Minister Andrews on foreign visit to submarine competitors?

April 14, 2015, 9:40 pm

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Australian Defence Minister, Kevin Andrews, appears to dislike photo opportunities next to uniforms or defence hardware. This perhaps makes Andrews a welcome change to Prime Minister Abbott's uniform chasing.

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After receiving a tipoff that Australian Defence Minister, Kevin Andrews, might be on an overseas visit to Australia's future submarine competitors (TKMS specifically mentioned) - Minister Andrews  possible itinerary is:

April 23, 2015 - ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) in Berlin (combined with courtesy visit to German Defence Minister) and/or visit to the Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW) submarine yard at Kiel.

April 24, 2015 – DCNS in Paris (courtesy visit to French Defence Minister) and/or to DCNS submarine yard at Cherbourg.

April 25, 2015 - attendance at ANZAC Day ceremony at Gallipoli, Turkey. The high probability that Minister Andrews would attend that ceremony on the Centenary of the Gallipoli landings places him far from Australia but close to France and Germany.

April 27-28, 2015 – Meeting with Japanese Minister of Defence Nakatani (with JMD submarine experts as well as Soryu builders MHI and KHI?) and visit to Kobe where the Soryus are built.

Accompanying Minister Andrews may be the Australian Navy, Head Future Submarine Program, a senior executive of Australia’s Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) and perhaps a senior executive of ASC.

Information from Minister Andrews' office may have already flowed to worthy Australian news corporations - but with the usual news embargo understandings. Minister Andrew’s attendance at Gallipoli may be a strong supporting sign that the tipoff coincided with something expected.

All necessarily speculation.

Pete

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South Korean Submarines, 3,000+ ton KSS-III, Nuclear Potential

April 15, 2015, 2:10 am

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One of South Korea's (international convention of just "Korea" now used) nine Chang Bogo class (KSS-Is). Korea is completing a sale of three to Indonesia.

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One of Korea's four Son Won-Il class (KSS-IIs) in commision - five to go. Larger than the KSS-I and AIP equipped. Looks like a pre-launch ceremony. 

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With the KSS-III being described as a "3,000 tonne submarine" for a decade the above dimensions (very similar to the single hull Collins) may be accurate. The "3,000 t" would be surfaced displacement.

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A larger KSS-III? If its length is really 83.5 m and breadth/beam 7.7 m, then compared with the Collins (77.4 m, 7.8 m) the KSS-III's displacement appears to be around 3,400 tonnes (surfaced) and 3,800 tonnes (submerged). There are many other variables in estimating displacement of course! Other possibilities are that the above is a "4,000 t" nuclear KSS-N? or 83.5 is propaganda to equal the Soryu's 84 m length.

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Another model of what the KSS-III may turn out like. It appears to have 6 VLS hatches but a 6 missile Vertical Multi Purpose Lock (VMPL) is more likely.
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South Korea (international convention of just "Korea" now used) has a long and competitive ship-building tradition. Korea has the world's largest ship-building industry - with 41% of world market share (in first quarter 2015). This has put Korea in a good position to build German TKMS-HDW designed submarines (from kits?) since 1990. Korea has also has submarine export success and is perhaps well prepared to develop a 3,000-4,000 tonne conventional submarine. It faces threats even greater than Japan does - having a land border with North Korea and in much closer proximity to China. The Korean Navy has publicised its creation of a Submarine Command for reasons difficult to discern but perhaps to suggest an eventual capability of a pre-emptive or second strike nuclear deterrent.

Korea's KSS-I, KSS-II and KSS-III building program suggest a goal of having a rolling average of at least 18 submarines operational and perhaps 22 to match Japan's medium term goal. The so-called "indigenous" submarine (KSS-III) project may still draw heavily on TKMS-HDW technology but "indigenous" also provides ambiguity if Korea needs to develop KSS-III into a nuclear propelled submarine "KSS-N" possibly nuclear armed. 

KSS-Is and KSS-IIs

Korea's navy operates:

- 9 Chang Bogo class (KSS-1), a variant of the TKMS-HDW type 209/1200. In 2011 Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME) won a contract to supply Indonesia with two pre-assembled Chang Bogos (to be delivered probably in 2016-2017) with a third Chang Bogo to be assembled in Indonesia (perhaps the beginning of an indigenous Indonesian production line!). The 9 KSS-Is have been regularly upgraded which may extend their service life past the usual 30 years. A major future upgrade may be Lithium-ion batteries fully or partly replacing lead-acid batteries - although such a retrofit may be very difficult. See NTI document for names of specific, commissioned KSS-Is and KSS-IIs up to 2011.

-  4 Son Won-Il class (KSS-II) as at April 2015. Five more are due to be commissioned by 2020. These are variants of the TKMS-HDW Type 214 submarines. Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) built the first three (commissioned 2007-2009). DSME, HHI and STX Offshore & Shipbuilding are alternately building the second batch of six with one of the six commissioned in December 2014 and the final one due to be commissioned in 2018. Like the KSS-Is the KSS-IIs carry some US built Harpoon missiles for anti-ship and possibly land attack. Like the KSS-Is the KSS-IIs are orientated to a surveillance, anti-shipping, anti-submarine and (a short range) land attack capability. A major future upgrade may be Lithium-ion batteries fully or partly replacing lead-acid batteries - better to incorporate such batteries-electricals into the remaining new-build KSS-IIs rather than attempt a retrofitting.

- several mini-submarines exist but are probably too old, making them non-operational.

KSS-III, 3,000-4,000 tonne Design - Conventional and Potentially Nuclear  

There will be eventually 9 (KSS-III) 3,000-4,000 tonne submarines.  If their length is 83.5 m and breadth/beam 7.7 m (see photo above) then they may displace 3,400 tonnes (surfaced) and 3,800 tonnes (submerged). DSME will be the main designer. The lead KSS-III boat began development in November 2014 at DSME's submarine yard at Okpo. The first KSS-III may take 4 years to build and launch (2018) then commissioning in about 2022. 

The larger size of the KSS-III will permit it to include some of the latest submarine technologies, including:

- Lithium-ion batteries, best for new build subs rather than retrofitted.
- large diameter unmanned underwater vehicles (LDUUVs)
- Seal/diver delivery vehicles (SDVs)
- dry-wet cells for special forces in dinghies/divers/Seals
- VLS or more probably the major advance of Vertical Multi Purpose Lock (VMPL) capable of launching 1,500+ km cruise and Harpoon missiles,, VMPLs are also capable of launching LDUUVs and SDVs. 

As well as retaining fuel cell (or less likely Stirling) AIP, KSS-IIIs could also incorporate features from the TKMS-HDW Dolphin 2 including the large rudder system and reinforced hull bottom which allow such a large SSK to operate in shallow, littoral waters.  

One additional reason Korea is going the indigenously developed submarine route is that Germany's  TKMS-HDW would be banned by German (and probably international) law from assisting South Korea to develop the KSS-III in the medium-long term into a nuclear propelled KSS-N submarine, possibly armed with nuclear weapons.

The capability to use Tomahawk or indigenous Hyunmoo-3 series cruise missiles of 1,500+ km (far longer than the 140 km range KSS-I/KSS-IIs UGM-84 Harpoons) potentially makes the KSS-III much more effective against such additional threats as China and Russia. 

The US may have been politically unwilling to supply the Tomahawk to Korea. Instead Korea appears to have incorporated many of Tomahawk's features into the Hyunmoo-3 series. By building an indigenous missile, warhead ambiguity is introduced. Korea is one of those countries (like Japan) that could develop a nuclear weapon in less than a year. Miniaturisation may be a major hurdle but a Hyunmoo-3 (or other cruise missiles) could trade range to achieve a heavier warhead than 500 kg.

KSS-III could best be described as multi-purpose. For a medium sized navy like Korea's KSS-IIIs (or KSS-Ns) could combine some of the capabilities that larger navies cover more comprehensively with distinctly different types, such as SSKs, SSNs, SSGNs and SSBNs. 

KSS-N, a Nuclear Development of the KSS-III? 

Korea appears to have long maintained an option of a KSS-N (also called KSSX-N and SSX) a 4,000+ ton nuclear propelled development of the KSS-III. On past plans see Globalsecurity.com report. However to date any plan has not occurred due to pressure from all of Korea's neighbours, US opposition and the necessity of building an indigenous submarine rather than a submarine that heavily relies on a foreign country (Germany). Also a nuclear propelled Korean submarine would diminish any chance that North Korea would remove/destroy its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Korea might develop the KSS-N submarine if threats against it sufficiently increase and/or US military support diminishes.


Korea has long and extensive experience building nuclear power reactors - mostly large but still useful in any future development of submarine reactors. Interestingly DSME (as at April 2015) appears to be designing a "nuclear propulsion [surface] ship". This would have the legitimate purpose of meeting market demand for nuclear propelled, very large, ice-breaking, oil and LNG tankers. This activity also provides dual-use potential for submerged nuclear propulsion. 

In terms of an actual reactor technology path the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) is also operating and further developing a small 100 MW ("SMART") pressurised water reactor with a output (at least) that may suite a 4,000 ton KSS-N. The SMART reactor's main current weakness is that it uses 5% enriched Uranium (U) 235 providing a poor power to size/weight ratio. 5% means SMART presently needs three year (overly frequent) refueling. Korea probably could legitimately develop the SMART at a higher (ice breaker surface ship) U enrichment percentage to make it much more useful as a submarine reactor. Korea has been seeking IAEA-US permission to develop a greater U enrichment capability but has been blocked. Although at a small amount-laboratory level Korea has a proven Uranium enrichment ability.

So Korea's indigenous submarine (KSS-III) program is well worth watching for its potential.

I'll do an article on North Korea's submarine situation in the future.

More Sources

http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/south-korea-submarine-capabilities/

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/show-daily/sea-air-space/2015/04/12/korea-south-north-navy-modernize-coastal-scandal-sub-helicopter-frigate/25512681/

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/kss-n.htm

Pete

Australian Naval Shipbuilding 30-40% pricier. Submarines Unmentionable.

April 17, 2015, 5:48 pm

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A Virginia SSN being completed in a massive Newport News shed. Will Australia ever build such submarines efficiently?

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On April 16, 2015 Australia's Minister for Defence [Media Released] a RAND Corporation Report Australia’s Naval Shipbuilding Enterprise – preparing for the 21st century. Probably the most significant finding is that “The cost of building naval ships in Australia is 30-40 per cent greater than United States benchmarks,…”. In contrast to South Korea's shipbuilding success Australia's shipbuilding industry has long been afflicted with the higly unionised British disease. Responsibility averse government and private sector management is another major failing.

Even with this defacto 40% tariff protection Australia cannot compete because ships and submarines  routinely completed 1 or 2 years late - often with subsequent modifications necessary. 

For Submarine Matters the absence of any discussion of Australia’s future submarine build in the Report compromises the whole report. It is akin to taking Future Frigates out of the equation.

The RAND Report, in part, found that:

·     "Australia could sustain a naval ship building industrial base by carefully managing a continuous ship building strategy in the longer–term, with a regular pace of delivering the new ships. But this would need to be premised on reform of the Australian naval ship building industry and significant improvement in productivity.

·       Australian naval ship builders can sustain an 18-24 month pace of large ship construction starts if Defence carefully manages its acquisition program and keeps the Future Frigates operational for 25 to 30 years [ie. needlessly shorter period than usual].

·       The gap between the completion of the Air Warfare Destroyer project and the start of the Future Frigate – Labor’s valley of death – cannot be overcome, but the impact could be lessened.

·       The cost of building naval ships in Australia is 30-40 per cent greater than United States benchmarks, and even greater against some other naval ship building nations. Australia is currently one the most expensive places to build naval vessels. This premium can be reduced by improved productivity through:

o  -  Establishing a consistent production and build demand.

o  -  Selecting a mature design at the start of the build and limiting the amount of changes once production begins.

o  -  The necessity of ensuring a well-integrated designer, builder and supplier team.

o  -  Matching the industrial base structure to demand.

o  -  Ensuring there is visionary leadership provided by company management.

The RAND report is a critical input into the Defence White Paper and the Naval Shipbuilding Plan. The Government will now carefully consider the report’s analysis and findings in preparation for the release of these documents later this year."

SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (SMH) COMMENT

On April 16, 2015 David Wroe http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/major-local-shipbuilding-report-excludes-submarine-costings-20150416-1mmed1.htmlreported:

“But the report strikingly left the future submarine project out of its calculations, concentrating instead on surface warship such as new frigates and patrol boats.

When asked why, lead researcher John Birkler told reporters submarines had been "specifically excluded" from RAND's terms of reference by the Abbott government. "We were asked not to include submarines," he said.

Mr Birkler went on to indicate that RAND had been told by the government last year that Australia planned to build its submarines offshore.” “His remarks, backed up by a table in the report that places the future submarine project in the "build offshore" column, is clearly at odds with the government's repeated insistence that it had at no point decided to have Japan build the new fleet of up to 12 submarines.”

[In unconvincing contradiction] “A spokesman for Mr Andrews said that at "no stage were RAND Corporation informed by the government or the Department of Defence that an offshore submarine build was the only option being considered".” See WHOLE SMH ARTICLE

MY COMMENT

The Report's productivity improvement recommendations are US best practice. This is understandable given the US authorship. The recommendations, however, appear to be technologically and economically unsustainable for Australia. Australia cannot cover all the design and development functions unlike the output of Soryus at the MHI-KHI shipyards and unlike output of the Virginia class at Newport News and General Dynamics Electric Boat.

Pete

Indians duped by Pakistani Rumour of Sale of 8 Submarines from China?

April 19, 2015, 7:53 pm

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As Chinese President Xi Jinping visits Pakistan today and tomorrow an 8 submarines for Pakistan deal is supposed to be signed. I suspect no firm deal will be signed because expectations in the Indian and international press are based on a Pakistani rumour campaign.

Pakistan has been trying to extract free or reduced price submarines from China for years. Pakistan has used an information loop rumour strategy over the last few weeks to try to pressure China to sell. 

How can Pakistan, with a naval budget of around $750 million(?) per year afford to buy, crew and maintain the 8 for wildly different amounts:
- $250 million to $325 million each to 
- equivalent of $500 million to 625 million each?

The specific aim is to pressure Chinese President Xi Jinping to sign a deal when he visits Pakistan April 20 and 21, 2015. If Pakistan claims a deal has been made then it would need to prove it with details, including:
- numbers of subs sold?
- type of subs? (ie. old Ming or newer Yuan class submarines, not vague "Project""S-26" of "S-30" designations)
- delivery or building schedule? (when is the first submarine and last to be delivered?)
- are the submarines used or new-build according to Pakistani specifications?

HISTORY OF RUMOURS

- March 9, 2011The Hindu“Pak plans to acquire 6 submarines from China” Obviously didn’t happen.

- March 1, 2014  Times of India story  - quoting a Pakistani official proved groundless with no deal made "by end 2014." - China didn't sign.

Pakistan times its latest rumour campaign in preparation for President Xi vist:

- March 31, 2015 Dawn article  "ISLAMABAD:  [Pakistani] Naval officials informed the Standing Committee on Defence Monday that the federal government has endorsed a summary to get eight submarines from China." -No Chinese promise.

- April 2, 2015  Discussion board insert - referring to speculative Dawn article - No Chinese promise. 

- April 2, 2015 Reuters article  - - Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has approved a deal "years in the making"[but has China approved?] to buy eight submarines from China, a Pakistani government official said on Thursday, in what could be one of China's largest overseas weapons sales once it is signed. The [Pakistani] official...said the deal to buy the diesel-electric submarines would likely be signed by Chinese President Xi Jinping when he visits, "but that is still not final".
"...Asked about the submarines, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying [only said] China and Pakistan were friendly neighbors and that the two sides had normal military exchanges. "I can tell you, relevant cooperation does not violate international convention and accords with China's three principles on military exports," she told a daily news briefing."- No Chinese promise.

Pete

Vietnam's (Russian speaking) Kilo Submarine Service at Work and Play

April 20, 2015, 9:31 pm

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An unintentionally funny submarine article!? They are rare. This article is genuine. It may indicate how "re-Russianized" and efficient some units of the Vietnamese military are becoming.

http://tuoitrenews.vn/ ("The News Gateway of Vietnam") reports, April 21, 2015  http://tuoitrenews.vn/features/27604/life-at-kiloclass-submarine-brigade-in-vietnam

 

"FEATURES

Life at Kilo-class submarine brigade in Vietnam

TUOI TRE NEWS

UPDATED : 04/21/2015 08:58 GMT + 7

PrevNext

A Tuoi Tre (Youth) newspaper contributor has expressed her marvel at the wholehearted dedication, rigorous training, and diligent study of the Russian language among the sailors stationed at a submarine base in central Vietnam after a recent visit.

The Tuoi Tre contributor narrated her memorable experiences during her trip to Submarine Brigade 189 under the Vietnam People's Navy.

The brigade is based in the Cam Ranh Military Port, which is situated in Khanh Hoa Province.

Before the brigade was founded in June 2011, selected soldiers joined a training course in Russia in October 2010 prior to passing on what they had learned to their colleagues and juniors at home.

However, rigorous training began well before that.

Over 30 years ago, Submarine Regiment 196 came into being and boasted well-qualified human resources.

Many members of the regiment's force were later transferred to the current Submarine Brigade 189.

Younger recruits to the brigade all excel in technical training, have good physique and stamina, and cope well under pressure.

One of the initial challenges involved newcomers spinning over 100 times and they were requested to regain balance shortly after the spinning came to a stop.

They also took on an immense challenge which required them to stay in a compressed air chamber with its pressure equivalent to that at a depth of 50 to 70 meters.

Such strenuous challenges now become their everyday routines.

[Training in dispute management aboard the sub!]

Submarine sailors are pictured during their everyday routines. Photo:Tuoi Tre

However, the sailors' arduous physical training did not surprise theTuoi Tre contributor as much as their single-minded devotion to honing their professional skills and command of Russian.

During her trip to the Russian-supported Submarine Training Center, which is located inside the Cam Ranh Military Port, she was amazed at the perplexingly intricate simulations, diagrams, and annotations written in Russian.

The center is one of Southeast Asia's most state-of-the-art facilities.

An officer affirmed that the sailors and staff there all have an adequate grasp of Russian.

The sailors’ eagerness to learn the Russian language was confirmed after the Tuoi Tre contributor met Team 7, which was once trained in India.

On Friday evening, the members did not watch films or sing together.

The 40-year-old team leader and his juniors as young as 24 years old were totally engrossed in their Russian studies.

Trained in Russia, the Tuoi Tre contributor sought permission to join their learning session.

Her keen observations showed that even those who just took up the language a few months back and mostly learn by teaching themselves are surprisingly proficient in the language.

The Russian experts who the Tuoi Tre contributor briefly talked to earlier during the trip gave them profuse compliments on their diligence, brightness, and willingness to learn.

The brigade received two Kilo-class submarines 182-Hanoi and 183-Ho Chi Minh City over one year ago but the officers and sailors have been in full control of the vessels.

They do not need accompanying Russian experts during their trips that last several days under the sea.

Vietnam signed a contract to buy six Kilo-class subs from Russia during Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung’s visit to Moscow in 2009.

Officers and hands on the 184-Hai Phong Submarine also manoeuvered the ship with relative ease thanks to their adequate grasp of the Russian language.

Apart from taking classes in professional skills, the sailors spend 3.5 hours from 7:30 pm to 11:00 pm every day but they still can get up at 6:00 the next morning for a three-kilometer run.

The officers insist only Russian be used in many of their internal meetings.  

Submarine sailors and an officer are pictured during a drill. Photo:Tuoi Tre

No room for errors

Safety and teamwork are the utmost priority among submarine sailors.

“There’s no room whatsoever for errors, as they may cost lives,” the head of Submarine Brigade 189 stressed.

One of the stories which the Tuoi Tre contributor found most compelling was the sonar radar operators’ keen sense of hearing to detect all passing ships of various sizes.

During highly authentic emergency exit drills, whenever some problem arose in a chamber, instead of getting out, the sailors inside that chamber were required to lock themselves tight in and work on the problem in order not to affect other chambers.

The sailors and their special work thrive on their mutual understanding, trust, and willingness to sacrifice for their comrades.

More surprises in store

The Tuoi Tre contributor went from one surprise to another during her stay with Submarine Brigade 189.

One of them was how the male officers and sailors managed to keep their all-white uniforms speckless and crease-free, which is quite a challenge for many housewives [thems fighten words!].

The Tuoi Tre contributor also kept pondering over why all the naval soldiers boast such flawlessly white teeth.

According to Dau Van Hoang, captain of the 184-Hai Phong Submarine, the first priority for submarine sailors is having decay-free teeth.

“Inside the submarines, where oxygen is such a scarcity for several days on end, the entire crew members stay alive on a mixture of air, of which oxygen makes up a mere 29 percent or even a lower percentage,” he explained.

“The exhaled air is always recycled to be inhaled again. If one has decaying teeth, the air would be rendered unusable,” Hoang said with a beaming smile, showing off his immaculately white teeth.

In one of the intriguing stories the Tuoi Tre contributor was told during her trip, Lieutenant Vu Van Dung, of Team 7, was prepared to get married, with his marriage date fixed.

However, he was sent to India for a task right before the wedding.

The two families decided to proceed with the wedding anyway, and Dung’s bride and her family agreed to carry out the bridal ceremony through Skype, a chatting program.

On the wedding day, the bride, the two families, their relatives, and friends celebrated the big day in Vietnam, while the groom attended the ceremony and party through Skype.

[As sun sets on tranquil Kilo] A submarine docks proudly at the Cam Ranh Military Port in Khanh Hoa Province. Photo: Tuoi Tre

Russian-made Kilo-class submarines, dubbed “black holes in the ocean” for its astonishing ability to vanish into the depth of the ocean, were built on a pilot basis during the mid-1990s. Four electric-diesel Kilo-class subs have been handed over to Vietnam. The fifth one, Khanh Hoa, left the Admiralty shipping yard in Russia on a trial run on April 1, 2015. The sixth, Vung Tau, whose building began in May last year, is expected to be transferred to Vietnam next year.

"

The End

Pete

Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) Issues

April 22, 2015, 7:09 am

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MISSION

On the Comment thread https://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=19245896&postID=5077212490045962874Anonymous on April 9, 2015 asked:

"I have few questions to ask you about submarines, what is actually air independent propulsion system of non nuclear submarine. There are many types of AIPS technology in the world and few are under development too so can you tell me which is best among these. And is it possible for a submarine with AIPS system to perform same like a nuclear submarine. I heard recently in a article talking about future diesel submarine will be capable like nuclear submarine with support of latest AIPS system."

On Comment thread https://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=19245896&postID=6049042900970745217&page=1&token=1429705517253 another Anonymous on April 21, 2015 asked: ""why would you want the AIP removed from TKMS Type 214 for Australia?"

"S" has provided useful comments, included in the text and Comments thread

RESPONSE

At some stages-usually a submarine will draw air/oxygen (while near the surface) through its snorkel to power its diesel engines. The submarine's batteries can then be recharged. For a limited time Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) technology makes snorkel air/oxygen drawing unnecessary.

AIP provides diesel-electric submarines with greater submerged endurance (several weeks as opposed to just several days (on existing lead-acid batteries)) and very quiet operation. This enhances a submarine's survivability and mission flexibility. AIP systems use limited amounts of stored (chemically, liquid or compressed) oxygen or hydrogen fuel.

AIP involves chemical changes and sometimes moving parts. My article Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) Technologies and Selection of August 5, 2014 which has diagrams, addresses questions on how AIP systems work. Basically the most developed AIP systems were/are made by 3 Western European countries centred around the North Atlantic and Baltic Seas. These are:

- German fuel cell AIP offered in German TKMS-HDW's latest submarine designs (214s, KSS-IIs, Dolphin 2s, probably 218s, offered for the future 216).
- Swedish Stirling AIP submarines (in Swedish Kockum's designed Gotland, Södermanland and Archer classes, Japan's Soryu class and China's Yuan class)
- French MESMA AIP (just on 3 French DCNS designed Agosta 90B submarines operated by Pakistan). Offered for France's newer Scorpene submarines (no takers?). MESMA and a second generation AIP are probably being offered to Australia within a offered SMX Ocean/conventional Barracuda. It is unclear whether Brazil's 4 future Scorpenes will have AIP.

Based on sales numbers and different countries buying them, Germany's fuel cell AIP and Sweden's Stirling AIP have been the most successful.

Countries that have recently announced plans to develop AIP include: Russia, Spain, India (DRDO) and France indicates it may develop a "second generation AIP". Possibly Japan and South Korea may develop indigenous AIP systems.

Different countries and different submarines builders will claim that their AIP is best. But these are  commercial claims. It depends what the customer country wants, what they actually need - all dependent on their typical mission profiles. Technological advances (such as Lithium-ion batteries and evolving anti-submarine sensors) also influence the value of AIP products. 

Any comparison/claim that AIP is like nuclear propulsion is a commercial or government/Navy sales pitch. It is like comparing a conventional high explosive bomb with a nuclear weapon. Nuclear propulsion can drive a submarine continuously at 30 knots for 3 months (only limited by food stocks for the crew). In comparison AIP technologies might only move an operational submarine (with full warload) at slow speed (4 knots?) for 3 weeks (?). Higher performance AIP systems may be possible but there might be major downsides eg. their stored explosive hydrogen and/or oxygen might make them too unsafe to be a usable weapon system.

Additional discussion of AIP issues comes by way of my response to Anonymous April 21, 2015 question "Why would you want the AIP removed from TKMS Type 214 for Australia?":

Australia might not want AIP because: 

-  AIP is not a standard inclusion for all new diesel submarines. Inclusion of AIP depends on a customer navy's typical mission profiles. Within the Type 214 a fuel cell AIP seems to be a compulsory sales inclusion that many countries don't need.

- AIP is ideal for countries with mission profiles that value 2 to 3 week submerged-slow or zero speed (sitting on the sea bottom). Some countries, like Sweden or Germany, when in the Baltic Sea, (or Singapore near its area) might have only 2 to 3 day missions when AIP alone may be sufficient. 

Australia's mission profile is very long distances, warm water, fast transit, then perhaps mainly medium speed patrolling. This places more value on efficient conventional diesel-electic operation which would not be at the expense of weighty AIP inclusion.

Also technological advances are trending toward submarines using Lithium-ion batteries (LIBs). Issues of relative energy efficiency AIP - batteries compared to LIBs - and LIBs compared to other batteries are very complex. See page 6 of this publication http://navyleague.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/The-Navy-Vol_70_No_4-Oct-2008.pdf for a brief discussion of the relative capacity. 

The newest batch of Soryus are believed not to have Stirling AIP but instead have LIB to cover slow-medium, prolonged, submerged operation. See S's calculations in the Comments thread. 

AIP's other possible downsides include:

- it is very expensive to incorporate into new build submarines or to retrofit - often amounting to one third of the submarine's price.

- non-replenishable during a mission

- very unsafe, flammable, even explosive, "S" reported, April 22, 2015 that "I agree about weak points of hydrogen fuel cell system for submarine. Submarines of this type are safe under the ordinary or non battle situation, but most important thing is safety under the battle situation with strong vibration or shock. Even if hull is not damaged, if slight hydrogen leakage is caused by tiny damages of piping system including valves, pressure gauges and joints, the submarine becomes perfectly dysfunctional. Because concentration of explosion limit for hydrogen is very low, you must avoid any kinds of stimuli as such heat or electrical ignition which cause explosion. And in the case of accident with hydrogen leakage, perhaps you cannot rescue the submariners by hull cutting with ignition."

- AIP involves weight tradeoffs. The weight taken up by AIP may in an Australian submarine be considered better used for extra batteries or diesel fuel.

- can break down (especially if it has moving parts like Stirling AIP)

- may be more efficient in cold water rather than Australia's mainly warm operating areas

For all these and other reasons AIP was never placed in the Collins sub - even though the Swedish-Kockums designers specialised in AIP subs.

Pete

Soryu - Lithium-ion battery Revolution from 2022?

April 24, 2015, 3:57 am

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≪ Previous: Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) Issues

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The following is mainly drawn from discussions between "S" and Pete on the Comments thread for Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) Issuesof April 23, 2015. A big thankyou to S for doing the estimates and providing other comments. 

S advises that originally Stirling AIP was unpopular in the Japanese Navy, because of its low power (2.5knots) and complicated operation. For Japan AIP was only a temporary measure on the Soryu until Lithium-ion batteries (LIBs) became a more mature technology.

Looking at the Table at the bottom of this article you will see the first tranch/group of what may eventually be 12 Soryu submarines are known as “16SS” in red. 16 is the last two digits of the Soryu’s first of class’s “Building no. 8116” and “SS” means conventional submarine. The “Soryu” 16SS was commissioned in 2009. 16SS is diesel-electric with lead-acid batteries and Stirling AIP.

Published figures for 16SS range/speed (see sidebar of Wiki) would most likely be for semi-submerged snorkel/snorting mode. 16SS fully submerged (no snorkel use) figures are classified but S’s estimate for submerged speed and endurance is 6 knots for 3 days.

The aim of S's input is to give an estimate for the fully submerged range/speed of the second tranche of Soryu’s further down the Table, known as 28SSin red. The first of class 28SS may be commissioned in 2022. It will not have AIP but instead will have new Lithium-ion batteries (LIBs).

As a yardstick for comparision the Collinssubmarine, has lead-acid batteries totalling 400 tonnes. Its range/speed is480 nautical milesat 4 knots

S estimates 28SS submerged speed/range and duration may be 5,040 nautical miles at 7 knots for  30 days.

HOW SPEED/RANGE AND DURATION ARE WORKED OUT

This 28SS estimate is based on a Japanese Navy (Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF)) estimate 10 years ago that LIBS have 1.5 times to twice the capacity and power (or is that twice the capacity and 1.5 times the power?) of lead-acid batteries.

While 16SS has AIP space and can carry only 500 low capacity lead-acid batteries (cells?) the 28SS will probably have five times more battery space = 500 LIBs + 2,000 LIBs in the space that used to house the AIP = 2,500 LIBs.

On the assumption that the submerged speed for 16SS is 6 knots and knowing power is proportional to the cube of velocity. Submerged speed for 28SS = 6 knots x 1.15 (cubic root of 1.5) = 7 knots.

Assuming the submerged duration for 16SS is 3 days the submerged duration for 28SS = 3 days x 2 (capacity ratio of 28SS/16SS) x 5 (batteries ratio of 28SS/16SS) = 30 days

Submerged range for 28SS = 30 days x 7 knots x 24 hours = 5,040nm.

COMMENTS

One must remember that the above are estimates based on several assumptions. Still, it indicates much greater submerged performance for the second tranche of Soryus (28SS) that will come into service from 2022.

Australia would want a transit speed (Fremantle to around Darwin and alternatively Freemantle to Sydney) of perhaps 12 knots. After that an Australian sub may rely on much more fully submerged LIB use in order to stay out of view of Chinese satellites (keeping away from Chinese undersea sensor arrays is another problem).

Variables that are difficult to predict are whether the next tranche of Soryus (28SS) is larger or smaller than 16SS or whether Japan may build an Australia-only version.

LIBs may well surpass expectations ever considered for AIP. But they still will not compare to the performance of nuclear propulsion. 

S used the following two web documents when doing the estimations:

-  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Drag_(physics), “Drag at high velocity”“Power” (in fluid dynamics 6 knot/h is high velocity).

-  https://samueldavey.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/fluid-dynamics-submarine-report.pdfan Australian Maritime College paper of 30 pages. This is especially interesting. It draws on Australian Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) findings. It explains why submarines are shaped as they are and what modifications can make them move more efficiently.

For further information on LIB issues and other Soryu issues see many more articles on Submarine Matters, including:

Technical issues and the Soryu - Lithium-ion batteries no AIP of February 12, 2015 and

MHI and KHI not at Australia's Future Submarine Summit, Adelaide, March 24-26, 2015 of March 24, 2015.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

THIS TABLE IS BASED (BASED ON WIKI)

	Building no.	Pennant no.	Name/Namesake	Laid down	Launched	Commissioned	Built By
16SS	8116	SS-501	Sōryū (そうりゅう) / Blue Dragon	31 March 2005	5 December 2007	30 March 2009	Mitsubishi
	8117	SS-502	Unryū (うんりゅう) / Cloud Dragon	31 March 2006	15 October 2008	25 March 2010	Kawasaki
	8118	SS-503	Hakuryū (はくりゅう) / White Dragon	6 February 2007	16 October 2009	14 March 2011	Mitsubishi
	8119	SS-504	Kenryū (けんりゅう) / Sword Dragon, Stegosauria	31 March 2008	15 November 2010	16 March 2012	Kawasaki
	8120	SS-505	Zuiryū (ずいりゅう) / Auspicious Dragon	16 March 2009	20 October 2011	6 March 2013	Mitsubishi
	8121	SS-506	Kokuryū (こくりゅう) / Black Dragon	21 January 2011	31 October 2013	(March 2015)	Kawasaki
	8122	SS-507	Jinryū (じんりゅう)/ Benevolent Dragon	14 February 2012	8 October 2014	(March 2016)	Mitsubishi
	8123	SS-508	?	2013?	2015?	2017?)	Kawasaki
	8124	SS-509	?	2014?	2016?	2018?	Mitsubishi?
	8125	SS-510	?	2015?	2017?	2019?	Kawasaki

28SS   8128      SS-513     ?                                           2018?          2020?          2022?            Mitsubishi?  

Again thankyou S for doing most of the work :)

Regards

Pete   

Singapore's Submarine Service - from Sweden to Germany

April 26, 2015, 8:14 pm

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A Dolphin 2 under construction in Kiel, Germany. Note complex rudder for tight turns in tight spots. Note the hard looking underbody for taking scrapes and sitting on the bottom (of the Malacca Strait)?

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Inside view of a Dolphin 2. Might Singapore's 218SGs look like this? 
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Singapore has worked closely with Sweden over two decades to build up a relaunched, but efficient, submarine service to meet Singapore's (presumably) short distance needs. Due to a uncharacteristically shortsighted Swedish decision in 1999 to sell its submarine builder to its German competitor this Swedish-Singaporean relationship appears to be gradually drawing to a close.

Singapore is maintaining a fleet of four operational submarines with the retirement of two of its older Challenger class submarines, RSS Challenger and RSS Centurionon March 11, 2015.

Singapore's submarine service now consists of:

- RSS Conqueror (Challenger class) launched 1967, relaunched 1999 - in semi-service to 2021? 
- RSS Chieftain (Challenger class) launched 1968, relaunched 2001 - in semi-service to 2022?

- RSS Archer (Archer class) 
- RSS Swordsman (Archer class)

All four submarines were built by Sweden's Kockums, were formerly in the Swedish Navy and will be replaced by (eventually four) German built TKMS-HDW 218SGs. This Swedish to German change directly followed Sweden's error in selling Kockums to HDW. Kockums was returned too late to avert the loss of new Singaporean business to Swedish (Saab) control in 2014. 

It remains unclear what the two TKMS-HDW 218SGs, when handed over to Singapore in 2020-2022, will most resemble - 212s, 214s, 216s or Dolphin 2s? The 218s will probably feature fuel-cell AIP and perhaps Lithium-ion batteries permitting an endurance of eleven weeks of which four weeks might be continuously submerged. They may also have a land attack capability and eventually Seal Delivery Vehicles and Large Diameter UUVs for surveillance in the shallows.

To pack all these features in a 218 would suggest a heavier sub than the Archer class (1,400 tonnes  surfaced) perhaps as heavy as the 2,000 tonne (surfaced) Dolphin 2. As the combined price of the 218s is less than US$2 Billion perhaps they are not as radically new as my 2014 prediction of a 3,000 tonne 216?

Pete

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Suspected Russian Mini-Submarine Near Helsinki, Finland

April 29, 2015, 2:40 am

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Indicating where suspected Russian mini-submarines were detected near Helsinki Harbour (late April 2015) and near Stockholm (October 2014 and January 2015).

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Helsinki Harbour. Suspected Russian (probably) mini-submarine detected late 2014. There would probably be sea-floor anti-submarine sensors arrays outside Helsinki Harbour (like Sweden's Malsten array). 

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There were many reports in the world media on April 28-29, 2015 that Finland's Navy had detected what was assumed to be a Russian submarine within Finland's territorial waters off Helsinki.

HNGN, April 28, 2015 reported: "Our sensors detected something, an uncertain underwater object, at lunchtime on Monday April 27, 2015] and then again overnight," Captain Olavi Jantunen told Helsingin Sanomat newspaper, reported the Guardian."Three [grenade] charges were dropped, but they were warning charges, with a light burst, meant to warn rather than do any harm to the object."

Jantunen said it's impossible to determine what the object was until a complete analysis has been performed on the sensor data, which could take as long as three weeks [takes about 3 minutes], according to the Guardian.

The [Finnish] defense ministry issued the following statement: "As part of the tasks to protect territorial integrity, the maritime surveillance system alerted the Finnish Navy of a possible underwater target around midday on 27 April 2015. The possible target was located within territorial waters, close to the limit of territorial waters off Helsinki. A search was then conducted by surface vessels."...

BACKGROUND AND COMMENT

The (probably) Russian mini-submarine or large diameter unmanned undersea vehicle (LDUUV) may be there to "trip" or test Finnish sensors or to make Finland politically nervous. This is like the Russian aircraft incursions - part of Putin's confrontational style. The mini-submarine may be a development of Russia's Losos-Pirana.

The Finnish Navy would have determined very quickly - via tell-tale sensor "signatures" - what type of undersea craft has trespassed Finland's territorial waters. For diplomatic-political reasons Finland would not accuse the trespasser, particularly if it is powerful and combative Russia. Though part of the European Union Finland maintains a careful neutral policy.

 The "sensors" used to alert the Finnish Navy may be hydrophones, magnetic anomally and other wireless or fixed sea-floor arrays deployed inside Finland territorial waters. Nokia Data Systems equipped the Finnish military with an integrated coastal surveillance system - according to late 1990s reports. This system would now be very high-tech with many of the sensor uprgrades and increased computer processing power available today. Even quite a small mini-submarine or LDUUV can be detected. Sweden's has its own Malsten Station array which no doubt is much improved since the 1980s.

The grenades used may be Saab ASW-601s [right-click mouse to translate to English] fitted to multiple grenade launchers on such Finnish vessels as the Hamina class missile boats. These grenades may have been aimed away from the suspected submarine/LDUUV or have adjustable burst features.

See Submarine Matters reports of October 25, 2015 and January 15, 2015 on Sweden's late 2014-early 2015 experience of suspected Russian mini-submarines or LDUUVs.

Pete

Defence Minister Kevin Andrews Apr 24, 2015 Visit to DCNS Cherbourg

May 3, 2015, 6:26 pm

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The SSBN Le Terrible under construction at DCNS Cherbourg submarine yard before its launch in 2008. Note the "H" plane rudder arrangement (more obvious here).

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Artist's conception of a Barracuda SSN (Courtesy of naval-technology (nt)). The first Barracuda Suffren is expected to be launched in 2017. It has X plane rudders typical of many SSKs and SSNs. I have not seen any photo of a Barracuda under construction. Can anyone help?

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Submarine Matters has covered Soryu and German TKMS submarine issues much more than issues  concerning France's DCNS. Little is known about what future submarine DCNS is offering to Australian future submarine selectors.  The French submarine might be called "conventional Barracuda SSK" or "SMX Ocean" both presumably weighing the same as the Barracuda SSN - 4,700 tonnes (surfaced). Or perhaps DCNS is offering an enlarged Scorpene of 4,000 tonnes (submerged) - hence "Scorpene-4000". The following is a NewswireToday report of April 24, 2015 http://www.newswiretoday.com/news/152321/ :

"DCNS Welcomes Australian Defence Minister to Cherbourg Shipyards"

“Cherbourg, Manche, France, 2015/04/24 - , Hervé Guillou, chairman and chief executive of DCNS Group, welcomed the Australian Minister for Defence, Hon. Kevin Andrews MP, to the company’s shipyards in Cherbourg, France.The Minister was given a tour of DCNS’ shipyard and explanation was given to him on the overall SSN / SSK capability and expertise of the site.

Cherbourg is the industrial base for DCNS and the heart of the company’s submarine capability. The city’s port has a long military history and has specialised in the construction of submarines since the late 19th century. From this date, 107 submarines have been built in Cherbourg, including 16 nuclear powered submarines. Currently, four Barracuda SSN are under construction in the shipyard. The first of class will be delivered to the French Navy in 2017.

DCNS has established a subsidiary company, DCNS Australia, in order to support its business operations in Australia.

“DCNS, in cooperation with the French Government, is supporting the Australian Government’s Competitive Evaluation Process for the Future Submarine program,” Mr Guillou said. “In coming months, DCNS will provide a total solution that meets all of the Royal Australian Navy’s needs”."

Press Contacts In Australia

Zackary McLennan

T: +61 434 996 461  

Connect with:

Submarine Matters April 15, 2015 article http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2015/04/minister-andrews-on-foreign-visit-to.html, and

Media Release: Minister for Defence – Ministerial visit to France – 24 April 2015 

http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2015/04/24/minister-for-defence-ministerial-visit-to-france-24-april-2015/

Pete

Any decision to build Australian subs overseas unlikely until late 2016

May 5, 2015, 2:44 am

≫ Next: Minister Andrews Phone Call to Minister Nakatani

≪ Previous: Defence Minister Kevin Andrews Apr 24, 2015 Visit to DCNS Cherbourg

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The likely mild nature of Australia's next Tuesday May 12, 2015 Federal Budget will prove an indicator that the Abbott Government wishes to avoid decisions that might alienate voters. Abbott's idea to "Build submarines overseas" will  increasingly become a decision to be delayed.

The Abbott Government originally plannedto make a decision in early 2016  on who (Japan, France or Germany) would build Australia's future submarine and where (mainly in Australia or mainly overseas). Early 2016 was the earliest period after the stages of the Competitive Evaluation Process (and see) were completed and also after part publications of the 2015 Defence White Paper and associated Force Structure Review.

It is likely that the Abbott Government will only make a decision AFTER the next Federal Election (likely in late 2016) that the submarines will be built overseas. 

Considerations are:

- The May 12, 2015 Federal Budget [watch this space] is already shaping up to be mild, risk averse and sensitive not to alienate too many of Australia's 16 million voters. This is because the Coalition Government's austere May 2014 Budget made the Government rapidly unpopular with  average voters. If Abbott were to declare a submarine policy that effectively meant that $20 Billion of Australia's declining revenue would be sent to Japan to buy Soryus this would be very unpopular. 

- The next Election by law must be held on or before January 14, 2017. However Governments rarely call elections in December or January as this causes voter resentment (too close to the major holiday period in Australia). An election in the southern hemisphere Spring ie. September, October or November 2016, is more likely.

- South Australian voters will become increasingly sensitive about shipbuilding job losses (or lack of growth) prior car factory job losses fully impacting. South Australian car factories have closed in the last few years including 1,000 job losses from the Mitsubishi factory closure in 2008 and General Motors Holden in South Australia is due to close by late 2017 with 1,600 job losses. 

Abbott would be mindful that a decision to build the submarines overseas might just lose him the 2016 Federal Election. Not only the Navy, workers and unions but many business leaders in Australia’s manufacturing sector prefer “Build in Australia”. Meanwhile, the submarine issue may influence votes definitly in South Australia but also in Victoria and NSW (both are also involved in submarine builds). The Labor Party Opposition's “Build Submarines in Australia” may prove increasingly attractive.

Hence, only after a September 2016 or October 2016 Election, is a definite Federal Government decision on any overseas build likely.

Pete

Minister Andrews Phone Call to Minister Nakatani

May 7, 2015, 3:12 am

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Japanese Defence Minister Gen* Nakatani throws himself from a parachute training simulator. Can Nakatani face the probable submarine sale to Australia challenge?

* Note that Gen (his first name not a previous rank) used to be a Captain in the Japanese Army's ranger-parachute corps. He can do things that no other Defence Minister would dare attempt. (Photo Courtesy Getty Images)

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A whole series of news articles on May 6, 2015 and May 7, 2015 have reported Australian Defence Minister Andrews' phone call invitation to Japanese Defence Minister Nakatani. This was a formal courtesy call for Japan to provide secret technical information in response to Australia's future submarine "competitive evaluation process". Minister Nakatani undertook to provide information in the next few weeks and reminded Minister Andrews of Australia's and Japan's increasingly close security-defence relations. This follows Minister Andrews visits to the German Defence Minister and TKMS on April 23, 2015 and to the French Defence Minister and DCNS on April 24, 2015.

As an aside Japanese-Australian relations have been formalised in the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation of March 2007 and the more recent Agreement Between The Government Of Japan And The Government Of Australia Concerning The Transfer Of Defence Equipment And Technology of July 2014

On the Andrews-Nakatani telephone call Japanese media reports include NHK on May 6, 2015 and Japan Today on May 7, 2015 and Australian reports of May 7, 2015, included AFR and SMH so far.   
Some issues arising from these articles and also previous issues raised in Submarine Matters include:

- Japanese Government indecision and inexperience regarding when and how to supply sensitive technical information to sell a major weapons system. The Japanese Government wants to know that Japan has been selected before it supplies all of the technical information desired. Perhaps Japan is already confident it has been selected so is happy to supply almost all.

- Lithium-ion batteries (LIBs) and removal of Stirling air independent propulsion (AIP) will be the most major technical changes in the Soryu Mark 2 "28SS" (first one probably lauched in 2020). Japan cannot be certain how LIBs will perform operationally in a submarine let alone one not built. It is unknown whether Japanese submarine (JS) Asashio TSS-3601, previously an AIP testbed, has been refitted as a LIB testbed?

- As LIBs will be lighter than existing lead-acid batteries and Stirling AIP removed this will (or should) allow more diesel fuel to be carried to provide Australian Soryus with the approximately 12,000 nautical mile range required by Australia.

- Japan and Australia cannot be certain how efficiently the US combat system (sensors, database and weapons) will operate when mated to a Japanese submarine for the first time.

- Japan's political-military-industrial establishment will need resolve and sometimes muddle-through  all the political, legal, Japanese public relations and procedural processes that will arise in the sale of Japan's first major weapons system to a foreign country.  

- Communication, language and cultural differences between Australia and Japan need to be faced and resolved. 10,000s of technical manual will need to be translated - not just at a literal level but the level of nuance for certain understanding.  This would include many Australian managers, technicians and naval officers learning Japanese and visa versa. Ideally 50? Australians will need to train in operational Japanese submarines. This will be much harder than English speakers understanding French and German language and personnel.

Even if Germany or France win this all represents Australia's greatest defence acquisition challenge. Whether the abolition of the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) makes the acquisition easier remains to be seen.

Pete

Aussie Submarine's Victory Over The US Navy

May 10, 2015, 6:41 am

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HMAS Rankin, a Collins class submarine,
defeats powerful US anti-submarine forces at Exercise Silent Fury.

My thanks to MHalblaub for spotting the youtube above. The youtube shows the Australian Collins class submarine HMAS Rankin as it takes part in a naval exercise with the US Navy off the coast of Hawaii. The captain, Steve Hussey, plans and executes a strategy to elude detection by the US fleet. This involves initially encouraging his crew to 'make a bit of noise’ so that the US ships will become accustomed to a high level of sonar 'noise’. This is followed by a period of silence in which they hope to evade detection. The plan appears to work.

Silent Fury, the exercise depicted in the clip, was part of the multinational maritime warfare exercise RIMPAC 04, carried out in July 2004. RIMPAC04 involved seven nations, Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the USA and the UK, practising their warfare and communication skills. The RIMPACexercises involved training in tactical proficiency, non-combatant evacuation operations, antisubmarine warfare and humanitarian assistance.

Sonar is commonly used by ships and submarines to detect underwater obstacles and search for other vessels, and by fishers searching for schools of fish. There are two types of sonar – passive sonar is a listening device, an acoustic receiver that emits no sound but listens for and analyses the sounds of other vessels, while active sonar sends out a pulse of sound into the water and locates objects by timing the returned 'echo’ of the sound pulse. Sonar reception depends on water temperature, other activity in the area and the weather on the surface but it is possible to detect noisy vessels more than 100 km away.

Australia is only the second country in the world after Norway to allow women, such as the sonar operators seen in the clip, to serve on submarines. Within the Australian armed forces, women are now allowed to work in support (non-combat) roles in battle zones.

See the youtube string at https://youtu.be/d8Kv4rqR6RQ  and http://aso.gov.au/titles/documentaries/submariners/clip2/ 

Pete

Usama bin Laden - Official US Narrative of His Death in May 2011 Weakening

May 12, 2015, 3:27 am

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President Obama's account weakening on the circumstances of bin Laden's death. To what degree is there a liaison between ISI and US agencies in the real world?

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A famous American journalist/writer, Seymour Hersh, on May 11, 2015, provided a convincing alternative narrative of the May 2011 Abbottabad operation that killed Usama bin Laden. This should make more respectable what Indians and I have been saying years before Hersh.

What Hersh said:

 - in shorter form includes http://www.news.com.au/world/north-america/pulitzer-prize-winning-journalist-seymour-hersh-claims-bin-laden-was-an-invalid-when-he-died/story-fnh81jut-1227350564489 and

- Hersh's 10,000 word essay “The Killing of Osama bin Laden”,  London Review of Books, Vol. 37, No. 10, (to be published in hardcopy May 21, 2015), pp. 3-12, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v37/n10/seymour-m-hersh/the-killing-of-osama-bin-laden  

What former RAW Chief Dulat said, Rediff News, May 5, 2011 reports http://www.rediff.com/news/special/if-america-kept-pakistan-in-the-dark-on-osama-their-ties-will-end-says-as-dulat/20110505.htm

What I said in 2013:

- From 2005 White House Knew About bin Laden's Imprisonment at Abbottabad

http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/09/from-2005-white-house-knew-about-bin.html (last updated September 2013) and

- Bin Laden's imprisonment from 2005, On Line Opinion, December 12, 2013 http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=15855 below:

ON LINE opinionAustralia’s e-journal of social and political debate

Bin Laden's imprisonment from 2005

By Peter Coates - posted Friday, 20 December 2013

Why do we trust President Obama's narrative that the US had no idea where Usama bin Laden (UBL) was from the time UBL fled Tora Bora in late 2001 to the time the US "discovered" his whereabouts in late 2010? Specifically was "UBL" (the acronym used by American intelligence) able to hide undetected at the Abbottabad compound from 2005 to 2010? My contention is that from 2005 UBL was not merely hiding at Abbottabad but in most respects a prisoner, behind the high walls of the compound. It is likely that UBL's imprisonment at Abbottabad from 2005 was known to small national security groups on a need-to-know basis in Pakistan, the US and (probably) UK from 2005. This article presents several arguments supporting this contention.

The imprisonment of UBL from 2005 represents a major success for the US and Pakistani intelligence services. However the few in the US who knew about this could not admit that they knew where UBL was from 2005 but chose not to kill or capture him in 2005. Equally the Pakistani leadership and its intelligence officers could not admit to cooperating with US intelligence in imprisoning UBL. UBL was, after all, a popular figure among some segments of the Pakistani population.

The depth of US intelligence coverage of Pakistan means that the US would probably have been aware of UBL's location in Pakistan from 2001. A former head of Indian foreign intelligence (RAW) provided the following information in 2011 "Do you know how many intelligence operatives work for America inside Pakistan? …There are around 3,000 [three thousand] intelligence operatives helping Americans collect information." Added to this human intelligence (HUMINT) coverage is the intensity of US signals intelligence (SIGINT) coverage of Pakistan – revealed in 2013 by Edward Snowden.

It was the job of Pakistani intelligence to know where such an infamous figure as UBL was when he lived in Pakistan. Given close contact between some Pakistani intelligence officers and UBL since the 1980s it is highly likely that Pakistan would continue to keep track of him - especially after 9/11. From 2005 the construction, purpose and maintenance of UBL's unusually large compound within the Abbottabad military suburb-base could not have occurred without the knowledge of Pakistani intelligence - which is staffed by military officers.

So why did UBL's imprisonment occur from late 2005? The late 2005 construction and occupation of the compound is in line with accounts given by UBL's wives, his Abbottabad neighbours and US "before and after" satellite imagery. 2005 marked a mixed al Qaeda-homegrown terrorist bombing of the London transport system on July 7, 2005 (later dubbed "7/7"). British intelligence would have stated loud and clear to the US and Pakistan that Britain was unhappy that UBL was still at large and still effective. 7/7 may have been a (or the) major reason for UBL being finally imprisoned in late 2005.

President Bush's pressing need in 2002 to find UBL, but lack of such a need by 2006, also points to UBL's location being known in 2005. It is significant that in 2002 Bush wanted UBL "dead or alive" but by 2006 Bush was saying capturing UBL is "not a top priority use of American resources." In line with this The Washington Post reported that the CIA paramilitary unit dedicated to capturing UBL was shut down by the Bush Administration in late 2005. The decision to shut down this "Find UBL Unit" was made because, by late 2005, the US knew where UBL was - safely imprisoned in Abbottabad.

But why imprison UBL rather than kill him? An imprisoned UBL made him an increasingly ineffectual leader – thus weakening al Qaeda. UBL also acted as a "stalking horse" permitting the monitoring by US and Pakistani intelligence of those in the al Qaeda leadership structure who remained in contact with him (2005 - 2011). The passage of information gleaned from al Qaeda helped American intelligence to head off all major al Qaeda attacks on Western countries from late 2005.

By late 2010 those in al Qaeda's leadership who were aware of UBL's imprisonment, would have become increasingly suspicious and demoralised the longer he remained immobile in Abbottabad. They would have communicated with him less and relied on him less. Through this process UBL's intelligence value to US and Pakistani intelligence declined as did the need to keep him alive. At the same time President Obama, wished to exploit the political value of "finding" and having UBL executed on Obama's watch. Hence UBL was executed in March 2011.

This article is not meant to be a criticism of the US or Pakistan. In fact if this account is accurate UBL's imprisonment constituted a successful intelligence operation - disrupting al Qaeda for five and a half years (2005 – 2011). Success has also been achieved in muzzling the mainstream media. Major intelligence operations that are successful can be kept secret for decades. Just look at the highly successful World War Two Anglo-American, Ultra SIGINT Operation which was kept officially secret for 29 years. All credit to the Pakistani leaders, Pakistani intelligence, President Obama, US intelligence and even President Bush, for making the six year Abbottabad Operation happen.

Pete

North Korea's alleged new SINPO class submarine and missile test

May 12, 2015, 5:30 pm

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 I have added several extra hyperlinks, comments in [ ] brackets and a photo (particularly concerning the suspected missiles, Golf and SINPO-class submarines) relevant to the following article.

That article is by Sean Gallagher at arstechnica published May 12, 2015 concerning North Korea's   alleged submarine launch of a ballistic missile. The submarine and missile details will need to be fully verified by intelligence agencies before they are taken as fact. 

So far, on May 13, 2015, US intelligence said North Korea may have achieved what is called a limited compressed gas ejection test. This is called a perhaps 200 meter "cold launch" in the vertical launch business.

South Korea is more than usually concerned about North Korea's emerging SLBM capability. See my April 16, 2015 article which mentions a future South Korea pre-emptive strike capability.

The arstechnica string is http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/05/north-korea-test-launches-polaris-1-ballistic-missile-from-submarine/ :

"North Korea test-launches “Polaris-1” ballistic missile from submarine

Analysts say DPRK missile subs could threaten Japan, South Korea in five years.

by Sean Gallagher - May 12, 2015 2:35am AEST

On May 9, a Korean People's Army Naval Force submarine test-launched a ballistic missile off the eastern coast of North Korea. The test launch, reported by North Korea's Rodong Sinmun newspaper, only traveled about 150 meters, according to South Korean defense officials. But it demonstrated that North Korea had developed the capability of performing submerged launches of missiles well ahead of previous intelligence estimates. Based on the launch, South Korean officials now believe that North Korea could have a limited submarine-launched missile capability deployed to its fleet of submarines within the next five years.

The test comes as South Korea nears a decision on the deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile system. China has been pressuring South Korea to not allow the deployment, but an earlier, barge-based test of the submarine-launchable missile (named "Polaris-1" by North Korea) on April 22 has made the deployment more likely.

North Korean press images of Kim Jong-un's successful supervision of the "Polaris-1" launch.

Polaris-1 [possibly a BM25-Musudan] [possibly also called "KN-11" or "KN-02"] is apparently a close copy of a Soviet-era R-27 ...SLBM...liquid-fuel SS-N-6 "Serb." This is the third test launch of the missile this year, but it is the first [possibly] submarine launch. Developed in apparent violation of a UN resolution banning North Korean ballistic missile development, the missile could have a range of about 1,500 miles.

The original R-27 was capable of carrying three independent nuclear warheads. An explosion of an R-27 missile caused by a reaction between a seawater leak and fuel residue aboard the Soviet "Yankee" class ballistic missile sub K-219 in 1986 off of Bermuda led to one of the most tense moments in the late Cold War (later breathlessly and inaccurately recounted in one of the worst submarine movies ever, Hostile Waters).

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, who had previously planned to travel to Russia over the weekend but then cancelled his plans last week, was on hand to observe the launch. "He stressed that the acquisition of the technology of firing ballistic missile from a strategic submarine underwater made it possible for the KPA to possess a world-level strategic weapon capable of striking and wiping out in any waters the hostile forces infringing upon the sovereignty and dignity of Songun Korea and conduct any underwater operation," reported the Korean Central News Agency, North Korea's government news service.

Almost all of North Korea's existing submarine fleet is made up of diesel-electric submarines with limited range, including about 20 based on the 1950s Soviet Project 633 ("Romeo") design imported from China or locally built. [North Korea reportedlyoperates 22 (or 20) Romeo class submarines. Seven were directly imported from China between 1973 and 1975, and the remainder locally assembled with Chinese supplied parts between 1976 and 1995. One apparently sank in an accident in 1985. Four Chinese imported units are based on North Korea’s western coast.]

A new submarine with one or two vertical missile launch tubes in its sail was spotted being built at North Korea's Sinpo South Shipyard last summer. [see photo inserted below

[North Korea's new "SINPO class" submarine (also see) considered capable of launching up to 3 SLBMs - Photo Courtesy http://38north.org/2015/01/jbermudez010815/. 38north wonders "Exactly what missile system would be used in a ballistic missile submarine (SSB) is purely speculative at this point. Several possibilities are a shorter naval version of the Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile, a Nodong medium-range ballistic missile, naval versions of the solid-fuelled KN-02 short-range ballistic missile or an entirely new system."

Wiki contributors wonder whether the SINPO's design may be derived from old Yugoslav Heroj and Sava small sub designs ^[1] and/or from medium sized Soviet/Russian Kilo class, or Golf class designs. Wiki also estimated SINPO's weight as "1,000-1,500 tons", length "65.5 meters" and range "1,500 nautical miles". It is difficult to know whether SINPO is diesel-electric or only has a battery (just electric)]

North Korea also obtained 10 Soviet Golf-II diesel-electric ballistic missile submarines, built in the late 1950s, from Russia in 1994. The Golf-II, or "Project 629A," submarines, which are capable of carrying three SLBMs, were transferred by Russia as scrap to North Korea. However, it is now believed that North Korea has been working on reactivating some of the subs and that one was used for the test launch this weekend.

The Golf-II class [Fourteen Golf Is were extensively modified  in 1966–1972 to carry larger, longer range missiles, becoming known as 629A's by the Soviet Navy and Golf IIs by NATO.] carried the R-27 missile toward the end of its active duty in the Soviet Navy and had an operational range of 9,500 nautical miles (about 11,000 miles). They were capable of 17 knots (about 20 mph) when running on the surface and 12 knots (about 14 mph) when submerged. So in theory, a North Korean Golf-II submarine could get in range of the United States for a launch, but it would require being at sea for two to three months to get close enough to strike, transiting a lot of open ocean. The Korean Peoples' Army Navy is mostly a coastal force with no deep-water experience, and diesel subs transiting the Pacific would be easy targets for US sensors and patrols.

The bigger concern is that these subs could evade detection in Korean coastal waters and launch attacks against South Korea and Japan with little warning. Jeffrey Lewis of the California-based Monterey Institute of International Studies told Reuters, "While North Korea's submarines are not especially effective, the challenge of finding even a small number of specific submarines armed with missiles would be quite a challenge.""

Pete

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Thailand may eventually purchase two submarines

March 24, 2015, 9:28 pm

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What appears to be a commissioning ceremony for two of Thailand's Matchanu class submarine in 1938. They were 370 tons surfaced.

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Model of a Matchanu class submarine (courtesy thaigunship). Submarines, up to 1945, carried many objects on the hull and often had upturned bows - all leading to slow submerged speeds.

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On March 25, 2015 the Bangkok Postreported a rise in Thai interest in submarines: "A plan to buy submarines for the Royal Thai Navy is on again with strong backing from Defence Minister Prawit Wongsuwon who wants Thailand’s fleet to be on par with neighbouring countries. [The Thai Navy may want] two diesel-powered submarines with displacement of 2,400-3,000 tonnes. The source said the Chinese-made Yuan class is favoured by the committee due to its specifications. The "U-class" [do they mean U-209 class?] from South Korea and Germany also pinged the sonar screen." 

Comment - the possible budget reported elsewhere equal to US$1.1 Billion would indicate a total  upfront price for two modern medium sized submarines. 

BACKGROUND

Japan sold four Matchanu class submarines to Thailand in 1938. Thailand may have decommissioned these submarines in 1951 or 1955 - see "Vigilis" and my comments. The early decommissioning was probably due to eventual lack of use, high operating costs and defeated Japan's inability to sustain, repair or supply spare parts for these submarines.

In recent years Thailand has been evaluating several small-medium submarine types with a view to restarting a submarine service that actually operates submarines. An interesting entry in http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/thailand/ssk.htm states:

"It has been standard practice with the Thai submarine program ever since it was originally floated in 1959, proposals are floated and subsequently suspended and revived several times until cancelled. It was revived (and canceled again) in 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2003, and 2009."

Thailand has several reasons for its current evaluation of submarines. The reasons include the growth and modernisation of navies surrounding Thailand. Nearby countries have developed submarine services, including India, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam and China. 

Bangladesh recently ordering two submarines from China and possible Burmese interest in Chinese submarines provide additional reasons for Thailand to buy submarines. Submarines provide a potent asymmetric defensive weapon for countries with small navies. Submarines also contribute to a country's and its Navy's prestige. The Royal Thai Navy has apparently established a submarine squadron at Sattahip naval base which has  a German-made Rheinmetall submarine simulator, staffed by RTN officers who have received submarine training in Germany, as well as South Korea, over the past two years.

Most submarine building countries have offered to sell two or three submarines to Thailand, including:

- France-DCNS (Scorpene?)

- South Korea-DSME (Chang Bogo class, Type 209 derivative) or alternatively the unbuilt "HDS-500RTN" based on the unbuilt "KSS-500A" (510 tons, crew of 10) which is in-turn a descendant of Germany's HDW Type 207 (Kobben) small defensive submarines.

- China - the "S-26T" which may be a version of China's Yuan class or used Romeo-Ming class?

- Germany-TKMS-HDW Type 209/1400mod and also the Type 210mod 
  
- Russia's improved Kilo class (Project 636)

- Sweden? (mysteriously silent). Perhaps two (further) refitted Sodermanland class? (currently Sweden's HMS Södermanland and HMS Östergötland?).

COMMENT

Thailand has been hesitant in acquiring submarines possibly seeking leases, used subs or good credit terms. This is in a business environment where the Thai economy is growing more slowly than anticipated. 

Thailand appears to be seeking smaller than standard submarines. If used submarines are considered the remaining German built Type 207s (Kobben class) and Chinese Romeo-Ming class are likely to be obsolete and rusty as they have passed or are nearing their 30 year use-buy dates. Design and construction of modern 500 ton submarines are likely to be expensive as they are smaller than standard - requiring higher than usual design costs for low production numbers. As Thailand has had no submarines for more than 60 years there is no easy answer to what Thailand needs - no simple replacement program. The German simulator may increase the chances that Germany or South Korea (using German designs) might eventually win any Thai order. 

I'm wondering about the silence on Sweden. With Sweden's recently announced pre-order of two A26s this may free-up Sweden's two Sodermanland class (currently Sweden's HMS Södermanland and HMS Östergötland) for further refitting and sale to Thailand. This is noting there is a historical precedent where Sweden effectively created Singapore's submarine service using 4 Challenger class (refitted Swedish) submarines. 

The question "what does Thailand want?" remains. Thailand may need small submarines for shallow, littoral waters in the Gulf of Thailand and Andaman Sea yet Thailand may also need medium sized submarines for longer range/endurance. Subs with AIP may be on Thailand's list of needs.

SOURCES 

My earlier article Bangladesh, Philippine, Burma and Thailand Submarine Issues, January 2, 2015.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/thailand/ssk.htm 

http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/thailand-eyes-submarine-fleet/

http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20150115000149&cid=1101

http://rpdefense.over-blog.com/2015/03/hyundai-offers-submarine-hds-500rtn-to-thailand.html

http://www.janes.com/article/48467/tkms-offers-type-209-and-type-210-submarines-to-royal-thai-navy

Pete

South Korean "Kill Chain" Preemptive Strike on North Korea - Problems

May 14, 2015, 11:26 pm

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A South Korean preemptive ("Kill Chain") strike on North Korea would be even more complicated and dangerous than described below. To what extent would the US, Russia, China and Japan become embroiled? (Click on image to expand, Courtesy National Post)

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In relation to North Korea’s developing nuclear ballistic missile and submarine launch capabilities South Korean preemptive strike (“Kill Chain”) doctrine is under pressure. Kill Chain may be obsolete with the possibility that eventual South Korean nuclear deterrence will be needed to replace it. Over the next three days I will write three articles on this issue. This is the first.

South Korea has been pushing for an indigenous nuclear deterrence capability since the early 1970s however US pressure and promises have been sufficient for South Korea to accept US extended nuclear deterrence. Nevertheless South Korea is more advanced in ballistic missile development than is generally known. 

The pressure on South Korea’s leadership of North Korea's action over the last week is reflected in Korea Joongang Daily’s, May 13, 2015 article "Park calls for a response to North’s launch"http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3004109&cloc=joongangdaily%7Chome%7Cnewslist1. President Park is seeking an expansion of preemptive strike sensor infrastructure to handle the emerging North Korean SLBM threat.

The process and requirements of Kill Chain premptive strike were summarised by Professor Choi Jong-kun of Yonsei University, Seoul in 2013. Under this doctrine the South Korean (with presumably US assistance) intelligence and military establishment would need to react to North Korea in order to:

“1. Within one minute, South Korean intelligence must pick up signals that North Korea intends to attack preemptively; and

2. Within one minute, South Korea must establish what and where North Korea intends to attack preemptively; and

3. Within three minutes, the supreme commander of the South Korean military must be able to hand down an order to strike preemptively against North Korean targets; and

4. South Korea must attack the relevant sites in North Korea before North Korea has time to launch its own attack; and

5. South Korea must be able to establish whether its initial strikes were sufficient to eliminate the source of the intended North Korean strike; and

6. South Korea must be capable of responding to immediate North Korean counterstrikes from elsewhere."

Problems with South Korean Kill Chain preemptive strike include:

-  The role of civilian South Korean authority particularly President Park in the chain of command and decision making?

-  The role of the US military and civilian authorities? South Korea needs complete confidence that US compliance and involvement in the Kill Chain will be nearly instant.

-  South Korea and the US need complete confidence that China would allow a preemptive strike on its client-buffer state North Korea.

-  Kill Chain requires perfect knowledge that North Korea wishes to launch a major strike against South Korea. By major this means that at least one nuclear (not conventional high explosive of chemical?) missile is about to be launched at South Korea (not Japan).

-  the problem of only one nuclear missile but (say) 100+ decoy high explosive missiles?

-  All the North Korea missiles must be destroyed on their launch platforms or shot down and all NK submarines, warships, air force aircraft and disguised North Korea “civilian” ships or "civilian" aircraft capable of firing nuclear tipped ballistic OR cruise missiles or bombs must be destroyed.

-  These shoot downs and sinkings must be as close to instant and simultaneous as possible. In that regard South Korean cruise missiles might be far too slow for the job.

Without perfect knowledge South Korea could make a situation where North Korea is merely debating the notion of a strike OR only wishes a conventional missile/bomb strike a nationally fatal act be South Korea. 

Where South Korea commits what might be considered an unnecessary preemptive "Pearl Harbor" attack will that make South Korea an international outcast? 

An unfounded South Korea preemptive strike would almost guarantee a massive nuclear response to South Korea (and perhaps Japan) or total North Korea desire to build a nuclear response in future.

Unless regime change to North Korea took place a South Korean preemptive strike would just be the beginning of further hostilities.

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The second article will be on South Korea's ballistic missile and nuclear history and future intentions. The third article will be on the extention of the Kill Chain to SLBM capable submarines. 

Connect withNorth Korea's alleged new SINPO class submarine and missile test, May 13, 2015 (below).

Pete

South Korean Future Nuclear Weapon Program

May 16, 2015, 9:06 pm

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If building nuclear weapons South Korea would rate highly the ability to penetrate deep North Korean bunkers or missile silos. South Korea has no appropriate aircraft (no US B-2s, pictured) but does have ballistic missiles for delivery. (Courtesy FAS).

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Nuclear weapons cycle. Highly simplified but some major stages. Uranium enrichment can also go more directly - to shaping then placement in device/warhead.

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South Korea has wished to increase its “breakout capacity” (ability to build nuclear weapons) or actually build them for decades. Such weapons would mainly provide a deterrent against North Korean or perhaps Chinese or Russian nuclear strikes or invasions. 

If nuclear war actually occurred South Korea would see the need to penetrate deeply dug North Korean command bunkers, ballistic missile silos and now SLBM submarines. On land such penetration is more easily accomplished using nuclear weapons rather than developing a very heavy bunker busting conventional bomb capability (which only the US possesses).

For decades the US has knocked back South Korea’s nuclear aspirations by pledging to provide extended nuclear deterrence. However South Korean anxiety remains that the US would not risk nuclear war – especially against China or Russia. North Korea’s SLBM program underlines that North Korea is deepening its nuclear weapon efforts rather than denuclearising its armed forces.

In terms of the three ingredients for nuclear capability (delivery systems, device and nuclear explosives) South Korea:

- has built a ballistic and cruise missile force capable of hitting any target in North Korea with a 500 kg warhead (see next article, later today).

- would have designs of nuclear weapons since the 1960s, supplemented in the 1990s by designs circulated by the A Q Khan network. South Korea may not have “cold tested” any device – certainly not hot tested – and may lack nuclear test results from any nuclear weapon nation.

- South Korea lacks the 100 kgs of nuclear explosives in the form of Plutonium 238 and/or HEU required to build a sufficient number of nuclear weapons.

To make up the explosive shortfalls South Korea needs the ability to reprocess spent fuel from its 23 nuclear power reactors or to enrich Uranium.

Since 1974, South Korea has signed a pact with the United States not to reprocess spent fuel. The pact (123 Agreement) expired March 2014, was immediately extended two years and is now due to expire in 2016. North Korea SLBM intentions have increased South Korea’s desire to have the right to reprocess if it wished. South Korea has proposed a technology known as pyroprocessingbut the US still opposes it as a type of reprocessing.

South Korea can point to the existence of permitted-legal Japanese reprocessing facilities. Japan’s reasons for reprocessing remain implausible given the highly uneconomic nature of reprocessing compared to other less expensive forms of disposal. Also Japan can buy fresh uranium cheaply at the low existing uranium prices (since the Fukushima disaster).

South Korea could also build nuclear weapons that solely rely on HEU or use HEU to boost Plutonium weapons. HEU might be produced by gas diffusion in centrifuges on a massive and obvious industrial scale. Alternatively laser enrichment technology is available that can enrich on a smaller less obvious scale.

The problems of South Korean testing and weaponisation-miniaturisation, in secrecy, are serious in the very small Korean Peninsula. South Korea might therefore have to obtain improved designs and test results (even if old) from a nuclear weapon nation or non-state actor.

CONNECT WITH

-  South Korean Submarines, 3,000+ ton KSS-III, Nuclear PotentialApril 16, 2015 http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2015/04/south-korean-submarines-3000-ton-kss.html

-  Mark Holt, “U.S. and South Korean Cooperation in the World Nuclear Energy Market: Major Policy Considerations”, Congressional Research Service, June 25, 2013

https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41032.pdf especially page 1.

-  http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/south-korea/ 

-  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_power_in_South_Korea, and 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Korean_nuclear_research_programs#Previously_unreported_experiments

Pete

South Korean Submarine Launched Missiles Possibilities - Modi Visit

May 17, 2015, 4:37 am

≫ Next: South Korea's Undersea Anti-Submarine Sensor Network - Part of SEAWEB

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(Courtesy Free Republic) Major sites of North Korean ballistic missiles with ranges of perhaps 2,000 km - capable of hitting all of South Korea and Japan. Some are in hard to penetrate silos. South Korea and the US may face restrictions on targeting sites near the Chinese border (including Chunggang-up).  This is due to the risk of SK-US warhead explosions effecting Chinese citizens as well as secondary fallout from destroyed NK warheads or nuclear facilities.  

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Also high on South Korea's target list would be North Korean nuclear research and possibly reactor and reprocessing sites (although fallout may be a consideration in not attacking reactors or reprocessing sites). South Korea and the US may face restrictions on targeting sites near the Chinese border (including Yongjo-ri and Hyesan).  This is due to the risk of SK-US warhead explosions effecting Chinese citizens as well as secondary fallout from destroyed NK warheads or nuclear facilities.  

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Please connect with -  South Korean Submarines, 3,000+ ton KSS-III, Nuclear Potential, April 16, 2015 and South Korean Future Nuclear Weapon Program, May 17, 2015

The following mainly deals with South Korean submarine launched missiles. It is acknowledged that South Korean land based missiles and a major US land/sea/aircraft launched missile and bomb  contribution would acutely influence the submarine aspects and requirements.

Indicates coverage over North Korea of South Korean missiles of 300km and 500km range. Their launch from a predictable launch point in SK runs the risk of NK destruction of the missiles at that launch point and greater effectives of NK anti-missiles-missiles shooting down missiles from that SK launch point. This underlines the value of  SK submarine launched missiles.

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South Korea (SK) has been developing land based ballistic missile with ranges around 800 km sufficient to reach all of North Korea (NK) and warheads of at least 500 kg. In order to penetrate silos and bunkers SK is probably working towards 1,000 kg warhead capabilities. 

To face NK's developing submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) threat South Korea would also be considering building an SLBM capability. SLBM would frequently shorten SK's time to NK target capability which is so important in SK's preemptive strike “Kill Chain” strategy. SLBMs are hard to shoot down due to their speed, of 3,000+ km/h, and variable (rather than on land predictable) launch points. Variable launch points complicate an enemy's battle plan thus adding to uncertainty - hopefully promoting deterrence.

South Korea's existing submarine launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) carry disadvantages of subsonic only (around 800 km/h) speeds making them frequently too slow for preemptive strike “Kill Chain” duties and more easily shot down by North Korea’s anti-missile defences. Nevertheless SLCMs might be effective against North Korean coastal targets depending on how close South Korea submarines can get to the coast. 

However South Korea would now be seeking to make its future submarines capable of firing vertically launched ballistic missiles. This may include the four final KSS-IIs submarines (see below) to be launched by 2020 and certainly the KSS-IIIs already due to receive vertical launch systems for cruise, ballistic missiles or anti-missile missiles (BMDs). South Korea may be accelerating its KSS-III program in view of the looming North Korean SLBM threat.

BALLISTIC MISSILE TYPES

South Korea has the following land based ballistic missiles that might be capable of development into a submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) including:

-  The Short Range South Korean Rocket (KSR) research program which has produced a missile of 800 km range perhaps with a 300 kg payload and 11.21m long. With a lot of development this may represent the closest SK built solution to its SLBM needs. See launch below. 

Launch of South Korea short range ballistic missile/rocket to deploy a satellite.

-  The US provided ATACMS (Army TACtical Missile System)  looks like it would require too much development to be modified into an SLBM. The US might also heavily restrict modifications.

-  The NHK-1/-2 (Hyon Mu 1 and 2) (which is unrelated to the Hyon Mu 3) has a length of 12.14 m which is probably too long for vertical launch from the hull of the future KSS-III. Firing through the sail/fin/conning tower might be possible. The NHK 2 (Hyon Mu 2) may now have a 800 km range and 500 kg payload. The diameter of 0.54 m would allow perhaps 6 to be carried by a 3,000 ton KSS-III.

New Foreign Missiles?

It may take South Korea too long (5 years?) to modify one of the above missiles for SLBM use. A wholly new missile might take longer. Therefore South Korea may seek foreign assistance or a complete foreign missile. Possible countries are the US - although the US might which to observe MTCR rules closely. Other countries might be:

-  France
-  Israel (Popeye Turbo - perhaps a supersonic SLCM, with the advantage of horizontal torpedo tube launch option) or
-  India (K-15 Sagarika missile?) noting Indian Prime Minister Modi's visit to South Korea on May 18-19, 2015.

BACKROUND ON THE SUBMARINES

South Korea has two existing types of submarine certainly capable of launching SLCMs and possibly SLBMs, including:

-  Nine  KSS-I Chang Bogo class (Type 209)(no AIP). They can would be capable of firing Harpoon missiles (220 kg warheads, 130 km range) to coastal parts of North Korea. 1,200 tons (surfaced) 8 torpedo tubes (how many can fire Harpoon missiles for land attack?). Could be retrofitted to fire South Korea's Tomahawk like Hyon Mu 3 cruise missiles (500 to 1,000 kg warheads) to any part of North Korea, and

Four KSS-IISonWon-II class (Type 214) with AIP (to remain fully submerged off North Korea’s coast for around 3 weeks). Five more KSS-IIs are due to be commissioned by 2020 which could be modified to launch SLBMs. 1,800 tons surfaced (8) 533 mm torpedo tubes, SLCMs (4?) Harpoon missile capable. Could fire Hyon Mu 3s.

South Korea is also developing KSS-III 3,000 ton submarines capable of firing Harpoons, Hyon Mu 3s SLCMs, and launching SLBMs from their vertical launch systems or anti-missile-missiles (BMDs).

Pete

South Korea's Undersea Anti-Submarine Sensor Network - Part of SEAWEB

May 19, 2015, 12:42 am

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North Korea Naval Bases and Fleet HQs. One might expect mini-submarines to operate out of Sagin Ni (under West Sea Fleet Command). Sinpo - Mayang Do and Chaho are listed as Submarine Bases (under East Sea Fleet Command).

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The SEAWEB Network goes by other names such as Fixed Surveillance System (FSS large PDF file - see pages 128-129) (, older term IUSS and oldest (SOSUS). SEAWEB includes sonar, LIDAR, optical CCTV, infrared, chemical sniffing and SIGINT amongst other sensors. (Courtesy US Navy in 2006, but since then the revolution in sensor technology and data management and storage has made SEAWEB a major unsung Western asset. South Korea's undersea sensor network is just one local branch of SEAWEB.)

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South Korea has had a fixed undersea sensor network for more than 60 years. This would have started with the US Navy installing seafloor SOSUS arrays and magnetic anomally-indicator loop technically. Two shocks, the sinking of ROKS Cheonan in 2010 and North Korean moves in May 2015 toward an SLBM capability, have increased attention on South Korea integrating its undersea sensor into the Kill Chain strategy and infrastructure.

As a political reaction South Korea's leadership talks of new beginnings regarding the undersea sensor network, but the network has steadily evolved in capability and in geographical extend since the early 1950s.

The following are portions of a May 13, 2015 South Korean Korea Joongang Daily, article indicating South Korea intends to extend its undersea "Kill Chain" infrastructure to handle the emerging North Korean SLBM threat :

"South’s military says ‘Kill Chain’ can be extended under water...Defense Ministry spokesman Kim Min-seok …said the South has the capability to track down North Korean submarines in real time when they are in naval bases. “If we concluded that a SLBM-capable submarine is a threat, we can pre-emptively take it out.”

The military also decided to improve its systems to detect the North’s SLBMs and upgrade submarine warfare capabilities. A military official said the modifications will be made based on the “4D Strategy” to detect, defend, disrupt and destroy North Korean threats, introduced by Commander Curtis Scaparrotti of the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command.

The two countries aim to create an operational plan based on that strategy and it is expected to include a plan to shoot down an SLBM-capable submarine of the North.

“We have an underwater interception system to counter the North’s submarines,” said the official. “Our military can operate Kill Chains both in the air and under water. We will improve our sonar abilities in the future.” 

SOUTH KOREAS UNDERSEA SENSORS

Reports of South Korean sensors to counter mainly North Korea submarine and ship incursions have concentrated on South Korea's response to the March 2010 NK midget submarine sinking of ROKS Cheonan. But South Korea and the US would have installed undersea sensors against North Korea since the early 1950s.

The fixed undersea sensor network complements mobile undersea elements including South Korean, Japanese and US submarines, AUVs, LDUUVs and air dropped sinking sensors.

As well as undersea sensors South Korea operates ground stations, naval surface vessels and aircraft as well as interacting with US satellites and stealth drones. All these that operate infrared, optical, sonar and radar sensors to detect when North Korea submarines leave North Korean naval bases or when submarines might fire missiles. SIGINT including traffic analysis would also prove productive before, during and after submarine operations. 

Strategypage has provided several articles in 2010, 2011 and 2014 on South Korea's "SOSUS (SOund Surveillance System)" but there are many more sensor types that have been installed into South Korea's sensor network over the decades. 

The undersea system would not be limited to active and passive sonar but could utilise other sensors including:

-  magnetic anomally-indicator loop sensors which has been widely used by countries since WWII onwards  
-  vapour-chemical sniffing sensors
-  fixed undersea LIDAR
-  infrared undersea CCTV, and
-  seafloor, tethered and floating SIGINT intercept.

The Cheonan sinking would have underlined the South Korean and US need to provide many more undersea sensor arrays and nodes to make the network more sensitive, and quicker reacting to  North Korea midget submarines on battery, diver propulsion vehicles, torpedos and SLBM launches. North Korea submarines and diver vehicles operate near the South Korea coast and islands with the expectation that landform and shallow water "clutter' would mask their movements.   

In January 2011 it was reported: "South Korea's military is planning to install underwater sensors near frontier islands in the Yellow Sea to guard against attacks by North Korea's submarines. "We plan to install a number of underwater sensors to beef up defence capability in strategically important north-western islands like Baengnyeong and Yeonpyeong following the sinking of the Cheonan warship," an unidentified senior military official said. The sensors will be monitored from a control centre located on Baengnyeong island, the closest one to the border with North Korea, according to Agence France Presse."

The need to detect North Korean SLBM launches from North Korean naval bases would logically require sensors to increasingly focus on submarine activities within those bases. 


The US Navy and the NSA would have worked with South Korean equivalents on the collection, tabulation and easy retrieval of data collected from the undersea sensor system. Data management is a major aspect of the US Navy-NSASEAWEB network - which could provide thousands of data signatures of North Korea, Chinese and Russian submarines and surface shipping. 

Even for an individual North Korean submarine operation South Korea and the US can lay surface vessel and air-dropped sonar buoys working to ground station, vessel and satellite - and in turn tying in with undersea sensors already there. Towed sensor arrays are also used.

Seafloor-upward floating or upward propelled mines/torpedos can be launched on command (including in peacetime) of automatically be activated/tripped in time of war. The sensor signatures give off by North Korean vessels would be relevant. 

Japan's undersea sensor network also faces the North Korean menace. Some aspects of Japan's network will be described next week.

Pete