Submarine & Other Matters

Map A. The Liaoning Carrier Group left the North Sea Fleet HQ Base (Qingdao) - followed the red line through the Miyako Strait - south, east of Taiwan - then moved west across the Bashi Channel (Luzon Strait) - then (unlike the map) it moved due west to Sanya/Yulin Naval Base, Hainan, China.

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Reports of the Liaoning carrier group's late December 2016 activity beyond the First Island Chain concentrated on surface warship details but, as usual, not subsurface details. Subsurface details therefore need to be imagined in the absence of harder information.

One or more Chinese submarines would protect the Liaoning carrier group by helping to prevent an enemy submarine getting between the carrier and the carrier's surface escorts. The carrier group zone that a Chinese submarine protects can be called the "Box".

The way I see it quiet Chinese SSKs (Songs, Yuans or in future Lada/Kalina similar Type 039Cs) would precede the group's movement by a day or two to protect the route of the group against submarines or against fast moving surface ship threats. Setting out early is necessary to allow the slow moving SSKs time to get into useful positions.

By using SSKs the amount of lead time may alert enemy submarines and other sensor platforms (eg. the Miyako Strait undersea array) that a carrier movement may be imminent. Use of SSNs for this long range lead-checking would have been preferable, but China has not had the time or the defence budget to develop sufficiently quiet SSNs or produce such SSNs in quantity. Chinese MPA (aircraft) and UUVs (in future) might also do lead-checking (also called "sanitising").

Still, a Chinese SSN or two within the Box may accompany the group. The noise of the surface ship engines may mask relative (to diesels and turbines) more quiet SSN nuclear engines.

As can be assumed from the youtube below the East China Sea, bordered by the Miyako Strait, is saturated with enemy sensors (including long range radars) and by weapons, including submarines and by anti-ship missiles and aircraft on island bases. In practice this saturation would preclude Chinese carrier movements in medium level warfare (shooting war) or high level (nuclear) warfare.

Submarine threats (or just infomation gathering against the Liaoning Group may include:

- Japanese (Oyashios and Soryus)
- US Los Angeles and Virginia SSNs
- South Korean Type 209s and 214s, and
- Taiwanese Hai Lung class

For the purposes of initial carrier group trials China is forced to use this "near seas" environment. Reasons include:

- this hostile submarine threat, and
- questions about the reliability of the Liaoning's propulsion (possible need to tow Liaoning at short
notice.

Also keeping Liaoning in the near seas is its inadequate protection from its airwing. Liaoning's airwing is still weak, with only 24 short range (due to ski jump launch) J-15 fighter aircraft. Liaoning therefore needs to operate under the "bastion" protection of aircraft and DF-21D anti-ship missiles on Chinese mainland and Hainan Island.

Long range Chinese airpower and SAMs on Woody Island and other South China Sea islands can also help protect Liaoning. Perhaps DF-21Ds and DF-26s will be based on South China Sea islands in future.

Like other Kuznetsov carrier derivatives Liaoning may utilise land (including island) air bases for its strike fighters to increase the fighter's range and weapons capacities. China's South China Sea island base building therefore has that extra value - not yet officially apparent. This is noting Russia's Kuznetsov has been sending its own fighters to land air bases in Syria.

Pete

Indonesia's Chief of the Armed Forces (TNI) General Gatot Nurmantyo running his own Indonesian political campaign, notionally against Australia.

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In early January 2017 Javanese born Indonesian Armed Forces Chief, General Gatot Nurmantyo accused the Australian military of posting anti-Indonesian (pro-Wester Papuan independence) material that offends Indonesia.

General Nurmantyo may continue to resent the expulsion of Indonesian forces in East Timor by Australian forces during East Timor's 1999 independence vote. "Back in March 2015, when [the Indonesian Army's] Chief of Staff, General Nurmantyo said efforts for East Timor to secede from Indonesia were a proxy war on the part of Australia to secure the oil field in Timor Gap."

Nurmantyo may now believe, or at least politically maintain, that Australia has designs on acquiring Indonesia's tense but resource rich province of West Papua. Like many in the Indonesian military General Nurmantyo appears impatient with civilian democracy (Indonesia, East Timorese and West Papuan).

This Indonesian military impatience is in the context of the military having a dual military-political role in Indonesia. This partly stems from Javanese patriots being seen as the revolutionary saviours who ousted the Dutch colonial masters from Indonesia in 1949 (in Indonesia's "National Revolution" or "War of Independence"). Many would add that the military is also a powerful economic force as well through running commercial enterprises and quietly taxing civilian businesses and officials.

The natural order of things in Indonesia are that Javanese generals are born to rule. Java is Indonesia's main island in terms of population and heritage. Indonesia's capital Jakarta is on Java. Javanese consider all Indonesia 1,000s of other islands to be "outer islands".

Indonesia's key leaders all share a Javanese and military heritage, including:

- Javanese born independence leader Sukarno (who was widely referred to as "General" and wore a general's uniform). He successfully led the independence struggle against the Dutch (1945-1949). He then became the first and founding President of Indonesia, ruling from 1945 to 1967. Sukarno made himself Dictator "President for Life" imposing a system of "Guided Democracy"

- Javanese born Gerneral Suharto was the second President of Indonesia (rising to power by coup) becoming Indonesia's Dictator between 1967 to 1998.

- the daughter of Sukarno, Megawati Sukarnoputri, became President from 2001 to 2004.

- Javanese General (retired) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono"SBY" became the popularly elected President between 2004 to 2014.

- Javanese General (retired) Prabowo Subianto was (unofficially) the military's candidate for President in Indonesia's 2014 Presidential Elections. Subianto is considered by many to be unscrupulous. He was beaten by a "mere" ordinary civilian, Joko ("Jokowi") Widodo (former Governor of Jakarta) who was not from Indonesia's military supported ruling class. Subianto might exploit disorder through using the military to "restore order".

QUESTIONS

1. Is General Nurmantyo's comments symptomatic of a military versus civilian power struggle in Indonesia. - With Widodo being seen as an upstart President with insufficient legitimacy.

2. Is General (retired) Subianto, having failed to become President in 2014, pulling the strings now in league with General Nurmantyo?

3. Is civilian authority in Indonesia too weak to rein General Nurmantyo in? General Nurmantyo appears to have voiced positions against Australia and even China - positions not shared by the Indonesian Defence Minister and President.

4. Has the tilt or return to the right in the US (Trump) and in Indonesia's neighbour the Philippines (Duturte) spread to Indonesia?

5. To what extent is General Nurmantyo (and Subianto) manipulating Indonesia politics through playing the race and religion cards? General Nurmantyo has alternated between Islamic supremacist positions and voicing Islam-Christian-Buddhist tolerance over the last few months. He was involved in the Jakarta November 2016 protests against the alleged blasphemy of the ethnic Chinese Governor of Jakartaagainst Islam (see second paragraph here). The Chief of the Indonesian Police is also making political statements with the police being a rival power center to the military.

6. To what extent is Indonesia's highly politicised Special Forces Kopassus (the main complainent against Australia's West Papua material) being used by General Nurmantyo to stir up trouble?

Cutaway, highlighting the weapons, of the Chinese Type 052D Luyang III class destroyer. Its technical quality (complete with 64 VLS and new AESA radar) may be creeping up on the US Arleigh Burke class destroyer. (Cutaway courtesy Global Military Review)

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Following this week's articles Liaoning carrier group 1 and 2.

REGIONAL CARRIER ARMS RACE?

In China fairly rapidly constructing carriers I’d say China does not wish other northeast Asian nations to have the only carriers in the Pacific. Those countries include:

- old enemy Japan (Izumo and Hyuga classes) and

- old possession South Korea (Dokdo class).

China may be concerned those carriers may become more potent once, or if, F-35Bs (that do not need ship modifications for ski-jumps or catapults) are eventually embarked on those carriers.

SURFACE ESCORTS

KQN's positive and informative comments of 3 January 2017 aided me in writing about Liaoning's late December 2016 surface escorts, particularly the Type 052D.

In IHS Janes Liaoning’s balanced group of surface (unlike the submerged) escorts were listed as:

- 2 x Type 052CLuyang II-class ( Zhengzhou (from the East Sea Fleet) and Haikou (South Sea Fleet) air warfare detroyers

- 1 x Type 052D“Luyang III-class” ( Changsha (South Sea Fleet)), air warfare destroyer KQN advised “China's surface fleet spear for AA/AD is truly carried by the 12+ type 052D destroyers and in the future supplemented with Type 055.”

[Note the Type 055 may turn out weighing 10,000 tons (like the US Arleigh Burke class. destroyer). The US DoD is already exaggerating that the Type 055 will be a Guided-missile Cruiser (CG) (see Chine Military Power 2016 edition here (PDF around 5 MB)page 26).]

It may be that the Type 052D already has the capabilities of the US Arleigh Burke class. Type 052D carries 64 VLS launchers similar to the US Mk41. The technology route CJ-10 cruise missile (whose technology route may come from the Russian Kh-55 , Russian Klub/Club or US Tomahawk.

“Besides Type 052D is equipped with the naval SAM version of the vaunted Russian S-300PMU (HQ-9). Already there are more type 052Ds than Japan has AEGIS destroyers. It looks like China is on track to build 2-3 Types 052D each year.”

- 2 x Type 054A multi role (anti-air/ASW/anti-surface craft/land attack capacity two Jiangkai II-class ( Yantai (North Sea Fleet) and Linyi (North Sea Fleet)) frigates (“4” for frigate?), listedas being from the PLAN’s North Sea Fleet

- 1 x Type 056A Jiangdao class ASW corvette, and

- 1 x Type 903A replenishment ship. This gives Liaoning a well-rounded protective screen of China's most modern anti-air and anti-submarine escorts.

Note the destroyers and frigates came from all three Fleets (North, East and South). This may suggest:

- the carriers group's sea trials are assessed by the PLAN HQ as being at a very early stage, hence all ships don't need to come from the North Sea Fleet.

- HQ wants to give all Fleets exposure to the Liaoning, and

- PLAN HQ may intend that all three Fleets will eventually have a carrier on strength.

I’ll expand the descriptions of the Type 052Cs, 055s, 054As, 052Bs, 054As and 903As next week. Also there is the contentious issue of the YJ-18’s range.

Pete

A reader, known as Che Anonymous (mugshot above), provided the following at the end of the holidays:

Proposition 1 - We need twice as many submarines ie. 12.

Proposition 2 - The 12 should be "regionally superior".

Proposition 3 - If the goal is regional or State economic development then spreading Federal money
for plausible reasons is an end in itself.
: hence putting a price on the A$50 Billion does not present an obvious bargaining
failure, now or in 20 years time.
: Japan Inc. and TKMS did not understand that saving money had nothing to do with it. TKMS saying A$20 Billion could buy all 12 submarines positively sealed its own fate.

Proposition 4 - The major providers have years of notice that they are the only major providers, and
there are no other conceivable customers. So all are comfortably catered for, for
decades.

Proposition 5 - As with other Projects any major management problems will be rectified by adding
more Management companies at greater cost rather than removing Management
companies to save money.

Proposition 6 - No competitive structures, eg. duopolies, are conceivable at the priceless end of the
shipbuilding industry once a definite number of A$Billions in public money is
promised for decades.

Proposition 7 - Savings on small items, from small suppliers, under industry offset
arrangements, will be trumpeted - definitely not the main money for the monopoly
suppliers.

Proposition 8 - No-one will rock the boat because those in the know either benefit from industry
connections or government connections or both,

Che Anonymous asks "Is all this responsible, fair and inevitable?"

As Japan is new to being an actual seller of military aircraft early success may be elusive. However the desire to seal a deal with New Zealand may mean Japan will offer the P-1 (above) and C-2 (below) at very attractive low prices.

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Jon Grevatt, for IHS Jane's Defence Weekly, reports from Bangkok, 6 January 2017

“Japan's Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI) is offering its P-1maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) and C-2transport aircraft to New Zealand...The company, in collaboration with the Japanese Ministry of Defense (MoD), has provided information to New Zealand in a bid to meet a requirement in the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) to replace its Lockheed Martin P-3K2 Orion MPA and C-130 Hercules transport aircraft, which have both been in service since the mid-1960s.

Japan's Nikkei financial newspaper had earlier reported that the Japanese MoD has already responded to New Zealand's request for information (RFI) about both requirements and that following talks it is expected to offer concrete proposals in the first half of 2017..." For whole Jane’s article see.

PETE'S COMMENT

I think New Zealand (NZ) plays it safe and traditional in its military hardware buying patterns. This will work against Japan's:

P-1 MPAs. Instead, I think NZ buying 4 x P-8 Poseidon MPAs is more likely. The need is to replace NZ's 6 x P-3K2 Orions. This is noting NZ's main ally, Australia, is buying the P-8. Although NZ has requested information on the P-1 MPA (and indeed C-2) doubts may exist that Japan can efficiently share the information to support the training, maintenance, avionics and sensor suites required, and

C-2 transport aircraft. I think NZ purchase of 5 x C-130J Super Hercules is more likely. The need is to replace NZ’s 5 older model C-130Hs. Again NZ’s main ally, Australia, is already operating the C-130J. The ability to operate from relatively short, rough airfields on small Pacific Islands (in NZ’s region) may put the C-2 at a disadvantage compared to the C-130J. For distant overseas operations, often shared with Australia, NZ may rely on Australia's C-17s. Or NZ might short-term lease cargo aircraft (for example).

Other weaknesses of the C-2 are that very few have been built (4? see right sidebar) and they have only been operated in Japan’s airforce since March 2016.

However Japan-Kawasaki may be very hungry to sell its first military aircraft to a prime Asia-Pacific customer. So Japan-Kawasaki may provide both aircraft at very low upfront and support prices.

Apologies for seeing New Zealand's needs through such an Australian lense. For more on New Zealand's defence environment see New Zealand's Defence White Paper 2016.

Pete

Trump "astonishingly excellent" - says one.

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Hi Donors

I've just emailed Submarine Matters'January 2017 Report TRUMP NOT THAT BAD out to you, as a WORD attachment. Please check your spam bin if you don't see it in your IN box.

For other readers wishing to receive TRUMP NOT THAT BAD please donate A$50 using the Donate Button on the righthand Submarine Matters sidebar. Once I have received your Donation I will email this Report to you. Over the next 11 months I will then send you a Special DONOR Report on the second Wednesday of each month.

Regards

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Director
Submarine Matters International

Japan's Sankei News reports that a Chinese Shenyang J-11 air superiority fighter (above) on September 26, 2016 intercepted an Australian AP-3C Orion (below) while the Orion patrolled the South China Sea. (Orion photo courtesy Photo © Keith Anderson).

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In the comment thread following the P-1 and C-2 article of January 10, 2017at 12/1/17 2:29 PM

“S” located some Japanese news reports which are very interesting:

1. Chinese Jet Intercepts an Australian Patrol Aircraft:

On January 11, 2017 it was revealed that the Chinese military had interfered more than once with the activities by Australian aircraft patrolling South China Sea[Pete Comment – Australian AP-3C Orions are known to patrol there regularly]. The report of the interference arose from a meeting between Japanese, Australia and US officials in mid December 2016. Australian officials explained the situation, and stressed the need to strengthen defence cooperation among the three countries and the necessity of collaboration with ASEAN including Thailand and the Philippines. This report comes from Japan’s Sankei News at http://www.sankei.com/politics/news/170112/plt1701120006-n1.htmlin Japanese.

Sankei News reports:

The Australian side explained at the mid December 2016 meeting between Japanese, US and Australian officials that the Australian patrol aircraft operating in the area around the South China Sea are periodically obstructed by Chinese military aircraft. As a concrete example, the case was reported of a top of the line Chinese Shenyang J-11 jet fighterapproaching the Australian patrol plane on September 26, 2016.

[Pete’s Comment, The Australian patrol aircraft are likely to be AP-3C Orions, of No. 92 Wing Based at Edinburgh RAAF Base in South Australia. To get to South China Sea the AP-3Cs may go via RAAF Darwin or RAAF Tindal in the Northern Territory and then stop at Malaysian Airforce Base Butterworth or Singapore’s Paya Lebar Air Base]

To the Chinese air forces credit the Australian side said that the intercept was "professional” with the Chinese pilot being “highly skilled.”

[Pete’s Comment – a professional intercept usually means that the Chinese pilot would have alerted, in English, on the radio, the Australian patrol aircraft, that it was being intercepted. The Chinese pilot should communicate clearly what he wants done – usually a message that an aircraft move out of airspace that China claims as “Chinese airspace”. The Chinese J-11 would then have moved gradually and predictably towards the patrol aircraft. A key behaviour would be the J-11 pilot must maintain internationally accepted separation distances from the patrol aircraft. This allows both aircraft to fly straight and level in a predictable manner. This would avoid the usual main danger, which is a collision].

On Chinese opposition to Australian Orion aircraft patrols over the South China Sea in November 2015 see Submarine Matters article of December 16, 2015.

2. Separately, regarding Japan’s military sales efforts:

The Japanese military (Japanese Self Defence Force (JSDF)) are enthusiastic about selling the C2 military transport aircraft and P-1 maritime patrol aircraft.

In October 2016 the Japanese military invited staff officers from 10 countries (USA, Philippines, Cambodia, Indonesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and Saudi Arabia) to presentations on the C-2 . See http://www.sankei.com/politics/photos/161013/plt1610130028-p5.html[in Japanese] which indicates the surprisingly large size of the C-2 that the staff officers (in the Sankei photo) are viewing. The C-2 is parked at Iruma Air Base, Japan.

3. Japanese Prime Minister Abe Visiting Australia Very Soon:

On January 12, 2017 Japanese Prime Minister Abe started a two day State visit to the Philippines where he will, of course, meet Philippine President Duterte.

[It will be interesting if Duterte voices appreciation for the patrol boat coast guard aid Japan has been supplying to the Philippines. This is in comparison to the much larger scale loan/aid money Duterte extracted from China and Russia in 2016.].

Prime Minister Abe will then visit Australia from January 13 to 15, 2017 when Abe is likely to discuss defence issues with Australian Prime Minister Turnbull [Pete’s Comment. It is likely that Defence and Foreign Ministers from Japan and Australia will also meet] and Abe’s tour will also take in Indonesia and Vietnam.

If Abe remains true to form he may discuss C-2 and P-1 sales with New Zealand representatives at some stage – perhaps a phone call or short meeting with New Zealand’s new Prime Minister Bill English.

Pete and S.

Japanese Prime Minister Abe and Australian Prime Minister Turnbull from January 13 to 15, 2017 will likely discuss a coordinated approach to (about to be Inaugurated) President Trump.

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1. Regarding the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Abe to the Philippines, Australia, Indonesia and Vietnam, in January 2017, "S" provided comment in the thread at 12/1/17 2:29 PM.

On January 12, 2017 Abe made a visit to the Philippines, where he will met Philippine President Duterte.

Pete's Comments

When Prime Minister Abe begins visiting Australia today until January 15, 2017 Abe and Australian Prime Minister Turnbull are likely to confidentially talk about:

- the foreign and defence policy implications of Trump's rise to the Presidency

- strategies to respond to Trump's expected moves and also surprises Trump may bring

- financial-economic strategies if Trump pulls the US out of the TPP

- responses to China, concerning its South China Sea activities

The Defence and Foreign Ministers from Japan and Australia are likely to be at the Abe-Turnbull table. The Defence and Foreign Ministers are also likely to meet separately, one on one, for more detailed discussions.

Abe will then visit Indonesia (from January 15) and then Vietnam.

2. Separately, regarding Japan’s military sales efforts: The Japanese military (Japanese Self Defence Force (JSDF)) are enthusiastic about selling the C-2 military transport aircraft and P-1 maritime patrol aircraft.

In October 2016 the Japanese military invited staff officers from 10 countries (USA, Philippines, Cambodia, Indonesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and Saudi Arabia[but not New Zealand?]) to presentations on the C-2 . See the Sankei News article [in Japanese] which indicates the surprisingly large size of the C-2 that the staff officers (in the Sankei photo) are viewing. The C-2 is parked at Iruma Air Base, Japan.

If Prime Minister Abe remains true to form he may discuss C-2 and P-1 sales with New Zealand representatives at some stage – perhaps a phone call or short meeting with New Zealand’s new Prime Minister Bill English.

Pete and S

Japan's three tiered anti-missile defense program. The main threat is nuclear tipped ballistic missiles from North Korea and to a lesser extent China. Japan hasn't decided whether it will, or can, deploy the third tier (known as THAAD). (Diagram courtesy Asahi Shimbun)

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COMMENTS

We in Australia have no idea how serious the conventional and especially nuclear threats are to Japan. Threats to Japan are a major reason why yesterday's Japan-Australia talks featured regional security so highly.

The nuclear missiles (without their warheads) that North Korea has tested for years near Japan are causing greater Japanese anxiety.

- one reason is that North Korea has been steadily shrinking formerly too large nuclear warheads to a

small enough size to fit on missiles.

- another reason is North Korea is developing submarines that could fire nuclear missiles.

China has a much more mature and powerful nuclear arsenal than North Korea. China has had missile warhead sized nuclear weapons since the 1960s and submarine fired nuclear missiles since the 1980s.

A North Korean or Chinese nuclear missile could reach Japan in under 5 minutes - hence Japan is worried.

To meet these threats Japan is developing increasingly comprehensive anti-missile missile defenses to shoot down North Korean and also Chinese missiles.

ARTICLE

RYO AIBARA for Japan’s Asahi Shimbun, January 14, 2017, reports http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201701140038.html

“...Japan currently relies on a two-pronged approach for missile defense, but is considering adding a third element because of the rapid advances in missile technology by North Korea.

...Japan's current missile defense involves a two-tiered system.

Outside of the atmosphere, SM-3 interceptor rockets launched by Aegis vessels would target ballistic missiles, while surface-to-air [Patriot] PAC-3 missiles would be aimed at the ballistic missiles once they re-enter the atmosphere.

Based on the Medium-term [Japanese] Defense Program for the period from fiscal 2014 until fiscal 2018, the number of Aegis destroyers capable of carrying SM-3 rockets will double from the current four. Improvements will also be made on the SM-3 and PAC-3 missiles to expand the range over which they can shoot down ballistic missiles.

[there are also calls in Japan for a third system]...the [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)] system...capable of intercepting missiles moving at far higher trajectories and even outer space.

...A major hurdle for deploying the THAAD is cost. Putting the system into play would require hundreds of billions of yen [many US$ Billions], which may be beyond what the [Japanese] Finance Ministry would sanction given the nation's tight fiscal crunch.

See WHOLE ASAHI SHIMBUN ARTICLE HERE

Pete

Chinese Strategic Expansion

China's warships are restricted by geography and late strategic entry (no Spanish-American War = an 1899 head start) to the bastion of the first island chain.

Perhaps a bought Philippines (via President Duterte's emerging foreign policies) may gradually allow China to project power out to the second island chain by ceding to China:

- Subic Bay (Ship) Freeport Zone and

- Subic Bay International Airport or

- Clark International Airport (part used by the Philippine Air Force).

As well as the Philippines Taiwan may peacefully/economically be courted into aiding China's move out to the second island chain.

The southern node of China's second island chain might one day be East Timor's Port of Dili and East Timor's Baucau Airport. East Timor is geographically within the Indonesian Archipelago, just to the east of Java.

Pete

Macau Daily Times, Jan 16, 2017, and other sources have provided comparisons of key traits of China’s Liaoning ski-jump carrier group versus US Nimitz carrier groups (See larger image here. Image via Business Insider Australia). These include:

- far less Chinese experience at long range, inter-ocean logistics (supply chains) for Liaoning and its
whole carrier group

- far fewer port arrangements, physical facilities and supporting ocean rim allies than the US

- Liaoning only carries 36 fighters/helicopters (nothing like the unique Osprey) vs up to around 80

fighters/helicopters/Ospreys on Nimitzes.

- China's only carrier fighter type, the J-15, lacks the stealth of F-35Bs or Cs and there seem no plans

to make carrier capable stealth prototypes of China's J-20 or J-31.

- as with India's INS Vikramaditya (ex-Kiev) and Russia's Admiral Kuznetsov, Liaoning’s old Soviet

steam turbines were badly designed, were poorly maintained, of limited range, limited to 20

knots cruise. This is even though China modified Liaoning's propulsion in a reported "1,000" ways.

- This means Liaoning would take longer to arrive on station and be less able to flee from threats.

- Meanwhile Nimitz-class can travel nuclear, around the world, at 30 knots.

- the J-15 ski-jump launch requires the J-15s to use more fuel than catapult assisted aircraft US

aircraft.

- Lower power to weight aircraft types (eg. AEW aircraft and cargo aircraft - standard on Nimitzes)

cannot be used on Liaoning

- of course, no catapult assistance limits fighters to smaller fuel-loads (far less range) and to lighter

weapons and/or sensor loads

- Liaoning’s pilots, airwing crew and ship crew are far less experienced (by around 94 years) than

their American counterparts, especially in fire and kinetic emergencies

- Liaoning doesn’t appear yet able to launch and recover aircraft at night, crucial for combat

effectiveness and safety (pilots don't want to underestimate when darkness comes)

All this makes Liaoning far less flexible and less effective than Nimitzes.

Tomorrow I look at what Liaoning can do and where.

Please connect to Liaoning carrier group 3

Pete

COMMENT

China’s Military-PLA Intelligence and also Civilian Intelligence (Ministry of State Security (MSS)) are doing an excellent job in Australia. This includes human intelligence (HUMINT) Case Officers. Such officers direct, or at least debrief, some in the following groups who live in or are travelling through Australia. Such intelligence collection groups might include some Chinese who are:

- students (especially graduate, post-graduate level working in "dual-use" high tech areas)
- academics, scientists (PhD on up) especially on high tech.
- engineers, business people (targets as above)
- journalists (usually official news agencies) also useful for influence spreading
- pro-China Australian citizens (including some politicians)
- "diplomats" and defence attaches (may be involved in directing and debriefing those categories
above), See article below.
- Chinese, China based government officials of all types active in directing and/or debriefing
Chinese (or non-Chinese Aussies?) travellers/residents, who were/are/will be, in Australia.

Intelligence gathering is a standard assumption. Intelligence might more often be collected in fragments (ie. bit by bit collection from all sources and methods). This is in contrast to the popular assumption of fully paid-up, dedicated human agents/moles (often with false identities) in the John le Carré "Soviet bloc tradition".

Other Chinese activities-objectives may include:

- spreading pro-Beijing political influence through "Agents of Influence". More specifically China
may influence Australian politics and perhaps compromise Australian politicians (recent
concern?), and

- security monitoring by Chinese diplomats (helped by informants) of any/all of the Chinese groups
while in Australia. This is monitoring particulary of Chinese deemed to be involved in:
: anti-Beijing Government causes
: anti-Communist
; pro-democracy
: pro-Tibet
: Falun Gong or
: some Christian influences).

China is not the only security/influence/intelligence threat to Australia, of course.

BACKGROUND AND ARTICLE

Regarding Chinese Government special political and intelligence activity in Australia, 2008 to the present. In 2008 Chinese diplomats organised and payed costs of at least 10,000 pro-Beijing supporters (Chinese students) (see photo above). The students travelled 100's of kms, from Sydney and Melbourne to Canberra (Australia's capital). This was for a 2 hour "spontaneous" loyalty demonstration. Pro-Tibet democracy protesters were crowded out and intimidated as were Australian police. The occasion was the pro-Beijing Olympics (2008) Torch Relay. Location was the usually Australian Federal Government controlled Federal Triangle, Canberra, 24 April 2008.

Just imagine if the Australian Embassy tried to do the same "support" protest organising in Beijing? Tiananmen Square II? (Photo courtesy Getty images).

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Andrew Greene, for Australia’s government financed news agency ABC Online, reported on 20 November 2016. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-11-20/how-many-spies-does-china-have-in-australia/8041004:

“Chinese spies in Australia on the rise, former diplomat Chen Yonglin says”

“Chen Yonglin, the Chinese diplomat who sensationally quit his job [at the Chinese consulate in Sydney Australia, in 2005] more than a decade ago, has broken a lengthy silence to warn of a growing number of spies and agents working for Beijing in Australia.

Key points:

- Chen Yonglin successfully sought political asylum in Australia after resigning his diplomat role

- Warned more that 1,000 Chinese spies in Australia

- Says "majority of Chinese community representatives" work for [Chinese] Government

- In 2005, Mr Chen caused global headlines when he claimed China was operating a network of

"over 1,000 Chinese secret agents and informants in Australia".

The former diplomat, who now works as a businessman, [Chen] has warned the number of secretive Chinese operatives has steadily grown since he stopped working for China's foreign service.

"There should be some increase after over 10 years because China is now the wealthiest government in the world, they should have money, they should be [able] to afford raise a huge number of spies here," he told ABC News.

He stressed the increase was mainly in casual informants who provided crucial pieces of intelligence to Beijing.

Since successfully seeking political asylum in Australia, Mr Chen said he had become growingly concerned about Beijing's influence in his new home.

He believes that of particular concern is last year's decision to approve a 99-year lease of the Port of Darwin to Chinese-owned company Landbridge [presumably this will be a great job opening for Chinese Military Intelligence, performing under cover in Darwin. Great job :]

[President Obama and the US Navy were very unhappy!]

"I think it's very stupid. It's common sense that Darwin Port is strategically important and against the northern invasion," he said.

Mr Chen has also hit out at activists who have recently taken to the streets to show support for China's military expansion in the South China Sea.

"A majority of Chinese community representatives work for the Chinese Government," he said. ENDS

TWO REFERENCES:

- My On Line Opinionarticle of 5 May 2008 Embracing China involves risks for Australia about

possible Chinese intelligence involvement in Chinese student mobilisation in Australia. In it I give
some emphasis to Chen Yonglin's revelations about Chinese intelligence activities.

and

- A major Sydney Morning Herald article of 7 May 2009, Defence 'rejected' minister spy link
concerns.

Pete

Now or soon AUVs will be able to identify Liaoning’s unique electronic and sound signatures. The AUV could then work through a transmitting float-to-satellite to cue long range missiles or buddy-torpedo-AUVs to destroy Liaoning. The AUVs could be air-dropped or submarine inserted in Liaonings likely paths - days or weeks before Liaoning passes by. This is one reason why China went to the political trouble, on December 15, 2016, to drone-nap a US UUV near the Philippines.

More generally Liaoning carrier group 4 yesterday pointed to just some of the weaknesses of Liaoning + its escorts as an effective fighting unit. Today I decided to reiterate the overwhelming potential threats to a Chinese attempt (that would use the Liaoning group) to project power east to the Second island chain.

Liaoning's current to medium term (out to 2030) uses will be published tomorrow.

As the key above indicates, the First island chain is in red, and Second island chain in blue. The US possession of Guam, with its large long range aircraft base and naval/SSN base gives Guam a commanding position over the Second island chain.

Liaoning and its escorts alone cannot defeat all the threats out past China's very restricted First island chain environment. The First island chain marks a bastion protective zone for the Chinese navy but foreign land forms and narrows also keep the Chinese navy bottled up in this zone.

It takes a great deal of national power to despatch a carrier group in safety – into threatening waters that are outside land based coverage. Even out to the Second Island China is potentially threatened by countries with long experience and advanced militaries (Russia, Japan, South Korea and US forces).

- even Vietnam, Singapore and Australia have useful submarines, with torpedos and growing
long-range anti-shipping missile capabilities, and

- North Korea has a near pathological leadership with access to deliverable nuclear weapons (in a
very few years) that may bite (on land or sea) the Chinese hand that feeds it.

To face all these threats - within the parameters of a medium level conflict (an international war using only conventional (non-nuclear) weapons) China would need, out to the Second island chain:

- regional air-superiority, ie. many more fighter aircraft than the 24 the Liaoning can provide + MPAs
(for ASW and anti-surface missions) that Liaoning doesn't have

- surface superiority on the sea and over landforms (ie. no enemy land-based long range missiles
within range of Liaoning), and

For undersea-submarine superiority, against forces of the power and standard of the US and Russian navies, China would need:
- SSNs of higher quality than China's Type 093s, and

- sensor superiority to anticipate and avoid such threats as:

= Fixed but in some ways smart and autonomous mines, that may be floating, tethered, and

rising from the seafloor or LWT style (propeller or rocket propelled).

= AUV/UAVs that promise to be even more autonomous, longer ranged, over longer periods, even

having battery recharging facilities on the sea floor.

The whole Western strategy of restricting Chinese power projection beyond the Second island chain, east into the broad Pacific, may collapse if the US adopts any isolationist, withdrawal from Asian bases from Guam or Darwin strategy.

So what use is Liaoning to China currently and out to the medium (15 year) term?

Pete

As well as the J-15 fighters Liaoning can probably take the usefully medium-large Z-18 helicopter. See much larger Liaoning image.

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Liaoning and its exercises with its escort group are a gradual Chinese weapons system project. China recognises that building superior aircraft carriers is more a long-term (15+ year) goal. A complimentary project is airbase island building in the South China Sea. Also useful to China would be a developed aerial refueling capability for carrier aircraft and land-based aircraft (currently very limited).

Drawing on the sources below I'd say China has built and operated the Liaoning:

- as a technical development prototype. Blueprints or just looking at Liaoning in port are inadequate. Liaoning's existing systems, China's many thousands of repairs and modifications, how Liaoning's technology interoperates with China's new J-15s, helicopters, defensive weapons and sensors all need to be tested in practice.

- training. the ship-crew, airwing maintainers/directors and pilots all need to be trained and tested. Best to make mistakes in practice rather than in action.

- given China has never operated modern fleets of ships of any type, in action, many skills and perceptions need developing. The difficult maneuvres and interdependencies of a carrier group also need practice and testing

- strategies and doctrines must be developed to coordinate Liaoning air operations with air operations from bases on the Chinese mainland, Hainan, and as MHalblaub says below, air bases on South China Sea islands.

- Liaoning is likely to be of little use in "liberating" Taiwan operations as missiles and aircraft on the Chinese mainland are already in easy range of Taiwan. Liaoning would also be highly vulnerable to Taiwanese anti-ship missiles and possibly torpedos

- along the lines Josh says below Liaoning is of little use againstpowerful navies (US, Japan, South Korea (ROK) I'd add Russian) and even against Australia's submarine squadron.

- it is in low or no threat environments that Liaoning's small, limited range, airwing is more useful.

- large aircraft carriers are potent symbols of emerging China’s status as a great power and eventual superpower. More specifically Liaoning is useful in ship visits to:

= boosting patriotism in northern China, in Shanghai and Hong Kong (these shorter
range missions would also help Liaoning develop its group logistics-replenishment procedures
and iron-out any propulsion breakdowns

= to intimidate or impress the locals in small countries, perhaps East Timor, Fiji, Solomons and
other island nations,
= to regional countries and arms customers, eg, the Philippines, Malaysia. Thailand might be
possible in August or later in 2017. This is for a proposed "International Fleet Review Thailand
2017" Thailand's 11,500 ton carrier is featured in this fleet review "trailer"

- for regional disaster-humanitarian missions and evacuation of Chinese nationals. Liaoning can provide many resources including a squadron of medium-large helicopters, accommodation for many, and medical facilities

- China may eventually aim to sail a Liaoning carrier group across the Indian Ocean. India may object and dissuade China from trying for several years.

- To service a rare alliance a visit to Karachi, Pakistan in 2019 may be enticing?

- 2019 or later an operational mission as a command/helicopter carrier on anti-drug, anti-piracy duties my be possible off the Horn of Africa. This may tie in with China's development of its new regional administrative and naval base at Djibouti (where thousands of Chinese military and civilians will serve).

- the followon ski-jump carrier to Liaoning may be the first used for counter-insurgency/terrorism airstrikes from the Mediterranean if the Syrian conflict continues. Such airstrikes from "floating airbases" are the standard function of US carriers and Charles de Gaulle.

A followon ski-jump carrier or two and then a catapult carrier are likely to be the next evolutionary stages in China's carrier program.

SOURCES

Josh indicated here: "The Liaoning's primary uses as I see it are gathering operational experience, projecting power into low/no threat areas, and diplomatic coercion of lesser regional powers (ie, Not the US, Oz, ROK, or Japan). Again those powers she likely is more of a liability and a target than an offensive asset."

MHalblaub indicated at 17/1/17 11:32 PM: "The Liaoning is a training vessel for China. Unlike other nations China has the capability to build nuclear powered aircraft carriers. China will notice the deficiencies and build a proper carrier on its own with catapults. At the moment China is building some very large aircraft carriers in the South China Sea. A type called island and very hard to sink by a submarine."

I found comment the American who may be the No.1 public naval analyst. He is Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Congressional Research Service (CRS) . In China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, June 17, 2016, CRS 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL33153 https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf (PDF around 10 MB) O'Rourke writes several pages (19 to 26) of comment on China's aircraft carrier and carrier aircraft aspirations. Pages 23 to 25 are strong on Liaoning's uses.

Pete

Outline of a Lithium-ion Battery for a Japanese submarine. This is from a January 2017 article on wispywood2344’s blog, at http://blog.livedoor.jp/wispywood2344/archives/2017-01.html .

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Submarine Matters looks at Japanese submarines in detail with periodic updates (for example on August 26, 2016). The following is the latest update followed by the SORYU TABLE. The Japanese Navy (JMSDF) is highly likely to be the first Navy to use Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) on its diesel-electric submarines. At the same time these new submarines, known as Soryu Mark 2s, will not use the existing Stirling AIP systems.

The first Soryu Mark 2 (with LIBs, no AIP) carries Soryu program number “27SS” (see table below). Construction of 27SS at the MHI shipyard in Kobe began in 2015. 27SS might be launched this year (2017) (with LIBs being inserted after launch?). With such a new battery technology for submarine use 27SS will undergo many more trials/tests and exercises than usual, It may be commissioned by 2020.

The arrangement of batteries, including LIBs, has many implications and affects, influencing:

- a submarine’s overall arrangement of all the other large internal items (fuel tanks, command center

location, diesel placement etc)

- balance/buoyancy of the submarine

- ease of removing old LIBs and placing in new ones

- electronic control of function and performance of the 100s of batteries used

- particularly avoiding runaway heat buildup in battery groups

- emergency measures

- minimising the batteries' electromagnetic emissions out of the sides and bottom of the submarine

(with implications for indiscretion)

NEW INFORMATION

Some interesting new information on 27SS’s LIB arrangement and many other details appeared in January 2017 on wispywood2344’s blog at http://blog.livedoor.jp/wispywood2344/archives/2017-01.html. The information is by way of a Japanese Freedom of Information request possibly made by wispywood2344.

After viewing http://blog.livedoor.jp/wispywood2344/archives/2017-01.htmlan Anonymous commented:

According to wispywood2344, 27SS shall be equipped with 2 battery module groups.

A. Each group consists of 16 rows x 20 columns, adding up to 320 batteries per group x 2 totals 640

batteries.

But, Anonymous thinks 27SS shall be equipped 2 possible different arrangements for the battery module groups.

B. The 2 battery module groups, will consist of 12 rows x 28 columns, adding up to 336 batteries x 2

totalling 672 batteries, OR

C. 12 rows x 24 columns, adding up to 288 batteries x 2 totalling 576 batteries.

By placing SORYU in the top left Search Box you will notice a wealth of information on Japanese submarines kindly provided to Submarine Matters.

SORYU TABLE (with earlier Oyashios) as at August 26, 2016

SS No.	Build No Name	Pennant No.	MoF approved amount ¥ Billions & FY	LABs, LIBs, AIP	Laid Down	Laun -ched	Commi-ssioned	Built By
5SS Oyashio	8105 Oyashio	SS-590/ TS3608	¥52.2B FY1993	LABs only	Jan 1994	Oct 1996	Mar 1998	KHI
6SS-15SS Oyashios 10 subs	8106 -8115 various	SS-591-600	¥52.2B per sub FY1994-FY2003	LABs only	Feb 1994		Mar 2008	MHI & KHI
16SS Soryu Mk 1	8116 Sōryū	SS-501	¥60B FY2004	LABs + AIP	Mar 2005	Dec 2007	Mar 2009	MHI
17SS	8117 Unryū	SS-502	¥58.7B FY2005	LABs + AIP	Mar 2006	Oct 2008	Mar 2010	KHI
18SS	8118 Hakuryū	SS-503	¥56.2 FY2006	LABs + AIP	Feb 2007	Oct 2009	Mar 2011	MHI
19SS	8119 Kenryū	SS-504	¥53B FY2007	LABs + AIP	Mar 2008	Nov 2010	Mar 2012	KHI
20SS	8120 Zuiryū	SS-505	¥51B FY2008	LABs + AIP	Mar 2009	Oct 2011	Mar 2013	MHI
No 21SS			No 21SS built
22SS	8121 Kokuryū	SS-506	¥52.8B FY2010	LABs + AIP	Jan 2011	Oct 2013	Mar 2015	KHI
23SS	8122 Jinryu	SS-507	¥54.6B FY2011	LABs + AIP	Feb 2012	Oct 2014	7 Mar 2016	MHI
24SS	8123 Sekiryū	SS-508	¥54.7B FY2012	LABs + AIP	Mar 2013	2 Nov 2015	Mar? 2017	KHI
25SS	8124	SS-509	¥53.1B FY2013	LABs + AIP	22 Oct 2013	Nov? 2016	Mar? 2018	MHI
26SS	8125	SS-510	¥51.7B FY2014	LABs + AIP	2014	?	Mar 2019?	KHI
27SS First Soryu Mk 2	8126	SS-511	¥64.3B FY2015	LIBs only	2015	2017?	Mar 2020?	MHI
28SS Second Soryu Mark 2	8127	SS-512	¥63.6B FY2016	LIBs only	2016?	2018?	Mar 2021?	KHI
29SS First of New Class	?	?	¥76B FY2018	LIBs only	?	?	2023?	MHI?

Table courtesy of exclusive information provided to Submarine Matters. LABs = lead-acid batteries, AIP=air independent propulsion, LIBs=lithium-ion batteries. ¥***B = Billion Yen.

Pete

The Bell Textron Scorpion light-attack jet may be ideal for the low threat counter-insurgency/terrorism missions the US and allies are fighting in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan (Photo/diagram courtesy BBC(dot)com in 2014).

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On January 16, 2017, Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator John McCain, issued a White Paper (about 10 MB, PDF) with a whole range of good looking ideas (eg.
- higher rate Virginia SSN production,
- medium aircraft carriers in addition to the Ford CVNs,
- frigates larger and instead than the Littoral Combat Ships in several years time
all worth discussing in Submarine Matters articles next week.

Meantime the short article below is about McCain's light-attack fighter suggestion:

The White Paper page 13 says:

"while [continued procurement of the F-35 and] sustaining the A-10 fighter fleet for close air support, the Air Force should procure 300 low-cost, light-attack fighters that would require minimal work to develop. These aircraft could conduct counterterrorism operations, perform close air support and other missions in permissive environments, and help to season pilots to mitigate the Air Force’s fighter pilot shortfall. The Air Force could procure the first 200 of these aircraft by Fiscal Year 2022."

One choice that may serve as a light attack (counter-insurgency) fighter is the Bell Textron Scorpion jet.

USAF Chief of Staff General David Goldfein said 300 light-attack would be a good idea and that Scorpion, Embraer’s A-29 Super Tucano (propeller) and Beechcraft’s AT-6 (propeller) might all be possibilities. Any others?

Here's a pitch at the Paris Air Show 2015, from Russ Smith, for a competing aircraft, the Beechcraft AT-6 Wolverine armed variant of the T-6.
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F-35s won't be ready for years and, in any case, are over-engineered/gold plated and overpriced for the low threat (to aircraft) counter-insurgency missions in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. The A-10 with its heavy armour and anti-tank cannon is also unsuited to most counter-insurgency warfare scenarios.

I see many objections coming from the industry, many pilots and revolving-dooristas of the USAF, USN and Marines. Some objections may be valid, most not.

Is the McCain, Goldfein idea of a light-attack fighter a good one?

Pete

The following Table, based on frequently contradictory Sources, is a work in progress. The ultimate, probably, unattainable aim, is to build a table as complete as the SORYU TABLE.

YUAN SUBMARINE TABLE, Type 039A, 039B or Type 041

1. Model	2. No.	3. Shipyard	4. Launched	5. Commiss ioned	6. Fleet serving	Remarks
039A	330	Wuchang1	31 May 2004	2006	East Sea
039A	331	Wuchang2	2007	2009	East Sea
039A	332	Wuchang	2007	2009	East Sea
039A	333	Wuchang	2008	2010	East Sea
039B	334	Wuchang	2010	2011	East Sea
039B	335	Wuchang	2010	2011	East Sea
039B	336	Shanghai? Changxing	2010	2011	East Sea
039B	337	Shanghai	2011?	2012	East Sea
039B	338	Wuchang	2011?	2012
039B	339	Wuchang	2011?	2012
039B	340	Shanghai?	?	2012	North Sea
039B	341	Shanghai?	?	2012	North Sea
039B	342	Wuchang	Dec 2013?	2015
	343	Wuchang		2015
	344	Wuchang	Dec? 2016
	345	Wuchang	Dec? 2016
	346		Dec? 2016
	347
	348
	349					Completing 20 for China
Export	Models
S20P		Wuchang		2023		4 to be export to Pakistan
S20P		Wuchang		2023		to Pakistan
S20P		Wuchang		2023		to Pakistan
S20P		Wuchang		2023		to Pakistan
S26T		Wuchang		2026		for Thailand
S26T		Wuchang		2026		for Thailand
S26T		Wuchang		2026		for Thailand
S20P		Karachi shipyard		2028		4 to be built in Pakistan
S20P		Karachi		2028		Pakistan
S20P		Karachi		2028		Pakistan
S20P		Karachi		2028		Pakistan

SOURCES

A. The most reliable data may be at column 5. “Commissioned”. This is drawn from Page 17, Table 1, “PLA Navy Submarine Commissionings” in Ronald O'Rourke's In China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, June 17, 2016, CRS 7-5700 RL33153 https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf (PDF 10 MB).

- Column 3 is a puzzle with most Shipyard entries being Wuchangin far northeastern China but there are a few mentions of Shanghai, Changxing Shipyard, east central coastal China.

- The O'Rourke, CRS Table 1, disagrees with many sources on number of Yuans Commissioned in 2011 and 2012.

B. Right-click mouse to translate Taiwanese source 039A / B meta-level diesel attack submarines http://www.mdc.idv.tw/mdc/navy/china/039ab.htm . Then scroll 1/3 down, after all the photos, to see a Table with model, number, shipyard, launch, commission, fleet. Also see much information with specs and many more details model by model.

C. Sources: Global Security (January 2017) for some lauch, commission and export details.,

D. Much analytical information I haven't assessed yet at Submarines: Chinese Kilo Evolves Beyond the Original https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htsub/articles/20170121.aspx of January 21, 2016 . With higher estimates of Yuans built and projected.

E. On S26T http://www.janes.com/article/66998/thailand-aims-to-operate-fleet-of-three-submarines-by-2026.

All of these Sources are useful to visit and revisit to build a more accurate Table(s).

Once the Yuans are more settled are China's Songs, Kilos, Mings, the odd Qing, SSNs then SSBNs.

Pete

Emperor Kublai Khan founded the Yuan Dynasty in 1271 but doesn't represent a submarine class terribly well.

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Following yesterday’s YUAN 1 article it struck me that it seems useful to look at the name “Yuan” submarine from first principles.

Dynastic Names Unhelpful

It seems the West/NATO was a little too clever in "reporting" naming Chinese submarines after Chinese dynasties. A downside includes an implication the Chinese PLAN is an age old mystically-minded outfit.

Here is an aging list of NATO reporting names for ships and submarines http://www.ais.org/~schnars/aero/nato-shp.htm which includes the dynastic “HAN Class”, “MING Class”, and “XIA Class”.

Western audiences (except for specialised enthusiasts) have no inkling of the sequence or characteristics of each successive Chinese dynasty.

In any case Chinese submarine dynasties are out of order. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yuan_dynasty (right sidebar scrolling about 1/5 way down) where you will see "Song" dynasty followed by "Yuan" (so far, so good) but then followed chronologically by “Ming” dynasty. This is unhelpful as the first Ming submarine was launched in 20th century terms long before the first Songs or Yuans).

Also "Yuan" is a unit of currency.

Sequential Numbers and Letters Much Better

Instead Chinese submarine developments have less to do with old dynasties and more to do with incremental submarine improvements that respond to:

- modern naval requirements,

- naval engineering solutions/realizations, and

- related technical developments in submarine components

(eg. electronics, weapons, AIP, batteries and diesels.)

Incremental improvements are best reflected in numbers and letters rather than dynastic names.

There is no single Yuan model. Instead each succeeding "Yuan" submarine incorporates gradual improvements (hence Type 039A, 039AG, 039B and 039B (upgraded), S20, and S26T.

Better than "Yuan" is using Type “41” as a collective term for all China's AIP submarines (and then A, B, C as subsets). This provides a clean break from the non-AIP Songs (Type 039s).

So far as I can see the “Type” numbers are of Chinese PLAN origin, judging by:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_Vessels_Naming_Regulation

Confirmed by this Chinese site http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2011-08/11/c_121845981.htm(right-click mouse to Translate to English)

Submarine Classification	Named After *
Nuclear submarines	“Long March” followed by a number*
Ballistic and cruise missile armed conventional submarines	“Expedition” followed by a number*
Conventional submarines	“Great Wall” followed by a number*

*but seems to be Westernized to “Type” followed by:

- a Mandarin Chinese numeral? translated to Arabic numeral? and

- Mandarin Chinese character translated to Roman alphabet letter?).

There is a consideration that politicians and navies prefer to use evocative names when describing submarine classes to other politicians, long-suffering Finance Ministers and the public. Evocative names seem a cheap drawcard to induce the public, as tax payers, to part with $100s millions per submarine and in Australia $Billions PER submarine.

Submarines should be demystified, de-romanticized as they are chiefly weapons of war rather than memorials to obscure, ancient, dynasties or metal fish.

Pete

Additional suggestions to light attack aircraft have been made in the January 16, 2017, "McCain" White Paper (about 10 MB, PDF) of the US Senate Armed Services Committee. This is for medium conventional aircraft carriers that could be built in addition to the nuclear propelled Ford supercarriers.

Carriers compared, though they forgot the Nimitz class! USS America (LHA-6) weighs 45,000 tons, 844 feet long, 40 jets/helicopters/Ospreys (is at lower level, second to left) See larger/clearer image courtesy Wikimedia Commons.
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In order to achieve the optimal 16 carriers, argued by some, the White Paper, page 10 recommends:

"The Navy should also pursue a new “high/low mix” in its aircraft carrier fleet. Traditional nuclear-powered supercarriers remain necessary to deter and defeat near-peer competitors, but other day-to-day missions, such as power projection, sea lane control, close air support, or counterterrorism, can be achieved with a smaller, lower cost, conventionally powered aircraft carrier. Over the next five years, the Navy should begin transitioning from large deck amphibious ships into smaller aircraft carriers with the goal of delivering the first such ship in the mid-2030s."

The "large deck amphibious ships" in question most directly mean the 45,000 ton America class designated Landing Helicopter Assualt (LHA) ships which are already dedicated to air assets (no landing craft or well deck). The airwing is frequently helicopters/Ospreys carrying Marines and up to 20 F-35Bs.

Modifications would presumably mean angled decks, catapults for F-18s and F-35Cs, and arrester cables. This may make them updates of the 45,000 ton Midway class carriers built in the 1940s (when Senator McCain was in his early teens).

Problem the conversion to traditional CATOBAR carrier would render the effort in of developing the STOVL F-35Bs wasted. This might mean only a handful of F-35Bs would be used by the US thereby shifting the fixed development costs to the main remaining users - the almost complete specialised for F-35B UK Queen Elizabeth class carriers to $300 million each levels.

Perhaps the White Paper, more usefully suggests, this time for the Ford carriers, on page 10:

- “...the number of aircraft carriers is irrelevant if there is a shortfall of Navy strike aircraft...Over the next five years, the Navy should therefore procure 58 additional F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets and 16 additional EA-18G Growlers, while continuing to procure the F-35C as rapidly as possible, to fill out ready and effective carrier air wings that can meet joint requirements."

- “Unmanned aerial vehicle technology will be essential to the future of the aircraft carrier and its continued ability to project power. The MQ-25will bring the first unmanned aerial vehicle to the carrier while performing [mid-air refueling] tanking and some [ISR] intelligence missions.”

What benefits or problems do you think these suggestions may make?

Pete

Submarine acquisitions are multi-year processes. Here is a DCNS - (Xavier of) Navy Recognition video, uploaded September 2, 2015, responding to the Polish sub replacement competition.

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Poland is seeking a submarine replacement (for its aging 450 ton TKMS Kobben class) from:

- DCNS, with Reuters, January 25, 2017 reporting:
“Poland's state-run defense firm PGZ has signed a memorandum of understanding with French
military shipbuilder DCNS that could allow them to work together on building submarines in
Poland, PGZ said in a statement.”

- TKMS. Submarine Mattersreported July 6, 2016:
"In June 2016 Germany and Poland signed an MoU to establish a joint submarine operating
command to be based in Glucksburg, Germany...The authority may increase the chances that
Poland will purchase German TKMS submarines - maybe new build Type 212As,
Type 210mods or used Ula class subs."

Poland seems to be keeping DCNS and TKMS guessing in order to, of course, extract the best deals from them. They may well be offering lower tonnage range DCNS Scorpenes (like the 1000) vs small version TKMS (Type 214s or 210mods). With DCNS and TKMS both offering:

- reformer fuel cell AIP, and

- Tomahawk style, torpedo tube launched, land attack cruise missiles, to make the Russians nervous.

Pete

Liaoning carrier group 2 - Submarine Activity & Air Wing

Indonesia's Military Chief Nurmantyo - New Javanese General Strongman?

Liaoning carrier goup 3 - Regional Competition and Surface Escorts.

Clawing back savings may not apply to all.

Japan selling its P-1 and C-2 military aircraft to NZ at low prices?

January 2017 Report - TRUMP NOT THAT BAD

Chinese Jet Intercepts an Australian Patrol Aircraft

Japanese PM Abe in Australia Quietly Talking about Trump

Missile Threat to Japan Perilous - Talks

Chinese Power Projection to Second Island Chain

Liaoning carrier group 4 - inferior to any Nimitz group

Chinese Intelligence Presence in Australia [New Comment]

Threats to Liaoning carrier group 5 - begs question of uses.

Liaoning carrier group 6 - Uses for Liaoning.

Lithium-ion Battery Arrangements Planned for New Japanese Submarines

Light-attack jet - a good McCain counter-insurgency idea?

YUAN Submarine Table - China's Type 039A/B, 041. Work in progress.

YUAN 2 - Naming first principles. Numbers not Dynasty Win.

McCain's Medium Carrier Luxury

Poland Signalling a DCNS or TKMS Submarine Preference