Submarine & Other Matters

Images of ASC Pty Ltd as seen in the white pages of the phonebook. ASC has been leaning more to shipbuilding (rather than submarine building) for years. Therefore should ASC now call itself "Australian Shipbuilding Corporation" instead of "...Submarine Building". Perhaps change the name when ASC breaks into the 3 new companies?
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Hi Donors

I've just emailed Submarine Matters July 2017 Donor Report: Naval Group To Handle Whole Submarine Build (So Far) out to you, as a WORD attachment. Please check your spam bin if you don't see it in your IN box.

Leadin to report:

Naval Group (formerly DCNS) is not rushing into associating itself with an Australian partner – even ASC (what was more commonly called “Australian Submarine Corporation”). Submarine building is too complex for politicians to simplify. Promises by politicians on ship and submarine building are temporary and maximised just before Elections.

Regards

Pete

Director

Submarine Matters International

An Anonymous commenton 1 July 2017 12:35 AM has prompted me to consider the issue of South Korea building a nuclear tipped ballistic missile capability.

South Korea has laid down its third KSS-III(also see) of 3,000+ ton conventional attack submarines (SSKs) to carry 6 cruise or ballistic missiles. If the KSS-IIIs carry ballistic missiles they can be reclassified conventionally propelled ballistic missile submarines (SSBs).

It is unknown whether the missiles will be in separate vertical launch tubes along the hull or be in one more flexible Vertical Multi-Purpose Lock. Confusingly the KSS-III can also be called KSS3, Jang Bogo-III or perhaps Chang Bogo-III.

The ballistic missile to be carried in the early 2020s may be the Hyunmoo-2B with a range of 500km and warhead/payload of 500kg. 500km may be more a political minimum estimate signalling China or the China-North Korea border areas are not targets.

KSS-III’s could potentially carry:

- 800 km range Hyunmoo-2C ballistic missiles, or

- 1,000 km range Tomahawk like Hyunmoo-3 cruise missiles that could make China a target.

North Korea has little to worry about South Korea missiles that only have conventional explosive warheads. Kim could be protected in a deep bunker.

If there are rumours or an actual South Korean nuclear weapons program then South Korea could utilise independent nuclear deterrence– something North Korea will respect.

If Trump is no longer interested in extended US nuclear deterrence then Australia should also contemplate building an independent nuclear deterrent.

The map above indicates how close some North Korean nuclear facilities are to the Chinese border, particularly Yongjo-ri uranium enrichment site and Hyesan nuclear research site. If either site were hit with South Korean (SK) or US conventional explosives this may spill radioactive fragments onto Chinese soil. This would bring China into any conflict. Use of US or future SK nuclear weapons on those sites would even more likely antagonise China. (Map courtesy The Guardian).

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This second map (courtesy The Economist) illustrates how constricted the waters are for South Korean (SK) submarines. Any SK cruise or ballistic missile submarines might be easily monitored by Chinese or North Korean submarines or undersea sensor/SOSUS arrays as the SK submarines leave port or move into vulnerable near seas (Sea of Japan, Yellow Sea or East China Sea) for missile launches.

Relatively distant Western Pacific waters would be safer but that may mean SK submarines need missiles of 2,000 km range - something likely unachievable now - unless Tomahawks from the US are used.

Pete

ARTICLES

The Guardian (Australian edition) July 17, 2017 and The Canberra Times, July 15, 2017 have reported that:

Australia's Defence Industry Minister, Christopher Pyne, has voiced enthusiasm about Australia becoming a major weapons exporter - perhaps on the scale of UK, French and German exports (see Table below). As Pyne mainly promotes shipbuilding from South Australia this is likely what he is talking about.

COMMENT

Major impediments to Pyne Vision are:

- Australia does not have an industrial base or equipment research sector large enough to develop
major weapon systems

- put another way Australia does not enjoy the economies of scale to sell a high volume of weapons
to the Australian domestic market that would make unit prices competitive or lower for foreign
customers

- Australia does not have the necessary labour efficiencies or productivity to compete against
existing major arms exporters (think South Korea and Spain for surface ships). Also Singapore is
highly efficient in labour productivity making it unlikely to buy from Australia.

- Australia does not have the major advantage of being an established weapons supplier with an
established sales structure in other countries. This is unlike all the exporters listed in the Table
below (US, Russia, Germany, China, France etc)

- Australia does not have the corporate financial depth to sell weapons at below market prices in
order to secure contracts - then recoup revenue over the long term (eg. by charging higher for
maintenance and spare parts, etc)

- Australia is constrained by licences and intellectual property being held by major exporters to
Australia (eg. US, Spain, UK and for the future submarine France.

- Australia is not geographically positioned well to sell weapons to paying regional allies (except for
New Zealand). NOT to impoverished Pacific Islands, PNG, East Timor etc.

So what is Pyne really talking about?

New Zealand. It is the only country Australia has built major weapons system for, and sold those weapons to. But New Zealand is still a very small customer. The largest orders to NZ over the last 3 decades have been 2 Anzac-class frigates in the 1990s and 2 Protector-class OPVs in the 2000s.

Offsets. Australia is partly justifying the large amounts of taxpayer money it is spending on F-35As by claiming that the much smaller scale Australian content and "sales" of some F-35 components will be a victory for Australian industry

Pyne appears to focus most of his attention to ship and submarine building in Adelaide. It is highly unlikely that Australia could build and export Future Frigates, Futures Submarines or OPVs, to foreign countries. This is mainly because those countries that designed and hold the intellectual property rights to those weapons system would not want to lose business to artificially created Australian reselling or competition.

Pyne's claims of a potential export benefits of Australian built weapons can mainly be seen as ways to divert criticism of the high prices Australia will be spending on F-35s, ships and submarines over the next 20 years. Pyne wants to maintain Australia's major policy direction - that is spending on the weapons sector should not be questioned in the way spending on the less deserving health, education, welfare, infrastructure and energy sectors is being questioned.

Pyne's words do not yecertify that he is out of touch with the realities of weapons exports.

Australia has long been geared to be a major weapons importer making it difficult for Australia to become a major weapons developer and exporter. Source is the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database via The Canberra Times.

Pete

This article follow comments by special Netherlands' correspondent Kevin on July 17, 2017, below Submarine Matters articleDutch Submarine Talks With TKMS & Kockums, not with DCNS of March 2, 2017.

The Netherlands' process to decide on a Walrusreplacement submarine has been slowed down by the Dutch general electionof March 15, 2017. The election result has been a hung parliament of parties unable to form a stable decision making coalition.

This means delays in parliament approving a large expensive (estimated at 2.5 Billion euros initial costs) new submarine program.

A June 2016 briefingby Defence Minister Jeanine Hennis envisages a submarine class:

- that is stealthy and long range

- with powerful weapons

- that is capable of ISR

- perhaps completely submerge for weeks, and

- can carry and deploy special forces.

All of these functions cannot be performed by unmanned platforms – very obviously not carriage and deployment of special forces.

With the first of the Walruses due to be retired in 2025 there is increasing pressure to research, decide on and order a new submarine class. Consultation with Australia, Germany, Norway and Sweden is important, but difficult.

Information following the March 2017 election is that there are many new parliamentarians in “Troelstra Hall” (is this an informal name for Parliament or a Committee meeting place?) who are less familiar with submarine issues. Also some are less than enthusiastic about ordering new submarines. This is slowing down decision making.

That the submarine issues need much more discussion and agreement is apparent after an experienced parliamentarian (Salima Belhaj (D66) scroll a third down) even voiced the idea of having nuclear submarines. It is unclear whether the submarines would be nuclear propelled and/or have nuclear weapons.

Other issues deemed important by some parliamentarians are:

- recognition that no off-the-shelf submarine design meets the Netherlands' needs [this strongly

implies a larger than usual European submarine design (ie. more than 2,000 tons surfaced – perhaps

Walrus sized) will be chosen]

- giving Dutch companies the right to bid in any submarine competitive selection process

- building the [probably 4] new submarines in the Netherlands [by Damen at the old RDM

shipyard?] and

- the Netherlands holding the submarines intellectual property rights.

With a deliver first submarine intention in the mid 2020s the Netherlands has even more issues to decide than Australia (deliver submarines by the early 2030s). The Netherlands decision makers have not even reached consensus on a submarine size or chosen a submarine designer or builder. All this suggests that the Netherlands may take several more years than currently expected to start building submarines.

Three out of four of the Netherlands'Walrus submarines undergoing maintenance on ship stands. The photo may indicate how limited and congested shipbuilding space is in the Netherlands. Also the situation of only one Walrus being available may become standard as the Walrus' reach their use by date. (Photo courtesy Willem Severins)

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Kevin and Pete

As Russia's democratically re-elected Leader for Life, Putin, can take the long view, developing long term projects.

Putin’s triumphant project is Trump. Putin is at heart a jokester, really.

Trump is Putin's great Agent of Disruption. Even better than an Agent of Influence.

Russia did its utmost to boost Trump's electoral prospects. Russia is still nurturing Trump's disruptive tendencies.

Trump is continually disrupting the US government, the nation and international reputation.

At the G20 Trump was again played by Putin “It’s very clear that Trump’s best single relationship...is with Putin. US allies were surprised, flummoxed, disheartened.”

China doesn't mind Trump bringing interesting times to America, either.

Best buddies - Montage courtesy Slate

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Pete

In the last 24 hours India's Deccan Herald and other quality Indian news outlets have carried an important Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) announcement. My comments are in [...] brackets.

India's MoD has issued the long anticipated request for information (RFI) to 6 submarine suppliers to participate in the construction of 6 advanced conventional diesel-electric submarines under the Project-75I (I for India). This will be a $9.5 Billion (so far) project.

Companies invited, via the RFI, to provide information are:

- France's Naval Group (formerly DCNS)
- Russia's Rosoboronexport
- Spain's Navantia
- Sweden's Saab
- Germany's TKMS, and
- Japan's MHI (which would include KHI).

Once India has declared a winner [India's is notorious for taking years of horse-trading to select major weapon systems - see [1]] the winner will need to:

- partner with an Indian company, and
- build the submarines in India [Australia has similar rules]
- [the winner will need to facilitate provision of air independent propulsion (AIP). Long discussed is
the winner being prepared to share the AIP technology with India's Defence Research and
Development Organisation (DRDO)
- [also long discussed as a requirement is the fitting of a vertical launch systems (VLS) or at least the
ability to torpedo tube launch long range, land attack, cruise missiles]

For more information see the WHOLE DECCAN HERALD article.

COMMENT

India has for over a decade been conscious that its strategic competitors have been exceeding India's very slow submarine production (and purchasing) rate.

China has produced dozens of submarines in the last two decades with increasing numbers featuring the advantage of AIP. India has no AIP conventional submarines and India's submarines are mostly of less stealthy, old, designs.

Pakistan already has 3 AIP submarines and has ordered 8 submarines designed by China. These 8 will likely have AIP fitted or retrofitted.

It is not yet clear whether India wants average sized submarines (about 1,900 tonnes submerged) or is thinking of a larger, more capable, design.

[1] In terms of the glacial age of Project P-75I see the Submarine Matters' article of 2012.

Pete

Russia's submarine programs continue to be haphazard with Husky the latest envisaged.

NATIONAL INTERST ARTICLE

Dave Majumdar for National Interest has written a fine article How Russia's New Husky-Class Submarines Borrow from the U.S. Navy's Playbook

COMMENT

Unfortunately for Russia it did not emulate America's successful strategy of evolutionary scheduling and longer build runs. Russia seems to be maintaining its inefficient and expensive submarine building programs by publicising the 3 submarine program currently codenamed "Husky".

Russia only commissioned the lead Borey/Borei SSBN and Yasen class SSN/SSGN in 2013 - see here and here respectively. This means the first Husky SSBN, SSN and SSGN might not be commissioned for 30 years, in 2047. Such an early announcement of the Husky concepts may owe more to the hoped for career continuity of submarines design bureaus and junior-middle ranking designers than timely planning schedules.

Russia is also repeating its build-only-a-few-subs tradition rather than the US and Japanese longer build, gradual evolution approach. Only 8 Boreys (right sidebar) and 6 to 10 (right sidebar) Yasens will be built. Small batches loses economies of scale.

However, Russia does seem to be following the sound US strategy of placing vertical missile launch plugs onto a SSN concept, in order to create the SSGN concept. The SSBN will involve more extensive changes with a long plug and bigger draught missile compartment hump. This will be needes to accommodate the SSBN's longer (or is that taller) compartment of at least 12.1m for Bulava missiles .

With a 3 type semi-common submarine program might Russia fall into some of the structural and weight problems of the 3 type F-35 program? The F-35s have long lost their cost cutting commonality "dividends". The F-35s have steadily become dissimilar due to different structure and load requirements (optimistically planned in 3 F-35 variants that would share 80% of their parts. However, by April 2017 the variants were sharing at most 20% common design). May much larger Husky SSBNs have far different stealth characteristics (eg. larger pressure hull dimensions and water flow (hydrodynamic noise) characterisks than the smaller SSNs?

In the 1980s upscaling a smaller Swedish submarine design for the Collins' design caused marked hydrodynamic noise problems.

This likely drop in common design percentage may also impact US plans that assume Columbia-class SSBNs can adopt many parts and solutions of the Virginia-class.

Russia could claim it has much shorter production runs than the US because Russia's defence budget is now just about one-ninth that of the US. But one could question the lack of an evolutionary continuous build.

Oh well, what's bad for Russia is probably good for Western democracies (though the Trump clan would disagree).

The commonality cost/efficiency "dividend" of the 3 Huskies is even more ambitious than the 2 class Virginia-Columbia dividend. The Columbia-class (aka Ohio replacement) SSBN is to carry many of the external and internal characteristics of the Virginia. But the Virginia structure laid down in 1999 may be very different from than engineering solutions desired in 2021, when the first Columbia is due to be laid down.

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Pete

China and Russia have been cementing their unholy naval alliance with regular exercises. The live fire “Joint Sea 2017” July 22 to July 28, is the latest. It is being held far from China, in the Baltic Sea near European Russia. See good Youtube about how Baltic nations are worried.

The regular Joint Sea exercises have been held since 2012 and mark the eclipse of Russia as a top five conventional naval power but China’s rise as the number two conventional naval power (neck and neck with Japan). Russia’s possession of the second largest fleet of nuclear submarines complicates relative strength measurements a bit.

Throughout the Joint Sea Exercises Russia has only been able to deploy very small or very old vessels (of uncertain engine reliability). Large tugboats therefore feature large in Russian flotillas.

China’s Xinhuanet News Agency reports the 2017 exercise includes: “drills on a map”; live firing of “secondary cannons” (30mm on Chinese vessels); air defence; “joint landing and inspection”; search and rescue; and underway replenishment, etc.

For 2017 the Russian Navy can only muster two corvettes (Steregushchy and the Boiky) and an essential tugboat (SB-123). Russia is providing lots of land based airpower though.

The Chinese flotilla consists of:

Type 052D destroyer Hefei 合肥 (DDG-174). It is the third 052D built, commissioned December 2015, in China’s South Sea Fleet. Its AESA radar and 64 cell VLS may make it almost as effective as a US Arleigh Burke-class destroyer.

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Type 054A multi-role frigate Yuncheng运城, No. 546 (sister ship above). At 4,000 tons (with a 32 cell VLS, 8 Harpoon like ASM, ASW torpedos and ASROC launchers) it is of the size and armament that the US Navy can return to - after the abortive US LCS program.

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And Type 903 replenishmentship Lomahu. 骆马湖, No. 964, commissioned July 2016 based at South Sea Fleet (sister ship above). At 23,000 tons it is a useful size for a flotilla. (photo courtesy Coatepeque at Chinese Defense Blog).

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PREVIOUS JOINT SEA Exercises

- Joint Sea 2012 was held in the Yellow Sea, April 22-27, 2012. A total of 25 warships and

submarines, 13 warplanes, nine helicopters and two commando units participated

- Joint Sea 2013was held in the Sea of Japan, July 5-12, 2013. 18 ships of the 2 countries took part

- Joint Sea 2014 was held in May 2014 in the East China Sea.

- Joint Sea 2015, held May 2015, in the Mediterranean Sea, included two Type 054A frigates

(Linyi and Weifang) and Type 903 replenishment ship Weishanhusubscription source, and

- Joint Sea 2016, was held September 2016, in the South China Sea. Three Russian warships and two

supply ships exercised with ten Chinese Navy ships (destroyers, frigates, landing ships, supply

ships and submarines) took part.

So the exercises are very regular. It is is not yet clear whether pro-Russian Trump will bother to comment or Twitter about this symptom of Chinese-Russian naval alliance.

Pete

And now something (non-North Korean nuclear tipped submarine launched missile) to worry about, in future:

"Amateur 'biohackers' who tinker with the genetic make-up of living organisms could develop new types of biological weapons, a leading academic has warned.

Professor John Parrington, a molecular biologist at Oxford University, claims cheap gene editing tools are becoming widely available around the world.

This is giving DIY scientists the chance to genetically alter organisms like bacteria and yeast to give them properties not seen in nature...."

see http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3777875/Biohackers-build-biological-weapon-Gene-editing-technology-used-terrorists-scientist-warns.html

Add 3D printing of bio weapons into the mix.

But NSA like cyber agencies may be able to seed, track and destroy bio weapon messages and/or organisations attempting to send such dangerous messages for 3D printers or other uses.

Something to worry about in 10 years (more or less)

So much can be said about the first Ford class supercarrier commissioned July 22, 2017. But I won't cover all. Instead I'll lift a few choice facts from National Interest.

The lead ship, Gerald R. Ford is:

"...is powered by two new-design AB1 nuclear reactors...manufactured by Bechtel, which...together...create six hundred megawatts of electricity, triple the two hundred megawatts of the Nimitz class."

"...Ford will also have the most modern radar systems in the fleet. The Ford will have the new Dual Band Radar [DBR], which combines both the X-Band AN/SPY-3 Aegis radar and the S-Band Volume Surveillance Radar. DBR is capable of search, track and multiple missile illumination, detecting enemy aircraft and missiles and then guiding Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM) to intercept.

For self-defense, Ford will have two Mk. 29 missile launchers with eight ESSM each, and two Rolling Airframe Missile launchers. It will also have four Phalanx Close-In Weapon Systems for point defense against aircraft, missiles and small ships, and four M2 .50 caliber machine guns. Ford’s generous electrical capacity means that the ship could someday mount laser self-defense weapons. Powered by the ship’s nuclear reactors, such a system would have a virtually limitless ammunition supply, vastly increasing the ship’s defensive capability."

"...USS John F. Kennedy, the second aircraft carrier to bear the name of the thirty-fifth president of the United States, is under construction at Newport News and expected to enter service in 2020. The third carrier, Enterprise, is expected to begin construction next year and will join the fleet in the early 2020s. The current push by President Donald Trump and the chief of naval operations to a 350–355-ship fleet will likely include at least one additional Ford-class carrier in the near term."

This Youtube neatly sums up the National Interest article.
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The Ford's new features at naval-technology(dot)com.
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Pete

Hi Donors

I've just emailed Submarine Matters August 2017 Donor Report: Chinese UUVs – More Than Just Gliders out to you, as a WORD attachment. Please check your spam bin if you don't see it in your IN box.

Leadin to report:

"Multi-talented submarine guru Bryan Clark has long preached the US Navy should keep its qualitative lead by heavily developing and deploying unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). One problem is the USN's main opponent, the Chinese Navy (PLA-N), has listened to Clark and is also developing a formidable UUV force..."

Possibly a Zhishui I (?) same as Qianlong-1 (?) deepwater UUV developed by the Shenyang Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of Sciences. Those who can read Chinese please confirm.

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Regards

Pete

Director

Submarine Matters International

Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s drop in popularity leading to a weaker position in Japan’s Parliament (Diet) may reverse his successes in:
- sending Japanese military forces overseas on UN duties, and

- weapon sales or coastguard aid (eg. to the Philippines) to foreign countries.

Abe now seems to have a low chance of revising the pacifist constitution(especially Article 9).

Particular matters that may have weakened Abe’s push to have a normal defence force and arms industry are:
- the resignation in late July 2017 of rightwing Defense Minister Inada
- due to the cover-up of internal records that exposed the danger Japanese peacekeepers faced in
South Sudan. Under Japanese political and legal rules the peacekeepers were only allowed in
South Sudan if there was a ceasefire in force. Instead the peacekeepers had been exposed to
combat since at least 2016.

Might the above events and Inada’s replacement on August 3, 2017 by new Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera slow down Japan’s ability to sell aircraft and submarines to foreign buyers?

Pete

Ever since Indonesia decided to buy 3 Improved Chang Bogo Type 209 variants from South Korea’s DSME (on December 20, 2011) decisions by many Indonesians involved have been a puzzle. The Indonesians sensibly decided to have 2 of the Type 209/1400 variants built in South Korea. The first submarine KRI Nagapasa was commissioned on August 2, 2017. The next 209, KRI Ardadedali, is expected to be commissioned in 2018.

However, in February 2014, the Indonesia Parliament made the curious decision to have the third submarine, KRI Alugoro, assembled from South Korean parts, at the PT PAL shipyard in Surabaya, Indonesia. By itself this would add up to a production run of only 1 submarine in Indonesia. A delay may also ensue as often it takes 5 years to build/assemble a submarine in a foreign customer's shipyard. So KRI Alugoro may only be launched in 2020 or later. A production run of 4 would be more logical.

So the deal with South Korea for 3 Type 209 variants has been made. But factions within the Indonesian bureaucracy, Navy and politicians have been talking about prospects for buying an unsettled number of:

- Russian Kilo, Amur or Kalina submarines

- likely South Korean designed minisubs, and

- talking to some extent to France.

In February 2014 the Jakarta Postreported:

“Despite the order of three submarines from Korea, KKIP implementation team head, Adm. (ret) Sumardjono said that Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro had also set a policy to procure Kilo-class submarines from Russia in motion. This is a stop-gap measure as we need 12 submarines to safeguard our waters,' he said.'”

The prospect of Indonesia fielding 2 or even 3 distinctly different classes of submarine may defy military efficiency or official purchasing sense. Although it may make sense to India, which has 3 foreign designed classes of SSKs built/building and may eventually buy a fourth SSK type, under Project-75i.

There may be what can be delicately described as a "financial commissions for many" reason for buyers to make extra deals or have extra talks with several submarine suppliers.

Other interpretations are:
- perhaps Indonesia wishes to match the 12 submarines to be built by Indonesia’s southern
neighbour, Australia. But this still does not explain 2 or 3 types for Indonesia, or
- perhaps Indonesia wants to spread its geo-political alliance net, via submarine purchases, as widely
as possible. In that sense buying from Russia, France or, less likely, China, may make sense.

The launch ceremony for KRI Nagapasa on March 24, 2016. It was attended by Indonesia's Minister of Defense (former General) Ryamizard Ryacudu and Indonesia's Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Ade Supandi (Photo of launch ceremony coutesy Indonesia's portal-komando website). On August 2, 2017 KRI Nagapasa was commissioned.

Pete

COMMENT

For decades no economic sanctions or diplomacy from the Western world has stopped North Korea developing nuclear weapons or developing surface-to-surface or submarine-missile delivery systems.

Are Trumps threats to North Korea a dangerous approach or fresh new approach to respond to Kim's threats?

SITUATION

"Nuclear Intelligence Report - In August 2017, the Washington Post reported on a confidential assessment carried out by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency which suggested that North Korea had successfully developed nuclear warheads for missiles within reach of the US mainland.^[74]

Reacting to the report President Trump stated that future threats would be "met with fire and fury and frankly power, the likes of which this world has never seen before." In response North Korea announced that it was examining an operational plan to strike areas around the U.S. territory of Guam in the Pacific, including the Andersen Air Force Base.^[75] " and Naval Base Guam which includes nuclear attack submarine (SSN) Squadron 15.

FURTHER COMMENT

Even if North Korea hasn't yet miniaturised warheads small enough to fit on a missile or torpedo, North Korea could try to deliver larger nuclear devices (maybe 2+ tons), especially to South Korea and/or Japan by other means, including North Korean:

- mini to medium submarines carrying fitted nuclear demolition charges. The subs would need to be
manned by a crew prepared to die or escape by diver delivery/propulsion vehicle (which allow
divers to "swim" away faster).

- nuclear devices on "civilian cargo ships" or "trawlers" that may have been at sea for days-weeks.
Escape the explosion using fast rigid dingies.

- on aircraft: transport, "civilian" aircraft, or regular reconnaissance aircraft. Bomber aircraft may be
a bit obvious. A semi-suicidal crew would need to parachute or eject.

- a well disguised truck load?

- via a tunnel under North Korean-South Korean border.

All of these methods would be semi-suicidal for the delivery crew. I don't know how frequently North Korean troops or agents are prepared to carry out suicide missions, but there appears to be some history of it.

Hopefully nothing will happen.

Pete

Over the last 24 hours Australia's Prime Minister Turnbull has declared that Australia, as an ally of the US, would come to the aid of the US, if the US went to war with North Korea (NK).

Turnbull's words were"America stands by its allies, including Australia of course, and we stand by the United States...So be very, very clear on that. If there's an attack on the US, the ANZUS Treaty would be invoked and Australia would come to the aid of the United States, as America would come to our aid if we were attacked."

COMMENT

If NK carried out its threat to fire missiles at the US Territory of Guam this might be a trigger for a US counter-strike against NK. If NK's action is judged "an attack on the US" Australia might then send air and/or sea units to reinforce US forces facing NK.

Australian military assets that might conceivably work with US forces could include:

Aircraft, for example, Australian:

- AP-3C Orions and/or P-8 Poseidons to patrol against NK submarines, NK ships and boats.
- Boeing 737 (platform) E-7A Wedgetail AEW&C aircraft
- Airbus A330 Multi Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) aerial refueling aircraft
- possibly Australian F/A-18/F and/or F/A-18A strike aircraft, and
- EA-18G (Growler) electronic jamming aircraft

Perhaps ships, including:

- 2 Anzac class and/or Adelaide class frigates.
- Australia's first Air Warfare Destroyer, HMAS Hobart, is unlikely to be commissioned in time.
- For the frigates' long voyage north 1 replenishment ship (HMAS Sirius or HMAS Success)
- Collins submarines for blocking defence, closer to Australian waters.

It is still unclear what South Korea, Japan, China and Russia might do given their geographic proximity to North Korea.

Pete

Shooting down NK ballistic missiles with AEGIS - SM-3 then THAAD in the boost phase and beginning of the mid flight phase is probably the best chance to shoot down the missiles. But still difficult to shoot down all. Shooting down single or multiple missile warheads in the terminal phase when they are plunging from space at hypersonic speeds is the most difficult time to hit them. (Map/Diagram courtesy US Missile Defense Agency, Raytheon, Lockheed Martin via CNN)

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Ballistic missile defences (BMD) to defend countries ever further from North Korea (NK) include:

South Korea (SK) relies on:

- Patriot missiles,

- only one battery of US THAAD missiles (more blocked by China)

- US ship based AEGIS aiming SM-3 missiles. Several ships per US carrier group) see Submarine

Matters’ article in April 2017.

- SK does have AEGIS destroyers but they do net yet have SM-3.

- SK lacks its own nuclear weapons - the best deterrent against NK nuclear weapons

Japan has:

- AEGIS destroyers mounting SM-3

- some AEGIS armed US ships may also protect Japan.

- Patriot missiles

- For more complete protection Japan should quickly purchase AEGIS ashore and/or THAAD.

- Japan lacks its own nuclear weapons - the best deterrent against NK nuclear weapons

Guam has:

- THAAD

- the US has nuclear weapons - the best deterrent against NK nuclear weapons

- Japan’s new Defence Minister Onodera said Japan’s right of collective self-defence could legally

permit Japan to intercept NK ballistic missiles aimed at (or near) for Guam. But Japan's BMDs

may be incapableof shooting down an NK missile launched for Guam.

Guam already in range. A risk is NK might aim to launch missiles near Guam but they might hit Guam by mistake - thus resulting in US retaliation. NK is steadily developing ICBM with the range to hit Australia. (Map courtesy The Daily Telegraph).

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Australia has:

- no SM-3, THAAD or Patriot missiles. A major reason is that they would likely be very ineffective
against ICBM warhead re-entry vehicles once the ICBMs have reached Australian airspace from

China, Russia or North Korea. Also Australia, with its spread out cities is much more difficult to
defend than close together cities in SK, Japan or Guam.

- the best deterrent against NK is nuclear weapons. Australia lacks its own nuclear weapons -

- Australia, like SK and Japan, therefore relies on the US nuclear weapon deterrent

See this very useful interactive site(on SM-3, Aegis, THAAD and Patriots) from the US DoD Missile Defense Agency.

Pete

Based on Anonymous commentsof August 11-12, 2017 I have compiled TABLE 1 below. For an overview of the Soryu program see TABLE 2 below that:

Soryu Mark IIs are likely to cost more than US$91 million = 10 Billion (B) Yen (¥) than Soryu Mark Is due to new:

- batteries, LIBs (replacing LABs+Stirling AIP) and diesel generator sets (gensets) for greater power

generation, and

- sonar systems new sonars for improved detection of the enemy and for better submerged
navigation-by-sonar

TABLE 1

Item/Submarine Type	Soryu Mark I	Soryu Mark II	Comments
SS order number	16SS – 26SS	27SS and 28SS	See Soryu Table below
Batteries + AIP (where applicable)	LABs + Stirling AIP	NCA LIBs[1]
Cost of batteries/Soryu in Billion Yen (¥*B) [2]**	LABs ¥1.44B	NCA-LIBs ¥8.3B	LIBs per Soryu almost 6 times costs of LABs
Battery cost/performance [3]	4.5 (for 576 LABs fitted)	5.4 (for 480 LIBs fitted)
Specific energy (Wh/kg) [4]	40-60	240	LIBs have 4-6 x the specific energy of LABs
Budgeted costs per Soryu in Billion Yen [5]	26SS ¥51.7B (FY2014)	27SS ¥64.4B (FY2015) 28SS ¥63.6B (FY2016)	MK IIs ¥12-13B more expensive than MK Is
Extra cost for in MK IIs [6]		genset about ¥2B higher sonars ¥3-4B higher

[1] Soryu Mark IIs will likely be equipped with (NCA LIBs) Lithium nickel cobalt aluminium oxide ( LiNiCoAlO₂) made by GS Yuasa.

[2] According to the Japanese Ministry of Defense’s Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) the costs of LABs and NCA-LIBs are reported to be 1.44 ¥B and 8.3 ¥B, respectively. This makes NCA-LIBs just under 6 times more expensive than LABs for each Soryu sub. But, in terms of cost/performance (see [3]), NCA-LIBs are not overly expensive.

[3] More precisely, price ratio of LAB to NCA-LIB is 4.5 and 5.4 for 576 and 480 LIBs in Soryu Mark II, respectively.

[4] Specific energy of NCA-LIBs are 240 Wh/kg and LABs are 40-60 Wh/kg. The specific energy of NCA-LIBs are 4 to 6 times that of LABs nearly the same as the above mentioned price raitio.

[5] Significant portions of the ¥12-13B cost of Soryu Mark IIs over Soryu Mark Is include...

[6] ...about ¥2B higher for the new gensets and ¥3-4B higher for new sonars. This suggests major changes in gensets and sonars for the Soryu Mark IIs.

TABLE 2 - Overvie of SORYU (& Oyashio) Programs as at August 15, 2017

SS No.	Build No Name	Pennant No.	MoF approved amount ¥ Billions & FY	LABs, LIBs, AIP	Laid Down	Laun -ched	Commi-ssioned	Built By
5SS Oyashio	8105 Oyashio	SS-590/ TS3608	¥52.2B FY1993	LABs only	Jan 1994	Oct 1996	Mar 1998	KHI
6SS-15SS Oyashios 10 subs	8106 -8115 various	SS-591-600	¥52.2B per sub FY1994-FY2003	LABs only	15SS Feb 2004	15SS Nov 2006	15SS Mar 2008	MHI & KHI
16SS Soryu Mk 1	8116 Sōryū	SS-501	¥60B FY2004	LABs + AIP	Mar 2005	Dec 2007	Mar 2009	MHI
17SS	8117 Unryū	SS-502	¥58.7B FY2005	LABs + AIP	Mar 2006	Oct 2008	Mar 2010	KHI
18SS	8118 Hakuryū	SS-503	¥56.2 FY2006	LABs + AIP	Feb 2007	Oct 2009	Mar 2011	MHI
19SS	8119 Kenryū	SS-504	¥53B FY2007	LABs + AIP	Mar 2008	Nov 2010	Mar 2012	KHI
20SS	8120 Zuiryū	SS-505	¥51B FY2008	LABs + AIP	Mar 2009	Oct 2011	Mar 2013	MHI
No 21SS			No 21SS built
22SS	8121 Kokuryū	SS-506	¥52.8B FY2010	LABs + AIP	Jan 2011	Oct 2013	Mar 2015	KHI
23SS	8122 Jinryu	SS-507	¥54.6B FY2011	LABs + AIP	Feb 2012	Oct 2014	7 Mar 2016	MHI
24SS	8123 Sekiryū	SS-508	¥54.7B FY2012	LABs + AIP	15 Mar 2013	2 Nov 2015	13 Mar 2017	KHI
25SS	8124 Seiryū	SS-509	¥53.1B FY2013	LABs + AIP	22 Oct 2013	12 Oct 2016	Mar? 2018	MHI
26SS	8125	SS-510	¥51.7B FY2014	LABs + AIP	2014	?	Mar 2019?	KHI
27SS First Soryu Mk 2	8126	SS-511	¥64.4B FY2015	LIBs only	2015	2017?	Mar 2020	MHI
28SS Second Soryu Mark 2	8127	SS-512	¥63.6B FY2016	LIBs only	2016?	2018?	Mar 2021?	KHI
29SS First of New Class	?	?	¥76B FY2018	LIBs only	?	?	2023?	MHI?

Table courtesy of exclusive information provided to Submarine Matters. LABs = lead-acid batteries, AIP=air independent propulsion, LIBs=lithium-ion batteries. ¥***B = Billion Yen.

Anonymous and Pete

Running parallel to the threat of North Korean missiles to the US Guam territory issue is a sporadic, ill-informed Australian domestic debate on the viability of any Australian ballistic missile defences (BMD).

Isolated current and former Australian politicians (Abbott and Rudd respectively) advocate BMD for Australia against the North Korean threat. The Australian Government insists that Australian BMD is technically ineffective and would be hugely expensive.

I agree. This particularly applies to such scenarios as North Korean, Chinese or Russian ICBM nuclear warhead reentry vehicles descending on the terminal phase of their flight toward major Australian cities and military/intelligence sites. See Diagram-Map 1. below.

Diagram-Map 1. Guam already in range. NK is steadily developing ICBM to hit any targets in Australia. Darwin may already be in range. (Map courtesy The Daily Telegraph)
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In view of physical realities and cost Australia doesn't have THAAD or Patriot missiles. One of Australia's AWDs (Air Warfare Destroyers) (HMAS Hobart) has AEGIS. Hobart is about to be commissioned and two more are being completed. None have BMD capable SM-3 missiles and might not have.

Australia best anti-missile missile hope is the US Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system - and that's a poor system.

US Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD)

The US Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) BMD system goes back to Reagan era SDI "Star Wars" years and is nowhere near ready after more than US$41 Billion spent. GMD:

- has a high failure rate, that is, a low success rate in shootdown-friendly tests,

- would be ineffective against most enemy submarines firing nuclear tipped ballistic and cruise
missiles from most launch positions at Australia, and
- probably needs decades more development
- again is extremely expensive making it perhaps of low marginal utility compared to a sovereign
Australian nuclear deterrent

Unlike the US Australia has no overpolar (over Alaska) interceptor "chokepoint" see Diagram-Map 2 below which would increase the US chances of interception. Australia's geography, with more than 10 dispersed large cities and 10+ dispersed military/intelligence bases, would need 20+ interceptor batteries (perhaps talking 100 x GMD missiles - see below).

Diagram-Map 2. includes the US$multi-billion giant radars deployed forward for interception of enemy ballistic missiles at their midcourse overflight "chokepoint" over Alaska. Australia has no such chokepoint but instead would need to construct 20+ interceptor batteries - a system probably more expensive than the ineffective US system. (Diagram-Map courtesy http://www.analisidifesa.it/2017/06/la-nuova-guerra-fredda-si-combatte-a-suon-di-missili/ ).

Patriot, THAAD or SM-3s located in Northeast Asia have the greatest chance of shooting down North Korean ICBMs in the early boost-phase. Australia could only send one or two AEGIS Air Warfare Destroyers, future armed with SM-3, across the world, to Northeast Asia, in the unlikely event of North Korea launching something. Australia's US, Japanese and South Korean allies are better situated for action in Northeast Asia.

The best deterrent against North Korea (like all enemy nuclear armed states) is nuclear weapons. Australia lacks its own nuclear weapons. Australia, like SK and Japan, therefore relies on their US ally's nuclear weapon deterrent.

Pete

Comments (of 6/8/17 1:39 AM and 11/8/17 1:20 AM) below Submarine Matters' article Could Australia be Pyne's major weapons exporter? Unkikely.have prompted me to write about the advantages of building major weapon systems (eg. ships, subs, tanks and jet aircraft) in Australia. Advantages include:

- employing workers and management in Australia rather than overseas means all their living

expenses are spent in Australia. The resulting money multiplier effect benefits surrounding

communities, eg. Adelaide. If living expenses are spent in Adelaide it doesn't matter if the

workforce carry the corporate identity of Naval Group, ASC, RAN, Lockheed Martin or other

entities.

- providing the skills to undertake major overhauls of weapons and repair major battle damage

in wartime building and overhauling weapons in Australia can be done more safely than exposing

them to enemy interference on long range journeys to foreign shipyards

- maintaining skills (like designing and welding) for other manufacturing sectors including civilian
shipbuilding. For background here is the Australian Manufacturing website and Defence Teaming
Centre Inc

- Federal money spent on weapons building in specific states promotes national unity and equity for

disadvantaged regions or states.

- spending large amounts of money has inherent political dimensions eg. winning sufficient Federal

seats in South Australia enabling the Turnbull Government to win the 2016 Election.

- a production run of weapons built in Australia creates efficiencies for each successive unit built
with resulting economies of scale for more competitive sales to foreign countries

- domestic production runs also spawn more competitive sales of components to foreign countries

- exporting weapons built in Australia has terms of trade benefits and diplomate benefits (eg. Pacific

Patrol Boat to small island nations and larger vessels to New Zealand).

Are not these arguments compelling?

The timeline/graph above (Courtesy Defence Teaming Centre Inc), is now out of date but the "Valley of Death" concern still applies. The Valley of Death applies to the downturn in AWD shipbuilding in Adelaide 2018-2021 that will not be totally rectified by the Federal Governments project to build 2 much smaller OPVs in Adelaide. The closing of the last car factory in Adelaide in October 2017 is an example of a different manufacturing sector contributing to Adelaide's manufacturing "Valley of Death".

---

Timeline courtesy the Australian Government's Naval Shipbuilding Plan May 2017, page 15. This illustrates the continuous shipbuilding strategy which will particularly benefit South Australia, Western Australia and all other states to a lesser extent. Canberra (ACT) also benefits.

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Naval Shipbuilding Timeline Australian Government Budget 2016-2017. This more centralised government document also demonstrates continuous shipbuilding (and also overhaul) strategy.

---

Pete

With the August 21, 2017 collision between USS John S. McCain and Alnic MC there's more tragedy for US sailors and embarrassment for the US Navy. This being the second US destroyer collision in just over 2 months (since the June 17, 2017 USS Fitzgerald collision).

Both the USS McCain and USS Fitzgerald collisions

- took place in highly congested waters (packed with ships).

- involved 30.000+ ton civilian ships generally considered too large to take evasive action

- the onus to avoid collision may be on the more manoeuvrable smaller destroyers, which also have more lookouts and sensors (eg. radar and satellite sensors (including AIS)).

The US Navy has already blamed "a steering failure" for a collision. But steering problems given backup systems involve a "combination of mechanical [equipment] and procedural [human] failure"

Under its own power, USS McCain has reached Changi Naval Base in Singapore where US investigators will look for the "missing" sailors.

The location of the destroyer USS John S. McCain collision off Malaysia and Singapore and actual damage to destroyer (inset)(Map and inset courtesy The Sun)

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Pete

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