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Australia's new (or pre-existing?) SPAD (anti-submarine?) research.

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Australia's Defence Science and Technology (DST) organisation has been developing a single-photon avalanche detector (SPAD) that may one day have anti-submarine applications. Below is a summary of the DST Media Release of April 10, 2019:

When suspended from a hovering drone just above the sea surface the aim is to dip the SPAD detector underwater. Working with a laser system SPAD may one day detect underwater objects (like mines, UUVs and submarines) by sensing low-light reflections.

[Pete Comment: There seems to be similarities with LIDAR].

SPAD is funding by the RAAF's Plan Jericho which, in part, is researching advanced sensors.

The SPAD system has been tested from a wharf at the Osborne shipyard in Adelaide, South Australia, then off a boat at sea near the Western Australian naval base, HMAS Stirling. 

"While the team successfully demonstrated underwater detection, Mau says there's still plenty of room for improvement, including optimising the optics and image processing."

The current SPAD chip is "a mere" 32×32 pixels of resolution and needs to be upgraded to 256×256 pixels to improve the sensor to practical effectiveness.

From dipping the SPAD sensor off a wharf and then off a boat at sea initial trials have been made with a custom-built, heavy-lift, unpiloted multicopter off the South Australian coast. 

FURTHER READING

A broader and I would say closely related principle is https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single-photon_avalanche_diode [which also carriers the acronym "SPAD"].

________________________________________________________

Separately, but not connected to the DST research, below is an example (with Australian connections) of a Heavy Lift Unpiloted Multi-copter carryng delicate equipment.


Pete

Russia's UET-1 electric propelled torpedo ordered by Russian Navy - Part Three

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An expert on Russian submarines "Starshiy" has kindly provided extra information on the Russian  electric battery propelled torpedoes being ordered by the Russian Navy. Starshiy advises:

"The TE-2 [in SubMatts' April 2, 2019 article] has not been ordered by the Russian Navy."

Russia's TASS News Agency instead advised, September 8, 2018 https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/5539446 that the Russian Navy instead chose 73 x UET-1s electric torpedoes to be delivered from 2019 to 2023. These are produced by Russia's Tactical Missiles Corporation"

Starshiy has added extra information:

The UET-1 is a 533mm "universal" [multi-purpose] electric torpedo made by Russia's Tactical Missiles Corporation's Dagdizel factory.

UET-1s will replace the obsolete, slower, lower detection range USET-80 [in German] from 2019. The order for 73 x UET-1s costs 7.2 billion rubles (about €103 million). The UET-1 was selected against competition from the TE-2.

UET-1 Specifications:

-  Maximum range: 50km
-  Max speed: 50 knots
-  Range of the homing controller from submarine: 3.4km
-  Surface ship wake indication time: 500 seconds.
-  Torpedo can regulate its speed.


Russian officials (including Anatoly Galyaev in senior Colonel's uniform now in Armaments Branch?) admire UET-1 torpedo components at Russia's Tactical Missiles Corporation Dagdizel torpedo factory (Photo courtesy Russian Ministry of Defence Media Release
 https://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12164690@egNews )
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Starshiy and Pete

What Does Indonesia Do With Its Submarines? on Tuesday 16th April 2019

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The launch by PT PAL of Indonesia's first homebuilt submarine will appear next Monday 15th April 2019.

Followed by What Does Indonesia Do With Its Submarines? on Tuesday.

Pete

Indonesia to Have 6 Modern Submarines by 2026, Maybe 12 total by 2035!

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It was came as a surprise on Friday (April 12, 2019) that Indonesia with DSME had signed a contract for 3 additional submarines by 2026. [Please see Indonesian Submarine Table (1959 – 2035) below for specifics and links.]

This is on top of the 3 submarines already received (2017, 2018 and KRI Alugoro 405 (launched April 11, 2019)).

All 6 submarines are known as Improved Chang Bogo, Type 209/1400s. All do/will rely on good German engineering via South Korean, DSME, efficiency.

The prospect of Indonesia owning 6 new submarines by 2026 while Australia's 6 Collins age will be making Australia's Navy quietly nervous.

Also, I have been reporting since February 20, 2014 (see that article here) that some Indonesian leaders and admirals are also interested in acquiring an additional 6 submarines, which may be South Korean DSME designed Type 214s (with formidable fuel cell AIP) - all adding up to 12.

If Indonesia has 12 fairly new submarines compared to 6 old Collins BEFORE Australia's first Attack-class sub is commissioned in 2035 - then this may represent a balance of power problem for Australia. 

See the Table below which takes the reader from Indonesia's first Whiskey/Tjakra-class (1959) submarine to the final Improved Chang Bogo (or Type 214 submarines) by 2035.

Indonesian Submarine Table (1959 – 2035)

Class/Sub Name/No.
Launched/
Delivered
Details – Comments
KRI = Ship of Republic of Indonesia
Tjakra class
12 from 1959 to scrapping in the 1970s.
12 Whiskey/Tjakra class built 1952? by Soviets and delivered to Indonesia on/from 1959. Initial training of key Indonesian officers and crew was in Poland. The declining relationship between Indonesia and the Soviets in 1965 resulted from fight with Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Led to a spare parts crisis in the Navy. Navy decommissioned some subs for their spare parts. Lack of Soviet assistance including spare parts led to all, but (410) being srapped by the 1970s.
KRI Tjakra (401)
Delivered Sept 12, 1959
First Whiskey/Tjakra class.
involved in West Irian takeover. Scrapped 1970. Former Captain was Manambai Abdulkadir, Deputy Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral of TNI.
KRI Trisula (402?),
KRI Trisula’s number is unknown
KRI Nagabanda (403)
?? (403)
 Name unknown.
KRl Nagarangsang (404),
?? (405)
 Name unknown.
KRI Alugoro (406)
?? (407)
 Name unknown.
KRI Tjandrasa (408)
Successfully launched an attack on the Dutch forces in West Papua area. In Operation TJAKRA II by infiltrating Special Forces on West Papua
?? (409)
 Name unknown.
KRI Pasopati (410)
decommissioned 25 January 1990. Now a submarine museum in Surabaya.
KRl Tjundamani (411)
?? (412)
 Name unknown.

Cakra class
Cakra class German HDW (now TKMS) built in Kiel. Are Type 209/1300. 8 x 533mm tubes with 14 AEG torpedoes. SPECIFICATIONS last refurbished 2012.[18]
KRI Cakra 401
SPECIFICATIONS Old at 2019 may be for 
training only.
KRI Nanggala 402
SPECIFICATIONS Old, still operational 2019.

Nagapasa class
3 submarine contract signed with South Korea's DSME, December 20, 2011. US$1.12 Billion total to build 3 x Improved Chang Bogo class, variants of the Type 209/1400 (beating Russian, French and German bids with better training, offset and logistics package). 

  "  KRI Nagapasa 403
Delivered 2017
  "  KRI Ardadedali 404
  "  KRI Alugoro 405
Launched
May be commissioned 2019 PT PAL at Surabaya
Unnamed class
could remain Nagapasa class
no sub names, 
still Type 209/1400s
US$1 billion contract with DSME signed April 12, 2019 in Bandung, Indonesia, to conclude in late March 2026. for contract with South Korea’s three Type 209/1400 Improved Chang Bogo submarines.
  "
 Probably 2024.
4th Nagapasa PT PAL to build 2 modules  to be sent to Okpo, South Korea (SK) where sub will be assembled with DSME’s 4 modules.
  "
 Probably 2025.
5th Nagapasa PT PAL to build 4 modules to be sent to Okpo SK, to be assmbled with DSME's 2 modules
  "
 By 2026.
6th Nagapasa may be assembled in PT Pal Surabaya, Indonesia.
Possible
Unnamed
Class
 By 2035
Possible 6 additional Improved Change Bogos or South Korean DSME designed Type 214s (with AIP).
First likely built in South Korea. Final five may be assembled by PT PAL, Surabaya, Indonesia.


It is significant that experts have predicted Indonesia’s economy will be 3 times the size of Australia’s by 2030.

Pete

Indonesia Submarine Table Revised: Dutch West New Guinea

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Below, the Indonesian Submarine Table (1959 – 2035) has been revised today.

An interesting part of it is why the Soviet Union quickly supplied Indonesia with 12 Whiskey submarines from 1959. In 1949 (after World War Two) the discredited Dutch East Indies colonial government was defeated in the Indonesian War of Independence.  But the Dutch still remained in the mineral rich province of Western New Guinea.

It was in Indonesian (we want our country) and Soviet (war against the West) interests to oust the Dutch. This required naval forces, including submarines, for the creation of the indonesian Navy. 

Using Soviet financial credit Indonesia “purchased” 12 Whiskey/Tjakra class submarines under the  Indonesian-Soviet Union Agreement of 1958Training of Indonesian crews took place secretly in Poland (1959) and Soviet Vladivostok (1962)The Whiskey subs were delivered to Indonesia between September 1959 and December 1962Russia also provided the large submarine tender KRI Ratulangi. Many Soviet built surface ships and jet fighters and bombers were also supplied to Indonesia.

In July 1959, the Indonesian government adopted a policy of Confrontation (Konfrontasi) against the Dutch. Indonesia's submarines dropped special forces on vital parts West New Guinea province. The Indonesians also used surface ships and paratrooper drops to fight the Dutch. Politically the United Nations, the US and Australia were very active in putting pressure on the Dutch to decolonise from the province. 
Once West New Guinea was liberated in 1962 the cost of maintaining 12 submarines was too great for then new and poor Indonesia. After Indonesia destroyed the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in 1965 the Soviets were no longer willing to foot most of the cost (including spare parts) of the submarines, ships and aircraft. Also there was no regional submarine arms race - as no other Southeast Asian country could afford submarines. Even China and India had no large submarine forces in the 1950s-60s and Japan no substantial forces until the late 1960s. 
So eleven of Indonesia's Whiskeys were scrapped by the 1970s with only KRI Pasopati (410) being put on dry land exhibition in Surabaya.
More on What Indonesia Does With Its Submarines tomorrow.
Indonesian Submarine Table (1959 – 2035) - Revised April 16, 2019

Class/Sub Name/No.
Launched/
Delivered
Details – Comments
KRI = Ship of Republic of Indonesia

Tjakra class

(wiki source for
names & numbers) 
12 from 1959 to scrapping in the 1970s.
Using Soviet (Russian) credit Indonesia “purchased” 12 Whiskey/Tjakra class under Indonesian-Soviet Union agreement of 1958. Subs originally built 1952? by Soviets & delivered to Indonesia Sept 1959 to Dec 1962.Training crews in Poland 1959 & Vladivostok 1962. Maintained by KRI Ratulangi [worth an article!] submarine tender ship esp in 1962. Break with Soviets from 1965 due to Indon treatment of PKI. Led to a spare parts crisis in the Navy. Navy decom some subs for spare parts. All, but (410) scrapped by the 1970s due to ousting Dutch by 1962, no Sov assistance 1965-on, lack of spare parts.
First Whiskey/Tjakra class.
Major action & main reason for being of all Whiskey/Tjakra class was liberation of West New Guinea from Dutch in 1962. Russian 1962 delivery crews may have remained in those 6 subs even in W New Guinean waters!
Delivered Jan 1962
Scrapped 1970. Former Captain was Manambai Abdulkadir, Deputy Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral of TNI.
KRI Tjandrasa (406)
first KRI Alugoro (407)Delivered Dec 1962
KRl Tjundamani (408)
Successfully launched an attack on the Dutch forces in Operation TJAKRA II by infiltrating Special Forces on West New Guinea
KRI Widjajadanu (409)

KRI Pasopati (410)
decommissioned 25 January 1990. Now a submarine museum in Surabaya.
KRI Hendrajala (411)
KRI Bramastra (412)
2 x no name WhiskeysDelivery dates unknownfor spare parts only
Cakra class
Two sub Cakra class German HDW (now TKMS) built in Kiel. Are Type 209/1300. 8 x 533mm tubes with 14 x AEG torpedoes. SPECIFICATIONS last refurbished 2012.[18]
KRI Cakra 401
SPECIFICATIONS Old at 2019 may be for training only.
KRI Nanggala 402

SPECIFICATIONS Old, still operational 2019.
Nagapasa class
3 submarine contract signed with South Korea's DSME, December 20, 2011. US$1.12 Billion total to build 3 x Improved Chang Bogo class, variants of the Type 209/1400 (beating Russian, French and German bids with better training, offset and logistics package). 
KRI Nagapasa 403
Delivered 2017
1st Nagapasa
KRI Ardadedali 404
2nd Nagapasa
KRI Alugoro 405
Launched April 11, 2019 Surabaya
3rd Nagapasa, Commissioned 2019? PT PAL assembled.
no sub names
US$1 billion contract with DSME signed April 12, 2019 in Bandung, Indonesia, to conclude in late March 2026. for contract with South Korea’s three Type 209/1400 Improved Chang Bogo submarines.
  "
 Probably 2024.
4th Nagapasa PT PAL to build 2 modules  to be sent to Okpo, South Korea (SK) where sub will be assembled with DSME’s 4 modules.
  "
 Probably 2025.
5th Nagapasa PT PAL to build 4 modules to be sent to Okpo SK, to be assmbled with DSME's 2 modules
  "
 By 2026.
6th Nagapasa may be assembled by PT PAL Surabaya, Indonesia.
Possible 6 more Nagapasas (409 to 414) or

New Class likely Type 214s
 By 2035
Possible 6 additional Nagapasa Improved Change Bogos or New Class South Korean DSME designed Type 214s (with AIP).

First likely built in South Korea. Final five may be assembled by PT PAL, Surabaya, Indonesia.
NOTE: Many of the links are in Indonesian. Word for submarine is "kapal selam" ("KS").  

Pete

Indonesia's Broad Strategic Picture - More on Submarines Next Week

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Indonesia's armed forces are dominated by a large army which is still influential in Indonesian politics and in the operation of army reliant businesses. The army's main role is maintaining internal security including preventing Indonesia (a country of many islands) from splitting up. Meanwhile compared to the army the air force and navy are relatively small maintaining good relations with nearby Singapore and Australia and somewhat more complicated relations with Malaysia and the Philippines. Chinese naval forces are too powerful for Indonesia to take on, without US help.

Indonesia has a rapidly growing (just over 5% GDP growth annually) mixed economy from a base of having the world's 16th largest economy (by nominal GDP). Much of Indonesia's wealth is on outer islands or under the sea - something other countries or separatist groups might covet.

As the good wiki saysThe Indonesian Navy is, of course, the naval branch of the Indonesian National Armed Forces. The Navy was founded on 10 September 1945 and has a role to patrol Indonesia's lengthy coastline, to enforce and patrol the territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Indonesia. The Navy also protects Indonesia's maritime strategic interests, protects the islands surrounding Indonesia, and defends against seaborne threats.

Indonesia's Submarine Force is gradually growing from a token force of two, old, Cakra class  submarines to a viable force of six modern Nagapasa class submarines (3 exist now and 3 more will be built by 2026) see Table yesterday. 

One point of friction is whether Malaysia, Indonesia or both own undersea Ambalat oil and gas  pockets just to the northeast of Kalimantan (better known as Borneo - see Map A. below). I reported on ongoing Ambalat friction 2009-2012. Indonesia's submarines could monitor Malaysian naval movements over Ambalat and instil uncertainty in that navy. It is unclear whether Ambalat friction has been resolved as at 2019.

Indonesia has tried to better address strategic/economic naval competition and to recognise that the outer islands of Indonesia are more than just a support system for the major commands/bases at Jakarta and Surabaya on Java. Indonesia is addressing this by building a tri-service Armed Forces base on the island of Natuna-Besar. Natuna is just to the west of central Borneo and on the southern periphery of the disputed South China Sea. A forward base for Indonesia's submarines is part of the Natuna plan. Army, air and naval forces in Natuna are/will be closer to all other countries of Southeast Asia. Natuna's surrounding EEZ lies astride China's notorious South China Sea "Nine-Dash Line" (in red on Map B below). 

Map A. All red distance lines point to the central strategic position of Indonesia's Armed Forces Base island of Natuna . See https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2018/08/14/defending-territorial-integrity-over-natuna-islands.html which sums up Natuna's importance well. 
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Map B. The South China Sea and conflicting national territorial water claims including China's "Nine-Dash Line" in red
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That is a very brief description of Indonesia's broad strategic picture. What Indonesia submarines do - sometimes interacting with Australian naval forces - will be revealed next week.

Pete

No F-22! Buy stealth, twinjet aircraft from China and Russia - Updated.

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On April 8, 2019 I wrote that Japan is frustrated that its twinjet F-15Js (ideal for intercepts) are wearing out doing so many peaceful interceptions. The 147 single engined F-35s that Japan has bought are basically underpowered for the peaceful intercept job - being relativey too slow horizontally and in climb rates. The F-35 is also not power-control surface configured to do the agile vectoring required of an air superiority fighter.

The Lockheed Martin comeback that the F-35s can perform interceptions with missiles from beyond visual range is not useful for peacetime interception when the interceptee has to visually see and then be escorted out by the interceptor. Hence a powerful (twinjet) aircraft is needed - preferably with more modern stealth levels than 4th generation F-15s.

Given the US's woeful decision (in 2006) not to export its twinjet 5th generation F-22 it is likely the US will decide not to export its proposed 6th generation F-X air superiority fighter. In any case the 20 year lead times for the F-35 and F-22 suggest the F-X will only be available to its likely only permitted customer, the US, in the late 2030s.

Russia has successfuly continued selling Kilo submarines to export customers for decades. More recently China is demonstrating that it can sell Yuan submarines (to Pakistan and Thailand) - submarines part reverse engineered from Russian Kilos.

So why can't Russia and China sell advanced air superiority fighters, with stealth features to a greater variety, of countries?  Russia was over-ambitious in going into a joint venture with India for developing Russia's fifth generation fighter PAK FA aka Su-57. India brought money to the project but India had no substantial stealth technological background to contribute.

In contrast a Russian-Chinese joint stealth dynamic would be different and may be already occurring with Russia's export of Su-35s with to China (see Diplomat) (also to India and Egypt). Advanced Su-35 vectoring, supercruisSaturn AL-41F1S engines are a particular attraction.

Such a defacto stealth development could produce results and for Russia's and China's it could avoid their duplication of stealth effort.

A Russian Chinese twin-jet stealth air-superiortity fighter might be the result by the late 2020s. Sales of export versions to Japan, India, France and other major customers may result.

After 4 more years of isolationist Trumpism (2020-early 2025) and suffering the US's continuing twinjet stealth embargo, countries will need to be more self-reliant from the US "alliance". Major countries may increasingly emulate India's policy of non-aligned arms purchasing from many powers.

Also those same major countries might have already bought F-35 stealth technology at the US's monopoly pricing and not want to suffer the same poor buying position again...

Pete

A Good Friday for Our Lord Trump

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In a just world Crucifixion would have followed the not-trumped up charges of Our Lord  obstructing due process - such was the faith in the FBI (Findings Into Blasphemy) Inquiry.

Instead this is a GOOD Friday for Our Lord. Sage soothsayers foretell such is his popularity compared to relatively obscure Democrats Our Lord is a sure bet to win a Second Term
(2020 to January 20, 2025).

 Alas. Our Lord's crucifixion would have been a hoot!



Pete

What Indonesia's Submarines might be used for, Missions - Part 4

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Continuing Submarine Matters' April 2019 articles on Indonesian submarines Parts 1, 2 and 3:

For more than 37 years (delivered from West Germany in 1981) Indonesia has operated just 2 Cakra class submarines (KRI Cakra 401 and KRI Nanggala 402). As they were often undergoing prolonged upgrades and regular maintenance they were largely a token force. Indonesia may have kept to 2 because the competitor Malaysia had no subs in the 1980s-early 2000s increasing to just 2 Scorpenes in 2007-2008.

The 2 Cakra's are probably inactive most of the time as their hulls (with only a limited number of full immersion cycles) and diesels are wearing out. Perhaps they are now mainly training platforms.  


That picture has now changed with the launch of 3 new"Nagapasa class" submarines 2017-2019 

-  In 2017, DSME delivered KRI Nagapasa 403 to the Indonesian Navy. 
-  A second Nagapasa KRI Ardadedali was delivered 2018. 
-  DSME built the modules for the third Nagapasa, KRI Alugoro 405 at Okpo Shipyard, South Korea
    and sent them to PT PAL Surabaya for assembly and launch (April 11, 2019).

In November 2018, DSME received the 3 additional Nagapasa orders, announced April 12, 2019 with the subs to be delivered by 2026.  

COMBAT SYSTEM (Weapons and Sensors)

A way to estimate what Indonesia's submarines may be used for is to look at the Combat System suite. The Nagapasa class' sensors and weapons are adequate (a match for Malaysia's non-AIP Scorpenes) though perhaps of lower quality and weapons quantity to the Australian neighbours' Collins and Singapore's Invincibles/Type 218s. The strategic threat, China's, latest SSN and SSK submarines, would by superior in quality and quantity to even 6 or 12 Nagapasas. Meanwhile the other neighbour, the Philippines, has no submarines and may only have a couple in the 2030s. The tiny Brunein Navy will probably never have subs. 


Weapons


-  8 x 533mm torpedo tubes, with a total of 14 heavyweight shots, including:
   =  Black Shark torpedoes, 

   =  UGM-84 Harpoon (anti-ship, capable of land attack) missiles.
   =  maybe 28 torpedo tube launched mines, in a dedicated minelaying mission.

Sensors


The 3 launched Nagapasas aka Improved Chang Bogos have combat systems that include:


-  Optronic masts (better than periscopes) 
-  Atlas Elektronik CSU 90 hull-mounted passive and active search-and-attack sonar and flank sonars -  Indra's Pegaso RESM system and Aries low-probability of intercept radar, 
-  L3's MAPPS integrated platform management systems and 
-  Safran's Sigma 40XP inertial navigation systems.

MISSIONS

Geography

The Nagapasa class range is 10,300nm (19,000km) combined surface, snorting and fully submerged movement at an average of around 6 knots. This allows them to make a return trip between any two points of Indonesia's very broad 5,120km (from East to West) Archipelago. A mission from the main base at Surabaya, Java to the developing northern forward base at Natuna island, and then patrol, might be common.

Indonesia is a maze of islands and choke points. The Nagapasa's may be able to sit on a chokepoint seafloor for 6 days but not the 2-3 weeks that AIP would permit. No AIP may be due to AIP's high cost and AIP is more suited to Singaporean, Swedish and German style very short missions.


Monitoring non-state actors

Much of mission activity will include monitoring using electronics (ie. signals interception). Such interception "targets" might include the naval and Indonesian coast guard vessels of neighbours (including Australia). China's navy, coastguard and Chinese government backed fishing fleets

More publically targets of electronic interception might include the shorter range radio signals of difficult to govern non-state actors (see yellow areas of Map A. below) eg. ship/boat hijackers (related to them) pirates, drug smugglers and Islamist separatists/terrorists.

Once a Nagapasa submarine senses a non-state actor target its torpedoes and missiles are too heavy and expensive (more than US$1.5 million per shot) to destroy a small boat. Also you'd blow up people who may only be suspects and blow up all the evidence! So, instead a submarine (using tethered signal buoy beaming to satellite?) may alert an Indonesian Navy patrol boat or Coast Guard patrol boat. That patrol boat may launch a smaller rigid hulled boat armed with machine guns, to deal with the target boat more "gently".

State actors?

More quietly the submarines are capable of monitoring and engaging their neighbours. With only 35 officers-sailors needing accommodation on Nagapasa , on special missions there may be space for:

-  around 4 intercept operators/linguists with 4 work stations, or 


-  around 7 divers-special forces and their equipment for sabotage, intelligence gathering, etc.

Some missions may be to monitor mainly Chinese, US, Australian, Malaysian, Philippine and Singaporean warship and submarine movements. Also monitoring movements of any other navies crossing the Indonesian Archipelago.


Map A. courtesy Stratfor’s report Southeast Asia's Treacherous Waters of June 2, 2016. 
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Map B. Indonesia. See much larger here (courtesy University of Texas). Shows how many islands and chokepoints there are to influence Nagapasa submarine missions. Monitoring non-state actors is likely a big part of the job because illegal non-state actors could politically further fragment Indonesia. Indonesia's more distant islands also share borders (and sometimes interests) with Malaysia's and the Philippines distant islands. All three countries meet in (and patrol) the Tri-Border Area which includes the Celebes and Sulu seas - a place where pirate/hijackers flourish.

Map C. Indonesian seafloor depth map. Showing much of the seafloor between western Indonesia islands is less than 200m deep - making it dangerous for shallow submarine travel in daylight. In such shallow water the magnetic signatures might be more easily detected by aircraft even at night. Meanwhile in eastern Indonesia there are many dangerous to navigate coral reefs (see reddots) between island chokepoints.

Indonesia has a complex sea and island geography that will prove a challenge for its new Nagapasa submarines.

SOME USEFUL SOURCES

Pete

Indonesian Submarine Mission Down Western Australian Coast 1963-64 - Part 5

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Often the saying "If you want to learn something new, read an old book" is proven true. To that end I've been scrolling through an Indonesian language Weapons Technology website that contains an interesting 2011 article. That article consists of snippets of various Indonesian submarine commanders' memories of their service, 1959 to 2009.

I first visited the 2011 article in 2015 writing about it then.

I revisited it today because it contains rare details of an Indonesian submarine voyage down the Western Australian coast. That brought the sub to the approaches of Australia's second largest naval base which was/is eventually called Fleet Base West situated in the Rockingham-Fremantle area just below Perth, Western Australia. The broader base area was heavily used by many US and some UK Royal Navy submarines during World War Two - subs that sank a great deal of Japanese shipping.

The snippet below concerns Indonesian submarine KRI Nagabanda's reconnaissance mission down the western Australian coast to the approaches to Australia's second largest naval base (after Sydney Harbour). At that time, 1963-64, there was tension between Indonesia and Australia, who were fighting in a small, quiet, war in Malaysia. If things had become more serious Australian shipping might have been at risk from (at that time Indonesia's) substantial force of 12 Whiskey-Tjakra class submarines. 


Some of Indonesia's 12 Whiskey-Tjakra class submarines, which it owned 1959-early 1970s. 
(Photo courtesy the Indonesian 2011 article).
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THE INDONESIAN ARTICLE 

That article is a collection of original stories told by the commanders involved with the title (translated into English) 50 years of Devotion to the “Shark” [Submarine] Service 1959-2009


"WASTE WASTE IN AUSTRALIA 

This story took place in 1963-1964,when I [an unnamed Indonesian Commander] had passed the submarine commander's school and waited for placement. At that time, there was still an incessant confrontation with Malaysia.

Finally I was appointed as commander of KRI Nagabanda. [A Whiskey-Tjakra class submarine delivered by the Soviets to Indonesia in January 1962].

Some submarines at that time were assigned to carry out reconnaissance in the southern Chinese sea, while KRI Nagabanda was assigned to eastern Indonesia. All Indonesian vessels were under the control of the Commander of the Alert Fleet Command, Commodore RP Poernomo.

At that time there have been tensions with Malaysia which was becoming independent from the UK. [Indonesia was in confrontation with] Malaysia and Singapore and other British Commonwealth forces, including Australia. Is was almost certain that Australia was interfering [which it very quietly was], therefore Indonesian Naval Command decided my sub should conduct a surveillance of  Australian waters. 

The [KRI Nagabanda] left [Indonesia's main submarine base] Surabaya [on the main island of Java, Indonesia] for Kupang [an Indonesian provincial center and small forward naval base on Indonesian West Timor]. Arriving in Timor, KRI Nagabanda anchored in the port and took on fresh food. It then raised anchor and sailed south. During the day we snorkelled [using the diesel engines to charge our] batteries. At night we sailed on the surface. We made sure to stay more than 50 miles away from the Australian coast [outside Australia's territorial waters].

After sailing roughly to the west of the city of Perth [and Australia's second largest naval base], the air inside our sub became really cold, not the usual [tropical heat-warm water we're used to]. We had not come equipped with warm clothes when we left Surabaya. So I decided to turn around to the north, back to Kupang. [West Timor. Also the submarine's limited diesel fuel/range and likely orders to go down close Australia's second largest naval base may have been significant].  

On the way to Kupang, my administrative officer, Lieutenant Ali Kamal, suggested "Commander, to mark KRI Nagabanda being in the waters west of Australia, we should dispose of the garbage here." 

I agreed with this noble proposal, and so ordered that used food cans, especially those made in Indonesia, and other waste, should be thrown into the sea. 

In carrying out this task, KRI Nagabanda managed to enter the waters of western Australia without being noticed by Australian ships."

PETE COMMENT

"without being noticed by Australian ships." may have been wishful thinking. I'll raise that issue tomorrow.

Pete

Can Australia Monitor Foreign Submarines Along Our Coasts?

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I'm now relating the April 24, 2019's article how Indonesian submarine KRI Nagabanda sailed south along the West Australian coast with the likelihood that Australian undersea sensors picked up Nagabanda's movements. In 1963-64 KRI Nagabanda's commander claimed/hoped that his submarine journeyed "without being noticed by Australian ships" but the undersea sensors may have alerted Australian ships to KRI Nagabanda's presence.

As KRI Nagabanda stayed outside the 50 mile coastal limit and Indonesia-Australia were not at war they allowed. KRI Nagabanda to continue unhindered. 

UNDERSEA SENSORS

When KRI Nagabanda sailed in 1963 two types of sensors had been used by Australia and/or its UK and US allies for 45 years

Undersea sensors to detect submarines have a long and established history including:

magnetic anomaly indicator loops developed and first used by the UK Royal Navy in 
   October 1918 to destroy German submarine UB-116, 

Relating this technology to Australia an Australian, Dr Richard Walding comments“Indicator Loops are long lengths of cable laid on the seafloor of harbours to detect enemy submarines.  They were developed by the Royal Navy in the early 1900s and first trialled at the end of WW1.  They were then successfully deployed in WW2in British ports both at home, in the Dominions (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, Kenya, Ceylon, Penang) or in allied harbours (Iceland, Holland, Dardanelles). By 1942 the United States had adapted this technology for its own needs." 

Comment: Magnetic anomaly sensors might still be used to protect Australia's Fleet Bases East and West.

-  and passive acoustic sensors "hydrophones", (also see)  developed and used in 1918 against 
   UB-116 by the British. The US adopted this technology and applied it worldwide as the Sound
   Surveillance System (SOSUS) network. SOSUS was/is most famously used in the North Atlantic
  (GIUK Gap

A US Navy publication on SOSUS also reveals “After a series of successful detection trials with a U.S. submarine, the Navy decided by mid-[1952] to install similar arrays along the entire U.S. East Coast – and then opted two years later to extend the system to the West Coast and Hawaii as well." 

If SOSUS (now the IUSS) has been monitoring submarine activity near US coasts for decades, then might Australia be monitoring subs around our own coasts? 

Map A. (above) positions where KRI Nagabanda set sail from Kupang, West Timor, Indonesia (see white rectangle) in relation to Australia. Now look at the Map B. (below) showing "Deployments" of hydrophone nodes. When KRI Nagabanda moved down the Western Australian coast as far south as Perth may have moved over the 2 red dots/nodes and black hydrophone/SOSUS dot/nodes. 

These hydrophones may have been present in 1963-64 and where only revealed in the 2000s. The dots/nodes belong to Australia's dual (naval-civilian) use Integrated Marine Observing System (IMOS). IMOS has a civilian image but its "Operational Partners" include the Royal Australian Navy and the Australian Department of Defence's "Defence Science and Technology Group (DST Group)". IMOS uses passive acoustic (hydrophone) equipment monitors natural and "man-made noise sources". Perhaps hydrophone arrays were/are strung between the nodes. Naval processing of data from "man-made noise sources" would occur at shore establishments and then passed on to anti-submarine ships, submarines and aircraft of the RAN and USN.

Map B. (below) showing "Deployments" of hydrophone nodes. Called SOSUS if used for monitoring submarines.
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Map C. (above) Another organisation related to IMOS is the Australian Ocean Data Network (AODN) whose partners also include the "Royal Australian Navy" and the "Defence Science and Technology Group (DST Group)".

Does Map C. at the bottom of the "About Us: IMOS" website imply an undersea sensor ring around Australia's coasts? Draw your own conclusions!

Pete

Whatever is happening to Norwegian Frigate Helge Ingstad?

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So what is happening (since my December 8, 2018 article) with Norwegian frigate Helge Ingstad? Poor Helge came off worse in a collision with a tanker. Then Helge sank on November 8, 2018. Helge was raised and transported to Norway’s main Haakonsvern naval base in February/March 2019. On seeing Helge in dock initial observations include an April 15, 2019, English language report: 

after 3 months underwater Helge’s “electronics, electrical equipment, fixtures and weapons systems are all ruined by saltwater contamination and would need replacing. Coupled with the costs of repairing the hull, bringing Helge Ingstad back into service may not be worth it.”

There being few subsequent reports in English I turned to the the Norwegian language media,  translated them and summaries are:

 A Norwegian source reports April 19, 2019 that the Norwegian inquiry into the collision-sinking may take 6 months due to the possibility of police proceedings and that radar, other navigation and communication systems/records need to be reviewed. [Pete Comment: I also suspect that the political imperative of forming a committee to finally report long after the shocking event, plays a part... Also the quality of Helge's Spanish shipbuilder, Navantia, and subsequent modifications may need assessing.]

According to a Norwegian April 23, 2019 source based on the Norwegian Armed Forced Annual Report the Helge Ingstad salvage cost the equivalent of US$84 million. Helge Ingstad was bought for US$496 million in 2000-2009 but following the sinking it has depreciated by US$254 million. Norway is weighing up whether to:

-  return Helge to operations
-  retain it for spare parts to cannibalise for Norway's other frigates, and/or
-  sell the hull for scrap.

Helge Ingstad damage just after it semi-sank on November 8, 2018 
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How low poor Helge sank when she settled to the bottom, 5 days later, on November 13, 2018. (Courtesy Norwegian source)
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Helge Ingstad today? Damage partly covered to stop her from sinking, again. Maybe moored at Norway’s Haakonsvern naval base  (Photo courtesy twitter).
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By mid-late 2019 the committee might report.

Pete

Poland May Not Have Operating Submarines For 5 Years!

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On September 27, 2018 I reported on Poland’s Orka future submarine program to buy 3 medium sized submarines. The new submarines need to replace Poland’s 2 operating Kobben class subs (ORP Sokół and ORP Bielik - on average 54 years old) and its 33 year old Kilo class sub (ORP Orzel). 

Poland’s DziennikZbrojny.pl military portal reported April 6, 2019 about the progress of the Orka program. I've translated the report from Polish and summarised it below.


In late March 2019 the Polish Ministry of National Defense floated an armaments plan. See the naval build plan (above) published on the DziennikZbrojny report. Under the draft plan the build of the first Orka submarine will only begin in mid 2023. This means that the first Orka might only be launched in 2026-2027.

It is reported that the Orka program has ceased to be a priority for the Defense Ministry. The Ministry had planned to choose the main foreign contractor in January 2018, but this deadline has passed with little explanation. Beginning the build in 2023 means delivery to the Navy in 2028-2029 at the earliest. The construction of a modern submarine requires a minimum of 5-6 years.


By 2028-2029 the Navy’s last two operating Kobben submarines [(ORP Sokół and ORP Bielik]will be more than 60 years old – too old to operate. Meanwile the Kilo sub, ORP Orzeł (291), will have been in service for 43 years and may also need retiring before 2029.

Pete Comment

So Poland may not have operating submarines for 5 years, 2024 - 2029.

Pete

Chinese Survey US & Aussie Manus Island to Guam Submarine Channels

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The US and Australia are substantially expanding the well situated Lombrum Naval Base that sits on Manus island (Papua New Guinea) in the Southwest Pacific. The US and Australia in December 2018 noticed suspicious activity of two Chinese oceanographic ships north of the Lombrum Base. Those ships include:

-  China's new research vessel Ke Xue (aka Kexue) a Type 625C research vessel, and 

-  patrol vessel Hai Ce (aka Haice) 3301. US Naval War College (page 3) gives details of "Haice"
   and "Kexue" also see


The Chinese ships performed manoeuvres interpreted as surveying potential submarine channels between Lombrum Base and the US submarine base at Guam. (Map courtesy Australia's ABC News via gfycat)
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The Australia government owned ABC News on April 21, 2019 charted the Chinese ship movements and reported an expert view that:

"[The ships are likely] Establishing the baseline data around what the seabed is made out of, what the seabed terrain is like, the salinity and what thermal layers exist in the water is useful for [mineral] mining but it also helps determine the acoustic conditions for submarine operations.""

ABC News further reported:

"...Ke Xue and Hai Ce 3301, are part of a two-dozen strong Chinese "Distant-Ocean Research fleet" that has conducted expansive maritime surveys around the Philippines, Palau, Guam and Japan over the past two years"

COMMENT

Australia's conventional submarines might in future be able to utilise Lombrum/Manus as a forward base for diesel refueling. It would also put these subs in a good position to patrol north to Guam Naval Base. For a very long Australian submarine mission further refueling at Guam might permit patrols all the way to the East China Sea and back.

In terms of blameless oceanography USNS Impeccable performed a similar exercise south of  China's Yulin nuclear submarine base on Hainan island, China, in 2009. Unlike US and Australian (December 2018) courtesy towards Chinese ships near Lombrum/Manus the Chinese reception near Hainan (2009) was decidedly hostile.  

Pete

New Aussie "ALP" Government May 18 2019? Changes to Submarine Program?

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Those wearied by constant changes of political leaders in Australia can expect the likely removal of the Coalition Government in the May 18, 2019 Federal Election. In its place would be the Australian Labor Party (ALP). The ALP remains slightly ahead of the Coalition in "TPP" opinion polls. If it wins the ALP might adopt some substantial, though not revolutionary, changes in Australia's Future "Attack class" submarine program. Maybe in the following  ways:

1.  Still 12 new subs, but a review. On March 14, 2019 Australia’s DEFENCECONNECTreported:

"Ahead of the expected May poll, opposition spokesman [and likely future Minister] on defence Richard Marles has reaffirmed Labor’s commitment to the $50 billion future submarine program, but has stated that a Labor government would conduct a review of the project to ensure suitability..."

2.  Less pressure to build all in Adelaide. Substantial submarine work (eg. building one module)
     might be reallocated from Adelaide, South Australia to the pro-ALP, slightly leftwing, state of
     Victoria. The Coalition Government seems to have intentionally excluded Victoria (including its
     efficient Williamstown Dockyard) from the submarine building program. The ALP leader Bill 
     Shorten's own electoral seat of Maribyrnong is in Melbourne, Victoria. Also the Coalition
     Defence Minister Christopher Pyne (from Adelaide, South Australia) left the Government on
     April 11, 2019, hence he is no longer a "build all in Adelaide" factor.  

3.  Unions to be more influential. As a former trade union leader Bill Shorten will be sensitive to
     calls from submarine building unions for better pay and conditions. This includes the principal
     shipbuilding union - the Australian Manufacturing Workers' Union (AMWU). See this (late April
     2016?) AMWU News Release which clearly supports Build In Adelaide and not overseas
     "The future of the South Australian economy depends on new shipbuilding orders..." Growing
     union influence vis a vis management and federal and state governments, remains likely.

Watch this space, for submarine program implications, following the May 18, 2019 Election.

Pete

Yet Another Fatal Indian Naval Accident

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COMMENT

India’s only operational aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya (a modified Soviet Kiev class carrier)  entered Indian service in 2013. Vikramaditya replaced India’s ancient carrier INS Viraat (ex HMS Hermes) which was decommissioned in 2017).

Meanwhile India's much troubled INS Vikrant was laid down in 2009, launched 2013, and may enter service in 2021.  

As India's main SSN, SSBN and carrier competitor is the much faster builder China, India has more problems than accidents.

ARTICLE

China’s Global Times, April 29, 2019reported:

“Indian carrier's fire likely result of lax military regulation: Chinese experts”

Chinese military experts on [April 26, 2019] said that India's military culture cannot keep up with its ambitious weapon and equipment development,which might be the reason behind its aircraft carrier's fatal fire on [April 24, 2019].

A fire broke out at the engine room of India's aircraft carrier Vikramaditya while it was entering harbor in Karnataka's Karwar on Friday. The fire killed a naval officer who led the firefighting efforts in the affected compartment, according to a [April 25, 2019] report by the Times of India.

The cause of the fire is yet to be announced by Indian authorities.

Li Jie, a Beijing-based naval expert, told the Global Times on [April 26, 2019] that the fire was more likely to be out of human error rather than mechanical problems. The fire and the extinguishing process suggested that they are unprofessional and unprepared to address such an emergency, he said.

India has been actively developing its military in recent years, but "its military culture is lax and it has loose regulations," which cannot effectively train soldiers to operate advanced military equipment, Li said.

[Earlier] India's nuclear submarine, $2.9 billion worth [INS] Arihantwas left out of commission after water rushed in as a hatch on the rear side was left open by mistake while it was at harbor in early 2017, the Hindu reported on January 2018.

Blasts of submarine [INS]Sindhurakshakthat killed 18 personnel in 2013 was induced by mistakes made during the arming of the torpedoes. Extensive checks on weapon related safety systems and audit of Standard Operating Procedures on all operational naval units were made as corrective steps, the Economic Times quoted defense ministry official as saying in July 2018.

But Li noted that the Indian Navy's lax regulations mean sailors may neglect or fail to obey the rules on handling advanced equipment.

"Meanwhile, the cutting-edge weapons and equipment have higher requirement for the soldiers, who need to learn the knowledge of operation and maintenance," Li said....”

China's SSBN Submarine Force and Strategy Matures

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Greg Torodeand David Lague,edited by Peter Hirschberg) have written an excellent REUTERSarticleof May 2, 2019 “Special Report - China's furtive underwater nukes test the Pentagon”. This is on China’s Type 094 Jin class SSBNs, their missiles, the Yulin Naval Base, Hainan Island, China nuclear sub home and broader strategy/tactics for their use. 

Also see the superb interactive version of the article with a vivid satellite-eye-view of  Sanya and Yulin Base. The whole article is 2,282 words. Below are extracts amounting to just 593 words:


"In a January [2019] report, the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency said the Chinese navy would need a minimum of five Jin-class submarinesto maintain a continuous nuclear deterrence at sea. China now has four.

To maximize its second-strike capability, China’s missile subs would need to be stealthy enough to go undetected as they sail to their patrol areas in the open ocean. U.S. and other foreign naval analysts say the Jin-class submarines are a sharp improvement over China’s earlier efforts, but they remain less stealthy than their U.S., Russian, French and British counterparts [and compared to India's 2 Arihant SSBNs?]

The 11,000-tonne Jin-class submarines are stationed on the southern coast of China’s Hainan Island, close to deep water channels leading into and out of the South China Sea. The geography of China’s coastal waters has forced Beijing to base its missile submarines in this [South China Sea] area, astride one of the world’s most important shipping lanes.

In the north, the Yellow Sea is too shallow to conceal big, ballistic missile submarines.

The East China Sea is deeper but it’s confined by the Korean Peninsula, Japan’s island chain and Taiwan.

And Japanese and U.S. forces can deploy advanced anti-submarine warfare ships and aircraft based in Japan to closely monitor these waters and the channels [eg. Japanese subs patrol the Bashi Channel / Luzon Strait] that pass out into the Western Pacific, where the [Chines] submarines are ultimately headed. The Chinese need to reach these waters to be in a position to fire on the United States.

The South China Sea, by contrast, is much bigger and in parts deeper, making it more suitable for concealed submarine operations, according to Western submariners with extensive experience of patrolling in this area.

China would need to get its submarines out of Hainan, past surveillance and into seas east of the Philippines for their missiles to be in striking range of the United States.

This is a key reason why China has gone to such lengths to reclaim and fortify islands and reefs in the South China Sea that are expanding Beijing’s control over this area, according to Western submariners and military attaches.

The [Chinese] sub fleet’s vulnerability to detection also explains China’s extreme sensitivity to the [ship and aircraft] surveillance operations  of the United States and its allies in these waters. [China suspects US and allies ships and aircraft FONOPs are an excuse for conducting anti-submarine surveillance]

China [“now appears to be” has long been] on guard against foreign subs attempting to detect and shadow its ballistic missile fleet. As China’s Jin-class vessels put to sea, they appear to be flanked by protective screens of surface warships and aircraft on station to track foreign submarines, according to military officers and analysts familiar with allied surveillance of the Chinese coast.

China has also installed an array of sensors, antennas and satellite communications installations on islands in the Spratlys, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies.”

The submarine base near Sanya is now under direct control of the Central Military Commission, the top military decision-making body, chaired by Xi Jinping himself. The new communications installations in the South China Sea have helped knit together the new command structure, allowing tighter control from Beijing, right down to individual vessels.

In 2017, Beijing appointed a veteran submariner, ViceAdmiral Yuan Yubai, to head [now heads] the Southern Theater Command, which is responsible for the South China Sea. His promotion was a clear indication of the importance China attaches to supporting nuclear sub operations, according to Chinese naval experts. Yuan is the first naval officer to head a command of this type, a promotion that’s part of a sweeping overhaul of the military structure by Xi Jinping.

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Separatley:


A to scale comparison (Jin second from top) of all the latest SSBNs, except India's 2 Arihant class mini SSBNs (aka Baby Boomers) whose specs are 6,000 tons, 112m, 11m beam, 12 K15 mini SLBMs, 6 torpedo tubes. The diagram comes from csis .org's China Power’s December 2015 article “Does China have an effectivesea-based nuclear deterrent?
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How the Quietness or Acoustic signature, of the Nato designation "Jin" Type 094, compares to  China's:

-  Xia, Type 092 SSBN
-  Han, 091 SSN
-  Shang, 093 SSN 
-  projected Type 095 SSN (with the signature computer modeled as at 2015) 

and to Russia's:

-  Akula, Akula II SSNs and Oscar II SSGN
-  Borey/Borei class "Dolgorukiy" SSBN, and
-  Yasen class "Severodvinsk" SSN

Pete

Comments on Taiwan's FOREIGN designed submarine on Tuesday May 14, 2019.

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Foreign, mainly Japanese, designers, designed Taiwan's future submarine.

Taiwan has no experience designing subs.

Also why does Taiwan want the future subs?

How Strategically Late Might Australia's Future Submarine Be?

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What are the key indicators of timeliness of Australia's Future Attack class Program? Naval Group (then DCNS) was announced as the Future Submarine Program winner in 2016. In 2016 Naval Group coined the name of the Future Submarine as the "Shortfin Barracuda".

Since then the Australian Government has announced the beginning of the the shipyard build in Osborne, Adelaide South Australia, and several contract signings.

But on timeliness we also need to look at authoritative French sources - the most important being Jean-Michel Billig.

Jean-Michel Billig, Executive Vice President Future Submarine Program, Naval Group, apparently said in Le Monde, February 11, 2019, https://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2019/02/11/l-accord-franco-australien-pour-construire-douze-sous-marins-signe_5421913_3234.html : 

""the first Shortfin Barracuda will not be operational before - at best - 2038, thirteen years after the planned end of life of the Collins"".

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Pete Comment

Meanwhile in the Indo-Pacific region countries are launching much more recent conventional submarines (China, Russia, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea...) than the Collins.

China's conventional submarines in particular are incorporating technologies that may not be put in Australia's Attack class. Some Chinesea (Yuan class) submarines already have Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) and soon Lithium-ion Batteries, likely making them more formidable than the Collins.

Meanwhile China's, Russia's and India's nuclear powered attack submarines (SSNs) will always be regionally superior to Australia's future Attack class (diesel + oxygen limited) conventional submarines.

Pete

Taiwan and Its FOREIGN Designed Submarine (Part 1)

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As announcedin the South China Morning Post (SCMP) May 9, 2019: Taiwan has offered a glimpse (see Photo A. below) of the home-built submarine designed to deter China. The shipbuilder says the first "indigenous" submarine will be launched in five years [very optimistic!] as construction work begins. Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen hails progress as proof of the island’s ability to defend itself.

Pete Comment

"Indigenous submarine" is a political slogan to justify the high cost of building 8 non-standard foreign designed submarines. This slogan is also used in Taiwan's attempt to deflect mainland China's anger away from the foreign (US, Japanese, UK and European) submarine companies designing and building the "indigenous" submarines. The submarines will be assembled in in Taiwan's China Shipbuilding Corporation (CSBC) Kaohsiung shipyard but they are a collection of specialized, mostly existing, components - sonars, computers, weapons, highly specialized motors and diesels etc, that Taiwan cannot invent.

Replacement subs for Taiwan have long been blocked by Chinese pressure deterring, foreign assistance, through trade threats. Only the US government's 2018 decision to allow US companies to assist Taiwan has made the "indigenous" submarine program possible.

In 2018 Submarine Matters identified the major contractors designing and instructing how to build the "indigenous" submarines. Contractors include "retired" Japanese KHI and MHI employees and the US combat system and more generalized submarine integrator Lockheed Martin. The sub's US built Harpoon missiles and Mark 48 torpedoes are standard components of the Lockheed Martin integration.

Another, perhaps notional, major contractor assisting Taiwan is UK Gibraltar based Gavron Ltd. Gavron may not have the staff or experience to design submarines but Taiwan identifying it spreads out Chinese blame of those countries assisting Taiwan to the UK.

Doubt that it is a fundamentally new, indigenous, submarine is even more evident given the short "five year" construction phase and relatively small budget Taiwan has quoted over the years 

The "indigenous" submarine building program and subsequent Lockheed Martine upgrades also serves Taiwan as an opportunity to financially and politically maintain, even strengthen ties with the US. Taiwan's sees the US as its main protector under the rather tentative Taiwan Relations Act.

"Indigenous" submarine's close resemblance to Japan's Soryu indicates its not indigenous!

Photo A. The most recent model (above) of Taiwan's future submarines bears a striking similarity to Japan's latest Soryu class submarine (at Photo B. below).  (Photo courtesy Focus Taiwan News Channel May 9, 2019). Points of similarity include:

-  flat on top, as part of a teardrop shape
-  position of fin/sail is well forward 
-  diving planes are mounted on the fin/sail 
-  the Soryu uses Harpoon anti-ship and land attack missiles. Taiwan will also use Harpoons as a
   carry over from Taiwan's current Hai Lung class (see Wiki's right sidebar)
-  Japan's Type 89 torpedoes are similar to Taiwan's US made Mark 48 torpedoes used on Taiwan's
   current Hai Lung class
-  both subs have X-plane tails


Photo B. The model is of Japanese Navy Soryu class submarine
(Courtesy Japan's https://plaza.rakuten.co.jp/kure46cm/diary/201111130000/ )
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Taiwan's future "indigenous" submarine is much smaller than the Soryu. This suggests Taiwan's submarine might carry less diesel fuel for shorter range defensive missions of Taiwan's small landmass and it probably won't have AIP.

Mike Chou, executive vice president and director of Taiwan's CSBC's submarine development center, revealed that the future submarine prototype will be about 70m long, 8m "wide" [beam] and 18m "high" [ = 8m beam + 10m sail/fin]. It will be around 2,500 to 3,000 tons. 

This is considerably smaller than the Soryu's 84m long, 9.1m beam, 2,900 tonnes (surfaced) to 4,200 (submerged).

Instead Taiwan's future submarine appears to be a slight increase in size and therefore capability to Taiwan's existing Hai Lung class (66.9m long, 8.4m beam, 2,376 tons (surfaced) to 2,660 tons (submerged).

The projected extra tonnage capacity might be taken up with emerging torpedo tube launched autonomous sensors/weapons, eg. AUV/UUVs and additional smart homing or mobile mines.

More on Thursday about weapons and what Taiwan's future submarines will be used for.

Pete
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