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Kalibr-M a Protest Against US Withdrawing from INF Treaty

January 13, 2019, 10:21 pm
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On October 20, 2018, citing Russian non-compliance, Trump announced that he was withdrawing the US from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear [Missile] Forces Treaty (INF).

Putin announced on November 20, 2018 that Russia was prepared to discuss INF with Washington but Russia would "retaliate" if the United States withdrew.

On January 8, 2019, Russia’s TASS News Agency, citing an unnamed source, announced Russia was developing an intermediate range (4,500 km), 1 tonne nuclear capable warhead, sea launched Kalibr missile, dubbed “Kalibr-M”.

The INF Treaty, between the US and USSR/Russia was agreed and ratified in the late 1980s. The INF aimed to eliminate all nuclear and conventional missiles with ranges from 500 km to 5,500 km. The INF was very much aimed at ground launched missiles in Europe deployed by NATO (including US forces) facing the Warsaw Pact (including Russia) in the 1980s. By May 1991, 2,692 missiles were eliminated.

Another US reason to withdraw is the need to counter the Chinese (an INF non-signatory) missile buildup covering the Pacific. This particularly means China's ground launched, ~1,500 km DF-21D"carrier killers" and < 5,500 km DF-26"Guam killers". US officials extending back to Obama days have noted China's ability to work outside of the INF treaty.

The INF treaty did not cover sea-launched missiles. The INF Treaty's non-coverage of sea-launched missiles has always provided room for technological exploitation and political threat of an arms race. Developing new sea-launched cruise missiles provides a technology backdoor for quicker development of INF breaking ground and air launched versions. 

Developing sea-launched Kalibr-M is a Russian way to protest and exploit the US withdrawal from the INF. Kalibr-M, with the "M" for marine or sea launch, comes with INF breaking air and ground launched versions. 


In this October 22, 2018 upload Trump uses typical subtlety to frighten NATO allies on his INF withdrawal. Lets hope Trump gamed it with Putin first!
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Tomorrow, the history and likely shapes of Kalibr-M.

Pete
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Ballistic and Cruise Missiles in East Asia-West Pacific Theater

January 14, 2019, 11:39 pm
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Hi KQN

Following the latest article - looks like we're keeping this dialogue to ourselves, knowing that other potential commenters in the blogosphere don't want to be woken up during their Christmas snooze...:)

Re your January 14, 2019 comment "Ground launched MRBM and IRBM are of limited value to the US given the westernmost US territory is Guam, unless one counts some of the smaller islands. I do not see South Koreans nor Japanese ever agreeing to deployments on their soils."

1980s US/USSR/Euopean/UK MRBMs and IRBMs INF Treaty

The INF Treaty on short and intermediate range missiles was very much a Reagan US - Gorbachev USSR signed agreement, concentrating on ground launched missiles in Europe not Asia. This was within a huge political-public-strategic debate in NATO countries, on such missiles endangering citizens at nuclear blast ground zero in the USSR-European satellite countries-out to Britain. 

I experienced this debate as a university student living in London in 1981. "No Cruise""Better Red than Dead" and Campaign for NuclearDisarmament (CND) were the slogans of most thinking, humanist, UK students. I unfortunately had to debate against them often, undercutting their arguments. Fellow students from India and Pakistan were very helpful as they were big supporters of MRBM and IRBM development to defend their own countries. Once the US won the Cold War in 1991 the students "Better Red Than Dead" slogan was proven misguided.

East Asia-Western Pacific MRBMs and IRBMs 2010s

So the 1980s INF was long before the 2010s development of mature Chinese MRBMs and IRBMs in East Asia and Western Pacific becoming an issue. In the 1980s only the USSR and US had fully protected, mature IRBMs-ICBMs mainly mounted on SSBNs in the Indian and western Pacific Oceans.

In the 2010s the US development of submarine launched missiles and B1, B2, F-22 and B-52s nuclear bombers means that ground launching from Guam or elsewhere is not a high priority for the US. Ground launching has all the public-host government shortcomings of whose ground?

I don't know the status of US and South Korea nuclear capable ATACM SRBMs in South Korea - see Reuters 2017?


September 2017 South Korea ballistic missile exercise - simulating attack on North Korea.
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For the time being the deterrent against Chinese and North Korean nuclear missiles is all US including, of course:

-  Trident II SLBMs but also ambiguity towards nuclear armed Tomahawks. 

The advantage of US submarine mounted Tomahawk MRCMs (1,000-3,000 km) are that instead of the US having to build longer range cruise missiles and mounting them on land (eg. Guam) US SSNs and SSGNs can move in close just east of China's first island chain (or within it for firing) to hit Chinese and North Korean targets.

I see South Korea's Jang Bogo class 3,000 tonne submarines KSS-IIIs as only justifying their ballistic missile carrying main mission if the SRBM-MRBM missiles have nuclear warheads (also see). This is in the next 10 years or so. 

Meanwhile Japan is restricted by its pacifism and Australia to no-nuclear-apathy - just hoping Trump will sacrifice America for their countries in any standoff edging toward, major war, risking nuclear war.

Pete
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Candidates for the Kalibr-M Western Europe Buster

January 16, 2019, 11:00 pm
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Following articles of January 9 and 10, 2019 on Russia's plan to build 4,500 km range, 1 tonne nuclear capable warhead, sea launched Kalibr-M cruise missiles. It is the nature of medium sized missiles that if they can be sea launched then versions can be air or ground launched. Russia (Putin) is pressing for US retention of the INF Treaty mainly to prevent the return of gound launched intermediate-ranged ballistic and cruise missiles to the Russia-NATO European theater. 

As the shape of Kalibr-M isn't known I have selected 2 possible candidates.



1.  A larger than existing evolution of Russia's Kalibr cruise missile (photo above), mainly subsonic, mainly turbojet. For convenience this could be a upscale of the Kalibr's 533mm to a 650mm horizontal torpedo tube launched with a float-up mode. 

The increase in range from Kalibr's 2,500 km range to over 4,000 km could allow Russia from Arctic Ocean and Black Sea launch points to hit much more of Western Europe (out to the UK and Spain etc). Also a ground launched version could launch from actual Russian territory with less need for forward basing in Belarus. 

To attain a 4,500 km range it may have just a one stage booster rocket that drops off when propulsion moves to the turbojet. If a nuclear warhead is desired it doesn't need to have a 1 tonne warhead because thermonuclear warheads can be just 100 kg or even smaller. 

This would fall short of Putin, INF breaking, terror weapon propaganda value. If relying on a subsonic turbojet it would have a very long, slow flight, making it easier to detect and shoot down, particularly if it transits over or into modern NATO air defences. 




2.  The multi-named P-750 (NATO: SS-NX-24 SCORPION) Meteorit-M (for Maritime-sea launch) 3М25 would look something like the air-launched version in the (photo above  - courtesy Wiki). It looks like an unmanned rocket-jet (like the 1950s US Regulus II) rather than a convenient torpedo or vertical cylinder shape for submarine launch. See Wiki https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kh-80

SS-NX-24was an unfinished project authorised in mid-1970s, part-developed in 1980s, but terminated due to strategic arms limitation treaties (including the INF) and lack of Soviet money by the late 1980s.

Kalibr-M, improvement of the SS-NX-24, specs could include:

Weight            6,380 kg 
Length            12.8 m 3M25A (12.5 m 3M25)
Diameter         0.9 m
Warhead         various HE, nuclear (200kt to < 6Mt)
Warhead         up to 1,000 kg (1 tonne)
Engine            liquid or solid rocket or ramjet, or very fast turbojet
Wingspan       5.1 m!

The SS-NX-24 was tested on a "Yankee Sidecar" modified from normal SSBN (Project 667M Andromeda class aka "Yankee SSGN"). This SSGN was a single-ship class carrying the number K-420. K-420 appeared in 1983, carrying 12 SS-NX-24 nuclear-tipped cruise missiles instead of the original ballistic missiles. The SS-NX-24 was an experimental cruise missile, with a supersonic flight regime and twin nuclear warheads. It was meant as a tri-service strategic weapon, and thus would have filled a rather different role than the anti-ship Oscar-class SSGNs. In the end, the missile was not adopted,

CONCLUSION

Significantly No. 2's (SS-NX-24) a high-supersonic, rocket, ramjet or advanced turbojet speed, may satisfy Putin's INF breaking terror weapon criteria. It provides an uncertain middle ground on the way to faster, nuclear-certain, Russian ballistic missiles.

Placing nuclear warheads on even a minority of subsonic cruise missiles may risk a nuclear response from NATO. 

However Putin may wish to intentionally raise tensions in Western Euope by re-introducing the Cold War uncertainty of nuclear armed cruise missiles. 

As the US mainland, unlike European countries, will not be under threat from nuclear cruise, Kalibr-M can help drive a wedge in already Trump damaged US-European NATO member relations. Such a wedge was present between the Reagan's US and European countries in the 1980s which was largely resolved by the INF Treaty.

Pete
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Watch Out MHI & KHI, China Warns(?) Those Helping Taiwan's Submarine Program

January 17, 2019, 11:24 pm
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On January 14, 2019, Hua Chunying (above) (and see official CV) China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson issued an Answer ("A:") Warning (?) in response to a Question ("Q:") to countries (companies and and contractors(?) assisting Taiwan's future submarine program.

Q: It is reported that the US has agreed to allow some military enterprises to export their technology to support Taiwan's Indigenous Defense Submarine (IDS) program. Many US, European, Japanese and Indian companies have expressed their willingness to participate in the program. What is your comment?

A: China firmly opposes arms sales to Taiwan by any country and military links in any form between any country and Taiwan. This position is consistent and clear. We urge the US and other relevant countries to keep in mind the sensitivity and graveness of this issue, earnestly abide by the one-China principle, not to permit relevant enterprises from participating in Taiwan's Indigenous Defense Submarine (IDS) program in any form...

BACKGROUND

“Six companies two from Europe, two from the US, one each from India and Japan have submitted design proposals for the submarines...The designs would come up for approval by Taiwanese government in March [2019].”

COMMENT

Noting Taiwan's Submarine Project: Confirmed and Unconfirmed Details of October 2, 2018. China might sanction countries, companies and contractors involved in assiting Taiwan's future submarine program.

But, like China's response ("More than a dozen Canadians have been detained") to Canada's arrest of a senior Chinese Huawei executive Ms Meng Wanzhou China may use a two track response of merely criticizing the US while arresting nationals from other countries helping Taiwan develop a submarine. Particularly current or ex KHI or MHI submarine branch employees/executives/contractors may need to watch out.

Pete
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Update on India's SSBN and SLBM Evolution

January 20, 2019, 11:45 pm
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(Diagram courtesy India's DRDO, H I Sutton and The Diplomat.)

Submarine Matters has periodically provided updates on India's SSBNs and SLBMs since 2009.

India’s Financial Express published an excellent article“INS Arihant: The ballistic missile submarine is giving India’s nuclear triad a lethal edge” of January 2, 2019 by Dr. Sanjay Badri-Maharaj
who neatly combines many issues of India’s evolving SSBNs and SLBMs. The following is drawn from the article with direct quotes (where indicated) with boldingby Pete.

On November 5, 2018, INS Arihant completed its first deterrence patrol.

India efforts have been concentrated on developing two SLBMs:

-  the 750 km range K-15 (see diagram above) which underwent at least 12 development trials from a submerged pontoon. On  November 25, 2015, an unarmed K-15 was purportedly fired from the INS Arihant. The K15’s limited range makes it very much an interim system. Twelve can be carried by the Arihant. “It should be stated that this has not yet been confirmed by Indian officials and no photographs have emerged of such a launch from the Arihant.”

-  the 3500km range K-4 to be deployed aboard the Arihant class SSBNs. The K-4 was first tested on March 24, 2014 from a submerged pontoon and then on March 7, 2016. Thereafter it was reportedly tested from the INS Arihant itself on March 31, 2016. “It would be surprising if such a major development were not highlighted in some way but in any event, development of the K-4 is clearly well in progress.” Four K-4s are to arm the Arihant class and the K-4 is very similar to the Agni-IIIs in dimensions and performance. “The K-4 has some way to go before it can be inducted into service, however, once it does, the INS Arihant and its sisters will have a much more viable weapon at their disposal, though the limited number of missiles carried will be a distinct drawback. It is anticipated that from the INS Arighat onwards, the number of K-4 missiles will increase to eight per vessel, making the SSBNs far more effective and flexible.

Tthe K-5 and K-6 are reportedly planned for follow-on SSBNs, displacing more than twice that of the Arihant class.

“The 13,500 ton SSBNs of the so-called S-5 class are to carry twelve of the 5000 km range K-5 – development of which started in 2015, with no tests done to date – or a similar number of the 6000 km range K-6” which is to have MIRVs. The longer-ranged K-5 could replace the K-4 on the Arihant class to enhance its effectiveness and flexibility.

“the Arihant class is a relatively modest vessel by the high standards set by the five larger nuclear powers which operate much more potent vessels.

“In fact, it might have been expected for India to develop an SSN – like the Akula class submarine currently leased as the INS Chakra. By opting for an SSBN, it is clear India allocated priority to the Arihant project with plans for six SSNs being left for the future.”

[Pete Comment: the SSBN first sequence was like France's which first had Redoubtable SSBNs in commission from 1971 and then Rubis SSNs from 1983.]

“However, while the INS Arihant does mark an important step forward for India’s nuclear triad, care should be taken not to assume that this leg of the triad is either complete or totally credible. Until the K-4 is operational, the INS Arihant has next to no deterrent capability vs China. In addition, additional SSBNs are needed to allow for continuous patrols. These two necessary steps will take time to come to fruition.”

Dr. Sanjay Badri-Maharaj is an Independent Defence Analyst and Security Consultant. He is also the author of Indian Nuclear Strategy: Confronting the Potential Threat from both China and Pakistan.


SEE THE WHOLE DR. BADRI-MAHARAJ ARTICLE


India's evolving SLBMs - the K-4 and K-15 (Diagram courtesy Indian Defense News).
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What my great-great-granfather Had to Go Through

January 22, 2019, 12:31 am
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Continuing on from Submarine Matters' My 1st Australian Ancestor was a "hard driving" Scottish Captain of January 3, 2019 below is a photo of Captain Begg, ship route map and Youtube of clipper ship crew still living.


My great great grandfather Captain William Begg is seated as years before he had broken both legs in a storm at sea. Standing without hat is probably his first officer, maybe of The Murray. The two standing gentleman with hats look relaxed and upper class, maybe owners of the ship or shipping company. (Photo may have been taken in 1872 and is from the Begg and Coates family collection. Both my Mum and late Dad were descendants of Captain Begg).
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In his clipper ship Captain Begg would travel from Britain south down the Atlantic Ocean to catch the west to east blowing "Roaring Forties". Then south past the Cape of Good Hope (tip of Africa) and continue east through the southern Indian Ocean to Australia. Stopping at Adelaide to drop off passengers and UK manufactured goods, then take on Australian wheat, wool and return passengers. Travel east, maybe stop at Port Melbourne then south of New Zealand through the South Pacific and south around Cape Horn (tip of South America) see below. Once east of Cape Horn turn north, back to Britain (maybe London, Liverpool, Glasgow and Edinburgh).(Map and further details courtesy Wikipedia)
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What Captain Begg (from the 1830s-70s) and his crew had to go through. The Last Cape Horner clipper ships were still economical for low value cargoes, through to the 1950s as ship insurance was minimal. As the 100+ year old ships had depreciated down to zero cost of capital. The cargo could be insured separately. And the crews were paid very little. Cape Horn, around South America, was particularly freezing and fierce, as the last survivors (some still alive in the 1990s?) describe in the Youtube.
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Pete
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Australia Sells "Classic" F/A-18 Hornets to Canada

January 22, 2019, 11:45 pm
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The youtube (which starts talking 32 seconds in) was uploaded in July 2018 from a Canadian perspective. Although US-Canada relations have hit a slump, with Trump vowing to punish Canadians over economic disputes, the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) correctly did not expect that to affect US approval of the Australian "Classic" F/A-18 Hornets to Canada deal.
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Wiki reports:“On 13 December 2017, Australian Minister for Defence Marise Payne confirmed the sale of 18 [Classic] F/A-18 Hornets and associated spare parts to Canada.[113][114] The Canadian Government announced at the same time that it had cancelled its plans to acquire [Boeing] Super Hornets.

[The Canadian government is buying the Australian “Classic” F/A-18 Hornets instead of a new fleet of 18 Super Hornets, Canada was trying to force Boeing to drop its trade dispute filed in 2016 by Boeing in the US International Trade Commission against Canada’s Bombardier Inc.]

[With US/Boeing approval the Australian Hornets are being] "acquired to enable the [Royal Canadian Air Force] to continue to meet its international commitments until a new fighter type is ordered and enters service.[115] 

In June 2018 the Canadian Government requested a further seven Australian Hornets. These additional aircraft will be used as a source of spare parts.[116][117] 

Two Australian Hornets are scheduled to be transferred to Canada in early 2019. The timeframe for handing over the other aircraft will be dependent on progress with introducing the F-35 into Australian service.[113] 

The sale of the 25 Hornets was finalised in early 2019, with the purchase price being C$90 million.[118] [a very low total price for 25 Hornets!?] Of these aircraft, 18 will be issued to operational units and the remainder used for trials purposes and as a source of spare parts. After they arrive in Canada, the aircraft will be fitted with different ejection seats and software so that they are identical to CF-18s.[119]”

COMMENT

Its interesting that Boeing is the company that:

-  lost the 18 Super Hornet sale to Canada, and

-  built the Classic Hornets that are being sold by Australia to Canada, and

-  along with the US Government would have approved the sale of the Australian F/A-18s (full of US
   intellectual property) to Canada.

So presumably Boeing is thinking in the long term. Boeing might still eventually sell Super Hornets to Canada. Or even if Canada finally decides to buy the F-35A, Boeing may still sell some EA-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft to Canada. 

Australia has gone down the route of buying F-35As and EA-18Gs (partly to increase the stealth of the F-35As).

Pete
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Possible SOSUS & RAP/FDS Arrays, Western Pacific - Indian Ocean

January 23, 2019, 11:14 pm
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Thanks KQN for locating Owen R. Cote Jr.’s excellent article Invisible nuclear-armed submarines, or transparent oceans? Are ballistic missile submarines still the best deterrent for the United States? Published online on January 7, 2019 at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2019.1555998. 

I've placed very small parts of it in Section A. (below) in quotation marks. I have bolded some words for emphasis and added links and comments in brackets [...] for extra information. Sections B. and C. further support A.

A.

In addition to the well known Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) there is an additional term/concept Reliable Acoustic Path (RAP). 

“Like SOSUS, RAP arrays are bottom-mounted [or vertically mounted from the bottom to a buoy], deep water arrays, but unlike SOSUS, they are upward-looking, and there are thousands of nodes in a single RAP array. [RAP arrays can be weaponized.] Each individual, upward-looking array node only receives signals from a tea cup-shaped zone of coverage several miles deep and 20 miles wide at the surface." 

"Consequently, an individual RAP array node has two huge advantages over the nodes in a SOSUS array: It is no more than a few miles away from its potential targets (which is point blank range for a sophisticated, passive acoustic sensor) and very little of the broad ocean’s noise is competing with the target’s signal. The flip side is that even a RAP array with thousands of nodes can only cover a small fraction of the ocean area that SOSUS covered during its heyday." 

"This means that RAP arrays do not provide anything close to ocean-wide surveillance. But they do provide reliable if fleeting, preliminary indications (“cues” in submariner-speak) of even the quietist submarines at natural chokepoints in the ocean, such as the one that exists between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom [GIUK] – or, more to the point, the Luzon Strait or the Ryukyus (i.e., the main exits from China’s Inner Seas to the Philippine Sea).”
[see map at B. below]

"Some Reliable Acoustic Path arrays are called Fixed, Distributed System [FDS] arrays capable of detecting the more quiet Russian nuclear submarines that pass over them (eg. Akula multipurpose SSNs). “A modernized version of the original Fixed, Distributed System likely is being deployed in the Western Pacific, if it has not already been done.” [perhaps covering] “...of chokepoints like the Ryukyus and the Luzon Strait...”

B.

Already in the public realm and on Submarine Matters at How to Trap the Chinese Dragon - SeaWeb's Fixed Undersea Array, since September 4, 2015 is the map below of a current or past hook shaped SOSUS and RAP/FDS array line in the Western Pacific hooking around to the Indian Ocean. The "point" of the hook probably terminates at Port Blair in India's Andaman Island territory. In 2018 I suspected and published that the array has been extended from Port Blair, west across the Bay of Bengal, to Chennai, India.


The map is from page 54 “Map 4. The US ‘Fish Hook’ Undersea Defense Line” by (the late) Desmond Ball and Richard Tanter, The Tools of Owatatsumi Japan’s Ocean Surveillance and Coastal Defence Capabilities (2015, ANU Press) http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p309261/pdf/book.pdf?referer=444. 

C.

Further interesting comment on SOSUS and RAP/FDS arrays are at  John Keller Editor, MiltaryAerospace(dot)com’s Navy to take a page from commercial undersea cable industry for new ocean surveillance technology of June 9, 2014.  I have bolded some words for emphasis

“...U.S. Navy undersea warfare experts are trying to tap into the commercial undersea cable industry to find recent technological advances that might be useful in maritime surveillance systems (MSS)....”

“...The term maritime surveillance generally refers to sonar listening arrays installed on the ocean bottom in strategic areas like the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap, the Straits of Florida and Yucatan Channel gateways to the Gulf of Mexico, and the Strait of Malacca [between Malaysia and] Indonesia.”

“...Navy fixed-site undersea sensor systems today include the Fixed Distributed System (FDS) and the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS), which are deployed in strategic ocean choke points...”


Pete
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China's DF-26 "Guam and carrier killer" missiles strut their stuff

January 28, 2019, 10:26 pm
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I’ve added further links, comments in brackets [...] for extra info and bolded to highlight some parts.

Liu Zhen for China's Hong Kong South China Morning Post reportedJanuary 11th (updated 12th) 2019:

"Chinese army sends DF-26 ballistic missiles to northwest region

·       Long-range missiles can carry nuclear or conventional warheads and strike medium to large vessels up to 4,000 km away
·       [Chinese] State media says they are being used in [China’s] plateau and desert areas for training

The People’s Liberation Army has sent its DF-26 ballistic missiles to China’s northwest region in an apparent bid to beef up training of its missile force.

State broadcaster CCTV reported on Thursday that the far-reaching anti-ship ballistic missiles were being used in active training in the country’s northwestern plateau and desert areas.

The DF-26 can carry a nuclear or conventional warhead and strike medium to large vessels [and use nuclear warheads against deep divesubmarines] as far as 4,000km (2,500 miles) away.

On [January 11, 2019], nationalistic tabloid Global Times highlighted the timing, with the mobilisation coinciding with US warship the USS McCampbell [see Wiki] “trespassing” in China’s territorial waters near the disputed Paracel Islands in the South China Sea that are claimed by Beijing.

But Song Zhongping, a Hong Kong-based military commentator,
[Song Zhongping can be considered a semi-official Chinese Government spokesman as he graduated from the People’s Liberation Army’s Second Artillery Engineering University (now the Rocket Force University of Engineering)]
said it would not be necessary to resort to a long-range missile like the DF-26 if China wanted to take action over such “intrusions”.

“You don’t kill a tiny chick with a cleaver you would use on a bull,” Song said. “Mentioning the
DF-26 is more about muscle-flexing in response to provocations generally.”

Song added that China had already deployed anti-ship missiles to both the Paracels and the Spratly Islands, which would be far more effective in dealing with any potential conflict.

“US warships in the South China Sea will fall within the firing range of these artilleries in the event of any incidents,” he said.

The mobilisation was seen as a measure to strengthen training of China’s missile force.

The PLA Rocket Force has set up training grounds and target ranges in the vast plateau and deserts of the northwest and carries out test firing in the sparsely populated region.

The ranges are equipped with monitoring facilities and electronic jamming to simulate a battlefield, and they are also outside the range of detection of US radars such as the THAAD– or Terminal High Altitude Area Defence – system deployed in South Korea.

The CCTV report showed seven military trucks carrying DF-26 missiles travelling along a road amid rough terrain and sand dunes but did not say when the mobilisation took place.

“Over the past few years, we have trained and held drills everywhere from the east coast to the northeast, and the desert in the northwest,” brigade commander Yao Wenshan told the broadcaster. “Our special mission is to kill at one strike from thousands of kilometres away.”

The DF-26 missile was first seen in public at a military parade in 2015 and it was confirmed to have entered into service in April [2018].

This week was the first time the missile has been shown to be in operation, including close-up footage and shots from its launch panel.

China has another anti-ship ballistic missile, the DF-21D [see Wiki], which is also believed to be able to strike an aircraft carrier, but with a shorter range of about 1,450km."

ARTICLE ENDS
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COMMENT

Its likely some DF-26s remain closer to China’s coast for continuing targeting  (satellite, SOSUS and radar ground station) network practice and for possible use in time of conflict.

Extra information from Wiki includes DF-26s:
-  have a 3,000–5,471 km (1,864–3,400 mile) range, and so are classed as a intermediate-range
   ballistic missile (IRBM) or anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM)
-  have a 1,200-1,800 kg warhead.
-  the USAF estimates that as of June 2017 over 16 launchers were operationally deployed.

The ambiguity of whether or not a DF-26 unit has conventional or nuclear warheads makes it risky for the US to target these missiles in a first strike.


From the China coast they can hit carriers and Guam. 

The CEPis an inaccurate (?) 150 – 450 meters (490 – 1,480 feet) which implies reliance on a nuclear warhead.

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The official Chinese media (CCTV) Youtube below closely follows the South China Morning Post article script and was released at the same time, January 12, 2019.


Pete
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Chinese DF-21D and DF-26 Missile Accuracy

January 31, 2019, 1:06 am
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Drawing from KQN's and Josh's interesting comments of 29 January and 31 January 2019 respectively.

The DF-26's accuracy improves with its manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle (in the terminal phase). It also likely uses Chinese BeiDou GPS, plus some form of seeker. 

[Pete Research - Looking at the BeiDou GPS wiki entry the "restricted military service has a location accuracy of 10 centimetres" [ie 0.1m] (though footnote 53, Science China 2012 "proof" is now a "dead" link). So theoretically Chinese DF-21D ASBMs and DF-26 IRBMs may have a CEP of 1 meter!]

Believed to be missile warhead craters in a Chinese desert, carrier sized, target. Satellite image originally in Want China Times (dead link) via Business Insider Australia, January 26, 2013 and reproduced in many other sources)
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There are some commercial satellite photos on the web, here (and see above) of Chinese land test targets simulating an aircraft carrier. You can clearly see the craters right in the middle of the target. Of course the target is not mobile while a US nuclear carrier is. The shorter (around 1,500 km minimum) range DF-21D's main targets are carriers including those in the main US northeast Asia naval base at Yokosuka, Japan. While the much longer (around 4,000 km) range DF-26 is for fixed targets like Andersen AFB Guam and the SSN naval base at Guam. 

DF-21Ds and DF-26s might be deployed at the new 2nd artillery (missile) base on China's Hainan Island (with Chinese SSBNs based nearby). Like many Chinese bases, deep dug protective tunnels for missiles and submarines are likely.


There seems to be little evidence that the DF-26 has an anti-shipping warhead like DF-21D, but it is  possible. The PLANs ability to target moving ships outside the first island chain is fairly limited right now so I wouldn't expect Chinese DF-21Ds and DF-26s to be deployed to hit ships outside the island chain yet.

It is worth noting again that geography and US foreign bases force the Chinese to test their weapons very far from the sea, like the desert in northwest China. The anti-ship targeting abilities of the DF-26 and DF-21D cannot be tested on an actual sea target. Test at sea would allow the US to learn about as much from the test as the Chinese. This has to impact Chinese confidence in these missiles somewhat.

A rough minimum range estimate, in kms, from Chinese launch points, estimated number of China's DF-21Ds and DF-26s, and some possible targets, are above.
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KQN, Josh and Pete
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Hypersonic Medium Range Boost-Glide Vehicles

February 1, 2019, 12:07 am
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A clear (July 3, 2018) discussion of hypersonic cruise missiles and boosted hypersonic glide vehicles. Will the physics of speed and the atmosphere causing overheating forever be an obstacle?
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Drawing from KQN's 30 January 2019 comment below this Submarine Matters' article of 29 January 2019:

The French Armed Forces Minister, Florence Parly, on January 21, 2019 announced France will be developing a missile boosted, then hypersonic (Mach 5+), glide vehicle by 2021. The glide vehicle is designated the Vehicule Manoeuvrant eXperimental (V-MaX) or experimental manoeuvring vehicle in English.

There might possibly be a proliferation of 1,000-3,000 km range missiles (MRBM)
 (eg. China's DF-21)(see below) as the launch platform for hypersonic gliders.

Even though Australia has been experimenting with hypersonic flight since 2007 (if not earlier) any Australian project would need to be a joint program (with the US, UK or France) on an unknown time-frame. A launch platform might conceivably be torpedo tubes in Australia's future submarines, modified F-35As, vertical launch systems in existing Hobart class destroyers or future Hunter class frigates.

At a minimum, the modified ballistic (glide) trajectory may point to a conventional warhead, rather than a nuclear warhead (with nuclear ambiguity inviting a nuclear response (eg. from China). China is developing the hypersonic DF-ZF (previously called "WU-14" by the US).

BACKGROUND

Courtesy wiki: Boost-glide trajectories in the military sense are reentry trajectories extending the range of reentry vehiclesby employing aerodynamic lift in the high upper atmosphere. 
In most examples, boost-glide roughly doubles the range over the purely ballistic trajectory. In others, a series of skips allows range to be further extended, and leads to the alternate terms skip-glide and skip reentry.
The concept was first seriously studied as a way to extend the range of ballistic missiles, but has not been used operationally in this form. The underlying aerodynamic concepts have been used to produce maneuverable reentry vehicles (MARV) to increase the accuracy of some missiles.
More recently the traditional form with an extended gliding phase has been considered as a way to reach targets while flying below their radar coverage.
"...research was eventually put to use in the Pershing II's MARV reentry vehicle. In this case, there is no extended gliding phase; the warhead uses lift only for short periods to adjust its trajectory. This is used late in the reentry process, combining data from an inertial navigation system with and Goodyear Aerospaceactive radarseeker.[17] Similar concepts have been developed for most nuclear-armed nation's theatre ballistic missiles.
In contrast to these maneuvering warhead concepts, there has been growing interest in the traditional boost-glide concept not to extend range per se, but to allow it to reach a given range while flying at a much lower altitude. The goal, in this case, is to keep the reentry vehicle below radar coverage until it enters the terminal phase.
Such a system is assumed to be used on the Chinese DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, which is also believed to maneuver during the terminal phase to make interception more difficult. 
China's later DF-26, a development of the DP-21, may be armed with the WU-14 later named DF-ZF, a hypersonic glide vehicle that has been successfully tested six times by the Chinese.[18] Similar efforts by Russia led to the Kholod and Igla hypersonic test projects, and more recently the Yu-71 hypersonic glide vehicle which can be carried by RS-28 Sarmat.[19][20]
Hypersonic Glide Vehicles could be used for delivering quick nuclear decapitating strikes.[22]
In March 2018, Russia unveiled hypersonic glide vehicle Avangard.

COUNTER-MEASURES

While flying below the operational envelope of Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicles, the tradeoff with HGVs in comparison to conventional MIRVs are many-fold, including no needle in a haystack protection from missile decoys and both less speed and altitude as they near the target, all of these characteristics result in HGVs having poorer survivability odds when placed against lower-tier interceptors.[24] 
Some examples of which include the high thrust mach-10 Sprint missile, its US derivatives and the still operational mach-17 Russian 53T6, ABM-3 Gazelle. Moreover, the possible re-emergence of nuclear or hit-to-kill stratosphere reaching guns, guided and triggered by forward operating flight-path sensors (such as the 2016 Hypervelocity Projectile (HVP) in development for the M109 howitzer) also will decrease HGV survivability odds.
Other more speculative counter-hypersonic vehicle measures may involve laser or rail gun technologies.[25]

KQN, Wiki and Pete
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Western & Russian Submarine Wake Detection Sensors including "SOKS"

February 5, 2019, 12:01 am
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This Russian Akula SSN is moving from right to left. The spikes towards the front of the fin/sail are probably wake detection sensors. These are known, in Russian, as System Obnarujenia Kilvaternovo Sleda (SOKS). SOKS was first tried in 1969 on Russia’s November class SSN K-14. Later types of SOKS may have been named Colossus, Toucan, and Bullfinch. These may have been mounted on all subsequent Soviet/Russian SSNs, including the curret Akulas and Yasens.
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From the mid 1950s onward submarine detectors such as “Autolycus“ (ie. aircraft mounted sensors to “sniff” submarine diesel exhaust) and search radar were being developed against the snorkels of diesel subs. These became less effective with the shift of major powers to nuclear submarines from the 1960s. Nuclear subs could run submerged, without needing to snorkel. Occasional periscope use still left SSNs vulnerable to sensitive radar.

In Russia and the West, new methods were sought to detect submerged nuclear subs. Some of these methods detected not the submarine itself, but the disturbances it made in the sea. If a sub's motion mixed layers of cold surface and underlying warm water, this would raise the apparent surface temperature slightly. 

This temperature change might be detected from infrared thermometers mounted on aircraft, UAVs,  satellites. But satellites suffered from being stationary or following predictable paths. Another platform might be the US X-37"uncrewed space plane" whose manoeuvrability could "surprise" Chinese or Russian nuclear submarines. 

It may or may not be possible to detect a submarine by only measuring the temperature of the wake. Greater definition might be achieved by imaging the temperature of the surrounding sea. Such imaging might happen in real time, but may be assisted by preliminary studies of sea conditions using massive amounts of data (say around China's Hainan Island and Russia's Pacific SSBN Base at Rybachiy on the Kamchatka Peninsula).

Sources here, here and here.

Pete
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France's Barracuda SSN Submarine Launching in 2019 - Maybe

February 5, 2019, 10:37 pm
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The launching of France's delayed (laid down 2007) first of class Barracuda-Suffren class SSN will free up a good part of Naval Group's design and construction labour force.

So far the main obstacle has been miniaturising France's tailored to SSBN K15 nuclear reactor (which also brings other improvements) so it will fit in the smaller Barracuda hull.

Once freed up the Naval Group design and construction labour force can begin to fully address Australia's huge Shortfin Barracuda (Attack class) SSK Program, on time and on budget.

Pete
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Trump Meeting Kim in Vietnam - Where US Abandoned South Vietnam

February 6, 2019, 3:46 pm
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Isn't it ironic that Kim and Trump are meeting in Vietnam of all places.

In 1973 the US signalled to North Vietnam that US support of its ally, South Vietnam, was weakening.

I wonder if South Koreans are quietly alarmed that 2019 may be seen as a negotiated US weakening of support for South Korea - against rising pressure from North Korea.

Pete
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South Korea Providing Mixed Signals Prior to Next Trump-Kim Summit

February 7, 2019, 9:07 pm
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An ageless cartoon: the risk of another North Korean attack and How Should The US Prevent It?
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The Second Trump-Kim Denuclearization Summit (in Vietnam, February 27-28, 2019) shares all the irritations as the First Summit.

On February 7, 2019 Anonymous kindly provided a comment below the article 

Trump Meeting Kim in Vietnam - Where US Abandoned South Vietnam (February 7). Pete has  further translated the comment, added additional links and provided extra comments in [...] brackets.


North Korea’s (NK’s) nuclear weapon and missile development has never stopped under the Kim dynastyno matter how much the Kims have been economical with the truth. Trump should not meet Kim Jong-un unless Trump insists on a genuine program of Complete, Verifiable and Irreversible Dismantlement (CVID). as assessed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). [But the goal "Irreversible Dismantlement" is impossible without constant and open international inspections of NK's military nuclear facilities and missile launch sites].

The US and SK have reached a preliminary settlement of the Special Measure Agreement (SMA). The SMA involves SK financial contributions to the non-personnel military costs of stationing US personnel in SK, which is updated every 5 years. With the SMA on the way to settlement US troops should not withdraw from SK. As such a withdrawal would only encourage NK to forcibly unite the Korean Peninsula [see [1] and [2] below]. [by invading SK].

[The defense of SK is not being helped by the mixed signals SK is giving NK.]

SK has breached international sanctions by supplying petroleum products to NK [3]

Contemporaries of SK President Moon Jae-in “the so-called 386 Generation” [4] have a leftwing view of NK and the world [rather than being anti-communist].

[1] https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/us-south-korea-reach-preliminary-one-year-burden-sharing-agreement/[paysite] On February 5, 2019 the US and SK reached a preliminary 1 year Burden-Sharing Agreement under which SK’s SMA contribution will rise to US$1 Billion per year.

[2] There is [mutual aid but no] automatic armed intervention clause in “Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea”. WhenNK subsequently invades SK, after a US troop withdrawal, US intervention would need the approval of the US Senate. In the worst case scenario, by the time the US tries to intervene this would be blocked by NK stationing nuclear missiles on what would be now "former SK territory".

[3] https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/01/31/asia-pacific/u-n-panel-concludes-south-korea-shipments-petroleum-north-violated-sanctions-sources-say/#.XFv1czP7TIU
“U.N. panel to accuse South Korea of violating sanctions with petroleum shipments to North, sources say”

[4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/386_GenerationThe “386 Generation” is the generationof South Koreans born in the 1960s who became leftwing activists in the anti-SK government democracy movement of the 1980s. 


“members of the 386 Generation are generally not as enthusiastic about US-[South] Korean relationships as their parents’ generation, and some have gone so far as to support the removal of US troops from the Korean peninsula altogether. Some of them are also sympathetic to the North Korean regime and advocate a peace agreement with North Korea at all costs.”

[Pete Comment - Over the decades NK, a very poor country, has spent a large proportion of its national income on building up its nuclear weapon and missile capability. NK is therefore very unlikely to dismantle its nuclear deterrent (against yet another invasion by the US). 

The only reasonable hope is that NK slows down construction of this nuclear capability and adopts a more positive attitude to South Korea, Japan, the US and other countries].

Anonymous and Pete
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Search

Some big problems doomed USS Fitzgerald before its fatal crash

February 10, 2019, 10:08 pm
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Here is some fascinating reading reproduced by Business Insider Australia, February 9, 2019, on USS Fitzgerald's many problems before its 2017 collision. Problems in the US Navy were (are?) even worse than originally thought.

USS Fitzgerald towed into US naval base Yokosuka, southwest of Tokyo, June 2017, after collision. (Photo courtesy Spc. 1st Class Peter Burghart/US Navy via AP).
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Submarine Matters originally reported on the fatal USS Fitzgerald collision on June 18, 2017 and on August 24, 2017.

Pete
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Good Youtube: Submarine food, gyms, Dear John letters, nav and collisions

February 11, 2019, 8:40 pm
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As evey man and his dog has published today on the latest Australia-France submarine sign-off, squeezed in before the May 2019 Australian Election (remember that?) I'll comment on that tomorrow. 

Meanwhile, above is a high standard submarine youtube, dated February 5, 2019, by Wendover Productions, on the following subjects: 

0 – 4 minutes - mainly nuclear weapons implications of SSBNs

2:45 UK launch and other instructions to UK SSBN if Britain destroyed

3:05 UK SSBN may then do nothing or place itself under the command of US “or Australia”
  
4:28 subs have best food, why? “The chef has nowhere to hide if food is bad” :)

4:46 fresh food only lasts 2 weeks then goes downhill to canned

6:08 relatively huge (for a sub) US cafeteria seating. [The torpedo room is no longer the biggest crew hangout place] my comments are in [...] brackets.

6:13 gym equipment

6:23 bunks still cramped

6:40 personal comms from loved ones comes to personal email addesses on US subs. But messages still read first by a comms officer to 7:00 stop distressing family news [eg. Dear John letters] 

7:20 VLF radio waves can be received underwater for instructions

7:45 VLF stations for US, UK and Australian subs include [lost at sea Australian Prime Minister] Harold E. Holt Naval (VLF) Communication Station in Western Australia

8:20 subs can actually transmit to satellite. [Though this is indiscrete, potentially interceptable by sophisticated Russian or Chinese opponents]

8:40 fully submerged navigation difficult. Active sonar indiscrete.

9:07 [Old fashioned] inertial navigation still used.

9:52 SSBNs are so stealthy that they may not sense each other - so collisions can occur – as happened in 2009 between a French and British SSBN

10:18 subs are dangerous , even in peacetime.

10:30 rescue subs


11:09 submarines are the best platform for anti-submarine warfare

Pete
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Australian Government on Future Submarine Program SPA

February 12, 2019, 11:30 pm
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COMMENT

This is a preliminary, for the record, post on what the current Coalition (noting yesterday’s news) Government of Australian Prime Minister Morrison said. This is regarding the February 11, 2019, Australian Future Submarine Program Strategic Partnering Agreement (SPA).

Further comment and analysis, at Submarine Matters, will follow next week, noting the Australian Government will almost certainly be out of office on May 18, 2019, if not before with a new Labor Party Government in office. 

A rapid change of Government, just after the SPA is signed, will weaken the legitimacy of the SPA.

As usual I've added comments in [...] brackets, links and some bolding for emphasis.

--------------------------------

MEDIA RELEASE:11 Feb 2019: Prime Minister [Morrison], Minister for Defence, Minister for Defence Industry https://www.pm.gov.au/media/government-delivers-future-submarine-program

“A key plank of the Government’s plan to keep Australians safe has been locked in with the signing of the Attack class submarine Strategic Partnering Agreement with Naval Group.
The $50 billion Attack class program will see 12 regionally superior [but inferior to SSNs] submarines designed and built in Australia for the Navy.
The formal signing of the Agreement is a defining moment for the country.
The submarines will help protect Australia’s security and prosperity for decades to come and also deepen the defence relationship between Australia and France.
Work on the submarines has taken place under the Design and Mobilisation Contract and this will continue uninterrupted under this Agreement.
Our Government is committed to maximising local industry involvement in the program to ensure Australians get the most out of this important national investment.
It’s estimated the program will generate an annual average of around 2,800 jobs, helping end the ‘valley of death’ in naval shipbuilding jobs we inherited from the Labor Party.
Work continues to deliver the first Attack class submarine, to be named HMAS Attack, in the early 2030s within budget.
The formalisation of this agreement represents the contractual basis for the program.
The decision to partner with Naval Group (formerly DCNS) was made in 2016, following a competitive evaluation process commenced by our Government after the Labor Party failed to commission even one single new ship for our Navy. During the negotiations, the Government focused on delivering an equitable and enduring agreement in the interests of our nation.
Other activities required to deliver this major program, including the development of the submarine construction yard at Osborne in South Australia, are continuing. 
The Attack class submarines are a major pillar of our $90 billion National Shipbuilding Plan, which will see 54 naval vessels built in Australia, to meet the strategic requirements set out in our 2016 Defence White Paper and giving our Navy the edge it needs in an uncertain world.”
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COMMENT

Below is an abridged version of the Transcript deleting most of Morrison’s vacuous embellishments. After all, it is a business deal. Morrison did not need to be part of the event given neither the French President nor the French Prime Minister were there. But perhaps the SPA is Morrison’s Swan song before taking a related post political career position? 

A submarine deal does not maketh a defence alliance with France, particularly since some French companies supply/have supplied weapons and components to China.] 
 -------------

PRIME MINISTER MORRISON TRANSCRIPT, 11 Feb 2019, Russell [DoD] Offices, Canberra https://www.pm.gov.au/media/remarks-strategic-partnership-signing.

PRIME MINISTER [said]: ...I also extend a very warm welcome to [French Armed Forces] Minister Florence Parly, it’s wonderful to have you here with us today. I know you’ve made a special effort to be here with us today...

To his Excellency [French Ambassador to Australia] Christophe Penot, thank you very much for all of your efforts in bringing us to this point today, working so closely....To my ministerial colleagues who are joining us today, particularly the Minister for Defence Christopher Pyne, congratulations Christopher on your stewardship of this....
What that means is that ensuring we are at the front of the pack when it comes to the latest naval vessels and firepower. As part of our Government's plan to keep Australians safe, we’re celebrating a milestone today with the next phase of our Future Submarine Program. In 2016 the Government selected France and Naval Group as our international partners to deliver a 12 strong fleet of cutting-edge submarines, as we promised to do. The signing today of the Strategic Partnership Agreement to deliver these submarines underscores the longstanding and strategic partnership between Australia and France.
...It’s more than a contract.
This is a project that will not only keep Australians safe, but it will deliver Australian jobs. It will build Australian skills. It will be made and require Australian steel....
Our Government is committed to maximising Australian industry content in the Future Submarine Program...
Hundreds of Australians are already employed on the Future Submarines Program and thousands more will be through the supply chain during the construction phase. So, as pleased as I know Premier Marshall is about the jobs in South Australia, these jobs reach right across our great continent.
The signing of this agreement today demonstrates our Government is delivering on our promise on the naval shipbuilding plan. It is a $90 billion commitment to build in total 54 new naval vessels and grow a strong, sustainable and sovereign Australian naval shipbuilding industry.
...Our region, which we keep secure, in close partnership with our valued allies. So we are delivering for our Navy, our nation and our people as we promised. We are delivering for our defence industry and jobs and we are delivering on our steadfast commitment to keep Australians safe and secure.
I conclude by thanking again all of those who have brought us to this point today, but I particularly want to commend Ministers Pyne and Parly for the wonderful working relationship they've had to bring us to where they are today and look forward to that relationship continuing into the future as we get this done. Thank you.”
Pyne and Morrison pleased with themselves, while Parly pensive. Note submarine model has that controversial pump jet which France most probably won't be supplying.
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 Next is a Submarine Matters article with Naval Group comments on the SPA.
Pete
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France's Naval Group About the Future Australian Submarine Program SPA

February 13, 2019, 10:57 pm
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Following on from yesterday's article on what the Australian Govenment said about the ShortfinBarracuda Future Australian Submarine Program Strategic Partnering Agreement (SPA) is

what French Government owned Naval Group says about the SPA.

Further comment and analysis, at Submarine Matters, will follow next week, noting the Australian Morrison Coalition Government will almost certainly be out of office on May 18, 2019, if not before with a new Labor Party Government in office. 

A rapid ousting of the Australian Government that signed the SPA will weaken the legitimacy of the SPA.

As usual I've added comments in [...] brackets, links and some bolding for emphasis.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

At http://naval-group.com.au/2019/02/11/naval-group-signs-the-strategic-partnering-agreement/

Happy signees of the Strategic Partnering Agreement Canberra February 11 2019. French Armed Forces Minister Florence Parly is in the center. (Photo courtesy Naval Group and Australian Department of Defence)
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"NAVAL GROUP SIGNS THE STRATEGIC PARTNERING AGREEMENT
February 11, 2019

A significant milestone has been achieved today with the signing of the Future Submarine Program Strategic Partnering Agreement (SPA) by the Commonwealth of Australia (CoA) and Naval Group.
The agreement was signed in the presence of Prime Minister Scott Morrison, The Hon. Christopher Pyne, Minister for Defence and Florence Parly, French Minister for the Armed Forces. 

[despite Morrison being present no equivalent French President or French Prime Minister was present. So why did Morrison turn up? Or why was the French PM not there?] 
The agreement sets out the principles of cooperation between the two partners for the Attack class Submarine Program which will see:
·       the delivery of 12 regionally superior submarines to Australia with leading edge capabilities; [maybe the Shortfin Attack class will be superior conventional subs but are/will be far inferior to China's SSNs] 
  • the delivery of new technologies and advanced manufacturing capabilities to Australia, introducing the next phase of Australian sovereignty as a submarine nation;
  • the creation of thousands of direct and indirect Australian jobs which will positively impact many generations of Australians; and
  • opportunities and long-term planning certainty for industry, allowing Australian companies involved in the submarine program to invest in the capabilities needed to support their involvement in construction and sustainment activities.
“Naval Group is known for building world-leading, technologically advanced submarines and has built 100 of them for nine different countries,” said Hervé Guillou, Chairman and CEO, Naval Group.
“This agreement with Australia will see Naval Group transfer the “know-how” and “know-why” to Australia to become a sovereign submarine nation. [Assembling a large proportion of French and Lockheed Martin (LM) US combat system parts does not add up to "sovereign". Don't forget the US LM mainly operating in Adelaide, is undertaking one third of the whole project.]
“We are very excited about the opportunities that lay ahead of us and are committed to delivering the Future Submarine Program for Australia.
“We are grateful to the teams from the Commonwealth of Australia and Naval Group who have worked hard to achieve this agreement,” said Mr Guillou.
Since being selected as Australia’s partner for the Attack class Submarine Program in April 2016, a lot has been achieved. 
[Really? Given full-sized hydrodynamic trials and stealth testing of the yet-to-be-launched baseline Barracuda SSN has not yet been achieved.]
Program milestones
  • Pre-sizing of the Future Submarine has been completed.
  • The Feasibility Study phase of the Future Submarine design contract being undertaken in France with the support of Australian engineers has been completed. This involves working closely with the Commonwealth to ensure the Future Submarine meets functionality, scheduling and cost requirements.
  • The first sod has been turned at the Future Submarine construction yard in Adelaide. Phase 1 of the onsite works will focus on site establishment, earth works and piling for the new facilities with the development to create at least 600 jobs.
  • The transfer of technology commenced with the relocation of the first group of Australian engineers to France to learn how to carry out the detailed design of the Future Submarines. The next group of engineers will depart for France in March 2019.
  • Officially opened the Future Submarine Program office in Cherbourg housing Naval Group personnel alongside their Defence and Lockheed Martin Australia [are, there LM is, in Cherbourg (not Adelaide)] colleagues.
  • Continued to work with education facilities, TAFEs and universities, having forged a collaborative engineering and research Memorandum of Understanding with the University of New South Wales.
  • Suppliers of the top five pieces of equipment including the main motor, diesel generators, switchboards, batteries and weapons discharge systems have been reviewed and will be announced in 2019.
Industry milestones
  • Continue to maximise the opportunities for Australian Industry involvement in the program, through all phases, without compromising the Commonwealths requirements against capability, cost and schedule.
o   To date Naval Group has engaged with over 1,100 Australian suppliers through expression of interests, requests for information, supplier visits and industry events to develop a in depth understanding of Australia Industry capability.
o   169 Australian suppliers have been pre-qualified for the program with Naval Group Australia.
o   Conducted numerous engagement activities in France and Australia to connect potential European and Australian suppliers.
  • Released Expressions of Interests and Requests for Information for major equipment and common technologies equipment for the Future Submarine.
  • Commenced efforts to procure capital equipment related to the Submarine Construction Yard including machining equipment, painting booths, a plate rolling machine, a plasma cutting machine, water jet cutting machine, rotating cradle and a milling machine. [theissue of "milling" a propeller OR parts of a pump jet still needs resolution.]
  • Conducted nine Future Submarine industry briefings across the nation providing Australian companies information on how to become involved in the Future Submarine Program.
Naval Group Australia milestones
  • Established our headquarters in Keswick, Adelaide.
  • Expanded the Naval Group Australia team from 15 employees to over 100. By 2028-2029, when production is in full swing, we expect to employ 1,600 people.
  • Successfully became ISO 9001 certified.
See the above Naval Group words in PDF, as well as extra wording about Naval Group and Naval Group Australia contact details here.

COMMENT

Next week - how Naval Group rebutted certain Australian media comments on the severe delay of Naval Group's not-yet-launched baseline Barracuda/Suffren class SSN (laid down 2007 I kid you not!). 

Pete
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Characteristics of the German-Norwegian Type 212CD Submarine

February 14, 2019, 11:22 pm
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The above Youtube is from Poland's Balt Military Expo 2018. At 1 minute in the Type 212CD is introduced by a senior ThyssenKrupp executive. (Youtube courtesy Xavier Vavasseur, Chief Editor, Navy Recognition). 
---

Following Anonymous’s December 20, 2017 advicethanks Anonymous for providing comments of February 12, 2019further translated below by Pete.

According to recent information [1], [2] and [3]theTKMS Type 212CD (for Common Design) will be equipped with Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs), two MTU diesels, a new generation PMSM (Siemens Permasyn motor) and new generation fuel cell (FC) AIP (utilising Siemens' metal hydride).

In the new generation FC, the metal hydride as a hydrogen source makes it safer than a more flammable hydrogen cylinder. A downside of metal hydride is its heavy weight, so an overall increase in submarine buoyancy is needed.

TKMS and Spain’s SENER are developing a more advanced methanol reforming FC technology. A weak point of methanol reforming FC is its limited diving depth due to the physical need to expel carbon dioxide against countervailing water pressure. Such a limitation has already been identified in Kockums Stirling AIP technology.

Like the preceding Type 212A, the 212CD’s hull is made of non-magnetic steel.

Judging by the ease of design, efficiency of production and common use of parts, the 212CD is presumably a larger version of the existing 212A owing to the extra diesel and larger crew quarters on the 212CD . This is in the same way that SAAB A26 Pelagic series can be stretched (with a hull plug addition) into Oceanic and Oceanic ER versions.

The hull diameter/beam of the 212CD may be the same (at 6.8m) as the 212A. This is because any change to the diameter would require a total rearrangement of 212 structure and parts. L (length) to D(diameter) ratio for the 212A is 8.23 (L=56m, D=6.8m) within the maximum L/D ration of a modern submarine of 10.5.

If L/D ration for the 212CD is 10.5, then this may point to a theoretical Length of 71.5m for the 212CD. Furthermore this may point to a 212CD displacement increase of around 20% (maybe 2,200 long tons submerged) compared to the 212A’s 1,830 long tons submerged.

Noting this caution, the 212CD’s LIBs will very likely be SAFT made lithium iron phosphate (LFP) which is stable at low temperature making the 212CD suited to operation in below zero Celsius Baltic Sea or Arctic Ocean conditions.

A simple exchange of the 212A’s Lead-acid Batteries (LABs) for LIBs is not feasible because LIBs operate at significantly higher voltages than LABs. This means many of the components and electrical junctions for the 212CD will need to be new.

Use of the 212CD for the Netherland’s Walrus replacement is difficult, because the likely Dutch diameter/beam requirement is 8.4m, which is considerably larger than the 212CD’s possible 6.8m diameter. This means if TKMS does not offer a large Type 216 (once offered to Australia) TKMS may lose a Walrus replacement decision in the early 2020s. Instead a large SAAB A26 (and see) or a small Naval Group Shortfinmay win the Walrus replacement competition.

[1]https://www.tu.no/artikler/norges-nye-ubater-kan-fa-nyutviklede-litiumion-batterier-fra-thyssenkrupp/449338[right-click mouse translate from Norwegian.] Norway's new submarines can receive newly developed lithium ion batteries offered by ThyssenKrupp.

[2]https://www.tu.no/artikler/norges-nye-ubat-kan-bli-forst-med-litiumionbatterier-eller-sist-med-blybatterier/427238[in Norwegian] Norway's new submarine can be first with lithium-ion batteries - or last with lead-acid batteries.

[3]https://www.defence24.com/pdf/?article=orka--the-german-way-will-the-polish-navy-submarines-be-built-in-szczecin[PDF about 5MB, in English] “ORKA – The German Way: Will The Polish Navy Submarines Be Built In Szczecin?” page 5. There is a scarcity of information available on the 212CD submarines. Even the dimensions remain confidential. The vessel is going to be derived from the 212A submarines. As the representatives of the shipyard admit, the [212CD] will be fitted with two MTU diesels, while the older [212As] use a single [diesel]. Also see more on Poland’s future submarine competition.

COMMENT

As will be seen next week there is uncertainty over the Type 212CD’s 2 x MTU diesel arrangement, which may make it more suitable as a Walrus replacement than originally thought.

Mostly Anonymous and a bit Pete
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