Quantcast
Channel: Submarine & Other Matters
Viewing all 2347 articles
Browse latest View live

China Winning the Aid to Philippines Auction

$
0
0
Duterte cosying up to the Chinese flag and, even more, loving China's cash. (Photo courtesy Kami)
---

COMMENT

Duterte is unscrupulous in openly courting cash from countries to fill his coffers. This is Duterte's Aid Auction. From his visit to China Duterte stands to score US$22.5 Billion. Can the US or Japan counter with higher bids?

Duterte is talking of a visit to Putin's Russia, perhaps soon. Will Putin try to buy Duterte as well?

ARTICLE

Thee following paragraphs are excerpts from the Los Angeles Times, October 20-21, 2016 http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-philippines-us-20161020-snap-story.html

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte announced [October 20, 2016] that he was “separating” from the United States and embracing China as the new best friend of the Philippines.

During the visit, China and the Philippines are signing agreements for US$13.5 billion in trade deals. The Philippines also said China had committed itself to US$9 billion in low-interest loans. And the Philippines offered to open negotiations with China over disputed fishing waters in the South China Sea, a surprising change of policy given that an international tribunal in the Hague had ruled in July against China’s claim of historic rights to the waters.

[Duterte said] “I’ve realigned myself in your ideological flow and maybe I will also go to Russia to talk to Putin and tell him that there are three of us against the world — China, Philippines and Russia,’’ he said. And as an added slap, Duterte mimicked an American accent and said: “Americans are loud, sometimes rowdy. Their larynx is not adjusted to civility.’’

At least for now, Duterte made no reference to cancelling the mutual defense treaty with the United States, which dates back to 1951. The previous U.S.-friendly administration of Benigno S. Aquino III had agreed to allow the United States stepped-up access to Philippine military bases, and that agreement apparently remains in effect.

Duterte’s announcement is a blow to the Obama administration’s much-heralded “pivot” to Asia. U.S. diplomats had previously pointed to warmer relations with Manila — and tensions between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea — as evidence that the policy was succeeding.

…other countries in the region — presumably Japan and South Korea  are similarly "confused" by Duterte's outbursts and "where this is going ... what it portends." See WHOLE LA TIMES ARTICLE.

BACKGROUND: CHINESE AND US MONEY TO THE PHILIPPINES 


Following are some details of the Philippines' two main bilateral relationships [with China and the US]:

- In 2015, Philippine exports to China were $6.4 billion, to the United States $8.8 billion.

- In the same year, Philippine imports from China were $10.83 billion, from the United States $7.21 billion.

- China had provided the Philippines $115.33 million in official development loans and $5.7 million as grants as of December 2014. The United States has provided $1.15 billion in grants to the Philippines as of June 2015.

- About 250,000 Filipinos lived in China, Hong Kong and Macau as of December 2015. About 6 million Filipinos live in the United States.

- About 454,000 American tourists visited the Philippines in the first half of this year. About 400,000 visited from China, Hong Kong and Macau.

- Filipinos in the United States remitted $8 billion in 2015. The figure from Filipinos in China, Hong Kong and Macao was just over $1 billion.

- Washington has designated the Philippines, a former colony, as a major non-NATO ally. The two countries signed a mutual defense treaty in 1951. While the United States closed its bases in the Philippines in 1992, the two countries have signed a deal allowing increased U.S. military presence on a rotational basis and storage of supplies and equipment for maritime security and humanitarian missions.

- Manila will receive about $120 million in U.S. military aid this year, the largest sum since 2000 when the American military returned to the Philippines for training and exercises after an eight-year hiatus.

Cost of Lithium-ion Batteries One Major Reason Why RAN Won't Adopt Them

$
0
0
A friend, with a wide knowledge of submarine battery usage rates and pricing, advised in late September 2016:

JAPANESE CONTEXT

Japan is adopting new technology Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) for the two Soryu Mark 2 submarines (27SS and 28SS)(see SORYU TABLE  below)  as well as the new Japanese class submarines (29SS onwards).

LIBs represent a major future submarine technology, but Japan may be the only (or at least the first) country that is fully moving to LIBs for newly commissioned submarines (ie. 27SS from 2020 onwards). The increased cost of LIBs appears to be one of the major reasons other navies are not shifting to LIBs.

The budgets for future Japanese submarines (including 27SS, 28SS and 29SS) suggests that LIBs are AUS$130 million (for one 6 year replacement cycle) more expensive than the existing LABs per Soryu submarine.

According to cost calculations (by the Japanese government) of mass produced LIBs, the equipment cost accounts for around 30% of total cost. So the cost of a battery modules consisting of 10 LIBs for the Soryu Mark 2s (27SS/28SS) is estimated as 1.5 million yen. This is significantly less than the actual cost of around 20 million yen and suggests that in very low volume production of submarine LIBs, the equipment cost accounts for more than 90% of total cost.

AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT

In constrast the Royal Australian Navy’s (RAN’s) appears to have rejected LIBs in favour of sticking with current Lead-acid Battery (LAB) technology. 

When increased LIBs/submarine costs are considered over Australian 12 Shortfin submarines operating for 30 years, each with twice the quantity of LIBs than Soryus, and considering LIBs need replacing every 6 years, then you get the following estimate:

(+AUS$130 million per sub) x 12 subs x 2 (amount of LIBs per sub) x 5 (replacements) = AUS$15.6 billion higher than if the Shortfins used LABs.

Putting costs in context - assume DCNS proposed the LAB cost for the whole Shortfin program, over the Shortfin's 30 year lives, would total AUS$50 billion. Then assume the RAN used LIBs instead - then Australia would be pay the extra AUS$15.6 billion,hence totalling AUS$65.6 billion just for LIBs over the operating life of the Shortfins. Quite large figures.

But as the LIBs cost reduces with increases in production of LIBs, the adoption of a Japanese submarine by the RAN woud have considerably reduced price of LIBs (e.g. from 20 to 12 million yen per unit battery module).

SORYU TABLE (with earlier Oyashios) as at October 21, 2016

SS
No.
Build No
Name
Pennant
No.
MoF approved amount ¥ Billions & FY
LABs, LIBs, AIP
Laid Down
Laun
-ched
Commi-ssioned
Built
By
5SS Oyashio
8105 Oyashio
SS-590/ TS3608
¥52.2B FY1993
LABs only
 Jan 1994
Oct 1996
Mar 1998
 KHI
6SS-15SS
Oyashios
10 subs
8106
-8115
various
SS-591-600
¥52.2B per sub
FY1994-FY2003
LABs only
 Feb 1994
Mar 2008
 MHI
&
KHI
16SS
Soryu Mk 1
8116
Sōryū
SS-501
¥60B FY2004
LABs + AIP
Mar 2005
Dec 2007
Mar
2009
MHI
17SS
8117
Unryū
SS-502
¥58.7B FY2005
LABs + AIP
Mar 2006
Oct 2008
Mar
2010
KHI
18SS
8118
Hakuryū
SS-503
¥56.2 FY2006
LABs + AIP
Feb 2007
Oct 2009
Mar
2011
MHI
19SS
8119
Kenryū
SS-504
¥53B FY2007
LABs + AIP
Mar 2008
Nov 2010
Mar
2012
KHI
20SS
8120
Zuiryū
SS-505
¥51B FY2008
LABs + AIP
Mar 2009
Oct 2011
Mar
2013
MHI
No
21SS
No 21SS built
22SS
8121
Kokuryū
SS-506
¥52.8B FY2010
LABs + AIP
Jan 2011
Oct 2013
Mar
2015
KHI
23SS
8122
Jinryu
SS-507
¥54.6B FY2011
LABs + AIP
Feb 2012
Oct 2014
7 Mar 2016
MHI
24SS
8123
Sekiryū
SS-508
¥54.7B FY2012
LABs + AIP
Mar 2013
2 Nov 2015
Mar? 2017
KHI
25SS
8124
Seiyū
SS-509
¥53.1B FY2013
LABs + AIP
22 Oct 2013
13 Oct 2016
Mar? 2018
MHI
26SS
8125
SS-510
¥51.7B FY2014
LABs + AIP
2014
?
Mar 2019?
KHI
27SS First
Soryu Mk 2
8126
SS-511
¥64.3B FY2015
LIBs only
2015
2017?
Mar
2020?
MHI
28SS  Second
Soryu Mark 2
8127
SS-512
¥63.6B FY2016
LIBs only
2016?
2018?
Mar 2021?
KHI
29SS First of
New Class
?
?
¥76B FY2018
LIBs only
?
?
2023?
MHI?
Table courtesy of information provided to Submarine MattersLABs = lead-acid batteries,  AIP = air independent propulsion, LIBs = lithium-ion batteries. ¥***B = Billion Yen.


CONCLUSIONS

So, not only do LIBs present a new technology, with the RAN reluctant to take increased project and operating risks adopting them, but the substantial extra costs of LIBs are a reason the RAN appears to be rejecting the LIB option.

Put against the increased risks and cost of LIBs is the higher fully submerged range and higher fully submerged speed performance they provide, compared to LABs alone. See some related comparitive figures for CollinsLABs vs TKMS Type 212ALABS+AIP vs Soryu LIBs. IF a future Australian submarine avoided imminent destruction because it had LIBs then the risks and costs of having LIBs might turn out to be worth it.

Pete  - Some translation and the Conclusions.
Friend – Most translation, all the calculations, data and views.

Israel seeking three Dolphin III subs from Germany - perhaps 1st delivered 2027

$
0
0

Israel plans to by 3 new submines for delivery in the late 2020s. They will likely be called TKMS Dolphin IIIs. Israel aleady has 3 Dolphin II subs (last one to be received 2017) + 3 Dolphin Is = 6 submarines. (See cutaway of Dolphins above. Note the 12 torpedo/missile tubes (4 to 6 more than usual) to take nuclear land attack missiles. The image is much larger/more readable here.)

Israel's announcement that it plans to buy three new (and larger) submarines will maintain its desired level of six submarines. 

See more details in this article https://www.yahoo.com/news/israel-seeking-three-submarines-germany-report-094813311.html . 

COMMENT

To maintain Israel's fleet of 6 submarines Israel will introduce one (possibly 3,000 tonne) Dolphin III when retiring each of its aging-by-then Dolphin Is. The TKMS Dolphin Is were commissioned in 1999 (or later), non-AIP and derived from TKMS Type 209s. Note - to maintain the six submarine fleet Israel also has three Type 214 derived Dolphin IIs (with AIP). See curret Dolphin numbers here.

The most important mission of Israel's Dolphin submarine fleet is as nuclear armed second strike platforms. Iran is on top of the hit list.

The first of the three new submarines is due to be bought by, or delivered to, Israel in 2027. If larger they could be of the 3,000 tonne class that TKMS is designing with South Korea. Israel's current larger subs (the Dolphin IIs) are just 2,000 tonnes (surfaced).

At a very low "combined price of 1.2 billion euros ($1.3 billion) [for the three Dolphin IIIs]" it appears Germany is continuing the tradition of heavily subsidizing submarine sales to Israel. This is a German post Holocaust "reparations" policy.

A 3,000 tonne sub could:
-  have greater range/endurance time on station 
-  longer time totally submerged
-  accommodate more crew to minimise exhaustion and
-  can accomodate larger/longer range/heavier warhead missiles (fired vertically or horizontally).

Pete

Cost of Lithium-ion Batteries One Major Reason Why RAN Won't Adopt Them

$
0
0
A friend, with a wide knowledge of submarine battery usage rates and pricing, advised in late September 2016:

JAPANESE CONTEXT

Japan is adopting new technology Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) for the two Soryu Mark 2 submarines (27SS and 28SS)(see SORYU TABLE  below)  as well as the new Japanese class submarines (29SS onwards).

LIBs represent a major future submarine technology, but Japan may be the only (or at least the first) country that is fully moving to LIBs for newly commissioned submarines (ie. 27SS from 2020 onwards). The increased cost of LIBs appears to be one of the major reasons other navies are not shifting to LIBs.

The budgets for future Japanese submarines (including 27SS, 28SS and 29SS) suggests that LIBs are AUS$130 million (for one 6 year replacement cycle) more expensive than the existing LABs per Soryu submarine.


According to cost calculations (by the Japanese government) of mass produced LIBs, the equipment cost accounts for around 15% of total cost. So the cost of a battery modules consisting of 10 LIBs for the Soryu Mark 2s (27SS/28SS) is estimated as 1.5 million yen. This is significantly less than the actual cost of around 20 million yen and suggests that in very low volume production of submarine LIBs, the equipment cost accounts for more than 90% of total cost.

AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT

In constrast the Royal Australian Navy’s (RAN’s) appears to have rejected LIBs in favour of sticking with current Lead-acid Battery (LAB) technology. 

When increased LIBs/submarine costs are considered over Australian 12 Shortfin submarines operating for 30 years, each with twice the quantity of LIBs than Soryus, and considering LIBs need replacing every 6 years, then you get the following estimate:

(+AUS$130 million per sub) x 12 subs x 2 (amount of LIBs per sub) x 5 (replacements) = AUS$15.6 billion higher than if the Shortfins used LABs.

Putting costs in context - assume DCNS proposed the LAB cost for the whole Shortfin program, over the Shortfin's 30 year lives, would total AUS$50 billion. Then assume the RAN used LIBs instead - then Australia would be pay the extra AUS$15.6 billion,hence totalling AUS$65.6 billion just for LIBs over the operating life of the Shortfins. Quite large figures.

But as the LIBs cost reduces with increases in production of LIBs, the adoption of a Japanese submarine by the RAN woud have considerably reduced price of LIBs (e.g. from 20 to 12 million yen per unit battery module).

SORYU TABLE (with earlier Oyashios) as at October 21, 2016

SS
No.
Build No
Name
Pennant
No.
MoF approved amount ¥ Billions & FY
LABs, LIBs, AIP
Laid Down
Laun
-ched
Commi-ssioned
Built
By
5SS Oyashio
8105 Oyashio
SS-590/ TS3608
¥52.2B FY1993
LABs only
 Jan 1994
Oct 1996
Mar 1998
 KHI
6SS-15SS
Oyashios
10 subs
8106
-8115
various
SS-591-600
¥52.2B per sub
FY1994-FY2003
LABs only
 Feb 1994
Mar 2008
 MHI
&
KHI
16SS
Soryu Mk 1
8116
Sōryū
SS-501
¥60B FY2004
LABs + AIP
Mar 2005
Dec 2007
Mar
2009
MHI
17SS
8117
Unryū
SS-502
¥58.7B FY2005
LABs + AIP
Mar 2006
Oct 2008
Mar
2010
KHI
18SS
8118
Hakuryū
SS-503
¥56.2 FY2006
LABs + AIP
Feb 2007
Oct 2009
Mar
2011
MHI
19SS
8119
Kenryū
SS-504
¥53B FY2007
LABs + AIP
Mar 2008
Nov 2010
Mar
2012
KHI
20SS
8120
Zuiryū
SS-505
¥51B FY2008
LABs + AIP
Mar 2009
Oct 2011
Mar
2013
MHI
No
21SS
No 21SS built
22SS
8121
Kokuryū
SS-506
¥52.8B FY2010
LABs + AIP
Jan 2011
Oct 2013
Mar
2015
KHI
23SS
8122
Jinryu
SS-507
¥54.6B FY2011
LABs + AIP
Feb 2012
Oct 2014
7 Mar 2016
MHI
24SS
8123
Sekiryū
SS-508
¥54.7B FY2012
LABs + AIP
Mar 2013
2 Nov 2015
Mar? 2017
KHI
25SS
8124
Seiyū
SS-509
¥53.1B FY2013
LABs + AIP
22 Oct 2013
13 Oct 2016
Mar? 2018
MHI
26SS
8125
SS-510
¥51.7B FY2014
LABs + AIP
2014
?
Mar 2019?
KHI
27SS First
Soryu Mk 2
8126
SS-511
¥64.3B FY2015
LIBs only
2015
2017?
Mar
2020?
MHI
28SS  Second
Soryu Mark 2
8127
SS-512
¥63.6B FY2016
LIBs only
2016?
2018?
Mar 2021?
KHI
29SS First of
New Class
?
?
¥76B FY2018
LIBs only
?
?
2023?
MHI?
Table courtesy of information provided to Submarine MattersLABs = lead-acid batteries,  AIP = air independent propulsion, LIBs = lithium-ion batteries. ¥***B = Billion Yen.


CONCLUSIONS

So, not only do LIBs present a new technology, with the RAN reluctant to take increased project and operating risks adopting them, but the substantial extra costs of LIBs are a reason the RAN appears to be rejecting the LIB option.

Put against the increased risks and cost of LIBs is the higher fully submerged range and higher fully submerged speed performance they provide, compared to LABs alone. See some related comparitive figures for CollinsLABs vs TKMS Type 212ALABS+AIP vs Soryu LIBs. IF a future Australian submarine avoided imminent destruction because it had LIBs then the risks and costs of having LIBs might turn out to be worth it.

Pete  - Some translation and the Conclusions.
Friend – Most translation, all the calculations, data and views.

Estimated Production Costs of Current-Future Lithium-ion Batteries for Submarine

$
0
0
Further to Submarine Matters' Cost of Lithium-ion Batteries One Major Reason Why RAN Won't Adopt Them, of October 21, 2016.

Thanks to new data, we have more insight into the price of Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs).

12 million yen/battery-module for LIBs is a reasonable price, though it looks very expensive. Both operating life and energy density of LIBs are twice as much as those of Lead-acid Batteries (LABs) according to Japanese Ministry of Defense (MoD). The price of LIBs actually corresponds to four times (=  twice operating life x twice energy density) the price of LABs.

Translation of Parts of Sources [1] and [2] Produces

"Quantitative Research on Scenario for Realization of Low Carbon Society”
 by Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST), Feb/16/2016, reference 2, page 9.

 "Construction of Technology Scenario based on Structuring of Basic Technology: Secondary Battery” by JST, on page 36, is Figure 2-5-3 Relationship between production cost (yen/Wh) and scale for lithium ion batteries
(Bars mean labor, equipment, utilities (electricity, etc) and raw material costs from top to bottom)

2.5.2 Calculation of Production Cost of Lithium Ion Battery by Sructuring Pocedure
(1) Calculation of Production Cost by Structuring of Production Process

Cost calculations show that the production cost of cylindrical LIBs with annual production scale of 10 GWh is 17 yen/Wh as shown in Figure 2-5-3 (standard case, middle). Raw material and utilities costs in variable cost are 77% and 4%, respectively. Equipment and labor costs in fixed cost are 15% and 3%, respectively. Raw material cost is highest.

TABLE 
Current Status and Future Senarios for Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) [based on Sources [1] and [2]?]


Current (2016)
FY 2020
FY 2030

Ni based battery
Ni based battery
Li2O based battery
Production Scale [GWh/y]
1
10
10
Yield [%]
66
90
90
Energy Density [Wh/kg]
250
340
500
Cathode/Anode
LiNi0.85Co0.12Al0.3O2
/graphite
LiNi0.85Co0.12Al0.3O2
/graphite
Co-Li2O/SiO
Cathode/Anode Capacity Density
[nAh/g]
200/300
270/380
440/2000
Ratio of actual capacity vs theoretical capacity of Cathode /Anode
0.71/0.78
0.97/0.99
0.75/0.75
Production Costs [Yen/Wh]



Variable Cost
Raw matterial
10.2
4.8
2.8
Utilities
0.5
0.4
0.3
Fixed Cost

3.2
1.4
2.1
Total Production Cost  [Yen/Wh]
13.9
6.6
5.2



COMMENTS ON TABLE

As the LIBs cost and efficiency estimates progress from 2016, to 2020, to 2030:

-  Production (in terms of GWh/y) Scale increases by a factor of 10.

-  Yield increases frrom 66% to 90. [how is Yield calculated?]

-  Energy Density, in Wh/kg, increases from 250, to 340, to 500.

-  Cathode/Anode substances change from LiNi0.85Co0.12Al0.3O2 /graphite  to  Co-Li2O/SiO

-  note that "Cathode/Anode Capacity Density [nAh/g]" AND  "Ratio of actual capacity vs 
   theoretical capacity of Cathode /Anode"

-  Production Costs (both Variable and Fixed) decline.

-  Total Production Costs, in terms of Yen/Wh, decline.

Other conclusions?

Friend - all the translation, calculations and data.
Pete - derived COMMENTS ON TABLE

Japanese Approaches That Reduce Hazards of Submarine Lithium-ion Battery Use

$
0
0
Japan's main submarine battery producer, GS Yuasa, does not advertise the secret Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) for its new class of Soryu submarines (the Soryu Mark 2s designated 27SS and 28SS). But a budding mole (probably already working for China) would find such LIBs in GS Yuasa's Large "Industrial and Military" (LIM) production division. Above is one of Japan's manned civilian submarines, the "SHINKAI 6500 Deep Submergence Research Vehicle" which, powered by GS Yuasa LIBs (driving a motor) can dive to 6,500 meters.
---

The safety of a submarine Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) system is essential, just like all systems on a submarine. Submarines, even in peacetime, are full of systems inherently dangerous to crews. Safety for LIBs is even more essential because:

i)   LIBs are a new technology for submarine compared to Lead-acid Batteries (LABs). LABs have been used since at least the 1880s (135 years ago). LIBs have never been used operationally.
ii)  the high energy density of LIBs (compared to LABs) makes them more prone to fire if their 
     design, management and monitoring systems are deficient or faulty.

Drawing on comments from Lithium-ion Battery (LIB) safety experts mid to late October 2016.

In Japanese LIBs for submarines, the manufacturer of even a single cell or battery has to satisfy:

i)    safety management system requirements and
ii)   product requirements.

Only a few Japanese manufacturers can conduct risk assessments and reduction measures for whole systems through a submarine's entire operational life. Satisfaction of all LIBs for submarine requirements needs detailed knowledge and comprehensive prior experience of providing LABs for submarine. This likely makes GS YUASA the appropriate LIBs manufacturer in Japan.

The LIBs process requires intensive identification of risks/hazards at all stages: production process, battery assembly, installation on the submarine, operation (see [1] below) on the submarine, removal from the sub and disposal of LIBs.

Analysis of hazard source, risk assessment and risk reduction are as follows:

i)    Modelling, Testing and Observation to identify and remove potential hazards and/or hazardous
       practices - such as recharging after over-discharging, Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC),
       shock resistance, etc - should be carried out,
ii)   risk should be assessed based on magnitude of effect and probability of hazard source, and
iii)  the performance targets of safety standards should be established and activities of risk reduction
       should be conducted.

In the above process the following approaches should include: Fault Tree Analysis, Failure Mode and Effects Analysis, and Safety Integrity Levels.

As an example of a Japanese standard on “secondary” lithium cells and batteries for a ship’s-electrical energy storage equipment is JIS (Japan Industrial Standard) C 8715-2 Secondary lithium cells and batteries for use in industrial applications-Part 2:Tests and requirements of safety Appendix E Establishment of target of safety level and risk reduction.


Secondary batteries (secondary cells or rechargeable batteries) must be charged first, before initial use, discharged into a load, and are typically recharged many times. LABs, LIBs and LSBs (described in a future article) are secondary batteries.

[1] HOW LIBS FUNCTION SAFELY WHEN ACTUALLY OPERATING IN THE SUB

Unsurprisingly Submarine Matters is particularly interested in how LIBs function safely when actually operating in the sub. The LIBs safety experts advise:

i)    LIBs should be operated within a specified temperature range (10C - 45C).
ii)   For lower temperature operation (under 10C) adequate measures, such as environment controls
       should be taken into account at the design stage to prevent thermal runaway caused by a 
       build-up of metallic lithium deposits.
iii)  A ventilation system, fire detector and a fixed fire extinguisher system should be fitted in the
       submarine. Carbon dioxide or nitrogen gas should be used as the extinguishing agent. Fresh
       water and/or sea water should not be used. Carbon dioxide is probably used instead of nitrogen,
       because carbon dioxide is heavier than air and nitrogen is lighter.
iv)   There should be highly detailed and complete understanding of effects on an operating sub’s:
        -  inclination in an aft/fore direction, port/starboard and at diagonal directions (noting the
           X-plane rudders) 
        -  vibration, and
        -  temperature effects on the electrochemical properties of LIBs (such as current-voltage, capacity-voltage, charge-discharge relationships and aging).
v)     As the above mentioned safety system of LIBs is quite different from that of LABs, thorough
        experimental then practical trials of the LIBs on the first two LIBs-only Soryus (27SS and 
        28SS) is very important. Simultaneously, a great many supplementary laboratory tests including
        "stress tested to destruction by fire" should be conducted. 

GENERAL BACKGROUND ON LITHIUM-ION BATTERIES (LIBS)

The Japanese Government and private industry have been methodically analysing the performance of Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) intended for use in submarines for more than a decade. Japan has actually been mounting LIBs during that time into older now-non-operational submarines designated "training" or more revealingly "testbed". LIBs may be the technology area that Japan has the greatest lead over its French (DCNS) and German (TKMS-HDW) competitors.

It appears that recent performance data on LIBs for submarine are kept very confidential by all 3 countries - on Commercial-in-Confidence and National Security grounds. This makes it very difficult to ascertain whether any of the 3 have superior or mature (for use on operational subs now) LIBs.

The US is also be developing LIBs for very small (ie. less than 30 tonnes) battery only Special Forces/SEALS Submarines. It is unknown whether the US Government (and US private industry) would exchange more LIB technical information with the US’s Pacific ally, Japan, or its NATO allies, Germany and France.

It is possible the Japanese Government (or companies) may share some LIBs technology with the US Government/Navy/companies under secret deals.

Please connect with Japan's Lithium-ion Battery Advantage..., October 15, 2015.

Authors:
-  The LIB safety experts - who did most of the research and most translation.
-  Pete and Local Helpers - some research and translation, the General Background.

Excellent Vietnamese Military (eg. Navy) Details/Commentary in The Diplomat

$
0
0
(Separate to The Diplomat article described below). The above map identifies Vietnam's main naval bases and the major vessel types in them. The Navy consists mainly of Russian built or designed vessels. The (potentially Klub missile armed) Gepard class frigates and Klub armed Improved Kilo submarines are the most powerful units. The TT-400TPs gunboats and Molniya corvettes are locally built. The Navy is orientated toward  low to medium level reconnaissance and warfare against Chinese aggression. This includes countering Chinese coast guard and naval militia "trawler" tactics  in the South China Sea. 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The continually high quality and informative website The Diplomat has produced an excellent 4,000 word (including graphs) article, Vietnam's Military Modernization. The article is dated October 28, 2016 and has a wealth of detail and commentary. The full article includes sections on Vietnam’s defence force modernization, (line, bar and pie) charts on the Defense Budget and arms imports in comparison to other ASEAN countries, Defense White Paper, Navy, Air Force, Ground Force, Missiles, ISR and Conclusion.

The article is by Zachary Abuza, PhD, Professor at the National War College (in Washington DC.) where he specializes in Southeast Asian security issues. The views expressed here are his own, and not the views of the Department of Defense or National War College. Follow him on Twitter @ZachAbuza. and by 

Nguyen Nhat Anh is a graduate of the University of Texas at Dallas, where he focused on International Political Economy. You can follow him on Twitter @anhnnguyen93


To convey an idea of its quality, the following is a 515 word extract of the 4,000 word article. The extract is on recent changes in the Vietnamese Navy including detail on its Kilo submarine force. I haven’t seen this quality of Vietnamese submarine detail elsewhere on the Internet.

“Navy

No service has benefitted more from modernization than the Vietnam People’s Army Navy (VPAN). Vietnam has acquired six Russian-built Kilo-class submarines, five of which have been delivered, and the sixth will arrive in early 2017. That gives Vietnam the most advanced submarine fleet in the region. Vietnam has already trained nine of 12 submarine crews and at least one submarine is currently patrolling without its Russian trainers and advisers. Vietnam surprised many when it successfully purchased submarine-launched Klub anti-shore missiles from Russia. Yet most evidence, to date, is that the ships are spending most of their training time on the surface, with only occasional dives, rather than prolonged underwater training missions.
Vietnam acquired two Gepard-class frigates in 2011, its largest and most modern surface warfare ships. Two more are currently under construction, to be delivered late 2016 or early 2017; these will be equipped with advanced anti-submarine warfare capabilities. A third pair is currently being negotiated.
Vietnam acquired two fast Molniya missile attack crafts from Russia. More importantly, it purchased the production license for six more that have already been built, and is currently negotiating the license to build four more. The new Molniya-class will have additional capabilities, including being armed with Klub ship-to-shore missiles, in addition to the existing Uran anti-ship missile. These will give Vietnam the ability to target any facilities China has constructed in the Spratly or Paracel Islands.
India provided a $500 million line of credit to Vietnam for the acquisition of Indian defense systems during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Hanoi in September 2016. There has been no information on exactly how that fund will be used, aside from $99 million allocated to produce an undisclosed number of patrol craft for Vietnam’s coast guard, including the license for Vietnam to begin local production. Vietnam may also move toward the acquisition of the BrahMos anti-ship missile (discussed below), though no agreement was reached during Indian Minister of Defense Manohar Parrikar’s visit to Hanoi in June 2016.
Vietnam is also trying to acquire niche capabilities to make up for shortfalls in its existing arsenal. One example is the Italian Pluto Plus mine-identification unmanned underwater vehicle, which was revealed in May 2016. It will assist Soviet 1960s Yurka minesweepers currently, but at the very end of their service life, with the VPAN. This acquisition also shows the VPA’s penchant for integrating older Russian systems with new Western weapons and equipment, and for looking westward for new purchases when it needs to. That being said, the skeleton of the VPA’s armory remains Russian, now and at least in the near future. And attempts at integrating Western and Soviet/Russian platforms have historically not gone well.
In sum, Vietnam’s naval developments to date have been impressive. Between 2011 and 2015, naval vessels accounted for 44 percent of defense imports. We expect in the coming years for Vietnam to continue with this trajectory, though at a slower rate as the new focus will be on the ground force. Maritime acquisitions will continue, yet the navy remains a small service arm that is unlikely to grow significantly.”
See the WHOLE 4,000 WORD ARTICLE at The Diplomat (subscription site) .

Russia set to unleash carrier aircraft and SLCMs on IS in Syria

$
0
0
COMMENT

In defiance of Western criticism of Russia’s air war over Syria President Putin is assembling a small armada (fleet) of Russia's only carrier, cruise missile firing ships and submarines to demonstrate that the Russian navy is again becoming a powerful force. Russia’s land based aircraft and missile forces in the Syrian region are already sufficient to attack Islamist rebels. But Russian inter-service rivalry demands (and other reasons - see FURTHER COMMENTS below) the Russian Navy also gets to demonstrate its land attack abilities.

Western forces have had long histories of three or four services (army, navy, airforce and marines) jockeying for position to get the lion's share of elective warfighting. Hence all services in UK and US forces in the Middle East's First and Second Gulf Wars wanted to serve there, no matter the iinefficiencies. 

Now Putin wants all to know its Russia’s turn to show what it can do in the Middle East. Western powers resent Russia's new presence in the Middle East. A particular concern is that Russia, as the second largest oil exporter, should not also have large military forces right next to the world's major oil exporter, Saudi Arabia.

RUSSIA ASSEMBLING LAND ATTACK WEAPONS FROM THE SEA

In late October 30, 2016 UK authorities were advised by Russia that it was sending three submarines  from north to south through the Irish Sea (between the UK and Ireland). These subs were from Russia's Northern Fleet, based in the Murmansk region. The subs may have stayed on the surface (in “innocent passage” mode) through the busy Irish Sea, to prevent collisions with ships, boats, rocks, avoid fishing nets and to avoid revealing submerged operational secrets to snooping UK ASW forces. 

The three subs consisted of two Akula SSNs  and one Kilo SSK. The Akulas and the Kilo can all fire Kalibr (3M14K variants) submarine launched land attack cruise missiles (SLCMs) through their horizontal torpedo tubes. They have no vertical launch tubes that I know of.

A sea baseed Kalibr land attack missile see the 3M14K (different reference) which may be approaching the performance of the US Tomahawk SLCM.
---

The blue arrow points to Tartus (Syria) Russia's only foreign naval base. A Russian fleet may tend to operate just offshore from Latakia (up the coast from Tartus) to be in closer carrier aircraft range to key targets (Aleppo and Islamic State HQ at Ar Raqqah). (Map courtesy Hashmonean). 
---

The subs are on their way to join the Russian Admiral Kuznetsov carrier group which is on station in the Mediterranean Sea, perhaps ready to strike IS in Aleppo or Raqqa, Syria. The group consists of the heavy nuclear propelled (and armed) missile cruiser Peter the Great, large destroyers/frigates Severomorsk and Vice-Admiral Kulakov and smaller maintenance vessels. 

No-one, this side of military intelligence agencies, would know what the Russian strike plans are. This is talking carrier aircraft dropping bombs and cruise missiles from the Russian subs. Also, in early October, it was reported that three small missile corvettes (MirazhSerpukhov and Zeleniy Dol), armed with Kalibr cruise missiles, had left Black Sea Fleet anchorages, with an expectation they were sailing into the Mediterranean for missile strikes on Syria (and accompanying the Kuznetsov group). 

All of these Russian vessels can get missile and bomb reloads from Russia’s Tartus naval, air and sigint base on Syria’s coast (see map above). The Syrian targets could include Islamic State, the Free Syrian Army,  al Nusra or other Islamist groups.

As stated in COMMENTS (above) for Russia to lay high explosive on Syrian targets the Admiral Kuznetsov carriergroup is not really needed. Ground attack aircraft already operate from air bases in the Tartus base region and long range Russian heavy bombers have been operating from Russia and reportedly Iran to hit targets in Syria. Russia also has short to medium range surface-to-surface missiles.

FURTHER COMMENTS

The reasons Russia wants to project land attack firepower from the sea then falls to:

1.  inter-service rivalries

2.  propaganda, showing Russia's/Putin's rising military might, 

3.  weapons testing under real operational conditions. Russian testing of its Kalibrs has not
     yet been fully refined. Russia has never used its carrier aircraft to drop ordinance on an enemy.

4.  the West has naval might in the region, so Russia, to a limited degree, wants to match this.

5.  Russian ship and submarine intelligence collection on Western naval forces, and

6.  Russia wants to demonstrate it has legitimate interests, that it will service militarily, in the
     Middle East.

Please connect this with Submarine Matters article Russian carrier Admiral Kuznetsov may conduct first airstrikes (against IS) of October 17, 2016.

Pete

Winning On The Melbourne Cup (Again)

$
0
0
Pete's horse (Almandin) wins the Melbourne Cup. (Photo courtesy News Corp Australia)
---

Those in the know will be aware that Australia's main day, that brings Australians together, is not:

- Australia Day

- nor ANZAC Day

- but Melbourne Cup Day (first Tuesday in November) a horse race watched on TV by most people
   in Australia and many in New Zealand,

So called "gambling luck" in horse racing is more a Skill in choosing horses, based on observing changes in the odds of a given horse winning. If the odds for Horse A become less favourable in the 3 days before a race - and on the day of the race - then Bookmakers have assessed that Horse A is more likely to win.

Basically the Bookmakers (nowdays large betting agencies) know more than me about Horse A's condition - but I can gain some of what Bookmakers know based on how Bookmakers change the published odds.

So today was my third year of choosing the Melbourne Cup winner and a place getter. For Melbourne Cup 2016 I bet on:

- the winner, Almandin (odds dropped quite sharply to 13 to 1), 

- third, Hartnell at (odds stayed the same at 5 or 5.50 to 1)

- and small amounts on 3 losers

Overall I doubled my money. 

Naturally betting on horses has relevance to statistical methods to detect hiding submarines. One thing to watch is changes in the rate of an enemy's signals traffic - a high rate may indicate a crisis involving the enemy's submarine.

"Betting" or Probabilities also has relevance to options and actions for a submarine's weapon use. An enemy SSK may prefer to use its torpedoes or ASCMs before it surfaces - if it is almost running out of oxygen - see Game Theory.

Pete

Military Intelligence Against Chinese Submarines and Traffic Analysis

$
0
0

Prior US intelligence gathering eg. of China’s Hainan Island Yulin/Sanya nuclear submarine naval base (above) can be (or is) very useful. (Photo courtesy mapsecrets via).

Military Intelligence Against Submarine Operations
Signals intelligence gathering by (sub or satellite) and sonar signature gathering by USNS Impeccable can act as a basis for further analysis of changing Chinese actions. This is in a low level confrontation scenario or a time of crisis (which may be a medium level shooting war). 
For example discerning a rise in traffic levels that are typical of an Type 094 SSBN or Type 093 SSNs putting to sea at unusual times may make interception by a US SSN or distant "tailing" easier. That a Chinese SSBN or SSN might put to sea at an unusual time would also say something about the Chinese political and military structures' state of mind (useful strategic intelligence).
Traffic analysis is a basic part of signals intelligence, and can be a source of information about the intentions and actions of the target. Representative patterns include:
·      Frequent (shore or satellite to submarine) communications — can denote planning

·      Rapid, short communications between naval command elements — can denote readjustments 

·      A lack of communication — can indicate a lack of activity, or completion of a finalized plan

·      Who talks to whom (eg. political leaders to admirals) can imply weapons-release or withdrawal
         by a submarine, and 

·      Who talks when — can indicate which stations are active in connection with events, which
         implies something about the information being passed and perhaps something about the
         personnel/access of those associated with some stations

This is the process intercepting and (real time computer) examination of messages to deduce information from patterns in communication. It can be performed even when the messages are encrypted and cannot be decrypted.

In general, the greater the number of messages observed, or even intercepted and stored, the more can be inferred from the traffic. Traffic analysis can be performed in the context of military intelligence, counter-intelligence, or pattern-of-life analysis, and is a concern in computer security.

Traffic analysis tasks are supported by dedicated computer software programs and supercomputers. Advanced traffic analysis techniques may include various forms of social network analysis.


Telephone exchanges are computer based as, of course, are servers. In computer security traffic analysis can involve an attacker gaining important information by monitoring the frequency and timing of network packets.

A timing attack on the SSHprotocol can use timing information to deduce information about passwords since, during interactive session, SSH transmits each keystroke as a message. The time between keystroke messages can be studied using hidden Markov models. A timing attack might recover passwords fifty times faster than a brute force attack.

Chinese sailors at Yulin Naval Base on Hainan Island should look over their shoulders - as they are being watched (by friend and foe) in so many ways.

Pete

China's Chengdu J-20 Shows Little Evidence of Stealth Capabilities

$
0
0

China'sChengdu J-20 (above) showed less stealthiness and less flying ability than the 26 year old Northrop YF-23 technology demonstrator. 

America's YF-23 (immediately below) supercruised in 1990 while the J-20 only managed moderate subsonic in 2016 - 26 years later.


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Below are some YF-23 plans. Is it possible China stole plans from an ex Northrop source to help design China's J-20?


--------------
COMMENTS

Submarine Matters studies, above water, jets sometimes. 


At one of China's major weapons PR events (the China International Aviation & Aerospace Exhibition, Zhuhai city, Guangdong Province) China showcased the beginnings of a technology demonstrator - which may become a Chengdu J-20 stealth fighter in a decade. 


The J-20 has:


-  the splayed out tail of a 26 year old YF-23 technology demonstrator, and 


-  canards like the Saab Gripen and some other fourth generation jets. 


Aircraft aficionados will recall that the YF-23 competed against and to the Lockheed YF-22 in 1991 in what effectively became the US stealth superiority fighter fly-off. China, like Russia and India, all have optimistic visions of developing stealth air superiority fighters in a mere 5-10 years time. This is unlikely. See the list of just some stealth requirements below.


STEALTH REQUIREMENTS 


1.  The easiest part is putting together impressive looking angles, by minimising verticals, to try to make the aircraft look flat - essentially a flying wing. Jack Northrop achieved a semi-safe flying wing  by 1943.


2.  The next most obvious attempted stealth qualities is how it moves using its jet engines. Recessing the engines so they will be less noisy and (most important) their heat signatures don't show much, and don't attract missiles, is difficult.


The F-22 can supercruise - the F-35 cannot. With relatively low fuel use an F-22 can rely on the "cruise" setting of its engines to achieve supersonic speeds. That is, there is no need to use loud, hot, after-burners. Afterburners flames can be seen at night, infrared detecters can also see them. Sensor/missile combinations can shoot after-burners users down. 


The ability of an engine to efficiently and regularly thrust-vector is also important to stealthy/Fifth generation air superiority fighters. In that respect Russia, and many other observers, believe China really made a long fought deal to receive examples of Russia's Su-35 fighter in order to reverse engineer the jet engines that the Su-35 uses. Creating a Chinese copy of Russia's AL-41F1S series engine may be a prime Chinese intention.


3.  Those with passive electromagnetic reception gear might be able to assess how unstealthy the J-20 radar, communications and other electronic emissions are.


4.  Those friendlies with distributed active radar pulses (without the ability to cue a jet in an airshow with their eyeballs) might want to assess how easily the J-20 can be detected and targetted.


5.  The radar absorbing presence and aerodynamic effectiveness of the J-20's Radar/Radiation Absorbent Material (RAM) coating (if it has any) would be the next checklist item in an assessment of the J-20's stealthiness. Assessing RAM may be difficult with a flying J-20 at a distance - much easier on the ground chipping off some RAM coating one foot away.  


See many of these aircraft stealth requirements here.




BACKGROUND

The Chengdu J-20 (not yet stealthy) fighter made its first mobile public appearance on October 31, 2016, at China's International Aviation & Aerospace ExhibitionZhuhai city,


The tentative, gentle movements of the J-20 in its only public flight - is captured in the Youtube above


The two flying J-20s looked flyable enough for their 25 tonne (near empty) weight and didn't test any major capabilities. 

Stealthy weapons bays, if there were any, remained shut. This might mean that the J-20s still need to hang highly unstealthy stores (bombs, missiles, sensor pods and fuel containers) from their wings and centerlines.


In terms of what is seen in the Youtube above it appears the J-20 is at least 25 years behind the F-22 in flight dynamics. However the Chinese are generally subtle in their conventional weapon testing. The J-20 may be capable of much more when the camera isn't looking.  

Report to Congress on the Virginia class Program Nov 3, 2016

"Indonesia's" Mini-Sub Likely TKMS+South Korean Designed

$
0
0
Indonesia's 22m long mini-concept-submarine was on show at the Indo Defence 2016 Exhibition (Jakarta).  Given a mini-sub's range-endurance limitations it might be used to keep an eye on Southeast Asian neighbours, East Timor or to monitor encroaching Chinese vessels in the South China Sea. (Photo courtesy IHS Janes 3 Nov 2016).
---
Drawing from two IHS Janes 3 Nov 2016 reports (hereand here):

Indonesia indicated at the Indo Defence 2016 Exhibition (Jakarta) that its Ministry of Defence and shipbuilder PT Palindo Marine may want to assemble a 22m concept mini-submarine in years to come. The mini-sub would be used for missions in the littorals, eg. near in-shore surveillance and special forces delivery [targeting Southeast Asia neighbours, East Timor, even monitoring northern Australia, comes to mind].

The proposers envisage a mini-sub with:

-  "22m" [perhaps 25m if it conforms with South Korean experience]
-  beam - 3m, 
-  max operating depth - 150m, 
-  endurance – 6  days [probably about 1,500nm]
-  crew – 5 + 9 [Special Forces or 3 operators for round-the-clock use of one workstation for
   Electronic Monitoring possible], 
-  max speed - 10kt (submerged), 
-  no internal torpedos or missiles [option of strap-on 400mm-533mm torpedos is possible later] also
   [ejected or diver delivered mini-mines or charges possible].

The German TKMS designed Type 200 mini-sub concept. TKMS's regional submarine licensee South Korea's DSME could (further) design/develop and deliver the parts to Indonesia for assembly. (Drawings courtesy Turkish Navy Shipbucket).
---

COMMENT

It is inevitable that Indonesia would not start from "scratch" nor "reinvent the wheel" in developing a mini-sub. In the high tech field of submarines utilising current contacts and designs is economically essential. 

It immediately occurred to me that Indonesia’s replacement submarine supplier South Korea (supplying 2 Chang Bogo Type 209s) is also a past, present and future user and designer of mini-subs. Indonesia may well be contemplating assembling German/South Korean concept subs which just happen to be in the 20 to 25 meter (long) class. 

South Korea's mini-sub experience includes its former use of the (175 tonne, 25m) Dolgorae class - see http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2015/06/philippines-increasing-interested-in.html .

South Korea could develop the German TKMS Type 200 concept. This is 25m long - see 
   http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2015/10/south-korean-hhis-hds-400-small.html. More specifically South Korea's DSME (being a TKMS licensee in the Asia-Pacic) could well (further) design/develop and deliver the parts to Indonesia for assembly (perhaps at PT Palindo Marine or PT Pal). The South Korean advisers already at PT Pal (for Indonesia's third Chand Bogo) could well work part-time assisting with the assembly of the "Indonesian" mini-sub, in years to come.

Pete

Reports to Congress on Columbia class (SSBN[X]) and Virginia class Programs

$
0
0
The following are two excellent reports to Congress by the USA's No.1 (overt) submarine analyst, Ronald O'Rourke "Specialist in Naval Affairs" writing for the Congressional Research Service (CRS). The reports are:

1.  Oct. 25, 2016 CRS report, Navy Columbia Class (Ohio Replacement) Ballistic Missile
     Submarine (SSBN[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress. (7-5700, ww.crs.gov


2.  As earlier reported in Submarine Matters, Oct. 25, 2016 CRS Report, Navy Virginia (SSN-774)
     Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress (7-5700, 
     www.crs.gov, RL32418) 


Pete

Intelligence Process - Speech from a Middle Level Humint Entity

$
0
0

Above is an illustration of an ideal Intelligence Process (diagram courtesy Joint Chiefs of Staff via wikipedia). What influences may make the Process less than ideal? (eg. UK-US political scares over WMDs?). For valid reasons there is now a proliferation of private intelligence consultancies in advanced Western nations.
---

COMMENT

Submarine Matters has no contact with any Australian or foreign government entities.

The following, for interest, is a speech from a middle level humint organisation.

Some of the politician's names (with wikipedia links) as they appear in the text, include:

-  Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies (1894-1978)
-  Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam (1916-2014)
-  Australian Prime Minister "Billy" McMahon (1908-1988)


SPEECH

“ASIS AT 60”

“Director-General Nick Warner gave the first ever public speech about ASIS on 19 July 2012 as part of the Lowy Institute’s Distinguished Speakers series.
Conceived in secrecy, the Australian Secret Intelligence Service has, unsurprisingly, spent the past 60 years operating in carefully cultivated shadows.

Over that time no Director-General of ASIS has, until today, made a public address concerning the role or nature of the organisation.

Some of you will know the story of our beginning. On a cold Canberra evening in mid-May 1950, Prime Minister Menzies, having served martinis to a select group of ministers and senior officials, including a colourful former army officer, Alfred Brookes, penned a letter to his British counterpart, Clement Attlee. A framed copy of the letter hangs outside my office door.

Menzies told Atlee that he had

"…decided to establish a Secret Intelligence Service which, when organised in due course, will operate in South East Asia and the Pacific areas adjacent to Australia. Recent developments in Asia and our 'near north' make this both a prudent and an urgent measure".

Concerned that the idea might leak, Menzies told Atlee:

"Knowledge regarding this scheme has been restricted to the fewest possible here, and for added security I have chosen to write in this way".

Atlee provided help with advice and training, and in May 1952 — just over 60 years ago — ASIS was formed. Alfred Brookes was appointed as the first head of the Service.

Menzies desire for secrecy stuck. Stories about ASIS didn't start to appear in the press until 1972, and ASIS's existence wasn't formally acknowledged publicly for another five years.

For the first couple of decades of its existence ASIS, small and Melbourne-based, was actually known to very few in the Canberra bureaucracy. In the 1960s some departments had only one or two officers briefed on the existence of ASIS.

Few people in government knew of ASIS's existence either. In 1960, almost a decade after the organisation's formation, Menzies, backed by his Defence Minister, decided that the then Minister for the Navy — John Gorton — had no need for a formal brief about ASIS, even though the Service was about to occupy a Navy facility.

Gorton eventually got his briefing when he became Prime Minister, but he in turn is said to have refused to allow the opposition leader, Gough Whitlam, to be briefed, as apparently did McMahon when he succeeded Gorton.

There have been a few times over the past 60 years when "knowledge regarding the scheme"— that is, of ASIS and its operations — has received widespread publicity in the Australian media.

And mostly this has been when things have gone wrong for one reason or another, sometimes the fault of ASIS and sometimes not.

In 1972 Prime Minister McMahon somehow found himself referring to ASlS's old codename — M09 — in a TV interview; there was the sacking of one of my predecessors, Bill Robertson, in 1975; and publicity in 1977 about operations in Chile undertaken on behalf of our allies. And some of you may remember the ill-conceived and bungled training exercise at the Sheraton Hotel in 1983.

So why have I decided today, after 60 years, to shed some light on ASlS's functions and contribution to the national interest? What's changed?

The fact is ASIS remains, at its heart, a foreign intelligence collection agency reliant on human sources. Its business always has, and always will, centre on human interaction, regardless of wider geopolitical or strategic influences.

Yet our world has changed utterly since ASIS was set up 60 years ago. Britain's empire has disappeared, the Cold War divide ended more than two decades ago, and a renascent East Asia, led by China, is now the prime engine of a truly global economy encompassing 7 billion people — nearly three times the world population at our inception.

The growth of new threats to Australia's national security in recent years has redefined and broadened the range of intelligence requirements. From a small, essentially regional body vitally focused on the Cold War, ASIS has evolved into a larger, geographically dispersed organisation helping to safeguard and advance our national interest on a broad front.

Over the past decade the changes have been particularly dramatic. The challenges of helping to prevent terrorist attacks, and providing the intelligence edge to Australian soldiers in the field, have impacted greatly on ASIS.

Our work has gained a new urgency and importance.

Undertaking supporting operations that achieve a direct outcome as distinct from our more traditional information gathering operations is now of increasing importance.

ASIS has needed to increase its operational capacity, and to be more innovative, creative and flexible.

We are now more integrated in our approach than ever before, working very closely with organisations like the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD). Operational and corporate collaboration is close and getting closer.

A consequence of that need for an integrated effort has been enhanced accountability arrangements, which in turn have resulted in a wider public awareness of the nature and scale of intelligence activities.

Still, there's little public awareness of ASlS's contribution to national security in helping to protect and advance Australia’s interests in our neighbourhood, of our support for military operations, and of our efforts in the areas of counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation, to name just a few.

This of course stems from the inevitable paradox inherent in publicising the achievements of an organisation whose activities are, by design, secret.

It's against this background that I think it's time to shed some light on the critical work being done by the men and women of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, and the unique contribution ASIS makes to our foreign policy and security.

I’ll focus on three key themes.

·       The changing role of ASIS and the contribution it makes to Australia's national security.
·        
·       The vital importance of risk management and the positive impact that more robust accountability processes have had on our intelligence effort.
·        
·       And finally how the changing international order is likely to impact on ASIS and its activities over the next 10 to 15 years.
·        
First, the role of ASIS.

ASIS's founders and first generation leaders, Alfred Brookes, Roblin Hearder and Bill Robertson (who sadly passed away last year) would barely recognise the ASIS of today.

In the mid-1950s ASIS consisted of less than 100 people, it had only a handful of very small stations, and its operational reach was restricted to a few countries in Asia and the Pacific. And ASIS's overwhelming focus during the early Cold War years was contingency planning in the event of another major land conflict in Asia.

But its core mission then, focused on the collection and distribution of foreign intelligence on those who might seek to undermine Australia's national interests, remains essentially the same today notwithstanding our vastly different circumstances.

ASIS is mainly in the business of collecting secret human intelligence or "HUMINT"— that is covert foreign intelligence obtained largely through intelligence officers managing a network of agents working overseas.

Intelligence in our particular realm can be defined as secret information gleaned without the official sanction of the owners of that information.

As far back as 1976 Justice Hope in his review of the intelligence agencies said that amongst the reporting ASIS had issued since its formation there were "diamonds", reporting of "considerable significance to Australia”. Today we are still producing diamonds but in greater quantities.

Of the thousands of secret intelligence reports now distributed by ASIS each year, many are produced by our officers from their contacts with ASIS agents (our sources) abroad. Other reports are obtained through our liaison with foreign intelligence services.

These reports cover everything from political developments, economic growth, defence modernization, and social cohesion in a particular country, to terrorist and insurgent planning and much more.

They form many of the building blocks of intelligence analysis by the Office of National Assessments (ONA) and the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO), are a significant input into the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in the formulation of foreign policy advice to government, and inform ministers of significant developments world-wide.

Good intelligence can assist government in many ways: it can provide early warning of planned terrorist attacks, information on insurgent networks, and more broadly, the intentions of potential foreign adversaries.

Our intelligence reporting can also improve the quality of strategic decision-making, assisting government in the prosecution of Australia's defence, foreign and trade interests, helping to enhance regional stability and avoiding strategic miscalculation. Intelligence can also become an active tool for disrupting the plans of others, including in areas such as cyber security and people smuggling. Intelligence reporting can be invaluable for law enforcement agencies. It can also be vital for Australia's military, helping our special forces and other units achieve tactical success as well as protecting our troops. This kind of intelligence work is now core business for ASIS.

At its heart ASIS has a cadre of highly trained intelligence officers who recruit and run agents.

Our intelligence officers are supported by ASIS Officers, who bring critical skills in operational analysis and reporting, technical capabilities, training and a diverse range of corporate services.

Most observers of the espionage game assume that gains come from putting more people on the front line to recruit sources. As important as that is, the complexities and significant risk of the business demand a substantial amount of support in the engine room, behind the scenes.

As well as collecting foreign intelligence and distributing it to government, ASIS also undertakes counter-intelligence activities to protect Australia's interests and, under ministerial direction, has the ability to conduct a range of sensitive operations abroad in support of our foreign and defence policy objectives. I’ll say a little more about this later on.

The undertakings ASIS makes to its agents and the way we deal with them is of central importance to the Service — they go to our core values of integrity, honesty and trust. ASIS doesn't use violence or blackmail or threats. And under the Intelligence Services Act of 2001, ASIS can use weapons in self defence to protect its officers and agents, but not to collect intelligence.

The way ASIS usually goes about its work necessarily needs to remain secret. So I won’t be talking in detail about the nature of current operations. What I can do though is give you a broad outline of ASIS activities in a range of areas.

Let me start with counter-terrorism.

Over recent years an important element of ASIS's operational effort has been directed at the terrorist threat to Australia.

The tragedy of the 2002 Bali bombings provided a great impetus to ASIS's work, which continues nearly a decade later. This event and 9/11, have seen AS1S intensify its focus on the very real threat posed by organisations like al Qaeda and the affiliates it has inspired — with a web of links between extremists from Australia to Indonesia, to the southern Philippines, to the FATA region in Pakistan, and to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen, and on to Somalia.

We know that the intention to conduct mass casualty attacks against Western countries, including Australia remains very real. We also know that many of these planned attacks are being conceived in places remote from Australia.

As the reach of terrorism has spread, so has ASIS had to expand its collection capability to the Middle East, South Asia and Africa.

We have for many years been involved in counter-terrorism capacity building with a range of intelligence partners to assist them to develop the professional and operations skills needed to tackle the extremist terrorist threat.

This training is important because it underpins the Australian whole-of-government strategy of assisting regional partners to have terrorists arrested and prosecuted in their own jurisdictions for the crimes they have plotted or committed.

Our counter-terrorism work involves not only collecting intelligence on the plans and intentions of terrorists groups but also working actively to disrupt their operations and to facilitate the work of law enforcement agencies.

ASIS, working with other Australian intelligence agencies and with law enforcement and foreign liaison partners, has been closely involved with the arrest and detention of dozens of terrorists in South-East Asia over the past decade — including in recent months.

Another important part of ASIS's efforts is focused on counter-proliferation.

The risk of nuclear proliferation and the spread of weapons of mass destruction remains a key challenge for Australia. ASIS has been tasked to interdict the flow of proliferation-related material and to support UN sanctions.

We work actively against companies overseas who attempt to trade in illicit and embargoed goods. This is a challenging target which requires a concerted effort by like-minded countries.

When countries choose to ignore or contravene UN efforts to control proliferation or to act against the letter and spirit of UN Security Council Resolutions there is a role for secret intelligence to expose these activities and to assist international efforts to disrupt the trade in WMD.

The threat posed by terrorist groups who might seek to acquire WMD is the ultimate nightmare for security planners and, of course, a prime concern for us and all of the Australian intelligence community.

Where terrorism intersects with counter-proliferation there is a clear but very challenging role for ASIS.

Starting with the Iraq war, support for the Australian Defence Force in military combat operations has become an important task for ASIS. We have a major commitment in Afghanistan, and this will remain as long as the ADF is deployed there.

Our work in support of the ADF ranges from force protection reporting at the tactical level through to strategic level reporting on the Taliban leadership.

ASIS reporting has been instrumental in saving the lives of Australian soldiers and civilians (including kidnap victims), and in enabling operations conducted by Australian Special Forces.

The ASIS personnel deployed with the ADF have developed strong bonds, and it’s difficult to see a situation in the future where the ADF would deploy without ASIS alongside.

The field of cyber operations is one of the most rapidly evolving and potentially serious threats to our national security in the coming decade. Government departments and agencies, together with corporate Australia, have been subject to concerted efforts by external actors seeking to infiltrate sensitive computer networks. DSD, ASIO and the Attorney-General's Department have a lead role in helping protect the government and business from such threats — as does ASIS.

Considerable resources are now being invested by the government to counter this threat and harden the defences of departments and agencies.

So far as ASIS is concerned, "HUMINT" has a role in identifying the source of these threats and revealing the underlying intentions of those probing our cyber realm. This will become an increasingly important part of ASIS's work in the years ahead.

ASIS also has a role in efforts to counter the activities of the people smuggling networks attempting to deliver people to Australia.

ASIS has contributed intelligence and expertise leading to many significant, and unheralded, successes in recent years which have disrupted people smuggling syndicates and their operations. ASIS provides unique enabling intelligence for exploitation by the AFP and other law enforcement agencies.

Having spoken about ASIS’s contributions to national security, let me also note that intelligence has its limits.

As the Independent Review of the Intelligence Community noted in its report last year, while Government can reasonably expect some success, balanced against risk and cost, to obtain intelligence that confers strategic and tactical advantage, intelligence is not a panacea for the actions of lone actors, or small groups undertaking acts of terrorism.

Likewise, the Review noted that intelligence can’t always predict major discontinuities and events, especially in closed societies, such as political and social changes occurring at the end of the Cold War, or more recently during the Arab Spring.

And HUMINT, by its nature, is an imperfect art.

Let me now turn to ASIS's foreign liaison relationships.

The Independent Review of the Intelligence Community judged that close relations between the six Australian Intelligence Community agencies and their international partners, especially long-standing allies, had provided "an enormous dividend" and was a "huge multiplier to the capabilities and effectiveness of our intelligence agencies".

Australia's national security now depends on a network of international intelligence partnerships that extends well beyond our traditional allies — the US, Britain, Canada and New Zealand — whose contributions remain of critical importance, particularly that of our major ally the United States. ASIS now liaises with over 170 different foreign intelligence services in almost 70 countries — where many close partnerships and vital links exist with agencies in North and South Asia, ASEAN, Europe and the Middle East.

Let me now go to risk and accountability.

A core part of ASIS business is risk management. Our work is inherently risky because we’re asked to do things that other arms of government cannot do. We have to manage risk across the whole range of our activity, from keeping our own staff and agents safe, to ensuring the integrity of our operational work and the validation of our sources.

A key element of risk management is our ability to remain secret and to operate in secrecy. In this, the protection of our agents is of critical importance. Agents won’t work for the Service unless they trust that we can protect them, and this goes to the methods we use to recruit and contact them.

ASIS understands the requirement for a very strong risk management framework and this is something that is central to the way we work. It draws on lessons learned and is guided by the legal framework under which ASIS operates.

Our approach to managing risk is assisted by strong external oversight mechanisms, including close consultation with government.

The 2001 Intelligence Services Act, for the first time, put ASIS on a statutory footing. The Act laid down the legislative basis for ASIS's work and provided a strong accountability framework to ensure that we operate in a lawful and ethical manner.

Our broad intelligence gathering priorities are set by Cabinet's National Security Committee. Approval for ASIS operations is given by the Foreign Minister under a set of rigorously enforced procedures and guidelines.

There is also scrutiny of our finances and administration by Parliament through the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security.

The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security provides independent scrutiny of ASIS operations, with the powers of a Royal Commission.

ONA regularly reviews the quality of our product, and the Australian National Audit Office scrutinises the ASIS budget on an annual basis.

Australians expect the actions of their intelligence agencies to be accountable and that ASIS act with propriety and in accordance with Australian law.

I can assure you ASIS is an agency with the highest levels of accountability and external oversight.

A few words now on the challenges ahead.

When Philip Flood produced his landmark review of Australia's intelligence agencies in 2004 he reported that ASIS was "going through perhaps the most substantial transition in its history in line with the changing security environment" as its role expanded and diversified.

That transition from a small agency whose role was focused almost entirely on the collection of secret foreign intelligence, to a fully-fledged intelligence service with wide reach, was completed successfully under my predecessor, David Irvine. Since the Flood review, ASIS has grown in size, capability, skill and in its positive contribution to Australian interests.

From my almost three years in ASIS I can tell you that its officers are highly-skilled, exceptionally professional in their operational tradecraft, and with a deep understanding of the issues they work on.

They are also acutely aware of the priorities of the Government they serve and committed to the kind of intelligence service Australia needs and the Australian people expect.

Sixty years on ASIS has evolved into a far-flung organisation with representation stretching right through our region to Central Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe and the United States.

While still a relatively small organisation with a budget of around $250 million, ASIS is now a key component of Australia's national security architecture. It makes a significant — I would argue disproportionate — contribution to Australia's security across a diverse spectrum.

Over the next 10 to 15 years, as Australia continues to grow and change, and the threats and challenges facing us evolve, ASIS will need to continue to adapt.

ASIS's operational sphere will become more challenging, volatile and dangerous than at any time since the Service's formation. Australia's strategic geography will dictate a requirement for high-quality, independent intelligence in the face of a much more dynamic international environment.

·       Some of the societies and countries ASIS focuses on will be less stable as a result of demographic trends, pervasive corruption and endemically weak government.        
·       ASIS officers will have to operate in denser, more complex urban environments in both developing and developed societies.        
·       The personal risk to our officers has increased in recent years and will continue to increase.        
·       The separate yet inter-related revolutions underway in information technology, nanotechnology, biometrics and materials technology will also fundamentally alter the environment in which our officers operate.        
·       Developments in cyber are a two-edged sword for an agency like ASIS. They offer new ways of collecting information, but the digital fingerprints and footprints which we all now leave behind complicate the task of operating covertly.        
·       Global competition for resources, not only for countries in North Asia, will become more acute as populations grow. Competitive tensions across regions will generate an increased demand for HUMINT and other intelligence reporting.        
·       Terrorist groups will have increasing opportunities to get their hands on WMD-related material. This will be a major concern for us and our partner agencies, and HUMINT will have a vital role in monitoring and disrupting the efforts of terrorists trying to obtain WMD.
        
All of this underlines the fact that ASIS is at a pivotal point in its development.

Our history and, in particular, the impressive progress of the past decade provide a strong foundation on which to build. But more needs to be done if ASIS is to deal effectively with the new and significant challenges we will face in the future.

A program of reform, restructure and revitalisation is now underway in ASIS to enhance the skills we will need to operate effectively in a shifting, globally-networked world.

Our biggest asset is our people. We need to focus on building a strong cadre of intelligence officers and ASIS Officers to enhance our operational structure.

About 40 years ago — after I left university and as a long-haired and scruffy youth — I went to an interview at Victoria Barracks in Melbourne, in an effort to join ASIS. It wasn't much of a process and I wasn't much of a candidate. I sat in a small office and chatted for an hour or so with an elderly, bespectacled man. I clearly didn't impress him. I didn't make the grade and then went off on a rather more eclectic career.

Now as Director-General — life can sometimes work in mysterious and satisfying ways — I’ve been gratified to find that ASIS continues to be as hard-headed and clear-sighted in its selection decisions. (I’ve also been gratified to find that our selection processes are now rather more comprehensive and sophisticated.)

Those who join ASIS are amongst the best young men and women Australia produces (women make up 45% of ASIS staff). ASIS offers unique challenges and a rewarding career for those who have a vital interest in Australia's future. Its staff are first class. While in films and books foreign intelligence work carries a reputation for mystique (and perhaps even glamour), the reality is that those who work for ASIS choose to do a complex and difficult job in secrecy, often facing tough environments, and without public recognition.

Sixty years ago Menzies saw the establishment of ASIS as a "prudent and urgent measure" in response to the many changes taking place in Asia and the Pacific. He was right to do so, and subsequent governments over the past six decades have been right to invest further in the development of ASlS's unique capabilities.

The coming decades will be demanding for Australia's intelligence community. However much technology continues to change the basis of intelligence collection there will always be a prime requirement for human intelligence — the kind of intelligence that can really make a difference and the work that is core business for ASIS.

A professional, capable and accountable Secret Intelligence Service is destined to play an even more central role in securing Australia's future in the decades ahead.

Nick Warner

Director-General
Australian Secret Intelligence Service
 
19 July 2012”

China sells (really donates) 4 naval vessels to Malaysia

$
0
0
The rise of China in Southeast Asia, at the zero-sum expense of the US, continues. 

On the occasion of the 30 Oct 2016 - 5 Nov 2016 visit of Malaysian Prime Minister "Scorpene" Razak to China, Malaysia has agreed to "buy" four Chinese "Littoral Mission Ships (LMS)".

These are 68 meter patrol vessels being bought for perhaps as low as US$7 million each. At such low prices that it is more like a Chinese military aid/donation.
-   this is Malaysia's first significant defense deal with China.
-   apparently two will be built in China and two built in Malaysia.
-   the LMS can operate a helicopter and mount missiles.
-   uses include coastal security, patrols and surveillance, disaster relief, search and rescue.
-   the LMS will be smaller, less capable and less expensive than the six stealth frigates Malaysia is
    buying from DCNS.
-  at 4 meters longer than the 64 meter Chinese built Durjoy class the LMS's for Malaysia are likely to
   displace about 700 tonnes.

 The four 4 "Littoral Mission Ships" (of 68m) China is selling to Malaysia (at donation price) may look like the Chinese built 64m long Durjoy-class used by the Bangladeshi Navy. Perhaps a helicopter can be squeezed on.
---

In return for this Chinese naval aid/donation Malaysia has pledged to handle South China Sea disputes bilaterally with China. So it can be concluded Malaysia won't utilise ASEAN, the US or use international legal structures (eg Court at the Hague)) to complain about China's claimed ownership of the South China Sea. 

Najib's visit follows that of Philippines President Duterte to China. The Trumpesquely undiplomatic Duturte used his Chinese holiday to announce the Philippine's "separation" from the US.

As well as the Philippines and Malaysia, China also has increasingly close relations with some other Southeast Asian nations, including:
-  Myanmar
-  Thailand
-  Cambodia
-  Laos, and
-  East Timor.

China has less warm relations with Vietnam, Singapore, Brunei and Indonesia. But the economic benefits China can bring may improve those relationships.

Pete

Zumwalt unlikely to fire its "golden" LRLAP Rounds - Agent Igor Reports

$
0
0

CLASSFIED - FYBSEO*


Above is a 5-inch Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM) [A]. The ERGM Program was prudently terminated by the US in 2008. But earlier, in 2005, the US imprudently commenced an ERGM replacement program (known as the 6-inch Long Range Land-Attack Projectile (LRLAP). Now (in 2016) the LRLAP may be history.
---

(VLADIVOSTOCK) This weeks’ Zumwalt-class,  LRLAP naval gun, $800,000 per round fiasco, has triggered vodka soaked rejoicing in Mother Russia. Agent “Igor” [B] confidentially reports Russia has cancelled its own decade long Long Range Land-Attack Projectile (LRLAP)-ski program on the strength of this latest capitalist balls-up. 

Decades after the US:

1. developed precision guided-missile-destroyers, and 

2. phased out effective large Iowa-class (16-inch, 406 mm) guns and completed since WWII heavy
     cruisers' 8-inch (203 mm) guns.

The US chose to throw many $Billions at:

3.  precision guided shells, and 

4.  extremely specialised, high risk, new technology, guns and special Zumwalt destroyer electrical
     systems, to fire them. 

Confirming an alternate reality planning approach, the "Advanced" Gun System on the Zumwalt [C] class destroyers is only designed to fire LRLAP shells. The fewer the Zumwalts (declining from 28 planned to 3) the higher the unit cost of the LRLAPs. 

The cost of one LRLAP Round (after all) is influenced by:

1.  huge research costs

2.  high, limited quantity, production costs

3.  high electronics handling and maintenance costs (compared to "dumb" rounds) when in ship's
     magazine 

4.  all inflated by the political package of Zumwalt+gun+LRLAP being "too big to fail".

The Zumwalt, in 2018, is likely to be commissioned with no ammunition for its $Billion dollar guns. 

PLEASE CONNECT WITH:

[A]  Regarding naval shore bombardment ops The ERGM/LRLAP Fraud.

[B] Igor's secret source details.

[C]  In a rare posthumous move Admiral Elmo Zumwalt has distanced himself from LRLAP lapping.

* This report has been provided to long suffering Program Managers' FYBSEO
   (for your bloodshot eyes only).

Pete

NOVEMBER Report to Donors "Team China's Arms Sales - Threat to Brand West/USA"

$
0
0

This Youtube was originally published on 29 March 2016. Trump's ignorance of foreign and defence policies is only matched by his certainty that he has a keen grasp of relevant realities. Hillary represents the continuities that US arms customers will recognise.
---


To Donors

I've been drafting the beginning of Submarine Matters monthly report over the last few days. 

Knowing the US Presidential Election result will strongly inflence the Report's wording and certainty. The title is provisionally: "Team China's Arms Sales - Threat to Brand West/USA".

Even if Trump loses...much damage has been done.

If the US Presidential Election results in a winner tomorrow (probably by Wednesday 9 November 7am Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) by my reckoning) I can complete tomorrow's (9 November, second Wednesday of the month) Report. 

But if the Election looks like being resolved a few hours later than Wednesday 9 November Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) I'll wait. If I'm waiting I'll tell you by altering this Submarine Matters article in thick bolded RED to let you know.

I'll then email the completed Report to Donors as a WORD attachment (the usual manner). 

For other readers wishing to receive "Team China's Arms Sales - Threat to Brand West/USA" please donate A$50. Please use the Donate Button on the righthand sidebar. Once I have received your Donation I will email this Report to you. Over the next 11 months I will then send you 11 more monthly Reports - that is one report on the second Wednesday of each month. 

Regards


Pete

"TRUMP HAS WON" INCREASING FEAR IN 20 MINUTES

$
0
0
(at Wednesday, 9 November 2016 at 5.05AM GREENWICH TIME (GMT))

If I'm reading http://www.sportsbet.com.au/betting/politics/us-election right - major betting agency's payout odds have reversed in favour of a prediction of Trump To Win!

- Yesterday   - Trump 4.75 vs Hillary 1.17

- Right Now - Trump 1.04 [indicates expectation of a certain win] vs Hillary 9.50


The Australian Stock Market (ASX) is becoming alarmed at an increasing prospect of a Trump win. "Live: ASX tumbles as Trump eyes White House Hotel" 
http://www.fool.com.au/2016/11/09/live-asx-falters-as-first-us-election-result-sits-on-knifes-edge/

A President Trump will liven up Submarine Matters in ways unexpected :)

Pete

At least 4 Reports Per Month to Donors - At no extra charge.

$
0
0
Image of  different Donald above. "TrumpFear" rules the Mainstream Media (MSM) after the MSM predicted/hoped-for his electoral loss. Trump's impact on US Defense Policy will also prove the MSM wrong and pleasantly surprised. Think Reagan's pleasant surprise - re the Soviet Empire. Above is a photo of Trump, Hillary and Trump's first two sons taken during the early (Bill) Clinton presidency (Photo see

--------------------------------------------------

Hi Donors

You may be wondering when this month's special Report will be sent to you. I'm still writing it - sorry. Meanwhile an avalanche of Mainstream Media (MSM) Trump Impact On Defense/Foreign Policy articles flood your databases.

The avalanche seems to assume no refinement of Trump's policy platform, The MSM write as if Trump will be President next week with no intervening influences over the next 13 weeks, from Obama's Presidency, Chinese, Japanese, European, Saudi or Russian influences or from other entities.

The good news is - I've changed Submarine Matters direction and will be writing one to two Reports per Week to Donors from now on - at no extra charge.  I'll email the next Report to Donors tomorrow, with the usual WORD attachment.

I will still aim to write at least two, short, articles for placement on the Submarine Matters' open website.

I'm seeing and writing things very differently to the MSM Avalanches, as Donors will see tomorrow.

Regards

Pete
Viewing all 2347 articles
Browse latest View live