Australian DoD considered walking away from $50 billion French submarine deal

January 14, 2020, 1:50 am

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Australia's government owned ABC Newsreports, January 14, 2019:

"Defence secretly considered walking away from the $50 billion French submarine deal during protracted and at times bitter contract negotiations, and started drawing up contingency plans for the new fleet.

The revelations are contained in a new report by the [Australian] auditor-general that also confirms the program is running nine months late and that Defence is unable to show whether the $396 million spent so far has been "fully effective"...

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Submarine Lithium-ion Batteries - Third Review of Battery Arrangements

January 14, 2020, 6:49 pm

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Following "Huge Study on Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) for Submarines" of December  16, 2019 Anonymous has kindly written a Third Review of Lithium-ion Battery (LIB) arrangements. The Second Review was not published. Changes are in pink. The main revisions are as follows:

1.    Detail description of LIBs for Russian submarine including Kilo-class. Figs. 8 and 9were added.

2.    Description of LIBs for Japanese submarine.

3.    Addition of Energy density in Table 3 and

4.    Format and expressions were changed to accord Submarine Matters' usage.

No patents on NCA by Japanese company GS-YUASA could be found. No information on sales and  manufacturing of NCA by GS-YUASA could be found.

Anonymous thinks GS-YUASA buys NCA batteries or has a manufacturing license approved by the  Japanese Ministry of Defense (MOD). If that is the case, the NCA supplier/licensor (X ) needs the following:

i)            X has patents of NCA, is manufacturing NCA and has enough technology.

ii)           X has a strong and stable financing  (big company),

iii)          X is relied by MOD (X has been reliable Japanese supplier of MOD), 

iv)          there is a reliable relationship between X and GS-YUASA.  A company that satisfies

              conditions i) - iii) is only Panasonic as far as Anonymous knows. 

A few years ago, Panasonic sold all LABs sections to GS-YUASA  making it the biggest LAB manufacturer in Japan. From these facts, Anonymous believes Panasonic offers NCA technology to GS-YUASA.

In this Third Review below recent information on LIBs in Submarine Matters are reviewed with additional new insights, and they are summarized. Battery cells suitable for submarine are estimated from published data, and battery modules and battery groups are also estimated. Finally, energy of battery is estimated. As many assumptions are used, the estimations in this contribution might sometimes be different from fact.

Summary (of possible adoption of Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) in future submarine classes):

-      In current AIP submarines which have Lead-acid Batteries (LABs), the energy of LIBs is considerably lower than for non-AIP submarine (like Soryu/29SS). Soryu/29SS will show best performance at high speed (Table 4).

-      The LIBs in future South Korean 2000t (eg. the DSME 2000) and 3000t (eg. The KSS-III Batch 2) subs will generate higher energy at ever lower cost. The 2000t submarine will become a strong competitor of the future Type 214-LIB (which may have LIBs).

-      In the TKMS Type 212CD and Italian built Type 212NSF, non-magnetic hulls and minimal magnetic field created by batteries will be important. For those subs the width of a battery group is narrow to make variation of vertical position of battery groups small.

-      Australia’s future Attack-class may adopt bigger battery groups than Type 212CDs. If Naval Group fully adopt LIBs in the early 2020s, then possible NAVAL Group Shortfin for - Walrus replacement and future LIB-Scorpene may precede an Attack class equipped with LIBs - with all Naval Group classes adopting the same LIBs battery groups. If the future Attack-class retains LABs then this may be a waste of time and money.

-     Numbers and energy (192pieces, 6.1MWh) of LIBs for China’s Yuan 039B is significantly smaller than reported ones (960 pieces, 32MWh).WB-LYP10000AHA shows excellent performance as Iron Phosphate based battery.

-     Energy level of LIBs (if adopted) for Lada/Amur-class is as same as Western counterparts.[This is noting that Russia has made so little progress with AIP (for Ladas/Amurs in 20 years) that Russia may upgrade future Ladas/Amurs instead]. As Kilo-class is a proven subamerine at a  reasonable price, LIB-Kilo is an attractive choice than Amur-class for some countries.

-      SAAB-DAMEN equips with bigger [heavier] LIBs to satisfy Netherland Navy requirements [for more energy in its 3,000 ton A26s to replace the Walrus's].

-      Currently, safety (=no hydrogen generation) and better maintenance of LIBs are emphasized rather than increase in energy except Soryu/29SS (see SORYU TABLE).

Figure 1

While voltage of LAB is 2V and all of LABs are directly connected to produce high voltage, voltage of LIB is much higher (nominal voltage : 3.2-3.7V) and combination of direct and parallel connection is adopted in LIBs. Favorable numbers of battery groups and battery strings are multiples of four (4, 8, 12, etc.) for minimization of stray magnetic field.

Port

Parallel connection of battery strings

Stern Series connection of battery groups

Bow

Starboard

Figure 1   Battery group arrangement and its connection for LIB-submarine

Table 1 Definition of terms

Term	Definition
Battery	A parallel circuit composed of battery groups (blue area surrounded by double solid lines in Fig.1).
Battery string	A series of battery groups;
Battery group	A parallel circuit composed of battery lines (blue area surrounded by single solid lines in Fig.1),
Battery line	A series circuit composed of individual battery cells

Asubmarine has one battery or two batteries. Favorable numbers of battery groups and battery strings are multiples of four (4, 6, 12, etc.) for minimization of indiscrete stray magnetic fields [that enemy sensors may detect. Stray magnetic fields may also adversely effect electrical/electronic equipment in a submarine].Figure 1 is a battery consisted of 8 battery strings where a battery string consists of 8 battery groups.

Table 2  Lithium ion battery cells for LIB-submarine

Lithium ion battery cells are listed in Table 2. The battery cells of FAAM and SAFT are square and others are cylindrical. Square battery cell shows higher efficiency than cylindrical one. Polymer (PO), LFP (lithium ion phosphate), LYP (lithium Ytterium)show higher safety. Thebest battery cell of the manufacturer is used for submarine.

SAMSUNG SDI shows high performance and excellent price by adopting commercial battery cells for EV (Electric Vhicle). As a reference, Russian latest square type cell (Liotech, LT-LFP72) is introduced.Energy density of LT-LYP (Yttrium added LFP)770 is lower than LT-LFP72[14].

  

Cell name	Make	Type	D	W	H or L	Weight	Voltage	Capacity	Energy density *6	Ref
			mm	mm	mm	kg	V	Ah	Wh/kg
SLPB160460330H	Kokam	NMC PO (*1)	14.8	462	327	4.58	3.7	200	164	1
SLPB160460330	Kokam	NMC PO	15.8	462	327	4.51	3,7	240	197	1
94Ah	SAMSUNG SDI	Prismatic NCM	45	173	125	2.01	3.68	94	174	4
111Ah	SAMSUNG SDI	Prismatic NCM	45	173	125	2.01	3.68	111	204	5,6
-	FAAM	LFP	63 (*3)	-	225	1.51	3.2	65	139	7
-	GS-YUASA	NCA	-	-	-	-	3.6	-	250 (*2)
NCA103450 (*2)	Panasonic	NCA	10.5	33.8	48.5	0.0383	3.6	2.35	220	20
SCiB™ 20Ah	Toshiba	LTO	22	116	106	0.515	2.38	20	89.3	8
SCiB™ 23Ah	Toshiba	LTO	22	116	106	0.55	2.38	23	96.1	8
VL56E (*2)	SAFT	LFP	54.1 (*2)	-	244 (*4)	1.17	3.3	56	158	10
LT-LFP 72 (*5)	Liotech	LFP	135	30	222	= or less than 1.8	3.2	72	130	14

*1 Lithium polymer battery

*2 General data ofNCA (Lithium Nickel Aluminum)

*3 Diamter

*4 Estimation by using SAFT VL48E and VL52LE

*5 The third generation LFP. Liotech is Russian Lithium ion battery maker.

*6 Energy = Capacity x Vlotage, Energy density =Energy/weight

*7 There is no information on NCA by GS-YUASA. Panasonic NCA103450 is introduced as a reference instead.

Table 3  Lithium ion battery modules (single module) for LIB-submarine

Various factors including diameter of submarine hatch,curvature of pressure hull, dimension and location of batteries, numbers of battery groups and battery modules (4, 8, 12, etc.), and size and performance of battery cell are considered to decide architecture of battery modules.

Details of SAFT-TKMS battery group are not reported, but, its footprint is expected to resemble FAAM battery group. SAFT-NAVAL battery group is hypotheticalmodel based on SAFT-TKMS battery group.

WB-LYP10000AHA will be exchanged through larg hatch, not hatch for crew. If WB-LYP10000AHA has two layers-strucure, then, number of cells is 22. Yttrium is a rare earth element and the major producing country is China. 

Module name	Make	Cell name	Cell	D	W	H	Weight	Voltage	Capacity	Energy	Energy density	Ref
			number-	mm	mm	mm	kg	V	Ah	kWh	Wh/kg
Green Orca	Floattech	SLPB160460330H	14	542	335	541	82	51.8	200	10.3	126	2
Green Orca	Floattech	SLPB160460330	14	542	335	541	80	51.8	240	12.4	155	3
M8994 E2 (*1)	SAMSUNG SDI	94Ah	24	370	588	160	Less than 60	88.3	94	8.39	138	5,6
E3-090	SAMSUNG SDI	111Ah	24	370	588	160	Less than 60	88.3	111	9.91	163	5,6
-	FAAM	-	24	252	378	225	More than 36	76.8	65	5.00	139	7
-	GS-YUASA	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	178 (*7)
20Ah 2P12S	Toshiba	SCiB™ 20Ah	24	360	190	125	14	27.6	40	1.10	79	9
23Ah 2P12S (*2)	Toshiba*1	SCiB™ 23Ah	24	360	190	125	15	27.6	45	1.24	83
(*3)	SAFT-TKMS	VL56E	16	237	586	131	Less than 20	52.8	56	2.95	148
(*4)	SAFT-NAVAL	VL56E	24	345	530	131	Less than 30	39.6	112	4.43	148
(*5)	Liotech	LT-LFP 72	36	270	540	222	64.8	57.2	144	8.23	127	19
(*6)	Winston Battery	WB-LYP10000AHA	11	367	687	756	335	3.2	10000	3210	96	16

*1 Voltage can be adjusted by change of cell connection.

*2 Estimation by using various Toshiba [8,10]

*3 Estimation by using various SAFT publications and TKMS LIB [11,12,13].Footprint of SAFT-TKMS is assumed to be as same as FAAM.

*4 This model is hypothetical. Change battery change through a hatch with diameter of 650-711mm [15], which is estimated from hatch of Suffren submarine, and cell of VL56E are considered.

*5 Estimation based on battery arrangement of Kilo-class.

*6 LYP = Lithium Yttrium IronPhosphate, WB-LYP10000AHA shows excellent energy density (185Wh/kg) as Iron Phoshate based battery.

*7 Esimation by using Pnasonic NCA103450 cell, SAMSUNG SDI 111Ah cell and SAMSUNG SDI E3-090 module

Figures 2 to 9

Battery modules and battery groups based on FAAB cell, latest SAFT VL56E cell and LT LFP 72 cell are proposed in these figures. Dimension of FAAB battery module is decided based on perspective view of Type 212A and picture of FAAB battery module. The SAFT modules and groups are assumed to be different from SAFT commercial Flex’ionTM Figures 4&6 and 5&7 correspond to SAFT-TKMS and SAFT-NAVAL, respectively. Improvement of FAAB and SAFT cylindrical cells to square type cells will provide increase of energy (e.g., plus 20%).

In Figures 8 and 9, Lada-class (single hull, beam 7.1m) and Kilo-class (double hull, dianmeter of inner hull 7.2m) were compared, also LABs arrangement in Kilo-class (12 x 15 LABs and 8 x 15LABs under diesel and torpedo sections, respectively) were considered to estimate number and dimension of battery groups and their arrangement.

W=378mm

D=252mm

BTU (*1)

BTU

H= ca.1100mm

W=378mm

D=252mm

H=225mm

Front view

Side view

Front view

Side view

Figure 2  Battery module consists of 24 FAAB cells  24 cylindrical battery cells (diameter 63mm, blue solid line) are vertically arranged.

Figure 3  Battery group consists of 4 layers of [24 FAAB cells]-modules Battery modules (blue solid line) & battery group (double solid line). (*1) Battery Management Unit = BMU.

						W=530mm
								D=345mm
	W=586mm
			D=273mm
	Top view					Top view
			H=131mm					H=131mm
	Front view					Front view
Figure 4  Battery module consists of 16 VL56E cells Battery module consists of 2 battery trays. A battery tray consists of horizontally arranged 8 VL56E cylindrical cells (diameter 54.1mm, solid line). Inner diameter of submarine hatch is assumed to be 650-711mm.					Figure 5  Battery module consist of 24 VL56E cells Battery module consists of 2 battery trays. A battery tray consists of  horizontally arranged 12 VL56E cylindrical cells (diameter 54.1mm, diblue solid line). Inner diameter of submarine hatch is assumed to be 650-711mm.

  

	W=586mm	D=273mm					W=530mm	D=345mm
H= ca. 1200mm	BTU		BTU			H=ca.1200mm	BTU		BTU
	Front view	Side view					Front view	Side view
Figure 6  Battery group consists of 8 layers of [16-VL56E cells]-modules. Battery modules (blue solid line) & battery group (double solid line) are assumed from pictures of TKMS battery modules and data of SAFT battery cells/modules.						Figure 7  Battery group consists of 8 layers of [24-VL56E cells]-modules Structure of battery group (double solid line) is based on Figure 6 and maximum package of battery modules (blue solid line). Height is estimated from curvature of pressure hull and other factors.

W=540mm

Top view

D=270mm

H=222mm

Front view

Side view

Figure 8  Battery module consists of 36 LT-LFP 72 cells Number (n) of battery cell is assumed to be 36, but, n = 34 also is possible. Encloseute is neglected..

	W=540mm	D=270-300mm
	BTU		BTU
H=1250mm
	Front view	Side view
Figure 9  Battery group consists of 4 [36-LT-LFP 72 cells] modules Enclosure of battery group is considered. Diameter of hatch is 650mm. Height of battery group is estimated from perspective of Kilo-class

Table 4  Structures of battery group and energy of battery for LIB-submarine

Explanation – Battery Management Unit (BMU) is located on the top of battery group (Table 3 (a)). Adoption of LIBs does not always provide significant increase in absolute energy of batteries. Increase in actual energy due to bigger depth of discharge in LIBs (80%), easy maintenance and higher safety without generation of hydrogen are achieved for LIBs. As output of AIP is not high, increase of LIBs is important to improve performance of submarine at high speed. Adoption of optical mast provides improved freedom of sections and arrangement of batteries. Here batteries are assumed to locate under diesel generator and torpedo sections. 

A Non-AIP submarine is equipped with larger amounts of LIBs than AIP submarine as shown in the Soryu/29SS and Kilo. As estimated energy of a LAB battery group for Kilo-class is 3.36MWh (*11), considerting depth of discharge (DOD, 50% for LABs and 80% for LIBs), energy of LIBs will increase 3.8-4.8 times of LABs. Kilo-class is a proven submarine with reasonable price. Therefore, LIB-Kilo may be more attravtive choise than Amur- class, which has unproven AIP and single hull structure (Russian submarine has double hull structure), for some countries.

a	Configura-tion of a battery group: BMU (Battery Management Unit, ye1low), battery modules (blue solid line), battery group (double solid line)
b	Make	GS-YUASA				SAMSUNG SDI			SAFT-TKMS		SAFT- NAVAL	FAAM				Liotech				Floattech						Winston Battery
c	Submarine builder	KHI/MHI				HHI(Hyndai Heavy Industries)			TKMS		NAVAL-ASC	FINCAN-TIERI				Russia				SAAB-DAMEN			SAAB			China
d	Number of battery modules in a battery group	10				8			8		8	4				5				2			2			1
f	Voltage of a battery group [V] (*1)	36				88.3			52.8		39.6	76.8				57.4				51.8			51.8			3.2
g	Energy of a battery group [kWh]	86(*10)				70.2 (*2)			23.6 (*3)		35.5 (*4)	20.0				41.1				37.2 (*5)			24.8 (*5)			32
h	Submarine	Soryu/29SS				3000t-class	2000t-class		Type 212CD		Attack-class	Type 212NFS				Kilo (*9) Lada Amur				SAAB-DAMEN			A26			Type 039B
i	Number of batteries	2				2	2		2		2	1				2				2			2			2
j	Number of battery strings (stern+bow *6)	28+28				12+12	8+8		12+12		16+12	0+24				10+15 12+12 8+8				8+12			8+12			8+8
k	Number of battery groups in a battery string (*7)	12				8	8		12		12	8				12+8 8 8				12			8			12
l	Energy of batteries [MWh]	58				15.2	10.1		6.8		11.9	3.8				9.9 7.9 5.3				8.9			4.0			6.1 *8

*1 Guideline of (f) and (j ) is 400V< (f) x (j) < 800V considering maximum and minimum voltage of battery cell.

*2 SAMSUNG SDI 111Ah cell and 24-cell module

*3 SAFT VL56E cell and 16-cell module

*4 SAFT VL56E cell and 24-cell module

*5 Kokam SLPB160460330 cell and 14-cell module

*6 Stern and bow batteries are placed under diesel generator and torpedo sections, respectively for submarines except Soryu/29SS.

*7 As battery groups and battery strings are directly and parallel connected, respectively.

*8 As diameter of hatch for exchange of WB-LYP 10000AHA is more than 780mm whitch is too big for crew, WB-LYP 10000AHA may be exchanged through hatches on the diesel and torpedo sections with 6-7m in length. Considering that footprint of WB-LYP 10000AHA is 1.32 times bigger than GS-YUASA LIB, that Type 039B is 80% smaller than AIP-Soryu MKI and that Type 039B is tear-drop type double hull structured, Type 098 may equip with ca. 200 battery groups at most (half of Soryu MKI). So, Type 039 equips two batteries of 6.1MW which considerably smaller than reported [18].

*9 Rubin Design Bereau of Russia is considering LIB – Kilo-class. Kilo-class has two batteries consist of 240 LABs. Estimated arrangement of LABs is 8 x 15 and 12 x 10 under torpedo and diesel sections. Arrengement of LIBs is expected to be the same.

*10 Estimation by using Panasonic NCA103450 cel, SAMSUNG SDI 111Ah cell, SAMSUNG SDI E-30] and its module E3-0903. In the 4 layered battery group (d=4), energy will be 80% of Table 4 (l).

*11 Size (D540mm x W270mm x H1200mm) and volumetric energy (80kWh/L) are assumed for LABs.

References

[1] http://m.kokam.com/m/?id=245

[2] https://www.est-floattech.com/app/uploads/2019/06/greenorca-technicalbrochure-144dpi.pdf

[3] Estimation based on [2]

[4] https://pushevs.com/2018/04/05/samsung-sdi-94-ah-battery-cell-full-specifications/

Capacity [Wh/kg] = 94Ah x 3.68V / 2.01kg = 173Wh/kg

[5] M8994 E2 module 

(94Ah)http://www.samsungsdi.com/upload/ess_brochure/Samsung%20SDI%20brochure_EN.pdf

[6] E3-M090 module 

(111Ah) http://www.samsungsdi.co.kr/upload/ess_brochure/201803_SamsungSDI%20ESS_EN.pdf

A comparison between M8994 E2 module (94Ah) vs E3-M090 module (111Ah) suggests same dimension of 94Ah and 111Ah.

[7] https://www.udt-global.com/media/libraries/sensors-and-processing/116---Vincenzo-Pennino-Slides.pdf

[8] https://www.scib.jp/download/SCiB_toshiba.pdf

[9] https://www.scib.jp/product/module.htm

[10] https://www.scib.jp/product/cell.htm

[11] https://www.saftbatteries.com/products-solutions/products/seanergy-modules?text=&tech=&market=333&sort=newest&submit=Search&per_page=24

[12] https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/naval-exhibitions/2018/euronaval2018/6606-euronaval-2018-tkms-showcasing-li-ion-battery-prototype-for-ssk.html

[13] https://esut.de/2018/11/meldungen/see/8260/neue-lithium-ionen-batterien-fuer-u-boote/

[14] https://www.liotech.ru/products/akkumulyatory/akkumulyatory-tretego-pokoleniya/

LT-LYP(http://www.enelt.com/?id=530) is also possible cell for submarine, but, its volumetric energy density is lower (93Wh/kg) than LT LFP72 (130Wh/kg).

[15] Hatch diameter range of 650-711mm is based on the followings: i) DSRV’s ( Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle’s) and SRC (Submarine Rescue Chamber’s) can accommodate hatches up to 28 inches (=711mm) in diameter [reference here], page 698, ii) diameter of small hatch of Japanese submarine are 650mm, and iii) Japanese is smaller than Westerner.

[16] http://en.winston-battery.com/index.php/products/power-battery/category/lyp-battery

[17] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_039A_submarine Type 039B Length 77.6m, Beam 8.4m, AIP, crew 36, submerged displacement 3600, double hull structure. 039B (upgraded)

[18] https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/yuan-design.htm

“The battery pack consists of 960 pcs of the WB-LYP10000AHA cells making the total energy of 31MWh.”

[19] From the pictures and perspective of battery section in Kilo-class submarine, size of LAB (D=ca.300mm, W=ca.550mm) and number of batterygroup (n=8) were estimated. And sizes of LIBs for Kilo, Lada and Amur-class are assumed to be same as LABs.

[20] https://industrial.panasonic.com/jp/products/batteries/secondary-batteries/lithium-ion/prismatic-type/NCA103450

Anonymous

Australia's French nuclear propulsion and nuke weapons potential

January 17, 2020, 12:05 am

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Pete's response to "Steve's"comment of January 17, 2020,

Hi Steve

Noting Australia's Attack class project - from development to last sub retirement mission is around 60 years (2080), much can happen.

Likely changes may include China becoming the dominat power in East Asia, West Pacific and maybe in the Indian Ocean. This would be an outcome of relative decline in US dominance, and less US interest in defending Australia at all costs.

The long game - So Australia needs to nurture new allies, nuclear armed if possible. Nuclear armed France is an obvious choice - France having territory in New Caledonia (very much in the China blockade arc over Australia) and in French Polynesia/Tahiti. 

Australia also re-nurtured its military relationship with the nuclear armed UK by choosing the future UK designed "Hunter-class" ("Type 26" in the UK) frigate.

So French strategic assistance was a good aspect to buy in the Attack class sub deal.

Also, France (unlike Germany or Japan) can offer nuclear powered "Attack class" (ie. Barracuda SSNs). France is already assisting Brazil's much delayed SSN program https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2014/01/brazil-future-ssn-dcns-assistance.html .

If the China threat becomes severe enough France (unlike Germany or Japan) can-might also assist Australia in developing nuclear weapons. Such assistance might quietly begin from the 2030-2040 timeframe. $Billions for the Attack class helps. 

France may have assistedapartheid era South Africa develop crude nuclear weapons "The possibility of South Africa collaborating with France^[5] and Israel in the development of nuclear weapons was the subject of speculation during the 1970s.^[6] South Africa developed a small finite deterrence arsenal of gun-type fission weapons in the 1980s. Six were constructed and another was under construction at the time the program ended.^[7]

France certainly helped Israel. See https://fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/farr.htm "...ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS" by (then active) Lieutenant Colonel Warner D. Farr, U.S. Army:

"Abstract

This paper is a history of the Israeli nuclear weapons program drawn from a review of unclassified sources. Israel began its search for nuclear weapons at the inception of the state in 1948. As payment for Israeli participation in the Suez Crisis of 1956, France provided nuclear expertise and constructed a reactor complex for Israel at Dimona capable of large-scale plutonium production and reprocessing."

see subheading "II. 1948-1962: With French Cooperation"

Shimon "Peres secured an agreement from France to assist Israel in developing a nuclear deterrent...."

subheading "III. 1963-1973: Seeing the Project to Completion"

"...The joint venture with France gave Israel several ingredients for nuclear weapons construction: a production reactor, a factory to extract plutonium from the spent fuel, and the design. In 1962, the Dimona reactor went critical; the French resumed work on the underground plutonium reprocessing plant, and completed it in 1964 or 1965. The acquisition of this reactor and related technologies was clearly intended for military purposes from the outset (not “dual-use”), as the reactor has no other function..."

France, through the company Dassault, also assisted with Israel's nuclear warhead delivery system in the shape of the Jericho I ballistic missile: 

"Initial development was in conjunction with France, Dassault provided various missile systems from 1963 and a type designated MD-620 was test fired in 1965. French co-operation was halted by an arms embargo in January 1968, though 12 missiles had been delivered from France.^[7]" 

PETE COMMENT

If Australia discussed with France the proliferation of SSNs and nuclear weapons know-how then that may induce longer term allies (the US or even the UK) to make pre-emptive counter-offers of nuclear assistance to Australia.

Happy India Republic and Australia Day!

January 25, 2020, 7:32 pm

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The National Flag of India– a tricolour of India saffron, white and India green; with the

  Ashoka Chakra, a 24-spoke wheel, in navy blue at its centre.

---

January 26th is India Republic Day and Australia Day!   

India's Republic Day features a large parade in New Delhi.

Indian Australians include both those who are Australian by birth and those born in India or elsewhere in the Indian diaspora. Indians are the youngest average age (34 years) and the fastest growing community both in terms of absolute numbers and percentages in Australia.^[3]

In 2017-18 India, with median age of 34 years and 2.4% population of Australia, was the largest source of new permanent annual migrants to Australia since 2016...

Of the top 10 languages spoken in AustraliaIn Hindi is ranked 8th with 0.7% of total population and  Punjabi 10th with 0.6% of total population.^[4][5][6] 

The largest Indian Australian population is found in the state of Victoria.^[7] Among Indian origin religions, which also include non-Indians, are Buddhist (2.4% of total population or 563700 people), Hindus (1.9% or 440300) and Sikhs (0.5% or 125900).^[5]

Indians were the highest educated migrant group in Australia with 54.6% of Indians in Australia having a bachelor's or higher degree, more than three times Australia's national average.^[8]

At https://www.indianlink.com.au/republic-day-australia-day/  in 2017 Vinaya Rai advised:

“The date 26 January is always special for Indians. More so in Australia, since we get a holiday and are able to celebrate our country of origin and the country we have chosen to live in on the same day!

In Adelaide [South Australia], the tradition of hoisting the Indian flag on Republic Day started only [in 2016]. So it was quite special hoisting it again on a make-shift pole and singing Jana Gana Mana standing under it. More than a hundred voices rose with the raising of the flag and it was a very special moment. The Australian national anthem [Advance Australia Fair]was also sung and this was followed by speeches inside the Indian Education Centre Hall.”

Some universal words:

They pray for thy blessings and sing thy praise
The saving of all people waits in thy hand.

Our land abounds in nature's gifts
Of beauty rich and rare.

Pete

India's K-4 may only be effective from 2030

January 28, 2020, 2:29 am

≫ Next: Argentina may buy old Type 210 "Ula class" submarine from Norway

≪ Previous: Happy India Republic and Australia Day!

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In response to ghalibkabir’scomments about the K-4, of January 23, 2020 my comments are:

For several reasons the K-4 submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) may not be fully deployed, economical or strategically effective until 2030. Since 2010 the K-4 has undergone several pontoon launches, one reported (but unproven) "dummy payload" submerged launch from INS Arihant on March 31, 2016 but then a failed pontoon launch on December 17, 2017 launch. Two successful pontoon launches took place on January 19 and 24, 2020. But the K-4 may need 3 years for 10 successful tests involving submarine launch and actual missile flight. 

All launch tubes in INS Arihant and INS Arighat may take 3 years to convert/develop for the K-4. So maybe 2026 for full K-4 deployment on Arihant and Arighat.to be considered reliable.

India has been unable to develop multiple warheads/MIRVs per missile and may take 10 years to do so. Only one warhead per K-4 with only 4 K-4s from Arihant would not be a economical/viable deterrent. A K-4 needs 3 or 4 warheads/MIRVs to be an adequate weapon system on economic and strategic grounds. As Arihant and Arighatcan only take 4 x K-4s Chinese anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems might be able to shoot all of them down. It is unknown whether K-4s can deploy "penetration aids" such as chaff or decoys to compensate for the current one warhead per K-4 problem. So India may take 10 years (until 2030) to finally develop reliable MIRVs.

Ghalibkabir refers to is the K-4's warhead maybe having an explosive power of 50 kT. This is perhaps insufficient to destroy deep dug Chinese command centers. 50 kT suggests India has only developed boosted fission nuclear weapons (as at the 1998 Shakti I test). India may not have developed more advanced 2-stage thermonuclear weapons (when on SLBMs often rated at 100-150 kT). 50 kT is less than SLBMs of other nuclear powers. For example Missile Threat indicates a Chinese JL-2 can deploy one warhead of 1 MT or 3 to 8 MIRVs with 20/90/150 kT warheads. Also China’s Type 094 “Jin class”SSBNs deploy 12 JL-2s.

So the K-4 may take until 2030 to be a fully deployed, economical and strategically effective SLBM.

Pete

Argentina may buy old Type 210 "Ula class" submarine from Norway

February 3, 2020, 12:41 am

≫ Next: US New Low-Yield Nukes Also To Be Aimed at China

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Argentina's La Nacion news, January 26, 2020, reports Argentina may buy one of Norway's old Type 210 "Ula" class submarines - effectively replacing the tragically sunk ARA San Juan. 

The specific article is https://www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/el-gobierno-negocia-con-noruega-la-compra-de-un-submarino-nid2327486 which (when right-click mouse translated) indicates:

"Although they did not [provide] abundant details, the [Argentine] Government began efforts to negotiate the possible purchase of a submarine with the naval authorities of Norway."

"It [terminated previous discussions that Argentina] had initiated with the president of Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro, for the cession of [4 old Type 209, Brazillian submarines] in an agreement destined to guarantee the joint patrolling in the South Atlantic...

...Since the tragedy of the ARA San Juan, Argentina has run out of operational submarines...."

PETE COMMENT

As Norways is buying 4 Type 212CD submarines from Germany a total of 5 more "Ula" submarines may eventually become available - perhaps for purchase by Argentina or another country (maybe Poland?).

Two Type 210 "Ula" class submarines docked at Norway's pretty Harkonsvern naval base, within the  Bergen area. (Photo courtesy Petr Šmerkl, Wikipedia)

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Pete

US New Low-Yield Nukes Also To Be Aimed at China

February 4, 2020, 11:53 pm

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See "China" two-thirds the way down.

US Government funded RadioFreeEuropeRadioLiberty February 5, 2020 reports:

“U.S. Deploys New, Low-Yield Nuclear Submarine Warhead To Deter Russia”

WASHINGTON -- The U.S. Navy announced it has put into operation a low-yield, nuclear ballistic missile aboard a submarine [called submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)] as it seeks to deter adversaries like Russia.

This supplemental capability strengthens deterrence and provides the United States a prompt, more survivable low-yield strategic weapon; supports our commitment to extended deterrence,” Under Secretary of Defense for Policy John Rood said in a statement on Feb. 4.

The administration of President Donald Trump first announced its intention to deploy the W76-2 low-yield weapon in February 2018 after a review concluded there was a perception of a gap in U.S. deterrence capabilities.

The Nuclear Posture Review concluded that Russia has a strategy known as "escalate to de-escalate," in which the Kremlin would use or threaten to use low-yield nuclear weapons in a limited conventional conflict in Europe to compel the United States and NATO to back down.

"Recent Russian statements on this evolving nuclear weapons doctrine appear to lower the threshold for Moscow's first-use of nuclear weapons," the 2018 review said.

Democrats in the House of Representatives criticized the deployment of the W76-2 as “dangerous” and said the Pentagon has refused to answer Congressional questions about the weapon.

“The deployment of this warhead does nothing to make Americans safer. Instead, this destabilizing deployment further increases the potential for miscalculation during a crisis,” House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith (Democrat-Washington) said in a statement.

Russia would not be able to determine if a weapon launched from a nuclear submarine is low-yield or not, adversaries say.

[Some define the upper limit of "low-yield" as "50 kilotons"].

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) [January 29, 2020 estimated] the W76-2 has an explosive yield of about five kilotons [equivalent to the explosive energy released by five thousand tonnes of TNT] compared with 90 kilotons for the W76-1. The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima had a yield of about 15 kilotons. 

The United States already has about 1,000 low-yield, nuclear weapons that can be delivered by fighter jets, FAS said. Advocates for the new submarine-based weapon say that the fighters might not be able to penetrate Russian air space.

FAS said that despite the focus on deploying the weapon to deter Russian aggression, the real target “is much more likely” to be North Korea or Iran.”

------------------------------------

FAS further commented, January 29, 2020:

“The first ballistic missile submarine scheduled to deploy with the new warhead was the USSTennessee (SSBN-734), which deployed from Kings Bay Submarine Base in Georgia [USA] during the final weeks of 2019 for a deterrent patrol in the Atlantic Ocean.... We estimate that one or two of the 20 missiles on the USS Tennessee and subsequent subs will be armed with the W76-2, either singly or carrying multiple warheads...The National Security Strategy and the NPR both describe a role for nuclear weapons against “non-nuclear strategic attacks, and large-scale conventional aggression.” [hence, so far not nuclear armed Iran becomes a possible target].

---------------------------------------------------

Pete Comment

As well as intending Russia, North Korea and Iran as targets the US also may have China in mind. China may see no US equivalent to its new (probably low-yield) DF-21D anti-ship ballitic missile and DF-26 intermediate range ballistic missile. China may hope the US would hesitate to use standard higher yield 90 kiloton SLBM warheads to retaliate against DF-21D and DF-26 missiles based 100s kms inland on the Chinese mainland. US low-yield SLBMs would provide a proportionate rather than escalating US response.

China may assume that low-yield "carrier killing" DF-21D ballistic missiles may only need 5 kilotons yield to destroy US Nimitz or Ford class carriers - at the same time detroying some escort vessels in the carrier group.

Another emerging Chinese low-yield candidate may be the DF-26 with sufficient range to be "Guam busting" . Perhaps one destroying the US Naval Base Guam which hosts nuclear Submarine Squadron 15 (with 4 US SSNs). Another DF-26 might destroy the nuclear bomber capable Andersen Air Force Base on Guam which hosts B-2s (temporarily), B-1Bs and B-52s more permanently.

-----------------------------------------------------------

Low-yield concepts overlap with the "limited nuclear strike" concept that the US explored in the 1970s but then was rejected by the Carter Administration. 

The Sydney Morning Herald, December 21, 2012 reported:

"THAT America could launch a limited nuclear strike against Russia was a fashionable belief in US strategic theory of the 1970s. Policymakers thought that if Cold War tensions boiled over, they could hit selected Soviet targets in a way that controlled further escalation and forced Moscow to back down."

"Among the first targets would be the other side's command and control centres - its eyes and ears. Once blinded, a superpower - consisting of real people responding with human instincts - would not distinguish a ''controlled'' strike from a full-scale attack and would retaliate with everything it had."

Pete Comment

But that Sydney Morning Herald was written before North Korea became a nuclear threat and Iran a potential nuclear threat. Also China had not developed (likely) low-yield DF-21D and DF-26 ballistic missiles. 

Pete

Why didn't Australia choose Saab for "Son of Collins" Submarines?

February 5, 2020, 6:13 pm

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At ASPI Strategist is an excellent article by Marcus Hellyer "The compounding risk in Australia’s transition to new submarines" of  February 6, 2020. 

Hellyer raises many interesting questions including: why Australia didn't build a "Son of Collins" and why Saab (which acquired Collins builder Kockums) wasn’t invited to participate in the 2015-2016 competitive evaluation process (CEP). Here is a small part of Hellyer's article:

"...[Australia's Department of] Defence has also started to reveal the scope of the life-of-type extension (LOTE) program in the 2020s] see here (page 31) and here (pages 17–22). In addition to all the usual maintenance and obsolescence management of a full-cycle docking, Defence wants to replace the Collins’ main motor, diesel generators, and electrical conversion and distribution system with new hardware made by the suppliers for the future submarine.

Interestingly, Defence has also said that these are three of the five most important systems on the future submarine. It is also looking at mast and sensor updates (for example, replacing periscopes with modern digital optronics masts) as well as combat system updates.

In short, the LOTE concept is starting to look a lot like a son of Collins—which Defence told the Senate in 2015 wasn’t worth the cost and risk involved. This poses serious questions about Defence’s risk-mitigation strategy for the submarine transition...."

See Marcus Hellyer's full, excellent article HERE.

Pete Comment
See my March 2016 articles here and here on the Collins midlife upgrade/extension issues. In addition to new hardware for the combat systems, new lead-acid batteries, more extensive than usual derusting and new sonars, adding new diesels, motors and electricals could mean more than A$1.5 Billion for each Collins. 

This price is high because these are none standard upgrades to a unique submarine type. There are no standard upgrades packages (enjoying economies of scale) that apply to TKMS Type 209s, 214s, Naval Group Scorpenes and Russian built Kilo submarines.

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Friday Folly: Cormorant submarine launched flying stealth drone

February 6, 2020, 8:34 pm

≫ Next: Russian/Italian Joint Venture? S1000 Submarines? for Qatar?

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In the early 2000s Lockheed Martin's "Skunk Works" were developing the Multi-purpose Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (MPUAV) (Cormorant) concept. See further details by scrolling half-way down this useful National Interest article. See Lockheed's sales Youtube below.

The project was cancelled in 2008. What might be the main drawback(s) of operating Cormorant?  

Pete

Russian/Italian Joint Venture? S1000 Submarines? for Qatar?

February 11, 2020, 12:11 am

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PressTV, February 9, 2020 reports:

"Qatar is reportedly expected to acquire submarines from Italy and turn into the first Persian Gulf Arab country to operate those watercrafts.

The American business magazine Forbes reported that a new memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Italian company Fincantieri, Europe's largest shipbuilder, covers the “supply of cutting-edge naval vessels and submarines” to the Qatari Emiri Navy.

"Qatar may become the first Arab Persian Gulf state to operate submarines," the report said, adding that currently Iran is the only submarine operator in the Persian Gulf.

According to the report, the Qatari submarines, which are likely to be relatively small light ones, may be part of a much larger 5-billion-euro deal with Italy which was agreed in 2017.

...It further said that Saudi Arabia and the UAE, two of Qatar’s neighbors embroiled in a diplomatic crisis with Doha, have both stated needs to acquire submarines.

"Qatar has difficult relations these countries so the submarine acquisition could be seen, at least in part, as a response to these moves," the report added. [Pete Comment - oddly Qatar, which sits in the Persian Gulf, enjoys good relations with Iran.]

See H I Sutton's original Forbes article, of  February 4, 2020:

https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/02/04/qatars-massive-naval-expansion-to-include-submarines/#200f905b322e.

Pete Comment

Italian shipbuilder Fincantieri joint builds with TKMS of Germany the Type 212A/Todaro class  conventional subs.   

Fincantieri is apparently joint marketing with Russia's ROSOBORONEXPORT (with RUBIN Design Bureau as the joint builder) a smaller 1,000 - 1,100 ton concept submarine,  known as the "S1000" (see artwork with specifications below). As https://www.fincantieri.com/en/products-and-services/naval-vessels/s1000/ indicates, the "S1000" can be fitted with a Air Independent Propulsion "AIP capability (Fuel cell based) 200 kW" 

As Italy is a NATO country, with access to high submarine tech, the idea of Fincantieri joint marketing with Russia the S1000 (which could be fitted with the Fuel Cell AIP system (designed in Germany? Still holding German intellectual property rights?) might be problematic.

Russian industry (in the Kilo sub ) has been unable to develop an AIP systems to compete with those of Western firms. Russia would find AIP in its Russian Navy Lada submarines to be strategically useful against the West. If Russia could at last incorporate Western AIP into its long awaited, but so far not exported, Amur 1650 and smaller Amur 950 submarines, such Russian exports could represent $Billions lost by Russia's Western submarine competitors.

Possibly Fincantieri might build much smaller submarines for Qatar (Italy has a long history building small subs) without any AIP tech/Russia complications. 

The S1000 concept submarine being marketed by Russia and Italy's Fincantieri (can include AIP).

(Artwork and specs courtesy Fincantieri)

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Pete

Reducing the Collins/Victoria Rust Trend for Australia's Future Submarines

February 12, 2020, 6:00 pm

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In response to /Kjell’s commentof February 13, 2020:

Much of the Victoria class' current maintenance problems are rust-corrosion going back as far as their long term UK storage when they were Upholders.

See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upholder/Victoria-class_submarine#Canadian_acquisition  

"the submarines deteriorated while in storage and the Royal Navy was not completely forthcoming on their condition during the sale."

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The complex fuel-water -ballast-buoyancy system of "fifteen" tanks for the Collins also suffers from excessive rust-corrosion.

See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collins-class_submarine#Propulsion_system

And see this Collins submarine image showing 2 of the Fuel Tanks and the Main Ballast Tank .

This is a major reason for the excessive A$700 million/year total maintenance bill for the Collins.

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So Naval Group is especially mindful of reducing rust-corrosion problems in the 12 Australian future submarines.

Pete

Australia warns French designers of Australia's future submarine fleet

February 14, 2020, 2:55 am

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https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-02-13/defence-minister-warns-france-over-80-billion-submarine-program/11963758

Australia cannot drop French contract as government would lose votes

February 17, 2020, 12:45 am

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Following comments of February 15/16, 2020 from Anonymous and Arpit Kanodia

Due to Australian July 2016 Federal election priorities (specifically votes for jobs in South Australian) Australia chose DCNS (now Naval Group), too early as the winner of the submarine competition.

Australia should have retained a two or three way competition (with Japan and/or TKMS/Germany) until at least 2018 when 2 or all 3 had a more complete designs and costings. Delays now mean Naval Group will only "cut steel" on the Attack class in 2023 (and I'd say, more likely, 2024).

So Australia now is relying on French Government owned Naval Group. But the French Government has already ordered Naval Group to tackle 2 major French submarine national security priorities first. That is before Naval Group gets round to doing serious work on the Attack class.

1. France is yet to complete a great deal of development work on the far from operational Barracuda SSN program. France is mindful that its preceding Rubis class SSNs are already up to 41 years old with the Rubis launched in 1979.

2. France has a great deal of work to do on its 15 year replacement SSBN program
    - in order to start replacing the preceding Triomphant class SSBNsby 2033.

So France's replacement SSN and SSBN programs are of higher priority for French Government owned Naval Group management, designers and workers than the Attack class program that Australia cannot walk away from.

The Australian Federal government knows it has nowhere to go now. It would lose too much face (political capital - including votes in South Australia) if it said it was wrong to choose France so early.

I'll write about any Japan option after I see what you readers think.

Pete

French, Russian, Israeli to India Nuclear Weapons Sharing

February 18, 2020, 6:26 pm

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Further to February 17-18, 2020 comments:

As I wrote in 2012 "It is likely India would seek (has received) cold and hot test results - most probably from Russia and perhaps from France and Israel (noting Indo-Israeli joint tests of nuclear (intended) missiles)."

Over the years I have commented on Submarine Matters that:

- as Russia definitely helped India with the INS Arihant reactor, and

- as India paid such high prices for the Chakra II/Nerpa refurbishment and conversion of the
  INS Vikramaditya carrier

in return the Russians assisted India with several aspects of Agni series, K-4 technology including MIRVing and Russian 2 stage "thermonuclear test results and perhaps designs".

Israeli nuclear and India

It is widely accepted that US intelligence sensors detected an Indian and Israeli nuclear missile test in the Indian Ocean in 2002.

"Popeye Turbo" is a cover name that could apply to a cruise missile, ballistic missile or a "2 stage" combination of turbojet then a rocket assisted Mach 3 end run.

France and Israel

France supplied the Jericho I technology, Dimona reactor and Plutonium reprocessing construction to Israel. Details could have been passed on to India. French MIRV technology could have then passed to Israel for Jerichos II and III and then passed to India.

According to (then serving) Lieutenant Colonel Warner D. Farr, in his 1999 report https://fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/farr.htm to the USAF Counterproliferation Center:

"Progress in nuclear science and technology in France and Israel remained closely linked throughout the early fifties." Furthermore, according to Farr, "There were several Israeli observers at the French [1960s] nuclear tests and the Israelis had 'unrestricted access to French nuclear test explosion data.[6]”

As French and Israeli (and some Jewish diaspora scientists working for third countries) nuclear weapon research has always been a 2 way informational deal there is no particular reason French 2 stage fusion details stopped going to Israel in the 1960s.

Additional 2 stage details continued (may well continue) and Israeli passage of some to India is a possibility.

Alot to take in.

Pete

Australian Future Submarines: How Many? and Basing?

February 20, 2020, 1:03 am

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From some comments on down from MHalblaub's comment (of February 19, 2020 at 7:05 AM)

HOW MANY AUSTRALIAN FUTURE SUBMARINES?

The Australian Navy (RAN) has had continuous problems since the 1970s finding commanders and crew for more than 5 submarines.

-  Commanders must now pass the conventional submarine Dutch Navy "Perisher"Submarine
   Command Course and about a 40% fail. The UK RN used to run the course but no longer since the
   UK went all nuclear subs.

-  the shortfall in numbers of Australian commanders has needed to be supplement by ex UK RN
   commanders to command Australian submarines.

-  A Commander for a small Baltic 1,000 tonne sub needs to be as well qualified (hence is as hard to
   find and train) as a Commander for a 4,500 tonne (surfaced) Attack class sub. So Australia
   finding 20 commanders, for any suggestion of 20 small submarines, is an illusion.

-  due to the hardship of long missions underwater (away from family) and higher paying jobs in the
   mining industry the RAN has been unable to raise crews to rotate (on missions/on courses/on
   leave) more than 5 submarine equivalents at any one time.

So suggestions we should have 12 submarines might only be justified during a time of medium-long term increase in the threat environment to Australia. A training effort would need to be more than doubled which involves training on surface fleet ships before transitioning to submarines.

In the current threat environment I think the RAN has followed the standard practice of talking more submarines (12) than it expects to receive (8).

You will note I wrote on another website in December 2014:

"A requirement for twelve submarines was an uncosted, minimally justified, extravagance included in the 2009 White Paper (page 70, section 9.3) drawn up under the Rudd Government. There appears to be a historical trend of shooting high in Australian submarine numbers.

 The numbers of UK built Oberon class submarines proposed for Australia shrank from eight to six (operating 1967-1999).  

 The proposed number of the Collins went from ten, to eight, to six (operating 1996 - present)."

No navy is launching 2 conventional classes of small and large submarines because it complicates training (for crews and commanders), HQ command, control, basing slots and deployment. It also increases costs of basing (again), training (again), maintenance, repair, overhaul and spare parts.

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BASING?

Basing is much more complex than how far north(?) and sea depths. Its all about people.

To get a handle on just some of the aspects it pays to read the Australian Department of Defence Future Submarine "FSM BASING STUDY" dated
2011 https://www.defence.gov.au/FOI/Docs/Disclosures/373_1718_Documents.pdf .

I suggest particularly reading the Executive Summary (pages 5 to 6), Key Findings (pages 7 to 11) and Recommendations (page 12). There may be later published studies?

The takeaways include:

-  Australian submarines need to be supported by large bases (for maintenance and overhaul)

-  protected by several surface ships (and I'd add maritime patrol aircraft) for that vulnerable travel
   leg immediately outside bases

-  in large cities (ie. Perth and Sydney, maybe Brisbane (page 17)) for the many support industries
   needed and (healthcare, education, jobs, inexpensive housing for) families and submariner
   retirement options.

-  Darwin is a part exception, as a forward operating base, but the city is too small to perform deep
   maintenance/overhaul or for the full range of other support industries needed.

-  So Australia submarines need to be permanently based in/near to cities over a million (fairly
   standard for other navies worldwide). Darwin or greenfield sites just can't be boosted to a million to
   serve a naval base.

Overall Australian submarine will always need to be large for fuel and weapons/UUV load (with 20 heavyweight shots not just 13 like the Type 212) for long transits (at 10 knots) to/from the average operating areas deep into Southeast Asia/Indian Ocean.

Pete

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Canada's short ranged (4,000nm!) Victoria class submarines

February 21, 2020, 1:51 am

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On February 13, 2020 I reported that the UK Royal Navy's four former Upholder class submarines gathered long term rust/corrossion problems due to being "mothballed" while sitting in seawater for several years in the 1990s. 

Canada inherited the rust/corrosion problems when they bought the submarines in a "deteriorated" condition and renamed them the Victoria class.

But, I was unaware of a whole host of additional problems (some fixed, some not) until Locum provided a long comment (below) on February 14, 2020:

"In December 1986, HMS Upholder [now HMCS Chicoutimi] was the first to be launched. The last one, HMS Unicorn, entered the water in April 1992. This entire class officially entered service between June 1990 and June '93. Because on the internet there are quite a few different data to be found.

In the [UK] Defense Review of 1992 it was proposed to lay off all Royal Navy diesel-electric submarines. This decision was ratified in June 1993.

At that time only HMS Upholder was operational, but the remaining 3 boats were allowed to be completed.

These 4 boats were mothballed in April - October 1994. In 1998 Canada decided to buy these 'second-hand', because new boats were deemed too expensive. In October 2000, the first boat was accepted and sailed by Canadians in the UK. To then undergo a 6-month Canadian Work Period modification program. However, back then there was already criticism of the state in which the Upholders came out of the mothballs.

Commissioned as of: December 2000; June '03; October '03 and the last one originally in October 2004, but due to fire it became September 2015.

From the start this class has been plagued by major rust and corrosion problems. Yes and ...

The Upholders were in many respects a leap forward compared to the old Oberon class: they had good sailing characteristics under water, were very quiet and had good fire control and sonar, but there were also a lot of things wrong.

Former commander of both British conventional and nuclear submarines, Dan Conley, was involved as a naval officer in the trial run and transfer of the yard to the British navy. Conley writes in his book "Cold War Command" about the "serious technical shortcomings" that he and his colleagues from Commodore Naval Ship Acceptance (CNSA) found:

1. the Upholders had problems with the automation on board;

2. During the test run, HMS Upholder was confronted with a power outage and loss of propulsion due

    to a design error. This was restored after months.

3. The boats were found to have a range of 4,000 nautical miles, instead of 8,000 nm!

4. The most serious safety problem was the complex torpedo launch system. The outer torpedo

    hatches could unexpectedly open while the inner door of the torpedo tube was open too. As a 

    result, a huge amount of water would come in in a short time.

5. The snorkel mast distorted because of the exhaust heat during snorting. The effect was noticed in 

    practice: tons of seawater came through the snorkel in the engine room.

6. Diesel exhaust gasses constantly crossed the bridge. This was not only bad for the health of the

    people on the bridge, the view was also limited.

7. A lot of equipment was difficult to access for repair and replacement.

8. Limited space for the crew. According to Conley, it was a generation back.

9. The 2 Paxman Valenta diesels, originally intended for trains, did not meet the heavy requirements

    on a submarine. Damn, in our LCF De Zeven Provincien AAW lass frigates there were / are also 

    Paxman diesel generator sets, which are actually intended for trains and also did not satisfy, 

    because of prematurely wear and teat and are / were replaced by Deutz 'diesel carts'.

There are problems with a new class more often, but although some were solved, other problems proved persistent. Conley described the design of the Upholder as a whole as "very disappointing".

Stephen Saunders of Jane's Fighting Ships, even said that there is something "fundamentally wrong" with these submarines.

The shortcomings were remedied as much as possible and a committee of inquiry also had confidence in the quality of the boats.

Locum."

Pete Comment

1.  Neither the UK nor Canada can fix the glaring range deficiency problem, ie. "3. The boats were found to have a range of 4,000 nautical miles". 

4,000nm may be barely sufficient for transits to/from the Victoria's bases both in southern Canada  (at Esquimalt (Pacific) and Halifax (Atlantic)) 

to the northern ice shelves (eg. anti-Russian submarine and ship chokepoints).

This range shortfall must be diabolical for the peace of mind of any Victoria Commanders considering putting their boats under the ice, even for 24 hours.

2.  I'd also add the Victoria's are not equipped with anti-ship missiles, like UGM-84 Harpoons - quite a deficiency compared to other navies owning modern conventional submarines.

Victoria class - inside and out.

Locum and Pete

Maybe INS Arihant Image - with Interesting Comments

February 26, 2020, 3:38 am

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Oddly pixelated image of India's INS Arihant(?) with image of Indian flag at periscope cluster. ("Photo by Chanakyathegreat, Wikimedia Commons."  via  eurasiareview)

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Pakistan's Sher Bano at eurasiareview news & analysis, February 25, 2020 presents some accurate and inaccurate comments:

"Present Limitations To India’s Nuclear Triad – OpEd"

Inaccurate "The INS Arihant is equipped with K-4 missiles with a range of 3500 km" and "Pakistan however has already built the Baber-3 or Hatf V-II (submarine launched cruise missile) with MIRV capability".

Accurate? "...the [K-4] missile range is still sub-optimal because it would require the submarine to operate on the north eastern fringes of the Bay of Bengal. Hence, requiring these submarines to travel round the Burmese and Bangladeshi littoral waters in order to target China’s vital economic and political hubs."

and "...Arihant was about to sink because its propulsion compartment was flooded because a hatch was left open by mistake. According to The Economic Times there exists an upsetting partition between the military authority and nation’s political leadership. Such an error, actual or speculative, is evidence enough that there are certain serious shortcomings within the Indian Nuclear Command Authority ..."

Pete 

Japanese Submarine Developments through to 2030, Soryu Table.

February 26, 2020, 11:26 pm

≫ Next: Excellent article in THE AUSTRALIAN "Australia 'Captured’ By French Submarine Contract..."

≪ Previous: Maybe INS Arihant Image - with Interesting Comments

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Japan relies on continuously building one submarine per year to keep the managers, designers and building workforce continuously employed. This also provides a construction tempo that is now aimed at having 22 submarines at any one time in the Japanese Navy. Design development is also continuous.

About 9 out of 10 years an operational submarine is produced, but about once every 10 years a test submarine (like 21SS) or extensive testing development program, occurs.

21SS

The designation “21SS” is derived from the submarine being laid-down (or at least the project commencing) on the 21st year of the reign of (now former) Japanese Emperor Akihito. Akihito acceded to the throne in 1989.

As can be seen in the SORYU TABLE below 21SS was a test submarine or test program equivalent.

Given 21SS’s 2010 timing Pete believes 21SS signified the concerted beginning of Japan’s 

Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) for submarine program. The actual LIBs testbed submarine used may have been Harushio class TSS-3601(launched as SS-589 in 1995, converted to AIP testbed in 2002, converted to LIBs testbed in 2010, decommissiond in 2017).

27SS

The LIBs development program continues to this day in the shape of 27SS (Japan’s first soon-to-be operational LIBs submarine) launched in 2018 and due to be commissioned this year (see Table below). Also see the Japanese Ministry of Defense (MoD) Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) LIBs development activity by scrolling half way down here.

29SS

The description of Japanese submarine 29SS research/testing below draws from Anonymous's comments on Japanese submarines on February 19and 21, 2020 

Submarine prototype and tests conducted during MoD budget financial years FY2017-2018 and FY2019-2022 concerned prototype research on submarine hull forms. This was aimed at significantly reducing hydrodynamic noise with the long term aim of permitting Japanese submarines to face ASW threats through the year 2030.

Anonymous believes optimization of hull form research was conducted to reduce noise caused by bubbles, hydrodynamic flow, vibration and by the propulsor – see [1] and [2].

Japanese researchers at ATLA built a [29SS] scale model for various tests conducted in large naval test tank (length 247m, width 12.5m, depth 7m). The findings of this research together with other research findings will influence Japan’s future (post Soryu) submarine design designated 29SS. [Pete comment: 29SS likely also exists as a complex mainframe computer simulation shared between MoD central, its ATLA agency and submarine builders MHI and KHI (see Key to Table below the Table).]

29SS may be the first submarine of a new class following the Soryus. A formal report by the MoD indicates 29SS is being used as a test submarine for various research technologies. 29SS has the same shape and dimensions as the Soryus. Further design modifications will take place in operationally deployed 30SS and 31SS (etc) as is usual in Japan’s yearly continuous build of submarines practice.

[Pete comment: There may be increased blending of the sail. There is some blending of the Soryu sail’s leading edge. Further blending may be not as extreme as depicted in Alfa and Type 212A submarines at Submarine Mattershere. There will be ongoing research for quieter diesel engines, improved LIBs and “Improved Snorkel”].

[1]“Terminology for underwater acoustics – Phenomena (Y0011B)” by Standard for Ministry of Defense (NDS), page 22, terminology number 1561. “Definition of hydrodynamic noise: noise caused by hydrodynamics.”

[2]ibid, page 67, “Classification Table”

Hydrodynamic noise is classified into i) bubble noise (1562, noise caused by generation, vibration or collapse of bubbles underwater), ii) flow noise (1564, noise caused by turbulence flow such as turbulence flow boundary, separating flow and wake), iii) flow induced vibration noise (1568, noise caused by vibration of structure or part of it which is induced by water flow), iv) wave-breaking noise (1569, noise caused by collapse of wave) and v) propulsor noise (1571, noise caused by propulsor*1-2).

*1 Propulsor includes propellers, water jets, etc.

*2 Causes of propulsor noise include cavitation, "wing" [rudder and sail-plane?] vibration by lift fluctuation, local vibration of [rudder] induced by tailing vortex.

Note: Pricing issues will be discussed next week using Anonymous’ comment of February 24, 2020 .This is on the issue of Australia possibly choosing a LIBs Soryu if the current Naval Group Attack class submarine program collapses.

SORYU TABLE. as at February 27, 2020. 

SS No. Diesel Type Motor	Build No Name	Pennant No.	MoF approved amount ¥ Billions FY	LABs, LIBs, AIP	Laid Down	Laun -ched	Commi ssioned	Built By
5SS Oyashio 2 Toshiba motors	8105 Oyashio (mythical currents)	SS-590/ TS3608	¥52.2B FY1993	LABs only	Jan 1994	Oct 1996	Mar 1998	KHI
6SS-15SS Oyashios  10 subs 2 Toshiba motors SMC-7?	8106 -8115 various	SS-591-600	¥52.2B per sub FY1994-FY2003	LABs only	15SS Feb 2004	15SS Nov 2006	15SS Mar 2008	MHI & KHI
16SS Soryu/ Dragon class  Mk I	8116 Sōryū (mythical dragons)	SS-501	¥60B FY2004 all Soryus with Kawasaki  12V25/25SB diesels, see and SMC-8 motor	LABs + AIP	Mar 2005	Dec 2007	Mar 2009	MHI
17SS	8117 Unryū	SS-502	¥58.7B FY2005	LABs + AIP	Mar 2006	Oct 2008	Mar 2010	KHI
18SS	8118 Hakuryū	SS-503	¥56.2 FY2006	LABs + AIP	Feb 2007	Oct 2009	Mar 2011	MHI
19SS	8119 Kenryū	SS-504	¥53B FY2007	LABs + AIP	Mar 2008	Nov 2010	Mar 2012	KHI
20SS	8120 Zuiryū	SS-505	¥51B FY2008	LABs + AIP	Mar 2009	Oct 2011	Mar 2013	MHI
21SSConcept			No 21SS built But was a concept research project on LIBs. 1st LIBs sub launched is 27SS		research in  2010	research	research
22SS	8121 Kokuryū	SS-506	¥52.8B FY2010	LABs + AIP	Jan 2011	Oct 2013	Mar 2015	KHI
23SS	8122 Jinryu	SS-507	¥54.6B FY2011	LABs + AIP	Feb 2012	Oct 2014	7 Mar 2016	MHI
24SS	8123 Sekiryū	SS-508	¥54.7B FY2012	LABs + AIP	15 Mar 2013	2 Nov 2015	13 Mar 2017	KHI
25SS	8124 Seiryū	SS-509	¥53.1B FY2013	LABs + AIP	22 Oct 2013	12 Oct   2016	12 Mar 2018	MHI
26SS	8125 Shoryū	SS-510	¥51.7B FY2014 last SMC-8 motor	LABs + AIP	2014	6 Nov 2017	18 Mar 2019	KHI
27SS Soryu Mk IIor New Class? due to 1st with LIBs and 1st com missioned under new Emperor.	8126 Oryū	SS-511	¥64.4B FY2015 12V25/25SB diesel SMC-8B motor Roblin paper US$536mil?	LIBs only (NCA type)	2015	4 Oct 2018	Mar 2020?	MHI
28SS Soryu Mk II New Class ?	8127 Toryu	SS-512	¥63.6B FY2016 "2,900t" surfaced	LIBs only	Jan 2017	6 Nov  2019	Mar 2021?	KHI
29SS Not operational. Research project like 21SS New class			¥76B FY2017 Concept research for new features eg. maybe blended fin for noise reduction & better water flow and also new propulsor. New diesels, new snorkel system. 1st all new features sub may will be 38SS	LIBs only	2017 research	research	research	MHI assisted by KHI & JMoD
30SS New Class? 12V25/31S SMC-	8028?	SS-513	¥71.5B FY2018	LIBs only	2018?	2020?	2022?	MHI?
31SS New Class ?	8029?	SS-514	¥B? FY2019	LIBs only	2019?	2021?	2023?	KHI?
32SS New Class ?	8030?	SS-515	¥B? FY2020	LIBs only	2020?	2022?	2024?	MHI?
33SS New Class ?	8031?	SS-516	¥B? FY2021	LIBs only	2021?	2023?	2025?	KHI?
34SS New Class ?	8032?	SS-517	¥B? FY2022	LIBs only	2022?	2024?	2026?	MHI?
35SS New Class ?	8033?	SS-518	¥B? FY2023	LIBs only	2023?	2025?	2027?	KHI?
36SS New Class ?	8034?	SS-519	¥B? FY2024	LIBs only	2024?	2026?	2028?	MHI?
37SS New Class ?	8035?	SS-520	¥B? FY2025	LIBs only	2025?	2027?	2029?	KHI?
38SS Soryu Mk IIIor New Class ?	8036?	SS-521	¥B? FY2026 1st production sub using all Project 29SS features	LIBs only	2026?	2028?	2030?	MHI?

Key to Table: Table information exclusively provided to Submarine Matters. LABs = lead-acid batteries, AIP = air independent propulsion, LIBs = Lithium-ion Batteries. ¥***B = Billion Yen. MHI = Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, KHI = Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation of Kawasaki Heavy Industries. 

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Anonymous and Pete

Excellent article in THE AUSTRALIAN "Australia 'Captured’ By French Submarine Contract..."

March 3, 2020, 11:07 pm

≫ Next: Less cost & risk if Australia Chose Japanese Designed Submarine with LIBs

≪ Previous: Japanese Submarine Developments through to 2030, Soryu Table.

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THE AUSTRALIAN has maintained its lead as the mainstream media’s most authoritative source on Australian future submarine issues. Its latest article (below) on Australia cutting off its future submarine options too early, is in line with my own article “French Future SSN & SSBN Priorities Before Attack class” of February 17, 2020 at https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2020/02/australia-cannot-drop-french-contract.html .

THE AUSTRALIAN'S ARTICLE

·     BEN PACKHAM, THE AUSTRALIAN’S Foreign Affairs And Defence Correspondent, reports March 4, 2020  https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/defence/australia-captured-by-french-submarine-contract-shipbuilding-board-member-says/news-story/0b4e47fbfc18b4f54c07919b4382937d

"Australia ‘Captured’ By French Submarine Contract, Shipbuilding Board Member Says

The Morrison government’s Naval Shipbuilding Advisory Board says the decision to hand Naval Group the $80bn Future Submarine project without a plan B has effectively left the nation “captured” by the French defence giant.

In a stunning testimony to Senate estimates, board member Ron Finlay said the government had given up leverage in its in the drawn-out negotiations with Naval Group by “down-selecting” to the French option in 2016.

He said as negotiations with the company became bogged down in the second quarter of 2018, the board advised the government to consider dumping the French company, and look at engaging German, Japanese or Swedish firms to build the next generation submarines.

But Defence argued none of those options would deliver the “regionally superior” submarine that Australia required, Mr Finlay said.

Under questioning by Labor Senator Penny Wong, Mr Finlay said the government’s naming of DCNS which later became Naval Group – as the successful bidder without any alternatives had compromised the government’s negotiating position.

“In my experience, many decades of negotiating major contracts, if you do not have an alternative of either going to bidder ‘b’ or cancelling the project, yes you are captured in a negotiation with few options,” he said.

“And, that does increase the number of issues that can become a block to concluding the negotiations.”

Mr Finlay told the Senate’s Foreign Affairs and Defence committee that, as negotiations with Naval Group threatened to break down in 2018, the board advised the government to look at alternative vendors, or consider a full rebuild of all six Collins-class subs “to buy time” to look for an alternative bidder.

He said the board was concerned the French company would be unable to deliver promised sovereign submarine-building capability, upskill the Australian workforce, or maximise Australian content in the boats.

Mr Finlay said the United States’ government requirement that the design of the Lockheed Martin provided combat system for the submarines not be shared with Naval Group was also a "higher-order risk".

BEN PACKHAM

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE CORRESPONDENT

Ben Packham has spent almost 20 years in journalism, working at Melbourne's Herald Sun before joining The Australian as a political reporter in 2011. He rejoined the bureau in 2018 after almost four years in Papua New Guinea, and is now foreign affairs and defence correspondent.

Less cost & risk if Australia Chose Japanese Designed Submarine with LIBs

March 4, 2020, 9:49 pm

≫ Next: UK Royal Navy to Build Huge Armable Unmanned Submarine

≪ Previous: Excellent article in THE AUSTRALIAN "Australia 'Captured’ By French Submarine Contract..."

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The French Naval Group, Australian Future Submarine Program, may collapse, due to higher French priorities. There is also France's batch building system of delaying a whole submarine class for years. This is in contrast to Japan's more efficient ("continuous") build system of launching a submarine each year.

The following is an indication of what benefits could flow if Australia made the safest choice for Australia’s new submarine program. That is choosing a Japanese designed submarine with some features of the 29SS research program (see SORYU TABLE below). Japanese submarines, benefitting from the 29SS research program, will be actually commissioned into the Japanese Navy around 2022-23.

Japan continuously accepts the risk of new improvements to its all diesel-electric submarine fleet. Japan would test diesel-electric technologies, including its (on Japanese Navy subs) LIBs before designing submarines for Australia.Something France, with its all nuclear propelled submarine fleet, cannot do.  

Anonymous states that the figures discussed below are based on the precise cost calculation formulae used by the Japanese Ministry of Defense (MoD). Hence Anonymous believes this is the most reliable cost calculation by a third party. On February 24, 2020 Anonymous commented:

The AUS 29SS would have four diesels, [Pete Comment also Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs)] and a range of 12,000nm. Meanwhile 29SS for the Japanese Navy submarine (JN 29SS) has just 2  Kawasaki diesels.

[Pete Comment: the French and German competition are far less advanced in submarine LIBs than Japan. Unlike Japan they have no submarines reliant on LIBs. So choosing LIBs in a French or German designed submarine would result in further delays, increased costs (with Australia carrying French and German LIB ACTUALLY ON SUBMARINE development costs) hence increased risks for Australia's future submarine program.] 

AUS 29SS would utilise a similar structure of single and double hulls as the Soryu submarine housing motor, diesel, torpedo and other sections. Extra diesel fuel in enlarged tanks between the inner and outer hulls would meet the longer range/endurance needs of AUS 29SS.

Anonymous indicates the increase in costs of AUS 29SS compared to JN 29SS’s may mainly be attributed to:

(a) US$0.02 Billion (B) for a hull plug housing larger fuel tanks for the extra 2 diesels in a lengthened AUS 29SS (94m) compared to JN 29SS’ 84m length. [Pete Comment: AUS 29SS would retain the Soryu's warload of 20 to 30 heavyweight torpedoes/missiles/UUV shots, or 40 to 60 mines.]

(b) US$0.027B for the two extra diesels themselves

(c) US$0.13B the cost of installing a US combat system instead of a different (though similar) Japanese combat system [coordinated with Lockheed Martin, Australia's combat system integrator] and

(d) US$0.11B profit for MHI.  

So the total cost increase of AUS 29SS compared to JN 29SS would be (a)+(b)+(c)+(d)= 0.02+0.027+0.13+0.11=US$0.29B.

Cost of JN 29SS is US$0.67B.

So the cost of AUS 29SS is US$0.96B (=0.67B+0.29B) meaning Japan can export AUS 29SS  (rounded up) for US$1B.

So for Australia’s 8 future submarines (assuming the Australian Government will only decide on 8 rather than 12 submarines):

- 2 x export AUS 29SS’s [assembled in Australia] (at US$1B/submarine)

and

- 6 x AUS post-29SS submarines (assuming US$1.3B/submarine)

then purchasing and maintenance costs are US$10B + US$10B = total cost of US$20B.

This represents a large cost saving for Australia, freeing up money for other defence or non-defence items.

SORYU TABLE. as at March 5, 2020 

SS No. Diesel Type Motor	Build No Name	Pennant No.	MoF approved amount ¥ Billions FY	LABs, LIBs, AIP	Laid Down	Laun -ched	Commi ssioned	Built By
5SS Oyashio 2 Toshiba motors	8105 Oyashio (mythical currents)	SS-590/ TS3608	¥52.2B FY1993	LABs only	Jan 1994	Oct 1996	Mar 1998	KHI
6SS-15SS Oyashios  10 subs 2 Toshiba motors SMC-7?	8106 -8115 various	SS-591-600	¥52.2B per sub FY1994-FY2003	LABs only	15SS Feb 2004	15SS Nov 2006	15SS Mar 2008	MHI & KHI
16SS Soryu/ Dragon class  Mk I	8116 Sōryū (mythical dragons)	SS-501	¥60B FY2004 all Soryus with Kawasaki  12V25/25SB diesels, see and SMC-8 motor	LABs + AIP	Mar 2005	Dec 2007	Mar 2009	MHI
17SS	8117 Unryū	SS-502	¥58.7B FY2005	LABs + AIP	Mar 2006	Oct 2008	Mar 2010	KHI
18SS	8118 Hakuryū	SS-503	¥56.2 FY2006	LABs + AIP	Feb 2007	Oct 2009	Mar 2011	MHI
19SS	8119 Kenryū	SS-504	¥53B FY2007	LABs + AIP	Mar 2008	Nov 2010	Mar 2012	KHI
20SS	8120 Zuiryū	SS-505	¥51B FY2008	LABs + AIP	Mar 2009	Oct 2011	Mar 2013	MHI
21SS Concept			No 21SS built But was a concept research project on LIBs. 1st LIBs sub launched is 27SS		research in  2010	research	research
22SS	8121 Kokuryū	SS-506	¥52.8B FY2010	LABs + AIP	Jan 2011	Oct 2013	Mar 2015	KHI
23SS	8122 Jinryu	SS-507	¥54.6B FY2011	LABs + AIP	Feb 2012	Oct 2014	7 Mar 2016	MHI
24SS	8123 Sekiryū	SS-508	¥54.7B FY2012	LABs + AIP	15 Mar 2013	2 Nov 2015	13 Mar 2017	KHI
25SS	8124 Seiryū	SS-509	¥53.1B FY2013	LABs + AIP	22 Oct 2013	12 Oct   2016	12 Mar 2018	MHI
26SS	8125 Shoryū	SS-510	¥51.7B FY2014 last SMC-8 motor	LABs + AIP	2014	6 Nov 2017	18 Mar 2019	KHI
27SS SoryuMk II  due to 1st with LIBs	8126 Oryū 11th Soryu	SS-511	¥64.4B FY2015 12V25/25SB dieselSMC-8B motor Sébastien Roblin paper US$536mil?	LIBs only (NCA type)	2015	4 Oct 2018	Mar 2020?	MHI
28SS Soryu Mk II	8127 Toryu 12th Soryu	SS-512	¥63.6B FY2016 "2,900t" surfaced	LIBs only	Jan 2017	6 Nov  2019	Mar 2021?	KHI
(JN) 29SS 29SS may be the 1st of a New class			¥76B FY2017 New features research may include: a further blended fin for noise reduction-better water flow, new propulsor, new diesels, new snorkel system. G-RX6 torpedoes replacing the Type 89s?	LIBs only	2017 pro-gram began			MHI assisted by KHI & JMoD
30SS New Class? 12V25/31S	8028?	SS-513	¥71.5B FY2018 using some 29SS features	LIBs only	2018?	2020?	2022?	MHI?
31SS New Class ?	8029?	SS-514	¥B?FY2019  using some 29SS features	LIBs only	2019?	2021?	2023?	KHI?
32SS New Class ?	8030?	SS-515	¥B?Y2020 using some 29SS features. AUS 29SS would cost estimated US$1 Billion	LIBs only	2020?	2022?	2024?	MHI?
33SS New Class ?	8031?	SS-516	¥B? FY2021	LIBs only	2021?	2023?	2025?	KHI?
34SS New Class ?	8032?	SS-517	¥B? FY2022	LIBs only	2022?	2024?	2026?	MHI?
35SS New Class ?	8033?	SS-518	¥B? FY2023	LIBs only	2023?	2025?	2027?	KHI?
36SS New Class ?	8034?	SS-519	¥B? FY2024	LIBs only	2024?	2026?	2028?	MHI?
37SS New Class ?	8035?	SS-520	¥B? FY2025	LIBs only	2025?	2027?	2029?	KHI?
38SS New Class ?	8036?	SS-521	¥B? FY2026	LIBs only	2026?	2028?	2030?	MHI?

Key to Table: Table information exclusively provided to Submarine Matters. LABs = lead-acid batteries, AIP = air independent propulsion, LIBs = Lithium-ion Batteries. ¥***B = Billion Yen. MHI = Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, KHI = Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation of Kawasaki Heavy Industries. 

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Anonymous and Pete