Submarine & Other Matters

Its not all China's fault. The sharp increase of US July activities has much to do with November 3rd.

Of course it takes 2 sides for a confrontation.

See https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3095817/sharp-increase-us-surveillance-south-china-sea-observed-july

Over the next three days I'll write about the Canadian submarine environment and choices.

Up until 1960's Canadians who wished to be submariners would need to be part of the UK Royal Navy (RN), be seconded to the RN, or at least trained by the 6th Division (more later). This applied more to Canada's easterly (Atlantic Ocean) environment rather than west, the Pacific Ocean. I haven't ever heard of Canadian submariners historically seconded to the US Navy (USN) although there may now be seconded Canadian observers/intelligence analysts for some inter-service functions.

Throughout World War One, interwar and Two Canadians interested in submarines were fully integrated into the RN. In 1954 perhaps as a training encouragement for the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) to form a submarine service the UK Government based a submarine "Division" (grand title for flotilla) in Canada. This was the RN's 6th Submarine Division based at Canada's main east coast (hence Atlantic) naval base at Halifax.

The 6th division consisted of 3 Amphion shortened to "A" class submarines. The A class had first appeared late in the WWII UK. Most A-class were heavily modified postwar incorporating improvements of the very advanced captured German Type XXI submarines. The A-class at Halifax had improvements which included streamlining, much increased battery capacity and usually no deck armament - all promoting longer submerged endurance at higher speed. One of the A class at Halifax was HMS Auriga (P419) Wikipedia implies Auriga was not improved as it mentions deck armament (20mm and 4-inch). In contrast rnsubs (below) shows Auriga with its subsequent and extensive postwar streamlining, with no deck armament.

HMS Auriga (P419) streamlined and no deck guns (Photo courtesy rnsubs)

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6th Division (Halifax)'s function included RN power projection, cooperation with the USN in anti-Soviet Navy operations, training Canadian submariners and sending a strong signal to Canada that Britain expected Canada to eventually buy British submarines for a RCN submarine unit. "Buy British" had strategic and economic benefits for the UK.

Between 1957-1960 Canada decided to buy submarines, but not necessarily British. Purchase of expensive US built Barbel-class submarines was, for a short time, entertained. The high Barbel price could be explained by high development costs being amortised into only 3 Barbels bought by the USN. US purchase of only 3 was explicable by the US and especially Rickover's intention (which the RCN would be aware of) of all nuclear propelled submarines in future. The RCN were aware of the risks of buying Barbels that would become "orphan subs" unsupported by the USN in terms of upgrades and spare parts.

The most obvious cheaper, safer, choice, a choice promoted by decades of RN "grooming" was buying the UK Oberon. Oberons, their very similar predessors the Porpoises (and before them the A-class) were bought and used in substantial numbers by the RN. Oberons, larger in size and crew, were better suited than the A-class to Canada's long-range transoceanic operations. Technical and strategic problems in the A-Porpoise-Oberon evolution were safely worked out and paid for by the British. This was a happy acquisitions and political situation for the RCN. This situation was also enjoyed in very similar ways by the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) which hosted a RN submarine flotilla in Sydney (1949-1969).

Tomorrow - Part Two.

Pete

Following Part One between 1957-1960 Canada decided to buy its own submarines. Canada chose Britain's Oberon-class for a number of reasons including:

- the Oberons were the latest class Britain were building and offering in the late 1950s

- Britain's Royal Navy (RN) had been training Canadian submariners on the 3 Amphion/A-class
submarines at 6th Division (Halifax) since 1954. The A-class in many technical and operational
ways evolved into the larger Porpoise-class and then Oberon class. Perhaps the main reasons the
Porpoise/Oberons were 600 tons heavier than the A-class were thicker pressure hulls/deeper diving,
greater battery tonnage/longer submerged, larger sonars, 8 more crew and more food for longer
missions/endurance.

- Britain itself (RN and Vickers) had a well developed secondment-training systen for British
Empire/Commonwealth submariners on RN submarines, particularly if the Royal Canadian Navy
(RCN) and Royal Australian Navy (RAN) were going to buy Oberons.

- the A-class to Porpoise/Oberon evolution had identified and resolved most technical problems
before they were bought by customer navies (something that couldn't happen for the RCN's later
Victoria/Upholders or the RAN's Collins and maybe future Attack class). The evolution meant
Oberon development costs were low.

- purchase and support (spare parts, upgrades etc) costs were also low because the RN itself bought
them in quantity (13 and later 2 more) and had a long term commitment to operate them. Also costs
were shared between the RAN (buying 6), Brazilian Navy (3) and Chilean Navy (2). The RCN
bought only 3, which was inadequate for continuous operations in both the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans. So permanent basing only seemed to a occur at Halifax, serving the Atlantic Ocean.

Canada's complete operational Oberon flotilla probably at Halifax naval base (Photo courtesy Corvus Publishing Group Ltd./Canada's Navy via http://www.hazegray.org/navhist/canada/postwar/oberon/ )

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Canada’s 3 Oberons: Ojibwa, Onondaga and Okanagan (all in above photo) entered service in 1965, 1967 and 1968 respectively. Their main function were service as "clockwork mice", submarines used to train RCN and USN surface vessels in anti-submarine warfare (ASW). "Clockwork mice" is a derogatory term for boring (for submariners) ASW training operations where the submarine is instructed to be "noisy" in order to be quickly/easily detected by surface forces. Also USN nuclear (SSN) and conventional (SSK) attack submarines would have exercised with Canada’s Oberons. The US operated its last Tench-class SSK until 1975 and last Barbel-class SSK until 1990.

From 1979 the RCN upgraded its 3 Oberons with new sonars, periscopes, communications, fire-control systems and torpedo tubes capable of firing the still used US Mk 48 torpedo. This would allow the 3 to be deployed by NATO in the North Atlantic to monitor, and if necessary destroy, Soviet submarines. Canada acquired 2 more Oberons (in 1989 Olympus and in 1992 Osiris) for stationary training and spare parts cannibalisation respectively.

From what I've read no Canadian Oberons were based in Canada's Pacific Ocean environment. One reason for this could have been Canada did not want to provide submarines for the US war in Vietnam. Reading between the lines the RAN's Oberons may have been used for Special Forces dropoffs and pickups in North Vietnam (through to 1972). See my two secret missions articles written in 2013 here and here.

Tomorrow Part Three where Canada tosses up buying SSNs or Victoria/Upholder (SSKs) to replace the Oberons. Next week I'll also do a Part Four.

Pete

Following Canada's purchase of 3 Oberon SSKs in the 1960s in the 1980s Canada explored the purchase of 10 nuclear propelled attack submarines (SSNs). Many issues surrounding the "Canada-class" SSN rejection are covered here so I won't restate these issues. Instead I'll discuss other issues, such as:

- increasing the Canadian submarine force from 3 inexpensive Oberon SSKs to be replaced by 10
very expensive SSNs always looked like an extravagant submarine service ask.

- why more than triple the submarine force? Was the naval budget going to triple or would major
surface ship and some army and airforce items by halved? Submarines need to operate in secret and
cannot provide the overt show of force provided by surface ships.

- the US would have been aware that the Canadian Navy was vastly underestimating the costs of
purchasing, operating and facility-supporting an SSN force. Canadian politicians and the public
would only learn the full costs when it was too late.

- Canadian SSKs were more useful strategically and tactically in complimenting USN specialties
than a Canadian SSN navy impoverished by nuclear submarine ownership.

- Facilities? Basing SSNs with their reactors and perhaps other radioactive support facilities in the
harbour of Halifax (a growing city of now 400,000) would prove unviable in the public-opposition
long term. Halifax had suffered a massive (ammunition ship) explosion in 1917 - so its citizens
wouldn't take kindly to a newer vessel hazard. Reactors have been known to leak and even threaten
to meltdown. Canada would need to build a new, very expensive, east coast naval base to take
SSNs.

- Why would Canada want an all nuclear, SSN, force - to match the all nuclear direction the UK, US
and French Navy were going in? Why were Canadian SSKs (say, for southerly missions) in a
mixed force, unsuitable.

- Was Canada aware that US, UK and French SSNs justified much of their high cost by protecting
those countries' SSBNs (eg. conducting sweeps of the approaches to SSBN bases)? Perhaps the US
suspected Canadian SSNs would be the thin end of the wedge to Canada building an SSBN force.

- When Canada entertained the idea of building all or some SSNs in Canada was Canada aware that
no nuclear country had tranferred a whole how-to-build an SSN package to a non-nuclear country.
The UK's Trafalgar-class SSN used a US reactor design which was non-transferable to third
countries. While the French Rubis-class SSN was all French technology it was too loud, slow,
small, crowded and only carried 14 heavyweight shots (eg. torpedoes) compared to Canada's
Oberons which carried 20 torpedoes.

- If the US (on national security grounds) was not going to supply SSNs to Canada was Canada
aware that the Monroe Doctrine still existed/exists? The US would want to prevent the UK or
France providing nuclear (reactor) military equipment to Canada which after all was a "Western
Hemisphere country" in US eyes. Most people are accustomed to consider the US the self-
appointed protector against leftwing or greater European influences in Latin America (eg. in
Panama and Venezuela, Brazil etc) and the Caribbean (Cuba always, and Grenada in the 1980s).
But people forget that the US sees itself as defender of Canada as well, via NATO, NORAD and
more unilateral US policies.

Many of the above issues also apply to Australia in a recurring and often poorly informed debate that Australia should have SSNs.

Pete

Language Warning - White House Spokeswoman speaks bluntly about Trump's special gifts:
at https://youtu.be/dpIkl2QnJeI and also below.

Hi Arpit Kanodia

Thanks for your August 5, 2020 pumpjet links.

Re your info “several people now murmuring that this DRDO developed Pumpjet will go into [future Indian SSBNs] S3 and S4 - and most probably S5" below.

A simple alleged DRDO designed alleged photo above revealed August 2020 at link

https://tdf.drdo.gov.in/datafiles/f26ffe8363c55eca6a7846cd4bcd3582.jpg.
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Arpit Kanodia adds “But surprisingly, SSN will still receive normal screwblades.”

Pete Comment: As India's S3 and S4 SSBN designs will likely be completed, launched and commissioned long before India's longterm 2030s SSN is completed, it makes sence that a SSN pumpjet vs propeller choice is left open until the late 2020s.

Arpit Kanodia also supplied this unattributed (though, by implication, DRDOs) undated, PDF document “PUMPJET PROPULSOR AGGREGATE: Objective: Development of Electric Motor to be integrated with the Pump-jet Propulsor to replace conventional propulsor system...” at https://tdf.drdo.gov.in/funding_details/download_document/381 .

Regards

Pete

Since 2015 I've been looking at the possibility of a nuclear propelled South Korean (SK) submarine (called KSS-N) which is larger than SK's KSS-III (see Submarine Matters'References below).

In 2015 I stated: "South Korea's strategy includes the creation of a pre-emptive strike "kill chain" (of threat detection, decision making-authorisation and (mainly missile) pre-emptive strike) against North Korea. Submarines would be a (or the) principal pre-emptive strike and counter-strike platform. Subsonic cruise missiles are generally too slow for these roles - making supersonic+ cruise and ballistic missiles the logical solution."

So it comes as no surprise that yesterday Elizabeth Shim for UPI (August 10, 2020) reported https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2020/08/10/South-Korea-to-invest-250B-in-missile-defense-submarines/4891597071443/ in part:

"...The [SK] defense ministry has also confirmed plans to build 3,600-ton and 4,000-ton submarines. The military is expected to install submarine-launched ballistic missiles, but a decision on whether the submarines are to be nuclear-powered is pending, according to reports. South Korea has agreed with the United States to not use nuclear power for military purposes.
Washington and Seoul recently agreed South Korea could revise missile guidelines that would allow for the use of solid fuel space rockets to launch military satellites..."

Submarine Matters'References

South Korean Submarines, 3,000+ ton KSS-III, Nuclear Potential, April 16, 2015 at https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2015/04/south-korean-submarines-3000-ton-kss.html

South Korean and Japanese Nuclear Submarine Propulsion, October 21, 2019https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2019/10/south-korean-and-japanese-nuclear.html

South Korea looking at France’s Barracuda SSN or Just the K15 Reactor, October 25, 2019
https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2019/10/south-korea-looking-at-frances.html

Pete

Submarine Matters is also interested in counterintelligence.

1. Below is a great article, with all the ingredients, about Russian spies and even a East European proxy, operating in Australia during the height of the Cold War. You will see Adelaide is mentioned. That article is “Spies, lies and hairdryers — the single mum who became a double agent in Cold War Australia” at ABC (Australia) News, August 12, 2020, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-08-12/spy-kay-marshall-intelligence-mystery-cold-war-australia/12531120 .

2. By coincidence see my 2019 article "Security Observations: Osborne Naval Shipyard & Edinburgh RAAF Base, Adelaide", June 9, 2019

https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2019/06/osborne-naval-shipyard-adelaide-security.html which mentions "Hence, in response, predictable growth:...of course, harder to detect non-official-cover "illegals" (not only Russians and Australian "moles"."

Hi Tri-ring and Anonymous (your August 11, 2020 comments on Japanese and South Korean submarines nuclear propulsion possibilities).

1. Tri-ring I think it much more likely Japan and South Korea will further develop what they have already achieved that is Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) that are small enough to fit on small ships. The fusion and other advanced engines (you mention) are for the US and China in coming decades.

Anonymous, I agree with you that South Korea will eventually move to nuclear propulsion, but suspect it will build SSBNs before SSNs.

As a technical and political EVOLUTIONARY process South Korea has been at looking at the issue of a nuclear or conventionally propelled ballistic missile launching First and Second Strike platform for more than 10 years. South Korea would have been looking at the nuclear issues even earlier: since 2003 when North Korea withdrew from the NPT and since 2006 North Korea's first nuclear weapon test.

Japan, in 1972, completed the Mutsu small nuclear propelled ship, working nuclear reactor and all.

South Korea has had a less visible marine reactor program with a view to using a modified civilian SMART reactor (note mention of an even smaller "SMART-P(SMART pilot plant, 1/5 scale)")

or equivalent since 1997. At this DSME site hover over "R&D" and you will see "Nuclear Propulsion Ship". Meanwhile South Korea likely has a parallel program with plans for a smaller reactor for a submarine.

Since these major advances in reactor miniaturisation for Japan (48 years ago) and South Korea (23 years ago) these advanced civilian reactor countries will have made substantial gains in knowledge on how to further miniaturise.

Also Japan and South Korea have overt and covert intelligence programs to gain knowledge from existing submarine reactor countries (US, UK, France, Russia, China, India and Brazil) on how to further miniaturise.

2. Meanwhile South Korea is technically and politically evolving submarines as First and Second Strike weapons against discreet targets in North Korea's cities and nuclear weapons facilities. South Korea is developing its KSS-III (3,360+ ton) submarines to each eventually vertically fire 10 missiles (cruise and eventually ballistic). The 9 x KSS-IIIs planned have air independent propulsion (AIP) and from the Batch II subclass onwards they may have Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs). AIP + LIBs may give a KSS-III the ability to lie in wait, sitting on the seafloor, for 6 weeks without surfacing.

KSS-IIIs being commissioned up to the mid 2030s may be a credible deterrent against North Korea but not against China. North Korea, would generally assume that 500+kg warhead incoming missiles may well have nuclear warheads. North Korea would therefore deliver a nuclear response. South Korea going to the trouble of building whole submarines with only 10 relatively small (500kg) warhead missiles is only explicable if these missiles eventually have nuclear warheads.

A South Korean nuclear propelled ballistic missile class (lets call them "KSS-BNs") being launched from the late 2030s may be sufficient against China and Russia (and against India, the US and Japan for that matter).

Can South Korea afford nuclear weapons and nuclear propelled submarines? When you look at nominal GDP for South Korea its GDP is equal to or greater than Russia's. South Korea's nuclear military aspirations have been held back by US promises of a nuclear umbrella against North Korea and China. This umbrella and US, Russian and Chinese political power has not stopped North Korea from nuclear arming. South Korea will feel even more desperate to build a true deterrent in 12 years time when North Korea will have fleshed out its nuclear triad.

Looks like my June 9, 2019article "Security Observations: Osborne Naval Shipyard & Edinburgh RAAF Base, Adelaide", at https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2019/06/osborne-naval-shipyard-adelaide-security.htmlhas gained some traction in Australian Government defence and security intelligence circles.

On June 9, 2019 in part I wrote:

"There is a boom in Osborne's construction and upgrades of Australia's: Hobart class destroyers; Arafura class offshore patrol vessels; future Hunter class frigates; and Collins and future Attack class submarines. Osborne has therefore become a high value intelligence hotspot."

"Hence, in response, predictable growth:

- in size and number of consulates-general (basically mini "embassies" - perhaps housing
"diplomats", defence and press attaches who collect military intelligence in Adelaide). China'sand
Russia'sconsulates-general?"

- in numbers of foreign engineering/scientific academics and students capable of collecting intel

and establishing lasting sensitive friendships at Adelaide universities, and

- of course, harder to detect non-official-cover "illegals" (not only Russians and Australian

"moles"."

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So it is encouraging the Australian Government has now officially recognised the increased Chinese diplomatic/intelligence footprint in Adelaide - making Australian, foreign naval ship and submarine secrets in Adelaide more vulnerable.

See Australia's government owned ABC News where Defence Correspondent Andrew Greenereports “Defence Department warns that 'highly active' spies pose 'extreme threat' to Australia's shipbuilding plan” August 16, 2020 at https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-08-16/defence-warns-active-foreign-spies-threaten-shipbuilding-plans/12562536which sates in part:

“Foreign agents are now "highly active" in plots to steal Australian military secrets, with Defence warning the threat to the nation's multi-billion-dollar shipbuilding projects is considered "extreme”.”

...“Beijing privately identified as leading culprit”

“Defence has declined to nominate which foreign actors it believes are responsible for targeting Australia's naval shipbuilding industry but, privately, national security figures believe the Chinese Government is the main culprit.

The growing concerns about Chinese espionage are prompting politicians from across the political divide to call for the closure of the sizeable Chinese consulate in South Australia, or a reduction in the number of diplomats based there.

In 2016, Beijing opened a new Consulate-General office in the Adelaide suburb of Findon for around 10 staff, located on a site that also includes the headquarters for the Overseas Chinese Association.

"It hasn't escaped me that the consulate was stood up in the same year that a significant naval shipbuilding program was announced by the Coalition Government," Senator Patrick said.

His concerns about the large Chinese diplomatic presence in a state which hosts considerable defence industry and space research is shared by members of both the Federal Government and Opposition.

"It's clear that the numbers in the Adelaide consulate are overweight— they should be reduced, preferably by negotiation," South Australian Labor MP Nick Champion said.

Liberal senator Concetta Fierravanti-Wells says ASIO records show similar tactics were used by Soviet spies during the Cold War to target military research in Australia.

"It comes as no surprise that Beijing has overcompensated the 'diplomatic' requirement to serve in Adelaide," Senator Fierravanti-Wells told the ABC.

"If ASIO and law enforcement agencies deem laws have been broken, then the 'diplomats' should be expelled."...”

SEE WHOLE ABC ARTICLE

Pete

This is the first part of a two part series of Singapore Surface Navy articles, all drawing heavily on very interesting comments made by Benjamin. There is also mention of some Singaporean Army and Airforce equipment.

The Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) consists of six formations- each contributing to naval defence. Those formations are:

- the Fleet,
- Maritime Security Task Force (MSTF) / Maritime Security (MARSEC) Command
- Maritime Training and Doctrine Command (MTDC)
- Naval Logistics Command (NALCOM)
- Naval Diving Unit (NDU) [which includes special forces] and
- Navy Medical Service

Further information on the Navy and ship characteristics are here

Benjamin, on August 16 2020, commented.

I would say it all began with this Youtube interview https://youtu.be/pFwcX4HfgO4 on 2016 which marked Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) day. Singapore’s Defence Minister (since 2011) Dr. Ng Eng Hen holds an interview every year during SAF Day giving updates.. The 2016 interview https://youtu.be/pFwcX4HfgO4was the greatest interview so far based on the number of major announcements. Announcements included:

- the unveiling of the Hunter Armoured Fighting Vehicle (4minutes, 12seconds into Youtube)

- the Belrex Protected Combat Support Vehicle (PCSV) (4m 29s in)

- replacements for the medium lift Super Pumas (4:48) and heavy lift CH-47s (4:59)

- what struck out the most was (6:21 "our LSTs [Endurance class amphibious transport docks] are
aging and need to be replaced by something larger...by a.(the phrase) "Joint Multi Mission
Vessel". It was an unexpected announcement. Perhaps too early for an announcement.

- also mentioned (6:11) by 2020 all 8 x 1,200 ton corvette sized Independence class Littoral

Mission Vessels (LMVs) would be operational, and indeed with the final 3 of the Independence

LMVs (also see at https://youtu.be/kBzG-2tPkkk ) entering service in February 2020.

Then there was a thought about the very light 500 ton (first launched 1988) Victory Class Missile Corvettes. Those Victories were about a decade older than the [first one launched 1998] Endurance class amphibious transport docks/"LSTs" (6:27) why weren't there any announcements with regards to [decommissioning for the all six active Victory class] corvettes?

Then came the year 2018 and Defence Minister Dr. Ng Eng Hen’s speech during SAF Day 2018 https://youtu.be/VkkP83vE6XM was the unveiling of the [2,500 ton?] Multi Role Combat Vessel (MRCV) [variant of the Vanguard 130? 130m long = 2,500 tons?]. Other than that were the Next Generation Howitzer [more details?] and use of unmanned-manned teaming concepts for the services.

With that in mind it would seem that the Navy announced replacements were settled since there were no other ships of class that needed replacements apart from the Bedok Class MCMVminesweeper/mine hunter vessels. Which from what Benjamin knows are intended to be replaced by unmanned platforms alongside manned platforms like the 1,200 ton Independence class Littoral Mission Vessels (LMVs) which can conduct mine sweeping/hunting roles as one of its module when needed.

So then came the speculation. What ships to succeed the Endurance class amphibious transport docks/ "LSTs" and Victory Class MCVs (Multi-purpose corvettes?).

For the Endurance class amphibious transport docks/ "LST" replacements many were hopping on the Endurance 160 which was revealed by ST Marine back in 2010. Many call it the ideal fit or the pretty obvious choice even though it is now a design revealed 10 years ago. However during IMDEX Asia 2017 an [Pete Comment: a flat top 170m long, maybe 10,000 ton] Endurance 170landing platform dock (LPD) was unveiled and that reinforced the speculation that the 170 could be the replacement. However the Endurance 170 article has downplayed all claims and I couldn't agree more. The "JMMS" [S for ship - or "Joint Multi Mission Vessel" is still far away and there is no commencement of project. As in my view revealing the idea of JMMS back in 2016 was premature. Perhaps they want us to get used to its term?

For the unveiling of the Multi Role Combat Vessel (MRCV) [variant of the Vanguard 130? 130m long = 2,500 tons?] during IMDEX Asia 2019 was quite clear cut in my opinion. I mean the concept is pretty much a match to what the MRCVis supposed to be. [Here the MRCV looks like it may weigh 700+ tons?].

Tomorrow Part Two

Some impressions about relations with Singapore:

1. Australia has close bilateral strategic relations with Singapore - see here and here. Part of the relationship goes down to Singapore and Australia being non-Muslim countries in a rather Muslim (eg. Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, southern Philippines) region. See MAP below.

Australia also has vast, relatively nearby, sea, air and land space to train in - while Singapore Island is tiny.

"The Australia-Singapore Military Training Initiative (ASMTI) is an opportunity for Australia to build Defence capability and enhance its bilateral relationship with Singapore, while providing enduring economic benefits to Central and North Queensland [Australia]" see June 2020 Factsheet.

Singapore's Defence Minister (since 2011) Dr. Ng Eng Hen trained as a medical doctor but clearly has a technical and political grasp of military matters above most ASEAN Defence Ministers. In his 2016 speech https://youtu.be/pFwcX4HfgO4?t=6m47s he mentions the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) in regards to Singapore's armed forces training in Australia's very large exercise areas.

2. Singapore has a logical, efficient weapons buying strategy and process. This can be correlated with Singapore's low level of corruption and minute size compared to occasionally threatening larger neighbours. In contrast some other regional countries (extending all the way to India) buy just a few weapons over excessively long (agonizingly slow) periods to maximise "commissions" across the board. While Australia is short on "commissions" promised private industry retirement positions (with substantial salary increases) suffice.

According to the reliable international Corruption Perceptions Index Singapore sits equal 4th (with Sweden and Switzerland) least corrupt internationally. This is behind NZ (1st), but better than Australia, UK, Canada (all equal 12th), US (23rd). Of some other ASEAN nations - Brunei (35th), Malaysia (51st), Indonesia (85th), Philippines (113th). India and China are joint 80th.

3. Australia and Singapore also interrelate due to common close bilateral relationships with the US (relationships even surviving the worldwide The 2016-2020 Trump Crisis - so far). See this prescient-still relevant Australian viewpoint.

4. Singapore's stable English speaking, pro-Western polity, British Commonwealth country, "close" to Israel, cutting edge (many weapons bought from US) military, sophisticated intelligence setup, shared threat from Islamic terrorism, all give Singapore a "Six Eye" status in relation to the Five Eyes alliance.

MAP. Find tiny Singapore (island) just south of the tip of mainland Malaysia. (Map courtesy and see it much enlarged at geographicguide.com)

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Following Singapore's Surface Navy - Part One, August 19, 2020, the following are further points from Benjamin, based on his August 18, 2020 comments:

Singapore’s Maritime Security Task Force (MSTF)(see Fact Sheet) was formed in 2009, believed to be in security coordinational response to threats from Islamic terrorists travelling by sea. The main fear was that Singapore was vulnerable to an event like the seaborne Islamic terrorist Mumbai, India in 2008 (which led to the deaths of 165 Indians).

Why was the announcement of purpose built ships for the Maritime Security Task Force (MSTF) so recent if the future (around 2,500 ton) multi role combat vessel (MRCV) and joint multi-mission (large 10,000 ton? amphibious) ship (JMMS) were announced years earlier?

The obvious reason was the rise in piracy along the Singapore Straits.

(Map above and statistics below courtesy Gard marine insurance headquartered in Oslo, Norway)

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Gard explains "According to data from the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia Information Sharing Centre (ReCaap ISC), a total of 31 piracy incidents, actual and attempted, were recorded in the Singapore Strait by 30 December 2019 compared to seven in 2018."

So far the reorganisation of the MSTF is seen in response to the increase in piracy with the concern of terrorism where returning fighters from the Middle East are returning to the region.

There were speculations why the increase in piracy. From COVID-19 which created economic hardships to the redeployment of naval vessels by the Indonesian Navy to contested waters in the South China Sea (SCS).

Increased pirate activity occurred before COVID hence such conclusion can't be drawn.

I am unsure if Indonesian naval redeployments to Indonesia's joint armed forces base in the Natuna islands resulted in a gap which created an opportunity for the pirates. The area concerned is the Singapore Strait. Origin of redeployed ships is unclear. [See map above. It is 565km from Singapore to the Natuna islands.]

There was a Maritime dispute between Singapore and Malaysia from 2018-2019 (map above) which I believe contributed to this restructuring as well. Here is a Singapore-Malaysia maritime dispute timeline (up to April 8, 2019) mainly over port limits [largely resolved]. The RSN deployed a Littoral mission Vessel (LMV) [in coastguard mode] to the area much to the dismay of Malaysia. Malaysia did not send any naval vessel. They deployed their maritime agency vessels. It was a grey zone conflict with no clashing involved other than a cat mouse chase https://youtu.be/KJiFQbbjdjk and one tanker made contact with their agency vessel - see https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/asia/collision-disputed-singapore-malaysia-waters-reignites-political-tension .

The matter was resolved with both sides reverting to the original status before the dispute took place after diplomatic talks/pressure. So Malaysia did not get what they came for in the end

What will these new purposed built ships look like? On one end it can be a lighter version of the LMV. On the other end it can be based on the [1,250 ton] Fearless 75.

Smaller than the LMV, these vessels are catered towards localised waters - see https://defpost.com/singapores-maritime-security-task-force-to-acquire-new-purpose-built-platforms/?amp

Also see Benjamin's comments of August 20, 2020 here and here.

(Handy map showing tiny Singapore island's proximity to the vital Strait of Malacca trade narrow. Singapore is geographically sandwiched between Malaysia and Indonesia.)

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Pete Comment

Singapore's naval procurement strategy and process is a complex, ongoing, matter. It would also be interesting to focus, in similar depth, on Malaysian, Indonesian and Philippine surface ship procurement. All of those navies are also under pressure from encroaching Chinese naval, coastguard and naval militia/fishing fleets.

An excellent essay by Associate Professor Alexey D. Muraviev

at https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-08-22/china-russia-relationship-australia-strategic-blind-spot/12582356 dated August 22, 2020.

If East Timor (ET) receives some of Singapore's second hand Fearless class patrol boats this will be on top of patrol boats already gifted to ET by Portugal (2001), China (2010) and South Korea (2011).

The ET government also ordered (to soft loan purchase) two patrol boats from Indonesiancompany PT Pal in 2011 for the price of $US40 million.^[79]

In 2017 ET accepted a gift of two new Guardian-class patrol boats and associated training and logistics assistance from the Australian Government. The vessels are scheduled to be delivered in 2023.

With between 80 and 250 sailors the still new ET navy's ability to absorb and use 5 or 6 very different types of patrol boats will be interesting.

I think Churchill said "Never in the course of history have so Many countries thrown so Many boats at such a small Navy crewed by so Few."

With all this throwing of boats and money around ET might do well to reject some offers OR might there be a temptation to use some unused patrol boats for high value commodity purposes?

see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timor_Leste_Defence_Force#Naval_Component

Hi Annono. Regarding your commentof August 23, 2020:

Thanks for info that the torpedo counter counter measures (TCCM) function of the newest Japanese torpedo designs isn't from American designs because Japan's heavyweight (HW) torpedos are much newer and more advanced than the US (and by extension Australian) Mk. 48 HWs.

That Japan basically reverse engineered legally transferred US Mk. 46 lightweight (LW) torpedo TCCM technology for use in the [up to 2020 current] Type 89 Japanese HW torpedo.

So Japan's G-RX7 (aka Type 18) HW torpedo is replacing Type 89 HW. You advise the G-RX7 represents an upgrade in every way (more advanced TCCM ("based loosely on the Mk.46"), quieter, and longer range, can hit deep and shallow targets (subs and ships respectively).

So the G-RX7/Type 18 torpedo is "the most advanced large torpedo in the world currently" [Pete Comment: This side of what is known or unknown about Chinese and Russian HW and LW torpedos...?]

Japan has quite a history of torpedo advancement [eg. the 24 inch Long Lance/Type 93 torpedo https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_93_torpedo] with tech transfer to Germany in WWII.

Pete Comment

Since Japan is advertizing how good the G-RX7/Type 18 HW torpedo is I'm assuming Japan will/has tech transferred it to the US?

See August 25, 2020's https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-08-25/scott-morrison-announces-$1b-defence-stimulus-package/12595200

"including the earlier than expected construction of a large hull vessel for the Pacific."

More see earlier November 9, 2018's https://www.aumanufacturing.com.au/australia-to-build-new-ship-aid-smes-in-new-pacific-focus

"The Prime Minister, Scott Morrison has committed the government to building a new, large naval ship dedicated to humanitarian work and disaster response among a suite of policies aimed at our Pacific Island neighbours."

COMMENT

As well as responses to warfare hospital ships are established methods of soft power projection. This is particularly to aid small islands and larger poor nations in the Pacific and Indian oceans.

Also bushfires up and down the coast of southeastern Australia in 2019-2020 established a need for short-notice humanitarian seaborne assistance (eg. to evacuate Australians from coastal towns under threat from bushfires).

There are regular events like cyclones, earthquakes and Tsunamis. Help to islands suffering
COVID-19 may be an irregular crisis.

Here is a list of Current Hospital Ships with the US and China now in competition to an extent. Not to be outdone Australia wants to acquire a specialised vessel.

For Australia a semi-flat-top ship of over 20,000 tons with helicopter and maybe landing craft is possible. It may be converted/modified from a civilian hull or new build.

The Australian government may be wary of raising the hopes of Australian shipbuilding and maritime unions that a high wage entitlement to again produce and crew civilian ships may begin. Things can get highly political.

Reported in South China Morning Post, August 26, 2020
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3098972/chinese-military-launches-two-missiles-south-china-sea-warning

Allegedly a response to Pre-US-Election heightened USN activity in "China's" near seas.

It appears China has tried to gain access to Germany's/Siemen's highly sensitive fuel cell air independent propulsion (FC-AIP) technology, for submarines, via a bold Pakistani approach to Germany.

Shishir Gupta for India's Hindustan Times, August 25, 2020 reports :

"Angela Merkel dashes [Pakistani Prime Minister] Imran Khan hopes to make Pak subs more lethal, says won’t help"

"Pakistan had requested Germany for access to the air independent propulsion (AIP) system that can recharge submarine batteries without having to surface for longer periods.

A top German security panel headed by Chancellor Angela Merkel has turned down Pakistan’s request for supply of air independent propulsion (AIP) systems for its submarines that would allow them to stay underwater for weeks, people familiar with the matter said.

The decision taken by the German Federal Security Council headed by Chancellor Merkel was conveyed to the Pakistan embassy on August 6, people cited above said on conditions of anonymity.

Pakistan had made the request for access to the air independent propulsion system that can recharge submarine batteries without having to surface for longer periods. [the following bolded by Pete] Pakistan had proposed the upgrade for submarines in its inventory and the Yuan class submarines being manufactured under joint China-Pakistan project in China.

...Pakistan watchers in Delhi said the primary reason for Germany to take a hard stance on Pakistan’s request was being attributed to its role in promoting terror, particularly Pakistan’s failure to cooperate in identifying the perpetrators of the truck bomb attack on the Germany Embassy in Kabul in May 2017..."

SEE FULL HINDUSTAN TIMES REPORT (WHICH ALSO HAS GOOD LINKS)

PETE COMMENT

Yuans are China's most advanced conventional submarines, but they use older, less advanced, AIP technology.

Pakistan's terrorism connections is one valid reason for the German rejection.

But I would say the risk of Germany's FC-AIP technology going to China would be the main concern. Pakistan would require extensive and sensitive German/Siemens help to integrate the
FC-AIP technology into the Yuans.

All through that process Chinese technicians working on Pakistan's Yuans (in China and Pakistan) would have access to the FC-AIP technology and especially how to integrate it into Chinese designed submarines (eg. Pakistan's Yuans). Then China would reverse engineer the FC-AIP technology and learn how to integrate it into submarines.

German, Western and Indian navies would find Chinese and Pakistani subs would be more of a threat with world class FC-AIP. Also China would market Yuans (with FC-AIP) in competition to Germany's TKMS submarine builder. China would have the competitive business advantage of cheaper labour and a government willing to heavily subsidize submarine export prices to get a market and/or strategic foothold.

H I Sutton has written a very interesting article for Forbes"China And Russia In Mysterious New

[Conventional] Submarine Project" on August 27, 2020

at https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/08/27/china-and-russia-in-mysterious-new-submarine-project/#7138fa451629

US Sharply Increases South China Sea Activities Pre-Election

Canadian Submarine Choices - Part One

Canadian Submarine Choices (Oberons) - Part Two

Canadian Submarine Choices (SSNs) - Part Three

White House Spokeswoman on Trump's Special Gifts

India's (DRDO's) Alleged Submarine Pumpjet Design

South Korean Nuclear Propelled Submarine: Renewed Interest

A Double Agent in Cold War Australia

S. Korean & Japanese Nuclear Submarine Propulsion & Weapons

My Concerns About Adelaide Naval Security Vulnerability Vindicated

Singapore Surface Navy - Part One

Singapore-Australian Strategic Relations - Impressions

Singapore's Surface Navy - Part Two

China's new intimacy with Russia a Blind Spot For Democracies

Gunboat Gifting to East Timor Excessive?

Japan's Advanced G-RX7 / Type 18 Heavyweight Torpedo

Australian Humanitarian/Hospital Ship on Cards

Chinese DF-21D & DF-26B Missiles Land in South China Sea

Germany Rejects Pakistan's Bid for Sensitive Submarine Tech: AIP China

Possible Joint China-Russia SSK Project