance, clandestinely and a long way from home - knowledge is power". etc - see http://sea1000.gov.au/submarine-essentials/faqs/
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This is an issue with some comments by readers already made, but the nuclear propulsion issue will always remain unfinished. The fact that the Shortfin concept is based on a soon to be launched  nuclear Barracuda SSN (Suffren in 2017) continues to draw nuclear propulsion interest. 

In Australia there will be a five year design phase (about 2017 to 2022) which, for the public will mainly be about discussion, inevitably much on nuclear propulsion. 2029 may see a renewal of discussion as suggested in paragraph 4.29 of the 2016 Defence White Paper (PDF of 10 MB):

4.29 "During the long life of the new submarines, the rapid rate of technological change and ongoing evolution of Australia’s strategic circumstances will continue. As part of the rolling acquisition program, a review based on strategic circumstances at the time, and developments in submarine technology, will be conducted in the late 2020s to consider whether the configuration of the submarines remains suitable or whether consideration of other specifications should commence."

SO MANY QUESTIONS ARE RELEVANT - INCLUDING:

1.  What technical problems may occur with Australia and DCNS converting a nuclear submarine (Barracuda SSN) into a conventional diesel-electric submarine (Shortfin SSK)? 

a.  the unusually large scale diesel-electric propulsion for the Collins caused/cause major operational and availability problems. As some of the players may be the same, the unusually large scale diesel-electric propulsion for the Shortfin may again cause major problems.

b.  Australia has chosen in such a way that it may be denied the advanced AIP of TKMS and probably mature, tested Lithium-ion Batteries of the Japanese option. Will the Shortfin be discrete/stealthy enough to face more thickly laid, more sensitive anti-submarine defences? This may not only include China and Russia but nations that recieve improved anti-submarine technology from those countries. 

c.  Submarine Matters is not alone on Question 1. Robert Gottliebsen in The Australian, May 13, 2016 states: “…there can be no nuclear option at the moment but if the [Shortfin design conversion goes badly over the 5 year design phase] clearly there could be a nuclear option. I accept that no one talked about the nuclear option in the [Australian] cabinet and during decision-making discussions but I am equally sure it was discussed among defence chiefs. Certainly it should have been.”

2.  What changing strategic conditions (opponents and friends) might drive the Australian Government to consider an SSN?

a.  Improved opposing sensor and weapons improvements are major strategic variables (like 1.b). China has only just begun its South China Sea island/shoal/reef military bastion building program.

b.  the US has naval and air bases (Diego Garcia, Guam, Japan/Okinawa, Hawaii, US West Coast) which are unfortunately distant from Australia. 
-  But what if China continues to groom East Timor and builds an air and naval base much closer to Australia?  A naval and air base at Baucau, East Timor could be built with South China Sea like rapidity and efficiency. Not only more aid in it for East Timor but China could add its political and oil/gas extraction assets to obtain the oil/gas revenues East Timor feels cheated of by Australia. 
-  An Independence Referendum in nickel rich New Caledonia (an island way outside of routine Australian discussion) expected in 2018 presents another strategic unknown which might be exploited by China.    
c.  Srategic changes can exist in terms of changing threats but also in changing, or declining, alliances. Denial that Trump is really serious and his chance at the Presidency will wane just keeps on rolling as his chances improve. So there may be US alliance instability caused by a President Trump who may strip ANZUS down to "cutting the deal". China may be encouraged by what it perceives to be US isolationism. 

d.  Nuclear Tipping Points in Northeast Asia, caused by US isolationism, the China and North Korea threat, may trigger a proliferation trend (weapons first, propulsion later if relevant) that Australia might be forced to address.  writing in ASPI Strategist, May 13, 2016 has succinctly written [Trump's] "suggestion that Tokyo and Seoul might need to start protecting themselves, via proliferation if necessary, contradict half a century of US foreign policy. Trump’s remarks saw some pundits justifying the value of those commitments and others considering the merits of his argument.

Further questions:

3.  For the above strategic changes does submarine propulsion system matter that much? 

4.  Are surface ships adequate for strategic changes or do they need help from submarines?

5.  In what scenarios might an SSN be advantageous for Australia?

6.  How could Australia acquire 4 to 6 nuclear propelled submarines?

Pete
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Strategic Issues for Australia - East Timor and New Caledonia

May 15, 2016, 11:00 pm
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East Timor is just north of yellow coffin shaped Zone of "Cooperation". China in 2007 was interested in placing a long range radar on the northeast coast of East Timor. 
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Australian naval assets, including submarines, might become interested in Chinese naval activities if China spreads sustained naval influence to East Timor and New Caledonia in the future.

China supplied 2 patrol boats to East Timor in 2010 but Chinese air, naval or radar facilities would be a greater worry.

East Timor (Timor Leste) is a very country (independent since 2002) just to Australia's north.

A naval and air base at Baucau, a small town with an airport on East Timor's northeast coast could be built with South China Sea like rapidity and efficiency. Baucau Airport was used by the Indonesian Air Force (1975-1999) and can take aircraft larger than 737s.

China has a record of attempting to make East Timor more of a military asset for China. In December 2007 Chinese defence “firms” approached the East Timorese Government with a suggestion that the “firms” build and operate a surveillance radar facility on East Timor's north east coast (probably in the Baucau area). East Timorese officials consulted the US and Australia before rejecting the Chinese “firms” offer.

East Timor has long been dissatisfied with the Timor Gap undersea oil/gas border and revenue sharing dispute with Australia. East Timor is increasingly vocal about this. China may be able to exploit the discontent. China could offer not only more aid but political leverage and oil/gas undersea extraction expertise assets to obtain higher oil/gas revenues for East Timor.



China may be able to exploit any New Caledonian disruption. New Caledonia is an island just to the northeast of Australia (see map). Many of the indigenous "Kanaks" are dicontented with French rule. Australians are largely ignorant of political happening in New Caledonia.

An Independence Referendum in nickel rich New Caledonia is expected in 2018.    

-  There is concern about violent disruption 2018 onwards. A possible precedent is independence of the nearby New Hebrides (now Vanuatu) in 1980 which become quite violent - including French planters in New Hebrides' larger northern island of Espiritu Santo trying to organize a Francophile Separatist Rebellion.

For white residents and nickel interests in New Caledonia there is concern about policies of any "Kanak" dominated independence government after 2018.

Australia and New Zealand would be concerned about events in a post 2018 New Caledonia, particularly which outside powers would come to influence an independent New Caledonia.

The concern is China may see East Timor and New Caledonia as military assets with air, radar and naval base facilities in the same way it is treating such South China Sea islands as Fiery Cross, Subi Reef and Mischief Reef.

Pete
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SAFT may supply Lithium-ion batteries for Shortfin

May 15, 2016, 11:30 pm
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S-80 - when Program Management and Combat System Integration go wrong.

May 17, 2016, 3:06 am
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On Navantia website. "Main electric motor installed on board S-81 "Isaac Peral" February 15, 2012 when all was still well.
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Both Raytheon and Lockheed Martinhave been selected to compete to be the Combat System Integrator (CSI) for Australia’s Future Submarine. Severe problems discovered in 2013 in Spain’s build of the S-80 Isaac Peral class provide a cautionary tale of what can go wrong with overall program management and presumably CSI.

Submarine Matter’s sitemeter indicated there was a lot of Australian Government interest in 2010 with Spain’s S-80.

The S-80’s construction was progressing rapidly and smoothly:

“SPAIN’S S-80: THE SEA 1000 DARK HORSE?” Asia Pacific Defence Reporter, September 30, 2010 http://www.asiapacificdefencereporter.com/articles/90/Spain-s-S-80-the-SEA-1000-dark-horse indicated:

“The weapons payload [of the proposed S-80] includes not only [Atlas Elektonik] DMA4 torpedoes and sub-Harpoons but potentially Tactical Land Attack Missiles such as Tomahawk – something that will be of great interest for Australia.

The S-80 seems to be the first completely indigenously designed Spanish submarine for quite some time and the company has drawn on a huge amount of previous experience to come up with a leading edge product.

…A critical part of a submarine is its combat system and sensors. For this Navantia have turned to Lockheed Martin and what seems to be a version of their Submarine Integrated Combat System (SUBICS). Lockheed Martin say that this product has been derived from the company’s experience with the USN and use a form of words suggesting that it is very similar to the combat system on the ‘Virginia’ Class nuclear submarines.” 

But by 2013 major problems, unforeseen by Navantia, such as the weight of what looks like the Combat System, including weapons, emerged.

Jose Matos, in “GROWING PAINS HIT SPAIN’S SUB FORCE, WARSHIPS International Fleet Review April 2016 edition, (hardcopy, paywalled) page 37 reported:

“…In May 2013 the first major production flaw was revealed: Technicians discovered that the submarine’s weight was [up to 100 tons] greater than originally designed and unevenly distributed.

The initial calculations were much lower than the final figures since the original figures did not account for the weight of the weapons and electronics suite [sounds like the Combat System], or features later introduced in the crew berthing areas….

[Navantia would need to] reduce the submarine’s total weight or increase its length, to more optimally distribute the excess weight. They opted to do the latter and increased the length by nearly ten per cent, from 71 to 78 metres.”

As the US AN/BYG-1 Combat System to be integrated into the Shortfin will likely be heavier than the SUBTICS? Combat System for Barracuda SSN, special care will be needed on weight and balance.


Pete
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The Last Post?

May 18, 2016, 5:07 am
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ON THE BRIGHT SIDE

-  things have been great guys

-  pageviews have never been higher, averaging more than 1,000 a day. Views come mainly from the US, then Australia, then from the major SSK building countries: France, Russia, Germany and Japan. There are also many visits from India, Singapore, UK and even small countries like Trinidad & Tobago.

-  more importantly there are comments from regular commenters, showing an increasing degree of  knowledge, effort and interest.

-  friendship.

BUT


Monetisation is one incentive:

Donations = Average Australian $1 per day (only 3 donations have been received since the Donation Button was on Submarine Matters - from March 2016)

Advertising = Averges Australian $1 per day (total).

Now that the CEP process has identified a winner, and in the knowledge that the Shortfin design phase may take 5 years, much of the raison d'être for Submarine Matters may have gone.

THE FUTURE?

1. Writing for other Journals OR
2.  on commission OR
3.  if donations come with requests, responding to those requests whicle still writing 1 or 2 articles a
      week on Submarine Matters?

I'd be grateful for any polite suggestions of what to do next:
-  in Comments or
-  more privately at pete74730@yahoo.com.au




A maybe not final last post.

Regards

Pete
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Evolution towards the Barracuda SSN

May 19, 2016, 5:34 pm
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REQUEST

Submarine Matters has had its first request from a Donor:

    JHM asks - "Can you advise me of the evolution of French submarines that 
    have resulted in the Barracuda SSN?"

RESPONSE

In the long term the design of the Barracuda SSN is based on knowledge accumulated by French designers from more than a century of French submarine building and operating. Basic design ideas also come from broader international submarine community. For example, viewing a surfaced Virginia SSN and talking photos might be very useful when the photos are combined with advanced submarin design computer programs. 

More immediately the Barracuda design descends from SSKs, SSNs and SSBNs built in France over the last 50 years See the Table I have compiled below..

FRENCH SUBMARINE TABLE

Submarine
(how many built?)
First Sub Laid Down
Last Sub Commissioned
Some still building?




Redoutable SSBN
6 built
1964
2008

Agosta SSKs
13 built
Early 1970s S 620 for French Navy
2006 for Pakistani Navy
no
Rubis SSNs
6 built
1976


AMETHYSTE rebuild of Rubis
1989 (rebuilding began)
1995

Triomphant SSBNs
4 built
1986
2010

Scorpene SSKs
5 completed
1999 O’Higgins Chile
Sep 2016 Kalvari India
5 x Kalvaris India
4 x S-BR Brazil
SN-BR SSN
1 planned
DCNS designing non-nuclear portion. Brazil building reactor.

Maybe launched in late 2020s
Barracuda SSNs
6 planned
2007
2029 for the last of the six

Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A
12 planned
2028?
2052? Assuming one sub built every two years


The Table indicates that there are a wide range of submarines providing experience for DCNS staff when they designed and build the first Barracuda.

The Barracuda is only the second SSN generation France has produced so it will be far more capable. than the first generation (th Rubis)

Interestingly Brazil envisages developing a submarine reactor and then installing it into Brazil's first nuclear sub (SN-BR).

Note the striking similarity between the Barracuda's sideview (bottom of wallchart) with the  Scorpene's (second from bottom). (Artwork courtesy DCNS Australia)

Clearly the Barracuda's hull and sail/fin are heavily infuenced by design work done for the Scorpene. Using the same external design has advantages in perfecting such critical traits (without reinventing the wheel) as low acoustic signatures and an efficient hydrodynamic design. 

Lessons learned in the operation of reactors in the Rubis and Triomphant submarines would have assisted Barracuda designers. More specifically DCNS designers and French Naval crews are experienced with the K15 reactor. The K15 has also become a mature design - as it is already fitted in Triomphants - and will be installed in the Barracudas. 

Experience with Scorpenes, Triomphants and Rubis also would have assisted Barracuda design in  less obvious features such as:

-  the positioning of on-hull sonar sensors
-  similar combat systems and weapons
-  use of a pumpjets on Triomphants acting as a testbed before using them on Barracudas
-  proving more crew comfort for long missions.
-  quieting technology including from anechoic tiles, elestic mounts to dampen sound and active noise
    control

So clearly Barracuda technology has been evolving from previous submarine designs. Increasing French Naval experience in using this technology contributes to even more evolution.

Pete
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There is no Comments facility anymore. If you wish to email Peter particularly on writing commissioned briefs on Submarine issues try pete74730@yahoo.com.au
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DARPA Upward Falling Payloads Program swimming slowly

May 21, 2016, 4:01 am
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Above, this chap describes the DARPA Upward Falling Payloads project in 2013. It seems a very gradual program. Below in a 2016 newspaper report.
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On May 14, 2016, Mark Prigg, UK DailyMail, excitedly reported about secret pods being developed that will hide swarms of hibernating US Navy drones deep below the sea for years at a time.

PETE'S EXPLANATION

More soberly this is the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Upward Falling Payloads (UFP) Program consisting of pods laid first by US Navy ships, subs, aircraft or by large UUVs. Then:

1. perhaps months or years later if a Threat (like a passing ship or sub) emerges a Trigger (perhaps triggered by passive sonar or remotely triggered from a US Base) will

2.  release the pod (called the "Riser") from the seabed or from its tether. The Riser floats up near to the surface or to the surface and then releases

3.  the Payload, which may be a group of very small UAVs or UUVs then unfurl their wings or fins and start moving toward the Target.

DARPA call the pods 'Upward Falling Payloads' here launching UAVs to follow ships or spy on land targets.

The UAVs and UUVs could be used for:

1.  Surveillance including chasing slower moving subs and ships

2.  Act as (wireless (no wires needed)) distributed communications links OR

3.  more darkly and not official policy, to destroy a sub, small ship or UAVs destroying a land target.

Advantages over much more expensive reconnaissance submarines are that subs may only be on station for a maximum mission length of 6 months (for an SSN) while Upward Falling Payloads can sit on, or near, the seafloor for years.

Nearly 50% of the world's oceans are deeper than 4 km. So another advantage is that instead of only waiting at the 500 meter maximum depth of a submarine, Upward Falling Payloads can theoretically operate down to a very deep seafloor.

There are disadvantages however. Upward Falling Payloads could be:

-  captured and "turned" to operate against the US Navy or against civilian ships and land targets
-  jammed, rendering them useless, or
-  wear out faster than predicted making them less reliable than a submarine.

Here's the actual DARPA Upward Falling Payloads Website.

Pete
There is no Comments facility anymore. If you wish to email Peter particularly on writing commissioned briefs on Submarine issues try pete74730@yahoo.com.au
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Secret German High Tech Submarine Propeller Covertly Photographed

May 22, 2016, 12:20 am
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At great personal risk an agent has taken these rare photos of a complex propeller used to power one of the latest German Type 212A submarines. Natürlich the agent's modus operandi remains forever secret. However, so as not to "blow his cover" he may well have used a button camera to take these incriminating photos. The strange small propeller at the end of the 212A's more conventional 7 blade propeller is called a Propeller Boss Cap Fins (PBCF).
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An effective submarine is made more efficient using a wide range of small, but significant, improvements. 

Up to a point the greater the number of propeller blades the slower the propeller needs to rotate to allow the submarine to reach the average patrol speed of around 5 knots. Slower rotation is one way to delay any onset of noisy, propeller damaging cavitation.

The strange small propeller at the end of the German Type 212A submarine's more conventional 7 blade propeller is called a Propeller Boss Cap Fins (PBCF).

An open Japanese website explains: 

"PBCF device was developed in 1987 by Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, West Japan Fluid Engineering Laboratory, and Mikado Propeller (Nakashima Mitsuwa Propeller) and it has been adopted by installed on more than 3,000 vessels worldwide. Its fundamental mechanism and effects have been repeatedly verified through numerous series of model tank tests and actual ship measurements from the first stage of the development."



Figure 1 courtesy PBCF website.
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PBCFs are small fins fitted to a propeller’s boss cap and are made of the same material as the boss cap as shown on the righthand diagram of Figure 1.

Tests on over 60 ships (and preumably Type 212A submarines) have shown benefits of 4-5% in fuel savings and an increase in speed of about 2% (at the same rotation rate). Without the fins, the flow of water around the propeller generates a hub vortex that wastes almost 10% of the engine's energy. The PBCF may also reduce a submarine's stern vibrations, hence reducing underwater noise. A quiet propeller, of course, adds to submarine stealth.


  This June 2015 PBCF promotional video indicates at:

  0:27 - the Propeller Boss Cap Fins developers
01:10 - why PBCF is successful?
02:10 - testing concept it in a cavitation tank
03:35 - adding PBC Fins efficiency advantages
06:45 - PBCF effects graphs

An effective submarine is made more efficient using a wide range of small improvements. The Propeller Boss Cap Fin is just one improvement that might be present on many more submarines than the Type 212A.

Pete
There is no Comments facility anymore. If you wish to email Peter particularly on writing commissioned briefs on Submarine issues try pete74730@yahoo.com.au
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Turnbull's Vote-Magnet Shipbuilding Promises are Labor Proof

May 23, 2016, 2:27 am
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(Flow-chart courtesy The Daily Telegraph based on Defence Teaming Australia advice, mid August 2015). In terms of cost estimates the A$17 Billion might be for a build of just 8 submarines. 12 submarines and the lower Australian dollar, since August 2015, may boost 17 up to A$25 Billion. As most of the submarine build will likely be in 13 years time (the 2030-2040s) inflation could double the figure, hence 2 x 25 = A$50 Billion (the most frequently quoted build estimate). 
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Submarine Matters will comment about once a fortnight on Australian ship (especially submarine) building issues in the runup to the July 2, 2016 Election.

After Prime Minister Turnbul's rush of shipbuilding announcements on:
-  April 18, 2016 (Offshore Patrol Vessels, Future Frigates, Pacific Patrol Boats) and
-  April 26, 2016 DCNS winning the submarine CEP, with build in Adelaide

The Australian Labor Party (ALP) Opposition and Nick Xenophon Team (NXT) have found it very difficult to criticise Turnbull's continuous shipbuilding strategy. They cannot criticise the extravagance of the shipbuilding promises because Turnbull is offering money and jobs for:
-  unionised workers (the ALP's natural constituency) and
-  workers and managers in South Australia (NXT's main constituency)

Even the ALP Government of South Australia under Premier Jay Weatherill has praised the Turnbull Government's South Australian centric shipbuilding program. 

The only opportunity for the ALP and Xenophon's NXT to criticise Turnbull was over the already 2 month old decision to have 2 naval supply ships built by Navantia in Spain. A criticism that did not "stick".

So the Turnbull Government is finding building of ships (and subs) in Australia to be a sound Vote-Magnet. But the inability of the ALP to criticise extravagant shipbuilding plans may encourage over-spending at the expense (opportunity cost) of other defence and civilian projects. 

There are two major milestones that may undue Turnbull's nicely played shipbuilding strategy:

1.  as announced April 26, 2016 the Turnbull Government is releasing a Naval Shipbuilding Plan AFTER the July 2, 2016 Election with a “review of the workforce, skills and infrastructure needs” for the “Future Submarine program…Future Frigate program and…Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) program…”. This may well allocate shipbuilding work to States that are less electorally unpredictable than the main shipbuilding beneficiaries (South Australia and Western Australia). That is Turnbull might give more of the ship/submarine section building work to Coalition leaning New South Wales (NSW) with NSW also receiving the submarine steel-making contract (at Port Kembla), And

2.  if the ALP wins the Election its leader, Bill Shorten, may well allocate more OPV and Frigate section building work to the ALP heartland in Williamstown, Victoria. Williamstown should also "win" on its own merits - having proved itself an efficient shipyard in the ANZAC class frigate and Canberra class LHD builds.

Aside from milestones there is a speed-bump. South Australians may underestimate how long the necessary submarine design negotiations between Australia and DCNS may stretch. It may take 3 to 5 years before the Future Submarine project begins to generate a substantial number of jobs in South Australia.

Turnbull may have done well in the shipbuilding program, so far, but the industry can expect some surprises. 

Please connect this with Submarine Matter's Turnbull's Pre-Election Shipbuilding Rush - Table of Ship/Sub Acquisitions, May 5, 2016.

Pete
THERE IS NO LONGER A WORKING COMMENTS BOX BELOW EACH ARTICLE. PEOPLE WHO KINDLY DONATE $50 PER YEAR WILL HAVE THEIR EMAILED COMMENTS TO PETE pete74730@yahoo.com.au ACTIONED.
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