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Some Comments on Taiwan's Political and Strategic Environment

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Anonymous on May 9, 2020commented:

The US may very well use the claims by other countries as a means to push back on China in an unofficial way. I think that is a dynamic that the South East Asia countries in general are aware of and try so sort of learn towards a balancing between China and the US. If the US uses Taiwan's claim in that way as well, it still falls short of supporting Taiwan to the extent of enabling it to declare independence. Taiwan's defense capabilities rely much on the FSA(?) [Foreign Military Sales Agreement?] by the US.

The number of Taiwanese workers in the PRC has decreased tremendously since 2016. Currently at around 400,000. (see https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3839550)

The rise to 1,000,000 coincided with Taiwanese President Ma Jing-geou who had a pro-China policy approach. He was President from 2008 to 2016, winning a second term. But China in that period was still a question mark in the geopolitical sense. Many other countries have been expanding trade with China at that time as well, including Australia.
Even though in 2008, the Charter 08 by Chinese intellectuals was shot down by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and democracy advocate Liu Xiaobo was arrested, Beijing had the 2008 Olympics. The general mood internationally was "if China develops a middle class, they will naturally evolve into greater openness and democracy". So its kind of hard to hold Taiwan to account in increasing workers in the PRC in these years.
The US and others let the PRC onto the World Trade Organisation (WTO) around in 2001. So the gates of open market/economy forces were opened. And the PRC will naturally try to carrot [entice?] Taiwan into unification sentiments under CCP rule.

Additionally, even US military equipment includes parts from Taiwan, if I recall correctly, Taiwanese bits are in the Patriot 3 missile system. Some computer chips of Chinese origin are used in other US military equipment. It is a questionable knotty mess. But instead of having that be used as a point to discredit efforts within Taiwan to keep unofficial independence and to discredit Taiwan's efforts to achieve official nation status, it should be a point used to reduce the interlocking of parts and businesses in the PRC-Taiwan-US supply lines.

But later, PRC activities around the Senkaku islands and Sarborough Shoal around 2012 and then later with the Hong Kong umbrella movement in 2014, and the beginning of the massive island making in the Spratly island group in 2014/2015, Liu Xiaobo remaining in prison up until his death in July 2017, the PRC buying an old aircraft carrier from the Ukraine [also see] on the basis of "turning it into a floating casino" in 1998 instead becoming a fully operational carrier with fighter jets setting sail as a carrier group with recently mass produced frigates and destroyers by 2016. Obviously the sentiment surrounding the Beijing Olympics in 2008 has proven to be wrong. And Taiwan has responded, electing Tsai in 2016 and reelecting her in 2020."

China's JL-3 SLBMs utilise carbon fiber booster casings for longer range

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As usual I peruse Beijing’s Chinese language SINA News Agencywebsite for submarine articles. I have translated the article below into better military technical English to give it a wider audience outside China. 

JL-3 SLBMs utilise carbon fiber booster casings for longer range of May 12, 2020 at https://mil.news.sina.com.cn/jssd/2020-05-12/doc-iircuyvi2662473.shtml. [I added the links in the text.]

The outside world believes that the domestic “new generation of giant wave submarine missiles [JL-3 SLBMs(Chinese巨浪-3; pinyin: Jù Làng Sān; literally: “Giant Wave 3”] may be equivalent or similar to the French M51 SLBM.
On May 11, 2020 at the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) announced the Selection of the Second National Innovation Competition Award for the underwater solid fuel launch vehicle development team. The outside world believes that this move indicates that the new JL-3 has been successfully developed, and "we have added a sharp sword".
As is widely known the first-generation domestic JL-1 submarine missile was tested in the 1980s, and the second-generation JL-2 submarine missile was first tested at the early 2000s. The JL-1 is nearly 40 years away, and JL-2 is close to 20 years. Obviously, these older JLs would not have been selected for the national innovation competition award. Therefore, the outside world speculates that this award is for the new JL-3.
The key characteristic of the Chinese produced JL-3 is larger diameter. The length of SLBMs are limited by the diameter of a submarine’s pressure hull. The larger the diameter of the pressure hull, the higher the technical difficulty and cost. Therefore, the length of the SLBM is higher than the diameter. Previously, the length of the JL-1s and 2s exceeded the diameter of China’s Type 092 and Type 094 SSBNs. Therefore, their missile compartments protruded beyond the hull, distorting the SSBN’s smooth cylindrical shape. This increased hydro-dynamic noise and drag.
Therefore, a solution is to reduce the SLBM’s length as much as possible. But increasing the range requires increasing the internal volume to accommodate more propellant, so increasing the diameter becomes the first choice. The early American Polaris A2 SLBM was 9.3 meters long and 1.3 meters in diameter. The length of the Trident I SLBM increased only to 10.3 meters, but its diameter increased to 1.9 meters. Judging from overseas data, the JL-2is about 2m in diameter, about 13m in length, and has a range of about 8,000-10,000 kms (the range of the missile will also vary depending on the payload).
The largest diameter (beam) of the pressure hull of the competing US Ohio-class SSBNis only about 13 meters. Taking into account factors such as technical difficulty, cost and price, the diameter of the pressure shell of China's next-generation Type 096 SSBN should not exceed 13 meters, so the length of the JL-3is estimated to be controlled at about 13 meters. The JL-3’s range is bound to increase if its diameter increases. So larger diameter for the JL-3 is the key characteristic.
It has been speculated by the outside world that the JL-3 SLBM is about the same as or similar to the French M51 SLBM, which is 13m long and 2.35 meters in diameter. The M51 submarine missile can carry up to 12 MIRVs, but in most cases only 6 are carried. At this time, the maximum range is 13,000 kms. In 2019, the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation completed the test run of a domestic large-diameter solid [fuel] rocket engine. Its diameter has reached 2.65 meters [see photo below], which has exceeded the diameter of the M51 submerged missile. Missiles are not difficult.
The domestic 200-ton solid rocket engine has a diameter of 2.65 meters, and the black shell indicates that it uses carbon fiber

M51 submarine missile is made of carbon fiber winding.
China’s 200-ton thrust solid [fuel] rocket motor has adopted a number of advanced technologies, one most notable is the large-diameter carbon fiber winding composite material shell technology. This should be the first time that we have mastered the large solid rocket motor carbon fiber winding composite material shell technology. This technology is also one of the key technologies of the M51 submarine missile. It makes the missile lighter providing a longer range.
According to overseas sources, the shell of the JL-2’s solid fuel rocket engine is made of aramid, which is lighter than metal but heavier than carbon fiber. Since the year 2000 Chinese carbon fiber has advanced by leaps and bounds. T800 grade carbon fiber has achieved a production capacity of 1,000 tons, T1000 has reached 100 tons, and M60J grade carbon fiberhas also been successfully developed, which shows that domestic carbon fiber has three important directions (high strength, high modulus, high Strength and high modulus) have achieved breakthroughs, which laid a solid foundation for the use of carbon fiber on domestic missiles and launch vehicles. Therefore, it can be speculated that China’s JL-3 SLBM solid fuel rocket engines also use a carbon fiber shell, for lighter weight and longer range.
From here, we can roughly speculate that the JL-3 is equivalent to or similar to the French M51 submarine missile, using a large-diameter solid rocket engine and a carbon fiber shell. In the case of carrying 6 MIRVs, the range reaches 13,000 kms or more, and it can cover the main targets of the strong enemy in China's offshore waters. After this type of missile is in service, our strategic counterattack capability will be significantly enhanced to better safeguard national security and rights.
See the article in its original Mandarin and initial translation. 

India’s INS Arihant SSBN compared to US Ohio-class SSBNs

Sweden's Loss was Germany's Submarine Selling Gain

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After Sweden made the grave error of selling its submarine maker (Kockums) to the Germans
1999-2014 the Germans hobbled Kockums submarine export-ability. This was particularly evident in Germany's sale of Type 218 Invincible class subs to Singapore. Singapore hitherto being a regular buyer of Swedish submarines (Challengers and then Archers).

Even since Sweden's Saab bought Kockums back in 2014 Sweden has been desperately trying to renew exports - to such markets as Australia, Poland and the Netherlands by feeding news/sales  updates like  

No Swedish luck so far, although a sale of 2 secondhand submarines to Poland may be in the offing. The Germans, Russians, South Koreans and French have maintained a lead in conventional submarine sales, but Sweden keeps on trying.

Pete

Hanks "Greyhound" Submarine movie to be on small screen.

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As usual I was perusing (not WashPost nor NYT) but the higher profile news website of the West African country of Ghana (BusinessGhana, of course!) which reports, May 21, 2020:


“Tom Hanks Submarine Drama ‘Greyhound’ Skips Theaters to Debut on Apple TV Plus...” see whole BusinessGhana article 

COMMENT

This is a shame, because I wanted to Greyhound (on now COVID-19 cancelled June 12) on the big cinema screen.

Checkout this trailer:




Pete

Comments on Malaysian and Mainly Singapore Naval Issues

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Shawn C has commented on Malaysian and mainly Singapore navy issues below – including Singapore’s Invincible class (Type 218SG) submarines might sport a mix of 533mm and 650mm torpedo tubes. Comments in square brackets [...] by Pete.:

Drawing from Shawn C’s comments 1.on May 24, 2020 and 2.on May 25, 2020

1.Frankly speaking - Malaysia is too much of a close economic partner with Singapore and I don't think they are seen as strategic competitors, especially in terms of defense. The last decade has widened the gulf between the military capabilities of the two, and niggling border [maritime, water and aviation] issues aside, Malaysia benefits from a neighbour who is willing to help them in terms of data fusion and ISR, particularly around the Malacca Straits and parts of the SES[?]. [See this December 2018 Youtube Video on maritime dispute].

That is not to say that Singapore doesn't ignore any Malaysian 'posturing'. There's plenty of stories by Singaporean National Servicemen of some of the 'mobilization exercises' they've gone through.

https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/saf-holds-largest-mobilisation-exercise-since-1985-with-8000-troops-700-vehicles

Singapore is a signatory of the NPT and does not have a nuclear industry - also no place to put a nuclear plant with a 30km safety zone.

It's a certainty that Singaporean and Israeli submariners have 'bumped into' each other during the construction of their respective submarines at TKMS, but what systems are shared is of course conjecture at this time, and I don't think the Israelis would let sailors of other nations into their super-secret subs. More likely the Singaporean crewmen trained on Type 212 boats.

We know from launch images of the RSS Invincible/Type 218SG [and see Wiki link] that while the sub has a family resemblance to the Dolphin II, the sail is located centrally, there are four X- rudders instead of the seven (four rudders and three fins) on the Dolphin II, and a broader keel that runs almost the whole length of the submarine.

What wasn't shown in the images, was the Invincible's eight torpedo tubes, and it may be that, like the Type 212, they have an asymmetrical torpedo tube layout, and could even be a mix of 533mm and 650mm tubes [like the Dolphin 1s and 2s!], which would make a lot of sense for special forces and UUV use, amongst other things.

Did TKMS torpedo Kockum with Australia and Singapore? The Swedes think so.
https://www.thelocal.de/20131015/52407

Ultimately Kockums was removed from the SEA 1000 project because "they hadn't built a submarine in twenty years". In a What If scenario - TKMS-Kockums get awarded the A26 project in 2010, and in 2012, with some delays, cuts steel on the first boat. In 2013 Singapore signs in for a customised version, so Kockums now has a 4 submarine order book. This keeps them in the SEA 1000 downselect.
https://au.finance.yahoo.com/news/sweden-barred-australia-sub-program-105608893.html

2.  [Pete never mentioned any Scorpenes had AIP. Only the 3 DCNS (now Naval Group) designed Pakistani Navy Agosta-90Bs have DCNS MESMA AIP. It was Wikipedia that wrongly implied MESMA AIP on Scorpenes hereand in Wikipedia’s right sidebar]. 

You might be interested that the Republic of  Singapore Navy (RSN) trains in the Andaman Islands with the Indian Navy https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/a-rare-look-at-rsn-submarine-training-crew-can-now-take-out-adversary-within-minutes

The Chief Trainer of Submarine Forces RSN, is a Perisher graduate:
https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/why-whiskey-was-the-last-thing-on-rsn-submarine-commanders-mind-during-gruelling-perisher

Checked up on the Polish A17 story, and I think there's a lot of unsubstantiated conjecture in the article, specifically with Sweden 'buying back' the Archer class submarines in 2023.
https://www.defence24.com/is-sweden-willing-to-maintain-its-submarines-and-their-potential

The RSN currently operates two Challenger class and two Archer class subs. The Challenger boats are over fifty years old [originally launched in 1968 and 1969] and in RSNcommission for twenty years, so their replacement by the first pair of Invincibles is urgent. With the Archers its a little more complicated - they were extensively modernised over five years and have been in service for about 9 years, which means they should be able to remain in RSN commission till 2030 without any major life-extensions needed.

While most commentators see the RSN'sintent is to replace the Archer's with the second pair of Invincibles, this won't happen till the boats are delivered in 2024-2025 (not 2023). The RSN may also be planning to expand its submarine forces to six submarines, and keep the Archers in commission while ordering a third pair of [Invincible class] Type 218SG boats for delivery later in the decade.

Great Aussie Convened Survey of SSBN & SSB Deterrence, Feb 2020.

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A great new publication for SSBN-submarine and nuclear deterrence aficionados is:

The Future of the Undersea Deterrent: A Global Survey”. Edited by Rory Medcalf, Katherine Mansted, Stephan Frühling and James Goldrick. Published by ANU National Security College; February 2020, downloadable for free at
https://nsc.crawford.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publication/nsc_crawford_anu_edu_au/2020-02/the_future_of_the_undersea_deterrent.pdf

[Summary]

"Amid rapid geopolitical change at the start of the 2020s, nuclear weapons manifest grim continuity with the previous century. Especially persistent is a capability that has existed since the 1960s: the deployment of nuclear weapons on submarines. The ungainly acronym SSBN represents nuclearpowered ballistic missile submarines: the most destructive armaments carried on a supposedly undetectable, and thus invulnerable, platform.

In the new nuclear age, many nations are investing in undersea nuclear deterrence. In the IndoPacific region (the centre of strategic contestation), four major powers – the United States, China, India [see details below] and Russia – have SSBN programs, while Pakistan and North Korea are pursuing more rudimentary forms of submarine-launched nuclear [SSB] firepower. This complex maritime-nuclear dynamic brings deterrence but also great risk. Yet the intersection of undersea nuclear forces, antisubmarine warfare (ASW), geostrategic competition, geography, and technological change is not well understood. This has a major bearing on peace and security, in terms both of crisis stability and arms race stability.

To illuminate these critical issues, the National Security College at The Australian National University, with the support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, is conducting an international research project on strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific. The project’s focus is on new technologies and risks relating to undersea warfare and nuclear deterrence over a twenty year timeframe. The present volume is the project’s second publication, bringing together the insights of leading international scholars and next-generation experts to produce a comprehensive and authoritative reference. The edited volume examines the interplay of strategic issues, including nuclear strategy and deterrence; maritime operational issues, including ASW; and technology issues, including new and disruptive technologies and potential game-changers in relation to deterrence. 

This volume represents a significant contribution to the field of nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. Its 22 authors span seven countries, and reflect world-leading academic and operational experience across nuclear strategy, deterrence and arms control, maritime operations, and the trajectory of emerging technologies.

This volume will help to advance critical conversations about undersea nuclear deterrence in the Indo-Pacific – a region of intensifying complexity, and uncertainty – and is of value to the policymakers and governments who must chart a course through these dynamics. 

Support for this publication was provided by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York." 
----------------------------------------------------------------

INDIA SPECIFIC CHAPTERS 

within “The Future of the Undersea Deterrent: A Global Survey” at:
on India are:

-   Chapter 10 “India’s Deterrence Posture and the Role of Nuclear Strategy” pages 36-38,
    by C. Raja Mohan

[Dr C. Raja Mohan is Director, Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore. He is one of India’s leading analysts of India’s foreign policy and an expert on South Asian security, great power relations in Asia, and arms control. He is the founding Director of the India Centre of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a foreign affairs columnist for The Indian Express newspaper and has served as a member of India’s National Security Advisory Board. He has a Master’s Degree in nuclear physics and a PhD in international relations. His most recent books are Modi’s World: Expanding India’s Sphere of Influence (2015) and India’s Naval Strategy and Asian Security (2016) (co-edited with Anit Mukherjee). His other books include: Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific (2012) and Power Realignments in Asia: China, India and the United States (2009).]

and

-   Chapter 11 “Atoms for Peace? India’s SSBN Fleet and Nuclear Deterrence” pages 39-42
     by Sudarshan Shrikhande

[“Rear Admiral Shrikhande retired in 2016 after 36 years in the Indian Navy. In flag rank he headed Naval Intelligence; was Chief of Staff/SNC; served in HQIDS and Strategic Forces Command among other positions. He is a graduate of the Soviet Naval War College in ASW weapon and sonar engineering in 1988; Indian Staff and Naval War Colleges and of the US NWC in 2003 with highest distinction. In retirement he teaches strategy formulation, operational art, force structuring, RMA, China, the Indo-Pacific, the Peloponnesian War, leadership and ethics in several military as well as civilian institutions. He writes regularl y for several Indian and foreign organisations. He is associated with the National Maritime, Vivekananda International and Observer Research Foundations as well as the Forum for Integrated National Security. He has participated in Track 1.5 dialogues with China and the US and in a US State Department Indo-Pacific Dialogue and Simulations conference in Sydney. He is studying for a PhD in sea-based nuclear deterrence.”]

These are just two chapters in a much broader work for SSBN, submarine and nuclear deterrence scholars everywhere.

Disruption of Arms Supplies to the Provisional IRA

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With relevance to tomorrow's Submarine Matters’ article:

“Provisional Irish Republican Army arms importation into Ireland for use in Northern Ireland began in the early 1970s. With these weapons it conducted an armed campaign against the British state in Northern Ireland. 

In the early stages of the Troubles, during the period 1969–1972, the Provisional IRA was poorly armed. They had access to weapons remaining from the IRA's failed Border Campaign between 1956 and 1962, but these weapons were outdated and unsuitable for a modern campaign.

To continue and escalate their armed campaign, the IRA needed to be better equipped, which meant securing modern small arms.

The IRA's main gun runner in the United States was George Harrison [not a Beatle of course], an IRA veteran, resident in New York since 1938...In 1971, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) had already seized 700 modern weapons from the IRA, including 2 tonnes of high explosive and 157,000 rounds of ammunition, most of which were of American manufacture.”

The FBI did much to arrest and disrupt US citizen exports of arms by sea to the IRA in Northern Ireland.

Other exports by sea to the IRA came from a complex network of suppliers including USSR and East German intelligence services using, or working with, Middle Eastern and Western Euro-terrorist cut-outs. The USSR considered aid as one way of boosting the USSR’s international revolutionary  credentials. USSR aid also weakened (if ever so little) the armed forces of a key NATO country (Britain). USSR aid further complicated the British Government’s prolonged, overall poor political record in Ireland.

The British Army was the largest and most visible British regular armed force fighting in the Troubles but the Royal Navy also played a part, little discussed in English - until tomorrow.

British submarines "spied on" Northern Ireland

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HMS Cachalot 
---

Flowing from yesterday’s article here is a rare case of country carrying out operational submarine surveillance of its own territory.

The account below was published at Spanish language website https://www.elsnorkel.com/ on May 10, 2020 at the link https://www.elsnorkel.com/2020/05/operaciones-especiales-submarinos-britanicos-conflicto-Irlanda.html

It was written in Spanish by  Law Professor Mariano Sciaroni [his details are below the article] from Argentina and translated into English at Submarine MattersPete has added a large number of links with additional explanation.in square [brackets]. 

“Special Operations British submarines in the Northern Ireland conflict.”

“In the early days of 1975, an order from the Clyde [Submarine] Naval Base (Flag Officer in Scotland and Northern Ireland - FOSNIin charge of operations) arrived at HMS Cachalot (a Porpoise class diesel-electric) submarine, to bring on board special forces for a mission. The code name for the Operation was Awless.”

The conflict in Northern Ireland [known as “The Troubles” for PR and property insurance continuity reasons] was in full swing in the mid-1970s. It must be remembered that the warring factions were the unionists (mostly Protestants), who wanted to remain tied to the United Kingdom and, on the other hand, the republicans (Catholics), who were a minority in the population and advocated an independent Northern Ireland. and/or uniting it with the Republic of Ireland.

In 1969 the British Army had intervened (within the framework of Operation Banner), which was initially received as a guarantor of peace against the various armed arms of the opposing communities. However, the deaths of unarmed civilians by 1 PARA (1st Battalion, Parachute Regiment) on “Bloody Sunday” (January 30, 1972) had led to a rejection by the Republican population of what was quickly considered a [British Army] force of occupation and [which “backed’ the Protestant unionist cause]. This led to increased Catholic support for the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA).

In a complex conflict, Operation Granada(a code name for patrols of Royal Navy and Royal Marine elements in support of army units) began to gain its own momentum. Their presence in the vicinity of the Northern Irish coast had a dissuasive purpose in general, but also a concrete utility, which was to prevent weapons, ammunition and explosives from reaching the [Protestant and Catholic paramilitary] combatants by sea.

British submarines were no strangers to that operation.

HMS Cachalot (SSK), Operation Awless, Jan 1975

“In the early days of 1975, an order from the Clyde [Submarine] Naval Base(Flag Officer in Scotland and Northern Ireland - FOSNIin charge of operations) arrived at HMS Cachalot a Porpoise class diesel-electric submarine (SSK), to bring on board Special Boat Service (SBS)
commandos for a mission. The code name for the Operation was Awless.”

Intelligence had been received information that the PIRA was planning to land weapons on the coast in the near future, with indications of the possible areas where this would occur.

The orders received implied that the HMS Cachalot had to set sail with 6thSquadron Special Boat Service (SBS) commandos, who would disembark from January 11, 1975 near Torr Headin three small canoes (or kayaks) and would be recovered on the January 16, 1975 in the vicinity from Garron Point. The submarine was to remain in the vicinity until the SBS commandos returned. The operation was extremely secretive (this was emphasized at all times) but, as the PIRA was deemed to lack the ability to intercept electronic emissions, the discreet use of the submarine's radar was authorized.
A Sea King helicopter section of the 819 Naval Air Squadron would be on alert for any problems that might occur during the operation.

Once ashore, the commandos were to analyse possible enemy landing zones in the area (Group X, four men), as well as establish an observation post (Group Y, with the two remaining men).

HMS Cachalot finally set sail from its usual base in Faslane, Scotland, without further complications and, after a short navigation, arrived at the area of operations at night on January 11, 1975. There, at a distance, HMS Cachalot made a first distant reconnaissance of the landing area (on the surface and without navigation lights), with the SBS commandos observing the coast with their [then rare] night vision goggles and, just later, a periscope reconnaissance was carried out at a very short distance (less than a mile from the coast).
[Doc 2.]
However, the bad weather and a rough sea complicated the kayak launching phase (which was carried out with HMS Cachalot on the surface), making it clear that the launches needeed to be made at two different points off the coast.

While the Group Y kayak was able to be launched in marginal conditions and HMS Cachalot headed for its next launch point, the first of the Group X kayaks rolled over. The mission having to be temporarily aborted until the kayak and the men were recovered. The weather was so bad that it was only possible to disembark the members of Group X on January 14, 1975 at 23.54 hours (London time). HMS Cachalot withdrew from the shore, remaining submerged.

The recovery phase, which had been postponed to the early hours of the January 17, 1975, was not easy either. HMS Kirklistona Royal Navy Ton class minesweeper almost collided with HMS Cachalot when he at periscope depth. HMS Kirklistonwas not alerted to the presence of HMS Cachalot or the SBS, and (such was the secrecy) that the sub and SBS were not authorized to contact HMS Kirkliston. Problems from the SBS on the ground led to only two kayaks showing up to be picked up by HMS Cachalot. Meanwhile the remaining members of the SBS patrol were exfiltrated by ground means (ie. they hitched a ride with a surprised civilian who drove by in a vehicle! :).

Despite all these problems (including that one of the SBS had to be hospitalized with “Trench foot”), HMS Cachalot’s commander considered the mission "very successful".

The Submarine Force Commander (FOSM) had the same opinion, but he also indicated that many of the dangers faced could be avoided in the future by having his submarines with an image intensifier in the periscope (such as it was being developed for the Swiftsure-classnuclear attack submarines (SSNs)) and thus be able to carry out shoreline reconnaissance at night.

The Force Commander's appreciation was quickly received and the Oberon-classsubmarine (successor to the Porpoise class) HMS Osiris was entrusted to conduct a patrol with an image intensifier in late July 1975.

HMS Osiris (SSK) Operation Artelot, July 1975

The January 1975 Operation had been codenamed Awless, but the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet quickly asked for a name change for post January operations to Operation Artelot, to avoid confusion.
However, Operation Artelotwas doomed from the start. The radio equipment on the HMS Osiris and the communications plan were deficient, without a direct channel of communication with military or police forces that could immediately exploit the intelligence the submarine obtained.

HMS Osiris arrived at the area of operations on July 24, 1975 and began to carry out reconnaissance and surveillance of the coast, using the two periscopes (observation and attack) at night and sporadically using the [thinner, therefore harder to see by arms smugglers] attack periscope during daylight hours. The [relatively new, therefore problem prone] night vision equipment was deficient, only being able to detect a darkened target within 1,000 yards. In all cases, the MAE [surveillance?] equipment was also exposed, as well as [any weapons smuggler] HF and VHF communications monitored.

It is worth adding that HMS Osiriswithdrew from the coast in the afternoons on the July 25 and 26, 1975 to recharge batteries using its snorkel.

The only suspicious contact occurred at 21.00 (9pm London time) on July 27, when two small motor boats were detected in the vicinity of Red Bayand, although at first they were taken to be fishermen, a second glance found that they had no fishing equipment. Also, a small white light came from the shore, appearing to be a signal to the two motor boats.

But the boats were already long gone when a message from HMS Osiriswas received by military and police forces informing them of this rare situation. HMS Kirkliston was sent to investigate, but it was too late.

However, being a moderately successful operational concept, the mission was repeated between November 16 and 18, 1975, using the submarine HMS Opossum [another Oberon class sub]. But HMS Opossum had the same problems with communications as its twin HMS Osiris.

[Despite little progress...] By the end of 1975 (which had turned into a particularly bloody year in the Northern Ireland conflict), the Flag Officer Submarines (FOSM) Force Command considered such patrols to be an "appropriate use of resources", recommending to the commander in command of the fleet to continue with them, even to the detriment of other scheduled operations.

HMS Cachalot returns, Operation Aver, Jan 1976

HMS Cachalot was then appointed again for a new covert surveillance patrol to prevent arms and explosives trafficking in the conflict zone. As an improvement on the two previous operations, emphasis was placed on the security and speed of communications with the various ground units. This was achieved by mounting a radiotelephone on the submarine.

In this way, Operation Averstarted January 1976. HMS Cachalot did not have important contacts, despite the fact that it monitored several merchant ships and the fishing fleet that operated in the vicinity of its designated area. HMS Cachalot had the support of the Ton-class minesweeper HMS Bildeston

The communications did not fail, and the reports of those involved mention the improvement in the command and control of operations, as well as that the coordination worked perfectly. FOSNI considered that Operation Aver "successfully tested the changes recently introduced for the command and control of submarines used in support of Operation Grenada." Submarine missions in support of Operation Grenada continued until the late 1970s and possibly later.

An interesting use of submarines for coastal surveillance, in the context of a low intensity conflict.
A lesson for the present and future.

Mariano Sciaroni is a lawyer, has a Master's in Strategy and Geopolitics and a postgraduate course in Contemporary Military History from the Argentine Army's Superior War College. He is also a member of the Argentine Institute of Military History. He is professor of procedural law at the Faculty of Law of the Argentine Catholic University and Reserve Lieutenant of the Argentine Army. He has published two books and dozens of articles on military history, published in Argentina, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Russia. [and, of course, is a Contributor to elSnorkel . com]
More Mariano Sciaroni Articles here.   Email: marcantilan (a) yahoo.com.ar 

A short account of HMS Cachalot, the SBS and Troubles surveillance is here.

Chinese Security & Intelligence Already in Hong Kong

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China's one party Parliament in Beijing decided on May 28, 2020 to apply China's national security laws to Hong Kong. This is unsurprising as I predicted on July 2, 2019 that this may happen, saying:

"Perhaps a broader circle of democracy activists in Hong Kong will also be arrested. The Beijing Government can suspend the legal convention that the PLA cannot interfere in Hong Kong's internal affairs. This is because the PLA has always had an underlying or active role in internal security for all regions of China." 


National security laws in most developed countries, including China, cover 4 categories:


-  terrorism, 
-  foreign interference, 
-  secession and 
-  generally subversion. 

Secession and subversion would include undermining the authority of China. even including insults to the National Anthem


Apart from the obvious police presence what most people inside and outside Hong Kong don't know is that China already draws on 10s of 1,000s of people including military/PLA (see below) and civilian agencies (I'll discuss them on Monday). 

Some are inside Hong Kong and even more outside (operating remote security technology that focusses on Hong Kong) to address the 4 categories.

China’s Armed Forces Garrison in Hong Kong


The People's Liberation Army's (PLA's) Hong Kong Garrison has more than 12,000 men headquartered in the PLA’s 28 storey Hong Kong Building (aka the “Prince of Wales Building”) in the center of the city. The Garrison previously concentrated on external defence but under Beijing’s legal changes will grow significantly and with an internal security mission – especially against protesters.

Elements of the Garrison include:


-  Army(infantry, artillery, special operations commandos, armoured vehicles (with machine guns) and (significantly) an “intelligence gathering battalion”. That intelligence gathering battalion may supply some of the manpower for China's NSA to monitor landline communications/internet and mobile phones in Hong Kong, undersea cable traffic going through entering/leaving and satellite communications.

-  
Navy, and

-  
Air Force(especially helicopters carrying troops, sensors and door gunners).

The Garrison is under direct leadership of Beijing’s Central Military Commission. The Garrison's local commander is Major General Chen Daoxiang (2019–present) and the Garrison’s essential Political Commissar is Major General Cai Yongzhong (2018–present who makes sure the PLA loyally carries out the Communist Party's commands).

More about Hong Kong's civilian security intelligence apparatus on Monday.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

In scenes intentionally evoking the cannot-be-talked-about Tiananmen Square Massacre is the Video above which includes:

0 to 40 seconds in     - dark, forbidding music, footage of PLA troops firing assault rifles, aiming a
                                    
handgun, firing sniper's rifle

40 to 58 seconds       - anti-riot drill against student-like "protesters"

58s - 1min 25 secs    - armoured cars (can be called "wheeled armoured personnel carriers") crushing
                                    
barricades, barbed wire, water canon, protesters herded under guard, 14.5mm
                                    heavy 
machine guns, more armoured cars

1min 25secs to 2min - off on tangent showing PLA's naval, attack helicopter, artillery-missile and
                                     anti-aircraft might


2min 2secs to the End - happy music, the peaceful alternative of military parades in front of
                                      appreciative, patriotic, cheering crowds and PLA civil assistance roles,
                                      raising flag, gaily goose-stepping.

Chinese Civilian Security & Intelligence in Hong Kong: Part 1

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Following on from China’s military spying on people in Hong Kong there are many more civilian intelligence employees and their informants doing the spying. Their targets include:

-  of course, current and former protesters who might retrospectively be charged with
   breaking the new security laws when enacted in a few weeks/months

-  anti-communist, pro-democracy figures (even if they haven’t attended a protest), and

-  those who have been recorded in contact with foreign representatives in Hong Kong,
   especially those Hong Kongese observed talking to or “receiving orders from” the
   US Consulate General in Hong Kong

The peak Chinese civilian external intelligence and internal security agency is the Ministry of State Security (MSS)whose public website (even in English) is here (at https://www.12339.gov.cn/.
 "12339" appears to be the MSS phone number that Chinese citizens can call to inform on somebody! So even if many in Hong Kong see themselves as separate from China they can still be monitored by MSS. To be precise monitored by MSS area Bureau No. 4 and by MSS Bureau No. 14 (responsible for "inspecting mail and telecommunications" which would work with, of be part of, China's NSA.)

Hong Kong in light green and only 1,104 square kms in size, has many islands and borders mainland China. Shenzhen can be seen just over the border. (Map courtesy TravelChinaGuide . com)
---

MSS officers in Hong Kong (population 7.5 million) no doubt number in their thousands. Many more may commute daily from the neighbouring city of Shenzhen (population 24 million). Also Hong Kongese can be monitored from MSS/Chinese NSA officers working at more remote surveillance terminals in Beijing, Shanghai or any other mainland Chinese area.

How MSS officers and informants monitor Hong Kong is the subject of tomorrow’s article.

Pete

How to Start World War Three, in South China Sea.

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https://edition.cnn.com/2020/06/07/asia/china-malaysia-indonesia-south-china-sea-intl-hnk/index.html

"...The Malaysian-authorized drill ship, the West Capella, was looking for resources in waters also claimed by Beijing, when a Chinese survey vessel, accompanied by coast guard ships, sailed into the area and began conducting scans, according to satellite images analyzed by the Asia Maritime Transparency Institute (AMTI).

Malaysia deployed naval vessels to the area, which were later backed by US warships that had been on joint exercises in the South China Sea..."

China's Mass Surveillance System Coming to Hong Kong Soon

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In addition to 91 million Communist Party members who, at the human intelligence level (humint) level, are required to report disloyalty to China's Ministry of State Security China has a vast electronic/internet mass surveillance system. Much of this effort is in Hong Kong already, but the new security laws will make coverage even more intense.

1. 
"Mass surveillance in China is the network of monitoring systems used by the Chinese Communist Party to supervise the lives of Chinese citizens.[1] It is primarily conducted through the government, although non-publicized corporate surveillance in connection with the Chinese government has been speculated to occur. China monitors its citizens through Internet, camera as well as through other digital technologies.[2][3] Mass surveillance in China is closely related to its Social Credit System, [see flow chart below at 2. ] and has significantly expanded under the China Internet Security Law and with the help of local companies like TencentDahua TechnologyHikvisionSenseTimeByteDance,[4] MegviiHuawei and ZTE, among many others.[5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12] 

As of 2019, it is estimated that 200 million monitoring CCTV cameras of the "Skynet" system have been put to use in mainland China, four times as many surveillance cameras in the United States.[2][13][14] By 2020, the number of surveillance cameras in mainland China is expected to reach 626 million.[15][16][17]"

In connection with camera surveillance, the Chinese government is developing a social credit system that rates the trustworthiness of [Chinese and soon Hong Kong] citizens by analyzing their social behaviors and collecting fiscal and government data.
[79][80][81] After capturing people's activities and identifying them through facial recognition techniques, the government links their activities to this personal credit rating so that the information is stored in a quantifiable and measurable way. 

Under this algorithmic surveillance system, people, their identities, and their actions are connected to a citizen score.[82] By utilizing information gathered about the citizens' activities captured by cameras and analyzing them with AI and data mining techniques, the state calculates and updates their citizen scores regularly. 

Participation in this system is currently voluntary but will become mandatory in 2020.[3][80][82] Many Chinese citizens have already started using the Sesame Credit created and operated by Alibaba, an e-commerce company.[82] The Sesame Credit is designed such that those with good credit scores can live a more convenient life than others with low credits scores.[3][80] For instance, people with high credit scores do not need to pay deposits when checking in at hotels and can obtain visas more quickly than others.[79][80] On the other hand, people with low credit scores cannot easily eat in restaurants, register at hotels, purchase products, or travel freely.[79][80]"

MORE SEE https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass_surveillance_in_China

____________________________________________________

2.

China's Social Credit System, including Travel Ban and other restrictions. Click here to vastly expand image so its readable. (Image courtesy https://nhglobalpartners.com/chinas-social-credit-system-explained/ ).

Scary!!

See Bob (alleged drug smug-la) eaten by BIG Aussie SHARK, OK?!

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"Bob", failed alleged Canadian drug smuggler crossed the Pacific to Australia's sunny Great Barrier Reef - see Youtube below (and here ) :




Bob held his breath all the way
"Simple enough" you might say. 

But then Bob and his drugs done got swallowed by somethen BIG!! - Youtube below (and here).




Moral of the story. Don't do drugs. They're bad! OK!




Pete

Langley's Lo Hung Phúc on China - Australian Relations

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A buddy from the Australia-New Zealand desk at Langley sent me the following essay. It’s by Ms Lo Hung Phúc known simply as “Phúc” by her friends and frenemies. Now Phúc’s main concern is the extent China is compromising Australia’s unquestioning strategic loyalty to the US.

A measure of US respect for Australia was the Trump Administration repeatedly getting the spelling of Australia's then Prime Minister Turnbull wrong.

Ms Phúc has come into some unexplained wealth that has raised eyebrows. Some call it Phúc’s “BBB” (Beijing Bonus Bonanza). Phúc MAY be a double for Beijing or even a triple “mole”. Who knows!

Anyways here’s Ms Phúc’s latest analysis of the threat that Australia will no longer be a vassal of  America during the unreliable, isolationist Trump Administration. For whatever reason Ms Phúc has coloured it revolutionary red...

“China hopes that Australia can have its independent China policy, and that Australia's relations with the US do not target third countries - including China.

Australia, as a key US ally, leans toward the US for security while depending on China for trade. After all, it is a Western country culturally and politically, and geographically hanging off the edge of Asia.

As a member of the Five Eyes network, an intelligence-sharing alliance among Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the US, Australia acts as a fervent US follower. When the US deems it not a good time for it to pick a fight with China at the frontline, Australia often jumps out and tests the reaction of each side.

Malcolm Turnbull, Australia's 29th prime minister, once defined the China relationship in one word - "frenemy," a portmanteau of "friend" and "enemy."

In Turnbull’s recently published memoir, he pointed to his speech during Asia's premier defense summit, the Shangri-La Dialogue, in June 2017, in which he expressed concerns over China's growing power, as the public start date of the current icy age between Australia and China.

A few months later at a conference in Melbourne, attending Australian politicians, academics and former government officials raised concerns that Australia's lack of an independent foreign policy from its conventional US-centric approach had undermined Australia's national interests.

Rational Australian experts are right in saying that Canberra's policy toward Beijing is ragged. But the question is how to save it. Australian politicians should realize that their country's security arrangements with the US and their adaptation of a rising China are not a zero-sum game.

Some Australian media have been quick to point out that China's latest Beef and Barley import suspension is revenge for an Australia-initiated inquiry into COVID-19 and called it "economic coercion."

But it's not. It's reasonable from China's point of view.

by Lo Hung Phúc”
----------------------------------------------------------

A little digression. President Trump of the “high IQ” likes to win. He’s such a winner that he’s won the Putin SVRaward for Russia’s Most Valuable Agent of Influence, with special mention for Damage to American Democracy and Degenerating the Western Alliance”. In his honour the Award is now known as the “Trump Dump”.

Here's the “Trump, PUTIN's PUPPET song” 




Trump: Russia's Top Agent of Influence

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Judging by this June 1st phone hookup, Trump and Putin remain on excellent terms.

"President Trump of the "high IQ"boast likes to win. He’s such a winner that he’s won the SVR award for Russia’s Most Valuable Agent of Influence, with special mention for "Damage to American Democracy" and "Trashing the Western Alliance”. For Russia's best agents, involved in Operation Trump The Order "For Merit to the Fatherland" and even "The Order of St. Andrew" are insufficient. Each has been awarded the ultimate accolade, “Hero of Trump's Dump”.

Trump's latest trick? NBC reports, June 12, 2020 https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/trump-authorizes-sanctions-international-criminal-court-officials-n1229916 

"The Trump administration launched an attack [June 11, 2020] on the International Criminal Court, which is set up to prosecute war crimes and genocide [the Trump administration] authorizing economic sanctions against officials investigating or prosecuting U.S. personnel without Washington’s consent." 

Here's the “Trump, PUTIN's PUPPET song” 

 

French SSN Submarine Fire "Not Nuclear"

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From Agency France Press (AFP) via France 24, June 13, 2020
https://www.france24.com/en/20200613-france-says-no-nuclear-accident-during-submarine-fire comes:

"France says 'no nuclear accident' during submarine fire

[Toulon Naval Base, France] A fire that raged for 14 hours on [the Perle(S606)(English “Pearl”) one of France's [Rubis-class SSNs] did not lead to an atomic accident as steps were taken to protect its reactor, the defence minister said [on June 13, 2020].
The submarine was under renovation in the southern base of Toulon when the blaze broke out at about 10:30 am (0830 GMT) on [on June 12, 2020] in a hard-to-access part of the lower bow section, the [French] navy said.
It then took around 100 firefighters and 150 support crew to put out the blaze by around midnight (2200 GMT [June 12, 2020]), the navy said in a statement.

"There was a fire, but no, there was not a nuclear accident," Defence Minister FlorenceParly said.
Parly added that during the fire "measures were taken in the rear area to protect the nuclear reactor compartment".
The navy said earlier there were no casualties and no risk of radiation because the nuclear fuel had been removed during the renovation of La Perle (The Pearl), one of France's six nuclear attack submarines.
The extent of the damage -- and what started the fire -- were not immediately clear but an official with the Naval Group repair centre called the incident "serious."
The regional authorities said that pollution and radioactivity tests carried out by independent experts had not found anything out of the ordinary.
But French nuclear watchdog association CRIIRAD said that a nearby measurement found that radioactivity levels had oscillated at low levels for a few hours in the days leading up to the fire.
The NGO said the "troubling" phenomenon "could have several explanations," but that it did "raise questions".
Parly responded by saying that "a natural radioactive element was emitted in infinitesimal quantities before the fire," adding that it showed that "we have an extremely sensitive and effective detection system".
Parly said a damage analysis would determine whether the vessel can be repaired, adding that it was lucky that almost all of the sub's equipment was not on board.
A judicial investigation and technical probe have been launched.
The submarine, which entered service in 1993, docked at Toulon in January for 18 months of renovation work that was to keep it operational until the end of the decade...”

Trump Closer to Putin Than Trump Toward His Own People

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Putin's Official "President of Russia" Press Release website records June 1, 2020
http://en.kremlin.ru/catalog/persons/498/events/63444

"Telephone conversation with US President Donald Trump

Vladimir Putin had a telephone conversation with President of the United States of America Donald Trump at the initiative of the American side.

June 1, 2020 18:45

The presidents exchanged views on the coronavirus response measures taken by both countries. Vladimir Putin expressed appreciation for the supply of US ventilators to Russia.

The Russian President congratulated Donald Trump on the successful launch of the Crew Dragon manned spacecraft on May 30, which carried American astronauts to the International Space Station. A common attitude towards the development of mutually beneficial cooperation in the space sector was confirmed.

The presidents addressed world oil market developments in the context of implementing the OPEC+ agreement. It was stated that this multilateral agreement, reached with the active support of the presidents of Russia and the United States, would lead to a gradual restoration of oil demand and price stabilisation.

Mr Trump informed Mr Putin about his idea of holding a G7 summit with the possible invitation of the leaders of Russia, Australia, India and the Republic of Korea.

The importance of enhancing the Russian-American dialogue on strategic stability and confidence-building measures in the military sector was noted.

The presidents agreed to continue contacts at various levels. The conversation was constructive, businesslike and substantive."

-------------------------------------

Meanwhile on the same day, June 1, 2020 https://www.npr.org/2020/06/01/867532070/trumps-unannounced-church-visit-angers-church-officials


Peaceful Protesters Tear-Gassed To Clear Way For Trump Church Photo-Op


June 1, 202011:50 PM ET
The plaza between St. John's Church and Lafayette Park was full of people nonviolently protesting police brutality late Monday afternoon when U.S. Park Police and National Guard troops, with the use of tear gas, suddenly started pushing them away for no apparent reason.
And then it became clear.

President Trump wanted to walk from the White House through the park to the Episcopal church. Camera crews scrambled to keep up with him as he strode through the park, followed by his daughter Ivanka 
[Note: Ivana/ "Ivanka" are feminine forms of the name Ivan, popular in Russia...] and her husband, Jared Kushner, along with Attorney General William Barr and other administration officials...."

Comment on the June 12, 2020 fire on France's SSN Perle (S606).

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Following SubMatts'June 14, 2020 article, submarine expert "S" has made some interesting comments regarding the June 12, 2020 14 hour fire on France's Rubis-classSSNPerle (S606)

S comments:

Heating of steel by fire and its cooling by water may result in significant damage of steel [1, 2]. According to submarine design experts, even apparently minor damage to submarine steel by heating and/or cooling might be extremely serious [3,4]. The degree of fire damage to the wiring/electrical  system should also be precisely measured and assessed. Perle will be scrapped if damage is as severe as on USS Miami[5].

[1] 
https://www.steelconstruction.info/Fire_damage_assessment_of_hot_rolled_structural_steelwork
“The assessment of fire damaged hot rolled structural steel is an area in which many engineers and architects have little practical experience. On many occasions fire affected steelwork shows little or no distortion resulting in considerable uncertainty regarding its re-usability. This is particularly true in situations where fire has resulted in some parts of the structure exhibiting little or no damage alongside areas where considerable damage and distortion are clearly visible.”

[2] 
https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jssc/21/84/21_84_67/_pdf “Effect of heating and cooling process assuming fire of steel bridged on characteristics of welded joints of structural steel”, Steel Construction Engineering, vol.21, No84, ”Dec/2014, page 67, M. Hirohata, et. al.

“For investigating the effect of heating and cooling process assuming fire of steel bridges on characteristics of welded joints of structural steel members, a series of experiments were carried out. The heating under transformation point did not affect the joint performance regardless of cooling process. The heating over transformation point caused the softening or the hardening according to cooling rate. The degree of them was larger in the base metal rather than in the weld metal because the amount of carbon in the base metal was more than that in the weld metal. Furthermore, the change of microstructure of base metal made by TMC process was more sensitive compared with that of weld metal.”

[3] 
https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/kyokaisi/460/0/460_KJ00002224747/_pdf “Issues on structural material and construction of submarine”, The Society of Naval Architects of Japan, No 460, Oct/1955, page 429, T. Sugimura et.al. (Technical Research and Development Institute, the Japan Defense Agency).

“USS Thresher sinking in 1963 was caused by fracture of welded parts of pipe of 10cm diameter. Risk of facture must be understood.” 

-  Also see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Thresher_(SSN-593)#Disaster_sequence_of_10_April_1963

[4] ibid, page 429


“There are two requirements in steel materials for submarine including welded parts: Standard Charpy strength at -70C and -2.2 C shall be more than 2.2kgm and 7kgm, respectively.”

[5] A USS Miami (SSN-755) was a  Los Angeles-class SSN 
which suffering a shipyard maintenance fire in 2013, assessed as intentional sabotage. Inspectors assessed it would cost up to US$700 million to repair. Hence it was decommissioned in 2014.

S

Singapore’s Type 218SG (Invincible-class) submarine ISSUES

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On June 15, 2020 new commenter “retortPouch” made some comments on Singapore’s current 2 Archer-classsubmarines, Type 214s and, in much greater detail Singapore’s Type 218SG Invincible-class submarines. retortPouch numbered the sections 1) to 13). There will eventually be 4 x 218SGs. Pete has added many links (other than the 3 Key CUTAWAY links, from retortPouch):

“1) It's almost certain that the Archers will be kept in service for a while longer maintaining a six boat fleet [ie. 2 Challenger-class, the 2 Archers and 2 x 218SGs (due for delivery 2021-22)] . The Archers are said to have had significant upgrades c.a. 2010 for which one particular Dr. Tan Beng Hock won the Defense Technology Prize in 2013.

2) It's actually very informative to make a comparison between the three HDW/TKMS Type 214 derivatives: the
"basic" 214, the Turkish 214TN Reis-class and the 218SG.


Key CUTAWAY links:



a) 218SGlargest cutaway (above – click here for a greatly enlarged image) (Cutaway courtesy https://www.naval.com.br/blog/2019/02/18/invincible-primeiro-submarino-type-218sg-de-singapura-e-lancado-na-alemanha/ )
---


b) Turkish Type 214TN "Reis" variant. Largest cutaway (above – click here for enlarged image) (Cutaway courtesy https://www.monch.com/mpg/news/naval-channel/4361-turksub.html )
---


c) Generic Type 214 above. For Largest cutaway (click here) (Cutaway courtesy http://www.naval.com.br/blog/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/u-214-schnittbild.jpg )
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3) Comparing the cutaway diagrams, using the central console as a central point of reference for size, we see that there is about a two and a half meter extension fore of the sail, and about a similar extension aft of the sail compared to the generic 214.

4) The area with bunk beds in the 218SG is almost certainly a reconfigurable space serving alternate duty as Spec Ops hotel, or Torpedo/Payload Room, or part of each at the same time. It is however the same size (between the Galley and the start of the Torpedo launch tubes) as that on the 214TN/Reis class.

5) [AARONQFW advises that compared to the Turkish Reis 214 variant (ie. 214TN), about 1 meter of the extension aft of the sail is in the engine room, about 1 meter is an enlarged combat center, and about half a meter is an enlarged technology room.] Try scaling it identically and superimposing the images to see. Maybe the 218SG's shtick really is "engaging targets at longer range" as the Defence Ministry puts it, and remote sensing/distributed swarm tactics with UUVs to "sense targets at greater range". Perhaps it is fitted for the DM2A4 ER SeaHake torpedo? See the SeaHake arms-showed here 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TYvt3tU2yqU .

6) The extension aft of the 218SG sail seems to be distributed throughout the engine room, and in the cutaway it appears to be used as empty space, but the cutaway seems to omit a lot of important things; it's almost like somebody turned off a few layers on a Computer Aided Design (CAD) rendering. We can only speculate (and I encourage you to speculate!) as to what might be contained in the engine room, because it's not typical of the Singaporean military to sacrifice equipment for comfort. If anything their stuff is chronically over modified.

7) The 218SG might not have a Horizontal Multi-Purpose Lock (HMPL) for Special Operations (“SEAL” diver) delivery; the airlock might be located in the base of the sail instead like the German and Italian Type 212As and the Greek Type 214s. However, no pictures are forthcoming of the 218SG sail itself. There is however, one picture of the 218SG bow during the February 18, 2019 commissioning ceremony on Alamy Stock Photos here, showing that like the classic 214s, the hydrophone and most of the larger sonar equipment is probably housed below the torpedo tubes. [Pete has used a Straits Times' image below due to copyright concerns]. 


Type 218SG Invincible-class  Bow from the Straits Times, February 18, 2019.
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8) The 218SG screw/propeller is obviously missing from the cutaway (which makes you wonder why they omitted the screw when HDW screws are very well photographed), and there are no extant pictures of the 218SG's screw. However, the cutaway shows a Propeller Boss Cap Fins (PBCF) in place of the traditional hub, and a large ring like shroud for several very thin, straight blades, probably non rotating. A very interesting device which I have not seen anywhere else. It have something to do with flow optimization, or it might have something to do with reducing cavitation. I recall some years ago on your blog a commenter said it had to do with a torpedo or towed array; as far as I can tell this is not the case since there are no torpedo tubes to the rear, and plenty of submarines with towed arrays function well without it.

9) The 218SG is quite a thin submarine with respect to draught. It's unlike the German/Italian Type 212A and Israeli Dolphin 1s and 2s, (which are more similar to each other than to the 214 derived series), and is probably not a true double decked design.

10) Depending on how long you think the Upgraded Västergötland-class [becoming Singapore’s 2 Archer-class] [and the Swedish Navy’s 2] Sodermanland-class Stirling subs can endure underwater, the 218SG has anywhere between 3 and 6 weeks' endurance (half again compared to Archer class, according to the Singapore’s Defence Ministry). My guess is that the rear of the 218SG is used to house more Liquid Oxygen LOX/ Metal Hydride MH, or more batteries. If it's batteries, then it's got to be lithium ion, because lead acids are too bulky and there's no point having more of them then. By a back of the envelope calculation, you'd need 13 to 14 tonnes of LOX to go 2,880 nautical miles, or 4 knots continuously at 60 to 70 percent reactant efficiency (which is ballpark for 4 knots for the SINAVY PEM 120kW cells, at 60 to 70kW total propulsion load) for 30 days. This works out to about 11 cubic meters of LOX (and a smaller volume of MH), which is quite a bit but not so much.

[Note retortPouch later wrote: “Sorry, I forgot to account for cell voltage in the basic calculation, the quantity can be divided by 0.6 for standard fuel cells giving 22 tonnes or 19 cubic meters of LOX, however Siemens claims the SINAVY PEM 120kW models run at about 1 volt cell voltage, which makes the calculation accidentally correct.”]

The alternative is between 100 cubic meters to 300 cubic meters worth of Lithium-ion batteries (LIBs). Instead of a full LIB solution, the 218SG might employ a very large load of LOX, perhaps up to 20 cubic meters worth for recharging, and a larger than normal volume of batteries, which might be LIB. HDW/TKMS is known to have explored LIBs for the Type 216[offered to Australia up to 2016 under the SEA 1000 competition], and as early as c. 2009, the below linked Singapore publication states specifically that HDW is researching replacing lead acid with lithium ion. In that case, the advantage would be a much larger sprint/surface reserve battery capability, mitigating the problem with the old Swedish subs.

See Introduction to Submarine Designby Singapore’s (?) Ong Li Koon, Liu Chee Kong and Toh Chee Wee athttps://www.dsta.gov.sg/docs/default-source/dsta-about/introduction-to-submarine-design.pdf?sfvrsn=2

11) At the [TKMS? Kiel?] dockyard, the bottom of the [218SG?] hull seems to be much blockier than the TKMS-Israeli Dolphinor classic Type 214. I speculate that it might provide extra strength, external reactant storage, and larger sensors. At the commissioning dockyard, I could not find any photo evidence of a side payload bay.

12) The contract price for the first two 218SG subs was stated in press releases to include logistics, training and the actual construction. At US$900 million per sub, if we assume half the costs go to logistics (spares) and training, the remaining half goes to the sub, which is about half again more expensive than the classic 214s that Korea and Greece received, which went for about US$300 million. The 218SG's construction costs are in the ballpark for a Type 212A but of course this is the purest kind of speculation.

13) Funnily enough, the diagram of the 218SG linked above, which the Singaporean Ministry of Defence released, appears to be an isometric projection, whereas the 214 and 214TN(?) are both orthographic projections. It's as if they just took a screenshot in AutoCAD and released it to the publicity people. Cheap on the minor, splurge on the major, classic.

The 218SGmight actually be shape up to be the smallest oceangoing capable submarine in service. Its shtick might be long submerged range, long engagement range, and long sensor range in a distributed swarm."

retortPouch
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