Possible Systemic Problems on Pre-Collision Destroyers

August 24, 2017, 5:27 am

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Anonymous (at 23/8/17 11:57 PM) and Ztev made some good points that I'll paraphrase below.

As the US Navy rapidly sacks admirals and officers of lower rank over the USS Fitzgerald and USS McCain collisions the search for systemic (recurring) reasons continues in public and more secretly in the navy.

Pre-dawn (USS Fitzgerald collided at about 1.30am and USS McCain at 5:24am) is one of the worst times as there is enough sunlight emerging to make lights less effective but not enough to see other ship structures particularly well. However, watch keepers and captains should know all this. 

Professionals should not be making these sort of mistakes with today's radar, optical night vision aids and other sensors.

USS Fitzgerald and USS McCain were  not involved in special manoeuvres (such as underway replenishment at sea (RAS), sailing close to shore, sailing in formation, or boarding at sea while underway, etc.

Civilian freighters and tankers are big and slow. They tend to be lit up like Christmas trees when running at night in heavy/congested shipping lanes. 

In contrast destroyers are fast (often capable of more than 30 knots) and have some of the most expensive radars and other sensors in existence. A systemic problem may be destroyers might be concentrating so hard on detecting small fast things like fighter jets and anti-ship missiles that they may not be looking for 30,000 ton tankers or freighters.

Might destroyers be turning down their sensors to save on hotel load electricity use to save on gas/fuel use out of misplaced greenhouse gas concerns?

Or are destroyers being run on autopilots, wrongly programmed and/or malfunctioning?

There may be many more systemic weaknesses that have crept in like fewers months of watch keeping training over the last few years for junior USN officers. Also there may have been lower then usual numbers of senior officers on both destroyers' bridges. Senior officers who wanted to be fresh for the delicate manoeuvres involved when arriving in port in the early morning.

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Previous North Korean Missiles Tests Over Japan

August 28, 2017, 4:16 pm

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North Korea's test of a missile over Japan's northern island of Hokkaido (map above) in the last 24 hours is not the first North Korean missile test over Japanese territory. The main difference is that  North Korea is now suspected (over the last few months) of being capable of building miniaturised nuclear warheads that would fit onto missiles.

Previous missile tests over Japanese territory, include:

-  In December 2012 North Korea fired a missile over Okinawa.

-  In August 1998: North Korea fired a suspected missile over Japan and into the Pacific Ocean. 

   North Korea called the payload a satellite.

-  There would be other proven or suspected tests over Japan?

It is not known if North Korea gave Japanese authorities prior warning of this latest (August 2017) test?

Pete

INS Aridhaman's (probably) Symbolic Launch late 2017

August 30, 2017, 8:14 am

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Artist's rendering of the future INS Aridhaman. Diagram courtesy Indian Defence Research Wing (IDRW)

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The following is partly based on Ghalib Kabir's comments of 28 to 29 August 2017 mixed with Pete’s research.

India's future SSBN INS Aridhaman has been under construction at the Ship Building Centre in Visakhapatnam since 2011.  Aridhaman might be symbolically launched in late 2017. Actual  launch (into the water for fitting out) may be in 2018. Then would follow harbor trials and sea trials for 2 years with commissioning expected sometime in 2020 or 2021.

Aridhaman is the second in the Arihant class and is larger than INS Arihant. While Arihant only has 4 large launch tubes Aridhaman has 8 making Aridhaman more useful as an SSBN. Each launch tube will be able to  carry 3 K-15 Sagarika missiles (total of 24) with a range of 750 km or a total of 8 future K-4 missiles (with a range of 3,500 km)

Aridhaman length and displacement will increase due to the 4 extra launch tubes, a longer more powerful reactor, extra crew, more powerful sonars and other mission critical equipment. Aridhaman  may be 125m long and 7,000 tonnes (surfaced) larger than INS Arihant’s 111m and 6,000 tonnes (surfaced). Aridhaman's dimention would be very similar to the no longer operating US Ethan Allan class (at 125m long/7,000 tonnes). 

Aridhaman will have one seven-blade propeller powered by a PWR reactor. INS Arihant has a 83 MWt (12 MWe, 16,000 shp) reactor while Aridhaman may have a 100 MWt reactor (approx 16 MWe or 20,000+ shp)

The increase in power of Aridhaman's 100 MWt reactor may be achieved by many means including:

-  larger size 

-  higher HEU than the usual 40% for Indian nuclear subs (see page 67 of this pdf) and

-  higher steam pressure

If the reactor heavily relies on Russian design assistance then Russia’s VM-4 reactor (70-90 MWt) may be an influence. Alternatively India's advanced nuclear complexes (especially that at Kalpakkam) might have allowed India to develop the 100 MWt reactor without Russian help. 

Another INS Aridhaman image (courtesy Defense News).

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Ghalib Kabir and Pete

India's New SSBN, INS Aridhaman, and its Nuclear Missiles

September 1, 2017, 1:42 am

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INS Arihant (4 vertical missile tubes) is acting as a missile testbed for some missiles that INS Aridhaman (8 tubes) will eventually deploy (Graphic courtesy DRDO, H I Sutton and The Diplomat via several publications, eg. the Dhaka Tribune).

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Following INS Aridhaman's (probably) Symbolic Launch late 2017 Ghalib Kabir has provided additional comments . When added to Pete's research based mainly on footnote [1] this yields:

MAINLY GHALIB'S COMMENTS

The imminent (symbolic "soft"[2]) launch of INS Aridhaman has been a strong rumor since April 2017 at least (not surprising considering the construction work since 2011). Ghalib would wager that the 'proper' ["hard"] launch is likely in early 2018, then sea trials by early 2020, with commissioning by late 2021. 

Nuclear Tipped Missiles

Ghalib hopes India retains the 8 vertical launch tube format for the 3,500 km range, 17t, 12m longK-4 SLBMlayout. [Pete estimates the K-15 "Sagarika" may be used on Aridhaman for several years (to 2025?) before the K-4 is a mature missile system.] But the K-15 has many deficiencies including a short 800km range useless [against the city of Islamabad and China] with a light (up to 800kg) warhead. [Pete - Even India's Nirbhay cruise missile has a longer range of 1,500km.] Ghalib hears that the current concept of the K-5 SLBM might have 3 MIRVs per missile [3]. [Pete - However some doubt India is trying to develop MIRVs at thiis stage][4] Initially the K-4 missiles might carry a single warhead only (like a Pu boosted fission device) [Pete - or 2 stage mainly fusion?].

Submarine Reactor Development

Russia's VM-5 [5] reactor (used on Russia's one and only Project 661 class test SSN (K-222) formed the on land (at Kalpakkam near Chennai) testbed for Ariahant's 83 MWt reactor. Russian assistance allegedly stopped in 2015-16. The VM-5 design probably formed the basis for some Indian submarine reactor improvements resulting in Aridhaman's reactor being uprated to 100 MWt.

Ghalib comments - according to Indian scientists more than 'Know-how' it was Russian 'Show-how' [of a submarine reactor and other nuclear submarine technology] that was more useful. I think thats the key here. To be 'shown how' makes for the actual breakthrough. See Page 135 of this book talks of Russia and Arihant's 83 MWt reactor:

Further reading on the special Russian-Indian nuclear submarine relationship is at [6] and [7] below.

PETE's COMMENTS, FOOTNOTES

[1]  Information on Indian SSBNs and SLBMs are on pages 130 to 138 of Peter Lobner’s “60 Years of Marine Nuclear Power: 1955-2015 – Part 4 – Other Nuclear Marine Nations”, dated August 2015, large PDF (around 20MB) http://www.lynceans.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Part-4_UK-France-Others-60-yrs-of-marine-nuc-power.pdf

[2]  A "soft launch" is when a submarine under construction stays on dry land after the "launch" ceremony or is launched into the water but is then returned to dry land for further construction. 

A well documented example of a soft launch was when  HMAS Collins was launched into the water on August 28, 1993 to meet a political schedule. When launched Collins was incomplete with the design not even finalised. At “launch” on August 28, 1993 important internal pipes and fittings were not installed, the components of the combat system had yet to be delivered, and some hull sections were actually sheets of timber painted black so the submarine would appear complete in photographs of the launching ceremony.  Within weeks of the “launch”, Collins was removed from the water, and it was not until June 1994 that the submarine was completed then really “hard” launched.]

[3]If the K-5 is closely based on the Agni V then the K-5 may eventually have 3 to 10 MIRVs per missile. Also the follow-on K-6 may have 10 MIRVs (See Agni VI wiki and right sidebar).

[4]Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris “Indian nuclear forces” in Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists, 2017 Vol. 73, No. 4 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2017.1337998 page 5 (208) argue that India has to prioritise given the limited payloads/range of Agno V and VI missiles. India may prefer to at least be capable of hitting distant targets (read targets in northeast China eg. Beijing) with a single warhead per missile rather than having MIRVs which would prevent Agni V/VI's hitting Beijing. 

[5] Pete is puzzled the right sidebar for K-222's VM-5m records:

"2 × VM-5m type pressurised water reactors, 177.4 MW (237,897 hp)

2 × steam turbines, 2 shafts

80,000 shp (60 MW)"

How can that data be converted to one reactor of 100 MWt?

[6] Verghese Koithara, Managing India's Nuclear Forces, link.

[7] Rakesh Krishnan Simhain “Arihant: How Russia helped deliver India’s baby boomer” Russia & India Report, 26 October 2015 https://in.rbth.com/blogs/stranger_than_fiction/2015/10/26/arihant-how-rusia-helped-deliver-indias-baby-boomer_533849“As India’s first nuclear powered submarine prepares for its maiden missile launch, a look at the extent of Russian assistance in the Arihant project.”

Ghalib Kabir, Pete and the Authors cited

Sniffer Aircraft May Have Pointed to North Korea Nuclear Device Being Thermonuclear

September 3, 2017, 7:46 pm

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Intelligence agencies are using not yet public sniffer test results to conclude the September 3, 2017 North Korean nuclear test was thermonuclear. Further confirmation is based arount the power of the 6.3 magnitude nuclear earthquake leading to a thermonuclear range estimated yield of 100 kilotons or higher (various estimates).

Three or more Japanese Air Force T-4 intermediate jet trainers have already been used as “sniffer” aircraft to collect radioactive dust (eg. tritium, deuterium and lithium-6 deuteride) and noble gases. The T-4s probably use external flow-through devices to collect particulates on filter paper. This is an advance over using a much larger, labor intensive, US Boeing WC-135 Constant Phoenix aircraft.

Some authorities limit the definition of thermonuclear weapon to a two stage weapon where the detonation of a primary fission stage sets off a secondary nuclear fusion stage. But a broader definition also encompasses a boosted fission weapon - typically a bomb using a small amount of fusion fuel to increase the explosive rate, and thus yield, of a fission reaction.

Photo of North Korean leader inspecting a device which looks like a thermonuclear weapon.  The photo was released a few hours before the test. See very useful BBC commentatry on physical aspects of the Kim-Bomb photo.

Pete

Saab Kockums Concept Proposal of Three A26 SSK Variants

September 4, 2017, 8:14 pm

≫ Next: Updated Table of Japan's Soryu & Oyashio Submarine Program: Admiral Kobayashi

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Saab Kockums August 31, 2017 concept proposal of three A26 SSK variants. "Pelagic" means Open Sea and can perhaps relate to Baltic, Mediterranean, Arabian and Caribbian Sea use. Artwork courtesy Saab Kockums via navyrecognition. 

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Anonymous for navyrecognition commented at 5/9/17 12:02 PM on Saab Kockums A26s.

Thanks for your details of August 31, 2017 concerning Saab Kockums concept proposal of three A26 SSK variants.

Pete Comment

The A26 Oceanic variant is interesting. This is the "baseline" A26 with two being built for the Swedish Navy. A26 Oceanic measures 65m long, around 1,900 tons to 2,000 tons (surfaced), over 6,500nm at 10 knots, endurance at patrol speed is over 30 days and is assisted by the AIP module, standard crew is 17 to 35. [Presumably around 10 Special Forces can also be accomodated?].

I assume four A26 Oceanic variants of approximately 2,300 tons (surfaced) are being offered to the Dutch Navy as Walrus replacements.

Saab Kockums concept proposal of the VLS (or Vertical Multi-Purpose Lock module(s) option that can be fitted to A26 SSK variants. Artwork courtesy Saab Kockums via navyrecognition.

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Pete

Updated Table of Japan's Soryu & Oyashio Submarine Program: Admiral Kobayashi

September 6, 2017, 2:36 am

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On September 4, 2017 Anonymous provided new information updating Submarine Matter's Amended Improvements & Higher Costs of Soryu Mark IIs Over Mark Is of August 21, 2017

 TABLE - SORYU & Oyashio Program as at September 6, 2017 

SS No.	Build No Name	Pennant No.	MoF approved amount ¥ Billions & FY	LABs, LIBs, AIP	Laid Down	Laun -ched	Commi-ssioned	Built By
5SS Oyashio	8105 Oyashio	SS-590/ TS3608	¥52.2B FY1993	LABs only	Jan 1994	Oct 1996	Mar 1998	KHI
6SS-15SS Oyashios 10 subs	8106 -8115 various	SS-591-600	¥52.2B per sub FY1994-FY2003	LABs only	15SS Feb 2004	15SS Nov 2006	15SS Mar 2008	MHI & KHI
16SS Soryu Mk 1	8116 Sōryū	SS-501	¥60B FY2004	LABs + AIP	Mar 2005	Dec 2007	Mar 2009	MHI
17SS	8117 Unryū	SS-502	¥58.7B FY2005	LABs + AIP	Mar 2006	Oct 2008	Mar 2010	KHI
18SS	8118 Hakuryū	SS-503	¥56.2 FY2006	LABs + AIP	Feb 2007	Oct 2009	Mar 2011	MHI
19SS	8119 Kenryū	SS-504	¥53B FY2007	LABs + AIP	Mar 2008	Nov 2010	Mar 2012	KHI
20SS	8120 Zuiryū	SS-505	¥51B FY2008	LABs + AIP	Mar 2009	Oct 2011	Mar 2013	MHI
No 21SS			No 21SS built
22SS	8121 Kokuryū	SS-506	¥52.8B FY2010	LABs + AIP	Jan 2011	Oct 2013	Mar 2015	KHI
23SS	8122 Jinryu	SS-507	¥54.6B FY2011	LABs + AIP	Feb 2012	Oct 2014	7 Mar 2016	MHI
24SS	8123 Sekiryū	SS-508	¥54.7B FY2012	LABs + AIP	15 Mar 2013	2 Nov 2015	13 Mar 2017	KHI
25SS	8124 Seiryū	SS-509	¥53.1B FY2013	LABs + AIP	22 Oct 2013	12 Oct 2016	Mar? 2018	MHI
26SS	8125	SS-510	¥51.7B FY2014	LABs + AIP	2014	?	Mar 2019?	KHI
27SS First Soryu Mk 2	8126	SS-511	¥64.4B FY2015	LIBs only	2015	2017?	Mar 2020	MHI
28SS  Second Soryu Mark 2	8127	SS-512	¥63.6B FY2016	LIBs only	2016?	2018?	Mar 2021?	KHI
29SS First Soryu Mk 3 (1) (3)	8128	?	¥76B FY2017	LIBs only	?	?	2023?	MHI?
30SS Second Soryu Mk 3(2)	8029?	?	¥71.5B FY2018	LIBs only	?	?	2024?	KHI?

Table from information exclusively provided to Submarine Matters. LABs = lead-acid batteries, AIP = air independent propulsion, LIBs = lithium-ion batteries. ¥***B = Billion Yen. MHI = Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, KHI = Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation of Kawasaki Heavy Industries.

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Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) announced the Financial Year FY 2018 budget on August 31, 2017. Based on the FY 2017 and FY 2018 budgets, the SORYU & Oyashio Program Table (above) can be revised (in red) as follows.

(1) Correction of 29SS; i) “Build No” is 8128; “[the Japanese Ministry of Finance (MoF)] approved amount Yen Billions & FY” is JPY 76 (7.6*)B FY2017.

(2) Addition of 30SS; i) “Build No” is 8029?; MoF approved amount Yen Billions & FY” is JPY 71.5 (2.3*)B FY2018 (submitted).

* Figure in bracket is the first year cost, such as new equipment, and is excluded from the FY budget number. In other words, the real budgets for 29SS and 30SS are 83.6 (=76 + 7.6) and 73.8 (=71.5 + 2.3) JPY B (Billion Japanese Yen), respectively. The first year cost for both 29SS and 30SS recognises that the builders of the two submarines are different.

(3) For application in future 29SS-type submarine, a budget for the study of a new silent driving system has been submitted.

Reported in the Japanese language publication SHIPS OF THE WORLD, October 2017 - the ex-commander of the submarine fleet Admiral (retired) Masao Kobayashi (photo and bio details below from Submarine Matters' records) has revealed that 29SS is an upgraded version of the Soryu, with improved LIBs, improved sonars and other performance improvements. So 29SS and 30SS can be considered Soryu Mark 3s.

 Vice Admiral Masao KOBAYASHI, JMSDF (Retired)  

Masao KOBAYASHI has performed as an adviser to Japan's National Security Council. He graduated from the Japanese Defense Academy in 1973 and commenced a career in the JMSDF submarine service. He held many posts in the submarine force.

Shore billets included Submarine Branch Head in the Ship Systems Section in the Maritime Staff Office and Operations Officer in the Fleet Submarine Force.

He has commanded TAKASHIO SS-571 (Uzushio class submarine), and was Commander of Submarine Division Two. In 2001/2 he was the Commander of Submarine Flotilla One, and was Coordinator of Exercise at sea for Pacific Reach 2002.

Masao’s last post was as Commander of the Fleet Submarine Force (2007 - 2009). He retired from the JMSDF in 2009. Vice Admiral KOBAYASHI served with distinction in the JMSDF and is well regarded as an authority in the international submariner community. 

Anonymous and Pete

September 2017 Report to Donors - Disruptions to Australian Shipbuilding Plans

September 13, 2017, 4:34 am

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Hi Donors

I've just emailed out Submarine Matters September 2017 Donor Report: 

Titled - Disruptions to Australian Shipbuilding Plans

Please check your spam bin if you don't see it in your IN box.

Leadin to report:

Timelineillustrates the Coalition Government’s best laid plans of an unprecedented peacetime boost to naval shipbuilding. The strategy is clearly Osborne, Adelaide, South Australia centric. See short Factsheet. But like all things political it is subject to change. (Timeline artwork courtesy Australian Government's Naval Shipbuilding Plan May 2017, page 15) 

Regards

Pete

Director

Submarine Matters International

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Australia (with US cooperation) Active in LIBs Research for Submarines

September 13, 2017, 7:20 pm

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Thermal runaway in Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) in submarines 

 has been a serious problem as US testing in November 2008 (see below) revealed. The above artwork concerns destructive phases through heat buildup in LIBs in hearing aids. (Courtesy Hearing Health & Technology Matters)

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Many countries (from Europe to Northeast Asia and the US) are carrying out Lithium-ion Battery (LIB) research for submarines.

Australia is also active in research on LIBs for submarines. Australia’s Department of Defence’s multi-faceted research organisation, the Defence Science and Technology (DST) Group is active in LIB safety research. 

In one of the activities DST's Defence researcher, Kane Ivory, is establishing DST’s LIB Safety Research Facility - on DST's website see an article Powering the Future of Submarine Fleets of 

5 September 2017 https://www.dst.defence.gov.au/news/2017/09/05/powering-future-submarine-fleets:

The US Navy and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) had bad experiences with LIBs way back in November 2008 under the now cancelled Advanced SEAL Delivery Vehicle (ASDS) program. The prototype (ASDS-1) "was having its lithium-ion batteries charged Nov. 9 when an explosion started a battery fire that burned for about six hours. No one was aboard the 60-ton craft, which was on shore at its base in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii...The incident came at a key time for the [ASDS] mini-sub program. The ASDS was to have deployed in November aboard the guided-missile submarine [USS Michigan (SSGN-727)] — the first SSGN deployment for the craft." 

As well as LIBs for mini-subs and UUVs the US Navy may want to eventually use LIBs as backup batteries in nuclear submarines. 

US-Australian cooperation in defence research is revealed by a US Navy document regarding Ken Ivory’s secondment, in 2016 to the US, under the Engineer and Scientist Exchange Program (ESEP). The US document indicates:

"Kane is here working with us on understanding how that safety program works and the types of tests and approaches to testing we have to see what is applicable to Australia," Fuentevilla said. "One common area of interest for Australia and the United States is early fault detection for lithium battery failures. Normal battery management systems will detect a fault or failure as it's happening, but not necessarily with sufficient time to prevent system-level hazards. We're looking at technologies that would provide additional early warning so that you can effectively implement hazard mitigation solutions to prevent a small problem from becoming a bigger problem."

Pete

India May Want to Buy Japanese Submarines

September 26, 2017, 2:10 am

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Might Japan one day sell India a for export specification submarine similar to Japan's Yushio-class design - with pressure hull steel equivalent to High Yield HY120 and air independent propulsion (AIP)? (Photo via Wikipedia).

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Japanese Prime Minister Abe's Indian visit in mid September 2017 raised the issue of a possible future sale of Japanese submarines to India. The sale would be under Project-75(I) to supply the Indian Navy with 6 AIP submarines. The re-issued and extended RFI might be steadily giving Japan a better chance of winning. Japanese Soryu submarines have been mentioned, but they may be too highly classified and expensive. Hence a for export specification Japanese design might be more likely.

Ever since Pakistan introduced MESMA AIP into its latest 3 Agosta submarines India has been intent on also acquiring AIP for its own submarines. China also has (Stirling) AIP (locally developed or bought from Sweden) in its Yuan submarines.

India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has long been developing a fuel cell AIP technology, but this is a very difficult - so much so that Germany is the only demonstrably successful fuel cell AIP developer.

Recent border friction with China and increased Chinese submarine activity in the Indian Ocean has underlined to India that it needs more powerful conventional submarines quickly. India's perpetually delayed Project 75(I) AIP submarine selection project is therefore being accelerated.

Chances that Japan is now a serious contender in Project 75(I) may be increasing. Japan builds highly capable large submarines (which can carry more missiles, torpedoes and mines) and has long experience with Stirling AIP (probably bought from Sweden). Japanese sale of Stirling AIP to India would likely require involvement of Sweden. Stirling AIP is likely superior in quietness and low heat signature to MESMA AIP. A submarine purchase from Japan would also boost a key regional strategic friendship against India's and Japan's strategic competitor, China.

Regional friendship is something Project-75(I) competitors (Germany, France, Sweden) in distant Western Europe, cannot deliver. Northeast Asian nations, (Siberian) Russia and South Korea, also competing for Project-75(I) are both careful not to antagonise China. 

Japan's large 2,900 ton (surfaced) Soryu submarines might be uncompetitive as they may be priced at US$1.5 billion each. This is in comparison to US$1 billion for 1,800 ton 75(I) competitors.

Japan does not want its most tightly held submarine secrets finding their way to China - so Soryu technology may be too sensitive. Japan would be wary of India's exchange of submarine high technology with Russia in the form of Kilos, naval reactors and SSNs. Russia also shares submarine technology with China.

Price and secrecy may mean that Japan might prudently supply lower specification for export submarine technology to India - particularly concerning Japan's Top Secret high yield pressure hull steel. Lower specification steel might perhaps be equivalent to the pressure hull steel in Japan's Yushio-class design ie. Japanese NS80 grade (equivalent to still advanced US High Yield HY120 steel - see the Table on Submarine Matters).

When eventually decided India's Project-75(I) competition will be a major win for any of the competitors.

Pete

Report Suggesting Two Future Australian Submarine Types

September 26, 2017, 10:15 pm

≫ Next: SSKs then SSNs: Continuing the Australian Future Submarine Debate

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A most interesting report commissioned by businesman GaryJohnston has been released today (September 27, 2017).

The report Australia’s Future Submarine Getting This Key Capability Right (September 2017) (Media Release and whole Report(PDF 12MB)) was written by Australia’s Insight Economics consultancy.

The report was launched by ANU Professor Hugh White and also by Michael Keating (former Head of the Australian Public Service) at the National Press Club, Canberra ((September 27, 2017). A transcript of the Press Club launch may follow tomorrow.

Some central issues in the report include:

1.  capability gap - any midlife upgrade of the 6 Collins subs might only make them useful until 

     around 2030. But the future submarine "Shortfin" may only be operational in 2040. Hence

     Australia may lack submarines for 10 years.

Suggestions:

2.  rather than extend Collins, take urgent steps to acquire 6 off-the-shelf submarines, modified to

     extend their range and built in Adelaide. At the National Press Club it was suggested 2 submarine
     builders be asked to submit interim (but already operating) submarine designs. They are Germany
     (maybe TKMS’s Type 212s/214s/218s/Dolphin 2s) and France (Naval Group’s Scorpenes) 

3.  because of the long transits to the Navy’s areas of operations, acquire a submarine tender (ship)

     forward based in Australian waters.

4.  the 6 interim subs and tender might cost under $10 billion.

5.  hold a review on whether Australia should either acquire more off the shelf 

     submarines; or build the Shortfins; or acquire nuclear subs [eg. Barracudas]

PETE COMMENT

Suggestions that Australia's interim and/or future submarines have Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) could delay either build by 10 years. AIP is less problematic. 

An order of 6 interim submarine Scorpenes with AIP, built in Adelaide, would make the most sense as:

-  legal problems of already signed agreements (with Naval Group) would be minimised

-  many Scorpene submarine parts, supply chains, personnel and operating methods would be

   common to the later Shortfins

-  engineering and legal continuity with Lockheed Martin integrating the combat systems into
   Scorpenes could more easily carry over to the Shortfins 

-  Naval Group is the only Western supplier that can offer both (conventional) SSKs and then

   6 (nuclear) SSNs. That is if Australia genuinely wants "regionally superior" attack submarines

   by the 2040s.

Pete

SSKs then SSNs: Continuing the Australian Future Submarine Debate

September 27, 2017, 10:35 pm

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In response to many of the points raised in comments on the previous article https://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2017/09/report-suggesting-two-future-australian.html:

Basic plan: the Australian solution could be 6 x 3,000 ton SSKs to be built 2030-2040 and 6 x 5,000 ton SSNs after 2040. These SSNs may carry small ballistic missiles - the precursor to a nuclear deterrent.

More Detailed Explanation:

If at least 4 Collins hulls (number of deep dives defines submarines that are too "old") can last until 2035 then I think an interim submarine will effectively become the next generation Future Submarine (FSM) which the Government has decided is the Shortfin SSK.

Alternatives to the Shortfin SSK could be 6 SSKs of at least 3,000 ton (surfaced)) with LIBs and maybe AIP, They might best be one of:

-  an enlarged (more fuel and batteries, AIP) 3,000 ton Scorpene currently known as SMX 3.0 see

   Submarine Matters' 2016 article and Naval Group's 2016 Press Release.

-  an enlarged Type 218 (could call it 216) (already has advanced fuel cell AIP)(has time to 

   incorporate LIBs)

-  a Soryu Mark 2 or 3 (which would already be developed for LIBs)

The 6 submarines could also utilize highly developed Autonomous Underwater Vehicles to extend capability into the more dangerous (by then China dominated) waters of the South China Sea and near China's future Indian Ocean naval bases.

A submarine tender ship is probably unviable for Western Australia north of Fleet Base West because of the lack of viable ports:

-  Exmouth port is only an uneconomic 700nm north of Fleet Base West

-  the Port of Darwin, run by a Chinese company, also has a naval base with tide/channel limitations 

   largely restricting it to small patrol boats and also is only minutes by fast jet or cruise missile from

   likely future Chinese air bases in East Timor

After these 6 SSKs are built in Australia it will be 2040 and by then Australia (to have regionally superior subs) will have needed to buy/build 6 SSNs. This is because regional countries (China, India, Russia already have SSNs) and by 2045 North Korea, South Korea and Japan will likely have developed SSNs, likely mounting SLBMs.

So the Australian solution could be 6 x 3,000 ton SSKs to be built 2030-2040 and 6 x 5,000 ton SSNs after 2040. These SSNs may carry small ballistic missiles - the precursor to a nuclear deterrent.

Scale model of the 3,000 tonne concept submarine, SMX 3.0, on display at the DCNS stand, at Euronaval 2016. The SMX 3.0's external shape seems to owe much to the current DCNS 2,000 tonne Scorpene. More details. (Photo courtesy Navy Recognition)

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Pete 

The Love Sub

October 1, 2017, 9:01 pm

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Based on a October 1, 2017 report by Mikey Smith of the (UK) Mirror, October 1, 2017.

The UK Royal Navy (RN) has suffered two vessel love affairs in recent years, one relating to a frigate, the other to a submarine. Intimate relationships of any kind on a RN ship or a submarine are banned. 

Details of the possible frigate affair go back to 2014 when Sarah West (above), the RN's first female warship captain, was removed from her command of the frigate HMS Portland, with the RN just citing an "internal matter". She was reassigned to another post.

-----------------------------------------

The submarine affair is current and more serious because the Vanguard class sub involved is an SSBN specifically designed to launch the nuclear weapons on board. 

Senior naval officers have been sent to the SSBN, deployed in international waters, to deal with claims there was an “inappropriate relationship” between a male and female officer. The female officer is apparently innocent of wrongdoing. RN woman were banned from serving on submarines until the rules changed in 2011.

COMMENT

My limited knowledge is that the Royal Australian Navy works on a less formal "don't ask, don't tell" basis, with far less publicity.

Pete

Latest on the Love Sub - revealed as HMS Vigilant

October 2, 2017, 6:27 pm

≫ Next: Choice of Submarine LIBs - Management and Operation

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Following Submarine Matters article of October 2, 2017 on ship/submarine romances more details of the SSBN likely remonce have been revealed.

Drawing from an article by Ben Farmer, Defencne Correspondent, (UK) Telegraph, October 2, 2017:

“Royal Navy submarine commander removed over claim of 'inappropriate relationship' with female officer” 

HMS Vigilant Commander (Cdr) Stuart Armstrong, UK Royal Navy (RN) “has been removed from his vessel amid claims of an inappropriate relationship with a subordinate."

Cdr Armstrong was taken off HMS Vigilant a 16 x Trident D5 missile armed Vanguard class SSBN submarine and relieved of his duties as a precaution while naval chiefs investigate the allegations.

"Naval sources said the investigation had been launched amid suspicions Cdr Armstrong’s relationship with an unnamed female officer was “closer than it should have been”.

It is understood the 41-year-old commander faces “a full range” of disciplinary measures if found guilty of any wrongdoing and could lose command of.”

HMS Vigilant, “one of Britain’s four Trident submarines, was not on nuclear deterrent patrol at the time and the Ministry of Defence said operations were not affected.” 

[Pete Comment - it may be that HMS Vigilant was restocking its Trident missiles at Kings Bay, Georgia, US nuclear submarine base or training at higly calibrated test ranges near that base.]

“Navy rules forbid any relationships between sailors in the same chain of command for fear it would lead to favouritism and undermine orders.

Relationships outside the chain of command are allowed, but there is a strict “no touching” rule during deployments.

Sources said the rules were considered particularly critical on submarine missions where sailors work in cramped conditions underwater for months at a time.

A source said: “This investigation is part of our duty of care to everyone on board, because of the possibility that command could be undermined by an inappropriate relationship.”

HMS Vigilant SSBN "Captain" (Commander) Stuart Armstrong. No George Clooney, but he was the most senior officer on the boat! (Photo courtesy Royal Navy, via The (UK) Times) 

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Pete

Choice of Submarine LIBs - Management and Operation

October 2, 2017, 10:21 pm

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In Submarine Matters'ongoing examination of Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) Anonymous's research and comments are always helpful. Anonymous's comments of  September 16 to 27, 2017 reveal much about the likely choice, management and operation of LIBs on submarines. Japan is leading the way with LIBs - planning full conversion to LIBs on new submarines launched from 2018 onwards (see Table below).

In the development of new LIB materials and control equipment for Japan's latest Soryu submarines, rigorous testing, prior to operational use, is required. LIB materials and equipment may fail under accelerated and severe condition testing. This includes testing under:

-  high or very low temperatures (the operational temperature of LIBs on Japanese submarines is
   within the range of 10-45 degrees C for efficient and safe operation) 

-  high pressures

-  strong mechanical stress, and

-  continuous vibration testing, etc.

Tri-ring advised the two simplest ways to avoid the particular LIB problem of "lithium plating" is to:

-   prevent over voltage during charging of LIBs (above 4.2 volts per cell), and

-   charging and discharging at low temperature (below 15⁰C). 

He adds that to counter thermal runaway of LIBs, great advances have been made in material science. One of them is a ceramic separator that has much higher resistance against heat.

The Japanese Ministry of Defence's (MOD) Acquisition, Technology & Logistic Agency (ATLA) and the Japanese Navy have been (and will be) conducting such testing of LIBs. For more accurate establishment of LIB safety standards, non accelerated testing under normal condition is preferable, even if this is time-consuming. 

Choice of LIBs

Japan has explored submarine use of many LIB combinations, including two that show exceptional stability at low temperatures and long charge-discharge cycle lives. These are : 

-  Lithium Iron Phosphate (LFP) 2,000 cycle lives, and 

-  Lithium Titanate (LTO) ( Li₄Ti₅O₁₂ ) 7,000 cycles, made by Toshiba. 

For LEP and LTO such stability at low temperatures and long cycle lives comes at the cost of  low energy density.

Drawing from this article. To remedy this low LIB energy density problem Japan may well have settled on Lithium nickel cobalt aluminium oxide (NCA),  ( LiNiCoAlO₂ ) LIBs for its Navy. These LIBs are made by GS Yuasa. Such LIBs are ideal for the Japanese Navy's mid-range continuous patrol operations.

All this LIB testing and subsequent use on Soryu submarines via liaison with France's Naval Group may contribute to use of LIBs on Australia's Shortfin Future Submarines (FSM). LIBs on Shortfins may be added from the first Shortfins onwards or fitted to later build Shortfins. TKMS, Saab-Kockums, Naval Group, Russia, China and MHI/KHI may develop fundamentally different LIBs for other submarines. Also their differing diesel engines are an additional diesel-electric variable. This means the efficiency and safety of LIBs developed by one submarine builder may note ensure efficient and safe use by other builders. 

For example Saab-Kockums and Russia that build submarines mainly for cold water operations may prefer LFP LIBs that may be more efficient in icy temperatures. As a customer Canada may prefer low temperature LIBs for its near Arctic Ocean operations. 

LIBs Management and Operation

Anonymous does not think a submarine's LIBs are discharged homogeneously (all at once and evenly). The numbers of charges and discharges of  LIBs during (say) a total of 4 charge-discharge phases over 96 hours) might occur as follows:
i)  half of the LIBs in the forward battery section may be used for the sub's first fully submerged dive and then charged in the first snorting, 
ii)  the other half of the forward LIBs is used for the second dive, then charged in the second snorting phase 
iii)  half of the LIBs in aft battery section is used for the third dive and then charged in the third snorting, and
iv)  the another half of the LIBs in the aft battery section is used for the fourth dive and then charged in the fourth snorting.

The management/operation (M/O) system of batteries/propulsion of  Japanese Oyashio and Soryu submarines is shown in 1 to 3 below. 

1 Oyashio class (built 1994-2006, see Table below)
In the eleven Oyashio class subs are classic DC motors reliant on limited capacity LABs. These make  the sub's fully submerged speed control complex. LABs are in 2 identical sections fore and aft (ie. 4 identical sections overall)
M/O of LABs are in parallel or series connection in sections/subsections
Propulsion: 2 identical DC motors

2 Soryu MK 1's (built 2005-present)
In the ten Soryu Mk 1s, latest Permanent Magnet Synchronous Motors (PMSMs) make speed control of the submarine easier. But the management of two power supply systems (LABs & AIP) is complex.
LABs: fore and aft sections consisted of 2 identical subsections, respectively (ie. 4 identical sections overall)
Stirling AIP
M/O of LABs: unknown
Propulsion: smaller and bigger AC motors; smaller one is for low speed

3 Soryu Mk 2s (estimation)(built 2015 (see Table) perhaps through to 2018)
Soryu Mk 2s adopt the simplest M/O system among Japanese submarines.
LIBs: fore and aft sections will consist of 2 identical subsections, respectively (ie. 4 identical sections overall)
M/O of LIBs: unknown, but may be in 4 phases, see i) to iv) above.
Propulsion: 2 identical AC motors

 TABLE - SORYU & Oyashio Program as at October 3, 2017 

SS No.	Build No Name	Pennant No.	MoF approved amount ¥ Billions FY	LABs, LIBs, AIP	Laid Down	Laun -ched	Commi ssioned	Built By
5SS Oyashio	8105 Oyashio	SS-590/ TS3608	¥52.2B FY1993	LABs only	Jan 1994	Oct 1996	Mar 1998	KHI
6SS-15SS Oyashios 10 subs	8106 -8115 various	SS-591-600	¥52.2B per sub FY1994-FY2003	LABs only	15SS Feb 2004	15SS Nov 2006	15SS Mar 2008	MHI & KHI
16SS Soryu Mk 1	8116 Sōryū	SS-501	¥60B FY2004	LABs + AIP	Mar 2005	Dec 2007	Mar 2009	MHI
17SS	8117 Unryū	SS-502	¥58.7B FY2005	LABs + AIP	Mar 2006	Oct 2008	Mar 2010	KHI
18SS	8118 Hakuryū	SS-503	¥56.2 FY2006	LABs + AIP	Feb 2007	Oct 2009	Mar 2011	MHI
19SS	8119 Kenryū	SS-504	¥53B FY2007	LABs + AIP	Mar 2008	Nov 2010	Mar 2012	KHI
20SS	8120 Zuiryū	SS-505	¥51B FY2008	LABs + AIP	Mar 2009	Oct 2011	Mar 2013	MHI
No 21SS			No 21SS built
22SS	8121 Kokuryū	SS-506	¥52.8B FY2010	LABs + AIP	Jan 2011	Oct 2013	Mar 2015	KHI
23SS	8122 Jinryu	SS-507	¥54.6B FY2011	LABs + AIP	Feb 2012	Oct 2014	7 Mar 2016	MHI
24SS	8123 Sekiryū	SS-508	¥54.7B FY2012	LABs + AIP	15 Mar 2013	2 Nov 2015	13 Mar 2017	KHI
25SS	8124 Seiryū	SS-509	¥53.1B FY2013	LABs + AIP	22 Oct 2013	12 Oct   2016	Mar? 2018	MHI
26SS	8125	SS-510	¥51.7B FY2014	LABs + AIP	2014	?	Mar 2019?	KHI
27SS First Soryu Mk 2	8126	SS-511	¥64.4B FY2015	LIBs only	2015	2017?	Mar 2020	MHI
28SS  Second Soryu Mark 2	8127	SS-512	¥63.6B FY2016	LIBs only	2016?	2018?	Mar 2021?	KHI
29SS First Soryu Mk 3	8128	?	¥76B FY2017	LIBs only	?	?	2023?	MHI?
30SS Second Soryu Mk 3	8029?	?	¥71.5B FY2018	LIBs only	?	?	2024?	KHI?

Table from information exclusively provided to Submarine Matters. LABs = lead-acid batteries, AIP = air independent propulsion, LIBs = lithium-ion batteries. ¥***B = Billion Yen. MHI = Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, KHI = Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation of Kawasaki Heavy Industries.

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So LIB Management and Operation is complex but as the batteries work to computer terminals a submarine's engineers should be able to manage and operate LIBs more easily than lead-acid batteries.

Pete

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Is Naval Group Backpedaling on the Australian Future Submarine Pump Jet Promise?

October 4, 2017, 2:35 am

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Thinking back on the pivotal April 26, 2016 announcement that Naval Group won the Australian Future Submarine competition.

A major part of Naval Group's public presentation was that Australia would benefit from stealth technology from France's nuclear submarine program. This was to be specifically in the shape of the winning French design having
"pump jet propulsion that replaces obsolete propeller technology".

See the pump jet offer 5 seconds into to Naval Group's (was DCNS) winning 2016 promotional Youtube.

At Pacific 17 reported by AAP via Australia's SBS (October 4, 2017) is a presentation by Naval Group executive director of the Australian submarine program Jean-Michel Billig: "The vessels may end up with conventional propellers...Mr Billig said." [Comment - Such propellers are what Naval Group previously described as "obsolete"]

Mr Billig dismissed fears about engineering difficulties. "We are not converting a nuclear-powered submarine into a conventional submarine, we are starting from scratch," he said.
[Comment - This is a big step back from the original major selling point of the French winner - that the French design would benefit from stealth technology from the French nuclear submarine program!]

On a another tack - did Australia criticise the German TKMS Type 216 entrant (in 2016) on high modelled noise because it did not have that vital French pump jet?

What Naval Group (then DCNS) offered Australia in its winning presentation, at the point of competition decision in 2016. Note the pump jet promise 16 seconds in. Beware this Youtube is likely to be taken down in the next few days.
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Details courtesy Naval Group (was DCNS) - via Sydney Morning Herald, April 26, 2016. Note  "Super-quiet pump jet propulsion instead of propellor" is featured.
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Pete

Mainstream Media Misses Naval Group's Misspeak *

October 5, 2017, 7:57 pm

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In response to KQN's comment of 6/10/17 6:30 AM,:

Yes the Naval Group's Executive Director, Australian Submarine Program, Mr Billig, saying we are designing the Shortfin "from scratch" doesn't seem to have been picked up by the journos of the Mainstream Media.

Mr Billig's misspeak directly contradicts Naval Group's 2016 reference to Shortfin using the Barracuda AND Scorpene as design references. This 2016 reference was in Sean Costello's (then CEO Naval Group/DCNS Australia) who stated in ASPI's The Strategist, April 8, 2016.

"The main area where Barracuda design references were not used [for Australia's future Shortfin submarine] was in the area of the electrical system (batteries and voltage), power generation (induction and diesel generators) and propulsion (main electric motor)."

"In these systems the design reference comes from the Scorpene class of diesel electric submarines, or from an existing submarine technology within DCNS. Existing technologies are re-used in all systems in the Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A. System by system, the whole ship performance is validated and the design loop closed."

Comment - Maybe there's a French to English translation glitch?

Pete

Mutiny? on HMS Vigilant nuclear missile submarine.

October 9, 2017, 1:14 am

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HMS Vigilant, with crew, in happier times (Photo courtesy Royal Navy, 2012)

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What do you call it when:

1.  the Captain of nuclear missile submarine HMS Vigilant (SSBN) is removed for an inappropriate
     relationship with a female crew member,

2.  thenhis second in command (Executive Officer) is also removed– same reason – different female

     crew member, and

3.  then it is revealed these shenanigans“sparked anger among crew members, with five [officers]

     threatening to resign”?

This is very serious on account of HMS Vigilantconstituting Britain’s whole active nuclear deterrent during the three to six months it is on patrol. During that period the other three Vanguards would be inactive while training or being overhauled. 

This Lockheed Martin document [PDF 10MB] also raises a third activity on page 6 - that is the Vanguards also regularly have their rented Trident missiles [right click mouse to translate] restocked at the US-UK Strategic Weapons Facility Atlantic (SWFLANT) at the US SSBN Base at King's Bay, Georgia. 

Kings Bay Base is large, at 16,000 acres and employing 9,000 people. A likely photo of US-UK Strategic Weapons Facility Atlantic's giant SSBN sheds is below - courtesy French Wikipedia. 

See inside one shed [on page 1. same PDF 10MB]

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A.  In view of the Vigilant Scandal the issue of having female crew on UK and US SSBNs is likely to

      be reviewed.

B.  The five officer threat to resign from what is a front line vessel might approach mutiny by some

      definitions. The most famous Mutiny on the Bounty was much more insignificant in comparison.

      HMS Bounty was an ex-collier only mounting 4 to 14small guns. Vigilantis more a like a whole

      fleet in one vessel – mounting up to 16 city smashing “guns”.

Pete 

Some (likely) Naval Group Approaches to Australia's Future Submarine

October 10, 2017, 1:12 am

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After much discussion on Submarine Matters (hereand here) and elsewhere on the direction Naval Group is going with Australia's Future Submarine...

Some observations are:

Descriptions of a huge 50 year to design, build and upgrade submarine program are made by different people, at different times, for different purposes, targeting different audiences.

Disruptions to the future submarine selection process made it difficult for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and contestants to nail down finalsubmarine requirements and designs. Up to February 2015 then Prime Minister Abbott unilaterally chose Japan. From February 2015 a selection process hid the reality that Japan was quietly still the winner. Japan was ahead until Abbott was removed from the Prime Ministership in September 2015. Once Prime Minister Turnbull was appointed the field was opened up to the 3 contestants (Germany, France and Japan) with a normally 3 year submarine selection period being compressed into 7 months (September 2015 to April 2016).

Turnbull chose to rapidly publicise the Future Submarine winner on April 26, 2016 in order to win South Australian votes in the early July 2, 2016 National Election. With the pork barrel of a $50 Billion project mainly at Osborne, Adelaide, South Australia Turnbull’s submarine-to-win-the-election-strategy succeeded in getting his government over the line by one crucial electorate/district/seat/vote.

Naval Group (then DCNS) had to publicly react quickly to Turnbull’s premature (April 26, 2016) announcement with as positive and concrete a submarine package as possible. For example Naval Group’s concept submarine was termed the “Shortfin Barracuda Block1A” to indicate to the public that it was a solid building blockin a highly developed submarine program. Shortfin was also presented as a conventional outgrowth of an already highly developed Barracuda nuclear submarine program.

Final Issues To Be Decided In Years To Come

In fact in a huge submarine program specific submarine characteristics can only be assessed and finalised once a finalised scale model can be hydro-dynamically tested or even after the full-sized first of class begins trials in the open sea (noise? cavitation?) in about 2031. Issues include:

-  length will fluctuate depending on many variables including the size of the bow sonar (Lockheed

   Martin (LM) input as one small part of its combat system) and whether a pump jet is added or

   rejected.

-  diameter could fluctuate (how many decks, bunk sizes and numbers, arrangement of how many

   torpedo tubes (LM), VLS? how many and size of diesels, batteries, fuel tanks, water ballast?

-  fuel cell AIP? inefficient to carry the LOX over Australia’s long transit distances, lack of

   observable French progress with Fuel Cell and lack of observable RAN interest

-  the first pump jet as standard on a SSK class. This would be a radical solution for the

   technologically conservative RAN 

-  RAN conservatism would also likely reject Australia becoming the second LIBs user after Japan.

At 8/10/17 5:13 PM someone with access to Naval Group thinking commented, in part:

“I think you will find that the [Australian Government] govt was well aware that both the DCNS & TKMS designs were just concepts (basic design only). Both required complete detailed design from scratch. Both would have used existing designs for reference (you don't reinvent the wheel unless you have to)...It will definitely be more like a conventional powered Barracuda than a stretched Scorpene (for a start you would have to stretch a Scorpene in all directions, not just make it longer)...”

A submarine builder’s technical design knowledge base, influencing future submarine designs, often goes back a century. The designs of the Scorpenes and Barracudas are only the latest. See the Table below.

Naval Group Submarine Development TABLE (by Pete)

Submarine (how many built?)	First Sub Laid Down	Last Sub Commissioned	Some still building?
Classes pre Agosta 4 Arethuse 26Daphne	1863 the Plongeur  1957 France only 1960?	many classes pre 1957 1960 1975 France & Export	No. eg. WWI era. Interwar and WWII  No
Redoutable SSBNs 6 built France only	1964 (1st commissioned 1971	2008	No
Agosta SSKs 13 built	Early 1970s French, Spanish & Pak Navy	2006, 3 Spanish, 5 Pakistani remain	No
RubisSSNs 6 built 2,500 tonnes	1976	Re-commissioned as AMETHYSTEs	No
AMETHYSTE	Rebuilds of the 6 existing Rubis SSNs	1995	No
Triomphant SSBNs 4 built	1986	2010	No
Scorpene SSKs (14 total) 2 built--------------------- 2 built--------------------- 1 built so far -----------------------------	1999 O’Higgins Chile 2004KD TA Rahman 2009 INS Kalvari India 2010 SBR-1-4 Brazil	2006 2009 Malaysia 2016 (1st planned) 2020 (1st SBR-1)	No No 5 x Kalvaris 1 per year 4 x SBRs (1 per year)
SN-BR SSN just 1 DCNS designing non-nuclear portion. 4 to 5,000 tonnes.	2024 (maybe) after the  SBR-SSKs Brazil building reactor.	2034 (or later) likely. Also depends on Brazilian economy.	1 in medium-long term
Barracuda/Suffren French only SSNs 6 planned	2007	2029 for the last of the six	Yes
Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A12 planned	2028?	2052? Assuming all are SSKs? 1 built/2 years?	Future
France’s Next Generation SSBN (SSBN NG) 4 likely	2035? Armed with 10? to 16? M51.3 SLBMs	2050? Assuming one sub built every two years	Future

Pete

October 2017 Donor Report: South Korea’s Next Submarine Class Dilemma

October 11, 2017, 5:30 am

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Hi Donors

I've just emailed you the October 2017 Donor Report: South Korea’s Next Submarine Class Dilemma

Please check your spam bin if you don't see it in your IN box.

Regards

Pete

Director

Submarine Matters International