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ANZAC Day 2021 Songs & Photos - In Remembrance

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Anzacs (or 'diggers') at Gallipoli in a rare quiet moment in 1915.
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Australia and New Zealand commemorates ANZAC Day on April 25th each year. It is our secular "holiest" day. The day commemorates the sacrifice of troops of the combined Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) in World War One and of Australians and New Zealanders who fought in all later wars (including some being waged right now). 

The following are songs and photos I've put together to remember them.

This great song And the Band Played Waltzing Matilda by Eric Bogle is about the life of a digger wounded at Gallipoli.

There is a myth that true Anzacs were and are all front line infantry. Some other occupations were more dangerous than infantry. Pilots and aircrew often suffered the highest casualties of any service. Sailors, in particular submariners, were often in great danger both from the enemy and also from accidents. Here is the Navy Hymn for Submariners.


 The hymn Abide With Me is traditionally sung at ANZAC Day services. The singer is Hayley Westernra from Christchurch, New Zealand.
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Iconic Vietnam War photo by Michael Coleridge. Diggers of 5 Platoon, B Company, 7RAR, waiting for Iroquois helicopters to land and take them back to Nui Dat at the end of an operation.
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 The song I Was Only 19 (by that under-appreciated Australian group Redgum) is in memory of Australians who fought, died and were injured in Vietnam (early 1960s to 1972).


I think Eric Bogle’s The Green Fields of France (also known as "No Man's Land" and "Willie McBride)  (above) is the best anti-war song ever written. As a haunting poem, march, song of love and injustice it is a fitting anthem to remember the men and women, living and dead, who are our poeple,  our Anzacs.


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For more songs see "Rembrance Day Songs 2018on this website.

Pete

Much Debris Recovered from KRI Nanggala, Indonesian Submarine

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Debris of (or from) KRI Nanggala recovered. The following is based on this report 

On April 24, 2021, the Indonesian Navy announced the finding of debris, including a part associated with torpedo tubes, a coolant pipe insulator, a bottle holding periscope grease, and prayer rugs. 

Because the debris was found within 10nm of the point of last contact and no other vessels were believed to be in the area, the debris was believed to have come from KRI Nanggala, hence the submarine was declared sunk.

Chief of Staff, Indonesian Navy, Admiral YudoMargono stated that a sonar scan had shown Nanggala at a depth of just under 850m ie. fatally below its crush depth of about 500m. 

On 25 April, after a more accurate sonar and magnetometer scan by KRI Rigel (933) (an Indonesian Navy Hydro-Oceanographic Assistance Ship with more powerful sonar equipment) the Indonesian Navy confirmed that all 53 of Nanggala’s crew were lost.

Underwater scans have identified parts of the submarine, including the rudder, external parts of the pressure hull, diving plane, anchor, and other miscellaneous items such as the MK11 submarine escape suit. The remotely operated vehicle (ROV) from Singapore Navy's MV Swift Rescue also made visual contact with the wreck and determined that KRI Nanggala had split into three parts (broken up in fragments). Nanggala is located at a depth of 838m at coordinates 7°48′56″S 114°51′20″E Coordinates: 7°48′56″S 114°51′20″E."

"White Hat" Statcounter sitemeter "sigint" Caution

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My STATCOUNTER sitemeter provided very crude, but effective, “sigint" (aka Cyber Intelligence) before April 2011, when:

-  Google displayed actual keywords used by "Northern Hemisphere" countries, intelligence agencies and nuclear weapons establishments (eg. Iran nuclear) searching my blog, and

-  with these "Northern Hemisphere" entities not disguising their organizational IP addresses, which in turn revealed their organization's name up until April 2011, 2 weeks before this.

-  Meanwhile Southern Hemisphere entities were/are always more anonymous and careful.

-  Since 2011 all agencies everywhere (except some navies and defense departments) are much more careful not to too openly link IP addresses with actual organizational names, when they're searching. 

Seawolf Class Submarine: Hunting the Soviet Typhoon

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Simon Whistler from Megaprojects (after a broad geopolitical Cold War overview) here and above clearly explains:

3:38 - summary of Russian Typhoon class SSBN 

4.22 - a few words on US Seawolf Project

6:58 - gets down to detail (specs and all) on US Seawolf Project.


Near Missile Launch Disaster on Russian Frigate

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The video here and above shows the potentially disastrous failed trial of a Kalibr-NK (export Club-N) cruise missile designed for ship launch. The launch was from Russian frigate/destroyer Marshal Shaposhnikov late April 2021.

That attempted launch of the missile was extremely dangerous for the ship's crew. This is because the missile could have immediately cork-screwed back onto the ship - rather than starting to corkscrew 1.5 seconds after launch and falling into the sea dangerously close by. 

Of the Kalibr's short trajectory, there may be at least three possibilities:
1.  t
he Russian Navy may have had no automatic safety system that would destroy such an erratically flying missile, or
2.  10 seconds into the video the missile appears to break into two (the rocket booster has accidentally, or by electronic signal, been separated from the Main Body (jet stage and non-explosive dummy warhead) or
3.  the missile remained so close to the ship that a ship's officer intentionally triggering the missile's destruction could have damaged or disabled the ship.

Even without an explosive Kalibr warhead the kinetic energy +  unspent jet/rocket fuel in the missile booster could have set Marshal Shaposhnikov ablaze.

Warships hulls are more likely to burn (giving off poisonous fumes) these days due to increasing use of lighter, often stronger, plastic/composites, rather than non-burnable steel.

KRI Nanggala Sunk: Human Error; Old Sub; Internal Wave?

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The Indonesian Navy's suspicion that KRI Nanggala's sinking was caused by a natural occurrence, an "internal solitary wave" [aka internal wave] appears adequate given that  Navy's concerns. 

The Jakarta Post, April 30, 2021, reports

"The submarine's former commander, Rear Admiral Muhammad Ali, has told local media that a so-called internal solitary wave could have been to blame. The natural phenomenon occurs when different sea depths come together, creating forces that could have dragged the vessel down, he said."

So simply no need to investigate or blame:

-  human error (say, leaving both doors of a torpedo tube open during Nanggala's known
   torpedo drill)

 or

-  a equipment failure brought on by a command decision to send to sea an overly 
   old 
submarine (with unreliable electrics? maybe with pressure hull metal fatigue?).  

For other possible human error and/or equipment failure causes see Submarine Matters' article Likely CAUSES of Indonesian Submarine Nanggala's Sinking of April 22. 2021.

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INTERNAL WAVE CAUSE?

Human Error?

KRI Nanggala was training in familiar waters not far from its Surabaya Home Naval Base. It could be the officer/crewman in charge of constant buoyancy corrections, in response to changing sea conditions (like internal waves) may have not have been as efficient or aware of local sea conditions as normally expected. ie: human error?

An internal wave sink rate of 10m/minute does not sound fatal for an efficient submarine crew response. 

Also a submarine commander might be expected to avoid sea areas/conditions known to build up to such waves. 

But:

An archived US Navy report, while revealing submarine commanders awareness internal waves risks since 1966 also points to the greater dangers of internal waves in a submarine without electrical power. See page 13 of the archived US Navy report:

"As a submarine is nearly neutrally buoyant, its total average density is about 1 gm/cm. The buoyant force (positive or negative) exerted on a vessel as a result of a 5 [degree] C temperature change would thus be about 1 dyne/cm, giving the vessel an acceleration of approximately 1 cm/sec, neglecting drag. A submarine under way could easily correct for the effect; however, this slight acceleration could cause serious problems for a submarine without power [as the Indonesian Navy theorised about Nanggala. Still it would be a command error to send such an old submarine, with old unreliable electrics, to sea.] [or] hovering, or moving at very slow speeds. 

Under these conditions it would not be possible to trim the vessel by the diving planes alone. It would be necessary to blow ballast, a difficult process during power failure and undesirable during quiet running. If the vessel were more compressible than sea water, the acceleration would be accentuated as the vessel's density responded to changes in hydrostatic pressure. Vertical displacement could thus reach serious proportions unless promptly controlled. As the vessel reached thermal equilibrium with its new environment, its buoyancy would change in the direction tending to restore the original position and would thus have a damping effect on the influence of the internal wave. 

The other possibility is that the submarine might be caught in a strong vertical current. If this current were caused by an underwater disturbance such as an explosion, landslide, or volcanic activity, it might be expected to reach serious proportions. It is also known that unusual internal wave phenomena occur at the edges of strong currents such as the Gulf Stream and Kuroshio and also in certain straits such as Gibraltar and Malacca. However, an ordinary internal wave moves at such a slow speed and has such a large ratio of wavelength to amplitude that the vertical motion of any region of water within the wave is of extremely low velocity; it would be well within the capability of a submarine commander to correct for any depth change caused by this slight motion. Again, it would be necessary to compensate for any buoyancy change brought about by changes in position and pressure.”

Indonesian Sub Almost Torpedoed Aus-NZ Ships 1999

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An Indonesian Cakra-class submarine (KRI Cakra or KRI Nanggala (tragically sunk alone in 2021) was involved in the following confrontation with Australian and New Zealand warships in 1999. Source: the operational history of Indonesia’s 2 Cakra class submarines - 1999 East Timor (ET) Crisis. 

GEO POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Tiny ET (see map below) a former Portuguese colony, was brutally invaded by Indonesia in 1975. ET is less than 700km from Australia and borders Indonesian West Timor. 

By early 1999 UN, US and Australian political pressure forced Indonesia to accept an an August 30, 1999 Referendum in which ET voters overwhelming favoured rapid  independence from Indonesia. 

After the Referendum, rightwing, moderately Muslim, military officers who (under the surface) still dominate Indonesia were outraged ET was to secede from Indonesia. In contrast ET was and remains a Catholic Latin leftwing country. Indonesia was concerned other islands of the difficult to control Indonesia Archipelago (like almost majority Christian West Papua/West Irian) would be encouraged by ET's success.  

Immediately after the August 30, 1999, Referendum Indonesian rightwing military leaders launched a "militia" (thugs paid by the Indonesian military) offensive to crush East Timorese independence. The UN, US and Australia objected to this new Indonesian militar action. 

By late 1999 relations between Indonesia and its southern neighbour, Australia, were extreme.


INDONESIAN NEAR TORPEDOING OF AUS/NZ SHIPS

As Australia was the closest democratic military power trusted by the UN-US, Australia rapidly led an air and sea liberation of ET in late 1999Naturally this led to some confrontations with Indonesia naval and army and active INTERFET suppression of Indonesia Army paid militia forces in/around ET. 

Royal Australian Navy (RAN) transport vessel, HMAS Kanimbla, was to serve as an INTERFET command post. 

As HMAS Kanimbla approached the coast of East Timor, it entered what were technically still Indonesian waters. One of the two Indonesian Cakra-class submarines (KRI Cakra or KRI Nanggal) was conducting routine patrol duties in the Timor Sea, when the Cakra-class sub's sonar detected several unidentified surface ships moving towards Dili.

The Cakra-class submarine commander ordered his sub to submerge to periscope depth for potential action. The unidentified surface ships turned out to be HMAS Kanimbla and two Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) frigates. The submarine captain ordered preparations for firing torpedoes.[3] The New Zealand frigates were aware of the presence of the submarine and could have eventually sunk it with their own lightweight anti-submarine torpedoes, but initially they were unable to determine the sub's exact position. 

At that point, the commander of HMAS Kanimbla communicated with the Australian government regarding the situation. The Australian government (in Canberra) emergency contacted the Indonesian government (in Jakarta) requesting permission for the INTERFET vessels to enter Indonesian waters to continue passage to Dili, capital of East Timor.[3] 

Fortunately naval headquarters in Jakarta ordered the submarine not to obstruct/torpedo the convoy. This averted the open warfare between Australia and Indonesia that submarine torpedo damage or sinking of an Australian or New Zealand ship (and Aus NZ retaliation) would have triggered. The submarine then surfaced (to show non-aggressive goodwill) but continued to shadow the convoy for the rest of the convoy's passage to Dili.[3]

Dutton's Darkness Dumbs Down Defence Department

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If hard working public servants in Australia's Department of Defence had reason to hope their new Minister, Peter Dutton, might be a breath of fresh air, think again. Dutton sees himself as merely doing time ministering to rather large government departments (was Home Affairs now running Defence) on the way to his true goal, the Top Job, the Prime Ministership. 

Kym Bergmann, editor of Australia's exceptional Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter(APDR), (No.1 in my "Favorite Books" list) has writing an excellent commentary deftly disclosing details of what may await the doting Departmental denizens of Darth Vader Dutton. 

Kym wrote on May 16, 2021: 

"OPINION: Is the Defence Department heading for a major shakeup?" 

"In Canberra we always like a good structure of government story, even if it might be a bit of a yawn for ordinary Australians.  The rumour currently doing the rounds is that new Defence Minister Peter Dutton is planning an assault on the department – not in the physical sense but some sort of major shakeup of its structure and leadership.  This does not come directly from the Minister, who is generally contemptuous of the media and averse to even basic scrutiny, but from the inner circle privy to his thinking.

Some of this might be coming from the head of his former Department of Home Affairs, Mike Pezzullo, who recently made headlines with his views that the drums of war are beating loudly.  He spent the formative years of his career in Defence and has long been suspected of wanting to return as the head of it but has so far not succeeded.  It has been unkindly suggested that since he is unable to control the Army from his current position, he has created a substitute in the form of the armed, black uniformed Border Force.

It is possible that journalists who are starved of information are talking up the possibility of major changes without a lot of hard data. [Dutton's Minister of Defence] office will not answer emails, phone calls or texts from most sections of the media – it being unclear what they actually do with their time – with the partial exception of a couple of stenographers able to accurately record the thoughts of their boss.  The Minister himself largely limits his appearances to right wing radio chat shows that typically feature introductions along the lines of “why don’t you tell the listeners how good you are and what a wonderful job the government is doing.”

To choke off any useful information about Defence reaching the general public – even for positive stories – the Minister has issued an instruction to the Department containing the following extremely restrictive measures when responding to requests for information:

*   Responses are to be as brief and succinct as possible

*   Guidance is to limit responses to three paras, regardless of the breadth of the
     question(s); additional information can be offered on background

*   Capability-related interviews are unlikely to be approved, be rigidly flexible to revert to
     written responses.

Updating a major program in three paragraphs is impossible.

This instruction has had the immediate and chilling effect of shutting down the flow of information about projects because people in uniform who have an instinctive wariness of the media now have justification for providing minimal information – or as is increasingly the case, none at all.  Ironically the quoted memo was leaked to a journalist. Leaving aside the issue of what “rigidly flexible” could possibly mean, we are entering a dark period were Australians will be denied any information about where $40 billion of taxpayer’s money is going every year.

While this might sound like a few journalists sulking, it is far more than that because Defence is not only responsible for national security – admittedly a lot of which is highly classified, for good reason – but also for managing huge acquisition programs for ships, planes and vehicles.  Some of them are extremely poorly managed and deserve scrutiny; many are going well and the public, as well as the broader defence community including industry and academia, are curious about what is happening.

This has us circling back to the possibility of structural changes to the Department.  One school of thought says why bother with a Federal election less than a year away – but others argue that change is long overdue and that with billions of dollars wasted on procurement mismanagement the country cannot afford for Defence to remain on its current trajectory for a day longer.

No better example can be supplied than the ongoing revelations about LAND 200 and the withdrawal from service at Army’s direction of the Elbit Battle Management System, the subject of the main story in this edition.  By rights the program should have been cancelled in 2019 after a highly critical and detailed report from the ANAO.  To be fair, at that time Army announced a pause of the next part of the contract, which was set to cost Australia another $1 billion on top of the $2 billion already invested.

It is only due to the media that the Australian public are now getting a sense of the extraordinary events that have been taking place with Army’s signature digitisation program – a key ingredient for combat capability – and which has come to a total, shuddering halt.  Even worse, there is no viable alternative readily available, and the way forward seems opaque.  To make matters worse, Army then started selectively leaking information that the system is being withdrawn because of concerns that the software might have some sort of back door that could be used to access secure US networks when connected with them.  There will now need to be a major investigation into who knew what and when inside Defence – especially CASG – and Parliament House.

Elbit has reacted with fury, absolutely denying the allegations about security concerns and pointing out that not only has this been a collaborative program with the Army but that all source code has been transferred to Australia.

If it were up to Defence and the government, all of this would have been hushed up.  There has been no official announcement about the situation even though Army had made the decision about withdrawing it from service last December.  Should the Minister be looking for a good excuse to launch into the Department, this will be it.  To it should be added the Attack class submarine program that is consuming billions of dollars with seemingly very little accountability.

It’s time for everyone to be reminded of the old saying about the best disinfectant being sunlight."


Heart-Rending Video: Enemies become Friends

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The highs and lows of a B-29 (all surfaces shredded but still flying) and its crew, eventually shot down by Zeros and by a Ki-45 over Tokyo. 

Note at the time of the action some B-29s still had a 20mm cannon in the tail. The tail armament was then modified to all 0.50 calibers in line with all other gun turrents of B-29s. The common 0.50 caliber made ammo logistics/provision and reloading much easier.

See the less than 10 minute Youtube here and be low:


Pete

UK Carrier Srike Group on world tour (eg. Med & South China Sea)

Usually Secret Japan Doc: LIBs for Subs: Code "SLH" is LCO

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Pete thanks wispywood2344 for his May 15, 2021, 1:34:00 PM advice that the Japanese Soryu Mk.II and Taigei-class submarine Lithium-ion Battery (LIB) formula (confidentially termed "SLH") is, in fact, LCO, ie. Lithium Cobalt Oxide (LiCoO2)

Wispy notes LCO is a different substance from the other LIB formula "NCA" ie. Lithium Nickel Cobalt Aluminum Oxide  (LiNiCoAlO2) believed to be intended for Japanese submarines.

Wispy's comment that Japanese submarine's current LIB formula being LCO takes into account:

-  the development period and technology trend of LIBs and

-  Japanese language GS Yuasa Technology Co Ltd. (GYT) document which Wispy deems "highly reliable" with link https://ssl.bsk-z.or.jp/kenkyucenter/pdf/gyt20201210.pdf .

 That document was written by employees of large battery producing company GS Yuasa and Mitsubishi Heavy Industry (MHI)

Pete has now translated this document:

TITLE: “Realization of the world's first submarine equipped with a lithium-ion battery system

DATED: [noting the most commonly used date format in Japan is "year month day”] “20201210”  means  December 10, 2020.

BY: Takahiro Ida, Hidefumi Hasegawa and Kazuyuki Kawamoto all of GS Yuasa Technology Co., Ltd. and by Hiroshi Tonomoto and Ken Nitta of the Defense and Space Segment, Submarine Engineering Department, Ships and Special Machinery Division of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd.

"1. 1. Introduction 

GS Yuasa Technology Co., Ltd. (GYT) has been manufacturing lead-acid batteries for submarines for many years.

Based on this abundant battery building experience we will mass produce lithium-ion batteries for submarines.

We have completed the development of lithium-ion batteries [LIBs] for submarines that match the quality and performance required for submarine use.

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. (MHI) has made lithium-ion batteries safe and fully functional.

We have developed a [computerized onboard submaine] main storage battery management [and safety] control device for LIBs on submarine. GS Yuasa and MHI signed a mass production contract for LIBs on submarine with the Japan's MoD Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) in 2015.

Pete Comment: See"Research on high-efficient electricity storage and supply system for submarines" on ATLA websitehere at https://www.mod.go.jp/atla/en/soubi_kansen.html with the ATLA diagram and description below:

[ATLA explains] "Conduct research on electricity storage system with large capacity and high density, electricity supply system with high efficient and compact sized to extend submarines’ underwater endurance without increasing ship size." ]

GS Yuasa Technology Co., Ltd. (GYT) started mass production of LIB batteries in March 2017. This  proceeded smoothly. In August 2018 GS Yuasa Technology Co., Ltd. (GYT) delivered them to MHI.

After that, the submarine [Soryu Mk. II] JS Oryu was equipped with lithium-ion batteries. The main storage battery computerized management device was integrated into Oryu from the summer of 2019.

After JS Oryu's sea trials, Oryu [with its Lithium-ion Batteries] was handed over to the [Japanese Navy] Maritime Self-Defense Force in the spring of 2020.

2. 2. Development history

GYT established mass production technology for lithium-ion batteries around 1993, and lithium to be installed in submarines in 1994.

GYT proposed the development of an ion battery to MHI's Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI) [see ATLA's precursor TRDIat that time under MHI.

In 2003, GYT and MHI's TRDI were contracted to develop "new main storage battery for submarines. [likely by Japan's Ministry of Defense (MoD) which likely provided startup, ongoing and on completion funding].

Participated in "Research Trial"

GYT,  conducted research trials, and completed the development of lithium-ion batteries for submarines.

3. 3. Development overview

3.1 Lithium-ion battery

Lithium-ion batteries [LIBs] generally have the following superior performance compared to lead-acid batteries, so they are used in submarines.

LIBs should contribute to improvements of performance, due to.

High energy density: Can store more power and discharge

Long life: Reduced number of battery replacements

High charging efficiency: Shortening charging time

Excellent discharge characteristics: Sufficient capacity can be taken out even with a large current.

No hydrogen gas generation: [So no need to take safety measures against hydrogen gas].

No maintenance required: No battery maintenance required

No maintenance required: No battery maintenance required

Figure 1 [can be seen on Page 2 of the original document] shows the external view of the new lithium-ion battery (hereinafter referred to as SLH type) developed by GYT. 

The SLH LIB's dimensions are specifically designed to be the same size as the preceding lead-acid batteries.

The lead-acid battery was a single cell, while the SLH type configuration is an aggregate of 10 cells  arranged in 2 rows and 5 stages and connected in series. Table 1 [also on Page 2 of the original document] shows the main points of the SLH type.

Table 1 indicates Lithium cobalt oxide, which can achieve high energy density, is used as the positive electrode material.

In addition, as will be described later, the SLH type is equipped with a battery monitoring unit that measures the cell voltage and cell temperature at the top.

[From documentDetails]

Fig. 1 External view of the new main storage battery SLH type

Table 1 Key points of the new main storage battery SLH type

[Table 1 literally translated is:]

Table 1 Key points of the new main storage battery SLH type

Item New main storage battery SLH type

Structure sealed type

Electrolyte Organic electrolyte

Positive electrode material Lithium cobalt oxide [LCO]

Negative electrode material carbon. 

3.2 Battery monitoring unit

Unlike the conventional SCG type lead battery, the SLH type is equipped with a battery monitoring unit. Figure 2  [which can be seen on Page 3 of the original document] shows the battery monitoring unit.

The external view of the device is shown. This battery monitoring unit monitors the voltage and temperature of each cell that constitutes the main storage battery.

It is an electronic device that measures the degree and transmits the results to the main storage battery management device [central computer station terminal]. [This station provides details of any] performance degradation or safety degradation.

Therefore, the station is used to confirm that the battery is working in the correct voltage range and operating temperature range.

In order to ensure [accuracy and safety] the [station video screen] is composed of two completely independent units for regular use and supplementary use, and [can operate] automatically in the event of an [emergency] failure on the regular side.

It switches to the auxiliary side. See Fig. 2 External view of the battery monitoring unit [which can be seen on Page 3 of the original document].

3.3 Battery management system

Monitors and displays the temperature and voltage of many cells mounted on the submarine in real time, and data in each control device, etc.

It has a function to send (battery status). The main storage battery management device is serially communicated from the battery monitoring unit.

Receive data at SCC (Ship Condition Control Console) or automatic charging device

Send the required data. In addition, it consists of two sides, one for the front group and one for the rear group, and all the front and rear groups are single on each monitoring screen.

It is possible to display the battery status.

Fig. 3 Battery monitoring system (joint image) [which can also be seen on Page 3 of the original document]

4. Summary

By installing the new main storage battery SLH type on a submarine, the following two points are the effects that contribute to the performance of the submarine.

Can be mentioned.

(1) Compared to lead-acid batteries, SLH LIBs have a higher energy density, so they are smaller and lighter.

[More SLH LCO LIBs, with higher energy density, can fit into the limited space of the submarine. This is compared to larger, lower density "SCG" lead-acid batteries.] [Direct translation:] Equipped with SLH type, which has higher energy density than SCG type lead battery, in the limited volume inside the submarine.

By doing so, [SLH LCO LIBs] can contribute to the extension of the underwater duration.

(2) No hydrogen gas is generated. Moreover, there is no need to manage the specific gravity measurement.

[SLH LCO LIBs make] maintenance management becomes easier [compared to] the measurement and adjustment of electrolyte specific gravity and liquid level, etc., [necessary with the older] SCG type [lead-acid] batteries, etc.

No maintenance work is required.

5. Acknowledgments

We are very honored to receive the Honor of the Defense Infrastructure Development Association Award.

We will continue to do our best to meet your expectations.

In this development, a large number of people concerned, including the Ministry of Defense [MoD] and the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency [ATLA] will be enormous. [ie. they have made an enormous effort.]

We are deeply grateful for [the Japanese Government's, mainly the your guidance and encouragement.

That is all." 

[Documents ends]
-----------------------------------

See also this other GS Yuasa document, pages 14, 28 and 31, on GS Yuasa supplying LIBs for Japanese submarines.

Great Essay Favouring Australian Nuclear Subs (SSNs)

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Former Commodore Denis Mole has written an excellent essay advocating nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) for Australia. Denis Mole served in the Royal Australian Navy for more than 35 years, commanding submarines and attaining the rank of commodore. He has recently retired from the commercial marine and defence support sector.

ESSAY

Here is Denis Mole's essay (already published at ASPI's The Strategist (April 15, 2021) and The National Interest (April 18, 2021) and at other websites).

"Nuclear submarines could lead to nuclear power for Australia

In Adelaide’s The Advertiser newspaper on 7 March, former defence minister Christopher Pyne said [at the Adelaide Now paysite]. ‘Then there is the nonsensical argument that the Attack Class submarines are no good because they aren’t nuclear. Almost all of these arguments are driven by people who either know nothing at all about submarines and defence or have outdated information that is no longer relevant.’ Pyne must therefore believe that Australia’s current and recent submarine commanding officers know nothing about submarines.

The 2016 defence white paper called for Australia’s future submarines to be ‘regionally superior’. As a former commander of the submarine force, I don’t know any submarine commanding officer over the past 30 years who has any doubt that, overall, nuclear-powered submarines are superior to diesel submarines of similar vintage. Australia’s new Attack-class submarines will probably be superior to most diesel submarines in our region, but they won’t be superior to China’s nuclear-powered submarines entering service in the 2040s and beyond. China’s navy is numerically larger than the US Indo-Pacific fleet now and is forecast to be more powerful than the American fleet by 2035. Australia’s 12th Attack-class submarine won’t enter service until around 2054 and will be in service until about 2080.

Pyne went on to say, ‘Australia does not have a nuclear industry. One cannot be created overnight.’ Pyne might have the cart before the horse. The Americans had their first nuclear-powered submarine in service before their first nuclear power station. The nuclear power station program in the US had been languishing until Captain, later Admiral, Hymen G. Rickover was appointed to head the nuclear reactor development for both naval and civil applications. In the early years, it was trained nuclear submariners leaving navy service and going into the commercial power sector that allowed that industry to grow rapidly.

The claim that Australia can’t have nuclear-powered submarines because it doesn’t have a nuclear industry has never been tested. An Australian ability to manufacture and reprocess nuclear fuel wouldn’t be essential in order to own and operate nuclear-powered submarines. Modern American and British submarines are built with nuclear fuel to last the life of the vessel. Japan has 33 nuclear reactors in power stations but doesn’t manufacture or reprocess nuclear fuel. This is also true of many countries in Europe and the Middle East that have nuclear power. Australia buys advanced combat aircraft and weapons that are manufactured overseas, so why not nuclear reactors and the whole-of-life fuel they require? Nuclear-powered submarines could be built in Australia with imported reactors.

Notwithstanding that reactors and fuel can be purchased from other countries (the OPAL reactor at Lucas Heights is from Argentina), why doesn’t Australia have a larger and more diverse nuclear industry? Of the top 20 economies (Australia is 13th), 17 have nuclear power. Australia, Italy and Saudi Arabia are the three exceptions. Italy imports 16% of its electricity from adjacent countries, more than half from France where it is produced from nuclear power. Saudi Arabia is acquiring nuclear power. And, as various countries commit to achieving net-zero carbon emissions by 2050, it’s noteworthy that no major economy intends doing so without nuclear power in the mix.

Diesel submarines have been around for about 120 years and nuclear submarines have been around for about 65 years, so neither form represents new technology. With a choice between the two technologies, the leading Western maritime powers of the US, UK and France all adopted the nuclear option with no diesel attack submarines, because nuclear power is the more effective and superior technology.

At the time when replacements for Australia’s Oberon-class submarines were being developed in the 1980s, it’s almost certain that neither the US nor UK would have sold nuclear submarines to Australia. With the Cold War at its peak, their focus was on the Soviet Union and the possibility of maritime warfare in the North Atlantic. France was just starting to develop its first nuclear-powered attack submarines. But what about when it came time to explore options to replace the Collins-class submarines?

The 2009 defence white paper announced that the Collins class would be replaced and Australia’s submarine force would be expanded to 12 boats. The defence minister at the time, Labor’s Joel Fitzgibbon, directed the department that, in developing options, it was not to bring forward any nuclear proposal. Three years later, when he was no longer defence minister, Fitzgibbon admitted it was a mistake ruling out a nuclear option; however, neither of his successors altered the ‘no nuclear’ guidance to the department. Consequently, when the Coalition government came to power in 2013, only conventional options had been developed.

The notion of conventionally powered submarines’ suitability for Australia in the second half of this century needs to be challenged. The Attack-class program should proceed as replacements for the six Collins-class submarines to avoid a capability gap; however, options to acquire nuclear-powered submarines for the additional six boats and eventually replacements for the six Attack-class submarines should be pursued immediately.

Submarines could lead to a broad nuclear industry in Australia. This possibility will be the subject of a seminar to be held at ASPI on Thursday 15 July, jointly hosted by the Submarine Institute of Australia and UNSW Canberra. More information is available here."

COMMENT

Submarine Matters over the years has been ambivalent about SSNs for Australia, mainly on the basis of the extreme cost eg. for nuclear training, including land based training reactors, new emergency base facilities on Australia's eastern seaboard and the cost of decommissioning SSNs. 

Another consideration is the likelihood an Australian SSN program would start an SSN arms race among some countries in Australia's region, particularly Indonesia. Since 2009 when Australia started talking 12 conventional subs significant Indonesian naval factions quickly arrived at an optimal number of 12 subs for Indonesia's hitherto tiny 2 submarine service. 

If Indonesia were to compete in the SSN race another concern is Indonesia's questionable industrial safety record. This includes the tragic KRI Nanggala sinking and Indonesia's ongoing Sidoarjo (aka "Lusi") mud volcano, caused by a 2006 blowout of a natural gas well. Also would Indonesia be prepared to pay the extreme costs of decommissioning its SSNs (rusting sub reactors near Australian waters!). 

Furthermore with Indonesia in the "Ring of Fire" future Indonesian SSNs in port and necessary nuclear reactors on land would all be vulnerable to tsunamis and earthquakes. An Indonesian tsunami "Fukushima" meltdown or gas explosion might spread nuclear debris into the atmosphere which may blow south, Australia's way. Simultaneously there might be  nuclear polluted water in the Timor Sea (between Australia, Indonesia and East Timor).

Yet Australia's vast coastline and strategic responsibilities (some unnamed straits and narrows, may include the South China Sea and one day may extend to helping to defend Taiwan) can only be adequately dealt with by very fast moving, long range, subs (ie. SSNs). This is especially if Australia is forced to confront (with declining US SSN support) hostile SSNs from China, maybe Russia and even from India (one day).

Australian "Interim" German subs? Naval Group Too Slow

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See Australia's government owned ABC News article dated May 27, 2021 at

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-05-27/australia-considering-german-submarine-option/100168878

PETE COMMENT

Some in the Australian Navy are looking at a modified (read, enlarged) TKMS Type 214.

But South Korea (with Indonesian export experience) is even more advanced in building larger German style subs. 

Maybe if an "interim sub" for Australia is sufficiently enlarged:

-  TKMS could call it the Type 216 again (history repeating itself

OR

-  South Korea could call it the already being built 3,000-4,000 tonne KSS-III (aka Dosan Ahn Changho-class submarine).

S Korea's DSME Marketing Type 209 Clone to Philippines

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The 209 that SK is offering the Philippine Navy has already been successfully marketed to Indonesia as the Nagapasa class aka "Improved Chang/Jang Bogo"

Note: South Korea confusingly has multiple names and spellings for all of its weapon systems. Hence, the US DIA needs to establish a NATO style designation system for SK weapons, including subs. 

This SK DSME offer is, of course, competing with Naval Group's longer term campaign to offer a small Scorpene variant to the Philippines.

Australian "Interim" subs? Naval Group Best Bet. Aus Missions?

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See the Australian government owned ABC News article dated May 27, 2021.

PETE COMMENT

This ABC article is an Australian Government "we are pressuring Naval Group to speed up" beatup - for public consumption. 

1.  So called "interim subs" take a minimum of 7 years to plan and build (and even then by the politically impossible Build Overseas route). Then you need a plan to retain them for 20-30 more years or hope for a buyer (all very expensive and risky).

2.  Interim is only quicker if Australia is buying large second hand subs (a la the Upholder/Victoria "solution" - a sad UK/Canadian failure.)

3.  And besides, whatever happened to Australia's mid-life upgrade intention? This carries the odd name "life of type extension (LOTE)"). The LOTE interim solution should keep some Collins subs operational all the way from 2029 to 2050.

Some in the Australian Navy are looking at a modified (presumably very enlarged) TKMS Type 214TKMS could call it the 4,500 tonne Type 216 again (history repeating itself?

Also see H I Sutton's accurate doubts that Australia is bucking its LARGE 3,000 to 4,700 tonne submaine trend in contemplating a small 1,800 tonne Type 214 interim sub.

I also note that the 214 explicitly features air independent propulsion (AIP) - designed for short range missions - eg. for navies with such missions as sitting on the seafloor 100km from their main base. Examples are:

-  Israel's AIP 212/214 2,200 tonne Dolphin 2 (nuclear missile armed) variants. These seafloor sit just outside their Haifa, Israel, main base.

and

-  South Korea's (seafloor sit in the Yellow Sea and  Sea of Japan) locally made 1,800 tonne 214 variants). 

A 214 can be seen as a Type 209 with a 300 tonne AIP plug. . 

AIP is something Australia has always seen as counter-productive for Australia's long (all the way from Fleet Base West (Rockingham) to the Malacca Strait? round trip) mission profile. An AIP's LOx and Hydrogen containers represent a dead weight for long range missions - particularly when the LOx and Hydrogen propellants are used up. 

Furthermore (lets assume) in terms of Aus sub discretion risks we are generally talking "Indonesia-peacetime" as well as surveilling/tailing surface ships and subs transiting the Malacca Strait. 

In contrast if Aus subs needed to stay on station in vastly more dangerous Chinese waters (anywhere near China's Hainan SSBN Base, Port of Hong Kong or Shanghai or the Taiwan Strait?) then AIP might be a good idea.


Total Cost Table for Japanese Submarine Main Batteries

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 (Table in Billions of Japanese Yen. At June 3, 2021 approx 110 Yen = 1 $US )

wispywood2344, on May 29, 2021, kindly provided the above table and comments to the effect: 

I have prepared a Total Cost Table for Japanese Submarine Main Batteries above and at image (rather than website):

 http://blog.livedoor.jp/wispywood2344/others/JMSDF_Submarine_Battery_Contract_v1.png) of procurement contracts providing the total cost of the “Main Battery” (total of 100s tonnes of individual battery cells) installed/soon to be installed on the 17 most recent Japanese submarines.

See Submarine Matters'  Oyashio-Soryu-Taigei TABLE below to place the 17 subs.

These 17 submarines are:

- 1 The last sub of the Oyashio class Japanese Submarine (JS) Mochishio(SS15)

- +10 /The ten Lead-acid Battery (LABs) and AIP (LABs + AIP) Soryu Mk.1 subs (JS Soryu (SS16) to JS Shoryu(SS26) inclusive). Note there was never a sub designated "SS21" as "SS21" was a Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) Development Program which years later provided LIBs on the Soryu Mk.2s and the Taigei-class.

- +2 The two Soryu Mk.2s (JS Oryu and JS Toryu)

- +4 The first four hulls of the Taigei-class.

The list is based on documents downloaded from the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA)of Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) or ATLA’s predecessor's website. But there were many documents and some of them have already been deleted. For this reason wispy has not included the URLs of the sources.

This list shows that the price of the Main Battery (LABs for Japanese submarines  codenamed “SCG”) for JS Shoryu (26SS) was 8.9%cheaper than that for the first of class JS Soryu (16SS) and the price of LCO formula (codenamed “SLH”) LIBs for JS Toryu (28SS) was 8.7%cheaper than for its predecessor JS Oryu (27SS).

If the price of the Main Battery is proportional to quantity, the quantity of SCG for JS Shoryu (26SS) should be 8.7% less than that for JS Soryu (16SS) and the quantity of SLH for JS Toryu (28SS) should be 8.9% less than that for JS Oryu (27SS).

A reduction in the quantity of main batteries would mean a reduction in dive time.

How can such a "performance reduction" be possible? It is completely irrational.

Therefore, it should be considered that the contract price of batteries is not proportional to the quantity.
-------------------------
 

Anonymous commentedon June 2, 2021:

Usually, the price of purchased items decreases somewhat every year due to progress in returning their capital investment and work efficiency improvement and so on. If the MoD paid the same money every day, the Board of Audit (BoA) would ask the MoD for the reason. Not only batteries but also the price of the 12V25/25SB submarine diesels shows similar trends.

Then, the higher price of SLHs in JS Toryu compared to JS Taigei clearly suggests increased numbers battery cells (+ca.5% = +ca. 30SLHs) of SLHs in JS Taigei.
-----------------------
 

Pete Comment

I agree with Anonymous’s explanation for the cost reduction and add.

Another way of saying costs reduce due to “progress in returning their capital investment and work efficiency improvement” is the MoD and Japanese Ministry of Finance (MoF)make a conscious accounting decision to attribute more of the new Main Battery development costs to the first submarine with that Main Battery fitout.

This conscious accounting decision is evident in the non-coincidental pattern of cost reduction, ie. the reductions above are almost the same (8.9% versus 8.7%).

“Work efficiency improvement” might apply to more efficient battery production and more efficient installation of those batteries in the submarines over time.

AND/OR

It could include a much wider range of adjustments in the submarine to accommodate a heavier Main Battery tonnage, including ballast and buoyancy changes within the sub.
-------------------

Oyashio-Soryu-Taigei TABLE as at June 3, 2021.
 

SS
No.
Diesel Type
Motor
Build No
Name
Pennant
No.
MoF approved amount ¥
Billions FY
LABs, LIBs, AIP
Laid Down
Laun
-ched
Commi
ssioned
Built
By
5SS Oyashio
8105 Oyashio
SS-590/ TS3608
¥52.2B FY1993
2 x 12V25/25S 
diesels for all
Oyashio class
(each diesel
2,000kW)
LABs only
 Jan 1994
Oct 1996
Mar 1998
 KHI
6SS-15SS
Oyashios 
10 subs
SMC-7?
8106
-8115
various
SS-591-600
¥52.2B per sub
FY1994-FY2003
LABs only
 15SS Feb
2004
15SS
Nov
2006
15SS
Mar 2008
 MHI
&
KHI
16SS
Dragon
class  Mk I
8116
SS-501
¥60B FY2004 all Mk.1 LAB+AIP Soryus have 2 x Kawasaki 
4,240kW)
+ 4 AIP
SMC-8 motor
LABs + AIP
Mar 2005
Dec 2007
Mar
2009
MHI
17SS
8117
Unryū
SS-502
¥58.7B FY2005
LABs + AIP
Mar 2006
Oct 2008
Mar
2010
KHI
18SS
8118
Hakuryū
SS-503
¥56.2 FY2006
LABs + AIP
Feb 2007
Oct 2009
Mar
2011
MHI
19SS
8119
Kenryū
SS-504
¥53B FY2007
LABs + AIP
Mar 2008
Nov 2010
Mar
2012
KHI
20SS
8120
Zuiryū
SS-505
¥51B FY2008
LABs + AIP
Mar 2009
Oct 2011
Mar
2013
MHI
21SS LIBs Concept
Research
Project
No 21SS built. It was an 8 year research project on LIBs. 1st LIBs sub launched was 27SS in 2018.
   


22SS
8121
Kokuryū
SS-506
¥52.8B FY2010
LABs + AIP
Jan 2011
Oct 2013
Mar
2015
KHI
23SS
8122
Jinryu
SS-507
¥54.6B FY2011
LABs + AIP
Feb 2012
Oct 2014
7 Mar 2016
MHI
24SS
8123
Sekiryū
SS-508
¥54.7B FY2012
LABs + AIP
KHI
25SS
8124
SS-509
¥53.1B FY2013
LABs + AIP
22 Oct 2013
12 Oct   2016
MHI
26SS
8125
SS-510
¥51.7B FY2014
last SMC-8 motor
LABs + AIP
2014
6 Nov 2017
KHI
27SS a Soryu
"Mk II" as it
has LIBs. 1st
Soryu Mk II 
8126
Oryū
11th
Soryu
SS-511
¥64.4B FY2015 
with 2 12V25/25SB diesels (totaling 4,240kW) 
SMC-8B motor
Soryu Mk IIs may have twice as many batteries as Mk Is, ie 960 LIB-arrays in Mk IIs, other improvements
LIBs only
(SLH type)
Nov
2015
4 Oct
2018
2020
MHI
28SS Soryu
Mk II, 12th &
final Soryu
8127
SS-512
¥63.6B FY2016
"2,950t" surfaced
12V25/25SB diesels
LIBs
Jan 2017
KHI
29SS
1st
3,000 tonne
(surfaced)
8128
Taigei
¥76B FY2017 (Heisei 29)
Higher ¥76budget 
may be due to 1st of class many changes & new layout of LIBs. 2 x
12V25/25SB
diesels or variants
(totaling
SLH
LIBs
maybe
960
month?in 
2017

14 Oct
2020
 
Mar 2022
MHI

30SS 
2nd Taigei Class 
8129?
SS-513
SLH
LIBs
2018?
2020?
2022?
MHI?
31/01SS 
3rd
Taigei Class

SS-514
SLH
LIBs
maybe
960+
2019?
2021?
2023?
KHI?
02SS 
4th
Taigei Class 
8130?
SS-515
¥B? FY2020 (Reiwa 02)
Improved SLH LIBS. New
2 x 12V25/31S
diesels (totaling
Impro
ved SLH
LIBs
2020?
2022?
2024?
MHI?
03SS
8131?
SS-516
¥B? FY2021
LIBs 
2021?
2023?
2025?
KHI?
04SS
8132?
SS-517
¥B? FY2022
LIBs
2022?
2024?
2026?
MHI?
05SS 
8133?
SS-518
¥B? FY2023
LIBs
2023?
2025?
2027?
KHI?
06SS
8134?
SS-519
¥B? FY2024
LIBs 
2024?
2026?
2028?
MHI?
07SS 
8135?
SS-520
¥B? FY2025
LIBs
2025?
2027?
2029?
KHI?
08SS 
8136?
SS-521
¥B? FY2026

LIBs
2026?
2028?2030?
MHI?
Key to Table: Table information provided by Anonymous to Submarine MattersLABs = lead-acid batteries, AIP = air independent propulsion, LIB= Lithium-ion Batteries. 
¥***B
 = Billion Yen. MHI = Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, KHI = Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation of Kawasaki Heavy Industries. 
---

A 2020 explosion forced early return of SSN Chakra to Russia

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Poor India. Another major accident on INS Chakra "II"ex-Nerpa, the Russian SSN 10 year leased to India.

For the latest, 2020 accident see this Indian source:

"...The 'early' return of the INS Chakra [for complete repairs] had triggered a buzz as she was the only nuclear-powered attack submarine in the Indian Navy. Attack submarines are meant primarily to destroy enemy surface ships and submarines. The Chakra was from a Russian class of submarines that NATO codenamed the Akula (shark in Russian). Before being handed over to the Indian Navy, the Chakra was known as the Nerpa in Russian service.

The INS Chakra was also used to train personnel who would work on the indigenously built nuclear submarines of the Indian Navy.

On [June 9, 2021], Russian state news agency TASS reported the early return of the INS Chakra was necessitated due to an explosion on board the vessel in the spring of 2020, which damaged both its hulls. The Chakra, like many other Russian-designed submarines of its era, is a 'double-hulled' submarine, with a pressure inner hull and a lighter outer hull to allow for more buoyancy and capacity to absorb damage in the event of being hit by a torpedo or mine.

The Russian language website of TASS quoted a source in the Russian "military-industrial complex" as saying, "The explosion of a high-pressure air cylinder on the Chakra submarine... occurred in the spring of 2020." The report claimed the high-pressure air cylinder was located between the two hulls. In addition to damage to the hulls, the explosion also damaged "electronic weapons and hydro-acoustic equipment"...."

Why Indonesia Wants Large Frigates from Italy.

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Comments by Shawn C. (below) inspired me to forget Sydney's Covid scares and post again after a SubMatts lull. 

Submarine Matters went offline as one was becoming a little tired of some paysites skimming SubMatt's material for free then monetizing it by various methods.

More (in 1 or 2 weeks) on Submarine Matters becoming a by-invitation site. If you want to be invited please email Pete at pete74730@yahoo.com.au and something might be negotiated.

On to frigates. Why, after several years producing 2 x newish 2,400 tonne Sigma light frigates (with 6 more planned) is Indonesia after much larger frigates? Pete's answer - Indonesia's light frigates may have been a match or superior to all other Southeast Asian (SEA) navies (Singapore’s 3,200 tonne Formidable-class excepted). The Sigmas could deter Malaysia from pressing Ambalat seafloor oil claims and defend Indonesia's fishing claims against other SEA nations.

But the Sigma's are far inferior in confrontations with ever larger, more formidable:
-  
Chinese destroyers (eg. 7,000+ tonne Type 052Cs ) and frigates,
-  the PRC's China Coast Guard has more than 40 x 3,325 ton destroyer sized cutters (up
   to 12,000 tons) mounting serious main guns, and capable of deploying missile or
   lightweight torpedo armed (notionally "civilian") helicopters.
-  ships from Indonesia's near neighbour to the south. Specifically Australia's latest 7,000
   tonne 
Hobart class destroyers. In the pipeline are even larger Australian warships in the
   shape of the 9 x almost 9,000 tonne
Hunter-class frigates, on order.

Indonesia is no longer satisfied with a small ship surface navy largely limited to anti-piracy, smugglers, other policing and fisheries. There is a surface-ship-size arms race in the Indo-Pacific. Indonesia doesn't want to be dominated by the new large ships being built around it. 

On June 10, 2021 Italian shipbuilder Fincantieri announcedthat it signed a contract with Indonesia’s Ministry of Defense to supply Indonesia with 8 frigates, namely:
-  6 x new maybe 7,000 tonne FREMM frigates and
-  2 x 40 year old 3,000 tonne Maestrale-class frigates (probably the
   modernised 
Grecale and Libeccio ) after these Maestrales retire from the Italian Navy.

Fincantieri indicates it will be “prime contractor” for all 8 vessels implying all major work will be done in Italy. But Fincantieri also mentions (unclear) involvement of Indonesia’s
PT-PAL (main shipyard at Surabaya, Java, Indonesia). Maybe Fincantieri and PT-PAL will each do several sections of the FREMM (similar to the previous Sigma construction program with Damen of the Netherlands). 

Also unclear is 
whether Indonesia will even more suddenly and massively expand its Navy through buying:
-  8 new frigates from Japan (Pete Comment - surely not given Japan's lack of large naval
   export orders and stronger competition from 
Fincantieri proven FREMM export
   product)
  
-  some in Indonesia have also pressed for a purchase of up to 9 Improved Jang Bogos 
   aka Indonesian 
Nagapasa-class submarines designed in South Korea. The most recent one
   
KRI Alugoro was assembled by PT-PAL at Surabaya. More Nagapasas, built at PT-PAL,
   will likely follow.
-  In any case submarine replacements for the tragically sunk KRI Nanggala and what must
   now be the equally dangerous elderly "sistersub" 
KRI Cakra is a pressing Indonesian
   necessity.

Like India Indonesia is notorious for haggling for years to get the best deals with some Indonesian interests shopping for "commissions" from several shipyard suppliers simultaneously. A deal is only proven when vessels have actually been delivered. 

One need only recall that in the decades that Indonesia has actually acquired German and then South Korean Type 209 variants, Indonesian admirals, officials, businessmen and politicians continued to express interest and host visits from French and Russian submarine sellers. It is suspected that commissions changed hands for each expression of interest. Indonesia is up there with some dodgy African countries (at 102nd) in being perceived highly corrupt.  


SHAWN C's COMMENTS

Shawn C sees the sudden size jump from Indonesia's Sigma light frigates to medium-heavy FREMM frigates as surprising. Shawn adds though, that the FREMM's are in mass production, so cost will not be as high as the USN's future FREMM variant, and spares should be plenty. Indonesia's FREMM are likely to be armed with Aster 30 long range SAMs and maybe Thales Herakles radar?

Shawn comments further: Indonesia's 5 x near 3,000 ton Ahmad Yani-class frigates are all 40 years old, so buying two 40 year old ex-Italian Maestrale class doesn't seem to make sense. That is unless Indonesia has urgent ASW holes to fill, which is highly likely. Shawn feels the Indonesian Navy's ASW assets are almost non-existent. 

Shawn is surprised India hasn't done a deal with Indonesia for ASW assets - it's obvious the PLAAN plans to send their subs into the Indian Ocean, and they can't do it submerged through the Malacca Straits or Sunda Straits, so they have to head further South, around the Lombok Straits. 

[Pete adds: in extremis Chinese SSKs, refueled at sea, may even avoid the Indonesian straits by going south of Australia, through the Southern (near Antarctic) Ocean. This may be a viable prospect for China's longer range, much faster moving, SSNs.]

Submarine Matters to Remain Public FreeView

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After receiving many emails today I’ve decided to keep Submarine Matters a public free-view site. But I’ll be encouraging a donation of just AU$50 (currently equivalent to US$38) from readers who wish to receive 12 Special Reports over the next 12 months.

That is, once you have expressed interest by contacting me at 
pete74730@yahoo.com.au 
I'll email an invoice to you. Once paid and using your email address I'll email you a Special Report on the 15th of each month. The first Report will be sent on July 15, 2021 with the final Report sent on June 15, 2022.

Enough donations will keep Submarine Matters going.

Regards

Pete

Numbers of Submarines Way Overrated

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The article "Could America's Submarine Fleet be Surpassed by China?" by ANKUR KUNDU , for the Maritime Executive, overrates sheer numbers until the last paragraph.

But even when Ankur at last points out "But numbers aren’t the whole story." Ankur underrates a whole range of factors, including geography and non-submarine based ASW platforms, that give the USN a huge advantage over all other countries (eg. China, Russia, North Korea, India and US allies) that have a substantial number of submarines.

I'll publish a couple of articles on Monday and Tuesday on this topic.
--------------------------------

After receiving many emails I’ve decided to keep Submarine Matters a public free-view site for all. But I’m encouraging a donation of just A$50 (currently equivalent to US$38) from readers who wish to receive 12 Special Reports over the next 12 months.

That is, once you have expressed interest in another email to me I'll email an invoice to you. Once paid and using your email address I'll email you a Special Report on the 15th of each month. The first Report will be sent on July 15, 2021 with the final Report sent on June 15, 2022.

Enough donations will keep Submarine Matters going. 

I would be grateful if you could donate.

Have a good weekend.

Pete

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