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Australian Nuclear Submarine Option - Virginia SSNs

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Largest diagram of Virginia SSN. Click to expand. Note the 12 vertical launch tubes near the bow will be replaced with Virginia Payload Tubes (VPT) at the mid-section for various uses (28 missiles, divers, autonomous underwater vehicles  (AUVs). Also see huge diagram.
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PETE'S COMMENT

If Australia is considering paying $2 to 3 Billion per Soryu and per 4,000 ton (surfaced) competitors then Virginia (nuclear propelled attack submarines) SSNs should also be an option.

However I think the political considerations make SSNs a remote buy. There would need to be a major threat, amounting to a strategic need, for SSNs. Domestic opposition is, at present, too great. There is too much opposition at the political left and even the center in Australia. 

When the US raised in February 2012 selling or leasing Virgina SSNs to Australia Australian concerns may have also been:

- the complete infrastructure and basing costs and issues seemed too expensive financially and politically. For example any nuclear submarine facilities could be nowhere near the current Fleet Base East which is in Sydney. Public opposition and separation safety standards may have meant a whole new base would need to be built on Australia's east coast for temporary or emergency uses. 

- the degree of US sincerity that it was a real offer may not have convinced Australia. Australia would have had to rely on much US influence in placating Australia's neighbours.

-  the crew number requirements of a Virginia are daunting. Crew may be 115-135 or even around 250+ if there are alternating Blue-Gold crews (2 x 115 to 135). This means the Australian submarine service, as it is, would not have the money to pay, train and maintain such large crews. Decades of training in reactor maintenance and safety is required. SSNs mean an extra national effort would be needed - hence strategic would need to be major. 

Australia and the US would also be concerned about igniting a nuclear propelled arms race in the wider region (eg. from such nuclear knowledgeable countries as Japan and South Korea). There might also be increased acceleration in the current SSN building programs in India and China.

Australia's near neighbour Indonesia can also increasingly afford nuclear technology (with Indonesia's GDP now passing Australia's by some measures). So Australia didn't/doesn't not want an arms race so close to home.

Accepting Australia's current budgetary worries, but leaving some room for escalation to SSNs, my ideal Australian submarine buying plan would be a low-then-high mix:

- 6 medium size SSKs within next 10-15 years (each less than $1Billion). With crews of around 30 so at least 4 could be crewed at any one time.

- at some point in future, and based on strategic need, 4 Virginias (or the US follow-on SSN at that time).

SSNs have major advantages in less-or-no indiscretion time (fully submerged so cannot be seen by Chinese or Russian satellites), much more range, speed (great for the 3,000 km transit gap) and much greater operational availability.

In terms of possible threat - China is likely to be pragmatic over an Australian purchase of future (conventional) submarine even if that submarine is likely to be superior to any Chinese conventional submarine. China would recognize that such an Australian submarine will be a second rate submarine compared to China's increasing numbers of SSNs. China would be much more concerned if Australia bought superior submarines, that is SSNs from the US, UK or France.

The SSN option was raised by the US Ambassador to Australia in early 2012.

ARTICLE

To read the whole article see the Australian Financial Review (AFR) of February 22, 2012  http://www.afr.com/p/national/us_floats_nuclear_subs_option_uPMgRrev3KjNwBLfFxpdeO

"US floats nuclear subs option - 22 Feb 2012 [following written by John Kerin]




VIRGINIA CLASS AT A GLANCE

  • Type: Attack submarine
  • Cost: $2.5 billion
  • Displacement: 7900 metric tonnes (submerged)
  • Length: 240 metres
  • Beam: 10 metres
  • Propulsion: S9G reactor
  • Speed: 25+ knots (46km/h)
  • Range: unlimited
  • Crew: 135
  • Armament: 12 Tomahawk cruise missiles, 4 533mm torpedo tubes
  • Built: 2000 - present
  • Active: 8
  • Planned: 30
  • Ships in class include: Virginia, Texas, Hawaii, North Carolina, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Missouri, California, Mississippi, Minnesota, North Dakota, John Warner
The United States has indicated for the first time it would be willing to lease or sell a nuclear submarine to Australia in a move that will inflame tensions with China and force the Coalition to declare its policy on ­bolstering regional defence.
US Ambassador to Australia ­Jeffrey Bleich told The Australian Financial Review yesterday that whichever option Canberra pursued as a replacement for its Collins class submarines, Washington viewed ­Australia’s subs program as crucial to security in the Asia-Pacific region.
“Decisions about the design of the Australian submarine are up to Australia’s leaders, including whether they pursue diesel power or nuclear power,” Mr Bleich said. “Whatever they decide the US is willing to help.’’
His comments suggest the US would be open to discussing nuclear submarine technologies with Australia at a time of severe budget constraints here and in the US, despite Defence Minister Stephen Smith restating Labor’s opposition to any nuclear submarine purchase. But Australian sources maintain they have been told by opposition figures that Coalition leader Tony Abbott will consider the nuclear option if he wins an election due in 2013.
Opposition defence spokesman David Johnston has gone as far as saying the Coalition would support Labor if it sought to examine the nuclear submarine option. Neither Mr Abbott’s office nor Mr Johnston were prepared to comment on Mr Bleich’s intervention last night
But leading defence analysts, including former Liberal minister Peter Reith, have urged both sides of politics to consider nuclear subs.
A senior Defence source said ­Australia would probably be able to buy a 7500 tonne Virginia Class submarine for around $2.5 billion, but because it would come off a mature production line its price would reduce over time.
Labor has been considering the purchase of 12 conventional submarines to replace the Collins, with an Australian designed and built option costing up to $36 billion, or $3 billion each." 
To read the whole article see the Australian Financial Review  http://www.afr.com/p/national/us_floats_nuclear_subs_option_uPMgRrev3KjNwBLfFxpdeO

Australia's submarine selection controversy quiet - currently.

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Defence Minister Kevin Andrews successfully asserting himself. Graphics courtesy julian winter.
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Andrews finding it is better to publish strategy papers than respond to media scrums. Photo courtesy Adelaide Advertiser.
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The high level of controversy regarding Australia's future submarine selection has died down over  the past three weeks due to what I see as:

- Prime Minister Abbott's position is now less threatened. He has not needed to reiterate his "build in Japan" preference. Abbott has also withdrawn himself from other submarine comments and public appearances.
- the removal of Sweden's Saab-Kockums from the submarine competition. Saab's business model appeared to be very much "build in Australia" - a campaign Saab was understandably running in  Adelaide ship building circles. "Build in Australia" was facilitated by Saab having no functioning production line for new submarines in Sweden. This was/is in contrast with ongoing production lines at Sweden's competitors, Japan's MHI-KHI, Germany's TKMS-HDW and France's DCNS.
- perhaps the main debate reducer was new Defence Minister Kevin Andrews who has been assertive when he needs to be and has issued Strategic direction of the Future Submarine Program (see  below). Andrews basically told the media he, as Minister, did not need to answer all their questions and as Minister he could call it "competitive evaluation process".

The submarine controversy will of course resurface in acrimony but it is quiet at present. Submarine problems effecting relations with Japan will recur when Abbott's popularity in his Party and in public again slides. Doubts about Andrews may start again once the cost overruns and lateness of the Air War Destroyer and other defence embarrassments again hit the news.

In having years of experience in several ministries Andrews is much wedded to defining the strategy and policy environment of major policy initiatives and programs. Toward those objectives Andrews, very early on, decided to delegate the task of writing a major paper Strategic direction of the Future Submarine Program for publication. The task probably fell to the Australia Department of Defence, the Navy and probably the Expert Panel who are writing the Defence White Paper 2015. I added the latter point because the Strategic direction of the Future Submarine Program would need to be consistent with the Defence White Paper. I would guess that shortened public version of the Defence White Paper may be published around September 2015.

It has been a good move by Andrews to write down a Strategic direction of the Future Submarine Program. This avoids the need for many voices to issue fragmentary and conflicting statements to a press that feed on missteps and conflict. Strategic direction of the Future Submarine Program below was issued as a Minister for Defence Media Release. It is well worth reading in full - as ever part is highly significant to the $20+ Billion selection http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2015/02/20/minister-for-defence-strategic-direction-of-the-future-submarine-program/ :

"Minister for Defence – Strategic direction of the Future Submarine Program

Today the Government announces the acquisition strategy for the Future Submarine Program. This announcement sets out further details of the competitive evaluation process that will be undertaken by the Department of Defence.

Submarines are an essential component of Australia’s naval capability and the Government will ensure that the future submarine provides the best possible capability and value for money for Australian taxpayers while maximising the involvement of Australian industry.

Submarines are the most complex, sensitive and expensive Defence capability acquisition a Government can make.

Australia’s national security and $1.6 trillion economy depend on secure sea lanes. We need the best possible submarine to protect our trade and support our maritime security.

It must be delivered in time to avoid a capability gap in the mid-2020s when the Collins Class submarine is scheduled to be retired from service. The decisions we make on the Future Submarine Program will determine what kind of capability we have to defend Australia and Australian interests into the 2040s and beyond.

The process outlined by the Government today provides a pathway for Australian industry to maximise its involvement in the program, whilst not compromising capability, cost, program schedule or risk.

The Government expects that significant work will be undertaken in Australia during the build phase of the future submarine including combat system integration, design assurance and land based testing. This will result in the creation at least 500 new high-skill jobs in Australia, the majority of which will be based in South Australia.

The Future Submarine Program is the largest Defence procurement program in Australia’s history and represents an investment in the order of $50 billion in Australia’s security. These costs will be subject to refinement through the competitive evaluation process. A significant proportion of this investment will be spent in Australia during the lifetime of the future submarine.

Successive governments have used various kinds of competitive evaluation processes for major Defence capability procurements.

As part of this competitive evaluation process, the Department of Defence will seek proposals from potential partners for:
a) Pre-concept designs based on meeting Australian capability criteria;
b) Options for design and build overseas, in Australia, and/or a hybrid approach;
c) Rough order of magnitude (ROM) costs and schedule for each option; and
d) Positions on key commercial issues, for example intellectual property rights and the ability to use and disclose technical data.

In addition to this – and on the advice of Defence – the Government has endorsed a set of key strategic requirements for our future submarines:
a) Range and endurance similar to the Collins Class submarine;
b) Sensor performance and stealth characteristics that are superior to the Collins Class submarine; and
c) The combat system and heavyweight torpedo jointly developed between the United States and Australia as the preferred combat system and main armament.

Defence advises that for Australian industry to have the best opportunity to maximise their involvement in the Future Submarine Program, it needs to work with an international partner.
Based on work completed by Defence, France, Germany, and Japan have emerged as potential international partners. All three countries have proven submarine design and build capabilities and are currently producing submarines.

France, Germany and Japan will be invited to participate in this competitive evaluation process that will assess their ability to partner with Australia to develop a Future Submarine that meets our capability requirements.

The Department of Defence will invite potential international partners to seek opportunities for Australian industry participation in the Future Submarine Program.

The competitive evaluation process will help the Government balance important considerations including capability, cost, schedule, and risk. Interoperability with our alliance partner, the United States, will also be a fundamental consideration.

The competitive evaluation process will take around ten months, after which an international partner will be selected for Australia’s Future Submarine Program. Further details about Australian industry involvement are also expected to be known at that point.

The competitive evaluation process will ensure that capability, cost, schedule, and key strategic considerations, along with Australian industry involvement, are carefully and methodically considered, and avoid unnecessary delays to the Future Submarine Program.

The Department of Defence will soon be holding industry briefings to inform Australian industry about the process and how they can engage with potential international partners.

An expert advisory panel will also be appointed to oversee the competitive evaluation process. Further details about this will be announced once individual appointments are confirmed." ENDS

Pete

Abbott's February 2015 Submarine Promise Juggling Again Controversial

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Australian Prime Minister Abbott's juggling of promises on the new submarine selection has again become controversial. Most of this controversy is old however what is new is:

- the lack of communication and joint decision-making between Abbott and his Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop (and presumably with her Department (DFAT)).

- that the Australian "Cabinet's top secret National Security Committee (NSC) met in October [2014] and supported a move that would allow the bulk of Australia's submarine fleet to be built offshore."

Abbott has made two conflicting promises:  :

1.  in 2013 - mid 2014 to South Australia that 12 new submarines would be built in South Australia, and

2. Abbott's request-promise in mid 2014 with Japanese Prime Minister Abe that Australia wishes to buy 6-12 new submarines from Japan (and built in Japan).

When Abbott's position as Prime Minister is threatened (as in February 2015) he quickly needs to juggle Promises 1 and 2. This juggling may occur again.

On March 16, 2015 Australia's ABC aired a 4 Corners program called "House of Cards" (video and transcript here) that recalled Abbott's juggling of Promises 1 and 2. See shorter report of ABC program (below). This juggling occurred on February 8-10, 2015 when Abbott told Liberal-National Party Coalition politicians that he would allow ASC to participate in an "open tender". This appeared to be a decision moving in the direction of Promise 1, as it would make it possible for Germany, France and Sweden to win and then "build in Australia".

By February 10, 2015 Abbott had apparently forgotten the "open tender"promise and had replaced it (or returned it) to "competitive evaluation proces" generally assumed to mean ASC could play a small part of "build in Japan". "Despite press speculation at the time, the [Australia's National Security Committee (NSC)] did not make any final decision to build the submarines in Japan." However it was assumed by many in the Federal Government and the South Australian Government that the build would occur in Japan (see article below).

This is a March 17, 2015 ABC article about the submarine issues that were brought to the surface in "House of Cards" (March 16, 2015http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-03-17/tony-abbott-changed-submarine-tender-policy-leadership-spill/6324620 : 


"Tony Abbott changed submarine tender policy overnight when faced with leadership spill

Prime Minister Tony Abbott took less than 24 hours to agree to re-examine the Government's policy on the $20 billion future submarine project, in an effort to shore up votes against a leadership spill last month.
The ABC's Four Corners program can reveal that Cabinet's top secret National Security Committee (NSC) met in October last year and supported a move that would allow the bulk of Australia's submarine fleet to be built offshore.
The sensitive decision was not announced at the time, although a press release had been drawn up for then defence minister David Johnston.
In February, the weekend before the spill motion, South Australian senator Sean Edwards told Mr Abbott his vote would depend on whether local shipbuilders, including the Australian Submarine Corporation [ASC], would be given the opportunity to participate in a tender for the contract.
"He rang me at 6.30 on Saturday night and I heard from him at ten past three the following Sunday, the next day," Senator Edwards told Four Corners.
"He said he'd had a discussion with the defence minister and they'd come to a position on this, which obviously I was seeking."

Policy change not discussed with Bishop

Mr Abbott did not raise the submarine discussions that weekend with Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, a spokeswoman for Ms Bishop told the program.
This was despite Ms Bishop being a member of the NSC.
Mr Abbott's agreement with Senator Edwards again revisited the previous outcome of the October NSC meeting, which had broken an election promise to construct the submarines in South Australia.
Details of the highly confidential October [2014] NSC meeting were based on accounts from sources closely involved in the submarine project.
Despite press speculation at the time, the NSC did not make any final decision to build the submarines in Japan.
However, it did decide to open the way for their construction overseas because of time and cost constraints.
South Australia's Minister for Defence Industries, Martin Hamilton-Smith, told [ABC's 4 Corners] his State Government "kept receiving feedback ... that the Japan option was very much the option".
"In fact, I was told we may as well give up," Mr Hamilton-Smith said.
Following the leadership spill, Mr Abbott reconvened the NSC and Defence Minister Kevin Andrews announced on February 20 that the Future Submarines Project would involve a "competitive evaluation process".
Under that process, the Minister said the Defence Department would seek proposals from partners that included "options for design and build" of the submarines "overseas, in Australia and/or a hybrid approach" ENDS
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COMMENT
In my article of September 8, 2014"Australia's Future Sub Likely to be Japan's Soryu, outsider is Germany" I indicated that it was likely Abbott had decided on buying Soryus built in Japan. I felt then and feel now that a foreign build is advisable. In that article I also raised some risks of Australia being Japan's first major defence customer as well as the Soryu's short range compared to what Australia wants.
The US may have put pressure on Japan and Australia to rush a Soryu deal but many details and issues (including substantial Australian participation) need to be ironed out first.   
Pete

Sweden announces pending order for two A26 submarines

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Japan, France and Germany are the last three contenders for Australia's future submarine (SEA 1000) competion. The specifications of Swedens A26 (above) have not been made public - are the figures above accurate? (Diagram courtesy The Australian)
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COMMENT

Good news from Sweden of (pending) production orders for two A26 middle size (?) conventional submarines for Sweden’s submarine assembly line. Australia-Sweden submarine relations have been under strain over the last few weeks due to another of Abbott’s statements – this time on his view of the modernity of Swedish submarines. This was in the context of the removal of Sweden's Saab-Kockums from Australia’s submarine competition in February 2015.

Swedish made submarines are not at all out of date. What may have concerned the Australian government more was Saab's (perhaps too strongly) politically insistent campaign alongside South Australian interests for "build in Australia". This may have been understandably prompted by Sweden's deep experience of building the Collins in Australia. Whatever the merits of the Collins build the Collins experience causes caution in politicians. Politicians, most of the public and fair-minded people are almost all outside of the professional inner circle and other interested parties who see/saw virtually no problems with the Collins build.

Under the, perhaps already decided "one horse race" called the “competitive evaluation process” DCNS’s position is not secure either. If Japan dropped out, for whatever reasons and/or the Australian Coalition Government fell, the possibility of returning Sweden to the selection process migh be more favourable.  

Anyway Sweden has made a positive announcement below, which should reassure potential customers that Saab-Kockums are a going submarine concern. I’m wondering whether there will be further announcements on 2 to 3 additional A26s for a total of 4 or 5 A26s to replace the 5  submarines currently in Sweden's submarine service ("flotilla"). An added concern is the emerging Russian threat in the Baltic Sea. Sweden might also wish to build 2 to 4 replacement submarines for the Netherlands. In that regard please connect with http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2015/02/sweden-and-netherlands-replacement.html of February 19, 2015.

ARTICLE

Marine Technology News, March 18, 2015 reports http://www.marinetechnologynews.com/news/sweden-orders-submarines-510865 :

"Sweden Orders New Submarines

By Aiswarya Lakshmi [and Saab, Peter Hultqvist, Sweden?]

Sweden is to buy two new submarines from constructors Saab Kockums. The A26 subs are to be delivered by 2022 and will cost up to SEK 8.2 billion ($945 million).

"This is the biggest single decision when it comes to economic investments that we will make during this parliament. The decision, to be formally made by the cabinet on Thursday, is to ensure Swedish submarine capability past 2030", stated Defence Minister Peter Hultqvist.

"These are the next generation of submarine. These submarines will be very hi-tech", he added.

The government will on Thursday authorize the armed forces to order two submarines, defense ministry spokeswoman Marinette Nyh Radebo said.

The Swedish government is increasing its defense spending over the coming years, citing a worsening security situation, particularly Russian activity in and around the Baltic Sea.

Defence and security company Saab welcomes the Swedish Minister of Defence, Peter Hultqvist’s, announcement to invest in two submarines of the next generation, A26.

[Acquistions are a multi-stage process, hence not finally signed yet.]

Saab has not received any order on production of the new submarine but Saab looks forward to the discussions, which will lead to an agreement and order for A26. This will be a part of an earlier signed Letter of Intent. 

Saab and FMV (The Swedish Defence Material Administration) signed a Letter of Intent in June 2014 regarding the Swedish Armed Forces’ underwater capability for the period 2015-2024. The Letter of Intent comprises support, development, design and production of submarines and other underwater systems, corresponding to potential orders of approximately SEK 11.2 billion [US$1.3 Billion], provided that necessary decisions are made." ENDS

Pete

Suspected Russian submarine snagging a Scottish trawler net

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The "Butt of Lewis" Lewis Point, Outer Hebrides, Scotland at the top of the map. The "Butt"/Point is  the closest point where a suspected encounter with a Russian submarine occurred. On the right is the UK (Scottish) mainland.
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Faslane Naval Base is in Gare Loch. A Russian submarine may regularly stay on station around 50km or more out to sea.
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Several UK media outlets have carried a mid-March 2015 report that a submarine snagged on a large net almost dragged a UK (Scottish) trawler under. The reported encounter occurred near the "Butt of Lewis" Lewis Point, Outer Hebrides, Scotland. 

If it was a Russian submarine it was probably a Russian attack submarine (Kilo SSK or Akula SSN) submarine from the Russian Northern or Baltic Fleets. Russian SSBNs would steer clear of northern Scotland where the encounter occurred.

One of the Russian Kilos or Akulas submarines was probably travelling to or from its regular surveillance area where UK (and perhaps US) submarines enter and leave the Faslane Naval Base (HMNB Clyde) 40 km northwest of Glasgow, Scotland. The Russian submarines would ideally wish to follow UK/US submarines leaving Faslane and also intercept UK telecommunications.

Submarine-Trawler Incidents Have a Long History

The revelation of a possible Russian submarine encounter follows more than 100 years of submarines accidentally damaging or wrecking trawlers through net snags and also collisions.

In 2005 the Guardian reported: "Large submarines have also been caught in fishing nets, but usually, the trawlers come off worse. In 1990, four fishermen died when their trawler was dragged under by a British submarine on a training exercise off the west coast of Scotland. A few weeks later, an American submarine ploughed into the nets of a trawler from Northern Ireland, making the vessel heave before ripping the net from its winches."

Submarine collisions destroying small ships also occur. In February 2001, while conducting an emergency main ballast tank blow off the coast of Oahu USS Greeneville struck and sank the 191-foot (58 m) Japanese fishery high school training ship Ehime Maru.

Pete

MHI and KHI not at Australia's Future Submarine Summit, Adelaide, March 24-26, 2015

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Australia's Future Submarine Summit is being held in Adelaide, South Australia on March 24-26, 2015. There are many Australian politicians, military officers and officials due to speak as well as foreign industry representatives.  

The content carried in an article of March 22, 2015 from the Reuters Tokyo office has been reproduced in the Australia media. The Reuters article reported: “Theno-show by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries [MHI] and Kawasaki Heavy Industries [KHI] at an event called Australia's Future Submarine Summit, held amid intensifying competition for the deal, exposes a potential weak link in Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's more muscular security agenda: Japan Inc.”

It is significant that two retired Japanese Vice Admirals, Masao Kobayashi and Yoji Koda (details of each below) are attending the Summit and are due to speak on March 26, 2015 - both are advisers to Japan's National Security Council. Some Australian newspapers (such as the Herald Sun drawing on The Adelaide Advertiser) did mention the Japanese Admiral’s attending. 

Perhaps officers from the Japanese Consulate, Adelaide and Japanese Embassy, Australia will also attend? The presence of the retired Japanese admirals who still advise the Japanese Government clearly indicates that Japanese bilateral relationship-alliance with Australia is Japan’s main submarine sale strength. Japan's approach at present seems to rely less on commercial approaches given the absence of MHI and KHI. This is in contrast to France and Germany’s more commercial approach – though German government representatives will also be present in Adelaide.

BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS OF THE RETIRED JAPANESE ADMIRALS


 Vice Admiral Masao KOBAYASHI, JMSDF (Retd) photo (above) courtesy Sub Summit

Maseo is now an adviser to Japan's National Security CouncilBiodata: "Masao graduated from the Japanese Defense Academy in 1973 and commenced a career in the JMSDF submarine service. He had held many posts in the submarine force. Shore billets included Submarine Branch Head in the Ship Systems Section in the Maritime Staff Office and Operations Officer in the Fleet Submarine Force. He has commanded TAKASHIO SS-571, (Uzushio class), and has been the Commander of Submarine Division Two. In 2001/2 he was the Commander of Submarine Flotilla One, and was Coordinator of Exercise at sea for Pacific Reach 2002. Masao’s last post was as Commander of the Fleet Submarine Force. He retired from the MSDF in 2009. Vice Admiral KOBAYASHI served with distinction in the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and is well regarded as an authourity in the submariner community." See Kobayashi's comments on submarines to the Japanese press - reported January 18, 2015.
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Vice Admiral Yoji KODA, JMSDF (Retd) - photo (above) courtesy Sub Summit

Yoji is Maseo is also an adviser to Japan's National Security Council. Biodata:"Yoji is a graduate of the Japanese Defense Academy in 1972, the JMSDF Staff College, and the US Naval War College. As a Surface Warfare Officer, he has commanded JS SAWAYUKI (DD-125), Flotilla Three and Fleet Escort Force at sea. Yoji’s shore duties include tours as Director General (DG) for Plans and Operations, Maritime Staff and Director-General of the Joint Staff. He retired from the JMSDF as Commander in Chief, Self-Defense Fleet, in 2008. Following retirement from active duty, he was invited to join the Asia-Center, Harvard University as a research fellow researching the US-Japan Alliance and the Chinese Navy during 2009/11. Yoji is a prolific writer on maritime and strategic subjects in both Japanese and English, and his most recent articles include “A new Carrier Race [large PDF file]” and “The Russo-Japanese War” published by the US Naval War College. He contributed to “Refighting the Pacific War (an Alternative History of World War II)” published by the US Naval Institute in 2011. He is currently an advisor to National Security Agency. Vice Admiral Koda served with distinction in the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and his body of academic subject matter speaks for itself."

Pete

Thailand may be next to purchase submarines

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What appears to be a commissioning ceremony for two of Thailand's Matchanu class submarine in 1938. They were 370 tons surfaced.
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Model of a Matchanu class submarine. Submarines, up to 1945, carried many objects on the hull and often had upturned bows - all leading to slow submerged speeds.
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Japan sold four Matchanu class submarines to Thailand in 1938, but Thailand closed down its submarine service in 1951, perhaps due to lack of use, cost and defeated Japan's inability to sustain those submarines.

In recent years Thailand has been evaluating several small-medium submarine types with a view to restarting a submarine service. Thailand has several reasons for this evaluation, including the growth and modernisation of navies surrounding Thailand. Nearby countries have developed submarine services, including India, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam and China. 

Bangladesh recently ordering two submarines from China and possible Burmese interest in Chinese submarines provide additional reasons for Thailand to buy submarines. Submarines provide a potent asymmetric defensive weapon for countries with small navies. Submarines also contribute to a country's and its Navy's prestige. The Royal Thai Navy has apparently established a submarine squadron at Sattahip naval base which has  a German-made Rheinmetall submarine simulator, staffed by RTN officers who have received submarine training in Germany, as well as South Korea, over the past two years.

Most submarine building countries have offered to sell two or three submarines to Thailand, including:

- France-DCNS (small version of the Scorpene?)

- South Korea-DSME (Chang Bogo class, Type 209 derivative) or alternatively the unbuilt "HDS-500RTN" based on the unbuilt "KSS-500A" (510 tons, crew of 10) which is in-turn a descendant of Germany's HDW Type 207 (Kobben) small defensive submarines.

- China - the "S-26T" which may be a small version of China's Yuan class or used Ming class?

- Germany-TKMS-HDW Type 209/1400mod and also the Type 210mod 
  
Russia's improved Kilo class (Project 636)

- Sweden? (mysteriously silent). Perhaps two further refitted Sodermanland class? (currently Sweden's HMS Södermanland and HMS Östergötland).

COMMENT

Thailand has been hesitant in acquiring submarines possibly seeking leases, used subs or good credit terms. This is in a business environment where the Thai economy is growing more slowly than anticipated

Thailand appears to be seeking smaller than standard submarines. If used submarines are considered the remaining German built Type 207s and Chinese Ming class are likely to be obsolete and rusty as they have long passed their 30 year use-buy dates. Design and construction of modern 500 ton submarines are likely to be expensive as they are smaller than standard - requiring higher than usual design costs for low production numbers. As Thailand has had no submarines for more than 60 years there is no easy answer to what Thailand needs - no simple replacement program. The German simulator may increase the chances that Germany or South Korea (using German designs) might eventually win any Thai order. 

I'm wondering about the silence on Sweden. With Sweden's recently announced pre-order of two A26s this may free-up Sweden's two Sodermanland class (currently Sweden's HMS Södermanland and HMS Östergötland) for further refitting and sale to Thailand. This is noting there is a historical precedent where Sweden effectively created Singapore's submarine service using 4 Challenger class (refitted Swedish) submarines. 


The question "what does Thailand want?" remains. Thailand may need small submarines for shallow, littoral waters in the Gulf of Thailand and Andaman Sea yet Thailand may also need medium sized submarines for longer range/endurance. Subs with AIP may be on Thailand's list of needs.

SOURCES 

Documents for Competitive Evaluation Process sent to (Likely) Bidders

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Rear Admiral Gregory John Sammut, Head of the Future Submarine Project with long experience as a submariner and other positions.
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Mr Harry Dunstall, Acting CEO, DMO (Defence Material Organisation). Only a thumbnail photo available.
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Australia'sFuture Submarine Summit (“Sub Summit”) Adelaide, South Australia, March 24-26, 2015 is just finishing. Many Australian politicians, military officers, officials and some lucky journalists took part as well as foreign industry representatives and foreign naval officers.

Yesterday (March 25) much logical procedural information for the competitive evaluation process was reported in the media.These details are in several news items but mainly the following http://www.news.com.au/national/politics/government-advisory-panel-to-overseas-future-submarine-project/story-fns0jze1-1227278674311:

Defence Minister Kevin Andrews reaffirmed that the competitive evaluation process would continue. Andrews said that Opposition Leader Bill Shorten’s [of the ALP “Labor Party”] alternate policy of a Tender (that also included Sweden) would not be adopted. Significantly Shorten promised he would honour any submarine contracts signed by the Abbott Government.

Andrews said the Abbott government will appoint an expert advisory panel to ensure accountability for the first phase of the future submarine project. That "The panel will oversee the “competitive evaluation process” between companies from Germany and France and the Government of Japan. Industry representatives questioned the move and many wondered how the evaluation process could possibly be fair when Japan was being dealt with on a government-to-government basis while the German and French builders were on a commercial level."

“It looks to me like the decision might already have been made,” said one CEO who asked to remain anonymous. “This whole process clearly favours Japan.”

Acting CEO of DMO, Harry Dunstall, said the project…would include maximum Australian industry involvement regardless of where the vessels were built. There are three build options on the table, an overseas build, an Australian build or a hybrid build between Australia and an overseas yard.

Mr Dunstall said potential build partners would submit pre-concept plans by November 2015with a decision to be made by government in early 2016.

[Another source advised “Harry Dunstall, …told the conference that after the bidding contracts had been signed, there would be an eight-month period during which the companies would prepare their preliminary design proposal and present it to the government for consideration. [Question - Is that an additional stage of the process?]

Dunstall said Australia would insist on full access to all technical and intellectual propertydetails related to the project for the life of the boats.

And firms would be banned from entering exclusive teaming arrangements with the bidders before a contract was signed.

“All potential international partners are to be treated fairly,” Mr Dunstall said. “We want industry to be available to work with any international partner that we choose.”

Rear Admiral Greg Sammut, Head of the Future Submarine Project said key attributes for an Australian submarine were;
-          range (how far they could travel)
-          endurance (how long they could stay there)
-          payload [Question - presumably this may not only include weapons but UUVs and Seal Delivery Vehicles?]
-          stealth and
-          sensors.

Separately Germany’s TKMS reported that they just received the:
-          draft contract
-          statement of work
-          data descriptions which tell us what we need to do, and
-          functional performance specifications (sent through classified channels)

Presumably Japan and France's DCNS received this documentation at the same time?

“Submarines must be capable of offensive operations … to strike the key capabilities of an adversary before they can be brought to bear against our interests,” Rear Admiral Sammut said.

He said the future submarine had to be affordable and delivered on schedule and in a fit state for the operators and he issued a warning about “over optimistic” delivery schedule.

Please link with Submarine Matters' article of March 24, 2015 MHI and KHI not at Australia's Future Submarine Summit, Adelaide, March 24-26, 2015

Pete

Concern competitive evaluation process Clearly Favours Japan

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It is difficult to find a photograph of Australian Defence Minister, Kevin Andrews letting himself be filmed with a submarine. Here's the next best thing - reflections of what looks to be a submarine in Andrew's binoculars (Photo courtesy thevine.com).
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The following are the portions of a speech most relevant to submarines made by Australian Defence Minister, Kevin Andrews on March 25, 2015 at 

COMMENT

The Andrews speech and other statements made by Australian government officers and officials at the Summit appeared to confirm a growing belief the evaluation process may not be truly competitive. This is due to what appears to be an unequal match between the official competitors, which are:

- the Government of Japan (including Prime Minister Abe and the Japanese Ministry of Defence (JMD) in part drawing advice from MHI and KHI). Significantly Japan is backed by overt US Government support *

versus 

- only companies: TKMS from Germany and DCNS from France. 

European company representatives at the Summit questioned this mismatch and many wondered how the evaluation process could possibly be fair when Japan was being dealt with on a government-to-government basis while the German and French builders were on a commercial level. “It looks to me like the decision might already have been made,” said one CEO who asked to remain anonymous. “This whole process clearly favours Japan.”

* US Support for Japan's Bid

The Japan Times reported: "Vice Adm. Robert Thomas, commander of the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet, reportedly said Oct. 24 [2014]  in Tokyo that then-Australian Defense Minister David Johnston was very interested in Japan’s Soryu-class subs.
“I talked to him about it four years ago and I said: ‘You want to find the finest diesel-electric submarine made on the planet — it’s made at Kobe works in Japan,’ Thomas was quoted as saying by Bloomberg News."

PORTIONS OF SPEECH

Minister for Defence – Speech – RUSI Submarine Summit – 25 March 2015

Submarines are the most complicated, sensitive and expensive Defence capability acquisition a Government can make in meeting that responsibility.
An effective submarine capability plays a critical role in Australia’s defence in conjunction with all Australian Defence Force elements.
I have previously stated – as a Government and as a nation, we have one chance to get this decision right.
Because of the previous government’s refusal for 6 years to make a decision on the replacement for the Collins class submarines, we had a looming security and capability gap arriving in about ten years.
The process that I recently announced is the best way forward to ensure that such a gap will not occur, simultaneously delivering the best possible capability to the ADF and value for money to Australian taxpayers.
Geographically we are an island continent, the world’s sixth largest country by area. This unique geography means we have special requirements for Australia’s future submarines.
Australia’s national security and our $1.6 trillion dollar economy rely on the unencumbered use of the sea.
Seventy per cent of Australia’s exported goods and services, by value, travel by sea, an export trade worth more than $220 billion in 2012-13. We are a maritime nation and we need maritime security.
By 2030, half of the world’s submarines will be in Australia’s broader strategic region. The Indo-Pacific region has some of the fastest growing economies in the world and the demand for defence technology to safeguard the region’s prosperity and security is ever increasing.
The future submarine programme represent a $50 billion investment in Australia’s safety and security – the largest Defence procurement in Australia’s history – with up to two thirds of this investment being spent in Australia during the lifetime of the future submarine.
To the average Australian taxpayer this may seem to be a huge price to be paid for a capability that may never be used in anger.
But that cost also needs to be measured against the major investment that would need to be made by any adversary to counter the effect of our submarines.
The complexity of Australia’s strategic environment means our defence planning has to cater for a range of possible contingencies, but particularly focussed on maintaining stability in our region and ensuring that conflict doesn’t have the chance to start. So submarines remain a logical and necessary investment in Australia’s wider defence capability.
And for this reason, Australia’s future submarine must give us a significant capability edge in our region as well as meet our needs in respect of geography and strategic outlook.
We need submarines capable of operations at long range over extended periods because they defend our interests far from our shores. The range and endurance must be similar to that of the Collins class submarine.
They are an essential part of our national security capability.
Another key strategic requirement for our Future Submarines includes sensor performance and characteristics that are superior to that of the Collins class submarine.
We need the sovereign ability to maintain the future submarine over coming decades, including repairs, modifications and certifying it as safe for use.
AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRY INVOLVEMENT
Now I acknowledge that – in recent times – there has been some anxiety about the future submarine programme.
This is why I announced the acquisition strategy in February – to provide a pathway for Australian industry to maximise its involvement in the program, whilst not compromising capability, cost, program schedule or risk.
The Government supports local industry and recognises how valuable it is to our nation. As Minister for Defence, I want to see a sustainable and viable industry better able to support Defence.
In 2014-15 financial year, Defence expects to spend $6.2 billion on equipment acquisition and support in Australia.
This equates to around 53 per cent of the military equipment acquisition and support expenditure this year, and is consistent with long-term averages of between 50 and 55 per cent being spent in Australia.
The Government does support local Defence industry.
When it comes to making decisions on Defence capability, the needs of the Australian Defence Force will – must – always come first.
The Government will acquire Defence capability that supports ADF requirements first and Australian industry can play a very significant role in this process.
Our sailors, soldiers or airmen and women need the right equipment and industry needs to demonstrate that they are world leaders, producing the best product at the best price.
SUBMARINES AND DEFENCE INDUSTRY
When it comes to Future Submarines, Australian industry will play an important role in delivering the best possible equipment at the best value for money.  
There will be many new high-skill jobs in Australia for the life of the Submarine program, decades into the future.
Significant work will be undertaken in Australia during the build phase. At a minimum, this includes combat system integration, design assurance and land-based testing.
There will be significant opportunities arising from the support and maintenance of the submarine for decades. In dollar terms, this often accounts for two-thirds of the investment.
All three potential international partners will require significant redesign work to be undertaken on their existing submarines. There are opportunities here for Australia.  
I want to make it clear – that maintenance can occur in Australia, even if there is an overseas build. The important consideration, and a lesson from Collins, is to ensure that maintenance and knowledge transfer are planned from the early stages of design.
As I mentioned previously, this is a busy time for Defence acquisition – and there are many exciting opportunities ahead for industry.  
Here in South Australia alone – over the next four years – subject to the outcomes of the Defence White Paper – there will be up to $4.4 billion in Defence spending for building and sustaining Defence materiel.
PROGRAMME OF ENGAGEMENT WITH DEFENCE INDUSTRY
As the competitive evaluation for the Future Submarine proceeds, Defence is engaging with a number of key industry representatives.
This includes engaging with Austrade and the Department of Industry and Science, along with engagement with State Governments, the Australian Industry Group, the Australian Industry Defence Network and the Australian Business Defence Industry Unit.
Here, in South Australia, Defence is consulting with Defence SA, the Defence Teaming Centre and, of course, ASC and other companies.
Importantly, the potential international partners that will deliver Australia’s Future Submarine fleet need to understand Australian industry’s capabilities and skill sets.
During a meeting yesterday between Defence and Department of Industry officials, State Government representatives, and defence industry groups, there was agreement to the SEA 1000 Industrial Engagement Strategy.  This included the formation of the State and Industry Association Consultative Group, comprising all attendees.
The SEA 1000 Industrial Engagement Strategy involves the members of this group working together with the common aim of providing competitive Australian companies with meaningful opportunities to demonstrate their capabilities and skills to international partners.
The strategy includes bimonthly meetings to monitor progress against planned activities that include preparation sessions for Australian industry, the development of company profiles to be provided to international partners, a schedule of interactions between the partners and state-based organisations, and visits by the partners to states across Australia to meet with company representatives and visit facilities.
These activities will commence in early April with briefings to major companies operating in Australia, and progress throughout the remainder of the year. 
The engagements between international partners and industry will be scheduled to complement the development their pre-concept designs, allowing timely judgments of how to best involve Australian capabilities and skills in their proposals.
Importantly, there is agreement on the need for a coordinated and consultative approach to the engagement, which offers international partners full visibility of how Australian industry can support the project and maximise Australian industrial involvement
INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS
As the Government has announced, France, Germany and Japan have emerged as potential international partners. All three countries have proven submarine design and build capabilities and are producing submarines.
The competitive evaluation process will ensure that capability, cost, schedule and key strategic considerations, along with Australian industry involvement, are carefully and methodically considered, and avoid unnecessary delays to Australia’s future Submarine program.
As part of the competitive evaluation, Defence will seek proposals from potential partners for:
  • Pre-concept designs based on meeting our capability criteria;
  • Options for design and build overseas, in Australia, and/or a hybrid approach;
  • Rough costs and schedule for each option; and
  • Positions on key commercial issues, for example intellectual property rights and the ability to use and disclose technical data.
The level of Australian industry involvement will be a fundamental consideration, as will interoperability with our alliance partner, the US.
The competitive evaluation will take at least ten months, after which time Defence will bring advice to Government for consideration.
The Government will continue to ensure that a careful, considered and methodical approach is taken in making decision on the future submarine.
The opportunity is now there for industry to engage with international partners and to demonstrate that maximum Australian involvement can deliver an affordable and quality submarine such that this vision can become a reality. 
EXPERT ADVISORY PANEL
As part of the Government’s commitment to a robust and transparent competitive evaluation, we will soon be announcing the appointments to an Expert Advisory Panel to oversee the competitive evaluation process.
This panel will oversee the conduct of the process, including ensuring its probity, managing any conflicts of interest, and ensuring that confidentiality is maintained in relation to all sensitive information received during the process.
This oversight will provide the Government and the public with confidence that the evaluation process not only is, but is seen to be, fair and defensible, and that the will robustly address all relevant factors, allowing Government to balance importance considerations, for acquisition and through life support, including capability, cost, schedule, and risk.
In closing, as you know, the first priority of government is the safety and security of its citizens.
As the newly appointed Defence Minister, I ask that we work together to bring this about." ENDS
Pete

Indian Defence Minister Visiting Japan Linking Soryu and Aircraft Issues?

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Indian Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar (Photo courtesy ZeeNews)
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Interesting report in the Japan Times, March 29, 2015 India interested in buying Japan's Soryu-class submarines :

This is just prior to Indian Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar visiting Japan including meeting with Defence Minister Nakatani.

COMMENT

Regarding "Parrikar noted that Japan had strict regulations on the export of defense technologies but that the rules are changing." in the article above. Japan should be well aware that India is close to Russia on high tech submarine issues. India has even financed Russian ship and submarine repairs/renovations. India is leasing a Russian Akula II class SSN (now INS Chakra - was Russian Nerpa). So future dangers might exist of Soryu materials, designs and specifications finding their way to Russia.

Japan might also wish to note India, like most great powers, plays hard-ball as a defence customer which sellers like France find difficult. India may already be playing hardball "Parrikar suggested that India is not likely to make a decision anytime soon on whether to purchase [ShinMaywa] US-2
 amphibious rescue aircraft used by the [Japanese] MSDF." This is noting that in 2014 there seemed to be assumptions (see footnotes 3 and 4 to Wikipedia article) in the press that the US-2 sale to India was a done deal.  

See more details of France's experience at Indian Possible Interest in Buying-Building Japan's Soryu Submarine - Australia, January 30, 2015 

Israeli Publicity concerning the Nuclear Capability of its Dolphin 2 Submarines

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The upper image is a Dolphin 2 - for size comparison and to indicate the fuel cell AIP additions. Lower submarine image highlights the high number of torpedo/missile tubes - apparently ten on the Dolphin 1s and 2s - useful for rapid nuclear missile launch. (Diagram courtesy Next Navy)
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Most probably very similar to the Russian-made P-800 Oniks, Yakhont , NATO reporting codename SS-N-26 "Strobile" is the Russian-India BrahMos (above) . The mach 2.8 end run makes Yakhont and BrahMos difficult to detect and shoot down in time. With a probable land attack capability and air-launched range longer than the notional 290km they will be a proliferating weapon to watch. (Diagram courtesy - Russian for "Military Parity" website).
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In terms of relevance to Australia the ability of Germany's TKMS-HDW to tailor-make largish Dolphin 2 (2,000+ ton (surfaced)) warm water, submarines for Israel implies a capability to successfully tailor-make future submarines for Australia.

In late March 2015 much of the Israeli media (eg. a haaretz article of March 30, 2015) seem to be carrying Israeli government generated news of technical progress with the ISS Tanin nuclear capable submarine. Tanin appears to be the most complete of Israel's Dolphin 2 class SSKs. It does not appear the Tanin is anywhere near formal commissioning - so why the publicity? 

The media reports substantially carry mention of the nuclear second strike capabilities of the Dolphins. This is a subject that requires Israeli Government permission to be published.

The reason to mention second strike appears to be Syrian government acquisition and possible deployment of Russian-made P-800 Yakhont, NATO reporting codename SS-N-26 "Strobile" - a supersonic cruise missiles. What has Israel worried is not so much the usual anti-shipping role but more the Yakhont's land attack capability. 

With Syria's record of using Sarin gas on crude warheads against civilians Israel's worry about the Oniks would be considerable. Syrian use of radiological warheads might also be feasible and of course high explosive. The chances of Sunni rebels or Sunni governments acquiring Yakhonts adds an extra worry. See my May 21, 2013 article on Israeli airstrikes on Syria.

Media stories on Israeli second strike would of course have a "put pressure on Iran" intent as well.

In an added twist India and Russia are jointly developing the BrahMos version of the Yakhont. India wishes to market BrahMos to several countries in the Asia-Pacific. Meanwhile Russia has already supplied the Yakhont in Australia's region to Indonesia and Vietnam

Please link with Submarine Matters'Israeli Dolphin Sub, Nuclear Armed, Conventionally Propelled, February 25, 2012 which mentions possible Israeli developed nuclear warheads on submarine launched Harpoon missiles (SLCMs). Israel's current nuclear SLCM may be the socalled Popeye Turbo or perhaps an Israeli version of the (jointly developed?) Indian K-15 small ballistic missile. The Dolphin 1s and 2's extraordinarily high number of ten torpedo tubes (including 4 unusually large 650mm tubes) implies the ability to rapidly launch ten nuclear land attack missiles. 

The sequence of the Dolphin 2s being delivered by Germany then modified/completed in Israel (Haifa) is a bit puzzling. Based on "Boats" but updated:

Dolphin 1 class
  • Dolphin – delivered May 1998 – commissioned 1999
  • Leviathan (trans. "Leviathan" or "whale") – delivered 1999 – commissioned 2000
  • Tekumah (trans. "Revival") – delivered 2000 – commissioned 2000
AIP Dolphin 2 class
  • Tanin (trans. "Tannin" or "Crocodile") – delivered 23 Sept 2014 - enter service 2015, commisioning 2015 or 2016?
  • Rahav (trans. "Splendour") – delivered 29 April 2013 - enter service in 2015 or 2016?
  • Name not assigned yet. Ordered 21 March 2012. Enter service in 2017 or 2018?

Tanin was apparently received months after Rahav yet Rahav will be completed later. 

Much of the Israeli modification/completion would be for the electronics and loading fitout for the nuclear missiles. Publicity about Germany in 2012 being overly knowledgable and helpful to Israel regarding the nuclear missile loading fitout must have resulted in Israel taking over that whole job. Perhaps Israel's procedures are not fully developed - hence the Tanin-Rahav completion anomaly.

Pete

Australia Narrows the Future Submarine Bidders to Japan, Germany and France.

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On Friday 20, 2015 the Australian Governments decided to select:

- the Government of Japan (effectively including Japanese Ministry of Defence (JMD), MHI and KHI)

- TKMS from Germany, and

- DCNS from France

Sweden was effectively excluded by not being mentioned. The Government stressed that weight was given to the bidders actually building submarines now.

The best succinct mainstream media article, on February 20, 2015, was probably http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-02-20/japan-france-germany-to-compete-for-submarine-build/6159834

The longest article is http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/at-least-500-jobs-to-come-from-submarine-project-but-no-guarantee-of-local-construction-20150220-13k5c0.htmlwith more on South Australia’s expected negative reaction

For the leadup to the Friday 20, 2015 decision see http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2015/02/open-tender-versus-competitive.html particularly about the main Australian workforce involvement being the integration of the US-Australian evolved AN/BYG-1 combat system.

As things stand I would say the Australian Government's favourites are Japan, Germany and France - in that order.

Pete

Latest on India's Aircraft Carrier Projects

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India's old and new aircraft carriers. Image courtesy of The Times of India, February 23, 2015
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INS Vikrant "2" on launch November 2014. Photo courtesy.
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India is gradually expanding its carrier force. India may have 2 carriers by 2019. Whether both will be fully commisioned then is a question mark. Basically India may be maintaining parity with China's slowly emerging carrier capability. Major  commissioned. 

Major milestones are:  

2016 - expected retirement of INS Viraat. It was acquired from UK 1987 – 28,000 tons displacement, 11 Sea Harriers.
2016 - INS Vikramadityarebuilt and handed over by Russia 2013. It will be India’s only commissioned carrier for 3 - 4 years after INS Viraat is decommissioned. 45,000 tons, 24 MiG-29Ks.
2019 - INS Vikrant "2" India’s first indigenous aircraft carrier (IAC-I), launched 2014, under construction 2016-17. Perhaps commissioned by 2019. 40,000 tons, 12 MiG-29Ks, 8 Tejas light combat aircraft (LCA). Construction of Vikrant has already been delayed by four years with repeated technical and budgetary issues. The "2" is sometimes informally used as Google searches simply for "INS Vikrant" often turn up the preceding INS Vikrant that was decommissioned in 1997.
2030 - INS Vishal(may be completed 2030) known as indigenous aircraft carrier-II (IAC-II), maybe nuclear propelled, 65,000 ton (displacement equal to China’s carrier Liaoning). May feature Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) being developed by the US for its new Ford class supercarriers. EMALs would allow full sized carrier aircraft, like the Super Hornet, to be launched. Vikramaditya’s and Vikrant’s ski-jumps only allow up to MiG-29 weight aircraft. If a successful design Vishal may be the first of class for 2 to 3 more 65,000 ton carriers (perhaps around 2035-2040) allowing Vikramaditya to retire.
India, like Russia, US, and even Australia often under-estimate the costs and build time of weapons systems. Politicians, bureaucrats, military officers and arms builders all can underestimate the cost-length-complexity of their projects. The main aim appears to be placating the public and Treasuries whose tax-payer dollars go into paying for weapons systems. 
Please connect with Submarine Matter's:


also connect with other recent sources:


http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-now-puts-aircraft-carrier-plan-on-fast-track/articleshow/46336472.cms


Artist's conception of INS Vikrant "2" - indigenous aircraft carrier (IAC-I)
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This Submarine Matters post originally carried an update of India's nuclear submarine INS Arihant and Chakra (enlarge design here. They will feature in a new Submarine Matters article TBA.

Pete

Reaper (Armed) Drones for Australia?

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One of the armed Reapers operated by the UK Royal Air Force, were over Afghanistan, now over Iraq and Syria.
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Approximate position of Reaper/Predator bases in region with greatest concentration now on Iraq-Syria. Note other drones are deployed: high altitude Global Hawks and high altitude, stealthy Sentinels. Map courtesy of http://dronewars.net/2014/05/07/analysis-where-are-british-reaper-drones-heading-after-afghanistan/ which also lists the drone bases.
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Several Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) personnel are now being trained in the US to operate Reaper armed drones. This only became public in the last few days. From just a few Australians in training Australia may ramp up to a squadron sized capability of three to five Reapers over the next few years.

Reaper drones are more technically known as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and by militaries as remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs).  

Australia has operated unarmed 1,150 kg Heron drones in Afghanistan for a few years in surveillance roles. Senior Australian officers have expressed interest inacquiring armed drones since at least 2012. The Australian Army has worked closely with US armed drones in Afghanistan since 2012, if not before. The war against Islamic State in Iraq has made training remote aircrew for drones and acquisition of armed drones themselves a high priority for the RAAF. It is also a high priority for the Australian Army who will most probably be unofficially fighting on the ground before 2016.

In a Media Release of February 23, 2015 Australian Parliamentary Secretary for Defence, Darren Chester, announced: “…that the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) has commenced training aircrew and support staff on [Reaper] operations in the United States.

Mr Chester said that the training program provides a cost effective method to increase the ADF’s understanding of complex [drone] operations and how this capability can be best used to protect Australian troops on future operations.

“Unmanned aerial systems are an advancing technology with a proven record of providing ‘eyes in the sky’ in the Middle East region,” Mr Chester said.

“It would be remiss of Australia not to continue to develop our knowledge of this technology to ensure we are able to gain the greatest benefit from unmanned aerial systems and the best protection for our troops on future operations.”

“For this reason, the RAAF is training personnel in USAF MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial system operations in the United States.”

[The RAAF] currently has five personnel training to be [Reaper remote pilots and weapons and sensor] operators at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico, and a communication systems engineer at Creech Air Force Base, Nevada.”

The UK and the US have operated armed Reapers since 2007. The US has also operated the closely related, but much smaller, Predator since 1995. The 4,780 kg Reapers can carry 1,760 kgs of weapons including Hellfire missiles, GPS programmed bombs or laser guided bombs. When carrying a couple of weapons a Reaper can loiter for around 20 hours. Scroll a third way down  http://dronewars.net/2014/05/07/analysis-where-are-british-reaper-drones-heading-after-afghanistan/ for a useful map and list of drone air bases that can send drones over Syria and Iraq.  

Unmanned drones and manned aircraft are limited by their pilot-equipment-network mix. Australia is operating several Super Hornets in the bombing role over Iraq. Pilots of those aircraft may only have a quick glimpse or no direct view of their target before they destroy it while Reapers drones can silently loiter for hours to be sure of their target.

One role for the eagle eyed Reaper is to detect if potential enemy are digging in improved explosive devices (IEDs) in front of an advancing allied patrol. Another role is detecting the enemy setting up ambushes against that patrol. That Reaper could fire Hellfire missiles at the enemy.

Reapers have advantages over fast jets like the RAAF Super Hornets currently over Iraq including longer loiter times, many lower operating costs, no vulnerable pilots who can be killed or captured, no jet engine wear, no mid-air refuelling needed. Reapers, unlike jets, also have the ability to silently protect patrols or convoys as these ground elements slowly move.

Reapers will complement the Super Hornets rather than replace them. One advantage of Super Hornets is that they can move, during the one mission, over long distances to trouble spots in Iraq much more quickly than Reapers. A particular problem with the Super Hornets though is that they frequently spend more time in transit (4 hours all up) from their base in the United Arab Emirates then the 3 hours at work over Iraq. Super Hornets can last longer than 7 hours with mid-air refuelling, but pilots suffer significant fatigue during these long missions while one Reaper crew can handover to a fresh crew every few hours over a 20 hour Reaper mission.

The RAAF may be asking for $300 million to buy several Reapers ($20 million per Reaper plus all the training, simulators and other network costs) . Judging from the UK Royal Air Force precedent Australia may buy 3 to 5 Reapers in the next 2 to 3 years. After piloting US Reapers in training Australian pilots at Creech Air Force Base, Nevada, might possibly graduate to flying US Reapers operationally. This may be prior to moving onto Australian Reapers within 2 to 3 years.

Moral issues about US use of drones over Afghanistan and Pakistan may be related to their increasing use by the US over the years, with more targets attacked. Another issue is the use of armed drones by the CIA against countries the US is officially at peace with. Use by the RAAF over Iraq in the next two or three years should hopefully be different.

Pete

Chinese Type 093A or 093G SSN armed with YJ-18 Carrier Killer Missiles

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What may be 3 Chinese Type 093A/093G SSN or SSGN submarines. An obviously blurry photo of a clarity far below military satellite standards. Nothing as clear as "reading a car's number plate". 
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What may be a Chinese 093A/093G SSN or SSGN submarine with a vertical launch system with two types of missile [?] and pump jet propulsion.
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Probably one of China's older model Type 093 "Shang" class SSNs.
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Depiction of a Klub-Sizzler submarine launched missile which may be similar to China's YJ-18 anti-ship missile.
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Ecns of China reported April 3, 2015 a new version of China's Type 093 (NATO "Shang class") SSN. The new version is variously named Type 093A or 093G. The ability of 093A/093G to mount vertically launched YJ-18 anti-ship missiles may cause the 093A/093G to be called an SSGN. There  seem to be no reliable photos of the YJ-18.

If the longer length and other differences of the Type 093A/093Gs are accurate it is possible China may eventually rename them Type 095s.

Just a note of caution that the 093A/093G reports seem to rely on 3rd or 4th hand Taiwanese sources in the information loop. The message that 093A/093Gs with their missiles are "carrier killers" of course worries the US. A message that directs more US military attention weapons-money-opportunities to Taiwan is beneficial to Taiwan. Taiwan definitly needs US help to pressure some country to help Taiwan build or acquire four new submarines.

Application of the term "carrier killer" to the YJ-18 should not imply that the YJ-18 is a new threat. There may be many similarities between the 093A/093G's YJ-18 anti-ship missile and the BrahMosYakhont or Klub-Sizzler. Significantly the Klub-Sizzler has already been fitted by Russia to China's 12 Russian built Kilo class submarines. Now China is taking the evolutionary (no game-changing) step of fitting Klub equivalents (YJ-18s) to faster moving and longer submerged Type 093A/093Gs.

All this missile activity is not a major departure from conventional and nuclear propelled submarines pre-existing torpedos capabilities - with torpedos being able to "kill"/destroy carriers and other major warships.

The YJ-18 may also owe some design attributes to the YJ-12 "a supersonic Chinese anti-ship missile developed in the 1990s".

Comment - while the YJ-18 sounds like an awesome weapon the hierarchical autonomy, tactics and efficiency of their human operators are very important. The human element is often mistakenly disregarded. How smoothly the YJ-18s fit into China's broader network of anti-shipping sensors is also a consideration.

The report from Ecns of China, April 3, 2015 has the string http://www.ecns.cn/military/2015/04-03/160484.shtml and is below  .

[Chinese PLA] "Navy to get 3 new nuclear subs

   
2015-04-03 09:07China DailyEditor: Si Huan
Three cutting-edge nuclear-powered attack submarines have been manufactured and will soon be commissioned by the Chinese navy, according to media reports.

China Central Television showed a satellite picture earlier this week of three submarines anchored at an unidentified port [see first picture above - very blurry], saying the vessels are China's most advanced Type-093G nuclear-powered attack submarines, just completed by a Chinese shipyard and a waiting delivery.

With a teardrop hull, the submarine is longer than its predecessor, the Type-093, and has a vertical launching system, the report said.

Another article carried by the People's Liberation Army navy's website said the Type-093G's wing-shaped cross-section [?] is designed to improve speed and mobility as well as reduce noise, and that the vertical launcher is capable of delivering the country's latest YJ-18 supersonic anti-ship missile.

China established its nuclear-powered submarine force in the early 1970s but had never shown it to the outside world until 2009, when two nuclear submarines took part in a parade marking the 60th anniversary of the PLA navy's founding.

The Type-093G is reported to be an upgraded version of Type-093, China's second-generation nuclear-powered attack submarine, which entered active service several years ago.

Cui Yiliang, editor-in-chief of Modern Ships magazine, said: "Though China was comparatively late in developing advanced nuclear-powered submarines such as the Type-093G, we used a lot of the most cutting-edge technologies and equipment on our submarines, enabling them to compete with their foreign counterparts."

He noted that China has researched the vertical launching system for many years and has installed it on other submarines and surface ships.

"Judging from the vessel's design, the Type-093G should have strong anti-ship and counter-submarine capabilities," said Yin Zhuo, a senior expert with the navy. "It is also likely to be upgraded with the capability of striking land targets with cruise missiles in the near future."

He added that the navy has formed a reliable logistics system for its nuclear submarine fleet.
Liu Jiangping, a naval equipment expert in Beijing who had served in the PLA navy for decades, said the vessel's vertical launching system enables the submarine to launch long-distance strikes from underwater, increasing the vessel's survivability in war.

The strategic force of the PLA navy now has about four nuclear-powered Type-094 ballistic missile submarines, up to six Type-093 nuclear-powered attack submarines and about three old Type-091 nuclear-powered attack submarines, CCTV quoted foreign media reports as saying.[note the report of six 093's may be Taiwanese deception. Wikipedia (see its sidebar) based on US DoD reports reported only 2 active 093s in June 2014. Wikipedia's sidebar agrees there are 3 active 091s however ].  
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Another report, from Deagel.com, last updated February 4, 2015, goes into much more detail on the YJ-18 anti-ship missile. The similarity to BrahMosYakhont or Klub-Sizzler in function is obvious. The report's string is http://www.deagel.com/Anti-Ship-Missiles/YJ-18_a002884001.aspx :

"YJ-18 [Missile]


Description:

The YingJi-18 (YJ-18 or Eagle/Hawk-18) is a vertically-launched, long-range, supersonic, sea-skimming anti-ship missile designed by China to kill US Navy's Aegis-equipped destroyers or its equivalents provided to Japan, South Korea or European Navies. The YJ-18 is planned for deployment by the newest People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Type 052D class destroyers and subsequently may be incorporated into existing destroyers and submarines as part of a modernization effort. Its guidance system consists of an advanced inertial navigation, maybe backed by the Beidou Chinese GPS, plus an active radar seeker in the terminal phase. Besides, a built-in data link allows the carrier ship to update the target's location. The Aegis-killer missile existence was first reported in 2013 with an entry into service expected by 2014 or later.

The YJ-18 missile is equipped with a 300 kg high explosive (HE) warhead capable of taking out a destroyer-sized ship. The HE warhead can be replaced by an anti-radiation/electromagnetic pulse warhead that is said can take down up to 60 percent of the enemy ship's electronic systems at a range of 50 meters after detonating. After the vertical launch the missile's turbojet engine is capable of flying at a cruise speed of Mach 0.8 for about 180 kilometers after that point the warhead section separates and a solid rocket engine ignites allowing at a top speed of Mach 2.5-3 for about 40 kilometers. The missile can maneuver at 10G acceleration to avoid enemy interception by air-to-air or surface-air missiles. The missile design and performance is very similar to Russia's 3M54E [Klub-Sizzlerwhich may have been the template for the YJ-18."

Pete

More evidence Australia's Soryu Choice based on US-Australia-Japan Alliance Considerations

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General Martin Dempsey (on right) Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and Air Chief Marshal Mark Binskin (at left), Australian Chief of the Defence Force, meet at RAN base HMAS Watson in Sydney, February, 23, 2015
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The following Reuters article confirms that non-tender factors such as the US preferences and what are assumed to be “common values” between Australia and Japan will heavily influence Australia's future submarine choice. Retired Vice Admiral Yoji Koda’s advocacy of most Soryus being built in Australia may amount to little compared to the views of Prime Ministers Abe and Abbott, MHI and KHI.

The article is a good summary of the key issues in Australia’s “competitive” evaluation process. I’ve included and bolded important sections. The article is by Matt Siegel, Reuters, April 1, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/02/australia-submarines-usa-idUSL3N0WX17A20150402:

“Washington's regional ambitions centre stage in Australian submarine tender

“…The qualitative difference between the [Japanese, German and French] submarines on offer was negligible, Rex Patrick, a former advisor to the previous defence minister and a submarine expert, told Reuters.

"All these guys build a good submarine. It will be factors other than capability which determines who wins," he said, partly referring to Washington's geo-strategic goals in Asia.

“…Japan had been the frontrunner to replace Australia's ageing Collins-class submarines with an off-the-shelf version of its 4,000-tonne Soryu-class vessel after Prime Minister Tony Abbott agreed to cooperate on military technology with Abe [in June 2014].

“…U.S. officials insist they are not pressing Australia to buy any particular submarine but say they see benefits from the interoperability of the Japanese option.

During a visit to Australia in February, General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the decision was one Australia would have to make on its own "for any number of domestic and international reasons".

But Dempsey also cited "interoperability"among allies as a key factor, although experts at the conference noted that submarines built by Germany and France, both NATO members, can communicate with U.S. vessels.

Still, Washington's view is that the Japanese submarine is technically superior to any European-made vessel, and will allow for the integration of more U.S. technology, a senior U.S. military source told Reuters.

"If they want to do it right, it is a Japanese hull and propulsion plant, with a U.S. combat system and ISR package," he said, using an acronym for the various types of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance sensors like sonar and radar used on U.S. submarines.

‘…One notable Japanese participant at the [Sub Summit], retired Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, told Reuters that Japanese-Australian cooperation on the submarine deal would ensure countries in the Asia-Pacific with common values such as democracy also shared a common defence capability.

"The key point is not exporting our equipment on an industrial basis, but to be more strategic," added Koda, who also said Tokyo should be flexible and build most of the vessels in Australia, which would make the deal politically more palatable for Abbott.

Until now, sources had said Japan was reluctant to engage in a tender partly to avoid getting embroiled in a bidding war.

Japanese industry is also seen as wary of undertaking significant construction in Australia because of concerns about its sensitive submarine technology, including its stealthy propulsion system and advanced welding techniques. (Additional reporting by David Alexander in WASHINGTON and Tim Kelly in TOKYO; Editing by Dean Yates).” See WHOLE Reuters article.

COMMENT

The article confirms the alliance and US preference points I made when reporting on the "Sub Summit" Adelaide, late March 2014 and much earlier in Australia - the future junior ally of Japan, February 2, 2015.

Pete

Submarine Steel Strength, China and Japan.

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High-strength steel welding, monitoring and other functions are now highly automated including  computer dependent, particularly in well established assembly lines. (Photo courtesy Design News and Bosch Rexroth)
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This present article continues discussions first raised in Soryu Submarine Steel Details - Japan Offer to Australia of January 20, 2015 and then raised in comments on previous articles over the last week.

Japan is particularly concerned that defence exports to customers/allies might increase the chances that Japan's submarine secrets (including its hull steel characteristics, cutting and welding techniques) might pass to potential enemies. A particular threat is passage of secrets to China. Particular concerns are China's ability to reverse engineer or develop counter-actions against allied weapons like the F-35.

Regarding the specific and sensitive issue of the operational depth of submarines. This depth is not soley dependent on the steel strength estimates discussed below. There are so many other determining factors including weld strength and hull structure.

Noone knows operational or crush depth except designers and naval officers who operate the submarines. Detailed computer simulation and materials testing is required to calculate pressure distribution on submarine hulls. 

Chinese submarines appear to be rapidly improving. Chinese submarines used to be clearly inferior to US or Japanese submarines, but now, the situation is changing. Ignorance of such rapid changes  makes people too optimistic. The latest Chinese subs may be superior to Collins subs at least in hull strength. Australian and Japanese hull strengths therefore need to be improved. 

Documentary Comparisons of Chinese and Japanese Submarine Steel Strengths

Chinese submarine hulls appear to made of "980 steel" with a yield strength of 800 MPa. China's "980" and Japans NS 80 are nearly the same. Their chemical components and mechanical strengths are very similar - see http://www.mod.go.jp/trdi/data/pdf/G/G3111C.pdf , page 3, table 3, chemical composition (NS80E) 4.2.1 left column.

See the following document: Shanghai Jiaotong University, School of Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering's, "High Crack Propagation of Steel 980 Welded Joiont under Spectrum Load” (Chinese), http://image02w.seesaawiki.jp/d/e/doramarine/16dc6f08dbd1d96c.pdf
Page 5, “ 2.2 Fatigue Testing indicates:

“Test material for high-strength structural steel submarine 980 steel welded joints. 980 steel (VHD402), yield strength σs> = 800MPa, China developed high strength, high toughness, can be welded with a submarine pressure hull.” See Page 5, Table 1 Chemical component (Steel and Weld for upper and lower rows respectively), Table 2 Mechanical Property (ibid).

 Using conversion site http://www.convertunits.com/from/psi/to/MPa  800 MPa = 116,030 psi = "HY-116".

Returning to G3111C.pdf

Soryu Submarine Steel Details - Japan Offer to Australia of January 20, 2015 very briefly describes  http://www.mod.go.jp/trdi/data/pdf/G/G3111C.pdf ,  Within that document see page 4, table 4.2.1 left column, which seems to indicate the Soryu has Japanese naval steel measure NS80 = 80kgf/mm2 which converts to 113,760 lbf/in2 or HY-114.

So assuming the translations and conversions are correct China's use of HY-116 steel is very similar to the Soryu's HY-114.

Soryu Submarine Steel Details - Japan Offer to Australia also discusses NS110 which may also be used in the Soryu. NS110 means 110kgf/mm2 proof stress converting to 156,414 lbf/in2 or HY-156 . HY-156 using simple linear calculations allow the Soryu an operating depth of just over 600 metres.

Conclusion

It has to be pointed out, however, that operational depth is not soley dependent on steel strength. There are so many other determining factors including weld strength and hull structure.

Noone knows a submarine's operational or crush depth except designers and naval officers who operate the submarines. Detailed computer simulation and materials testing is also required to calculate pressure distribution on submarine hulls. 

Anonymous and Pete

Russian Submarine Fire Perhaps Caused By Battery Fumes

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There appears to be a tightly packed collection of shipping around the submarine on fire. Wouldn't they be at fire or at least smoke risk? Perhaps  authorities moved ships around the sub on fire to reduce the number of embarrassing photos?. 

Reuters (carried in the SMH) reported April 8, 2015: "[Russian RIA] news agency reports said the fire [on the Oscar II class submarine Orel]  had started near the stern during welding work that caused insulation materials to catch fire. RIA quoted a well-informed source as saying it was proving hard to put out the blaze because of thick smoke.

"At the moment they are 'attacking' with foam to try to put out the fire but it's not having any effect. Because of this they are considering whether to fully submerge the whole dock under water," the source said."

Note commentary of this Youtube includes "authorities accused of hiding information" in the past.

Although "80 firefighters and 20 fire trucks were involved in the work to extinguish the fire" Russian authorities claim after "preliminary inspections of the “Oryol”, no important infrastructure was damaged".

COMMENT

The Russian authorities are clearly taking pains to minimise the seriousness of the fire. 

An alternate theory, to the fire starting with insulating material, is that the welding set fumes from the backup batteries alight. Even nuclear subs have batteries. Battery fumes are a more common cause of submarine fire than merely insulating material.

Pete

Pace of India's nuclear submarine program, Arihant, Chakra.

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Perhaps a minimally doctored August 2014 photo of INS Arihant. It shares similarities with Russia's latest, minimally humped, Borei class SSBN and the preceding very humped, sail planed, Russian Delta SSBN.
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Minimally humped, Borei class SSBN 
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A very humped Delta II class SSBN with sail planes like Arihant.
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MISSION

On April 5, 2015 I was tasked by "lachit" to assess India's nuclear submarine state of play:

"India needs to get her nuclear subs SSBN & SSN & SSGN up running pronto. Can you guess which subs will ultimately take over the role of SSGN? I would surely like to know your personal opinion on the capabilities of Arihant sub. Thanks

On April 8, 2015 (and in the same thread) Biswajit Pattanaik augmented my tasking with the preamble:


@"lachit" my bet will be on S2/ARIHANT,S3 &S4 SSBNs that they will be converted into SSGNs. This will happen when in the future the better & the bigger SSBNs i.e. S5,S6 & S7 comes into service.

Hi Pete,
Just want to add something about Future Indian SSNs. According to me either Indian Navy could go with a Barracuda based SSN or even a Scorpene based SSN just like the Brazilians Sn-BR SSN. What's your take on this?"

RESPONSE

To which I respond:

You entrust me with grave responsibilities :) My personal response, is:

I've followed INS Arihant's publically available information since it was launched in June 2009. At the launch ceremony (then) Prime Minister Singh thanked the Russians implicitly for their ongoing assistance on the submarine reactors on "S-1" and S-2.

S-1 is the half submarine reactor test rig at Kalpakkam (India's southeast coast, just south of Chennai)
S-2 is INS Arihant itself (undergoing trials - may never be operational).
S-3 is INS Aridhaman (under construction at the Shipbuilding Centre Visakhapatnam (India's east coast)) probable launch perhaps late 2015 or in 2016 - will be the defacto first of class SSBN initially with K-15s.
S-4 no name yet (under construction Shipbuilding Centre Vadodara prior to launch perhaps in 2017)

Arihant was/is only intended as a technology demonstrator (particularly for the reactor) a bit like the USS Nautilus rather than a serious first of class. Unlike the Nautilus there has been no list of Arihant's nuclear sub achievements eg. long submerged range or endurance. This makes me suspicious that Arihant has had major problems with its reactor functioning - the major new piece of technology. The need for security - away from prying Pak or Chinese craft - may be another reason for avoiding long semi-public sea voyages.

The delays in Arihant seem to have increased unrealistic expectations that it could be an operational submarine design.

The distinction between SSN's and new-build SSGN's (G for guided missile) is largely historical and decidedly Russian. The distinction mainly rested on the first SSN's being only horizontal torpedo tube armed and very much orientated to torpedos and mines with few or no missiles. 

Over the last 20 years SSN-SSGN distinctions have become clouded  as horizontally launched missiles have become a major component of an SSN's armament. An even more fundamental structural change has been Vertical Launch Systems for most new build SSNs (be they Akulas, Yasens, later Los Angeles and Virginia class). Therefore new build SSGN's have been merged into "SSN" or in the case of the Yasen "multi-purpose". I think India will be building "multi-purpose SSNs" in the direction of the Chakra class (Akula II) rather than separate SSN and SSGN designations. However, Arihant may evolve into the only SSGN and specialising in missile tests, rather than being an actual new build SSGN.

Advances in missiles' range mean that even SSN fired cruise missile have (or will have) the range to hit anywhere in Pakistan while land launched Agni IIIs (with a light warhead load) can hit anywhere in China. Agni III's will be supplemented by K-4 SLBMs in around a decade. 

It would be tidy for India to have a firm build schedule for nuclear subs S3 through S7 but I think India's build schedule is still under development and heavily dependent on Russian advice - in exchange for India paying excessive amounts for Russian arms (effectively subsidization). Also India has unique geography and needs that submarine types can be iteratively evolved around. India is not the US or Russia than can afford 10 new SSBNs and 20-40 new missile armed SSNs. Multi purpose Indian designs may become a substantial component.

The initial Indian SSNs, if they stay at the Arihant class' displacement of 6,000 tons (surfaced) will be underpowered unless they have an uprated reactor (maybe 130 MW). This may take some years to achieve. The reactor in the Chakra/Akula is an obvious item to study. As the study of reactor safety takes decades I suspect that Russian advisers are on hand towards the rear of the Chakra and Arihant.

An SSBN version of the Arihant appears to have the right sized reactor if the speed specifications are accurate.

Rather than Arihant and follow on subs being influenced by French nuclear submarines (like the Barracuda) I think Russia's Delta class and Borei subs are already a strong influence. India was, and I assume still is, extraordinarily committed to two Chakra/Akula IIs. India appeared to cross subsidise Russia nuclear sub building program in the long years Chakra/Akula was being built when Russia was crying out for defence money.

Much patience is needed tracking India's nuclear sub program. Unlike the 10+% of Russian and US GDP's that resulted in rapid nuclear sub program gains in the 1950s-60s India is only spending around 2.5% GDP on defence (according to Stockholm SIPRI stats). This is not a breakout amount for rapid increases in numbers or models. India's nuclear sub program also faces competition from the probably highest priority Agni IRBM-ICBM program and from India's conventional military priorities.

The launch of INS Aridhaman, perhaps later this year, will be the next major step.

Pete

Australian government sends ASC confusing instructions

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Adelaide's Independent News (IN)Daily, April 14, 2015 reported on the confusing instructions the Federal Government has been sending government owned Australian Submarine Corporation (ASC). The relevant parts of the article http://indaily.com.au/news/2015/04/14/asc-agnostic-on-subs-contract/
 are:

"ASC “agnostic” on subs contract


TOM RICHARDSON 

ADELAIDE | The Defence Department has issued an edict to Government-owned shipbuilder ASC that it must deal “fairly and equally” with all prospective international contractors for the lucrative future submarines project.

The missive, revealed today by SA Senator Nick Xenophon during a Senate committee hearing in Adelaide, belies the Abbott Government’s public rhetoric that the Osborne-based shipbuilder should pick an international partner with which to put forward a joint bid.

Defence Minister Kevin Andrews announced in February that the contract would be determined by a “competitive evaluation process”, saying “for the best opportunity to maximise their involvement in the program (ASC) needs to work with an international partner”.

Just last week, SA-based Liberal heavyweight Christopher Pyne urged Xenophon to “assist ASC in putting together a competitive bid for the new submarine project as part of a joint venture with another submarine builder”.

Xenophon today quizzed ASC representatives to the Senate inquiry into the future submarine project whether such a joint venture was actually allowed, “given your instruction from defence”.

“You can’t act on that on the basis that you’ve received quite reasonable instructions from defence to deal with prospective international bidders in an even-handed manner,” asserted Xenophon.

ASC’s chief operating officer Martin Edwards said the company’s “role at the moment is to help those potential partners understand the skills capability and where we can assist, particularly because we’ve had many decades of shipbuilding in Australia”.

He said a potential design partner would not be known until the evaluation process was completed.


“From as ASC perspective, we’re agnostic in relation to whether it’s Japan or Germany or France – we’ll work with any one of those,” Edwards said." See WHOLE ARTICLE.

COMMENT

It appears that as the German (TKMS) and French (DCNS) competitors have much greater experience than Japan in participating in major defence consortiums the Australian Government does not want to put Japan at the disadvantage of facing actual competition. Put another way the Government does not want ASC to choose an international partner on that partner's merits. The Government wants Japan's special position in the so-called "competitive" evaluation maintained.

Of course the Australia Government's hands are tied. The US has already selected Japan to win the "competitive evaluation process" and what the US says goes.

Pete
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