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UK Royal Navy to Build Huge Armable Unmanned Submarine
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Coronavirus Impacting Wuhan's Submarine Industry
The following are some snippets on how deeply coronavirus hit Wuhan is involved in conventional submarine building and developing nuclear propulsion for submarine.
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GlobalData, has reported, February 6, 2020, “Coronavirus is impacting China’s defense industry and shipbuilding”
“Companies affected in Wuhan include Wuchang Shipbuilding Industry Group [an affiliate of China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC) see map below], which produces Submarines for the Chinese Navy and Naval University of Engineering, which produces a variety of underwater technologies for the Chinese Navy.
Davies concludes: “Whilst this delay will only have a minor impact in the short term, if the crisis continues and companies are forced to halt production for a longer period then this could have long term impact on China’s shipbuilding timelines.”
The GlobalData article was countered 18 days later by China/Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post“Laid low by coronavirus, Wuhan’s industrial heart is kept beating by its defence industries”, which reported,February 24, 2020:
“[Wuhan] will remain an economic power thanks to its defence industries and its reputation as the cradle of Chinese naval shipbuilding.
...[Wuhan’s] PLA Naval University of Engineering...[is involved in developing] “a quieter propulsion system for China’s nuclear submarines.”
Some of the many things China Shipbuilding Trading (Wuhan) Co, Ltd.(CSTCWH) builds through its affiliate Wuchang Shipbuildingare:
Submarine Exports To Thailand and Pakistan
Wuchang Shipbuilding, Wuhan, also happens to be building the Yuan derivatives for export to Thailand and Pakistan.
Chinese shipyards"
“Admiral...Abbasi, Chief of the Naval Staff ...Pakistan, visited...Wuchang Shipbuilding (Group) Co. Ltd., ... [He] visited the Type 054AE/P frigate and the S-20 conventionally-powered submarinebeing built for the Pakistan Navy...[He] also attended a naming ceremony [at] the Shuangliu base in Wuhan, [naming] the S-20class submarine built for Pakistan “Hangor”, as the first one of Hangor Class."
See Wuhan's Wuchang Shipyard at the southernmost blue ring. (Map courtesy CSIS China Power)
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Pete
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↧
Australia's French Submarine Program May Collapse, "Australia should consider SSNs"
Andrew Greene, (Defence Correspondent at Australia’s government owned ABC News) reports,
March 11, 2020:
PETE COMMENTAnd it should be added France's SSN and SSBN replacement programs are of higher priority for French Government owned Naval Group than Australia's Attack class program (which may collapse over-due, over-budget).
1. France is yet to complete a great deal of development work on its long delayed, far from
operational, Barracuda SSN program. France is mindful that its preceding Rubis class SSNs are
already up to 41 years old with the Rubis launched in 1979.
2. France has a great deal of work to do on its 15 year replacement SSBN program
- in order to start replacing the preceding Triomphant class SSBNs by 2033.
Pete
March 11, 2020:
“French submarine program 'dangerously off track' warns report urging Australia to consider nuclear alternative
Australia's $80 billion Future Submarine Program is "dangerously off track" according to a new report[the Report, 1.83MB PDF, ishere ] that urges the Government to ditch the controversial project and consider a nuclear option.
Key points:
· The report indicates there are fears the current project is at a high risk of failing
· The Defence Minister denies those fears and maintains the project remains on track
· Under a proposed "Plan B" scenario, the company that designed the Collins class submarines would prepare an updated design
Businessman Gary Johnston, who commissioned and funded the study, fears the current plan to build 12 attack class submarines designed by French company Naval Group is at "high risk" of failing.
His report, prepared by Insight Economics, suggests Australia should instead immediately begin work on a "Plan B"— an evolved version of the current Collins class fleet — before eventually acquiring nuclear-powered boats.
Earlier this year, a report from the auditor-general confirmed the Future Submarine Program was running nine months late and Defence was unable to show whether the $396 million spent so far had been "fully effective".
The Government's own advisory body, including three American admirals, even recommended the Government should consider walking away from the project," Mr Johnston said.
Under the proposed "Plan B", Swedish company Saab Kockums, which designed the navy's Collins class submarines, would be asked to prepare an updated design for the future submarine fleet.
In 2022-23, both Naval Group and Saab will present their competing preliminary design studies for building the first batch of three submarines in Adelaide — based on a fixed price, capability, delivery and local content.
Mr Johnston, along with former naval officers in the Submarines for Australia organisation, argue that over the long term the Government should begin preparing to acquire nuclear submarines.
With Beijing's growing military assertiveness in the South China Sea, Mr Johnston said the most disturbing finding in the report was that by the 2030s the effectiveness and survivability of Australia's submarines in a high-intensity theatre would be threatened.
"If the Government wants to continue deploying submarines to this theatre alongside the US Navy, the nation's duty of care to the dedicated men and women of the ADF means we will need to begin the long and difficult process of acquiring nuclear-powered submarines," Mr Johnston said.
"With our very small nuclear industry, that will not be easy — but we can make a start."
Government rejects report, issues warning
The Submarines for Australia report will be formally launched by ANU Emeritus Professor Hugh White at the National Press Club today, but it is already drawing fire from the Morrison Government.
"I totally reject the premise that this project is 'dangerously off track', as stated in the new Submarines for Australia report", Defence Minister Linda Reynolds said.
"The delivery of the attack class submarine remains on track, with construction set to commence in 2023."
Senator Reynolds said the technical feasibility of delivering an evolved Collins class submarine was reviewed in 2013-14, but a review found it would be equivalent to a whole new design, involving similar costs and risks, without a commensurate gain in capability.
[The Defenced Minister said] "This assessment [the Report] by Submarines for Australia will only increase cost, delay the delivery, and put at risk our submarine capability."
[The Defenced Minister said] "This assessment [the Report] by Submarines for Australia will only increase cost, delay the delivery, and put at risk our submarine capability."
The Defence Minister also flatly rejected any suggestion of a nuclear-powered submarine in the future.
"As has been the policy of successive Australian Governments, a nuclear-powered submarine is not being considered as an option for the attack class submarine," Senator Reynolds said.”
PETE COMMENT
1. France is yet to complete a great deal of development work on its long delayed, far from
operational, Barracuda SSN program. France is mindful that its preceding Rubis class SSNs are
already up to 41 years old with the Rubis launched in 1979.
2. France has a great deal of work to do on its 15 year replacement SSBN program
- in order to start replacing the preceding Triomphant class SSBNs by 2033.
Pete
↧
Best English Narrated German 212A Submarine Documentary
Thanks to /Kjell for finding this. Probably the best documentary I've seen on a modern submarine. It was very recently published - February 20, 2020 and has clear English commentary. It is above and at https://youtu.be/CcgDyxADsiM.
The video takes the viewer from German Navy Type 212A U-32's submarine voyage from Germany's Eckernförde Naval Base (which hosts Germany's Submarine Squadron of 6 submarines,
"combat swimmers" (ie. Navy SEALs) and submarine support ships). Then U-32 goes through the difficult-to-navigate Kiel Canal to a naval exercise in and around Plymouth, UK.
Along the way:
- 1 minute, 40 seconds in - some woman in the crew
- 4 min, 9 secs - specs and cut away diagram
- 4:50 diesel engine, fuel cell AIP and battery functioning
- 7:25 critical nature of food/provisions to keep crew sane
- 9:20 including crates of Becks beer
- 10:15 beer literally stored inside the torpedo tubes!
- 11:20 divers check for bombs and damage below the water line
- 12:46 shows submarine planning meetings actually occur onshore. Planning dangerous passage,
surfaced, through the 100km long Kiel Canal (which connects the Baltic Sea with the North
Sea)
- 14:35 Theme music of "Das Boot""The Boat" as mission begins
- 17:30 radar, sonar, and periscope information is all compared to get out of busy port
- 18:30 crew's "long drawn out intonation of commands" to ensure crew gets the message
- 20:45 how diving works technically
- 21:25 all about periscopes, with thermal imaging and radar etc
22:50 use of sonar, avoiding yachts and fishing boats/nets. Large ships actually easier to avoid as
they travel on predictable courses, with loud easily recognisable propellers.
25:00 (diesel engine) fire drill, very strenuous. If serious injury, helicopter evacuation (in peacetime)
28:20 small room. sub rocking and smell of food can make the cook seasick. Little room for exercise
so cook cannot allow crew to put on too much weight. Crew need to look forward to food to
avoid bad moods. No shift system for only cook aboard.
30:20 surfacing procedure (with intonation)
31:50 restrictive life of a submariner. Crew as a "replacement family". Foot spray for smelly feet.
35:40 rudder failure exercise ie steering cannot can't be controlled in control room. So Helmsman
must go to emergency rudder in stern.
37:30 only now reached Kiel Canal with help of 2 tugboats. Moves through Canal, surfaced of
course. A sub isn't very manoeuvrable while on the surface.
41:45 just 2 toilets "heads" and bathrooms for whole crew of 30. No designated "female only".
44:55 - submarine simulator for helmsmen to learn to steer without crashing. All crew from Cook to
Commander must practice steering in the simulator.
48;00 only 80 active submariners in whole German submarine Corps!
48:10 need to really want to be a submariner.
Pete
↧
Japan's 29SS Submarine Research Program - Land Attack Missiles, etc.
Based on what I've read so far, likely, but cannot be proven. The Japanese Navy has formalized its submarine testing:
- from testing new technologies on several operational Oyashio and Soryu submarines.
- to a formal testing program called 29SS (with 29SS being a Japanese Ministry of Finance to
Ministry of Defense research funding designation, rather than an actual operational submarine).
The 29SS Program apparently begun in 2017 (see SORYU TABLE below). 29SS apparently involves testing of such new technologies as:
- new, higher sea state (storm) snorkel system http://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2018/01/japanese-
soryu-higher-power-snorkel.html
- new pumpjet? propulsor
- new 12V25/31S diesels
- new diesel-to-LIB and LIB-to-propeller/propulsor transmissions.
- further LIB testing (eg. new LIB types/formulas)
- more broadly an updated combat system which would include:
: new "G-RX6" torpedoes, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_89_torpedo which contains
sentence "A succeeding design is in development under the development name of "G-RX6" still
using Mark 48 torpedo technology.
: new mines and decoys,
: possible Japanese successor to the Harpoon ASM
: consideration of Tomahawk or more advanced Land Attack Missiles
: such sensors as hull and towed sonars, radars, other submarine motion detectors
: optronic (non-hull piercing) masts,
: new central processing computers.
Even though 29SS does not mean a new submarine, the technologies above could be tested on existing "training" submarines. "Training" can be a cover for "testbed" submarine.
Japan's 2 known training submarines are the 2 earliest Oyashios
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oyashio-class_submarine#Boats namely:
- SS-590. Converted to training submarine (TSS-3608) on 6 March 2015, and
- SS-591. Converted to training submarine (TSS-3609) on 27 February 2017.
So TSS-3608 and/or TSS-3609 could be the full scale testbeds for 29SS Submarine Research Program. Meanwhile there is a great deal of on-shore testing of 29SS technologies, eg. electronics, weapons and test pools (for miniature scale models to test the hydrodynamics of slightly altered hull shapes).
A new sail/fin, less exaggerated than the German Type 212A's, may eventially be adopted. A much lower, muc more blended sail/fin than the Soryu's is unlikely because Japanese submarines still need to be tall/perpendicular enough to operate, surfaced, without being swamped, in the higher sea states of the open Western Pacific Ocean.
As is Japan's usual practice the new technologies will be steadily incorporated into individual submarines on an iterative, continuous-build basis, rather than a US/European style batch basis.
Looking at the SORYU TABLE below, 30SS may be the first new-build submarine to begin incorporating 29SS Program features (eg. 2 x 12V25/31S diesels). Some Oyashios and Soryu's may be retrofitted - especially with updated combat system electronics and perhaps the G-RX6 torpedo.
Pete
- from testing new technologies on several operational Oyashio and Soryu submarines.
- to a formal testing program called 29SS (with 29SS being a Japanese Ministry of Finance to
Ministry of Defense research funding designation, rather than an actual operational submarine).
The 29SS Program apparently begun in 2017 (see SORYU TABLE below). 29SS apparently involves testing of such new technologies as:
- new, higher sea state (storm) snorkel system http://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2018/01/japanese-
soryu-higher-power-snorkel.html
- new pumpjet? propulsor
- new 12V25/31S diesels
- new diesel-to-LIB and LIB-to-propeller/propulsor transmissions.
- further LIB testing (eg. new LIB types/formulas)
- more broadly an updated combat system which would include:
: new "G-RX6" torpedoes, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_89_torpedo which contains
sentence "A succeeding design is in development under the development name of "G-RX6" still
using Mark 48 torpedo technology.
: new mines and decoys,
: possible Japanese successor to the Harpoon ASM
: consideration of Tomahawk or more advanced Land Attack Missiles
: such sensors as hull and towed sonars, radars, other submarine motion detectors
: optronic (non-hull piercing) masts,
: new central processing computers.
Even though 29SS does not mean a new submarine, the technologies above could be tested on existing "training" submarines. "Training" can be a cover for "testbed" submarine.
Japan's 2 known training submarines are the 2 earliest Oyashios
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oyashio-class_submarine#Boats namely:
- SS-590. Converted to training submarine (TSS-3608) on 6 March 2015, and
- SS-591. Converted to training submarine (TSS-3609) on 27 February 2017.
So TSS-3608 and/or TSS-3609 could be the full scale testbeds for 29SS Submarine Research Program. Meanwhile there is a great deal of on-shore testing of 29SS technologies, eg. electronics, weapons and test pools (for miniature scale models to test the hydrodynamics of slightly altered hull shapes).
A new sail/fin, less exaggerated than the German Type 212A's, may eventially be adopted. A much lower, muc more blended sail/fin than the Soryu's is unlikely because Japanese submarines still need to be tall/perpendicular enough to operate, surfaced, without being swamped, in the higher sea states of the open Western Pacific Ocean.
As is Japan's usual practice the new technologies will be steadily incorporated into individual submarines on an iterative, continuous-build basis, rather than a US/European style batch basis.
Looking at the SORYU TABLE below, 30SS may be the first new-build submarine to begin incorporating 29SS Program features (eg. 2 x 12V25/31S diesels). Some Oyashios and Soryu's may be retrofitted - especially with updated combat system electronics and perhaps the G-RX6 torpedo.
SORYU TABLE. as at March 13, 2020
SS No. Diesel Type Motor | Build No Name | Pennant No. | MoF approved amount ¥ Billions FY | LABs, LIBs, AIP | Laid Down | Laun -ched | Commi ssioned | Built By |
5SS Oyashio | 8105 Oyashio (mythical | SS-590/ TS3608 | ¥52.2B FY1993 | LABs only | Jan 1994 | Oct 1996 | Mar 1998 | KHI |
6SS-15SS Oyashios 10 subs SMC-7? | 8106 -8115 various | SS-591-600 | ¥52.2B per sub FY1994-FY2003 | LABs only | 15SS Feb 2004 | 15SS Nov 2006 | 15SS Mar 2008 | MHI & KHI |
16SS Dragon class Mk I | 8116 | SS-501 | ¥60B FY2004 all Soryus with Kawasaki SMC-8 motor | LABs + AIP | Mar 2005 | Dec 2007 | Mar 2009 | MHI |
17SS | 8117 Unryū | SS-502 | ¥58.7B FY2005 | LABs + AIP | Mar 2006 | Oct 2008 | Mar 2010 | KHI |
18SS | 8118 Hakuryū | SS-503 | ¥56.2 FY2006 | LABs + AIP | Feb 2007 | Oct 2009 | Mar 2011 | MHI |
19SS | 8119 Kenryū | SS-504 | ¥53B FY2007 | LABs + AIP | Mar 2008 | Nov 2010 | Mar 2012 | KHI |
20SS | 8120 Zuiryū | SS-505 | ¥51B FY2008 | LABs + AIP | Mar 2009 | Oct 2011 | Mar 2013 | MHI |
21SS Concept | No 21SS built But was a concept research project on LIBs. 1st LIBs sub launched is 27SS | research in 2010 | research | research | ||||
22SS | 8121 Kokuryū | SS-506 | ¥52.8B FY2010 | LABs + AIP | Jan 2011 | Oct 2013 | Mar 2015 | KHI |
23SS | 8122 Jinryu | SS-507 | ¥54.6B FY2011 | LABs + AIP | Feb 2012 | Oct 2014 | 7 Mar 2016 | MHI |
24SS | 8123 Sekiryū | SS-508 | ¥54.7B FY2012 | LABs + AIP | KHI | |||
25SS | 8124 | SS-509 | ¥53.1B FY2013 | LABs + AIP | 22 Oct 2013 | 12 Oct 2016 | MHI | |
26SS | 8125 | SS-510 | LABs + AIP | 2014 | 6 Nov 2017 | KHI | ||
27SS SoryuMk II due to 1st with LIBs | 8126 | SS-511 | LIBs only (NCA type) | 2015 | 4 Oct 2018 | MHI | ||
28SS Soryu Mk II | 8127 | SS-512 | ¥63.6B FY2016 "2,900t" surfaced | LIBs only | Jan 2017 | Mar 2021? | KHI | |
29SS may be the 1st of a New class | ¥76B FY2017 New features research may include: a further blended fin for noise reduction-better water flow, new propulsor, new diesels, new snorkel system. G-RX6 torpedoes replacing the Type 89s? May be using TSS-3608 and TSS-3609 as testbeds. | research in 2017pro-gram began | research | research | MHI assisted by KHI & JMoD | |||
30SS New Class? | 8028? | SS-513 | ¥71.5B FY2018 | LIBs only | 2018? | 2020? | 2022? | MHI? |
31SS New Class ? | 8029? | SS-514 | ¥B?FY2019 | LIBs only | 2019? | 2021? | 2023? | KHI? |
32SS New Class ? | 8030? | SS-515 | ¥B?Y2020 | LIBs only | 2020? | 2022? | 2024? | MHI? |
33SS New Class ? | 8031? | SS-516 | ¥B? FY2021 | LIBs only | 2021? | 2023? | 2025? | KHI? |
34SS New Class ? | 8032? | SS-517 | ¥B? FY2022 | LIBs only | 2022? | 2024? | 2026? | MHI? |
35SS New Class ? | 8033? | SS-518 | ¥B? FY2023 | LIBs only | 2023? | 2025? | 2027? | KHI? |
36SS New Class ? | 8034? | SS-519 | ¥B? FY2024 | LIBs only | 2024? | 2026? | 2028? | MHI? |
37SS New Class ? | 8035? | SS-520 | ¥B? FY2025 | LIBs only | 2025? | 2027? | 2029? | KHI? |
38SS New Class ? | 8036? | SS-521 | ¥B? FY2026 | LIBs only | 2026? | 2028? | 2030? | MHI? |
Key to Table: Table information exclusively provided to Submarine Matters. LABs = lead-acid batteries, AIP = air independent propulsion, LIBs = Lithium-ion Batteries. ¥***B = Billion Yen. MHI = Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, KHI = Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation of Kawasaki Heavy Industries.
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↧
↧
ASC Closes Osborne Submarine Facility After Worker Coronavirus Positive
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Major Attack-class submarine bow redesign - Feb 2020 APDR.
Asia Pacific Defence Reporter (APDR) continues to be a unique source (or I haven't seen details elsewhere) on problems with the Australia's Attack-class Future Submarine Program.
For APDR's open website see https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/.
See very useful commentary at https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/apdr-february-2020-australian-national-audit-office-identifies-problems-with-the-future-submarine-project/ and scrolling down that link see
"Read more in the [February 2020] issue of APDR (Free to read with registration or via Facebook/Linkedin): https://venturaapdr.partica.online/apdr/apdr-feb-2020/features/australian-national-audit-office-identifies-problems-with-the-future-submarine-project ":
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For APDR's open website see https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/.
See very useful commentary at https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/apdr-february-2020-australian-national-audit-office-identifies-problems-with-the-future-submarine-project/ and scrolling down that link see
"Read more in the [February 2020] issue of APDR (Free to read with registration or via Facebook/Linkedin): https://venturaapdr.partica.online/apdr/apdr-feb-2020/features/australian-national-audit-office-identifies-problems-with-the-future-submarine-project ":
"If [Australia's Defence Department] wanted to make the task for Naval Group far less costly and risky, they might want to change their approach to the layout of the torpedo tubes. The Barracuda has a 2 + 2 arrangement, but the RAN has a fixation on six torpedo tubes in a horizontal plane. Why this is the case, no one knows – even experienced ex submariners believe that four torpedo tubes are adequate. That is what the USN Virginia class attack submarines have. It would also be a considerable cost saving, with two less active discharge systems, two less handling systems – and a lot more room in what is a very crowded compartment.
The front of the submarine is already the most engineeringly complex and risky part of the build, and Defence is adding greatly to the difficulty of what is involved for reasons that are opaque and might never have been questioned, let alone analysed in detail..."
The front of the submarine is already the most engineeringly complex and risky part of the build, and Defence is adding greatly to the difficulty of what is involved for reasons that are opaque and might never have been questioned, let alone analysed in detail..."
The Collins submarine's 6 torpedo tube horizontal arrangement can be seen above. Above the torpedo tube room likely sits the large Thomson Sintra Scylla active/passive bow sonar (aka "Thales Underwater Systems TSM 2233 Scylla active/passive bow array" (see page 9)).
---
PETE COMMENT
It could be that if the RAN wants to carry over the Collins submarine's "Thomson Sintra Scylla active/passive bow sonar" to the Attack-class then a 2 + 2 torpedo tube arrangement may not be practical. Still, if the Attack class will involve such major differences of torpedo tube and bow sonar arrangements there will be a a major flow of other rearrangements required within the Attack class' interior.
This is on top of all the other Attack-class rearrangements required to fit the 4 to 6 diesel engines, diesel fuel tanks, and compensating seawater ballast tanks etc.
All these Attack-class interior changes mean this class has very little in common with the Barracuda SSN, the purported basis of the Attack-class. The marketing name "Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A" which helped sell the Naval Group concept submarine, is but a redundant memory.
Pete
↧
Official Australian Submarine Availability - List of Commanders
On this Royal Australian Navy publically available website
https://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/ships-boats-craft/submarines/ssg (as at March 18, 2020) is some interesting information, including submarine "docking" (non-availability) and Commanding Officers names, Commanding Officers' names, in turn, link to their official career details.
- South Africa born Commander Darren White transferred from the South African Navy.
- UK born Commander Robin Dainty transferred from the UK Royal Navy, and
- UK born Commander Christopher Ellis transferred from the Royal Canadian Navy
Regarding "Status" three of the submarines (HMAS Rankin, HMAS Sheean and HMAS Waller) are undergoing varying types of "docking" which I assume to mean they are being overhauled (maintenance, repairs and upgrades), hence unavailable for operations.
This leaves just 3 Collins submarines, half the submarines physically available for operations. But the "Rule of Thirds" might suggest only 2 crews are available for operations.
Pete
https://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/ships-boats-craft/submarines/ssg (as at March 18, 2020) is some interesting information, including submarine "docking" (non-availability) and Commanding Officers names, Commanding Officers' names, in turn, link to their official career details.
"Following is a list of Collins class submarines commissioned into the Royal Australian Navy."
Name | Pennant [number] | Commissioned | Commanding Officer | Status |
S73 | 27 July 1996 | |||
S76 | 23 February 2001 | |||
S74 | 31 January 1998 | |||
S78 | 29 March 2003 | Mid-cycle docking | ||
S77 | 23 February 2001 | [none?] | Intermediate Docking | |
S75 | 10 July 1999 | Full-cycle docking |
From the table above there appears to be only five Commanding Officers for Australia's six submarines.
On February 20, 2020 I mentioned the difficulty the Australian Navy has experienced in finding submariners and especially submarine Commanders. I assumed Commander transferees came from the UK Royal Navy - but that now appears just part of the story.
The difficulty in finding Australian born commanders is reflected in the table above, wherein:
- South Africa born Commander Darren White transferred from the South African Navy.
- UK born Commander Robin Dainty transferred from the UK Royal Navy, and
- UK born Commander Christopher Ellis transferred from the Royal Canadian Navy
Regarding "Status" three of the submarines (HMAS Rankin, HMAS Sheean and HMAS Waller) are undergoing varying types of "docking" which I assume to mean they are being overhauled (maintenance, repairs and upgrades), hence unavailable for operations.
This leaves just 3 Collins submarines, half the submarines physically available for operations. But the "Rule of Thirds" might suggest only 2 crews are available for operations.
Pete
↧
The 5 Collins Submarine Commanders' Career Details
ollowing Official Australian Submarine Availability – List of Commanders, March 18, 2020 I’ve reordered the official Royal Australian Navy (RAN) submarine list (table here) from submarine name alphabetical order to the more conventional order of date Commissioned, which coincides with Pennant number. See Table A.
Also drawing from the RAN website are the official career details and photos of Australia’s five Commanding Officers of submarines. See List B.
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Table A. (as at March 20, 2020)
Name | Pennant [number] | Commissioned | Commanding Officer | Status |
S73 | 27 July 1996 | |||
S74 | 31 January 1998 | |||
S75 | 10 July 1999 | Full-cycle docking | ||
S76 | 23 February 2001 | |||
S77 | 23 February 2001 | [none?] | Intermediate Docking | |
S78 | 29 March 2003 | Mid-cycle docking |
List B.
Commander Darren White, RAN was born in Cape Town, South Africa He attended a local boarding school and graduated in 1992. Commander White enlisted into the South African Navy in 1994 and was drafted to SA Naval College in Gordon’s Bay, where he received his commission after successfully completing Officer training.
Commander White rotated through the various Squadrons and attained his Bridge Warfare Certificate in 1998. After selection for the MCM Squadron, he qualified as a MCM Officer in 1999. Commander White went on to complete two consecutive Executive Officer appointments on Minesweepers before volunteering for Submarine duty in 2002.
He commenced submarine training and qualified as a Submarine Officer in November 2003. In 2004 Commander White was selected for Project WILLS (South African Type 209 submarine acquisition project). In 2005 he deployed to Germany and crewed two of the newly acquired submarines on their maiden voyages from Germany to South Africa, the first as the Sonar Officer and the second as the Executive Officer.
He commenced submarine training and qualified as a Submarine Officer in November 2003. In 2004 Commander White was selected for Project WILLS (South African Type 209 submarine acquisition project). In 2005 he deployed to Germany and crewed two of the newly acquired submarines on their maiden voyages from Germany to South Africa, the first as the Sonar Officer and the second as the Executive Officer.
Commander White completed Perisher in 2008 and thereafter completed two consecutive Type 209 Submarine commands. This was followed by an Executive Officer appointment on a MEKO 200 Frigate, prior to immigrating to Australia.
Commander White joined the RAN in January 2015 and immediately commenced CCSM training, which included postings to HMAS Rankin, Waller and Farncomb before being appointed as the Executive Officer of HMAS Dechaineux in December 2016. This appointment included a successful North East Asia deployment. Commander White has a Bachelor degree in Business Administration.
Commander White assumed command of HMAS Collins in January 2020.
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Commander Michael Power
Commander Michael Power was born in Hastings, Victoria. He entered the Royal Australian Naval College in January 2007 as a direct entry warfare officer, before proceeding through the Junior Warfare Officer Application Course.
While still under training Michael served in the Middle Eastern Area of Operations in 2009 whilst posted to HMAS Toowoomba, before attaining his Bridge Warfare Certificate on HMAS Anzac the following year. Shortly after this qualification, Michael joined the Submarine Service in 2011, commencing Submarine Officer Training Course.
Michael’s first significant submarine posting was to HMAS Farncomb in September 2011. During this posting he was awarded his ‘Dolphins’ in March 2012, before achieving his Officer of the Watch Dived proficiency later that same year.
While completing the Junior Officer Leadership Course in 2013 he was awarded both the Hue Paffard Award and Dux of the course. Following a brief posting as Navigator of HMAS Farncomb in 2014, Michael completed the Submarine Warfare Officers Course, where he was awarded the Submarine Sword of Excellence as Dux of the course.
Michael served onboard HMAS Rankin as the Sonar officer and Operations Officer in 2015 and 2016 respectively. In December 2017 he was appointed as the Executive Officer of HMAS Sheean, however only served in that role until September the following year as he had been selected to attend the Netherlands Submarine Command Course (NLSMCC) in January 2019.
Upon successful completion of NLSMCC and the Australian Commanding Officer Designate Course, Commander Power assumed Command of HMAS Farncomb in November 2019.
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Commander Christopher Ellis (above)
Commander Christopher Ellis, born in England, spent his schooling years in Canada before joining the Canadian Armed Forces in 1987. He attended Royal Roads Military College, and Collège Militaire de Royale; graduating in 1991 with a Bachelor Degree in Business Administration.
In 1992, after completing initial Naval training on HMCS Saskatchewan, Commander Ellis volunteered for submarine service. He conducted his submarine training on HMC Submarines Ojibwa and Okanagan, with his dolphins being awarded in August 1994. He then re-joined Okanagan in 1996 as the navigating officer having recently completed the Destroyer Navigation Officer course in 1995.
In July 1997, Commander Ellis commenced a two year exchange with the RAN where he was employed as HMAS Onslow’s Sonar Officer, executed the duties as the Manager of Tactical Training at the submarine school, and attended the Submarine Warfare Officer Course. Returning to Canada in 1999, he was then posted to the United Kingdom to conduct Upholder conversion training as the Operations Officer on HMS Ursula (HMCS Corner Brook).
After returning to Canada with Corner Brook in 2003, he attended the RAN Submarine Executive Officer course, and returned to Australia early 2004 to sail with HMAS Rankin to Hawaii.
In July 2004, Commander Ellis was appointed the Executive Officer of HMCS Victoria. This appointment concluded with him joining Rankin later in 2005 so as to prepare for an upcoming Submarine Command Course (SMCC).
In July 2006, Commander Ellis became the second Canadian to successfully complete the Royal Netherlands Navy SMCC. On his return to Canada, he was promoted to Lieutenant Commander, and appointed Victoria’s Commanding Officer. He subsequently commanded HMCS Windsor for her last operational cycle prior to attending the USN SMCC Class 12 in Groton, Connecticut in January 2007. He then passed the 2008/09 academic year in Toronto on the Joint Command and Staff Programme where he completed his Professional Masters in Defence Studies.
In 2009, Commander Ellis was again appointed Victoria’s Commanding Officer, and promoted to Commander. Victoria was the first of Class to complete a Canadian full cycle docking, and then to become weapon certified; a capability that culminated in the sinking of ex-USS Concord while participating in the exercise Rim of the Pacific 2012. On completion of his command in 2013, Commander Ellis was posted as the Deputy Commander of Submarine Operations.
Commander Ellis assumed Command of HMAS Waller in December 2019.
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Commander Bradley Francis
Commander Bradley Francis, RAN was born and raised in Adelaide, South Australia. He joined the Royal Australian Navy in 2000 as a Seaman Officer. After completing his studies at the Australian Defence Force Academy he served in Fremantle Class Patrol Boats before gaining his Bridge Warfare Certificate in the Adelaide Class Frigate HMAS Canberra in 2005.
Joining the Submarine Service in 2006, Brad was awarded his ‘Dolphins’ in HMAS Sheean that year. He then served in HMAS Waller (2007-2008) and Royal Canadian Navy Submarines (2009-2010). After Submarine Warfare Officers Course in 2011, Brad served as a Warfare Officer in HMAS Dechaineux, Waller and Sheean over the course of 2012-14.
In November 2015, Brad was appointed as the Executive Officer of HMAS Rankin. Subsequent to this posting, he graduated from the Australian Command and Staff Course in 2017 and was then appointed as Deputy Director Submarines – Warfare within Navy Headquarters.
Brad is a graduate of the 2015 Netherlands Submarine Command Course (‘Perisher’) and the 2016 United States Submarine Command Course. His academic qualifications include a Bachelor of Science and a Masters of Arts from the University of New South Wales, and a Masters of Military and Defence Studies from Australian National University.
Commander Francis assumed Command of HMAS Dechaineux in December 2018.
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Commander Robin Dainty (above)
Robin Dainty was born in Grimsby, England in 1967. His father had previously served in the Royal Navy on Minesweepers and Submarines from 1953-1963 and it had always been Dainty’s intention to follow his father's lead. Towards the end of his schooling, Dainty applied to join the RN as an Able Seaman.He joined HMS RALEIGH, the recruit training school in June 1983 and whilst there applied for submarine training as a direct entry submariner. Having completed his submarine training the following year, his first posting was to HMS Hermes (Aircraft Carrier) which came as a shock to both he and his family.
Shortly afterwards he joined his first submarine, HMS Revenge (SSBN) and was awarded his Dolphins in November 1984. Promoted to Leading Seaman in 1987 and then Petty Officer in 1990, Dainty served in HMS Ocelot (SSK), HMS Torbay (SSN) and HMS Talent (SSN). Having been promoted to Chief Petty Officer in 1998 he was then selected for Commissioned Rank and joined Britannia Naval College in 1999.
Dainty returned to the submarine service after a short period in HMS Leeds Castle (FPV), enjoying periods in HMS Triumph (SSGN) and two tours in HMS Turbulent (SSGN), the first as the Navigating Officer and the second as the Operations Officer. These postings allowed him to witness the full range of submarine operations, including service during both Gulf War One and Gulf War Two.
He successfully completed Submarine Command Course (Perisher) in 2007 and then joined HMS Vengeance (SSBN) as the Executive Officer. He had the honour to Command Vengeance for a short period and Vengeance was to be his last appointment in the Royal Navy, joining the Royal Australian Navy in May 2011.
Initial service was in HMAS Dechaineux, followed by two years as the Executive Officer of HMAS Waller. He returned to HMAS Dechaineux in November 2014 as the Commanding Officer, departing her in January 2017 for an overseas posting at COMSUBPAC, Hawaii. Having returned to WA in February 2019, Dainty was selected to Command HMAS Collins.
Commander Dainty assumed command of HMAS Rankin in January 2020.
Pete
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Shooter Negotiations Russian Style
Thought for the day.
Western security forces attempt to negotiate with cornered "shooters" into surrendering, if possible.
But not in Russia. The Barents Observer, March 24, 2020 reports:
He was ultimately killed by a small bomb planted by the [Russian Federal Security Bureaus] FSB inside the telephone used for negotiations...”
Russians just have to put up with the FSB, or else.
Western security forces attempt to negotiate with cornered "shooters" into surrendering, if possible.
But not in Russia. The Barents Observer, March 24, 2020 reports:
He was ultimately killed by a small bomb planted by the [Russian Federal Security Bureaus] FSB inside the telephone used for negotiations...”
Russians just have to put up with the FSB, or else.
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US WWII Era Submarine Achievements
Something to brighten up the Corona Captivity (no pubs, clubs, cafes or cinemas) of submarine enthusiasts:
See "Silent Service Boats Of World War II Documentary" 44 minutes, starring the world's best long range submarines of the time, the US Gato and Balao classes in the Pacific against Japan, at https://youtu.be/udn9Od5kjCY .
Pete
See "Silent Service Boats Of World War II Documentary" 44 minutes, starring the world's best long range submarines of the time, the US Gato and Balao classes in the Pacific against Japan, at https://youtu.be/udn9Od5kjCY .
Pete
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UK's Trident Nuke Submarine Base: 20 Staff in COVID-19 Isolation
JAKE WALLIS SIMONS. ASSOCIATE GLOBAL EDITOR, for The UK’s Daily Mail Online, March 20, 2020 reports, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8131755/Coronavirus-crisis-UKs-nuclear-submarine-base.html:
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“...Coronavirus crisis at UK's nuclear submarine base as twenty staff show COVID-19 symptoms and are forced into isolation”
- A makeshift quarantine unit has been created on a floor of the nuclear base
- Staff have complained at being 'left in the dark' about the virus risk at the facility
- An MoD source insisted that Britain's nuclear deterrent remains fully operational...
Britain's [Vanguard-class SSBN] Trident nuclear submarine base is in the grip of a Coronavirus scare, MailOnline can reveal.
A regular long-range Russian "Bear" aircraft's eye view of Britain's "Trident submarine" SSBN base, at Faslane, just north of Glasgow, during a typical dark, rainy, Scottish day. (Photo courtesy "Ivan").
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[Her Majesty's Naval Base (HMNB) Clyde] the home of the UK nuclear deterrent in [Faslane] Scotland, has nearly 20 possible cases of infection so far. [HMNB Clyde is served by the nearby base for nuclear weapons storage at RNAD Coulport].
Servicemen and women reporting Covid-19 symptoms have been isolated in sealed rooms with 'no entry' signs taped to the doors.
The number of possible victims is currently [as at March 20, 2020] in the 'low teens', a source said, and preparations are underway for a major outbreak.
The top floor of the Linton Block, one of 17 accommodation buildings at the facility, has been converted into a makeshift quarantine unit and sealed off.
A medical team equipped with masks and yellow biohazard bags was seen at work on the base last week.
A Ministry of Defence source insisted that Britain's nuclear deterrent remains fully operational and that there is no possibility of a national security emergency.
So far nobody has tested positive on the base, he added, though he acknowledged that testing has not been carried out in every case, in line with Government guidelines.
Staff have complained at being 'left in the dark', saying they have not been informed about the virus risk at the facility.
'Nobody knows what is going on and it's making people frightened,' one told MailOnline on condition of anonymity.
'We have not had a single communication to tell us what is happening, and every day more rooms are sealed off.
'Everyone here is expected to put our lives on the line for the Navy. We just want the Navy to level with us and tell us what the risk is.'
A Ministry of Defence source said that the jigsaw of different private firms and Navy units that operate the base has made it difficult to communicate news about the virus effectively to all staff.
The source said: 'The base is endeavouring to ensure all personnel are aware of the situation and the measures being taken to safeguard personnel.'
HMNB Clyde, commonly known throughout the Navy as 'Faslane', is home to 3,000 service personnel, 800 of their families and 4,000 civilian workers, mainly from the engineering firm Babcock International.
The Linton Block, where the quarantine facility is being set up, is opposite the 'Supermess', one of the base's major leisure hubs.
In addition to separate bars for officers and sailors, there are restaurants, cafes and shops, with a bowling alley, ski slope, swimming pool and gym nearby.
All of these are now seen as a 'petri dish for the virus', according to personnel serving at the site, and most are being closed down as the top brass prepares for the worst.
The sports schedules, which include circuit training and team events such as football, rugby and boxing, have been cancelled, and the swimming pool has been shut in an effort to combat the spread of the disease.
The quarantine area consists of about 24 single rooms – known as 'cabins' in Navy jargon – each containing a double bed, wardrobe, desk and chair, chest of drawers, bedside cabinet and television table.
Each also has a walk-in shower, en-suite lavatory and sink.
Cleaning staff normally service the cabins once a week and there are communal kitchens with washing machines and tumble dryers.
A Royal Navy spokesman said: 'The Ministry of Defence has put in place robust plans to ensure the delivery of key operations in the UK and overseas and we are confident that essential defence tasks will be maintained during this time.
'Any serving personnel who are showing symptoms will follow the advice and guidance issued by Public Health England. Whilst sensible precautions are being taken, all required outputs are being maintained at HM Naval Base Clyde.'
The base in Faslane, about 40miles northwest of Glasgow, is the home of the Submarine Service, and is the Royal Navy's main presence in Scotland.
In addition to Trident, Britain's nuclear deterrent, it houses the new generation of hunter-killer submarines.
The site is run in partnership with Babcock International, a civilian firm that provides specialist engineering services and manages the base's critical infrastructure and nuclear facilities.
The Royal Naval Armaments Depotat Coulport, eight miles from Faslane, is responsible for the storage and maintenance of Trident and all submarine weaponry...”
See the WHOLE DAILY MAIL ARTICLE which has more photos of Faslane and links.
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Sweden's Naval Museum: Starring Hajen I (the "Shark")
/Kjell had kindly provided the video above (and here) about Sweden's Naval Museum at Karlskrona.
50 seconds into the video is Sweden's first submarine the Hajen I ("Shark" in Swedish) launched in 1904. It was intended for (but it didn't fight in) such Baltic confrontations as the "union conflict" between Sweden and Norway. I've never heard of this conflict. Nothing to do with trade unions, but a complex 1905 dissolution of the union of Sweden and Norway involving royalty, nationalism, democracy (for men only!) and constitutions.
The Museum explains https://www.marinmuseum.se/en/exhibitions/submarine-exhibition/the-hajenThe Hajen I has only three torpedoes, top speed of nine knots, and no heating equipment whatsoever. However, in 1904, when launched, the Hajen was a terrifying state-of-the-art naval war weapon.
(Photo courtesy Sweden's Naval Museum)
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Carl Richson (above) born 1857 was a civilian marine engineer and designer, not a naval officer, despite his uniform). Richson was Hajen I’s main creator. Richson, a crofter's son and "social climber" from the Swedish province of Södermanland, lived in the US for ten years. There, he took various jobs before eventually becoming head of the design office of the naval dockyard in New York, and became a very well-known ship designer.
In 1897 Richson moved back to Sweden, where he started working at the Maritime Administration and was soon placed in a position that would prove highly important as the Swedish fleet prepared to enter the new century.
Alongside the work on the fleet surface vessels, Richson began early on to lay the technical foundation for the upcoming Swedish submarine weapon. In the fall of 1900, Richson was ordered to return to the US to obtain knowledge of the construction of submarines there. One reason for this was probably that the US Navy the year before purchased a submarine designed by (main inventor of the modern submarine) the Irish American J P Holland. Richson, brought home a 26-page design from the "Electric Boat" company building Holland's submarines.
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(Hajen I surfaced. Not designed for high seas! (Photo courtesy Sweden's Naval Museum)
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After returning to Sweden, Richson, in 1901–1903 prepared the drawings for Hajen I. It was built at the Naval Shipyard in Stockholm and launched in July 1904. The difficulties in the construction of Hajen I were many and complicated, but all were quickly solved by Richson in a satisfactory manner. More detailed specifications are that Hajen I had only a length of 21.6m, diameter 3.6m, displacement 111 tons, with a crew of eight. It had a surface speed of 7–8 knots, and 6 knots submerged. It had three 450mm torpedoes and maximum diving depth of 30m. The propeller was directly connected to an electric motor, which when surfaced received power from a kerosene-powered engine and from a battery when submerged. Hajen I was rebuilt in 1915–16, with a more reliable and less fire prone diesel engine replacing the kerosene engine. It re-entered service in the last year of the First World War and was decommissioned in 1922.
Neptun (Neptune) when in service. Its resemblance to the much larger Collins is obvious.
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1 minute 43 seconds into the video In June, 2014, a new section of the museum opened where visitors can visit a more modern submarine His/Her Swedish Majesty's Ship (HSwMS) Neptun, a Swedish Näcken-class submarine about 980 tonnes (surfaced) and 19 officers/crew,
6 x 533mm torpedo tubes and 2 x 400mm (Baltic corvette "friendly") torpedo tubes. Neptun was in service 1980 to 1998.
Pete
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Submariners do not/did NOT Practice Social Distancing COVID-19 Style
Steering area of a US nuclear submarine control room.
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All these ex-submariners - like Darryl Manzer here - dispensing advice about how they lived with "social distancing."
Fact is they were the least socially distanced of any profession.
60 to 150 submariners (who volunteered) to be crammed into a narrow metal tube - slept, worked, ate, watched movies, next to each other, chatting (or formal voice interacting) face-to-face about 18 hours a day. Also physically dodging/squeezing around each other in the narrow spaces for months.
Submariner "Social Distancing" bears little resemblance to enforced COVID-19 social distancing. With COVID meaning being involuntarily stuck in your home/flat alone (or with only 1 or 2 others) sharply curtailing the face-to-face interaction you're used to.
Spacially - Submariners being crammed with others night and day is totally unlike COVID 1.5 meter separation social distancing (a COVID "treat" being off to the supermarket for a half hour 2 times a week).
Submariners had/have it tough but COVIDteering (though less so) also has its pressures - in very different ways.
Bunks in 1940s-60s Gato-Balao-Tench (still, 2 Hai Shih) class submarines. Similar lack of social distancing in Oberon class bunks and those in later SSKs.
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Pete
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Tom Lehrer on the "Brighter Side" of Infectious Disease
Here is a cheering poem by Tom Lehrer who had an extraordinary poetical career, from being a mathematical genius, who worked at the Los Alamos nuclear weapons center and the NSA, before becoming a comic, singer-songwriter.
Tom's still kicking at 91. Here's his poem:
"I Got It From Agnes" (in various versions since 1953).
Here’s the Video of Tom singing it http://youtu.be/6WHSVOVLmNY
"I love my friends and they love me
We're just as close as we can be
And just because we really care
Whatever we get, we share!
I got it from Agnes
She got it from Jim
We all agree it must have been
Louise who gave it to him
Now she got it from Harry
Who got it from Marie
And ev'rybody knows that Marie
Got it from me
Giles got it from Daphne
She got it from Joan
Who picked it up in County Cork
A-kissin' the Blarney stone
Pierre gave it to Shiela
Who must have brought it there
He got it from Francois and Jacques
Aha, lucky Pierre!
Max got it from Edith
Who gets it ev'ry spring
She got it from her daddy
Who just gives her ev'rything
She then gave it to Daniel
Whose spaniel has it now
Our dentist even got it
And we're still wondering how
But I got it from Agnes
Or maybe it was Sue
Or Millie or Billie or Gillie or Willie
It doesn't matter who
It might have been at the pub
Or at the club, or in the loo
And if you will be my friend, then I might
(Mind you, I said "might")
Give it to you!"
Tom's still kicking at 91. Here's his poem:
"I Got It From Agnes" (in various versions since 1953).
Here’s the Video of Tom singing it http://youtu.be/6WHSVOVLmNY
"I love my friends and they love me
We're just as close as we can be
And just because we really care
Whatever we get, we share!
I got it from Agnes
She got it from Jim
We all agree it must have been
Louise who gave it to him
Now she got it from Harry
Who got it from Marie
And ev'rybody knows that Marie
Got it from me
Giles got it from Daphne
She got it from Joan
Who picked it up in County Cork
A-kissin' the Blarney stone
Pierre gave it to Shiela
Who must have brought it there
He got it from Francois and Jacques
Aha, lucky Pierre!
Max got it from Edith
Who gets it ev'ry spring
She got it from her daddy
Who just gives her ev'rything
She then gave it to Daniel
Whose spaniel has it now
Our dentist even got it
And we're still wondering how
But I got it from Agnes
Or maybe it was Sue
Or Millie or Billie or Gillie or Willie
It doesn't matter who
It might have been at the pub
Or at the club, or in the loo
And if you will be my friend, then I might
(Mind you, I said "might")
Give it to you!"
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Indian SSBN Arihant's Deterrence Shortcomings
On January 14, 2019 Yogesh Joshipublished an excellent article at Texas National Security Review's website War On The Rocks, titled “ANGLES AND DANGLES: ARIHANT AND THE DILEMMA OF INDIA’S UNDERSEA NUCLEAR WEAPONS” The following is just a portion of Joshi's article, with the link https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/angles-and-dangles-arihant-and-the-dilemma-of-indias-undersea-nuclear-weapons/
"...Project Samudra and the Burden of History
The peculiar history of India’s long quest for a nuclear submarine leaves a long shadow over Arihant’s [Wiki link] capabilities.
India’s nuclear submarine program began in 1966 with feasibility studies on marine nuclear propulsion. Rather than being driven by any military necessity, the program was influenced by considerations of the nuclear establishment’s organizational prestige. As Homi Bhabha, father of India’s nuclear energy program, argued at the time, maritime reactors “could demonstrate India’s impressive capabilities in the field of nuclear energy.” Military justification for the program came much later when, during the 1971 Bangladesh war, the United States sent the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal to support Pakistan. Thereupon, as a conventional fighting platform, nuclear attack submarines attracted the attention of the Indian Navy because they could raise the threshold of superpower intervention in the region. However, the nuclear scientists could not produce a viable marine reactor. In the early 1980s, therefore, the Indian Navy turned to the Soviets for assistance.
In April 1982, the Soviet Union agreed to lease an attack nuclear submarine (SSN) to the Indian Navy and provide technical assistance to India in building its own submarines. This was the beginning of Project Samudra (Project Ocean), which was to include two vessels codenamed S-1 and S-2.
The stated intent was to produce a “cost-effective deterrent against Pakistan’s enlarging military machine,” according to a top-secret report explaining the program that I obtained from a former government official. The larger objective of these acquisitions, however, had little to do with nuclear deterrence — it was directed towards the growing naval presence of the great powers in the Indian Ocean, more focused on conventional operations than nuclear issues. The report stated, “more significantly, such acquisitions would enhance India’s credibility particularly in view of the increasing presence of the outside powers in the Indian Ocean.”
Project S-1 culminated with the loan of a Soviet Charlie-class SSN in 1988. Project S-2 paved the way for the establishment of the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) Directorate, a dedicated research and development agency responsible solely for building an indigenous SSN. The project suffered major delays as India’s nuclear establishment continued to face technological hurdles in producing a viable reactor design. Still, the path was set: India was designing and developing a nuclear attack submarine.
The Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons tests of 1998 changed the nature of India’s nuclear submarine program. Indian decision-makers were keen to explore avenues that could render their nuclear forces more survivable, including placing nuclear weapons at sea. The first step towards building a sea-based deterrent was to place modified Prithvi missiles on board two Sukanya-class missile boats. The ATV Directorate, however, soon proposed modifying the nuclear attack submarine into a strategic weapon system. The navy was also keen to have its share of the nuclear pie. Thus, soon after the 1998 nuclear tests, India decided to convert what was originally designed as a nuclear attack submarine armed with cruise missiles for conventional naval operations into a strategic weapon system for nuclear delivery. Project S-2 became the first of India’s SSBNs.
Yet this revised mission left the program highly limited in its capabilities. India had started developing a 300-km earth-skimming cruise missile called Sagarika with Russian help in 1991. When India decided to convert the attack submarine into an SSBN, the size of the boat and its missile block was fixed based on the earlier SSN design — meaning only a modest missile with limited range could be retrofitted in. The only option was to replace the Sagarika cruise missiles with ballistic missiles that could carry a one-ton nuclear warhead. Today, the limited range of the K-15, the primary weapon system on Arihant, is the result of these post-hoc technological fixes. Arihant can carry 12 of these 750–1,000-kilometer range missiles, barely sufficient to hit a few major cities in retaliatory strikes against Pakistan, let alone Chinese targets. Its small reactor size also restricts its endurance at sea. In fact, the nuclear reactor onboard Arihant is of vintage Soviet design. Arihant is not Pakistan-specific by design but only by default: Its technological evolution rendered it incapable of anything else.
The burden of history continued to inform the trajectory of India’s SSBN program. To achieve meaningful deterrence vis-à-vis China, India not only needed more SSBNs, but also longer-range missiles that could strike deep inside Chinese territory. In the early 2000s, the Indian government, therefore, sanctioned the ATV Directorate to produce two more SSBNs of the S-1 type and to increase the range of the missiles to 3,500 kilometers. The increase in range entailed a consequent decrease in the number of missiles. The problem, again, was the fixed size of the submarine: Given the immutability of the S-1 design, the long-range missile could only be accommodated by increasing the missile diameter and reducing the total payload. But reduction in nuclear payload meant lesser bang for India’s buck, since it reduced the number of nuclear weapons it could deploy at any given time against China.
When the cabinet of ministers pointed out this problem in 2004, the ATV Directorate decided to include another missile block by increasing the length of the next two boats. Yet in 2006, a major technical review of the program concluded that all five boats proposed so far fell short of a true SSBN force capable of deploying intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that could reach all parts of China. It also required a nuclear reactor double the size of previous boats that could endure longer operations at sea. The review committee recommended a new class of boomers with a reactor double the size of previous S-Class boats and capable of launching ballistic missiles in excess of 6,000 kilometers. S-5, as the boat is officially designated, was approved in 2015. This evolution of Project S is symptomatic of mission creep in India’s deterrent requirements, especially as it attempts to achieve deterrence parity with China. The piecemeal expansion of India’s nuclear submarine program severely undermines its deterrent capability. Until India fields an SSBN fleet with ICBM capabilities and improves upon the designs of its nuclear propulsion package, its sea-based deterrent will remain a paper tiger. As Admiral Arun Prakash estimates, it will take India “50-60 years” to field a credible SSBN force.
Arihant’s historical evolution also leaves doubts about its robustness and reliability. There are more than a few rumblings within Indian Navy circles regarding reactor designs based on second-generation Soviet submarines. Arihant’s first deterrent patrol lasted merely 20 days, suggesting endurance issues with its nuclear propulsion package. Finally, the Indian Navy would have to develop very robust infrastructure for training, maintenance, and repair of its SSBN fleet before the sea-based deterrent could be realized. In fact, the fleet has recently suffered from a series of accidents, including the 2017 mishap onboard Arihant. Only extensive operational experience will build the required confidence both in the men and the machine.
Given the twists and turns of its nuclear submarine program, the resulting technological limits, and the underlying problems with Soviet legacy platforms, Arihant’s first deterrent patrol is just a modest beginning in India’s effort to deploy a credible nuclear triad. For the prospective future, its nuclear deterrent will continue to rely on the land- and air-based legs. Indian decision-makers must accept the reality of this modest enterprise. Rather than engaging in premature triumphalism over Arihant, India should take a page from the Chinese playbook to hide its capacities and bide its time.
Operationalizing Deterrence at Sea
Even though Arihant, in its current form, has limited utility against China, its operationalization has nonetheless raised serious questions about how India would deploy its nuclear submarine force, whether this will entail a “ready-to-use” arsenal, and whether India has developed a sufficiently elaborate command and control mechanism to avoid unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. Such alarmist reactions, however, do not fully capture the efforts India’s Strategic Forces Command has made in establishing operational protocols for its SSBNs. The command’s standard operating procedures for the nuclear triad alleviate three major concerns. First, a sea-based deterrent would not engage in conventional operations, nor does it automatically translate into a “ready-to-use” arsenal. Second, custody of India’s nuclear weapons has not necessarily been delegated to the military. Last, India’s political leadership will maintain firm control over nuclear assets.
First, as far as deployment is concerned, India is most likely to follow a bastion strategy rather than putting its SSBNs on constant patrol in open seas. A “bastion” or a “citadel” model entails operating submarines in waters close to home and away from hostile forces. In India’s case, the most suitable geography is in the Bay of Bengal, the Andaman Sea, and in the Northern Indian Ocean. The Pakistani Navy has very limited capability to operate in these waters, while India’s overwhelming naval presence through its conventional fleet and anti-submarine warfare operations will be able to create a cordon sanitaire against Chinese submarine activity.
While some fear the nuclear submarines will have a dual (nuclear and conventional) role, my interviews with Indian Strategic Forces Command officials suggest otherwise. The nuclear submarines will remain solely under the operational command of the Strategic Forces Command, which handles nuclear forces, rather than the Navy, (which handles conventional naval forces). A clear division of labor between the two has been codified, reducing the risk that Indian nuclear forces at sea could get entangled in conventional operations.
In fact, Indian SSBNs would not operate alongside the Navy’s conventional fleet as any coordination could lead to the nuclear submarines’ exposure by enemy intercepts of fleet communications.
Relatedly, the operationalization of Arihant does not mean India’s nuclear weapons are now on hair-trigger alert. It is highly unlikely that the submarines will carry a nuclear payload during peacetime. In fact, insofar as India’s SSBN force will not perform constant patrols armed with nuclear weapons at all times, it does not entirely fit the definition of a true triad. India’s operational plans for its nuclear submarines consist of a three-stage process. The first is nuclear alerting, or mechanically mating missile launch tubes with missile canisters armed with nuclear weapons at specialized naval facilities. This would start at the first indications of a crisis situation (Strategic Forces Command defines a crisis not as the start of actual conflict, but any scenario where Indian decision-makers foresee a possibility of military escalation with Pakistan or China). The second stage involves dispersing the submarines on deterrence patrol. It is only after the boats receive political authorization that they will maneuver to predetermined positions to prepare for the eventual launch of nuclear weapons. This strategy does entail a risk of a “bolt from the blue” nuclear strike against India’s major naval bases, but decision-makers are willing to run this risk given the other legs of the nuclear triad and the inherent uncertainty that any first strike would eliminate all its nuclear assets. Since at least 2008, Strategic Forces Command has consistently strived to develop and put into practice such operational plans for India’s SSBN force.
Lastly, India has developed an elaborate command and control apparatus to maintain firm political control over its sea-based nuclear assets. When the submarines encounter a crisis situation, nuclear weapons will be physically mated with ballistic missiles, per the first of the three steps described above. For this reason, India needed positive command-and-control mechanisms to ensure that when authorized a launch will always occur and that unauthorized or accidental launches never occur. Former Strategic Forces Command personnel have told me in interviews that India has developed such mechanisms: Even after nuclear weapons have been mated with missile tubes, the military will not be in command of nuclear weapons. Any ballistic missile launch requires a two-step authorization, in which civilian authority plays a key role. Even in situations where an imminent enemy strike may be about to take out the submarine’s ballistic missiles, civilian authority will remain the sole custodian of India’s sea-based nuclear forces.
These operational procedures would require extensive testing and training, and a robust communications network. Strategic Forces Command has to establish beyond doubt that the controls will work under the fog of war and that decisions will be securely communicated to the submarines’ battle stations. The infrastructure for these communications has grown alongside the SSBN program, but will still take a lot of time to mature and attain operational effectiveness and reliability. These concerns will continue to cloud the readiness of India’s SSBN force.
Thus, Arihant’s operationalization should not lead to a conclusion that its nuclear weapons are now fully mated with delivery systems and that control has shifted to the military, as many alarmists seem to fear. India has strived to ensure complete political control of its nuclear assets at sea, ruling out any unauthorized use.
Indeed, Arihant’s problem is not that it has nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert, that it suffers from loose command and control, or that it increases the risks of accidental nuclear use. Rather, Arihant is yet another manifestation of India’s deterrent dilemma between China and Pakistan. As Pakistan responds to India’s sea-based deterrent, it will exacerbate the subcontinent’s nuclear tensions while providing no meaningful change in India’s nuclear deterrent vis-à-vis Beijing in the foreseeable future..."
Yogesh Joshi is a Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University. He is the coauthor of India and Nuclear Asia: Forces, Doctrine and Dangers (Georgetown University Press, 2018).See Yogesh Joshi's whole excellent article at War On The Rocks.
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Extra Pressure on Submariners Social Distancing Onshore
A reply by Anonymous has prompted me to look further at the COVID-19 social distancing pressures on submariners, their families and other loved ones.
I imagine all these restrictions and worry about family on COVID restrictions (from Fleet Base West at HMAS Stirling (below) to Perth CBD) are playing on submariners' minds as they go on their next mission.
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Pete
Hi Anonymous
Yes, no doubt, colds and maybe flu (?) may impact crews on missions doubly.
But COVID-19 is a greater order of risk. I hear submarine crews are now required to go into individual quarantine for 2 weeks Before the 2 to 3 month SSK mission.
2 weeks quarantine on top of the usual hardship of separation from families (and other loved ones) couldn't be fun.
Also even the downtime R & R onshore is compromised by the Western Australian government's understandable COVID-19 restrictions. Hitting the town is severely limited.
Onshore families are likely feeling the pressure of social distancing restrictions. Maybe ones spouse has lost her job in Perth. The freedom of kids going off to school may now change to stay-at-home learning. The extra money (pay for hardship) submariners generate now cannot be spent in the usual way.
Pete
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Australia to Delay Payments on Major Defence Projects
Due to announced future spending of more A$200 Billion on COVID-19 the Australian Government will eventually announce severe payment delays in big ticket naval defence projects. This especially impacts major projects that have not yet “cut steel” including the:
- 12 x Attack class future submarines to cost more than A$100 Billion (life of project) for the RAN
- 9 x Hunter class future frigates to cost more than A$35 Billion for the RAN, and
- 12 x Attack class future submarines to cost more than A$100 Billion (life of project) for the RAN
- 9 x Hunter class future frigates to cost more than A$35 Billion for the RAN, and
- 6 x MQ-4C Triton marine reconnaissance UAVs to cost more than A$7 Billion for the RAAF.
Major contractors, including Naval Group (Attack class) and BAE Systems (Hunter class), will find their projects may be delayed 2 to 5 years.
This is
Pete
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Captain Crozier COVID-19 Affair - Sacking Admirals?
With Captain Crozier of USS Theodore Roosevelt being relieved of command, April 2, for publically demanding his COVID hit crew be allowed to disembark in Guam - new questions are being asked about which Admiral heads should roll. If any.
This is following the resignation of a high civilian, acting Secretary of the Navy Modly, over the affair. All this is to do with sometime conflicting needs of honouring chain of command against responsibility for the welfare of your crew.
This is a complex issue involving the USN's octopus like chain of command.
The USN no longer maintains the rank of "Commodore" (a 1 star Admiral) so a 2 star, Rear Admiral, is next up the chain.
Looks like Croziers's immediate boss is Rear Admiral Stewart P. Baker, Commander Carrier Strike Group 9 which includes USS Theodore Roosevelt. Should Baker's head roll?
Here's a major part of a Washington Examiner, article, April 7, 2020, focusing on Admiral Baker:
"Baker was Crozier's direct commanding officer in his role as commander of Carrier Strike Group 9. While aircraft carrier captains such as Crozier are in charge of their particular vessels, an admiral commands the deployed strike group, [including the carrier, and associated destroyers, cruisers, submarines and supply ships].
So far, however, we don't know what Baker was or was not doing about Crozier's concerns in the days that preceded the latter's email. And that matters very greatly because learning more will help us get to the bottom of whether Crozier's chain of command failed him or he failed it.
For a start, note that the New York Times has reported "that tensions between Captain Crozier and his immediate boss, Rear Adm. Stuart P. Baker, the commander of a multiship task force including the Roosevelt, most likely complicated the Navy’s response to the viral outbreak and prompted the captain to send a four-page [email] pleading for help."
As Defense One's timeline points out, we know that these tensions were bubbling two days before Crozier's email hit the San Francisco Chronicle. Now, note some reporting on why Crozier sent his email without first informing Baker of his intent to do so. As the very well-sourced David Ignatius explains, Baker told Modly that he had asked Crozier why he hadn’t sought advance clearance for the message or large distribution and, "According to Modly, Crozier answered that 'he worried Baker would not let him send it to that broad a group.' Baker affirmed to Modly: 'He was right. I wouldn’t.'"
The key here is thus to figure out whether Modly is being entirely honest when he says that Crozier was receiving all appropriate Navy guidance and assistance before he sent out his email. Or whether Crozier, as his unauthorized email would suggest, felt that the chain of command was risking the lives of the Theodore Roosevelt's crew and air wing without compelling mission rationale to the contrary. It is worth noting here that, contrary to Modly's pushback against Crozier's email description of a nonwar footing that justified the Theodore Roosevelt's return to port, it would be a big problem for the Theodore Roosevelt to arrive in the South China Sea as an epidemic wreaked havoc across the ship. That would risk the ship being unable to face a critical enemy threat such as Chinese ballistic missile forces.
So, what about Baker?
Well, what's odd here is how quiet Baker has been since Crozier's firing. We haven't heard that he's delivered any rallying speeches to the Theodore Roosevelt's crew, for example. Instead, Baker seems to have been focused on praising his Navy leadership. Note Baker's comments on Sunday expressing how he is "extremely thankful for the overwhelming support from the government of Guam and Naval Base Guam in the fight against COVID-19, even with such short notice, they were able to assist getting our Sailors moved off ship in a short period of time. Their support has been critical to our ability to remain mission ready."
Again, perhaps Crozier was receiving Baker's ardent support and simply overreacted without justification. Perhaps the Navy had already decided to give Crozier what he needed as hundreds of crew members faced infection. But Baker's choice of words and the disagreements prior to Crozier's email over how to handle the outbreak suggest another possibility. Namely, that Baker had his eyes more tightly focused on getting one of the Navy's few vice admiral billets and ignored Crozier's concerns in fear of aggravating Navy leaders.
In short, we need to know more. As far as is possible amid the coronavirus outbreak, congressional armed services committees should seek testimony from Baker, Crozier, Modly, and 7th Fleet commander Bill Merz [Merz, HQ'd in Yokosuka, Japan might not be in Baker's chain of command]. The Navy has had too many senior leadership failings in the past 12 months. Let's ensure accountability."
WHAT OF OTHER ADMIRALS INVOLVED?
Baker's vulnerability includes only being a Rear Admiral. But there are more senior Admirals up the chain:
- Baker's boss Vice Admiral Scott D. Conn Commander US Third Fleet, based in San
Diego.
Diego.
- Conn's boss, 4 star Admiral John C. Aquilino - Commander US Pacific Fleet, based in
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
- Aquilino's boss, 4 star Admiral Philip S. Davidson, Commander Indo-Pacific Command
- Another Aquilino boss, 4 star Admiral Michael M Gilday, Chief of Naval Operations
- Gilday's boss, 4 star General Mark A. Milley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
PETE COMMENT
Look's like there are sufficient 4 stars to blur the chain of command.
The COVID-19 threat deserves quick sorting out on policy and naval-military operational response levels.
I wonder if the Commander-in-Chief
Of the one paragraph brief
POTUS Trump, is up to expediting that process?
Pete
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A COVID Poem by Pete
With apologies to a pretty good band :) *
When we find ourselves in times of COVID
Months of hopefulness decree
There will be a vaccine
Let it be.
And in lonely hours of darkness typing
Listening to the crash of sea
Good Friday comes tomorrow
Let it be
Let it be, let it be.
Let it be, yeah let it be.
Whisper joys pre-COVID
Let it be
When we find ourselves in times of COVID
Months of hopefulness decree
There will be a vaccine
Let it be.
And in lonely hours of darkness typing
Listening to the crash of sea
Good Friday comes tomorrow
Let it be
Let it be, let it be.
Let it be, yeah let it be.
Whisper joys pre-COVID
Let it be
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