Australian Future Submarine's Diesel Generator Requirements - PART ONE

January 2, 2018, 10:05 pm

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HAPPY NEW YEAR ALL INTERESTED IN THE TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF SUBMARINES :)

It is interesting to calculate the Australian Future Submarine's (was called Shortfin's) diesel generator requirements based on the Collin's displacements, speeds, diesel and generator outputs. 

COLLINS COMMENT-DETAILS 

Looking at Collins-wiki right-sidebar) the Collins is: 3,100 tonnes (surfaced), 3,407 tonnes (submerged including at snort depth), 10 knots (surfaced and snort depth (limited by water resistance against snorkel) and 20+ knots fully submerged

"3 x Jeumont-Schneider generators" (1.4MW, 440-volt DC) right-sidebar = total electrical generation is 4.2MWe 

If power figures for the Collin's "3 x Garden Island-Hedemora HV V18b/15Ub (VB210) 18-cylinder diesels" right-sidebar are unavailable then inverting the standard 0.8 power factor gives 1.25. 

So 4.2 x 1.25 gives Total output of 5.25MW for the Collin's 3 diesels = 1.75MW output per diesel. 

Note that notorious unreliability and associated lower "not exceed" performance limitations apply to the power output of these Collins diesels.

and

Main motor driving propeller is "1 x Jeumont-Schneider DC motor" 5.4MW right-sidebar

PART TWO TOMORROW WILL BE EXTRAPOLATING DIESEL-GENERATOR REQUIREMENTS FOR AUSTRALIA'S FUTURE SUBMARINES

This is noting figures for Australian Future Submarines have been reconfirmed as 97m in length, 8.8m in diameter announced by Defence Industry Minister Pyne (November 14, 2017) and

4,500 tonnes (surfaced) using actually unchanged length - diameter figures already published at Australian Navy News way back on May 5, 2016.

Pete

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Jeaumont Electric Have Aleady Won Australian Future Submarine's GENERATOR Order?

January 2, 2018, 10:21 pm

≫ Next: Aus Future Sub Suppliers? Federal Election. Excellent Mer et Marine Article

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It may be comforting, or surprising, to look at past but still valid (?) large supplier Press Releases on Australia's Future Submarine program.  On May 11, 2016 Submarine Matter's bolding crucial bits pointed to:

A naval-technology.com article carrying a Press Release by Jeumont Electric, May 10, 2016
 http://www.naval-technology.com/contractors/electrical/jeumont-electric/pressjeumont-electric-australian-submarine-programme.html : 

"Jeumont Electric One of Top Five Suppliers in Australian Submarine Programme

Jeumont Electric announced today that it has been selected as a major supplier in the Australian government's Sea 1000 Future Submarine Programme, French naval defence and energy company DCNS [now Naval Group] is the Australian government's exclusive partner on the programme.

The contract covers the construction of 12 submarines to replace the fleet's six current Collins-type submarines and also includes the transfer of stealth technology, production, and the combat system, plus maintenance throughout the submarines' lifetimes.

Jeumont Electric, a recognised expert in rotating electric machines for more than a century, had been working on the technical and business aspects of the bid since October 2015, earning a position among the programme's top five largest and most strategic suppliers.

Jeumont Electric will supply the propulsion pack, which includes manufacturing permanent-magnet synchronous motors and the associated power electronics cabinets, and will also provide maintenance training.

"We are pleased that the Australian government has entrusted DCNS with this contract," said Daniel Marlot, Director of Sales, Marine Industry at Jeumont Electric.

"We are working closely with DCNS and with most of the other suppliers involved in this exciting programme. Our teams in France had demonstrated the quality of their work on several previous projects.

"We are pleased to bring our know-how to this demanding and far-reaching new programme. We plan to build a close working relationship with the Australian government to ensure their full satisfaction."

The original Jeumont Press Release is still on the Internet, presumably still valid and dated
May 9, 2016, at http://www.jeumontelectric.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/04-29-2016-CP-AUSTRALIE-JE_sfm_ang_final.pdf

Pete

Aus Future Sub Suppliers? Federal Election. Excellent Mer et Marine Article

January 3, 2018, 9:06 pm

≫ Next: Australian Future Sub's Diesel Generator Requirements - PART TWO

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While looking at Jeumont Electric's May 9, 2016, Press Release on (Submarine Matters January 3, 2017) I noticed http://www.jeumontelectric.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/04-29-2016-CP-AUSTRALIE-JE_sfm_ang_final.pdf: Jeumont Electric claimed to be "among the [Australian future submarine] program’s top five largest and most strategic suppliers".

Presuming Jeumont meant the top five French suppliers. I'm wondering what other large French suppliers may make the top five?

French website Mer et Marine (Maritime News) published an excellent article"DCNS groundwork for RAN sub programme" on June 6, 2017, which noted Marie-Pierre de Bailliencourt, deputy chief executive of DCNS and general manager of the group’s FSP programme said:

"To expedite contract management, we’ve split the main contracts into tranches. Given that the programme will run for 50 years, it hardly seemed reasonable to stipulate everything from the outset,”

So a list of major suppliers may not be readily available. 

Fortunately the Mer et Marine article goes on to note "The strategic procurement plan associated with this mammoth endeavour will coordinate supply chains in Australia and France. Where there are capability gaps in Australia, [Naval Group, was DCNS] will turn to French equipment manufacturers." In the same paragraph mentioning:

-  Thales (already has extensive facilities in Australia)
-  Schneider Electric (already has facilities in Australia) [A competitor to Jeumont?
   Schneider Electric advises "Most major navies rely on us for their daily operations, from stealthy
   submarines to largest aircraft carriers"

-  Jeumont and Leroy Somer (electric motors)
-  Fapmo (silent pumps)
-  Techclam (high-pressure piping)
-  Def Ouest (firefighting equipment)
-  Industeel, Aubert & Duval, Dembiermont, FMDL (suppliers of special steels and foundry
   work)

Assisted by: 
-  Pôle Mer (a French maritime "cluster" (conglomerate?)) 
-  Medef (a French Business confederation)
-  Business France, and 
-  Gican (a marine industry association) 

The Lockheed Martin integrated, US designed, combat system, which includes sonars and weapons, is also mentioned in the last paragraph:

"Marie-Pierre de Bailliencourt also reminds us that, aside from the local industrial fabric for sub construction, one of the programme’s other major challenges is the integration of a US-designed combat management system and weapons with a French-designed sub. “We will have to achieve complete convergence of our respective specifications and make sure that neither the platform nor the combat system has a negative impact on the other’s performance.” For instance, given that the Shortfin Barracudas use conventional propulsion, trade-offs will have to be made regarding power consumption by the platform and the combat system. This is important because the [Combat Management System] CMS will be based on systems developed for nuclear-powered subs aboard which power consumption is less of an issue. On a diesel-electric boat, choices have to be made.“Do you allocate more energy to the CMS or to endurance? The challenge is to achieve a trade-off ensuring the best possible overall performance. We will be working closely with both the Australians and Lockheed Martin to precisely this end. So far our relations with both are going well. For the last six months, which is to say since October 2016, we’ve been working together, with everyone on the same page.” 

SEE WHOLE MER ET MARINE ARTICLE  (which was translated and adapted by Steve Dyson).

PETE COMMENT

Some in Australia feel that that French component supplying and system building should be minimised. This is to maximise the amount of local Australian content - to boost Australian jobs and to deliver essential electoral seats to Australia's Federal Government. 

This is noting Australia may have another Federal Election between August 2018 and May 2019. September (the beginning of the southern Spring public optimism) 2018 may be the most likely month.

Pete

Australian Future Sub's Diesel Generator Requirements - PART TWO

January 4, 2018, 1:07 am

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This article follows PART ONE, published January 3, 2018.

The Australia’s Future Submarine (future sub) is very large for an SSK. So powerful diesel-generators in the 2MW class are desirable. This should  minimise the number of diesel-generators and keep the length and displacement of the submarine within efficient limits.

The diesel-generator requirements of  the future sub remain unknown due to understandable lack of:

-  published figures on the future sub's actual snort cruising speed – between 9 and 14 knots

-  a final decision on whether the future sub will use existing lead-acid batteries or lithium-ion

   batteries (which can benefit from higher charging rates of more powerful diesel-generators)

-  whether 4, 5 or 6 diesels fit best in the future sub (eg. can diesel-generators be mounted 2 sets of 3

   horizontally across? or 2 sets of 3 fitting into the sub’s circular diameter?)

-  whether the diesels will have single or twin turbochargers or superchargers or the latest fuel 

   injection system, and

-  how pressure considerations are taken into account to minimise seawater ingestion into fuel

   tanks

This Naval Group Barracuda-Suffren class SSN cutaway (with K15 reactor) unfortunately does not resolve how 4 to 6 diesel-generators could be arranged in Australia's Future Submarine (Cutaway from Naval Group via navyrecognition via Submarine Matters)

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Power requirements are therefore vague, but the future sub will require around 6 to 8MWe of output - noting its 4,500 tonne (surfaced) displacement and also its high hotel load (serving the (usually nuclear submarine) AN/BYG-1 combat system). 

Unusually powerful diesels are risky if they have not been tried and tested in submarines for years before Australia accepts them. The Collins at 3,100 tonnes (surfaced) uses 3 Garden Island-Hedemora diesels with a total output of 5.25MW x 0.8 = 4.2MWe. The Hedemoras needed to be unusually high powered for their time, unfortunately meaning they were untried in submarines, unreliable, restricted use and disliked by RAN submariners. 

From a December 2017 comment on diesel-generator choices for the future sub - ideally the diesels should be around 2MW: 

Approaching 2MW output is the KAWASAKI 12V/25/25SBs at 1.7MW. Two KAWASAKI ((Totalling 3.4MW output) are used in Japan’s (2,900 tonne (surfaced)) large Soryu SSK. So if 4 x 1.7MW (Kawasakis) are used = Total 6.8MW. 6.8 x 0.8 (power factor) = 5,44MWe. Five Kawasakis may be needed to exceed 6MWe, so 5 x 1.7 x 0.8 = 6.8MWe. It is highly unlikely France and/or Australia would select a Japanese diesel.

If the KAWASAKI option is discarded Australia might require 6 diesels of lower power output, of part-known submarine reliability, even if this increases the dimensions of the submarine. 

Both MAN12PA4V200SMDS [1] at 1.33MW and MTU12V4000U83 [2] at 1.3MW appear to have the same performance. Whether they have been sufficiently tried and tested on submarines may still be an open question. Although the piston speed of the engine MAN diesel (at 9.1m/s) is lower than that of MTU (11.4m/s). Anonymous advises lower piston speed tends to reduce sound producing vibration. 

Calculating 6 x MAN12PA4200SMDSs = 6 x 1.33 x 0.8 = 6.4MWe.

OR

6 x MTU12V4000U83s = 6 x 1.3 x 0.8 = 6.24MWe.

[1] MAN 12 PA4 V 200 SMDS: Bore 200 mm, Stroke 210 mm, Mechanical output 1.33MW at 1300 rpm (=Piston speed 9.1m/s) , Generator output 1.064MW

(see http://www.marine.man.eu/docs/default-source/shopwaredocuments/pa4-sm-smdsfba3ca1740b144429518d4e002fd7d6f.pdf?sfvrsn=3 )

[2] MTU 12V4000U83: Bore 170 mm, Stroke 190 mm, Mechanical output 1.3MW at 1800 rpm (=Piston speed 11.4m/s), Generator output 1.040MW
( see http://www.tognum.com/fileadmin/fm-dam/tognum/press/2011/MTU_Submarine_Charging_Unit_12V_4000.pdf )

Naval Group and the Australian Government might decide to publicise what they have chosen to solve these diesel-generator output issues in the next 3 or 4 years.

Anonymous and Pete 

US Nuke Sub Backup Diesels - Possible Technology Path for Aus Future Subs

January 6, 2018, 6:04 pm

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First published June 16, 2017 but still relevant. Large SSK diesels, already in use, including as backups in nuclear subs, are less risky than new diesels for Australian use only.

Australia's inexperience (and trust in Kockums in the 1980s-90s) was readily apparent. ASC and the RAN no longer had Vickers or the UK RN (Parents of the Oberons) to protect Australia in the Collins project. GI-H's were one submarine class ORPHAN diesels which would have been good for the cold, short distance, Baltic, but remain a constant problem for Australia's warm wide ocean requirements. Tried, tested common-in-submarine-use MANs or MTUs should have been selected for the Collins instead.

I think regular tried and tested submarine Kawasaki, MAN or MTU diesels would be better for Shortfin rather than again specially developing "new orphan" engines like the Garden Island-Hedemoras (GI-H).

The bottom of this site http://www.fairbanksmorse.com/marine/ indeed points to Fairbanks-Morse diesels being used for backup on Ohio, Seawolf and Los Angeles class nuclear subs. The specific diesel is a slightly modified version - Fairbanks-Morse 38ND 8-1/8. This is noting the Fairbanks-Morse 38 8-1/8 was used extensively in US diesel electric submarines of the 1940s and 1950s.

Significantly French associated MAN works with Fairbanks-Morse - “[see F-M website] FM-MAN engines are manufactured under license from MAN Diesel. Colt-Pielstick engines are manufactured under license from S.E.M.T. Pielstick. S.E.M.T. Pielstick is a registered trademark of S.E.M.T. Pielstick, France.”

Current and Still being fitted for large submarine use are the Caterpillar 3512B V-12 Twin-turbo charged diesels . The US Viginia class SSN use these diesels as backup (bottom of another site) described in 2004. Closely related 3512C on Caterpillar site. Also here , here and here).

All this recognises characteristics of backup diesels for nuclear subs might be different than for continuous long range use on conventional subs (SSKs). I'd be happier if F-M was still supplying diesels to SSKs rather leaving this market years ago.

Pete

January 2018 Donor Report: Table of Influences on Submarine Programs

January 10, 2018, 2:31 am

≫ Next: Australian Future Subs Diesel Generator Requirements PART 0.5

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Hi Donors

I have just sent you Submarine Matters' January 2018 Donor Report: TABLE OF INFLUENCES ON SUBMARINE PROGRAMS

This is the final Donor Report. 

I've enjoyed writing and sending Donor Reports, but from a semi-professional viewpoint, look forward to accepting any commissions for specific topics.  

Leadin of report: 

"The table...has several measures (including military spending) that underline some big picture realities. These ultimately impact submarine sector activities, production and international competition. Since the Cold War no country has spent enough to develop all submarine sectors (including nuclear submarines, SSKs or AIP all in mature quantity production). Comments...will center more on the US, China and Russia than other submarine nations. No reliable financial or submarine measures (other than 72 mainly small-mini subs) can be attached to North Korea (yet)..."

Please check your spam bin if you don't see it in your IN box.

Cheers

Pete

Director

Submarine Matters International

Australian Future Subs Diesel Generator Requirements PART 0.5

January 10, 2018, 7:21 pm

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This article is a necessary Prequel, which, in retrospect, I should have written before I wrote Australian Future Subs Diesel Generator Requirements PARTs ONE and TWO

Basically greater definition of the diesel problems are required before assessments of diesel remedies can be made.

In the beginning Australia was well served, from 1967 to 1999 by the long UK developed military-off-the-shelf (MOTS) Oberon class submarine. This included the mature, (used since 1959?) Admiralty Standard Range V16 diesel. The Oberon's diesels were apparently used long enough on submarines to detect and resolve deficiencies. Comments from readers who actually worked with Oberon diesels are welcome.

Without the benefit of long UK experience Australia embarked from the late 1970s, on studies and then development of locally built Collins class submarines. The UK Royal Navy had long experience of operating submarines in Indian and Pacific Ocean conditions while the Swedes had not. 

There begins the unhappy tale of the Garden Island-Hedemora (GI-H) diesel and most of the other components of the Collin's drive-train. 

The UK headquartered, but international Royal Institute of Naval Architects (RINA) have published  a very useful  paper titled "Technical Meeting - 3 February 2016" which is partly on the GI-H, see https://www.rina.org.uk/iqs/dbitemid.1665/rp.2/sfa.view/Section_News1.html

In 1987, Australia, hoping for a “off-the-shelf or low-risk” diesel for the Collins submarine, selected the Hedemora V18B14SUB diesel. At that time, nothing else was judged to have met Australia’s stringent, high power, diesel specifications. Unfortunately the Swedish Hedemora Diesel company declined and Australia's Hedemora diesels became Australia Only orphan technology.

"Now [Australia has] all of the 19 Hedemora V18B14SUB engines in the world [just for all 6 of Australia's Collins subs]! The V indicates the vee configuration, the 18 is the number of cylinders, the B is the larger bore (210×210 mm), the 14 is the speed (1400 rpm), and the SUB category is the monolithic engine (not bedplate mounted) for submarines." 

“Hedemora had demonstrated the V12B configured for snorting, and promised that the V18B would work as well giving 1.4 MWe. However, they had never actually built a turbocharged V18B14SUB, but had built lots of V18B engines for industrial power and marine generator sets, and had tested a V12B against submarine-type conditions. They had built a number of V12A (smaller bore) submarine engines for the Royal Swedish Navy, the latest examples being turbocharged."

"Therefore the V18B14SUB was accepted as an off-the-shelf design, which it really wasn’t. But then, nothing else seems to have met the specification either [no MAN, MTU diesels met Australia's criteria and Japan was nowhere near contemplating exporting arms].”

Looking to the Australian future submarine the paper goes on to comment:

"Safety Issues
With fuel supply at around 2000 bar (200 Pa), containment is critical. All components, including pumps, need to be safely contained. MTU have developed (or are developing) a submarine variant of their 4000 series engine (it is mentioned on their website). However, many in the submarine community remain nervous of such high pressure systems.

Performance Issues

Such an engine would require significant work on the control system and turbocharging arrangements. The control system would need load control, not just the conventional speed control. MTU are well capable of this, but one would need to be reassured that they were applying it to cope with open-ocean sea states. Likewise for the Pielstick engines, which may be favoured by a French supplier, although Pielstick is now back in the MAN stable after many years in French hands."

So several issues need to be kept in mind: 

1.  What is a military-off-the-shelf (MOTS) submarine diesel? 

2.  Is MOTS the structure of a still unmodified diesel?

3.  Must a MOTS diesel be proven by being used for years in submarines? Is prior use on a

     locomotive or surface ship beneficial?

4.  Can turbocharging or supercharging a diesel disrupt the reliability or other 
     characteristics of the diesel?

5.  How extensive can modifications to the structure or use of a MOTS diesel be before it is
     no longer MOTS? Hence becoming risky?

Reader comments made here January 5 to 10, 2018, will be added to two "Australian Future Subs Diesel Generator Requirements PART..." per week.

Pete

Trump’s Latest "Low-Yield" Nuclear War Ignition Policy Raises Questions

January 10, 2018, 8:22 pm

≫ Next: Was it actually a North Korean submarine that entered Japan's contiguous zone?

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Just when people were becoming relaxed about mega-death via nuclear war, Trump alarms US allies, again. Trump appears to be stoking talk of low-yield nuclear weapons, which frequently overlap with the tactical nuclear weapon category. Hopefully this is a rather blunt first-strike warning to North Korea (to not even consider hitting South Korea or Japan with nuclear weapons).

This has been reported as "President Trump’s administration plans to loosen nuclear weapons constraints and develop more ‘usable’ warheads" in The South China Morning Post, January 10, 2018. Key parts of that article are:

"The Trump administration plans to loosen constraints on the use of nuclear weapons and develop a new low-yield nuclear warhead for US Trident [D5 SLBMs] according to a former official who has seen the most recent draft of a policy review....[This is aimed to deter] Russia from using tactical warheads in a conflict in Eastern Europe.

... Arms control advocates have voiced alarm at the new proposal to make smaller, more “usable” nuclear weapons, arguing it makes a nuclear war more likely, especially in view of what they see as Donald Trump’s volatility and readiness to brandish the US arsenal in showdowns with the nation’s adversaries.

...The [Nuclear Posture Review] also expands the circumstances in which the US might use its nuclear arsenal, to include a response to a non-nuclear attack that caused mass casualties.   [It removes] assurances to non nuclear weapons states that the US will not use its nuclear arsenal against them.”

COMMENT

Problems with this new policy include:

1.  making nuclear war against a non-nuclear enemy more acceptable? That is US nuclear weapons
     can be used in a conventional war, not just as nuclear deterrents?

2.  The intended targets of these "low-yield" nuclear weapons won't trust them to be "limited to
     low-yield" or targeted countries won't limit their nuclear response anyway. China, Russia, North
     Korea, or Pakistan could hit the US or US allies (intentionally or in panic) with high yield nuclear
     weapons.

3.  Use them or Lose Them: China, Russia but mainly North Korea, or Pakistan could feel they have
     to use all available nuclear weapons (of any yield) due to the fear they may lose them to further
     US low-yield strikes.

4.  Could another mass casualty 9/11 justify the US responding with low-yield weapons that kill
     vastly more people, cause unintended health effects to US allies and upset the whole global
     balance?

5.  Would, as yet, only conventionally armed countries be encouraged to develop nuclear arsenals to
     deter Trump's latest low-yield policy? and

6.  Firing even low-yield missiles exposes a submarine to enemy satellite or radar detection and rapid
     destruction. Would the destruction of a US Ohio SSBN, its 23 remaining SLBMs (with say 100
     nuclear warheads total) be an acceptable trade-off if the SSBN was ordered to fire just one "low-
     yield" warhead on one of its Trident D5 SLBMs?

Pete

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Was it actually a North Korean submarine that entered Japan's contiguous zone?

January 11, 2018, 7:39 pm

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Japan's Mainichi Newsreported January 11, 2018 that:

"TOKYO (Kyodo) -- A Chinese frigate and an unidentified foreign submerged submarine were spotted Thursday just outside Japanese territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands [near Miyako Island] in the East China Sea, the Defense Ministry said, prompting Tokyo to protest to Beijing over the sailing..." 

PETE'S COMMENT

The Japanese Navy has almost automatically assumed (or decided to announce) that because a Chinese frigate was detected, the submarine must also be Chinese.

My alternative theory is that the Chinese Navy spotted a North Korean (NK) submarine. China wishing to avoid another Cheonan Incident pursued the NK sub to warn-off that sub. The Cheonan Incident  was when a NK submarine torpedoed a South Korean surface ship in 2010. An NK sub would also be a threat to Japanese surface ships.

The Chinese frigate's actions is part of China's new policy of pressuring NK to be less belligerent in its actions and threats. China wishes to de-escalate NK vs (South Korea, Japan, US) tensions.

Another conclusion is that Japan is utilising its undersea sensor array to detect NK submarines. See array map below. The array includes seafloor hydrophones and other sensors, which is strung from the Japanese home islands, via Okinawa (main) Island and via Miyako (in Japan's Senkakus) Island etc. 

The map is from page 54 “Map 4. The US ‘Fish Hook’ Undersea Defense Line” in Desmond Ball and Richard Tanter, The Tools of Owatatsumi Japan’s Ocean Surveillance and Coastal Defence Capabilities (2015, ANU Press) http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p309261/pdf/book.pdf?referer=444. The map may depict past or current locations of the eastern Asia - inner western Pacific SOSUS-IUSS seafloor array. 

Pete

False Alarm - Missile toward Hawaii - First details

January 13, 2018, 8:44 pm

≫ Next: INS Arihant's Temporary Sinking Explains Arighat's Launch & Aridhaman's Delay

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False Missile against Hawaii warning - sent to Hawaiian, USA cell phones. More information on sensor or alarm chain of command errors will appear as it becomes available.

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From Australia's ABC News January 14, 2018, first details:

[On January 13, 2018 (Hawaii time) a false alarm was sent out to Hawaiian residents and tourists] "Ballistic missile threat inbound to Hawaii. Seek immediate shelter. This is not a drill."

It might sound like something straight out of a horror movie, but for 38 minutes terrified Hawaiian residents thought the world was going to end.

...Why did it take 38 minutes to correct the error?

Many have been left asking why it took so long for emergency management to reveal it was a false alarm, with some residents only finding out it was sent in error because of a tweet sent in the interim by US Representative Tulsi Gabbard.

A revised alert informing of the "false alarm" did not reach mobile phones until about 40 minutes after the first warning was sent.

Hawaii's Emergency Management Agency administrator Vern Miyagi said "there was no automated way to send a false alarm cancellation".

"We had to initiate a manual process. And that was why it took a while to notify everyone," he told a media conference.

When asked if that was why it took 38 minutes to notify people, he again replied it was due to the "manual process to provide notification on the smartphones and cellphones".

"We did have other notification that occurred much, much sooner than that," he said.

The agency had tweeted there was no threat about 10 minutes after the initial alert, but residents who were not on Twitter did not see the correction.

More information on sensor or alarm chain of command errors will appear as it becomes available.

Pete

INS Arihant's Temporary Sinking Explains Arighat's Launch & Aridhaman's Delay

January 14, 2018, 9:06 pm

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It seems the Indian Navy and broader government thought it wise to launch INS Arighat on November 19, 2017 in the then secret knowledge that INS Arihant has sunk at its moorings during a test in February 2017. The Arighat (very similar to Arihant in size and design) launch can be seen as a means of deflecting the political embarrassment and recriminations of the Arihant sinking.

INS Arihant.

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Arihant sank at India's major east coast naval base of Visakhapatnam . The cause - allegedly a hatch left open during an Arihant submersion test.

Given the apparent lack of such a hatch on Arihant (reports India's Economic Times, Jan 12, 2018) and likelihood of sensors to avoid major accidents the official "hatch left open" explanation seems suspicious. Maybe instead, sabotage by a disgruntled or bribed crewman or technician? Even Chinese or Pakistani agent involvement?

India's Visakhapatnam east coast naval base. Naval vessels can be seen halfway up the harbour. This is to the right of what looks like the submarine repair and SLBM loading shed that INS Arihant will need to use, or is already under repair at. 

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Repairing, or if need be, replacing Arihant's reactor is likely to be a Billion dollar exercise. Involving Arihant being placed in drydock, moved to Visakhapatnam repair shed then being vertically cut open, basically in half.

The Arihant accident not only involves major repair costs but delays India's SSBN and broader indigenous nuclear submarine technical modification/learning program. It also delays training of the  officers and crew who will transition to a full size Aridhaman SSBN around 2020(?).

In fact these negative impacts (repair cost, technical improvements and training program) of the Arihant accident may have delayed Aridhaman's launch by a year or two.

Pete

Soryu LABs vs LIBs, AIP and Indiscretion Ratios

January 15, 2018, 6:22 pm

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Anonymous has provided the following commentsfrom January 13 to 15, 2018 (with some further translation by Pete). This is on the interrelated issues of LABs vs LIBs, AIP and Indiscretion Ratios. The maths are quite challenging.

According to the former Commander of the Japanese Navy Submarines Service, Vice Admiral (retired) Masao Kobayashi, in a lead-acid battery (LABs) submarine, one hour-ventilation by using a diesel generator (DG) is needed after battery charging to release hydrogen generated by the charging process. 

Based on this information, the indiscretion ratio of the five following submarine Cases/scenarios have been reviewed and very roughly estimated for Japanese submarine missions of 70 days. This is where the surveillance period is 50 days and transiting period is 10 days x 2 = 20 days) and the DG output (hotel load + propulsion) is 250kW:

The lower the Indiscretion Ratio (IR) (the snorkeling period per 24 hours) the better.

Case I   (submarine length 84m, LABs, powered 100MW (or is that 100 kW?) - air independent

             propulsion (AIP), 2 x 2MW-generators, model SoryuMK I, IR =7%;

Case II  (length 84m, lithium-ion batteries (LIBs), 2 x 2MW-generators, model Soryu MK II)

              see Table below) IR=6%;

Case III  (long range Soryu proposed for Australian Future Submarine (AFS), length 90m, LIBs, 

               4 x 2MW-gnerators) IR=2.5%;

Case IV  (AFS, length 96m, 100MW-AIP, LIBs, 4 x 2MW-gnerators) IR=2%;

Case V   (AFS, length 96m, 100MW-AIP, LABs, 4 x 1MW-generators) IR=7%.

Comparison of Cases I and V shows that IR is determined by slow charge rate of LABs in a LAB-submarine. Comparison of Cases II, III an IV shows that output of the DG shows critical effects on IR for LIB submarines.

Performance at low speed means IR is Case IV>= Case III >>Case II >Case V = Case I.

Performance at high speed, which depends on batteries, is Case III>= Case IV >>Case II >Case V = Case I.

The facts that:

-  using up stored liquid oxygen (LOx) ends the usefulness of the Soryu’s Stirling AIP, and

-  LIBs are better than LABs

shows the flexibility of operation of each cases: Case III>= Case II >Case IV> Case V=Case I.

The superiority of AIP and LIBs, or simple LIBs, depends on a submarine’s mission. DGs play a critical role in both LIBs-submarines (Cases II and IV) within certain diesel power output ranges.

Anonymous thinks the future of LABs-submarines (Cases I, III and V) are limited with or without AIP and recent the tragedy of Argentina’s ARA San Juan shows LABs are not automatically safe.

More mathatically IR was very roughly estimated as follows:

Over 24 hours the balance of energy supplied [Es] to batteries and energy consumed [Ec] form batteries and AIP is described in equation (1)

(1)   Es = Ec

(2)   Es = Energy from diesel generator [Ed] + Energy from AIP [Ea]

(3)   Ec = Energy for propulsion [Ep] + Energy for hotel load [Eh]

The Indiscretion ratio (IR) which is the snorkeling period [ts] per day (=24h) is described in eq (4)

(4)   IR = ts/24 x 100 (%) = (tg + th)/24 x 100 (%)

(5)   ts = snorkeling period for diesel generation [tg] + snorkeling period for hydrogen release [th] 

        This is where, th =1h for LABs with hydrogen generation, and th = 0h for LIBs without 

        hydrogen generation.

Charge of batteries (capacity X (MWh)) with Y of C rate, Ed for ts is described in (6)

(6)   Ed = 1000XYtg  This where C daily energy from Z (MWh)-AIP for 50 days-opertion is 

        described in (7)

(7)   Ea =1000Z/50 =20Z

(8)   is derived from (2), (6) and (7), Es =1000XYtg + 20Z

(9)   If 250 kW of energy is consumed in an hour, then, Ec = 250 x {24-(tg + th)} ---

(10) is derived from (1), (8) and (9), 1000XY tg+ 20Z = 250 x {24-(tg + th)}

(11) is derived from (4) and (10), IR =[1-{(1000XY tg+ 20Z)/(250x24)}]x100=(tg + th)/24 x100 .  

       Where, tg = (250 x24-20Z-250 th)/(1000XY+250)  IR is from eq (11)

10MWh-LAB, non-AIP, 0.2 C rate, 2MW-diesel: X=10, Y=0.2, Z=0, th =1, IR=14.8%

10MWh-LAB, 100MWh-AIP, 0.2 C rate, 2MW-diesel: X=10, Y=0.2, Z=100, th =1, IR=11.1%

20MWh-LIB, non-AIP, 0.2 C rate, 4MW-diesel: X=20, Y=0.2, Z=0, th =0, IR=5.8%

20MWh-LIB, non-AIP, 0.4 C rate, 8MW-diesel: X=20, Y=0.4, Z=0, th =0, IR=3.0%

20MWh-LIB, 100MWh-AIP, 0.2 C rate, 4MW-diesel: X=20, Y=0.2, Z=100, th =0, IR=3.9%

20MWh-LIB, 100MWh-AIP, 0.4 C rate, 8MW-diesel: X=20, Y=0.4, Z=100, th =0, IR=2.0%

ANONYMOS’s CONCLUSION (LIBs Over LABs)

Though the estimates are based on many assumptions and are rough, the results clearly show the superiority of LIBs over LABs. Anonymous believes LIBs are indispensable to maintain the regional superiority of a conventional submarine.

 TABLE - SORYU & Oyashio Program as at January 16, 2018 

SS No.	Build No Name	Pennant No.	MoF approved amount ¥ Billions FY	LABs, LIBs, AIP	Laid Down	Laun -ched	Commi ssioned	Built By
5SS Oyashio	8105 Oyashio	SS-590/ TS3608	¥52.2B FY1993	LABs only	Jan 1994	Oct 1996	Mar 1998	KHI
6SS-15SS Oyashios 10 subs	8106 -8115 various	SS-591-600	¥52.2B per sub FY1994-FY2003	LABs only	15SS Feb 2004	15SS Nov 2006	15SS Mar 2008	MHI & KHI
16SS Soryu Mk 1	8116 Sōryū	SS-501	¥60B FY2004	LABs + AIP	Mar 2005	Dec 2007	Mar 2009	MHI
17SS	8117 Unryū	SS-502	¥58.7B FY2005	LABs + AIP	Mar 2006	Oct 2008	Mar 2010	KHI
18SS	8118 Hakuryū	SS-503	¥56.2 FY2006	LABs + AIP	Feb 2007	Oct 2009	Mar 2011	MHI
19SS	8119 Kenryū	SS-504	¥53B FY2007	LABs + AIP	Mar 2008	Nov 2010	Mar 2012	KHI
20SS	8120 Zuiryū	SS-505	¥51B FY2008	LABs + AIP	Mar 2009	Oct 2011	Mar 2013	MHI
No 21SS			No 21SS built
22SS	8121 Kokuryū	SS-506	¥52.8B FY2010	LABs + AIP	Jan 2011	Oct 2013	Mar 2015	KHI
23SS	8122 Jinryu	SS-507	¥54.6B FY2011	LABs + AIP	Feb 2012	Oct 2014	7 Mar 2016	MHI
24SS	8123 Sekiryū	SS-508	¥54.7B FY2012	LABs + AIP	15 Mar 2013	2 Nov 2015	13 Mar 2017	KHI
25SS	8124 Seiryū	SS-509	¥53.1B FY2013	LABs + AIP	22 Oct 2013	12 Oct   2016	Mar? 2018	MHI
26SS	8125 Shyuriyu	SS-510	¥51.7B FY2014	LABs + AIP	2014	6 Nov 2017	Mar 2019?	KHI
27SS First Soryu Mk 2	8126	SS-511	¥64.4B FY2015	LIBs only	2015	2018?	Mar 2020	MHI
28SS  Second Soryu Mark 2	8127	SS-512	¥63.6B FY2016	LIBs only	2016?	2018?	Mar 2021?	KHI
29SS First Soryu Mk 3 (1) (3)	8128	?	¥76B FY2017	LIBs only	?	?	2023?	MHI?
30SS Second Soryu Mk 3 (2)	8029?	?	¥71.5B FY2018	LIBs only	?	?	2024?	KHI?

Table from information exclusively provided to Submarine Matters. LABs = lead-acid batteries, AIP = air independent propulsion, LIBs = lithium-ion batteries. ¥***B = Billion Yen. MHI = Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, KHI = Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation of Kawasaki Heavy Industries.

---

By Anonymous

Australian Submarine Expert, Senator Patrick, Forgets Johnson

January 17, 2018, 1:01 am

≫ Next: Japanese Soryu Higher Power Snorkel (Intake and Exhaust) Study

≪ Previous: Soryu LABs vs LIBs, AIP and Indiscretion Ratios

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Australia's government owned ABC News service reports, January 17, 2018, in part  http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-01-17/submarine-delays-could-lead-to-cost-blowout-senator-says/9334240

"The cost of Australia's Future Submarine program is likely to blow out by billions of dollars because it is already missing key deadlines, [Rex Patrick] a former defence contractor turned senator has warned.

...In December, [the Australian Defence Department] confirmed two planning documents due to be released last year had yet to be finalised, but the department insisted there had been "no delays to key milestones" and no "cost or schedule impacts" to the $50 billion project.

Senator Rex Patrick, who once also served as a Royal Australian Navy [RAN] submariner, has not been convinced and said some military insiders were privately conceding the submarine program was "starting to go a little bit off the rails".

[The Head of Australia’s Future Submarine Program since September 2013] "Rear Admiral [Gregory] Sammut is a highly respected and highly capable naval officer, however he's never run a major project, he's never run a minor project," Senator Patrick said....” See WHOLE ABC article.

PETE's COMMENT

Given the postings rate of senior RAN officers Rear Admiral Sammut has already headed the RAN-Project liaison aspects of the Submarine Program for a long time since 2013. The 50 year Submarine Program will of course see more than six changes of RAN Head.

Head of program is a shared function between senior officers of the Prime Minister’s Department, Minister of Defence Industry, CEO of Naval Group Australia and also Naval Group HQ Cherbourg.

Perhaps the closest thing to THE Program Manager is US Navy Rear Admiral (retired) Stephen E. Johnson (photo below). He is General Manager Submarines in the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group, Australian Department of Defence. Johnson worked for 3 years in the management team of US Virginia class submarine program (from 1992-1995) and 6 years on the Seawolf class submarine program (1998-2003).See Johnson’s longer bio here .

Johnson's Australian Department of Defence Position Description reads"Stephen E. Johnson commenced as General Manager Submarines in the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group on 4 November 2015. Steve is responsible for all aspects of submarine support across Defence in Australia, working across government and industry as the project integrator of our existing submarine fleet and the Future Submarine Project." See here and here.

---

Pete

Japanese Soryu Higher Power Snorkel (Intake and Exhaust) Study

January 17, 2018, 9:04 pm

≫ Next: Suspicious Russian Submarine Fire, Vladivostok, Diesel Vapour? Battery Hydrogen?

≪ Previous: Australian Submarine Expert, Senator Patrick, Forgets Johnson

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"wispywood2344" has drawn and labelled this very useful diagram of the Japan's top of the line Soryu class submarine.  The diagram (minus the Stirling AIP) could represent the Japanese entrant "SEA-1000 Japanese submarine (SEA-J)” in the Australia’s Future Submarine competition (which France won in April 2016). A larger version of the diagram is at http://blog.livedoor.jp/wispywood2344/others/Soryu_cutaway.svg. 

---

Anonymous has kindly provided information for the following. One of the key factors in considering Soryu propulsive power (see January 16, 2018 article) comes through taking account of the efficiency of the snorkel (diesel intake and exhaust) system. If resistance against snorkel intake and exhaust is too high, the diesel generation system does not function well, resulting in poor output. 

Though the effectiveness of intake and exhaust system has been proven for Japanese submarines equipped with generators of around 4MW (total), the effectiveness of intake and exhaust has not been published for 8MW generators (the power required by Australian Future Submarines).

In this current article there is some discussion of the Japanese entrant "SEA-J" (diagram above) a Soryu enlarged for Australian conditions.

LARGER SEA-J

SEA-J highly likely omitted the Stirling AIP  (including LOx tanks, sections (9) and (10), 4th compartment) and was lengthened by 6m (from current 84m to 90m). This provided for:

-  extra diesel fuel (to increase range from the current Soryu Mark I's limited 6,100nm 

   range to the 10,000-12,000nm Australia required 

-  extra batteries (for increased fully submerged range on battery) and

-  larger bunks for the on average taller crew. The bunks are already individual for 65 crew

   (ie. no uncomfortable "hot bunking").  

Omitting the AIP (especially the large, weight shifting, LOx tank, of diminishing utility on Australia's long range missions) is easily understood. But the 6m increase in length is less understandable. SEA-J's extra length may be needed to handle an extra two diesel engines (four in all for the 8MW total power) instead of just two diesels in the existing Soryu Mark I. 

MORE POWERFUL SNORKEL SYSTEM

Rearrangements in SEA-J may be new sections 5, 6 and 7 to accommodate the larger, more powerful, diesel driven snorkel sytem. Such a faster working snorkel system would be required for the extra pressure and faster operation of four diesels (totaling 8MW) in SEA-J.

A larger, more powerful snorkel system may also be required in the Soryu Mark II (see Table, for 27SS, laid down in 2015) which may be launced in 2018. Mark II will have more powerful diesels to more quickly charge and technically exploit the new Lithium-ion batteries (LIBs) to be introduced in Mark II. 

Faster charging on Mark II will improve its indiscretion ratio (IR). Indiscretion being a submarine's fully surfaced or shallow submerged danger period, when it is snorting. SEA-J could have also benefitted from fast charge LIBs (if Australia had selected SEA-J).

Mainly by Anonymous 

Suspicious Russian Submarine Fire, Vladivostok, Diesel Vapour? Battery Hydrogen?

January 21, 2018, 8:03 pm

≫ Next: Chinese undersea sound surveillance sensors (SOSUS) near Guam

≪ Previous: Japanese Soryu Higher Power Snorkel (Intake and Exhaust) Study

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KQN has drawn Submarine Matter's attention to a January 21, 2018 Russian claim that the Russian Navy intentionally set a Russian conventional, diesel-electric, Kilo class submarine on fire, on January 21, as part of a “damage control exercise”. This fire was/is at Vladivostok Main Naval Base, Russian Pacific Fleet.

The Kilo is most likely part of the Russian Pacific Fleet's, Vladivostok, 19th Submarine Brigade and may well be an unimproved Project 877 Kilo (likely Pennant Number "B-260", "B-445", "B-394", "B-464", "B-494", "B-187", "B-190" or "B-345"). Intentionally starting a fire is highly unlikely given the cost of a Kilo and close proximity of several other Kilo subs near the fire (see photo below).

Russian Kilo submarine on fire, January 21, 2018, at Vladivostok. (Photo courtesy Anonymous Russian via a scoop by Tyler Rogoway, The Drive January 21, 2018, website).

---

It will be interesting if the Russians admit the real reason, eg:

-  residual diesel fuel vapour catching alight 

-  angle grinder or welding equipment started a fire of insulation or diesel fuel vapour between the 

   outer hull and pressure hull, 

-  battery maintenance causing release of flammable Hydrogen gas from the batteries, leading to fire. 

OR

-  fire of highly volatile torpedo propellant, then subsequent "cooking-off" of torpedo warheads

Precents include:

-   the welding caused fire between outer and pressure hulls on the Russian Oscar class SSGN "Orel" 
    on April 8, 2015

-  the fire and explosion of IndianKilo submarine INS Sindhurakshak, on August 14,  2013.

Pete

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Chinese undersea sound surveillance sensors (SOSUS) near Guam

January 22, 2018, 8:56 pm

≫ Next: Tension Between Western Delegations on Evacuation of Foreign Nationals from S Korea

≪ Previous: Suspicious Russian Submarine Fire, Vladivostok, Diesel Vapour? Battery Hydrogen?

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"The Chinese Academy of Sciences recently disclosed that underwater acoustic sensors have been monitoring sea activity near Guam since 2016."

Source: Russia's SputnikNews relaying a Hong Kong, South China Morning Post report of  

January 22, 2018. 

COMMENT

The report indicates "The sensors collect water temperature and salinity data that impact how sound moves through water". These make the underwater acoustic (SOSUS) sensors more accurate AND also provides a scientific research "cover" for basically ASW sensors. 

Once China perfects node sensors near Guam, and in the South, China Sea, China will lay 500+ km  undersea SOSUS cable arrays, stringing many sensors together

-  thereby providing electrical and communications channels to the sensors.

The main (near Guam) Chinese sensor targets would be the US Submarine Squadron 15 (SUBRON 15), at Naval Base Guam island. 

Anderson Air Base (at right) is also on Guam island, as is Guam (Apra) Naval Base, where

SUBRON 15 has long been based. South China Sea on left. All "targets" for China's developing SOSUS systems.

---

SUBRON 15mainly consists of:

-  the large submarine tender USS Frank Cable (AS-40)

-  four Los Angeles class SSNs, namely USS Key West (SSN 722), USS Oklahoma City (SSN 723), 

   USS Topeka (SSN 754) and USS Asheville (SSN 758). 

-  an Ohio class SSGN also occasionally visits.

Pete

Tension Between Western Delegations on Evacuation of Foreign Nationals from S Korea

January 22, 2018, 11:29 pm

≫ Next: Australian Future Sub's Diesel Genset Requirements - PART THREE

≪ Previous: Chinese undersea sound surveillance sensors (SOSUS) near Guam

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This is an interesting matter between Western military, diplomatic and security agencies. It is within the context of sensitivities around the 2018 Winter Olympics (also see). 

These Olympics will be held in PyeongChang, South Korea from 9 to 25 February 2018. PyeongChang is a mountainous area of South Korea just 100 km south of the tense Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) with North Korea.

 If any of North Korea's frequent nuclear/missile threats occurred in February this could wreck the usual good feelings of the Winter Olympics. Mass evacuations of foreign nationals is a possibility, however slight.

This deals with the sensitivies of:

1.   promising North Korea that no military exercises will be held in South Korea prior to the February 2018 Winter Olympics in South Korea. Summary of a January 2018 Washington Postreport: Trump and South Korean President Moon Jae-in have agreed to postpone the large annual Foal Eagle Exercise until after the Winter Olympics to reduce tensions with North Korea. 

2.  North Korea might decide to feel cheated that "secret" plans were reported in the Japanese media (below) in January 2018 concerning international preparations made in South Korea (SK) for evacuating foreign nationals in case of high tension or conflict with North Korea (NK). 

[PETE COMMENT

From the following it appears there is a high degree of ill-feeling on security issues, between and within Western delegations (including Japan and SK) in dealings with NK. The Chinese and Russians must be perplexed.]

On January 21, 2018 Anonymous translated [right-click mouse] page 2 of a Japanese language Gendai article of January 20, 2018. Pete did further translation for context:

"In a period of emergency in the Korean Peninsula, when President Trump has taken military action against NK, concrete measures to rescue US, UK, Canadian, Australian, French and Japanese and Americans nationals from SK are being planned:

In November 2017, the first meeting of Japan and five members of UN Command in SK (US, UK, Canada, Australia and France) was held secretly at Osan US Air Force (USAF) Base 64 km south of Seoul to discuss rescue/evacuation planning for their foreign nationals. 

[Osan hosts US 7th Air Force Headquarters]. 

"It was a military official consultation and SK was excluded because of possible information leakages to NK through the SK "Blue House"." 

[the "Blue House" is a large complex that is the Executive Office and Official Residence of SK President Moon Jae-in]

Japanese attendance included Counsellor Level officials from the National Security Bureau of the Cabinet Secretariat and uniformed staff from the Japanese Ministry of Defense (MoD). They were transferred by USAF aircraft travelling from USAF Base Yokota (Tokyo) to Osan USAF Base.

Numbers of the foreign nationals in each region of South Korea, identified by the US, were displayed on a huge screen and projector in the November 2017 meeting room at Osan Base. Measures for transporting the nationals to Busan Port and the Port of Incheon via air, land and sea were explained.

The US Department of State (DoS) informed SK diplomatic and security authorities who had been excluded from the November 2017 meeting. SK reacted by complaining strongly and could [did?] attend the second meeting held in December 2017.

Until [November 2017?] these kinds of meetings have only been held secretly between the US National Security Council (NSC), US Department of Defense (DoD), Japanese NSC (J-NSC) and Japanese  Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). The US Department of State (DoS) and Japanese Ministry of Defense (J-MoD) have been excluded because the security of their information management has been suspect.

"Under multilateral talks discussing the situation in North Korea, it can be understood that leakage of confidential information is a deadly and serious problem."

Translated by Anonymous and by Pete.

Australian Future Sub's Diesel Genset Requirements - PART THREE

January 23, 2018, 11:27 pm

≫ Next: Translation of Japanese J-Ships Article which uses Submarine Matters Articles

≪ Previous: Tension Between Western Delegations on Evacuation of Foreign Nationals from S Korea

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The critical issues of providing sufficiently powerful and reliable diesels for Australian future submarines are complex. Unreliable diesels and generators seem to have been the main weakness of the Collins.

Australia enthusiasm for selecting a Japanese submarine in the years up to 2016 relied heavily on an Australian assessment that the KAWASAKI 12V/25/25SB was the best high power submarine diesel available worldwide. The 12V25/25SB has been successfully used on Japanese subs since 2005 (see sidebar). 

So far I think Naval Group should work through the MAN Diesel & Turbo SE (which owns SEMT Pielstick diesel builder) grouping to obtain the 12V/25/25SB diesels under licence. Or perhaps obtaining Kawasaki's newly developed 12V25/31S (to be installed in 29SS, to be laid down in 2018/19 - see TABLE) as this will gradually replace the 12V/25/25SB. This is noting MAN and Kawasaki are already closely associated on marine diesels.

As outlined in PART TWO diesels (around 1.4MW or less) for smaller European designed submarines are inadequate in power to meet Australian submarine needs. Four more powerful diesels (around 2MW each) are required. This would avoid the need for 6 “euro” diesels (an arrangement which would inefficiently stretch the Australian submarine's length and/or diameter.

On the need for four diesels submarine expert Hans J. Ohff, with much knowledge and many Adelaide and Canberra contacts, commented on Selection of Naval Group Day (April 26, 2016) that: 

"The [Australian future submarine] will be equipped with four diesel alternators to generate electricity, a  >7 megawatt permanent magnet motor and ample battery storage." 

A Kawasaki-MAN effort to introduce Kawasaki diesels for Australian use should preferably avoid  major alterations, like an Australia Only turbocharger-supercharger system, due to technical/reliability risk. 

Australian submarine diesels will not function in isolation. Other power train components matter. In that vein it appears that Naval Group has already selected Jeumont Electric as the official supplier of the generator pack which includes manufacturing permanent-magnet synchronous motors and the associated power electronics cabinets. Hence the diesel supplier will need to work closely with Jeumont Electric on a business and technical level.

Pete

Translation of Japanese J-Ships Article which uses Submarine Matters Articles

January 24, 2018, 8:05 pm

≫ Next: Penske MTU 4000 competition to Kawasaki Diesel for Submarine - PART FOUR

≪ Previous: Australian Future Sub's Diesel Genset Requirements - PART THREE

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Tanaka (in a comment here) has kindly translated (from Japanese to English) an article by Isaku Okabe (a popular  Japanese military critic) in the J-Ships February 2018 issue. J-Ships is a popular Japanese maritime magazine.

Isaku Okabe's article concerns the Soryu Mk.2's improved, more stealthy, snorting/snorkeling performance. The information on the Soryu Mk.2 performance is based on Submarine Matters' articles written by Anonymous and Pete ( here, here and here and especially here, here and here ) .

Tanaka's Translation [with some further Pete translation] is:

"THE INCREASING CAPABILITY OF STEALTH CRUISING THANKS TO THE LONGER UNDERWATER DURATION".

"There are some estimations of performance comparison between [the current] Soryu class [Mk. 1] and [submarine number] 27SS [see TABLE below] in a blog [Submarine Matters] written by a foreigner [ :) ] who is familiar with submarine matters.

In the blog, 27SS is called "Soryu Mk.2" and its maximum period of continuous [fully submerged] cruising at a speed of 4 knots is estimated to be 7~9 days compared to that of Soryu's 3~3.5days.

The blog says the general period of continuous [Soryu Mk.2] fully submerged cruising will increase to 6~8 days though the current Soryu class can cruise only 1~1.5 days.

The so called "Soryu Mk.2" will be able to conduct secret patrols without snorting for a much longer time. In regard to cruising at a speed of 18 knots, "Soryu Mk.2" will be able to do it continuously for 3~4 hours which is 3~4 times longer than current Soryu's.

The time required for charging batteries for the current Soryu Mk. 1 is estimated to be 5~10 hours, whereas the "Soryu Mk.2" needs just 1~2 hours, which makes the latter much more stealthy.

Supposing the mission period is 60 days, the "Soryu Mk.2" [needs to snort] 8~10 times compared to 40~60 times for the Soryu Mk.1. Snorting [with loud diesels running] reduces stealthiness - so a submarine needs to move out of its operational area to be safe.

[Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs)] can reduce the number and length of snorting times which increases the stealthy operational time. This results in much more efficient use of submarines.

It goes without saying that these are estimations by a foreigner [ but kindly provided by Anonymous ] and no one knows if they are correct or not. But at least they can be good indicators to infer the progress of submarines using LIBs [rather than shorter operating Lead-acid Batteries (LABs)] .

Converting from [the Soryu Mk.1's] AIP + LABs to [the Soryu Mk.2's] LIBs is not as simple as just changing the type of batteries. Many parts of the submarine need to be modified such as whole power system and safety management system for the realistic and safe use of LIBs.

The 11th [27SS] and 12th [28SS] Soryu class submarines, which correspond to what the foreigner calls "Soryu Mk.2", will undergo major battery-electrical system conversions but not other major changes. Soryu Mk.2's hulls, weapons, sensors and control systems remain almost the same as current Soryu class." [The author, Okabe, did not mention the major change to the more powerful, storm tolerant, snorkel system. Maybe that will be introduced on the Soryu Mk.3?].

TABLE - SORYU & Oyashio Program as at January 25, 2018 

SS No.	Build No Name	Pennant No.	MoF approved amount ¥ Billions FY	LABs, LIBs, AIP	Laid Down	Laun -ched	Commi ssioned	Built By
5SS Oyashio	8105 Oyashio	SS-590/ TS3608	¥52.2B FY1993	LABs only	Jan 1994	Oct 1996	Mar 1998	KHI
6SS-15SS Oyashios 10 subs	8106 -8115 various	SS-591-600	¥52.2B per sub FY1994-FY2003	LABs only	15SS Feb 2004	15SS Nov 2006	15SS Mar 2008	MHI & KHI
16SS Soryu Mk 1	8116 Sōryū	SS-501	¥60B FY2004	LABs + AIP	Mar 2005	Dec 2007	Mar 2009	MHI
17SS	8117 Unryū	SS-502	¥58.7B FY2005	LABs + AIP	Mar 2006	Oct 2008	Mar 2010	KHI
18SS	8118 Hakuryū	SS-503	¥56.2 FY2006	LABs + AIP	Feb 2007	Oct 2009	Mar 2011	MHI
19SS	8119 Kenryū	SS-504	¥53B FY2007	LABs + AIP	Mar 2008	Nov 2010	Mar 2012	KHI
20SS	8120 Zuiryū	SS-505	¥51B FY2008	LABs + AIP	Mar 2009	Oct 2011	Mar 2013	MHI
No 21SS			No 21SS built
22SS	8121 Kokuryū	SS-506	¥52.8B FY2010	LABs + AIP	Jan 2011	Oct 2013	Mar 2015	KHI
23SS	8122 Jinryu	SS-507	¥54.6B FY2011	LABs + AIP	Feb 2012	Oct 2014	7 Mar 2016	MHI
24SS	8123 Sekiryū	SS-508	¥54.7B FY2012	LABs + AIP	15 Mar 2013	2 Nov 2015	13 Mar 2017	KHI
25SS	8124 Seiryū	SS-509	¥53.1B FY2013	LABs + AIP	22 Oct 2013	12 Oct   2016	Mar? 2018	MHI
26SS	8125 Shoryu	SS-510	¥51.7B FY2014	LABs + AIP	2014	6 Nov 2017	Mar 2019?	KHI
27SS First Soryu Mk 2	8126	SS-511	¥64.4B FY2015	LIBs only	2015	2018?	Mar 2020	MHI
28SS  Second Soryu Mark 2	8127	SS-512	¥63.6B FY2016	LIBs only	2016?	2018?	Mar 2021?	KHI
29SS First Soryu Mk 3 (1) (3)	8128	?	¥76B FY2017	LIBs only	?	?	2023?	MHI?
30SS Second Soryu Mk 3 (2)	8029?	?	¥71.5B FY2018	LIBs only	?	?	2024?	KHI?

Table from information exclusively provided to Submarine Matters. LABs = lead-acid batteries, AIP = air independent propulsion, LIBs = lithium-ion batteries. ¥***B = Billion Yen. MHI = Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, KHI = Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation of Kawasaki Heavy Industries.

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Tanaka, Anonymous and Pete

Penske MTU 4000 competition to Kawasaki Diesel for Submarine - PART FOUR

January 25, 2018, 4:00 pm

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Against my preference for Kawasaki diesels (see PART THREE) sourced through Naval Group’s European partner, MAN, is MTU/Penske/ASC’s promotion of the MTU 4000 for Australia’s future submarine.

ASC’s Media Release of October 6, 2017 reported:

“Australia’s sovereign submarine company, ASC, and Penske Power Systems have announced their intention to enter into an agreement to put MTU engines through their paces at ASC’s engine test facilities in Adelaide as part of an ongoing research and development activity.”

On September 9, 2017 Penske was more specific, reporting:

“In a world first, Penske Power Systems will unveil the much anticipated MTU 12V4000U83 submarine engine at Pacific 2017 on [October 3, 2017].

This will be the global reveal of MTU’s next generation of submarine charging unit engines, suitable for projects such as the upgrade of the current Collins class and inclusion within the Australian future submarine.

With a well proven pedigree, the 12V4000U83 boasts greater power ([only] up to 1,500 kW) than its 16V396SE84 predecessor while being IMO Tier II compliant and compact.”

COMMENT

With only an output of 1.5MW 12V4000U83 diesels fall short of the 2MW required in a 8MW total, 4 diesel arrangement for the Australian Future Submarine. The option of further developed more powerful MTU diesels may deserve consideration - though this is risky.

An unhelpfully blurry MTU diesel chart, with the very narrow power range MTU 4000 for submarine 3rd from bottom. See chart a little larger and clearer here http://www.mtu-online.com/mtu/applications/marine-defense/?L=eyeusejkvzrfvkp .

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In a January 6, 2018 commentMHalblaub suggests MTU 4000 diesels for submarine more powerful with more cylinders than the current with MTU 4000 12V (2185mm Height x 1850mm Width x 2870mm Length (without gearbox).

Those larger maybe 2MW, more cylinder, MTU 4000s are:

-  16 V: 2185 x 1850 x 3510 or

-  20 V: 2240 x 1470 x 4040

But there may be risks of developing specially Australia Only (therefore potentially orphan) MTU diesels for submarine. The precedent of selecting untried Garden Island-Hedemora V18B14SUBs (with turbocharger) for the Collins submarines should be remembered. The most unique, orphan part of the Garden Island- Hedemora V18B14SUB was the turbocharger, the precursor to over reliance on Australian technical solutions and exorbitant maintenance rather than relying on a large industrial development base like Kawasaki, MAN or MTU 12V4000s.

Additional issues are unstealthy vibration from diesels causing excessive noise as n the Hedemora V18B14SUB [source?]. 

High power Kawasaki diesels already used on Japanese submarines may be a less risky and more efficient choice.

Pete