Submarine & Other Matters

French Special Forces-External Intelligence Directorate (DGSE) "Propulseur Sous-Marins 3rd Generation (PSM3G) for fitting on top of French Barracuda-Suffren Class SSNs and Australian Future Subs (SSKs). (Diagram and further background courtesy H. I. Sutton's Covert Shores).

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Noting much equipment on Australia's Future Submarine will be specifically compatible with France's Barracuda-Suffren class SSN DefenseNewsreports January 25, 2017, in part:

"PARIS ― The head of France’s special forces has presented a wish list to lawmakers that includes a modified NH90 helicopter and a mini-submarine to complement the Barracuda nuclear attack submarine."

"Mini-submarine

Naval special forces are “waiting impatiently for entry into service of the PSM3G in 2018,” he noted. That is a third-generation, propelled mini-submarine that would work in conjunction with the Barracuda submarine.

That mini-sub would work with the Mistral projection and command ship as an interim measure, he said. “The PSM3G is a rare and immediately available capability effective against the famous ‘area-denial’ threat — the special forces have to be able to get close to an enemy coast to call in a strike,” he said.

The mini-submarine is a relatively large unit, capable of being launched from the Barracuda while submerged, he explained. “They are undetected from departure to return from the mission; that is, to say, an intelligence-gathering mission without being seen, without a signature, without particular risk and with an impressive efficiency,” he said.

The particularly high-performing mini-submarine, according to Isnard, would be fully autonomous, run on battery power and have a navigation system.

...[also significant] The Suffren, the first-of-class Barracuda boat, [laid down 2007!] is due for delivery in 2019 - a year late."

Comments here by "PUNTER" and others, has prompted me to revisit the January 11. 2018 incursion of a (probably) Chinese Type 093 SSNinto the Japanese claimed “Senkaku” islands-sea area. The incursion appears to be a:

- Chinese politico-strategic demonstration that China also claims those islands-waters, and

- a reconnaissance-intelligence exercise to test the efficiency of Japanese and probably America

ASW fixed and mobile sensors.

The Chinese exercise would allow China to “trace” or “track” predictable responses by Japan’s intelligence agencies and politico-military chain of command the exercise could yield some decoded SIGINT benefits and undecoded traffic analysis analytical benefits.

The incursion by the 093 and a Chinese Type 054/054A Frigate was beneficial to Chinese electronic interception as it attracted Japanese MPAs and surface craft. If a Japanese submarine was also sent then Chinese tracking of it would be an even greater intelligence prize.

BACKGROUND

Two Type 093s, were built in the 2000s, and at least 2 or 3 more improved (could be called Type 093As) were commissioned in 2016. The Type 093A reputedly have vertical launch YJ-18 supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles and may be as stealthy as unimproved US Los Angeles class SSN-688s) and much quieter than China’s first and noisy Type 091 SSNs.

Side view of a Chinese Type 093. Note old fashioned (maybe 1990-2009 design) cruciform rudder, instead of modern x-plane rudder. See much larger.

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The January 11, 2018, Type 093 forced to surface or it surfaced to show the Chinese flag. Note that the cruciform rudder may indicate that the Type 093 might have only have been "old style""unimproved?" (Mark. 1(?)) build in the 2000s (Photo via Kyodo News).

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For security and deception China has variously called the Type 093 (or allowed it to be called) "unimproved [2000s build]""improved [2016 build], plain 093, 093A, 093B and 093G. "Shang" is a NATO reporting name. What the 5 Type 093s are called seems to rely more on what the non-Chinese observers decide to call it rather than usually secret Chinese designations.

FURTHER ON THE INTELLIGENCE MISSION

The Type 093 perhaps entered the Miyako-jima (island) part of the Senkakus:

- without an expectation of detection, or

- to see how close it could get to Japan’s seafloor SOSUS array or Japan's Integrated Undersea

Surveillance System (IUSS) which is SOSUS + many additional sensor platforms).

This method of gauging the sensitivity of Japanese and US sensors is very useful to China. Also ease or difficulty of detection would assist China in indicating how many additionalstealth improvements or efforts with existing stealth features are required.

If, it is an old Type 093 then China may wish to deceive Japan-US into conclusions that the submarine “could be too easy to detect”

I would conclude “there is not enough information to back up [the easy to detect] theory”.

Better to be a bit pessimistic in intelligence assessments than too optimistic.

Pete

From November 18, 2017 to December 1, 2018 Submarine Matters reported many aspects of the loss of the Argentine submarine ARA San Juan. San Juan remains lost without a trace, even though several countries continue to look for it.

On January 30, 2017 International Business Timesreported :

" The ARA San Juan was “’limited’ in its operational depth at 100 meters...because at greater depth [it] could not ‘guarantee its watertightness’, according to the document" [the document may be from the Comprehensive-Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty-Organization (CTBTO) or US Naval Intelligence (?)]

The new internal document may be able to shed light on what happened to the ARA San Juan. Officials still had not determined the cause of the submarine’s disappearance, though a report released in January by SaveTheRoyalNavy(dot)org said it was likely that all crew on board died from an explosion on the vessel.

An acoustic signal was detected the day the submarine disappeared that authorities said was consistent with the sound of an implosion of pressure inside the ship at a depth of 388 meters... The report stated the explosion was equivalent to 5,669 kilograms of TNT which would have destroyed the hull in 40 milliseconds." [this is according to a CTBTO and/or US Naval Intelligence report]

COMMENT

By setting a safe operating depth of 100 meters the Argentine naval authorities must have decided that San Juan had a severely weakened pressure hull. Only a 100 meter safe operating depth is surprisingly shallow. Even German Type XXI submarines built in 1943 had "Test" (ie. operating) depths of 240 meters (see sidebar). A weak pressure hull may be due to one or several factors including:

- age (San Juan was completed 35 years ago in 1983). A 25 to 30 year operating life for a well
maintained submarine is considered standard.
- age in conjunction with too many deep immersion cycles (repeated deep diving, then surfacing
gradually causes metal fatigue in the pressure hull over a number of years).
- the Argentine Navy is notorious for poor maintenance
- extensive and/or improper hull cutting for engine maintenance (cutting or welding pressure hulls
weakens them) and/or
- too much rust and saltwater corrosion of the pressure hull shell and of strengtheners.

In general the newer the submarine the stronger its steel alloy pressure hull and the deeper it can safely dive (see here and here). Titanium alloy permits much deeper diving (eg. Russian Alfa class submarines) but titanium is more expensive to process, weld, use in construction and repair.

Pete

Anonymous in Table A. has kindly submarized some characteristics of diesel engines in Japanese submarine classes since 1960. Anonymous concludes that the current 12V25/25S (of the Oyashio II and Soryu classes) represent a major improvement of power output.

PETE COMMENT

The estimated Mechanical output of 2827 kW (or 2.827 MW) for the 12V25/31S in the future 29SS (which can be called Soryu Mk. 3 see Table B.) represents an even larger improvement.

Note [1] (below) that these early diesels were built by KAWASAKI under licence from MAN, while [2] diesels since 1990 have been KAWASAKI's design and licence.

For Australia's Future Submarine a broader and continuing KAWASAKI-MAN relationship, may allow Naval Group access via MAN to the Soryu's high power 2.280 MW 12V25/25SB or the Soryu Mk.3's (estimated) 2.827 MW 12V25/31S.

KAWASAKI-MAN's relationship can be seen here: "Kawasaki’s manufacture of marine diesel engines began with a licensing agreement with Germany’s MAN in 1911. Following the merger of MAN and Denmark’s B&W in 1981, Kawasaki renewed the agreement and began producing Kawasaki-MAN B&W 2-stroke diesel engines. [By 2006 Kawasaki] delivered enough MAN B&W engines to output over 10 million horsepower."

Also in 2006"Completed the Kawasaki-MAN B&W 12K98ME, an electronically controlled marine diesel engine (93, 360 PS)."

Table A.List of Diesel Characteristics for Japanese submarine since 1960

Class (from Wiki)	First commiss-ioned	No. of vessels	Model [1] or [2]	No. of diesels	No. of cylinders	Bore mm	Stroke mm	Mechanical ouput kW	Electrical outpout kW [3]	Speed rpm
Oyashio I	1960	1	V8V22/30mAL [1]	2	16 or 8?	220	300	993	794	850
Oshio + Asashio	1965	5	V8V24/30mMAL [1]	2	16	240	300	993	794	850
Uzushio	1971	7	V8V24/30AMT [1]	2	16	240	300	1544	1235	850
Yushio	1980	10	V8V24/30AMT [1]	2	16	240	300	1544	1235	850
Harushio	1990	7	12V25/25S [2]	2	12	250	250	1985	1588	1200
Oyashio II	1998	11	12V25/25S [2]	2	12	250	250	1985	1588	1200
Soryu Mk.1	2009	11	12V25/25SB [2]	2	12	250	250	2280	1824	1200
29SS Soryu Mk.3?	2024?	-	12V25/31S [2] [4]	2	12	250	310	2827	2261	1200

[1] KAWASAKI (under the license of MAN) diesels: V8V22/30mAL, V8V24/30mMAL

and V8V24/30AMT

[2] Wholly KAWASAKI diesels: 12V25/25S, 12V25/25SB and 12V25/31S

[3] Electrical output = mechanical output x the 0.8 power factor

[4] Estimated values.

TABLE B. SORYU & Oyashio II Program as at February 1, 2018

SS No.	Build No Name	Pennant No.	MoF approved amount ¥ Billions FY	LABs, LIBs, AIP	Laid Down	Laun -ched	Commi ssioned	Built By
5SS Oyashio	8105 Oyashio	SS-590/ TS3608	¥52.2B FY1993	LABs only	Jan 1994	Oct 1996	Mar 1998	KHI
6SS-15SS Oyashios 10 subs	8106 -8115 various	SS-591-600	¥52.2B per sub FY1994-FY2003	LABs only	15SS Feb 2004	15SS Nov 2006	15SS Mar 2008	MHI & KHI
16SS Soryu Mk 1	8116 Sōryū	SS-501	¥60B FY2004	LABs + AIP	Mar 2005	Dec 2007	Mar 2009	MHI
17SS	8117 Unryū	SS-502	¥58.7B FY2005	LABs + AIP	Mar 2006	Oct 2008	Mar 2010	KHI
18SS	8118 Hakuryū	SS-503	¥56.2 FY2006	LABs + AIP	Feb 2007	Oct 2009	Mar 2011	MHI
19SS	8119 Kenryū	SS-504	¥53B FY2007	LABs + AIP	Mar 2008	Nov 2010	Mar 2012	KHI
20SS	8120 Zuiryū	SS-505	¥51B FY2008	LABs + AIP	Mar 2009	Oct 2011	Mar 2013	MHI
No 21SS			No 21SS built
22SS	8121 Kokuryū	SS-506	¥52.8B FY2010	LABs + AIP	Jan 2011	Oct 2013	Mar 2015	KHI
23SS	8122 Jinryu	SS-507	¥54.6B FY2011	LABs + AIP	Feb 2012	Oct 2014	7 Mar 2016	MHI
24SS	8123 Sekiryū	SS-508	¥54.7B FY2012	LABs + AIP	15 Mar 2013	2 Nov 2015	13 Mar 2017	KHI
25SS	8124 Seiryū	SS-509	¥53.1B FY2013	LABs + AIP	22 Oct 2013	12 Oct 2016	Mar? 2018	MHI
26SS	8125 Shoryu	SS-510	¥51.7B FY2014	LABs + AIP	2014	6 Nov 2017	Mar 2019?	KHI
27SS First Soryu Mk 2	8126	SS-511	¥64.4B FY2015	LIBs only	2015	2018?	Mar 2020	MHI
28SS Second Soryu Mark 2	8127	SS-512	¥63.6B FY2016	LIBs only	2016?	2018?	Mar 2021?	KHI
29SS First Soryu Mk 3 (1) (3)	8128	?	¥76B FY2017	LIBs only	?	?	2023?	MHI?
30SS Second Soryu Mk 3 (2)	8029?	?	¥71.5B FY2018	LIBs only	?	?	2024?	KHI?

Table from information exclusively provided to Submarine Matters. LABs = lead-acid batteries, AIP = air independent propulsion, LIBs = lithium-ion batteries. ¥***B = Billion Yen. MHI = Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, KHI = Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation of Kawasaki Heavy Industries.

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Anonymous and Pete

Anonymous has revised Table A, originally published as Submarine Mattersarticle of February 1, 2018. The revised (now the correct) data is in Yellow with data sources [5] and [6] by experts. ( ) is based on [5], other data are based on [6].

Revised Table A (ver 3)

Class	First completion year	No. of vessels	Model [1] or [2]	No. of diesels	No. of cylinders	Bore mm	Stroke mm	Mechanical ouput kW	Electrical outpout kW [3]	Speed rpm
Oyasho	1960	1	V8V22/30mAL [1]	2	16	220	300	993 (993)	794 (794)	850
Oshio	1964	5	V8V24/30mMAL [1]	2	16	240	300	993 (1066)	794 (853)	850
Uzushio	1970	7	V8V24/30AMT [1]	2	16	240	300	1544 (1287)	1235 (1030)	850
Yushio	1970	10	V8V24/30AMT [1]	2	16	240	300	1544 (1545)	1235 (1236)	850
Harushio	1990	7	12V25/25S [2]	2	12	250	250	1985 (2280)	1588 (1824)	1200
Oyashio	1998	11	12V25/25S [2]	2	12	250	250	1985 (2500)	1588 (2000)	1200
Soryu MK I & II [7]	2009	11	12V25/25SB [2]	2	12	250	250	(2500)	(2000)	1200
29SS	-	-	12V25/31S [2] [4]	2	12	250	310	3100	2500	1200

[1] KAWASAKI (under the license of MAN): V8V22/30mAL, V8V24/30mMAL, V8V24/30AMT

[2]KAWASAKI: 12V25/25S, 12V25/25SB, 12V25/31S

[3]Electrical output = mechanical output x 0.8

[4] Estimated values:

[5] “Historical Development of Four Stroke Diesel Engine” byKazuya Sato, Center of the History of Japanese Industrial Technology, National Museum of Nature and Science.

This is comprehensive review and is reviewed by representative diesel manufacturers in Japan (KHI, MHI, MAN-Japan, JFE, Mitsui, etc) reviewed this article. [Pete comment the Japanese version is at http://sts.kahaku.go.jp/diversity/document/system/pdf/044.pdf [PDF, about 15MB] with an Abstract in English. It has a "Table 3.4.14 Main subject of submarine" covering the years 1960-1997 on page 35. As the document is dated March 2008 it predated public details of the Soryu-class.]

[6]“History of Japanese submarine after WWII” by Rear Admiral and ex-commander, Dr. Yoichi Hirama republished on Submarine Matters with edits as Updated History and Photos of Japanese Submarines After WWII of January 17, 2015.

[7] Based on those of 12V25/25S for Oyashio [6].

The relationship between KHI and MAN Diesel & Turbo is very healthy.

Anonymous located the following KHI Media Release “100th anniversary of technology partnership on diesel engines with MAN” dated October 24, 2011 (originally in Japanese,) published at http://www.khi.co.jp/machinery/news/detail/111024.html and further translated by Pete:

Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI) commemorates the 100th anniversary of 1911, the year it entered into technical cooperation relationship with Germany's M.A.N. company (currently, MAN Diesel & Turbo) concerning diesel engines. This is the longest historical relationship among companies currently licensed with MAN Diesel & Turbo.

In 1911, when the first contract was signed, the steam engine was still in use for the propulsion of merchant ships and the diesel engine had not been introduced. KHI’s first president, Kojiro Matsukata [bio takes 30 seconds to download], signed a technical agreement with M.A.N. regarding diesels submarine use. Though the relationship was temporarily interrupted by the two world wars, we have revived the relationship each time and it continues up until the present day.

At the beginning of the contract, we intended the diesel engine for submarine use, but then extended the use to main propulsion engines for merchant ships, auxiliary power generation agencies, onshore power generation agencies, and power engines for diesel locomotives, etc.

Since 1980, we also manufacture turbochargers under the license of MAN. We provide various products of MAN Diesel & Turbo including 2 stroke diesels, 4 stroke diesels and turbo chargers.

KHI will continue to manufacture reliable, highly efficient and environmentally friendly diesel engines and turbochargers assisted by the strong relationship with MAN Diesel & Turbo.

Anonymous and Pete

Australia's Department of Defence appears to have taken note of Submarine Matters' article titled "Australian Submarine Expert, Senator Patrick, Forgets US Admiral Johnson" of 17 January 2018 at http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2018/01/australian-submarine-expert-senator.html

where Submarine Matters says in part:

"Perhaps the closest thing to THE [Australian Future Submarine] Program Manager is US Navy Rear Admiral (retired) Stephen E. Johnson... . He is General Manager Submarines in the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group, Australian Department of Defence. Johnson worked for 3 years in the management team of US Virginia class submarine program (from 1992-1995) and 6 years on the Seawolf class submarine program (1998-2003). See Johnson’s longer bio here ."

This is indicated 5 days later in Australia's Department of Defence statement https://news.defence.gov.au/media/on-the-record/future-submarine-program-statement of 22 January 2018, which says, in part:

"The team assembled to manage the Future Submarine Project is led by Mr Stephen Johnson, General Manager Submarines, who is a highly accomplished program manager.

Mr Johnson served as the Director of the Strategic Systems Program and had a major role in the design of the United States Virginia Class, as well as serving as Program Manager for the Seawolf Class. These are the most complex and advanced submarines available.

Mr Johnson’s biography can be found on the Defence website at this link: http://www.defence.gov.au/casg/multimedia/stephen_e._johnson_bio_accessible-9-7221.pdf ."

Submarine Matters feels privileged to help Australia's defence in small ways like this.

Regards

Pete

Weapons’ exports are a key means for an exporter to influence a recipient. Large sums involved and commercial and national security secrecy of major weapons exports may increase the chances of corruption of the recipient’s officials, politicians and military officers.

The Table below starts with Chinese exports to Thailand. Chinese exports to other countries in the Indo-Pacific will follow.

China has designed and exported major weapons systems to Thailand as early as the 1980s, long before the submarine sale. Major items for the Royal Thai Armyinclude the latest VT-4 Main Battle Tanks. Chinese frigates, OPVs and a replenishment ship have been exported to the Royal Thai Navy since 1993.

Chinese Designed and Built Weapon Systems for Thailand

From China	Exported more than 20 years ago	Less than 20 year old, new or future
to Thailand	450 x Armoured Personnel Carriers Type 85 from 1987 2 x Frigates Type 025T Naresuan class from 1993-4 4 x Frigates Type 053HT Chao Phraya class early 1990s with C-802/CSS-N-8 ASMs HTMS SimilanType 908 replenishment ship 1996-	100+ Main Battle Tanks Type 30 was 69-ll built 1987-2004, retired 3 x OPVs Hua Hin class built 2002-4, in use 2 x OPVs Pattani class from 2004 49 to 150 Main Battle Tanks VT-4 from 2017- 34 x Infantry fighting vehicle VN-1 from 2020- based on China’s ZBL-08 3 x Submarines Type S26T from 2021-

Pete

Takakazu Kinashi was born in 1902 on the home island of Kyushu, Japan. He decided when young on a naval career. In 1920 he graduated from the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy 255th in a class of 255 cadets. Given this “distinction” its amazing he wasn’t kicked out of the Navy instantly. Kinashi must have redeemed himself in his later service on cruisers, destroyers and submarines to the extent he was given command of the large submarine I-19 (photo below) in 1942.

During the Guadalcanal campaign Kinashi found himself the right commander at the right time. On September 15, 1942, he sighted and attacked the American carrier USS Wasp, which was part of a task force transporting the 7th Marine Regiment and stores to Guadalcanal. Kinashi penetrated Wasp's destroyer screen, and after moving as close as 500 meters to Wasp, he launched a full salvo of six torpedoes. Three torpedoes struck Wasp, starting uncontrollable fires which soon forced abandon ship.

The remaining three torpedoes continued for another twelve miles into a separate task force, striking the newbuild, fast battleship USS North Carolina and destroyer USS O'Brien. O'Brien sank several weeks later and North Carolina was so severely damaged that it was out of commission for several months for repairs. Kinashi was promoted to commander less than two months later, and honored with a personal interview with Emperor Hirohito.

Takakazu Kinashi managed to sink the US carrier Wasp when he commanded Japanese submarine

I-19 (above). I-19 was a large SSK then and now, displacing 2,584 tons (surfaced) and 3,654 tons (submerged). But like most WWII submarines it was an old style (pre Type XXI) submarine with limited battery capacity and no snorkel. It was thus designed to spend more time on the surface (with a speed of 23.5 knots) than submerged (speed 8 knots). It only carried 17 torpedoes partly due to I-19 being burdened with modifications for its Yokosuka E14Y reconnaisance floatplane. Requiring carriage of one or more floatplanes was a poor strategic concept forcing too many WWII Japanese submarines to be inefficiently large.

wispywood2344's diagram of a Soryu class submarine. To accommodate more powerful motor(s) changes like a longer section 12 (at the back) would be required. See larger, more readable, image of the diagram at http://blog.livedoor.jp/wispywood2344/others/Soryu_cutaway.svg.

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Submarine Matters has lately concentrated on diesels for Australia Future Submarine but motors are equally important in submarine generator sets (gensets).

Anonymous has kindly made comments of January 19, 2018 on submarine motors. The comments have been further translated by Pete.

Japan’s proposed submarine design “SEA-J” for the Australian Future Submarine (SEA 1000) competition was to be 92m long. Naval Group of France won the competition in April 2016, but it is still relevant how Japan would have handled the more powerful propulsion solutions for a large Australian submarine. Relevant because Naval Group will need to resolve similar propulsion issues.

SEA-J is 8m longer than Japan's already built Soryu submarine’s 84m. In the cutaway diagram above the main motor section (12) was lengthened by 2m to improve the performance of the main motor. As SEA-J would have been required to transit long distance (perhaps 3,000 km each way) and at high speed, the durability and reliability of the main motor is all the more essential. The motor’s durability could be improved by measures such as adopting a tandem connection of two main motors. This results in longer length.

Neodymium magnets (which experience thermal and electrical environmental degradation) and bearings (which experience wear) are used in a submarine’s Permanent Magnet Synchronous Motor (PMSM). A PMSM uses permanent magnets embedded in a steel rotor to create a constant magnetic field. The stator carries windings connected to an AC supply to produce a rotating magnetic field. To prevent damage, the magnets, made out of Neodymiumare kept cool. This is achieved by limiting the rotation speed/load and limiting bearing temperature.

Japan's current Soryu Mk.I (with LABs and AIP) is equipped with one SMC-8 main motor. This is the first time the Soryu’s motor has been named in English to Pete’s knowledge.) The SMC-8 main motor consists of two rotors and two bearings. The SMC-8 main motor’s maximum output is 6 MW. If two small main motors (eg. 4 MW each or total?),each consisting of a single and smaller rotor and two bearings, are connected in tandem, the load on each bearing would be significantly reduced, improving the durability of motors.

Regarding motor components, of interest is the RENK Company of Hanover, Germany's “Propulsion Motor Bearings and Thrust Bearings for Naval Application (Submarines)” document (PDF 2MB). In it:

- A stern side picture of a PMSM motor is shown at Fig. 3, on page2.

- Most western submarine builders including Naval Group, TKMS and Navantia (S-80s) use RENK

products. See page 4 which indicates “Over the last 50 years RENK slide bearings [have]

equipped...more than 160 submarines.”

By Anonymous and Pete

The following is part of a Chinese Global Times article of February 6, 2018 by "Beijing-based naval expert" Li Jie at http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1088479.shtml :

“...[India's first indigenous nuclear submarine] INS Arihant passed all trials in February 2016 and was commissioned into service in August [2016], making India the sixth country in the world to put a nuclear-armed submarine into operation. That was considered a milestone in the history of Indian Navy's development.

However, it was recently disclosed that the vessel had suffered a mishap after less than two years and not sailed for more than 10 months.

According to the Hindu, INS Arihant's propulsion compartment was damaged after water rushed in when a hatch on the rear side was left open by mistake. Since the accident, the submarine has been undergoing repairs and clean-up. Besides other repair work, many pipes had to be cut open and replaced. "Cleaning-up" of a nuclear submarine is a laborious task that requires a lot of effort, money and time.

The Indian submarine was built at a cost of $2.9 billion. Why did such a silly human error occur so as to damage it? The direct causes seem to be inadequate management, indiscipline and slackness among officers and soldiers of the Indian Navy.

...India has long dreamed of becoming a military power. It hopes to acquire more core defense technologies as soon as possible. However, most of India's weapons are purchased from major military powers including Russia, France, the UK and the US. The sources of India's weaponry and equipment are complicated.

Norms and technical standards that various countries follow to make weapons are different. Coupled with the fact that India is also developing indigenous weapons, it's fair to say that the country's arsenal is a hodgepodge.

...Improvement in military technology does not come about overnight. It is a long process that is not solely a military issue, but also related to a country's comprehensive strength, level of technology, manufacturing capability and quality of personnel. But the Indian military has been over-anxious for quick results in recent years and has paid too much attention to dealing with China. This will inevitably lead to adverse consequences."

SEE WHILE GLOBAL TIMES ARTICLE.

(Illustration by Liu Rui/GT in Chinese Global Times article, February 6, 2018 at http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1088479.shtml)

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COMMENT

All submarine services have accidents, some tragically fatal. China would do well to remember the fate of Chinese Navy’s (PLA-N's) Type 035 Ming submarine No. 361:

In 2003, “all 70 crew members [of 361] died when the submarine's diesel engine used up all the oxygen (because it failed to shut down properly) while the boat was submerged on April 16, 2003. The submarine, which was [extraordinarily] commanded by [a] Commodore Cheng Fuming (程福明), had been taking part in naval exercises east of Inner Changshan Islands in the Bohai Sea of Northeastern China. Along with its normal complement, the crew also included 13 trainee cadets from the Chinese naval academy.^[3]

After the disaster, the crippled submarine drifted for ten days because it was on a silent, no-contact exercises. The boat was discovered by Chinese fishermen who noticed its periscope sticking above the surface on April 25, 2003.”

See a less critical Submarine Mattersarticle of January 15, 2018 on INS Arihant's accident.

Submarine Propulsion in 7 lines. Air through snorkel is sucked into the Diesel Engine. Combustion from [spark and?] compressed diesel fuel produces the Diesel's mechanical power - Which then drives the Generator (which changes mechanical energy into electrical energy). The electricity and drives the Electric Motor which charges the Batteries. Diesels/Generator/Electric Motor/Magnets or Reduction Gearing to rotate propeller to produce (about) 8-12 knot snorting speed. OR Batteries/Electric Motor/Magnets or Reduction Gearing producing the silent running speed of (about) up to 6 knots. [further explanation or necessary changes to above description?] .
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Following Submarine Matters Possible Motor Modifications for Australia's Future Submarine, February 9, 2018 Anonymous kindly commentedon February 5, 2018 (with a bit of further translation by Pete):

The Soryu Mk 2 (at 27SS in the Table below) importantly will have:

(A) a modified propulsion motor (designated “SMC-8B”) [1]

(B) accompanied by Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs). LIBs provide various benefits such as a low

indiscretion ratio (IR) [a lower the ratio of time spent at periscope depth snorting to time completely submerged

(D) 12V25/25SB diesels used in the current Soryu Mk 1 [but uprated? ie. more powerful? for
the] Soryu Mk 2 prior to use of 12V25/31S in Soryu Mk 3.

The newly modified propulsion motor (designated “SMC-8B”) will benefit from the more powerful diesel and the more electrically powerful LIBs quick charging of LIBs in order to achieve flexibility of operation and high speed performance submerged. In Soryu Mk 1, low speed performance is emphasized because of low effective capacity of LABs.

In the Soryu Mk 2, higher speed performance will be emphasized, because of drastically improved LIB and motor capacity. This allows high speed submergence for a much longer period.

In other words, the main objective of the SMC-8B is [being able to maintain maximum silent speed of up to 6 knots (?) for a longer period]. Key factors will be optimized to reduce vibration/noise, in Anonymous's opinion. As result, maximum speed from point to point somewhat changes as shown in [2] and [3]. As even a tiny improvement of maximum speed for only 5 minutes needs higher power, Anonymous does not think such a tiny improvement has meaning in actual operation.

[1] Budget of Japanese Ministry of Defense (MoD)

Soryu Mk 1s have propulsion motor SMC-8 and Mk 2s have SMC-8B (where the B means first revision) see Table below. The degree of revision can be measured by the first year cost which is cost for new equipment and so on in the first year. In SMC-8B, the first year cost was budgeted suggesting that SMC-8B experienced huge modifications or SMC-8B is actually a new model. So overall the last Soryu Mk 1 (26SS with SMC-8) costs ¥51.7B FY2014 (see Table below) the cost for the first Soryu Mk 2 (27SS) jumps to ¥64.4B FY2015 of which the development and unit costs of the first SMC-8B are a part.

[2] “FY2014 Annual Report on Life Cycle Cost Management”, Equipment

Procurement and Construction Office, Ministry of Defense (MoD), page 78, Tabale 2. The maximum submerged speed of 26SS (Soryu Mk 1 with Lead-acid Batteries (LABs) + AIP) and 27SS (Soryu Mk 2 with LIBs) are both 20 knots.

[3] Using English wikipedia websites - LIBs have a greater average charge and discharge efficiency 80%-90% (see LIB sidebar) compared to LABs with a lower average in the 50%-95% (see LAB sidebar). A Soryu Mk 2 submarine using LIBs, like a Soryu Mk 1 submarine using LABs both will not exceed 20 knots. However while a Soryu Mk 1 can only maintain 20 knots [for around 1 hour?] a Soryu Mk 2 can maintain 20 knots for longer [around 3 hours?]. This means higher speed for a Soryu Mk 2 between two points.

TABLE SORYU & Oyashio Program as at February 13, 2018

SS No. Diesel Type Motor	Build No Name	Pennant No.	MoF approved amount ¥ Billions FY	LABs, LIBs, AIP	Laid Down	Laun -ched	Commi ssioned	Built By
5SS Oyashio 2 Toshiba motors	8105 Oyashio	SS-590/ TS3608	¥52.2B FY1993	LABs only	Jan 1994	Oct 1996	Mar 1998	KHI
6SS-15SS Oyashios 10 subs 2 Toshiba motors SMC-7?	8106 -8115 various	SS-591-600	¥52.2B per sub FY1994-FY2003	LABs only	15SS Feb 2004	15SS Nov 2006	15SS Mar 2008	MHI & KHI
16SS Soryu Mk 1 12V25/25SB SMC-8	8116 Sōryū	SS-501	¥60B FY2004	LABs + AIP	Mar 2005	Dec 2007	Mar 2009	MHI
17SS	8117 Unryū	SS-502	¥58.7B FY2005	LABs + AIP	Mar 2006	Oct 2008	Mar 2010	KHI
18SS	8118 Hakuryū	SS-503	¥56.2 FY2006	LABs + AIP	Feb 2007	Oct 2009	Mar 2011	MHI
19SS	8119 Kenryū	SS-504	¥53B FY2007	LABs + AIP	Mar 2008	Nov 2010	Mar 2012	KHI
20SS	8120 Zuiryū	SS-505	¥51B FY2008	LABs + AIP	Mar 2009	Oct 2011	Mar 2013	MHI
No 21SS			No 21SS built
22SS	8121 Kokuryū	SS-506	¥52.8B FY2010	LABs + AIP	Jan 2011	Oct 2013	Mar 2015	KHI
23SS	8122 Jinryu	SS-507	¥54.6B FY2011	LABs + AIP	Feb 2012	Oct 2014	7 Mar 2016	MHI
24SS	8123 Sekiryū	SS-508	¥54.7B FY2012	LABs + AIP	15 Mar 2013	2 Nov 2015	13 Mar 2017	KHI
25SS	8124 Seiryū	SS-509	¥53.1B FY2013	LABs + AIP	22 Oct 2013	12 Oct 2016	Mar? 2018	MHI
26SS end of SMC-8s	8125 Shoryu	SS-510	¥51.7B FY2014	LABs + AIP	2014	6 Nov 2017	Mar 2019?	KHI
27SS First Soryu Mk 2 12V25/25SB first SMC-8B	8126	SS-511	¥64.4B FY2015	LIBs only	2015	2018?	Mar 2020	MHI
28SS Second Soryu Mark 2 12V25/25SB SMC-8B	8127	SS-512	¥63.6B FY2016	LIBs only	2016?	2018?	Mar 2021?	KHI
29SS First Soryu Mk 3 12V25/31S SMC-??	8128	?	¥76B FY2017	LIBs only	?	?	2023?	MHI?
30SS Second Soryu Mk 3	8029?	?	¥71.5B FY2018	LIBs only	?	?	2024?	KHI?

---

Anonymous and Pete

In terms of conventional subs (SSKs) Russia has only been able to build and sell Kilo submarines (Project 877) since 1980 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kilo-class_submarine#Project_877_units

and Improved Kilo subs (Project 636) since 1996 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kilo-class_submarine#Project_636_units

In 2012 Russia also 10 year leased one Akula II SSN (known as INS Chakra) to India https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_submarine_Nerpa_(K-152)

Due to a limited submarine defense budget Russia has spent more on nuclear submarine development and production (new Yasen "Multipurpose", Borey/Borei SSBNs and updated Akula SSNs, Delta SSBNs and Oscar SSGNs) with insufficient money to develop AIP for conventional diesel-electric subs.

Thus Russia has been unable to develop and market AIP submarines which it hoped to sell under marketing names of Project Amur https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amur-class_submarine and Kalina https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_Kalina

This is a good summary https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Future_of_the_Russian_Navy#Submarines

What Russia has announced as Project Haski or Husky may only produce new nuclear multipurpose and SSBNs in the 2040s or later.

Pete

The following is a translation from French, drawing from a long excellent article by "Khan" of January 12, 2018, titled "Russian Shipbuilding [Statistics] 2017". That article is contained in the French language, but mainly Russian website, The portal of the naval forces of the Russian Federation.

The end of 2017 reveals information on the financial and industrial priorities of [shipbuilding in Russia]. This provides context to some long delays in delivery of some surface vessels and submarines...The nature of the platforms is changing, with a trend toward combat units of lower tonnage [eg. more corvettes] but still with a high weapons load (eg. Kalibr missiles). So, what do we have to remember about shipbuilding for the Russian fleet in 2017?

... Submarines

No submarines were commissioned in 2017. However 3 subs were launched in 2017 (see TABLE below):

- the second Project 0885.1 Yasen SSGN (K-561Kazan) was launched by Sevmash shipbuilding at

Severodvinsk (which is by the White Sea, north of St. Petersburg).

- the seventh Yasen (Ulyanovsk) was put "on hold".
- 6 Project 636.3 Kilo class SSKs for the Pacific Fleet were commenced at the Admiralty shipyard,

St. Petersburg. This was starting with 2 Kilos (B-603Volkhov and B-274

Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsk).

TABLE of Submarines Commissioned or Launched 2013 to 2017.

2013
Commissioned	2
Launched	1
2014
Commissioned	4
Launched	7
2015
Commissioned	2
Launched	3
2016
Commissioned	2
Launched	2
2017
Commissioned	0
Launched	3

See the WHOLE ORIGINAL ARTICLE in French HERE (right-click mouse to translate into your own language).

Separately soumarsovadvises regarding the Project 885 Yasen SSGNclass:

- one (the first, named Severodvinsk K-560 ) is active in the Northern Fleet. She has been in

experimental service for years and only in March 2016 was she fully combat ready.

- the follow-on Yasens are designated 885M or “Yasen-M”.

- Six Yasen-Ms only are under construction at Sevmash:

: the first one, Kazan, was launched in March 2017 and is expected to be commissioned at the end

of 2018.

: the last one, Ulyanovsk, is due to be commissioned 2023 at the earliest.

More on Russian SSKs, SSGNs, SSNs and SSBNs from soumarsov next week.

Pete

The following draws on a French language article of January 24, 2018 titled "Mysterious disappearances of two Russian engineers" on "Khan's" mainly Russian website, The portal of the naval forces of the Russian Federation.

Engineer A

Over the last 4 weeks, two Russian shipbuilding engineers have been reported missing. Life working in trusted positions of the Russian military-industrial complex can be grim.

Engineer A, aged 38, formally employed by the Yantar shipyard at Kaliningrad (see map below) was officially reported missing on January 11, 2018. Kaliningrad is a high security Russian Baltic Fleet Base area. There the Yantar shipyard builds, amongst other things, Project 11356M frigates, which are equipped with Kalibr cruise missiles.

The Russian Federal Security Bureau (FSB) had become suspicious of Engineer A's activities in nearby Vilnius, Lithuania (a NATO country) in July 2017. Engineer A had then, in agreement with Yantar, stopped working for Yantar in August 2017. On January 11, 2018 the FSB issued a "search" warrant for Engineer A. It is unclear whether the FSB eventually arrested Engineer A.

Engineer B

Engineer A's disappearance raised suspicions of a pattern occuring with the later disappearance of Engineer B. Engineer B was a "first class" engineer [1] of the Malakhit Design Bureau [2] (St. Petersburg) on January 24, 2018. Engineer B lived alone in the suburbs of St. Petersburg.

Tragically, on January 25, 2018, it was reported (Russian article) that Engineer B was found hanging in his St. Petersburg apartment.

[1] By implication Engineer B held a senior position with access to nuclear submarine Top Secrets.
This may have included nuclear submarine design information collected by espionage from all
other nuclear submarine building nations (as well as the German 212's smoothly faired
demagnetised hull).

[2] The Malakhit Bureau along with Rubin Design Bureau are the two leading Russian engineering
firms that specialize in the development of nuclear submarines. The Malakhit Bureau designed
Russia's latest SSGN, the Project 885 Yasen> The Yasen is probably of high interest to Western
countries and certainly its stealth and SSGN VLS features are of interest to China.

COMMENT

Not all is known about the reasons for Engineer B's suspected suicide. If it was work related, high security work can be highly isolating and alienating. In Russia security pressures are not improved by the low pay Russian engineers recieve for highly sensitive defense work. Russia's dark, very cold, northern Winter also doesn't help.

Engineer A was based at the highly militarized Kaliningrad, "exclave" in orange on the Baltic, problematically surrounded by NATO countries, separating it from the main Russian landmass. Kaliningrad functions as the headquarters of Russia's Baltic Fleet, ringed by Chernyakhovsk (air base), Donskoye (air base) and Kaliningrad Chkalovsk (naval air base). Engineer B lived and worked in St. Petersburg, also marked on map. (Map courtesy of Geography in the News via National Geographic)

---

Pete

https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-and-military-balance

versus US$24 trillion for the US in 2030

It seems China and India are jockeying for economic and political position in the strategically important Maldives islands. The Maldives is a Muslim nation of around 430,000 people sitting in the Arabian Sea but just to the south of regional power India (map above). The Maldives is suffering a leadership and judicial crisis which began this month. Some in the Maldives are seeking Indian military peace-keeping while others are mindful that the Maldives is heavily financial indebted to China. Also China is the largest source of blameless tourist traffic to the Maldives.

Over the last week many of the Western press believe or disbelieve that China despatched a mixed fleet of around 10 ships (including destroyers, frigates, supply and a landing ship) to put some gunboat diplomacy pressure on the Maldives and India.

A Western website reported that Chinese News outlets appeared to concoct the story "Last week, the state-aligned paper Global Times warned that “If India one-sidedly sends troops to the Maldives, China will take action to stop New Delhi." Sina.com.cn reported [on February 17, 2018] that there are presently 11 PLA(N) surface warships in the Indian Ocean".

The Indian Press has covered the Maldives Crisis more closely, soberly, with miniscule sabre-rattling.

On February 22, 2018, Prabhash K Dutta reported from New Delhi along the lines:

In January 2018 before the Maldives crisis started the Chinese Navy began an exercise in the South China Sea..."The Chinese naval fleet proceeded towards South Pacific Ocean and touched Australian waters before turning back. Reports suggest that on their backward journey, the Chinese naval fleet had to pass through the Indian Ocean for some distance....no Chinese warship were deployed close to the Maldives....A Chinese destroyer and a frigate had crossed into the Eastern Indian Ocean through the Sunda Strait and exited the Indian Ocean through the Lombok Strait

[the straits are on each side of the most important Indonesian island of Java with Jakarta the capital. See map below]

while heading towards the South China Sea. The two sea passages are located on the margins of Indian Ocean near Indonesia, and some 2,500 nautical miles or over 4,600 kilometres from Maldives."

COMMENT

So the sailors of China are, as always, chock full of innocence and international goodwill despite what Chinese news-sites concoct. Confused?

It is but a slur that"The cost of Chinese [financial assistance to the Maldives] may prove to be steep. Like Sri Lanka and Pakistan, the Maldives is deeply indebted to China, and it may eventually come under pressure from Beijing to give up large assets - like land or port facilities - in return for debt forgiveness."

The Chinese destroyer and a frigate following the dotted line crossing into the Eastern Indian Ocean through the Sunda Strait then east exiting the Indian Ocean through the Lombok Strait. These straits are on each side of the most important Indonesian island of Java with Jakarta the capital. The Chinese were safely some 2,500 nautical miles or over 4,600 kms from the Maldives.

---

Any Chinese submarine movements near the Maldives remain unknown!

Pete

China's problems are evident from comments made of late February 2018 to Submarine Mattershere and here. I'm attempting a summary with the following points:

China is struggling to achieve economic growth reliant on domestic consumption, Instead it is being fueled by unsustainable lending. Such lending is based on infrastructure investments (even though the average returns on those investments are nil). All this, and the following, will delay the time that China’s GDP will surpass the US GDP.

China produces far less oil and gas than its main competitors the US and Russia. China therefore has to import oil and gas more expensively and inefficiently than the US and Russia. China's coal is highly polluting.

China has many current and future labour problems: The price of Chinese labour is no longer cheap since 1990. There is a coming demographic inversion with too many people by 2030 over 60yo, causing huge spike in health care costs, supported by too few offspring under 60 working.

China's overly large population (one dot represents 100,000 people). (Source Thorium)

---

China has insufficient clean water (especially in northern China) too little arable/farm land, too high a concentration of cities (too many people), too many factories and power stations. All this is leading to dangerously unhealthy air, water and food pollution for the population.

Solutions? Spreading population?:

North? China has difficulty expanding north over the border to Russia due to Russia’s military superiority. Russian conventional or nuclear armed 9K720 Iskander short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) are aimed at China. Also China has cooperative trade with Russia in energy and many weapons sectors (including conventional submarines and high performance jet fighters).

East? Expansion East into South Korea and Japan is complicated by their own military and US nuclear and conventional forces. North Korea now has a preventative nuclear deterrence.

West? into Kazakhstan (protected by Russia). India and Pakistan have preventative nuclear deterrents

South? Bangladesh is already overcrowded and serves as a source of cheap labour.
More possibilities expanding south into poorly defended Southeast Asia including:

Thailand (noting many Chinese in frontier cities),

Cambodia (to build that mega deep water port).
Laos
Philippines
Indonesia

South into Australia? Australia also has limited water.
- A long way to control from China.
- A Chinese company has already leased the strategic Port of Darwin for 99 years.
- After India China is the largest source of immigrants to Australia.

Does China have any viable solutions to its problems?

Pete

The Russian Navy suffers a high number of major nuclear submarine fires compared to other nuclear navies. See the April 2015 fire of Oscar class SSGN Orel. Fire was also a part of the August 2000 Oscar class submarine Kursk disaster.

Kyle Mizokami for Popular Mechanics on February 28, 2018 reported an earlier even more dangerous, December 2011, fire that involved Russian Delta class SSBN "Ekaterinburg" still carrying highly flammable torpedoes (with propellant), SLBM rocket fuel, nuclear warheads and of course its two VM4-SG nuclear reactors.

Following is a portion of Kyle's article https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a18757426/in-2011-a-russian-submarine-fire-nearly-cause-a-nuclear-disaster/

"Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Rogozin has admitted that a December 2011 incident involving a nuclear missile submarine almost became one of the worst nuclear weapons disasters ever recorded.

The Ekaterinburg, a ballistic missile submarine, caught fire in drydock, threatening its load of liquid-fueled nuclear missiles. If the missiles had caught fire, then the resulting explosions would have spewed radioactivity over a wide area, threatening a nearby town of 300,000 people.

The nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine K-84, also known as Ekaterinburg, had made a quick stop in drydock before heading out on a missile patrol. The ship was surrounded by wooden scaffolding for a welding job on the bow when a fire broke out. The fire quickly spread to the submarine’s rubber anechoic coating, which is designed to lower the sub’s acoustic signature underwater. The fire burned for nearly a day as firefighters struggled to contain the blaze..."

See WHOLE POPULAR MECHANICS ARTICLE

Also see. Ekaterinburg, commissioned in 1985, is still in active service.

Pete

Anonymous has kindly provided a review, Table A (ver 4), of the earlier Table A (ver 3) (provided February 5, 2018 at Submarine Matters)).

At Table A (ver 4) (below) Anonymous introduces the primary sources of information on modern Japanese submarines [6]. Anonymous has revised the mechanical and electrical output figures, based on [6]. The importance of electrical ouput when snorting/snorkeling is briefly discussed and rough estimates are added using foregin data.

[Pete Comment: The whole Table and Footnotes appear to constitute a uniquely comprehensive source of information, unavailable elsewhere on the English language Internet. Below there is a small amount of further translation into English by Pete.]

The Revised Figures are expressed in blue color.

Table A (ver 4)

Class	First completion year	No. of subs	Model [1] or [2]	No. of diesels	No. of cylinders	Bore mm	Stroke mm	Mechanical ouput surfaced kW	Electrical outpout surfaced kW [3]	Electrical output snorting kW [10]	Speed rpm
Oyashio .I	1960	1	V8V22/30mAL [1]	2	16	220	300	993 [6]	794	-	850
Oshio	1964	5	V8V24/30mMAL [1]	2	16	240	300	1066 [6]	853	-	850
Uzushio	1970	7	V8V24/30AMT [1]	2	16	240	300	1287 [6]	1030	-	850
Yushio	1970	10	V8V24/30AMT [1]	2	16	240	300	1545 [6]	1236	-	850
Harushio	1990	7	12V25/25S [2]	2	12	250	250	2280 [6,8,9] (2500)	1824 (2000)	-	1200
Oyashio .II	1998	11	12V25/25S [2]	2	12	250	250	2500 [6,9]	2000	>=1800	1200
Soryu MK I & II [7]	2009	11	12V25/25SB [2]	2	12	250	250	2500	2000 [11]	>=1800	1200
29SS	-	-	12V25/31S [2][4]	2	12	250	310	3100	2500 [11]	>=2250	1200

[1] KAWASAKI (under the license of MAN): V8V22/30mAL, V8V24/30mMAL, V8V24/30AMT

[2]KAWASAKI: 12V25/25S, 12V25/25SB, 12V25/31S

[3] Electical output = mechanical output x 0.8

[4]Estimated values:

[5] “Historical Development of Four Stroke Diesel Engine” byKazuya Sato, Center of the History of Japanese Industrial Technology, National Museum of Nature and Science. This is comprehensive review. Representative diesel manufacturers in Japan (KHI, MHI, MAN-Japan, JFE, Mitsui, etc) reviewed that article.

[6]“History of Japan Maritime Defense Force Submarine” by Dr Yoichi Hirama.

Past positions of Dr Hirama are Rear Admiral (Maritime Self-Defense Force:Navy/Retired 1988), Professor & Director of Library of National Defense Academy (Retired 1998), Lecturer of Tsukuba University (International Relations/Retired 2002), Lecturerof Tokiwa University (Japanese History/Retired 2003). This article is the primary source of information on modern Japanese submarine (except Soryus and Post Soryus), and search procedure is as follows:

To access [6] Click on http://hiramayoihi.com/yh_e_top.html.

(1) Click "Papers"

(2) Search “English History”

(3) scroll down, then Click”Japao n l'auto defense”, Marines & Navales:Hors Serie Sous-Marins:Special sous-Marins Diesels(Paris:2004) (English version), which provides "History of the Japanese Submarine(After WWII)

(4) for original Japanese language version Click "History of Japan Maritime Defense Force Submarine “

[7] Based on those of 12V25/25S for Oyashio [6].

[8] Unfortunatedly, output of 12V25/25S for Harushio-class shows contradiction in English version of [6] (English version 3100PS=2280kW & 3400PS (2500kW), Japanese version 3100PS=2280kW),and considering that Dr Hirama is Japanese, 3100PS =2280kW of mechanical output is used for Revised Table A (ver4).

[9] Since diesel engines are greatly dependent on the back pressure of the exhaust system in terms of their efficiency, decision on electrical output when snorkeling need information on the snorkel system. If the snorkel system of Oyashio.II -class is more effective than that of Harushio-class, mechanical output of 12V25/25S in Oyashio.II-class would show a higher output than the same 12V25/25S in Harushio-class.

[10] The charge of the battery must take place at the highest generator output to reduce the time of the submarine in snorting/snorkeling mode, or, the time in which submarine can be detecteded (indiscrete) would increase. That’s why information on electrical output in snorting/snorkeling mode is quite important. But there is no information in [6].

In http://www.bmtdsl.co.uk/media/5045649/BMTDSL-Sub-Power-and-Propulsion-Confpaper-Pacific-Jan12.pdf page 2, “As an example the MTU 12V 396TE54 is rated at 1200kWe (electrical output) for the surface ship TE54 designation but when employed in the submarine version it is derated to 1000kW on the surface and 900kW when snorting”. This data (10% output reduction by snorkeling) was used to roughly estimate electrical output in snorting/snorkeling mode as reference. Since 12V25/25S and 12V25/25SB as well as 12V25/31S are younger diesels, designed after the MTU 12V396, they may show better efficiency than that MTU (less than 10% output reduction in snorting/snorkeling mode).

[11] The related standard specifies electric output of diesel being ---1800kW, 2000kW, 2500kW ---. I think that 2500kW of electrical output as target performance was decided at modification of 12V25/25SB to 12V25/31S at first, and at next, 310mm of stroke was decided to achieve this performance.

Anonymous

Pete Comment: the following Russian submarine descriptions probably started out being in Russian, then translated into French, then English. Pete has further translated some comments into more correct English.

On February 18, 2018 an Anonymous from https://www.soumarsov.eu/sous_marins.htm– commented at Submarine Matters:

Hello, Pete

The wording of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Future_of_the_Russian_Navy#Submarines is either out of date or sketchy. As you know, I follow Russian submarine matters on a daily basis. My comments on the various Russian submarine categories are:

SSBNs

There are 3 x Project 955A Boreys currently in service, one in Russia’s Northern fleet, two others in the Pacific Fleet. See https://www.soumarsov.eu/Sous-marins/Post92/955/955.htm

5 x Project 955A Boreys are under construction. The first one is expected to be in service in 2018, the last one in November 2021. But the last could be delayed until 2023-2025. See https://www.soumarsov.eu/Sous-marins/Post92/955A/955A.htm

New Project, 955B Boreys are expected to be in service from 2026. As it takes roughly 7 years to build a Borey, the first Project 955B Borey should be laid down in 2018 or 2019. But there is a fierce fight between the Rubin and Malakhit Design Bureaus to handle the 955B project engineering. Rubin is arguing for a 995A follow-on, while Malakhit advocates a common platform for SSNs, SSGNs and SSBNs.

The major overhaul schedule for the 6 x Project 667BDRM Delta IV SSBNs, is every ten years. See https://www.soumarsov.eu/Sous-marins/Post45/667BDRM/667BDRM.htm

2013 artwork celebrating laying down, on July 26, 2013, of Novosibirsk, the 3rd Yasen Project 885 SSGN. The Yasen is armed with 8 x 650mm and 2 x 533mm torpedo tubes, 8 VLS (which can take total weapons load of 32 Yakhont/Oniks ASM or 40 Kalibr-PL ASM/Land Attack)

SSGNs [often called “Multipurpose”]

Two classes are in current service, the Project 949A Antey / Oscar II and the Project 885 Yasen.NATO reporting name: "Severodvinsk”.

The Yasenwas [designed by the Malakhit Design Bureau and based on the Akula SSN and Alfa SSN] The first Yasen Severodvinskis active in the Northern Fleet (K-560). She has been in experimental service since 2011 and only in March 2016 was she fully accepted.

A follow-on class is the Project 885MYasen-Ms. Only 6 x Yasen-Ms are under construction at Sevmash shipyard. The first is Kazan (K-561), expected for the end of 2018. The last one, Ulyanovsk, is, at earliest, due in 2023. See https://www.soumarsov.eu/Sous-marins/Post92/885M/885M.htm
There in no follow-on announced.

Some Project 949A Oscar IIs are to be modernized in project 949AM. Modernization will allow them to deploy Kalibr-PLmissiles [with ranges up to 2,500 km. At least two Oscar IIs are in Zvezda shipyard, (Eastern Siberia) including Irkutsk (K-132) modernised by 2021, and Chelyabinsk (K-442) modernised by 2023. Modernization of the 3rd and 4th Oscar IIs is yet to be announced. See https://www.soumarsov.eu/Sous-marins/Post92/949AM/949AM.htm

Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Borisov announced on February 7, 2018 that modernized Project 949A Oscar IIs, will be in service with Kalibr missiles, starting between 2018 and 2021. As far as I know Omsk is only at Zvezda shipyard(?) for repairs to her propulsion system. (those huge Oscar II subs seem to have frequent propulsion problems).

Anonymous's excellent details on Russian SSNs and SSKs will follow early next week.

Anonymous

French Mini-Sub Likely to be used for Australia's Future Submarine

China's January 11, 2018, Type 093 Submarine Incursion A SIGINT Probe

Submarine ARA San Juan only had a Weak Hull (eg. 100 Meter Operating Depth)

Table of Kawasaki-MAN and wholly Kawasaki Marine Diesel Characteristics

Revised Table of KHI-MAN Diesels for Japanese Submarines

Submarine Matters helping Australia's defence.

China’s decades of weapons to Thailand

Japanese WWII submarine sank a US Carrier simultaneously damaging a Battleship

Possible Motor Modifications for Australia's Future Submarine

China Critical of Indian Nuclear Submarine's Major Accident

Japan Increasingly its Submarine Propulsion (Diesels & Motors)

Russian Submarine Development as at 2018

Russian Submarine Building Statistics 2017 - Yasens-Ms

Disappearances of Two (High Security) Russian Shipbuilding Engineers

Rising China "US$42 trillion economy by 2030"

Chinese Navy Innocent of Maldives Meddling - Ask India

China's Many Problems - Expand South?

Another Near Catastrophic Russian Nuclear Submarine Fire, occurred in 2011

Revised Table A (ver 4) of Diesels for Japanese Submarines - includes Snorting Output

Revised Russian SSBN & SSGN Details from Russian Sub Expert