The UK Trident SSBN Debate MAY be settled this year

May 24, 2016, 2:21 am

≫ Next: Submarine Trends since 1990 - Actually fewer nuclear.

≪ Previous: Turnbull's Vote-Magnet Shipbuilding Promises are Labor Proof

UK Defence Secretary Michael Fallon talks to journalist Kirsty Wark (who asks some searching questions). This is 6 minutes of UK Newsnightspecial on the future of the Trident SSBN.

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For years the UK has debated whether to replace the UK's existing Vanguard classSSBNs with a new set of four SSBNs. As the Vanguards are armed with Trident missiles, as is intended for the replacement SSBNs, (the Successor class) the issue is frequently called the Trident Debate.

Arguments against a new class of UK SSBNs appear to be rather naive. In a world with countries like North Korea and Iran developing hypersonic ballistic missiles (then arm them with nuclear warheads) some in the UK believe that the UK's new submarines could merely be armed with slow subsonic cruise missiles. Some in the UK go further in suggesting that Russian nuclear aggression could be deterred by British fighter bombers carrying freefall nuclear bombs 1950s style.

The issue is major because UK's Trident missiles are the UK's only active nuclear deterrent. Trident is also an important aspect of the UK's alliance with the US. The Trident missiles and SSBNs apparently cost just 6% of the UK's defence budget.

Another issue is whether there should be a Continuous At-Sea Deterrent (CASD). If a SSBN does not need to be at sea 24/7 the implication is that a smaller force of only 2 or 3 submarines would be adequate. But this assumes an enemy (say Russia) would not spring surprises.

Some in the British Labour Party reason that the rift between the unilateral disarmament Labour Left and the shipbuilding Unions (who want to build new SSBNs) could be healed if the Unions built four SSBNs but did not arm them with nuclear missiles ($50 Billion white elephants).

Oh the idiocy!

The final decision (known as "Main Gate") to build new SSBNs (or not) is meant to be made by the UK Parliament later this year. Trident alternatives, in more detail, are below.

See much larger image here (Diagram courtesy SIPRI and the Financial Times)

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Pete

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Submarine Trends since 1990 - Actually fewer nuclear.

May 25, 2016, 3:01 am

≫ Next: Donors Will Receive a Two Page Submarine Matters Report Per Month

≪ Previous: The UK Trident SSBN Debate MAY be settled this year

The diagram/map above is "Changes in the global submarine market since 1990" in The Military Balance 2015 Chapter 2: Comparative defence statistics, pp: 21-28. (Courtesy the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) London, Febuary 2015).
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The biggest changes since 1990 have been:

- far fewer US + Russian submarines overall by 2014, along with

- far fewer nuclear submarines worldwide.

United States

Under the Reagan Administration 1981-1989 there was very rapid US submarine building in pursuit of the 600 ship navy. During the Reagan years alone this included completion of 11 Ohio-class SSBNs and 28 Los Angeles-class SSNs. This rapid building program was in addition to high pre-existing numbers. So by 1990 the US had 125 nuclear = 36 SSBNs + 89 SSNs). No operational US SSKs.

The reduction in the Russian threat 1990-2010 permited a gradual decline in US numbers under the "peace dividend". From 125 there has been a steady decline in SSBN and SSN categories - though a small rise of 4 in SSGNs.

Soviet Union/Russia

Architect of the Soviet Navy Fleet Admiral Gorshkov believed that "quantity had a quality of its own" meaning high tempo, post WWII building of nuclear and conventional subs, with very few subs retired. By 1990 the Soviet Navy consisted of a large (Soviet Empire breaking) total of 273 submarines including:

- 63 SSBNs

- 72 SSGNs

- 64 SSNs

- 65 SSKs

- 9 “auxiliary” (mothership and testbed)

Lack of money for crews, operations, maintenance and new subs led to the decommissioning of 200 Soviet/Russian nuclear submarines in the early 1990s.

Other Countries

In the 1990s many other countries slowed submarine procurement as part of the peace dividend. But regional tensions and some technical improvements have maintained or increased submarine numbers. Rising submarine aspirations of China and North Korea, from a very low base, have substantially added to the numbers of conventional subs in Asia.

Regional Tensions

Have included:

Turkey vs Greece

Israel vs Arab countries vs Iran

India vs Pakistan

India vs China

China vs all surrounding powers (Russia, US, Japan, South Korea, India)

North Korea vs all surrounding countries (Japan, South Korea, US, arguably China and Russia)

Vietnam vs China

Japanese and South Korean distrust (maintaining numbers).

Japan vs (Russia, China and North Korea)

Russia vs (all nuclear powers and Japan)

Southeast Asian nations distrust of each other and China

Latin America distrust and anti-drug smuggling

Business Opportunities

Arms companies making submarines an essential naval component and political prestige item in all regions.

Some middlemen in some countries seeing the high costs of submarines as an opportunity to seek "commissions" to provide necessary permissions.

Technological Improvements Leading to Gradual Arms Race

- Several countries seeing subs as platforms for nuclear ballistic missiles. Ballistic include India,

China and North Korea. Nuclear cruise include Israel, Pakistan and North Korea.

- SSNs, SSGNs and SSKs as platforms for "carrier killing" anti-ship missiles

- SSBNs as second nuclear strike platforms and for some countries (like the UK) the only national
nuclear weapon platform

- Ability of SSNs, SSGNs to launch conventional warhead land attack cruise missiles used by the

USN and UKRN since the 1990s and by Russia since 2015. Land attack cruise missiles are

increasingly envisaged by some navies in Europe, Vietnam and maybe Indonesia and Australia.

Air independent propulsion (AIP), nuclear propulsion, and Lithium-ion Batteries have made little impact on overall numbers of submarines compared to the numbers of plain diesel-electic submarines operating in the late 1940s and 1950s. But the size and firepower of nuclear submarines is much greater than diesel-electic submarines.

Pete

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Donors Will Receive a Two Page Submarine Matters Report Per Month

May 26, 2016, 1:54 am

≫ Next: US International Role Keeps Rebalance to Australia Way Below 2,500 Marine Target

≪ Previous: Submarine Trends since 1990 - Actually fewer nuclear.

Indonesia's Type 209, KRI Nagabanda, Pennant Number 403, in May 2016. This sub is due to be delivered from DSME shipyard, South Korea, to Indonesia in 2017. Indonesia's new submarines will be a major item in Submarine Matter's Southeast Asian Submarine Developments Report to be emailed to Donors on June 8, 2016.

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Hi

I have been considering what extra service I could provide to Donors and decided to email a special Submarine Matters Report to Donors on the 2nd Wednesday of each month. This will start on Wednesday June 8, 2016.

My thanks to Donors who have donated the $50 (per year).

I shall email the Report (a 2 page Word Attachment) to Donors' email addresses.

Proposed topics for Reports include:

- Southeast Asian Submarine Developments

- Chinese Arms Sales to Southeast Asia

- SeaWeb Developments

- South Asian Submarine Developments

- Chinese Submarine Developments

- Australia Naval Shipbuilding Plan (due late 2016)

- French and German Submarine Developments

- Japanese Arms Export Prospects

- Australia's Submarine Combat System Selection (due late 2016)

If a Donor would like to suggest a Report on an additional topic please email me to discuss it.

Regards

Pete
pete74730@yahoo.com.au

↧

US International Role Keeps Rebalance to Australia Way Below 2,500 Marine Target

May 27, 2016, 1:56 am

≫ Next: CHART of Every American Combat Vehicle (air, land and sea)

≪ Previous: Donors Will Receive a Two Page Submarine Matters Report Per Month

2,500 Marines won't rotate to Australia in 2016 or 2017 - this may not happen until 2020 - if not later. The grand vision for US rebalancing to the southern Asia-Pacific (ie. Australia) discussed between President Obama and Prime Minister Gillard in November 2011 has not happened. So there has been no steady increase in Marine numbers rotating through Australia. Major reasons include Western force buildups in the Middle East, inability to withdraw quickly enough from Afghanistan, concern about Russia in Eastern Europe, North Korean missile-rattling, and Chinese expansion in the South China Sea.

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Perhaps out of deference to a Chinese company that began a 99 year lease on the Port of Darwin in late 2015, the regular US Marine rotation in April 2016 was a minimal media affair.

The annual 6 month deployment of the US Marine Rotational Force-Darwin kicked off on April 13, 2016. Most of the Marines are from 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, out of Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California. Prior to the rotation US Navy ships unloaded a large quantity of needed supplies, vehicles and helicopters at China Port-Darwin.

The rotation is part of Obama's envisaged US "rebalance" or "pivot" to the Asia-Pacific region. This rotation, negotiated by the President Obama and the Gillard Labor Governments in November 2011, is of considerable Australian defence and foreign policy importance. The rotation is also intended to reassure US allies in the Southeast Asian and South Pacific region while reminding China not to be too ambitious. Another, less visible US activity, is what is thought to be an increasing number of US Air Force bomber and refuelling aircraft flights to RAAF Base Tindal, 320 km southeast of Darwin. The least visible but still significant activity is the ongoing visit of US nuclear submarines to Australia’s Fleet Base West (HMAS Stirling, Rockingham, Western Australia).

It may be embarrassing to the Australian and US governments that the number of US Marines rotating is unlikely to increase to 2,500 by 2017 as predicted. While 1,300 Marines rotated in 2014, then down to 1,150 marines in 2015, this year’s rotation is only a slight increase (or return) to 1,250 Marines. Obama had hoped for no return to Iraq and an almost complete withdrawal from Afghanistan as his legacies – but this won't happen. US concerns about the Russians in Eastern Europe, North Korea and China (South China Sea) have kept Marines in more pressing areas.

The deadline for full deployment to 2,500 has been pushed back till 2020. Northern Territory Chief Minister Adam Giles has blamed Canberra for the delay.The Northern Territory’s complaints may be more to do with the delay in full economic benefits of 2,500 Marines spending money in Darwin rather than strategic benefits. The Northern Territory after all, was quite enthusiastic about having China buy/lease the Port of Darwin at above market prices.

During the six-month rotation, the Marines are participating in activities and exercises with the Australian Defence Force and other armed forces (including Japanese and Chinese forces) in the Asia-Pacific region.

The US chose Darwin as a place for rotation (an economical form of deployment) for several reasons:

- Alliance value to Australia. Australia has felt vulnerable about Darwin since the WWII Japanese

bombing raids.

- Darwin is close to major shipping lanes (Straits of Malacca and lesser known Straits in the

Indonesian archipelago)

- But far enough away from the Strait of Malacca flashpoint to defend RAAF Base Darwin

and Tindal Air Base from Chinese air/missile attack.

- The Marines can be part of the defence force for these Air Bases.

- The Darwin region has low-traffic skies for aerial training and a bombing range near Tindal.

- There are huge, sparsely populated, interior regions of land for Marine live-firing exercises.

Please connect with Submarine Matters article US told 2 Days After Sale of Port of Darwin to a Chinese Company, November 24, 2015.

An Osprey in Australia during the 2013 Marine rotation.

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Pete

↧

CHART of Every American Combat Vehicle (air, land and sea)

May 28, 2016, 12:12 am

≫ Next: A SeaWeb (US, Japan, Australia, India) Quadrilateral Developing

≪ Previous: US International Role Keeps Rebalance to Australia Way Below 2,500 Marine Target

Chart is, of course, too small above BUT clicking HERE takes you to a huge version. It was originally produced and is being sold in hardcopy by Pop Chart Lab which has many other great charts.

Here is a Chart of "Every Single American Combat Vehicle". This includes:

- aircraft/helicopters on top

- land fighting vehicles (middle) and

- navy boats, ships and submarines (lower third)

The vehicles are mostly not to scale - as this would not result in a viable chart.

Pete

↧

A SeaWeb (US, Japan, Australia, India) Quadrilateral Developing

May 29, 2016, 12:43 am

≫ Next: Part 2 - Undersea Webs - US-Japan-SE Asia-Indian Ocean SOSUS - 2005 on

≪ Previous: CHART of Every American Combat Vehicle (air, land and sea)

INTRODUCTION

A steady development of Internet writing on the all platform Western sea surveillance system SeaWeb (often referred to on Sub Matters) is becoming more specific.

Two Australian Professors, Desmond Ball at the Australian National University and Richard Tanter at Melbourne University, produced a major book on how China’s naval forces are surrounded by undersea sensors. The book is The Tools of Owatatsumi (free Download from ANU Press) of January 2015. Using data from the book Hamish McDonald on April 18, 2015 published an excellent essay "Japan and US enclose Chinese coast within sensor net"

Readers may recall Submarine Matters’ How to Trap the Chinese Dragon – SeaWeb’s Fixed Undersea Array, September 4, 2015

ARTICLE

In 2016 an increasing level of detail is surfacing on the (possible) undersea sensor array's extension (or pre-existence) northwest of Indonesia in India's Andaman and Nicobar Islands region.

Where all this is going is that Prasun K. Sengupta on his TRISHUL website has reported on discussions at Day 2 of DEFEXPO INDIA 2016 (March 28 -31, 2016) of April 15, 2016 titled. Prasun K. Sengupta's report is excellent (and 7 pages long). So I will break it into 4 parts over 4 days.

Part 1 - Undersea Webs

[I have highlighted parts and added links where useful]

"A web of strategic projects is now taking firm shape as India enters into closer multilateral military cooperation relationships with Japan, Australia and the United States, as well as regional powers like Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam. Matters began taking on urgency in late September 2014, after US President Barack Obama and PM Modi have pledged to intensify cooperation in maritime security. Following this, on March 16, 2015 the defence ministers of the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the end of the two-day 9th ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting in Langkawi, Malaysia, collectively stated that they wanted India to play a far bigger role in both the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and the South China Sea.

In the near future, therefore, under the auspices of the US–India Defence Framework Agreement, foundational pacts like the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum Agreement (CISMOA), and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation (BECA) [see explanation of BECA and other acronyms], are likely to be inked by the two countries later this year.

Concurrently, Japan can be expected to extend funding from the Japan International Cooperation Agency for the upgradation of naval air bases and construction of new ELINT/SIGINT stations along the Andaman and Nicobar chain of islands, which is made up of 572 islands (of which only 34 are presently inhabited), stretching around 470 miles north to south.

But most importantly, preliminary planning has commenced on a Japan-financed project that calls for

1) laying of an undersea optical fibre cable from Chennai to Port Blair; and

2) the construction of an undersea network of seabed-based surveillance sensors stretching from the tip of Sumatra right up to Indira Point. Once completed, this network will be an integral part of the existing US-Japan ‘Fish Hook’ sound surveillance (SOSUS) network [See The Tools of Owatatsumi (ANU Press, January 2015) Map 4, Page 54] that will play a pivotal role in constantly monitoring all submarine patrols mounted by China’s PLA Navy (PLAN) in both the South China Sea and the IOR.

(Courtesy India Defense News)

This network will in turn be networked with the Indian Navy’s (IN) high-bandwidth National Command Control and Communications Intelligence network (NC3I) [above], which has been set up under the IN’s National Maritime Domain Awareness (NMDA) project at a cost of Rs.1,003 crores [US$150 million]. At the heart of the NC3I is the Gurgaon-based, Rs.453 crore Information Management and Analysis Centre (IMAC), whose systems integration software packages were supplied by Raytheon and CISCO.

Oblique references to all these developments were made in the joint statement that was issued last month after the visiting US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter held delegation-level talks with his Indian counterpart Manohar Parrikar. The joint statement spoke about: A) new opportunities to deepen cooperation in maritime security and maritime domain awareness; B) commencement of navy-to-navy discussions on submarine safety and anti-submarine warfare; and

3) enhancing on-going navy-to-navy discussions to cover submarine-related issues.

The US-Japan "Fish Hook" SOSUS network. Map featured in the Ball and Tanter book The Tools of Owatatsumi (ANU Press, January 2015) Map 4, Page 54.

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US-Japan Fish Hook SOSUS network [Map above]

The US was always interested in Japanese and Indian locations for its SOSUS stations. Initially called Project Caesar, this involved running cables out on continental shelves and connecting them to hydrophones suspended above the sea bottom at optimum signal depths.

An ‘experimental station’ was established at the north-western tip of Hokkaido in 1957, with the cable extending into the Soya (La Perouse) Strait. It monitored all Soviet submarine traffic going in and out of Vladivostok and Nakhodka in the Sea of Japan.Undersea surveillance systems and associated shore-based data collection stations code-named Barrier and Bronco were installed in Japan in the 1960s. Acoustic data collected at these sites was transmitted by US defence communications satellites to US Navy (USN) processing and analysis centres in the US.In the 1970s, a network between between Japan and the Korean Peninsula was commissioned.

By 1980, three stations at Wakkanai (designated JAP-4), Tsushima (JAP-108) and the Ryukyu Islands (RYU-80) were operational in Japan, along with earlier stations built in the Tsushima Straits and the Okinawa area. The existence of old cables at Horonai Point in north-west Honshu, which during the Cold War led out to SOSUS arrays in the Sea of Japan, has been widely described by scuba divers. By the mid-1980s the SOSUS hydrophone arrays stretched from southern Japan to The Philippines, covering the approaches to China.

After the collapse of the USSR and the decline of the submarine threat to the US in the early 1990s, the USN allowed its SOSUS systems in the north-west Pacific to atrophy, although some arrays were retained in working order so as to support civilian scientific research (such as tracking whales and monitoring undersea volcanic activity). According to a USN directive issued in August 1994, all seabed-based fixed-arrays in the Pacific were placed on ‘hot standby’; personnel would ‘not be routinely assigned to monitor fixed-array data’ unless that data was required for operational purposes, but in practice the probability of being able to reconstitute them to full operational status was ‘extremely low’."

Part 2 is tomorrow

Pete

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Part 2 - Undersea Webs - US-Japan-SE Asia-Indian Ocean SOSUS - 2005 on

May 30, 2016, 1:45 am

≫ Next: Australian Government Reveals Why DCNS Won

≪ Previous: A SeaWeb (US, Japan, Australia, India) Quadrilateral Developing

The US-Japan "Fish Hook" SOSUS network. Map featured in the Ball and Tanter book The Tools of Owatatsumi (ANU Press, January 2015) Map 4, Page 54.
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INTRODUCTION

This continues Prasun K. Sengupta’s Undersea Webs article - the first part of which was republished as Part 1 - Undersea Webs - US-Japan SOSUS Against Soviets/Russia of May 29, 2016

Part 1 - Undersea Webs ended with the initial phase of the US-Japan SOSUS network which concentrated on tracking Soviet/Russian submarines entering and leaving Vladivostock-Sea of Japan. This limited network was permitted to rundown as the perceived threat from its initial Soviet/Russian target diminished in the 1990s.

Part 2 – Undersea Webs describes how in the early 2000s this limited SOSUS (+ with additional sensors eg. magnetic anomally) network was modernised and extended South (down through East China Sea, South China Sea/Philippine and Indonesian archipelagos through to the Indian Ocean) against the new Chinese Navy (PLAN) submarine threat. There were also key nodes at US naval bases at Okinawa, Guam and in Taiwan. The renewed threat from Russian subs and new threat from North Korean subs would also have driven the SOSUS+ expansion.

ARTICLE

Part 2 – Undersea Webs

"However, in the early 2000s, facing an increasing PLAN submarine force and more aggressive PLAN submarine patrols, the USN decided that it needed a new chain of fixed arrays designed primarily to monitor the movement of PLAN submarines between the East China Sea and South China Sea on the one hand, and between the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean on the other. Thus was born the US-Japan ‘Fish Hook Undersea Defense Line’ in early 2005 [see map above], stretching from Japan southwards to Southeast Asia, with key nodes at Okinawa, Guam and Taiwan.

Beginning from near Kagoshima in the southwest part of Kyushu, it runs down the Osumi archipelago to Okinawa, then to Miyako-jima and Yonaguni in the southern part of the Ryukyu Islands, past Taiwan to the Balabac Islands in The Philippines, to Lombok in the eastern part of the Indonesian archipelago, across the Sunda Strait between Java and Sumatra, and from northern Sumatra to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Three major gaps—between Yonaguni and Suao in north-east Taiwan (120km), between Kaohsiung in south-western Taiwan and the Dongsha (Pratas) Islands (450km) where the East China Sea meets the South China Sea, and across the Bashi Channel (220km) between Hengchun at Taiwan’s southernmost tip and Luzon Island in The Philippines—were plugged.

In addition, the USN installed a new SOSUS network, stretching from Sasebo down to Okinawa, in 2006, when the US cable-laying ship USNS Zeus [T-ARC-7] operated together with oceanographic survey vessels and nuclear submarines in this area. In July 2013, Beijing claimed that the US and Japan had jointly established ‘very large underwater monitoring systems’ at the northern and southern ends of Taiwan. One of these stretched from Yonaguni to the Senkaku Islands (about 150km), while the other covered the Bashi Channel down to The Philippines.

Thus, this US-Japan undersea trip-wire around the PLAN presently extends across the Tsushima Strait between Japan and the Korean Peninsula, and from Japan’s southern main island of Kyushu down past Taiwan to The Philippines. The curve of the hook stretches across the Java Sea from Kalimantan to Java, across the Sunda Strait between Java and Sumatra, and from the northern tip of Sumatra along the eastern side of India’s Andaman and Nicobar island chain. Real-time information-sharing between the US and Japan joins the undersea defence line-up, effectively drawing a tight arc around Southeast Asia, from the Andaman Sea to Japan."

Part 3 - On China’s New Undersea Trip-Wire (SOSUS) appears tomorrow.

Pete

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Australian Government Reveals Why DCNS Won

May 31, 2016, 1:31 am

≫ Next: Japanese Report: Key Japanese Companies Were Not Interested in Exporting the Soryu

≪ Previous: Part 2 - Undersea Webs - US-Japan-SE Asia-Indian Ocean SOSUS - 2005 on

Cutaway diagram of most of the future TKMS Type 216. Note there is space for a Vertical Multi Purpose Lock (VMPL) or two behind the sail. There is also the option of a Horizontal Multi Purpose Lock (HMPL) (the thick tube) in the torpedo section. Perhaps Australian assessors rated the Multi Purpose Lock flexibility as a deficiency (Hence The Australian newspaper mentioned"The Australians told [TKMS] the pre-concept design submitted to Defence at the end of November [2015] was “not balanced” and design optimisation “was not achieved”). (Cutaway courtesy TKMS)

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Reading Cameron Stewart’s The Australian, May 30, 2016 article The sound of silence - Why Germany lost its subs bidit appears:

The Australian Government in a document marked “PROTECTED — Sensitive”, gave some reasons for the Future Australian Submarine CEP decision that favoured the DCNS Shortfin proposal. TKMS’s loss was due to:

- An unacceptably high level of radiated noise’ of the TKMS Type 216 proposal. This was at a

particular frequency that was very important to the RAN. This appeared to be while a 216 was

intelligence collecting close to shore. This meant the 216 had a lower level of stealth.
: Australia assessed the Japanese Soryu for Australia (Soryu Aus) also had less stealth

- Australia accepted French calculations that the Shortfin would have a higher tactical silent speed

than the 216 and Japan’s Soryu Aus.

[Pete's Comment (PC) - A "higher tactical silent speed" could mean dash speed in the operational area as well as transit (with DCNS identifying 14 knots as transit in past statements].

- DCNS has proposed a pumpjet (generally associated with higher silent speed on large submarines)

for the Shortfin. This is instead of propellers fitted on past and current SSKs and all future SSKs

except the Shortfin

[PC Comment - developed pumpjets only come from countries that have developed pumpjets for their own large nuclear submarines. With pumpjets equating to higher silent speeds that excludes Germany and Japan from the higher speeds criterion that Australia seems to have rated very strongly. In the end a pumpjet may not turn out to be viable for the Shortfin's propulsion - then where will Australia be?]

- "The Australians told [TKMS] the pre-concept design [like the cutaway above] submitted to

Defence at the end of November [2015] was “not balanced” and design optimisation “was not

achieved”.

[PC Comment - Perhaps Australian assessors rated the Multi Purpose Lock flexibility as a deficiency.]

- Australia had concerns about the safety of Lithium ion Batteries (LIBs) being proposed by TKMS and Japan. While DCNS Australia did not publicly raise a LIBs danger issue DCNS in France did in March 2016

- Australia was concerned about the difficulty TKMS would have in upscaling its Siemens motors
and existing 2,000 tonne hulls to a 4,000 tonne hull.

- Australia was concerned TKMS cost projections were too optimistic and not reflecting technical
challenges

[PC Comment - This begs questions what has DCNS estimated for DCNS hull + and total propulsion conversion and DCNS hull + propulsion + US combat system].

OTHER COMMENTS

Additional comments from an Anonymous Donor:

The Australian Government’s behaviour is difficult to understand. Australia should not have explained the reasons Germany and to a lesser extent Japan were defeated. The article in The Australian that draws on a Classified Document itself proves that Australia has an information security system that leaks. Japan, is, in a sense, lucky it was defeated because Japanese submarine secrets were less exposed to Australian leaks.

Australia has publicly commented on the alleged noisiness of the German 216 proposal. How is Germany expected to accept such a comment?

Germany sells submarines worldwide. Australia tried to calm Germany, but, the result was the opposite. Germany has, instead, been insulted. Australia sometimes does not understand that other countries may have different ideas. Frankly this is a fault in Aussie thinking.

Australia has not mentioned the poor comparative indiscretion ratio of the DCNS Shortfin as it is limited to Lead-acid Batteries (LABs). In terms of indiscretion ratios the TKMS 216 may rate the best as it would have Fuel Cell AIP + LIBs, then the Japanese Soryu Aus with LIBs and then the poorest discretion with DCNS (no LIBs or AIP, only LABs).

DCNS has the least proven technology. Last year, the French Navy showed in its home page that its SSNs had sunk half of the US Navy ships in a NATO exercise. I think that DCNS had definitely over-emphasized this tremendous (SSN not SSK) result for the benefit of the RAN.

SEE THE AUSTRALIAN’ NEWSPAPER'S FULL ARTICLE

Please connect with Submarine Matter's April 29, 2016 article on the future Shortfin Pumpjet.

Pete

↧

Japanese Report: Key Japanese Companies Were Not Interested in Exporting the Soryu

June 1, 2016, 3:29 am

≫ Next: China's SeaWeb Undersea Surveillance Network

≪ Previous: Australian Government Reveals Why DCNS Won

A Soryu submarine (left) and Oyashio class sub (right) are serviced at KHI's Kobe (Japan) submarine yard (Photo courtesy Kenichirou Akiyama in his Diamond Report, page 2).

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On June 22, 2015 a freelance journalist, Kenichiro Akiyama,in Diamond (one of Japan’s leading economic magazines) published an insider Report (at http://diamond.jp/articles/-/73594) detailing the lack of interest from Japanese arms companies in exporting submarines.

As this is a Japanese Report and was written 10 months before Australia announced the winning bid this Report has considerable significance.

It is likely that Australia Future Submarine CEP assessors, after reading this Report in June 2015, began to suspect a lack of Japanese corporate interest in being involved in the export of Soryu submarines to Australia.

A very brief translation of this Japanese language Report http://diamond.jp/articles/-/73594 is:

“THE REASON WHY THE [JAPANESE] DEFENSE INDUSTRY IS APATHETIC ABOUT LONG-SOUGHT ARMS EXPORTS”

A senior manager whose company produces submarines has explained that Japan’s arms export industry has not had to face international competition for many years. In May 2015 the Japanese Government made a firm decision to participate in the campaign to sell the technically advanced Soryu submarine to Australia.

But, surprisingly, the responses from defence companies was far from enthusiastic. In particular, MHI and KHI’s submarine sectors were not enthusiastic. This lack of enthusiasm was apparent in three ways:

"First reason is" building submarines for export is "unprofitable"

"The second reason is a lack of capacity" in terms of as manpower and equipment/facilities, and

"Third, this is not a story limited to the submarine," which is a the military industrial market is shrinking.

.............................................................................................................................................................

Overall the Japanese defence industrial feeling appeared to be negative. Industries seemed to think that the weapon export activity was cumbersome.

As English speakers translating the Report (by Right-Clicking Mouse then “Translate to English”) can see there is much more of interest in the Japanese Diamond Report.

Pete

↧

China's SeaWeb Undersea Surveillance Network

June 2, 2016, 1:25 am

≫ Next: Much in doubt for arms projects & companies after July 2, 2016 Election

≪ Previous: Japanese Report: Key Japanese Companies Were Not Interested in Exporting the Soryu

The HQ of each of the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army - Navy (PLAN's) Fleets are indicated, along with ship and submarine numbers in each. The undersea surveillance network particularly protects major ports - with (perhaps top) priority for China's 4 Yulin-Sanya (Hainan Island) based SSBNs (South Sea Fleet). (Map courtesy US Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress - Chinese Military Power 2016 on page 29)
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The following description of China's SeaWeb undersea sensor network is based on Prasun K. Sengupta's TRISHUL website article of April 15, 2016 which reported on DEFEXPO INDIA 2016 (March 28 -31, 2016). It indicates that China has developed/deployed its SeaWeb sensors relatively late compared to other major powers (eg. noting the UK's successful use of sensors, at Scapa Flow naval base in 1918).

China may give priority to sensor protection of naval bases and then seas in the following order: Bohai Sea, Yellow Sea, East China Sea and then South China Sea. Proximity of seas to Beijing may be one criterion. Officials and politicians in Beijing would be concerned about sub launched missile range to Beijing - this includes SSK launched cruise missiles. Also the smaller the sea (smaller in the north) the faster that sea can be "sown" with sensors by Chinese forces.

"China’s Undersea Trip-Wire

The PLAN’s seabed-based surveillance network, developed jointly by Ukraine [some current Russian, some ex-Russian Ukrainian interests] and China since 1996, has been under installation along China's territorial waters since 2012, with work expected to be completed later this [in 2016].

The seabed-based component of this network comprises arrays of hydrophones and magnetic anomaly detectors spaced along undersea cables laid at the axis of deep sound-channels roughly [“normal” orientated] to the direction that the arrays are to listen. This capability is next paired with maritime reconnaissance/ASW aircraft assets to establish a multi-tier ASW network. The first naval bases to be covered by this network were the PLAN’s submarine bases in four sites:

1. the Bohai shipyard at Huludao on the Bohai Sea [Huludao is about 400 km east of Beijing] where all nuclear-powered submarines are built;

2. the North Sea Fleet’s Xiaopingdao naval refit base near Dalian [see Dalian in map at bottom] where the SSBNs are fitted out for SLBM test-firings from the Bohai Sea across China into Delingha in the Qinghai desert and the desert of Lop Nor in Xinjiang;

3. the North Sea Fleet’s base at Jianggezhuang (Laoshan) approximately 18km east of Qingdao in Shandong Province;

4. and the South Sea Fleet’s bases at Longpo and Yulin at Yalong Bay near Sanya on the southern tip of Hainan Island.

Elements of PLAN's unersea sensor network. The sensors can be tethered or sit on the seafloor to track a submarine, a UUV's or Diver Delivery Vehicle's presence, direction and speed. The sensors can then surface or remain submerged when alerting other submerged or onshore communications nodes including (in wartime) missile batteries. (see more readable large image)

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As far back as 2001, a researcher at the PLAN’s Institute 715 had published a survey of ocean surveillance technologies that included a detailed discussion of the US SOSUS programme....Another analysis by several PLAN researchers in late 2012 discussed this station and military applications for its seabed-based sensors, alongside civilian uses, including environmental protection, navigation, and disaster prevention.

The analysis compared different configurations for seabed-based sensor networks, including linear, circular, and tree-type designs, and also evaluating their respective cost, security and reliability implications. It also mentioned the Xiaoqushan Station as the basis for a larger ‘East Sea Ocean Floor Sensor Network’ that will be completed by 2016. The analysis also mentioned undersea mobile sensor stations, as well as fixed seabed sensors.

China is not only deploying sensors for surveillance but, in wartime, as triggers for explosive destruction of unwelcome submarines. Once definitely detected China could send warheads small torpedos carried by cruise missiles, subrocs, aircraft or charges from mines (tethered, seafloor or mobile). More see Submaine Matters March 2016 article.

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In early 2013, China Science Daily’s March 26 edition opted to go public with the system by publishing a feature with the banner headline: “Here They Are Quietly Listening to the Ocean: The Whole Story of the Building of Our Country’s First Deep Sea Ocean Floor Sensor Network Base”. According to this article, R & D efforts had commenced in 1996 and an initial prototype of the seabed-based sensor system was tested back in 2005 in the waters surrounding the PLAN’s base at Qingdao in Shandong Province.

An additional site was selected for the Longpo naval base, and work formally commenced there in April 2009. Initial set-up was completed in 2010. The undersea-sensor system has since been integrated with a larger surveillance network that also has airborne and space-based components. Two articles appearing in mid-2013 in the technical journal Ship Electronic Engineering, confirmed that this network was now at an active deployment stage. One article discussed the technical challenge of energy supply by proposing a low-power ‘sleep-wake mode’, and mentioned the interesting additional problem that a country’s undersea sensors are subject to being captured by an adversary. Another article discussed the importance of advances in ‘burst communications’ for enhancing the military value of the seabed-based sensor network. A mid-2012 analysis in the naval magazine Modern Ships unequivocally confirmed the existence of PLAN’s network of seabed-based sensors.

The cover-story of a second quasi-official naval journal, Naval & Merchant Ships from mid-2013, similarly showed an acute PLAN sensitivity to its perceived vulnerability to Western and Japanese submarines. The central concern shown there was protecting the PLAN’s SSBNs, while the main threat vector mentioned was the USN.

(Map courtesy photos4travel)
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Pete

↧

Much in doubt for arms projects & companies after July 2, 2016 Election

June 3, 2016, 1:58 am

≫ Next: Report "Southeast Asian Submarine Developments" available to donors.

≪ Previous: China's SeaWeb Undersea Surveillance Network

This is the once in a fortnight comment on submarine and shipbuilding issues in the runup to Australia's July 2, 2016 Federal Election.

The table below compares two-party-preferred (2PP) polling (for the House of Representatives, Lower House of Parliament seats) by percentage for States and Territories in Australia. The Liberal/National Party (LNP) Coalition is the Current Government under Prime Minister Turnbull. The Australian Labor Party (ALP) is the main Opposition party.

Number of Lower House Seats by State/Territory (NSW largest with 47...)	LNP Govern -ment 2PP at 31/5/2016 (%)	ALP 2PP (%)	% Swing Against LNP Government since September 2013 Election
New South Wales (47)	51.5	48.5	2.9
Victoria (37)	46.0	54.0	3.8
Queensland (30)	53.1	46.9	3.9
Western Australia (16)	48.9	51.1	9.3
South Australia (11)	50.6	49.4	1.7
Tasmania (5)	46.7	53.3	2.1
ACT & NT (4)	48.3	51.7	Only swing in favour of LNP, 5.2
Total Australia (150)	49.8	50.2	Total swing against LNP 3.7 %

The current polling is almost exactly 50:50. That has been the situation for several months. If an Election were held tomorrow either Party could win. Even a party with a smaller vote (like 49.8% above) could win. If crossbenchers (Greens and Independents) are again prominent it makes the situation of submarine and shipbuilding projects even more unpredictable.

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ANALYSIS

Much is in doubt for arms projects and companies in the runup to the knife-edge July 2, 2016 Election.

In Australia a Party or Coalition can form Government if it has a majority of seats in the Lower House (of Representatives). Such seats = electorates are held by Members of Parliament (MPs). The Upper House is the Senate, the house of review, which can block legislation and make government unworkable. The Senate is often "hung" ie. the Government needs Senate minor parties and independents ("crossbenchers" that hold the Balance-of-Power) to form a majority to pass legislation. Legislation includes Defence budgets which include naval shipbuilding projects.

I just need to recount some history to explain the current situation:

2010 - Following the 2010 Election both the LNP and ALP only had a minority of Lower House seats amounting to 72 seats each. The ALP managed to attract the support of the necessary 4 Lower House crossbench MPs (1 Green, 3 Independents) to form a Government.

But the price was that the ALP Minority Government appeared weak and indecisive because it had to compromise with its crossbench MPs. The rivalry between ALP leaders Julia Gillard and Kevin Rudd only served to weaken the ALP Government's reputation. The crossbenchers did not support such defence issues as shipbuilding - so no new shipbuilding was authorised 2010-2013.

2013 - ALP weaknesses and a vigorous opposition effort by LNP leader Tony Abbott and actual co-Leader Peta Credlin led to the defeat of the ALP in the September 2013 Election. In 2013 the LNP won 90 seats versus 55 seats for the ALP (see right sidebar here).

CURRENT SITUATION

In all except its decisive plan for naval shipbuilding the Turnbull Government has appeared weak and indecisive. Turnbull has failed to initiate new and necessary tax revenue raising policies. This has hobbled his Government's ability to pay for key civilian programs (health, education, welfare and industrial support).

Also Turnbull has reason to watch his back because he remains unpopular with the still Abbott-Credlin influenced conservative elements in the LNP.

So readers impressed with shipbuilding under the Turnbull Government may have gained an unrealistic impression of how potent the Turnbull Government really is.

The ALP Leader Bill Shorten enjoys the united support of the ALP (in all but illegal immigrant policy).

What this means is that the Turnbull LNP Government has returned to the weak, indecisive, default position of many/most Australian Governments. This often means minority parties and independents in both Houses of Parliament get elected and hold the Balance of Power. If Turnbull or Shorten need MPs from the Greens to form Government the anti-defence Greens may slow down some submarine/shipbuilding projects in favour of civilian spending.

The Senator Nick Xenophon (NXT) Team is a new and minor party that supports shipbuilding and other centrist causes. NXT may do well in South Australia (perhaps 2 Senate spots and one MP). It is difficult to predict how NXT will do outside of South Australia.

If the ALP has the most seats it may form Government and divert substantial sub/shipbuilding work (first Offshore Patrol Vessels 2018-, then Future Frigates 2020- ) towards ALP heartland Victoria.

Also if the ALP wins the quiet and efficient Marise Payne will no longer be Defence Minister. The way the submarine and shipbuilding projects were part decided and announced in April 2016 was unusually decisive and efficient by the usually low standards of other Ministers who have "served time" (their attitude) in the Defence portfolio.

So conditions for arms companies could change with little warning after July 2, 2016.

Pete

↧

Report "Southeast Asian Submarine Developments" available to donors.

June 8, 2016, 3:18 am

≫ Next: Serious Industrial issues for TKMS following DCNS's Aus Sub Win

≪ Previous: Much in doubt for arms projects & companies after July 2, 2016 Election

(Map courtesy US Centers for Environmental Information).

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1. I have emailed the first Submarine Matters Special Report to donors.

- Report subject is Southeast Asian Submarine Developments.

- This report is more than 1,250 words.

The report concentrates on the four Southeast Asian nations (Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia) that have submarines and discusses the chances of the other seven nations buying submarines. There are many reasons why submarines will be bought or not. Two reasons are strategic priorities and sea levels around a country (see map above).

If you wish to receive Southeast Asian Submarine Developments and subsequent monthly reports please donate (see upper right sidebar) then email me at pete74730@yahoo.com.au

2. I am reopening the COMMENTS facility, at the bottom of future Submarine Matters articles, to
all (except spammers) .

Regards

Pete

↧

Serious Industrial issues for TKMS following DCNS's Aus Sub Win

June 9, 2016, 2:52 am

≫ Next: Nuclear Propulsion Advocated in Major Australian Document of June 7, 2016

≪ Previous: Report "Southeast Asian Submarine Developments" available to donors.

The German Navy's sub Type 212A U36 at TKMS' Kiel Shipyard

(Photo courtesy AP via n-tv(dot)de June 6, 2016)

This Submarine Matters article mainly draws on German media sources spotted by a friend. Translating using right-click then “Translate to English” is handy.

On June 1, 2016 several news outlets carried an Agency France Press (AFP) article DCNS is seeking submarine tie-up with ThyssenKrupp. DCNS has long suggested it and ThyssenKrupp band together to face new competition from Chinese, Indian and South Korean arms companies. DCNS rightly indicated that during ThyssenKrupp’s initial period of disappointment ThyssenKrupp was unlikely to respond positively to DCNS.

Germany is still angry. Anger is over at least 7 published issues and for the inherently imprecise nature of Australia’s CEP, versus a tender, which would have been preferable. Germany and Japan also wonder whether DCNS won due to DCNS unique advantage of being able to offer nuclear propulsion to Australia in the longer term.

But the anger has been tempered by the hope that a German bidder will win Australia’s Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) CEP later in 2016. The announced shortlist of 3 bidders for that CEP includes 2 German bidders, Fassmer and “Lurrsen”.

TKMS is, to a degree, heartened by ongoing submarine orders in the Asia-Pacific including:

- 2 x Type 218SGs being built in Kiel for Singapore

- providing parts for South Korean assembled Type 214s (for South Korea)

- parts for 2 x South Korean assembled 209s for Indonesia

- 1 x 209 to be assembled in Indonesia, and

- largely secret assistance in designing and assisting South Korea in building the future

KSS-III 3,400 tonne (SLBM armed) submarines.

TKMS also hopes to help India build 4 to 6 Type 214s for Project-75(I for India).

However, with the Australian loss, TKMS does not have enough submarine or surface shipbuilding business (over the medium 5+ year term) to keep all of its German workforce employed.

By June 6 there was increasing news of criticisms of TKMS from German shipbuilding unionists with calls for a review of management. Future job security, for around 3,500 shipbuilding workers and 600 "temporary" (casual?) workers, is a major issue.

European shipyards are threatened by defence cost cutting from their own governments. Increasing business from Asia-Pacific countries is valued highly but even there European arms sellers need to compete against Russian and Asian arms companies.

ThyssenKrupp AG's share price dropped sharply after high level leaks indicated TKMS and Japan had lost the submarine CEP, while DCNS had won. The leaks were quickly confirmed by Prime Minister Turnbull on 26 April 2016. (Graph courtesy German Kursdaten Telebörse, 8 June 2016)

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Pete

↧

Nuclear Propulsion Advocated in Major Australian Document of June 7, 2016

June 10, 2016, 2:13 am

≫ Next: US dry submersible program – Russia Blazed The Way

≪ Previous: Serious Industrial issues for TKMS following DCNS's Aus Sub Win

Peter Jennings, Executive Director of the Australian Strategic

Policy Institute (ASPI)

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The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has produced a strongly worded briefing paper:

Agenda for Change 2016: Strategic choices for the next government, of June 7, 2016, [100 page PDF, 6.1MB]. A major purpose of Agenda for Change 2016 is to discuss a subject effectively blocked by political interests from being proactively discussed in the 2016 Defence White Paper [10MB]. That subject is the place of future submarine nuclear propulsion as a serious option for Australia. It argues Australia should "Prepare the ground for submarine nuclear propulsion" in order that this propulsion can be used in Australian submarines by the 2040s

Agenda for Change 2016 is intended for the incoming Australian Government that wins the July 2, 2016 Election and for public consumption. Major contributors to the briefing paper include:
- former Defence Minister and former Ambassador to the US, KimBeazley
- Executive Director of ASPI Peter Jennings,
- Graeme Dobell, Shiro Armstrong and ASPI analysts.
- and it is edited by Malcolm Davis.

Agenda for Change 2016, also covers non-nuclear topics including:
- concluding a major war,
- redesigning ANZUS cooperation,
- and reorienting the Australian defence industry to export markets.

Chapter 1 THE STRATEGIC AGENDA [pages 10 to 18] by Peter Jennings

[page 10, "Key recommendations] "• Prepare the ground for submarine nuclear propulsion."
[page 12, "New policy challenges] "• Prepare the ground for submarine nuclear propulsion".

Prepare for submarine nuclear propulsion

The major nuclear propulsion discussion is on pages 15 and 16:

[page 15] " It’s been an article of faith since the 2009 Defence White Paper that Australia’s next submarine will be conventionally powered, using a combination of diesel and electric propulsion. Although geography imposes a unique requirement for our submarines to have extended range, nuclear propulsion (which essentially gives submarines unlimited range) has been off the agenda for political reasons. That’s unfortunate, because the capabilities required for our future submarine would in many respects be better performed by nuclear-powered boats. Readers will appreciate the irony of Australia selecting the French-designed Shortfin Barracuda—a nuclear submarine that will be adapted to conventional propulsion.

It may be that community thinking on nuclear power is changing. The South Australian Government is conducting a royal commission into the nuclear fuel cycle. In particular, the royal commission is examining the viability of expanding mineral extraction, processing and manufacturing, the use of nuclear fuels for electricity generation and the disposal of nuclear materials. [6. See the terms of reference for the royal commission, online] Waste storage may offer a valuable industry for South Australia if safety issues can be properly addressed."

[Significantly Peter Jennings Chaired the Expert Panel& Community Consultations for the 2016 Defence White Paper (2016 DWP). I've bolded parts for emphasis. In strong wording:]

"In the defence field, the expert panel that advised the Australian Government on the 2016 DWP found in its 2015 community consultation that there was a strong public desire to understand the details of how nuclear propulsion might serve Australian interests. The panel recommended that the government ‘identify an opportunity to explain the “pros and cons” of nuclear propulsion for submarines.’[7. Defence White Paper Expert Panel, Guarding against uncertainty: Australian attitudes to defence, 2015, p. ix, online.] This didn’t happen in the 2016 DWP, nor indeed at the announcement of the preferred submarine design, which was accompanied with a risible 13-paragraph media announcement.[ 8. Prime Minister of Australia, Future Submarine Program, 26 April 2016, online] Unsurprisingly, a good deal of the public reaction to the White Paper and submarine design decision continues to seek further information on the issue. The 2016 DWP does, however, offer this somewhat cryptic remark:

During the long life of the new submarines, the rapid rate of technological change and ongoing evolution of Australia’s strategic circumstances will continue. As part of the rolling acquisition program, a review based on strategic circumstances at the time, and developments in submarine technology, will be conducted in the late 2020s to consider whether the configuration of the submarines remains suitable or whether consideration of other specifications should commence. [9. Australian Government, 2016 Defence White Paper, paragraph 4.29, online.]

This could be hinting that nuclear propulsion may be considered a decade or more from now. However, no Australian Government in the 2030s or later will be in a position to adopt nuclear propulsion unless earlier decisions have been taken to prepare the ground for such a major development. In 2016, Australia has no viable option other than conventional propulsion for our future submarines because the Navy, the wider Defence establishment and Australia’s industry and infrastructure are simply not at the right level of capability to crew, operate and support nuclear-propelled submarines. Nor should we assume that the US as our key ally would be willing to give us access to some of its most carefully guarded military technology without Australia first demonstrating a serious intent to operate and support nuclear propulsion systems. Getting to that point will require a sustained investment effort to build a cadre of trained nuclear technicians, industry specialists and Navy crew able to work with nuclear propulsion systems.

After the 2016 election, the Australian Government should start to scope out what steps might sensibly be taken to create a realistic option for nuclear propulsion at the end of the 2020s. A key part of this strategy should be to have an open discussion with the Australian people explaining the basis for the submarine design decision. Government should consider the following steps:

1. Commission an expert panel to evaluate necessary steps to position for a nuclear propulsion option. The panel should produce a public discussion paper setting out the challenges, risks, opportunities, financial cost and industry requirements necessary to support this technology.

2. As Adelaide is being positioned to be the centre of continuous ship and submarine construction in Australia, the federal and state governments should jointly develop a plan to strengthen university-level instruction in physics, nuclear engineering and necessary supporting sciences based in South Australia.
-----------------------------------------

[page 16]

3. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) should develop a training program in collaboration with the US Navy and potentially the French and UK navies for officers and other personnel involved in operating nuclear propulsion systems.

4. The Defence Science and Technology Group should do its own scoping study to determine Defence’s science and technology requirements to support a move to nuclear propulsion.

5. Defence, in conjunction with other government agencies, will need to determine how to establish an appropriate safety regime to manage nuclear propulsion systems, and quantify the investment needed to make naval bases and support systems suitable to accommodate nuclear submarines.

6. Defence should discuss with the US the possibility of seconding significant numbers of RAN personnel in to the US Navy submarine arm. Beyond the nuclear propulsion aspect, this has a number of benefits: the RAN can grow its own cadre of submariners, which it will have to do to prepare for the future submarine, and we will be able to enhance alliance cooperation with the US Navy in a critical area of strategic interest to both countries.

These six steps point to the very substantial investment needed to make the capability leap to nuclear propulsion. They also point to the reasons why nuclear propulsion has been off the table for Australian Governments up to now. This is no small step. The 2016 DWP is, however, quite right to say that changing technology and strategic circumstances might well force an Australian rethink about nuclear propulsion. The responsibility of the government we elect in 2016 should be to do what’s needed to enable a government in 2026 or later to make realistic decisions about nuclear propulsion".

[page 17] "Conclusion

The diversity of these four recommendations - concluding a major war, redesigning ANZUS cooperation, planning for nuclear propulsion and reorienting the Australian defence industry to export markets - shows the enormous task expected of the Australian Government. Most particularly, the Defence Minister will play a central role in delivering on these policy suggestions. It’s regrettable that since the publication of the last Agenda for reform paper in August of 2013 we’ve had four defence ministers (Stephen Smith, David Johnston, Kevin Andrews and Marise Payne) in less than 36 months. For any new policy initiative to get traction and to make a difference, we need the next Defence Minister, indeed the next

[page 18] government, to prize stability in cabinet positions—in the old phrase, ‘good process delivers good policy.’ To that nostrum one might add the thought that experienced ministers who have received adequate sleep and aren’t prone to panic are the sponsors of good processes. Australia needs these capabilities more desperately now than at any time since the end of the Cold War.

See the whole of ASPI's Agenda for Change 2016: Strategic choices for the next government, of June 7, 2016, [100 page PDF, 6.1MB]

SUBMARINE MATTERS COMMENT

Peter Jennings' comments on the politicians is timely, frank and fearless. He may be right that there needs to be a lead time of 20+ years to prepare the way for nuclear propulsion.

The South Australian nuclear fuel cycle royal commission actually delivered its Final Report in May 2016 to very little public interest or discussion (so far). This could be because both the South Australian Government and Federal Government have been very tentative in suggesting action this side of the July 2, 2016 Election and other milestones they can procrastinate about.

However, even if Australia spent 10s of $Billions on fuel-cycle raising infrastructure, eg. enrichment and/or reprocessing facilities, actually refueling submarine reactors is another thing. Refueling and servicing submarine reactors is a highly specialised science and art. The K15 reactors on Barracuda SSNs present a major refueling problem as it would need to be done every 7 to 10 years.

Perhaps if Australia could avoid decades of moving up the nuclear fuel cycle by purchasing or leasing Virginia SSNs with reactors that do not need refueling during the 33 year life of those submarines. "...a cadre of trained nuclear technicians, industry specialists and Navy crew able to work with nuclear propulsion systems" could perhaps be trained in pre-existing US facilities rather than Australia duplicating training facilities here. This is noting the US already has a track record of sharing its facitilities, training, SSBN, SSN and submarine reactor secrets with the UK since the 1960s.

A similar case is Australia pre-paying F-35s. Australia has been part of the US based F-35 program for around a decade, buying some F-35s that have remained in the US for years, with Australian pilots training on these F-35's using multi-$Billion US training facilities for several years. Australia has not needed to duplicatethe multi-$Billion US training facilities or reinvent many of the high-tech technology.

Please connect with many Submarine Matters articles over the last 7 years including:

- French Attack Submarines (SSNs) For Australia? First Published March 31, 2009

- Australian Nuclear Submarine Option may be realizable April 19, 2012

- Australia's Future Submarine - Virginia Class Best Option, November 29, 2012

- Australian Nuclear Submarine Option - Virginia SSNs of February 10, 2015 and others.

Pete

↧

US dry submersible program – Russia Blazed The Way

June 12, 2016, 2:55 am

≫ Next: Funky Carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth and the SRVLs

≪ Previous: Nuclear Propulsion Advocated in Major Australian Document of June 7, 2016

Italy’s Giunio Santi Engineering (GSE) in cooperation with General Dynamics - Electric Boat is developing the acronym filled “GSE Trieste 'Button 5.60' - UOES3 dry-SDV” dry mini-sub (Photo courtesy H I Sutton in Covert Shores)

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As this US Defense Department document of 2011indicates there has been a US requirement for a battery powered dry submersible for at least 5 years.

SEALS and other Special Forces become tired in wet mini-subs where they have to wear scuba gear. The water can also be freezing making them exhausted and cold before they even hit the beach

Scout Warrior reports June 10 2016: US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and sub-maker General Dynamics Electric Boat have partnered up to develop a dry submersible mini-sub designed to more safely and efficiently deliver Navy SEALs into hostile, high-threat areas beneath the surface of the ocean.

The 10 meter long underwater vehicle, called the User Operational Evaluation System (UOES), can carry as many as six people. It is currently being tested and developed through a three-year, $44 million SOCOM firm-fixed price design, build and deliver contract.

Ideally dry mini-subs can fit into dry deck shelter (DDS) that sits on a submarine back behind the sail/fin of large submarines. Maybe even the future Shortfin! (Diagram courtesy HI Sutton in Covert Shores)

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It takes a very special set of engineering kills to build such a small dry sub which is still operationally viable so SOCOM turned to proven European designers, among them Italy’s Giunio Santi Engineering (GSE). Italy has a rich heritage of building devastingly effective mini-subs and diver delivery vehicles.

Some of the navigational technology used on a mini-sub includes a sonar Doppler velocity log which bounces a signal off the bottom of the ocean to help provide essential mission-relevant location information – as demonstrated 12 seconds into this unrelated DCNS Youtube.

Seperately on June 7, June 2016 H I Sutton discusses a competing bid for the User Operational Evaluation System (UOES) program from Lockheed Martin’s S302 Dry Combat Submersible (DCS) design

Rough specifications or requirements for the UOES solution may be.

Length: 9.36m (31ft) (vs 7.25m / 24ft fr S301i)

Beam: 2.34m (7.7ft)

Height: 2.34m (7.7ft)

Weight: 14,000 kg (31,000lb) loaded

Depth rating: 100m (328ft)

Maximum lock-out depth: 30m (98ft)

Endurance: 24hrs +

Range: 60nm @ 5kt

Speed: At least 8kt

RUSSIA'S MINI-SUB WITH ALL THE BELLS AND WISTLES

Due to US geography - with its coasts 1,000s kms serious enemy shores Special Forces carrying mini-subs usually need to be piggy-backable in the dry deck shelters of much larger submarines.

However for some in the US Navy may want a near-seas option (longer than 60nm, on battery, range). As Russia has demonstrated diesel engines may be necessary or perhaps quieter fuel-cell AIP.

The Russian Project 865 Piranha-Losus mini-sub

The 'Piranha' was (or maybe still is?) a dedicated Russian special forces operations craft capable of delivering 6 men to a target over 400 miles from its base.

Useful diagrams and photos of Piranhas are again at H I Sutton's Covert Shores. A Piranha is a solution ideal for a country bordering small seas, like the Baltic, parts of the Mediterranean and maybe the Caribbean. At 30 meters long a Piranha was too large for DDS piggy-backing.

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Piranha's boasted (maybe still boast) diesel engines, electronic intercept capabilities, torpedos, diver lock-out chambers, and their own small diver delivery vehicles. Perhaps an excellent command for a junior officer before he/she works up to SSNs? Piranhas came in various sizes, with the middle size specs:

Propulsion: diesel-electric

2 to 8 x 400mm torpedo tubes

Diver lock-out chamber with ‘moon pool’ hatch in floor

4 x Sirena-UM 2-man Swimmer Delivery Vehicle (in torpedo tubes)

or 6-8 'Proton' diver propulsion devices

Length: 28.2 meters

Beam: 4.74 meter

Displacement: 218 tons surfaced, 287 tons submerged

Speed: Maximum 6.28 kts surfaced, 6.5kts submerged

Operating depth: 180m (200m max)

Endurance : 10 days, 603nm at cruising speed of 4kts surfaced, 260nm at 4kts submerged

Armament: up to 8 x 400mm torpedos (maybe smaller number of 533mm instead).

Crew: 3 or 4

Special Forces: 6

Possible sitings of Russian Piranha mini-subs in the Baltic, off the Swedish coast, are reported in Submarine Matters articles of October 25, 2014 and January 15, 2015.

Pete

↧

Funky Carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth and the SRVLs

June 13, 2016, 3:05 am

≫ Next: Many In Japanese Government Relieved Japan Did Not Win Submarine Bid

≪ Previous: US dry submersible program – Russia Blazed The Way

In non-submarine news, several weeks ago the captain took control of UK aircraft carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth, at Rosyth Dockyard in Scotland. The 65,000 to 71,000 tonne, conventionally propelled, Queen Elizabeth and its sister-ship Prince of Wales, will be the second-largest carriers in the world, after the USS Nimitz-class carriers. Then third, after the first US Nimitz sized Ford-class is commissioned.

The UK carrier program was to be a joint UK-French venture but France strongly wants to stay with nuclear propulsion. France is relying on heavily utilising its nuclear Charles de Gaulle rather than building a second or third carrier.

Only the US can afford to simultaneously operate supercarriers dedicated to fixed-wing and amphibious assault carriers (with helicopters, Ospreys, STOVL Harriers and F-35Bs).

Queen Elizabeth is due to start sea trials in March 2017. Flight trials with helicopters will begin in 2017 and F-35B flight trials towards the end of 2018. An "operational military capability" will be declared in 2020.

The Queen Elizabeth was designed primarily to carry the mainly F-35B air wing (up to 40 max). A typical warload, however, might be be 24 F-35Bs and some helicopters. These could be a Maritime Force Protection package of nine anti-submarine Merlin HM2 and five Merlin Crowsnest for airborne early warning; alternatively a Littoral Manoeuvre package could include a mix of RAF Chinooks, Army Apaches, Merlin HC4 and Wildcat HM2. Command and control of all four armed services (if you counted Royal Marines as independent) might be challenging.

Shipborne Rolling Vertical Landings (SRVLS)

The F-35Bs will likely adopt shipborne rolling vertical landings (SRVLs) on the carrier's deck. With a rolling vertical landing the aircraft uses downward jet thrust to hover while it is still moving fast enough to also generate wing lift and on hitting the deck will rely on its computer controlled disc brakes.

SRVLs may not require clearing as much of the deck as conventional fixed wing arrested landings. SRVLs will also enable the F-35B to land on the carrier with an increased weapon and fuel load compared to straight vertical. Straight vertical landings often meant jettisoning weapons and dumping almost all fuel.

SRVLs can also reduce the level of wear on the lift engines and extend their operational life. However a number of defence analysts have suggested that operational SRVL landings may only be possible within a limited range of sea states and praying that the computer controlled breaks work.

Pete

↧

Many In Japanese Government Relieved Japan Did Not Win Submarine Bid

June 14, 2016, 2:47 am

≫ Next: An Abbott Defence Ministry May Offer Japan Hope

≪ Previous: Funky Carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth and the SRVLs

Both Prime Minister Abe (above) and MHI President, Shunichi Miyanaga (below) were/are deeply unhappy with Japan's loss in the submarine bid. But many in the Japanese Government are not grieving.

In early June 2016 an anonymous with connections in Japan’s military-industrial complex, commented that Japanese attitudes to losing the bid to sell submarines to Australia were complex and had several levels of meaning.

As is well known Prime Minister Abe was very pro sale but how he instructed government departments to push the sale is less well known. After Japan was defeated by China in the Indonesian high speed rail contract (in September 2015), the Prime Minister's Office ordered the Ministry of Defense (MoD) “Do not fail in the submarine bid.” But the peak Japanese National Security Council (NSC),which is answerable to the Prime Minister, became the Government Headquarters for the submarine bid, not the MoD. Possibly due to bureaucratic rivalry many considered the NSC’s orders nonsense. This included such orders as “Go to Australia to lobby for the subs every month”. The MoD considered this all very odd and consequently it was not inspired to do much selling.

The Japanese Navy (Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force (JMSDF) was highly negative because of concerns about information security. This particularly concerned Japan exporting its high yield pressure hull steel (NS80, NS90 and NS110). See mentions in this Submarine MattersTable. Other sensitive technology was the snorkel system and related technology. This was apparent from:

1. Japanese journal SHIPS OF THE WORLD No 321, Sept 2015, page 108.

2. Sankei Shinbun April 27, 2016. The JMSDF were negative about submarine exports, but PM Abe and his office rushed to export. KHI and many below the top of MHI worried about leakage of secret information.

3. Nikkan-Gendai (news online) writing about the defeat of Japanese bid. (http://www.nikkan-gendai.com/articles/view/news/180342/4which could be translated as “the truth of the matter about the bid is that, Abe's push was premature. Building Soryus required special building techniques which could not be duplicated in Australia. Meaning Japan was lucky that it lost.”

The peak leadership of MHI was very serious about the bid and was shocked by the defeat. In late 2015 MHI had experienced major losses due to delivery delays for two cruise liners for Germany’s AIDAprima Cruises. This encouraged very powerful MHI President Miyanaga in his resolve that MHI should win the submarine bid as a key business reconstruction measure for MHI. Below Miyanaga the middle management and workers of MHI were negative about selling. Negativity among the workers included much harder work being expected of them but without a pay rise.

KHI, quietly most in MHI, JMSDF and MoD did not feel too depressed by the defeat of the Japanese bid after Prime Minister Turnbull’s April 26, 2016 announcement. Australia could have attempted to build Soryus in Adelaide, but, building the Soryu needs special technology and a skill base that has grown up around Japanese building methods. Despite this PM Abe wanted the submarine sale.

The special technology (and knowledge) includes not only NS110 (super high yield steel) and gas tungsten arc welding (to work NS110). But also the roundness of cylindrical hull critically effects submergence depth. An error of the roundness needs to be less than 5mm for a cylindrical hull of that is 9.1 meter in diameter. This means a maximum error of 0.055% which is very difficult to achieve.

Anonymous feels that MHI and KHI have higher submarine technical skills than DCNS (with its paper Shortfin design) in most areas. But, MHI and KHI do not have enough ability in presenting. The defence business arms of MHI and KHI are mainly full of engineers rather than sales men and women.

PETE'S COMMENT

While sour grapes crossed my mind the above certainly indicates that there was insufficient consensus in Japan's military-industrial and political complex for the Australian customer to feel confident. Australia was right to be cautious about such a fragmented, hybrid, government-business sales "team".

Perhaps, in several years, the various Japanese players could have eventually worked together and with Australia to smoothly build the submarines in Adelaide, but it would have been high risk for Australia.

When Abe's orders were combined with the equally non-consensual brainstorms of Abbott's Prime Minister's office to:

- Buy from Japan

- Build in Japan and

- in a near "crash program" to start replacing the Collins in the mid 2020s,

We are lucky crisis was averted, or perhaps delayed. Fingers crossed.

Pete

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An Abbott Defence Ministry May Offer Japan Hope

June 16, 2016, 12:16 am

≫ Next: Japanese Nuclear Propulsion 1 - The Mutsu Episode

≪ Previous: Many In Japanese Government Relieved Japan Did Not Win Submarine Bid

If (current) Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull wins the July 2, 2016 Election, with a likely reduced majority, post election ministerial rearrangements are highly likely. A reduced majority would weaken Turnbull while strengthening the conservative wing of the Liberal Party, with conservatives still supporting deposed Prime Minister Tony Abbott (above).

Despite Abbott's public denials Abbott still intends to return to power. Perhaps first Abbott might be appointed Defence Minister and then he may attempt to unseat (current) Prime Minister, Turnbull, later this year.

The following may be of concern to DCNS but may offer hope for Japan:

Australia's SkyNews reports, June 16, 2016:

"...Mr Turnbull is said to be facing pressure from within Liberal ranks to give his predecessor a promotion.

Some have suggested Mr Abbott be given the defence ministry.

Cabinet minister Peter Dutton conceded Mr Abbott had the backing of some within the party for a ministerial job....”

COMMENT

What could Abbott in charge of Defence (including the submarine contracts) mean for the not yet legally finalized DCNS submarine decision?

Pete

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Japanese Nuclear Propulsion 1 - The Mutsu Episode

June 17, 2016, 2:07 am

≫ Next: DCNS, ASC Putting Shortfin Build Partnership in Place

≪ Previous: An Abbott Defence Ministry May Offer Japan Hope

Mutsu photo (Courtesy http://jolisfukyu.tokai-sc.jaea.go.jp/fukyu/tayu/ACT95E/06/0601.htm)

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Mutsu Diagram (Courtesy)

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S has located a chapter in Japan's history that is surprising. That Japan developed and utilised "dual-use" nuclear reactor propulsion to power the ship Mutsu in the 1970s to 1992.

In Commentsin mid June 2016 S identified Japan’s one public example of a nuclear propulsion for a ship.

Japan's Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) built a nuclear propelled ship, the Mutsu, nearly 50 years (1968-1970). Mutsu's had a 36 MW Mitsubishi pressurised water reactor (PWR). The reactor was completed in August 1972. Low enriched (less than 20% U235) Uranium was loaded into the reactor in September 1972.

Minor radiation (neutrons and gamma rays) emanating from Mutsu's reactor during workup assessments, at sea, in September 1974. This was misinterpreted by the Japanese press as a leak of radioactive substances. The ray "leakage" was only equivalent to twice as much as the usual "radiation" from an old-style television picture tube.

With this press coverage the Mutsu's future became a high profile anti-nuclar issue. Local fisherman blocked Mutsu's return to her home port for more than 50 days.

“The Japanese Government finally came to an agreement with the local government and fishermen. The Mutsu was allowed back to port on condition that it was to find a new home port, and the ship returned to Ōminato on 15 October.

In Sasebo, between 1978 and 1982, various modifications were made to the reactor shield of the Mutsu, and its home port was moved to Sekinehama in 1983. Following an overhaul, the Mutsu was completed in February 1991. She then completed her original design objective of travelling 82,000 kilometres in testing, and was decommissioned in 1992. Over 25 years the programme had cost (about US$ 1.2 billion).” [quite a modest sum for reactor development.]

But Mutsu had a second life - after its reactor was removed in 1995 it was renamed the (non-nuclear) Mirai.

During and after the Mutsu experience Japan's Atomic Energy Agency has not planned, built or purchased a nuclear propelled ship.

S Comments

Building nuclear submarines is technically possible for Japan and many in the Japanese Navy (JMSDF) would be happy having Japanese nuclear propelled submarines. But public and political anti-nuclear sensitivities in general and memories of the Mutsu, have blocked any serious thought of Japanese nuclear propelled submarines. Even if the Japanese Navy built nuclear submarines, no local governor of a Japanese prefecture would permit such a submarine to enter a port.

Pete's Comment

This is also noting that Japan's major submarine bases are Kure (in Hiroshima Prefecture) and Yokosuka (near extremely populated Yokohama-Tokyo). It is odd that US nuclear propelled submarines and the US Seventh Fleet supercarrier share the Yokosuka base - but that is a nuclear political paradox.

An isolated naval base in Japan would probably need to be built to permanently base Japanese nuclear submarines. Australia has a similar problem in that Fleet Base East (Sydney Harbour) could not serve as the number two base (including emergency porting) for any future Australian nuclear submarines.

The military value of a Japanese civilian ship reactor is that it represents a dual-use technological testbed for future miniaturisation and increase in power output (100 MW would be a submarine minimum). This is a necessary preliminary for a mature submarine reactor.

The state of national nuclear knowledge to build a marine reactor has almost been the exclusive preserve of nuclear weapon states:
- Historical developments show that it is generally harder to develop a marine reactor than it is to develop thermonuclear weapons. Put another way almost all nuclear weapon states only managed to build a marine reactor after they had developed an H-Bomb. Japan's ability to develop a marine reactor casts an interesting impression on its ability to develop nuclear weapons.
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Next week S and Pete will complete Japanese Nuclear Propulsion 2 - further down the technological track towards a Japanese submarine reactor capability.

S and Pete

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DCNS, ASC Putting Shortfin Build Partnership in Place

June 18, 2016, 12:13 am

≫ Next: New Coatings, Possible LIBs, for Italy's Next Todaro Class / Type 212As

≪ Previous: Japanese Nuclear Propulsion 1 - The Mutsu Episode

Pete's Comment - In about 2030 ASC will be launching Shortfins (faster, quieter, world class, bold and cutting edge) maintaining ASC's Collins and Air Warfare Destroyer (above) standards. (Photo courtesy ASC)

IHS Jane's Defence Weekly, June 17, 2016 reports:

"DCNS and ASC negotiate new commercial partnership for Australia's future submarines"

Jon Grevatt, Bangkok - IHS Jane's Defence Weekly

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